


THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY.



Vol. IX—Number 2

Spring, 1953

PRESENT RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

C. C. Gecys

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A sample of Greco-Scythian art in prehistoric Ukraine.

THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

VOL. IX. — NUMBER 2.



LOWER LINE: PRE-WAR TERRITORY IN 1918 UPPER LINE: RECONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE AFTER THE WORLD WAR

SPRING 1953

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NATIONALITY PROBLEMS AND THE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Editorial

The words "nationality" and "nationalism" are very unpopular in America; during World War II, they were definitely proscribed, thanks to the clever pro-Soviet propaganda in the United States; these words were falsely identified with the conceptions of Nazism, the bestial and degenerate form of German nationalism.

However, thanks to this propaganda, Communism, especially Russian Communism, which cloaked itself with the name of internationalism, found full sympathy in American public opinion, especially among the majority of American liberals, who gave a good mark to Communism and ignored the Soviet genocide, the struggle against religion and its concentration camps of death which were not less brutal and bloody than were those of the Nazis. The last wizard of this American liberalism was Corliss Lamont, the son of a millionaire, when he set forth this type of liberalism in his new book "*Soviet Civilization*" (New York, 1952).

Even now, although America has a much better knowledge of its wartime ally with its international stamp, yet the words "nationality" and "nationalism" do not sound well to the average American journalist and statesman, despite the fact that they are basically anti-Communist, deeply ideological and patriotic. These words represent movements for liberation and democracy which spring from the masses of the people, rely upon the masses of the people and seek political and economic freedom for the peoples after the destruction of an alien rule.

Ideologically these movements are close to the idea of Americanism. They are based upon the ideology of the American Declaration of Independence; in practical politics they appeal again to the American doctrine of President Wilson as to the right of self-determination for peoples. The national movements as dynamic anti-Communist movements should be considered by the American foreign policy in the present cold war against the Kremlin, and in the future in a possible hot war with world Communism. Too often American foreign policy has failed to understand these dynamic forces which alone are able to overthrow world Communism; has ignored them and even turned them against itself. But world Communism under the leadership of the Kremlin, though basically the foe of national movements for liberation and the chief

oppressor of many peoples, has by its clever policy turned these movements against America and has taken advantage of the American mistakes in national questions and its failure to understand this dynamic force which is now becoming the chief trend in the life of mankind.

Some invisible forces in America are trying to present these national movements, the natural allies of America, in a negative light and to reduce their role to the greatest degree possible. As a result with a few exceptions America now knows no national movements, does not understand them and what is worse, shows no desire to study them. America is now giving millions in public and private funds to found various research institutes yet there is not a single institute in America dedicated exclusively to the study of the nationality problems.

It is clear that the ignoring of this element by American science and practical American policy does not check these movements; they are advancing in their own way. It would be much more profitable for America, if these national movements saw in it their protector for if there is one thing certain, it is that these movements are fundamentally anti-materialistic and anti-Communist and will dominate the next decades of human history. Only after their success for all the peoples of the world, will it be possible to think of a new arrangement of the life of mankind.

America's failure to understand the national movements is caused by the different conceptions of the meaning of "nation" and "nationalism" in the Anglo-Saxon world and outside of it. In America the word "nation" is equated with the word "state" or "republic." Nationality is the same thing as "citizenship." They are conceptions of a legal nature. On the other hand in Central Europe, on the territory of the USSR and everywhere where there are enslaved or semi-enslaved peoples, *the nation is a collective composed of millions of individuals connected by bonds, of a spiritual and moral nature, as the unity of culture (language, religion, customs), national tradition and common historical experiences.*

Legal bonds of a state nature do not exist for them because these nations exist without regard to state boundaries. The main object of this spiritual collective of millions of members is to preserve their spiritual and national values and thus keep their identity against the assimilation by the ruling nation. The only way to preserve permanently these national values and the existence of the nation is to free itself from the rule of foreigners and to strengthen its nationality by the creation of its own government by the will of the people and for the people. This is the main idea of these national movements; it is the idea of the "bourgeois nationalisms," which give no peace to the potentates of the Kremlin; it is the leading idea of the people of western, middle and eastern Asia, it is the idea of the liberation of the peoples of Africa even including primitive tribes.

When we speak of the Soviet Union, there are in America hundreds of "Russian Studies" but there is not one which is devoted exclusively to the study of the national movements of the USSR, that Achilles' Heel of the Union. Our Russian studies, still guided partly by Russians and now more and more by American Russophiles trained by Russians, look at the Soviet Union as a monolithic Russia. The name Russia has vanished for over 35 years from the vocabulary of international law, but it has been preserved in America as a tabu, useful to nobody knows whom, except to irritate the natural allies of America, the peoples enslaved by Moscow, who regard it as an insult to be labelled as Russians and their lands as part of Russia.

The sources used in these "Russian Studies" in America are usually official Soviet books, publications, laws, political declarations which give an extraordinary perverted view of reality and the economic studies of the USSR as a single whole have a prominent place; other sources for the majority of American students on USSR are non-important and are ignored.

It is only sporadically that there appears any reference to "bourgeois nationalism" in Ukraine, White Ruthenia, the Caucasus or Turkestan and only when there are hints of the national difficulties in the Soviet Union. Because they are not mentioned in Soviet publications the American publicists emphasize that "the national movements in the USSR are dying out." The Soviet press is evidently well trained to speak less and less of the difficulties with „bourgeois nationalism" and to write more frequently of the "one Soviet people."

George F. Kennan, in love with the Russian people and Pushkin, writes of these national movements for liberation that they are "bewildered linguistic groups."¹

Even of the satellite states which only a few years ago became satellites of Moscow, a distinguished American journalist writes that the Soviets can destroy in them their national spirit and that the one hope for America is national Communism (Titoism), although Communism never had support in these lands before the Soviet occupation.² This

¹ "America and the American Future," by George F. Kennan. *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1951.

² "Policy of Liberation, Tough One to Execute," by Drew Middleton (*New York Times*, March 1, 1953.) The author writes as follows about such nationally dynamic peoples as Poland and Hungary: "Any success for this method will depend on whether or not the Soviet Union has succeeded in eliminating the national spirit in the nations it holds in thrall. Certainly that has been Russia's objective since Tito's defection and the goal may have been reached to the extent that all ambitions of the intensely nationalist nations of Southeast Europe have been sublimated to the needs of international communism. For at the moment

shows his full failure to understand the character of national problems in this part of Europe.

The national feelings and national movements are not political moods which can be changed in a few years; they are moral forces which are imbedded in the souls of millions of people through generations and need centuries to eliminate them. If the American experts on East Europe studied the national movements of Poland, Hungary, Czechia, Ukraine, Lithuania and the other peoples, now under the yoke of Russian Communism, they could not write such nonsense.

It is unfortunate that such views of persons totally ignorant of national problems have a certain influence on the practical policy of America and the guiding of the American cold war. If the propaganda of the "Voice of America" in this part of the world has been almost without effect, it is because the Americans do not know the national problems of the peoples of the USSR and the satellite nations. The American press has concealed the fact that the circles of the Ukrainian Underground, the friends of America, two years ago sent an authentic voice to the American State Department with a request to stop such propaganda of the "Voice of America" as it is now conducting, for it only took away faith in America among the Ukrainian people behind the iron curtain, our allies, as stated by W. H. Chamberlin. The Ukrainian broadcasts sent from New York—so it was written from behind the iron curtain—were little different from those sent out by the Soviet radio from Kiev or Moscow. How could they be different when the Ukrainian section of the "Voice of America" was for a long time only a sub-section of the Russian and was carried on by a Ukrainian Social-Revolutionist and an internationalist, under the direction of a Russian?

"The American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR," or "the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" or the "American Committee for the Liberation from Bolshevism" at the waste of a large amount of American money has been conducting such a senseless policy among the national groups under the USSR for two years so that no intelligent East European can understand the reason for the existence of an organization which is winning for America the ill-will of those peoples who would be the natural friends of America against the Kremlin. The three changes of name of this Committee in the course of two years, while even the last is unacceptable to the non-Russian peoples, show only what dilettantes are carrying on this work

it seems depressingly clear that only the people in Central and Eastern Europe with influence and prestige great enough to lead their nations away from the East toward the West are those Communists who may still harbor national ambition."

which requires a basic knowledge and study of the national problems of the USSR.

What can we expect, if in case of a world crisis, the Americans with such extraordinary experts on the USSR, find themselves on the borders of Ukraine, White Ruthenia, the Caucasus or Turkestan? We would be threatened with the same catastrophe that overtook Hitler, who also did not believe that there were real national problems in the USSR. After three months the Germans turned their potential allies into partisans who fought against the Germans in the rear of the German armies standing at Stalingrad with the same vigor as against the Communists.

Let us glance at Asia. We lost in China because the same type of diplomatic agents liked the name of the Chinese "internationalist-agrarians" better than that of the Chinese nationalists. What was the reason that Syngman Rhee, our ally, to whom we have devoted thousands of lives of American boys and 15 billion dollars for the defense of the freedom of South Korea refuses to understand our sincere desire to help the cause of the Korean independence? Why, as the American press has reported, are the American broadcasts to India not so favorably received as those of the Soviets? Why can't we find a common ambitions with the nationalists of Iran under Mohammed Mossadegh, although it is a strategically located country south of the USSR?

For years we have had no comprehension of the national ambitions of Egypt and the peoples of Africa. Throughout the entire world the peoples have awakened and are demanding their own national life, which would allow them to preserve the traditions of their ancestors and to maintain their own life. We do not understand these ambitions, for we do not study the national problems of the world as they are carefully studied in Moscow so as to turn America's natural allies from her and to ascribe to America, the champion of freedom, the stain of being the guardian of colonialism and of national enslavement.

The *New York Times*, (August 17, 1952) published a very remarkable letter from a young Egyptian, Abdel-Hady Makhoulf, a student at Princeton, in an answer to an article by Albion Ross, a correspondent of the *Times*. The young Egyptian thus emphasized the reality of Egyptian nationalism:

"Let me tell Mr. Ross that what the Egyptians want is not different from what any respectable human society wants. They want independence and they want democracy. Let me also tell him that they will never cease revolting against any kind of foreign political or economic interference and against any kind of undemocratic, unconstitutional Egyptian Government. . ."

The same *New York Times* in an editorial on October 25, 1952 published the confession of a 17 year old African, Vaniki, a member of the terrorist society of the Mau-Mau in Kenya, in which he set forth the program of this terrorist organization among the Kikuyu tribe and stated that the definite seventh point of their program was "that the land of the population of the Kikuyu tribe had to belong to them."

It is natural that no civilized country can permit the terrorism of a Mau-Mau organized by agents of the Soviets, but it is a fact that the Soviets have cleverly contributed to use the natural right of even primitive African tribes to live on their own land their own national life. These are mass movements and dynamic and no one can fight against them.⁸

There was held recently in Hartford, Conn., a conference of Protestant missions for Africa and a statement was made that at the present time Christian missions will not be successful, if the Christian missionaries fail to study seriously the languages, cultures and traditions of the primitive peoples of Africa for the Christian religion will not otherwise take root in African culture.

If it is important for the primitive peoples of Africa whose culture and traditions are not on a high level, what shall we say when American policy totally ignores the cultures, national traditions and national ambitions of half of the population of the USSR, our most valuable potential allies in a conflict with Moscow, which they hate and against which they have been fighting for centuries.

The Protestant missionaries for Africa are advised to study the languages and cultures of the primitive Africans, but who studies in America the language, culture and history of the efforts at liberation of the 40,000,000 Ukrainian people with their history of one thousand years and the weakest spot of the Kremlin? Who in the United States knows the echo aroused in Ukraine a century ago by the struggle for liberty of the Caucasian against the Russian invaders? In America there is no study of the national movement, culture and language of Ukraine, and few people in this country can read the poem *Caucasus* by the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, a flaming defence of the Caucasian fighting for freedom, while they do read similar poems of Pushkin written to defend the Russian invaders against the liberty of the Caucasians. Who in America studies the destruction by the Russians of the great Turkestan-Arab cultures of Bukhara?

⁸ For the elemental character of this, see "Flames of Nationalist Revolt Perils Africa" by Ludwell Denny, *World Telegram and Sun*, May 8, 1953. "All Africa is Moved" by C. L. Sulzberger, *New York Times*, Dec. 21, 1952.

In America there is diligent study of the economy of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Turkestan but with the conclusion of that "expert on Russia," Kennan that the resources have to remain the property of Moscow and that America must take care to carry on its policy so that these non-Muscovite resources would not harm the economy of Russia even by liberating the enslaved peoples, the natural owners of these lands and of these resources. The American *spets* on Russia, does not know what the 17 year old Vaniki knew of the Kikuyu tribe, that the land on which a tribe lives belongs to it. For the American *spets* Ukraine is only the Pennsylvania of Russia, for he does not know that Ukraine has fought for three centuries to free itself from Moscow so that the resources of Ukraine may belong to the Ukrainian people.

The Ukrainian struggle for liberation in the 18th century was known in France and the great writer Voltaire spoke of it as an example of the struggle for national liberation; it is far less known in America today.

Without knowing the history and the reality of the national movements of Central Europe and the USSR, the Americans allow themselves to be duped by the Soviet phrases of the new *Soviet people*. There have recently appeared in this country many articles which follow this line of Soviet propaganda that the Soviets have succeeded by terror in creating a new miracle of creating a new people.⁴ There would be no such naivete, if such statesmen knew that Moscow for three hundred years had been trying to create one Russian people, to destroy the identity of the Ukrainian and the White Ruthenian peoples, but without success. In 1917 these people rose phoenix-like from the ashes, although hardly any one in the world had even known of their existence.

Without knowing these peoples the then American foreign service at Versailles Conference 1918-1919 carried through a stupid policy that was harmful to American interests and contrary to American policy by refusing to Ukraine the right of self-determination. By that act America saved a monolithic Bolshevik Russia, now its bitter foe and enemy of humanity.

Now in America there is a legend of a miracle which the Bolsheviks have performed in *resettling great masses of the people*. The people had to yield and the dream of one Russian people under the name of the Soviet people has become a reality. Anyone who studied the national problems of the USSR, would understand that this was nonsense.

⁴ "The Soviet Man — Portrait of a Mystery" by Frederick C. Barghorn, *New York Times Magazine*, May 3, 1953. "A Weapon for the West" by Isaac Don Levine, *Life Magazine*, April 19, 1953.

The mixing of subjected peoples is not a Bolshevik invention. It was devised by the grandson of the founder of the Moscow state, Vsevolod III at the beginning of the 13th century.⁵ The Muscovite princes and tsars Basil III, Ivan the Terrible, Peter I, Catherine II, Nicholas I all resettled conquered peoples nevertheless there still remained in the USSR non-Russian peoples. It is impossible in the present USSR to move a nation of forty millions without ruining the economy of Ukraine. The removal of even half of the Ukrainians to Asiatic part of the USSR would make of that a land with a majority of Ukrainians. What could the Bolsheviks do there with so many millions of people hostile to Moscow? We must not forget that the Asiatic part of the USSR is the chief base of the Soviet military industry. What is the logic of the conclusion?

Unfortunately the Soviet government, basically the bitter foe of the movements for national liberation, studies them with exceptional depth and uses them against the world much better by cleverly putting American policy in a delicate position as in Asia and Africa.

In its expansion to the West, the Kremlin placed in an attractive form the uniting of the Ukrainians and the White Ruthenians with their fellowmen in the USSR, and annexed Western Ukraine and Carpatho-Ukraine, despite the fact that the population knew the gifts of Bolshevism to the Ukrainian people.

The last changes in the Moscow Government policy favorable for Ukrainian nationalism became a deep enigma for America. Several commentators tried to invent different theories concerning these events.⁶

Anyone who carefully read previous issues of this journal will recall our contentions that when the Communists find themselves in precarious circumstances will make many concessions insofar as the Ukrainian nationalism is concerned because they know the strength of this force.

This problem is quite difficult for the American people to understand when the main source of information for American press, the Associated Press of June 13, 1953 commenting upon these events explains *urbi et orbi* that Western Ukraine is the most sensible point in Soviet-Ukrainian policy because "many of the people there are Ruthenians."! *Sapienti sat!*⁷ These *Ruthenians* are the source of Kremlin's *Ukrainian* troubles.

⁵ See the *Social and Economic History of Russia* by Peter Struve. Paris, 1952, p. 84.

⁶ Moscow removes leader in Ukraine by Harrison E. Salisbury (N. Y. Times, June 13, 1953). The Russian Purge Resumes (N. Y. Times June 14, 1953) and others.

⁷ Teletype of the Associated Press. June 13, 1953: "Ukraine Purge."

The Soviet studies of national movements are so basic that even the Soviet solutions of international boundary disputes can take the appearance of a compromising of the quarrels and can snatch the arms from even their bitter foes.

For the skilful use of national sentiments by the Bolsheviks mention is made of such American scholars as Moseley and Carman in their works.⁸

If America wishes to oppose successfully the Bolshevik penetration of the whole world, it must also begin basic studies of the national cultures, and the efforts at national liberation of the enslaved peoples of the whole world, especially the peoples of the USSR. This is the only way to omit basic mistakes in our foreign policy created by our ignorance or by biased information of Russian imperialists.

The Bolsheviks cleverly use the arguments of the national interests of the peoples of Asia and Africa to turn them politically against America despite their moral poverty. The national questions of the USSR, the eternally living and revolutionary nationalisms of the non-Russian peoples are able to give a death blow to Russian Communism and Imperialism; why are they not used in the struggle against the Kremlin? The statesmen of America who are responsible for the foreign policy of our country must answer. They have a great responsibility, of historical importance.

⁸ *Soviet Exploitation of National Conflicts in Eastern Europe* by Ph. Moseley. The Soviet Union, ed. by W. Gurian. Notre Dame 1951. *Soviet Imperialism. Russia's Drive Toward World Domination*, by E. Day Carman. Public Affairs publ. Washington, D. C. 1950.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE'S POLICY FEEDBACK

By KURT GLASER

HOW OUR IRON-CURTIAN ALLIANCES AFFECT FOREIGN POLICY

By tradition, the psychological warrior does not make foreign policy. He is required to conform to the policy handed down by his military superiors, who have presumably received it from or at least coordinated it with the State Department and if necessary the White House. He must make the best of what may, in terms of obtaining the acceptance of American and rejection of enemy objectives, be at times unsatisfactory raw material. Thus if the powers that be decide on "unconditional surrender," the psychological warrior must accept this *fait accompli*, even though he may privately feel that the policy has been made to order for *the enemy's* psychological warfare organization. Although psychwar intelligence may feed in data showing what kind of American policies would strengthen psychological warfare, the most the groups can do is to make recommendations which may or may not be considered. While this description may have fitted the relationship between those engaged in psychological warfare attached to theater commands and the centers of policy making in World War II, it does not apply to the present "cold war" situation.

Various agencies of the United States, and several "private" organizations with different degrees of Government support, are conducting large-scale psychological warfare operations designed to build up the defensive (and ultimately the offensive) strength of the Free World and to weaken the power system of the Communist World. In addition to overt propaganda (such as the *Voice of America*), the Government conducts "under cover" operations, costly but necessary to counteract the efforts of the thousands of propaganda agents and spies which the Kremlin maintains on both sides of the iron curtain. The Government also assists the National Committee for a Free Europe and the American Committee for the Liberation from Bolshevism, which operate radio stations over which iron-curtain exiles broadcast to the peoples of Soviet Union and its satellites in their native tongues. United States public and private agencies also help to finance organizations

of iron-curtain exiles in Western Europe and through them support underground movements in countries under Soviet control.

Until very recently, the situation affecting the formation of American foreign policy seems to have been nearly the reverse of the classic relationship between policy makers and those engaged in psychological warfare. While the author has not had access to correspondence between the State Department and the psychological warfare agencies, his observations of the latter suggest that they have not in the past received the policy guidance necessary for building a coherent program in which public and private agencies alike should strive toward a common goal. The President's Committee on International Information Activities has the specific task of correcting this deficiency. Comprehensive policy guidance is doubly necessary since without it persons in the psychological warfare, through their selection of iron-curtain allies and their tendency to accept the policies pursued by such allies — which are at best irrelevant to a consideration of United States interests — are in a position to influence if not determine United States foreign policy in vital areas. The operation of this "policy feedback," which is unintentional on the part of the Americans concerned where they do not identify themselves deliberately with particular foreign interests, will be demonstrated with respect to two critical areas of psychological warfare: Czecho-Slovakia and the Soviet Union.

The conditions for a policy feedback are created by the fact that Americans in psychological warfare must select exiles from iron-curtain countries as operating partners and must—whether they will or not—accept at least to a degree the policies advocated by these exiles. The exiles from iron-curtain countries, both here and in Europe, are divided into scores of larger and smaller parties, liberation movements and action committees, presenting a political spectrum from extreme socialism or Trotskyism to conservative nationalism. Many of these groups fight each other more bitterly than they do the Stalinists. The reaction of many Americans to this tempest in the samovar is to say: "a plague on all your houses."

Unfortunately, we can not wash our hands of the disputes between iron-curtain exile groups, for the following reasons:

1) *In order to conduct effective psychological warfare we have to relate our propaganda to the actual struggle for liberation being conducted by the underground movements in iron-curtain countries and by the exile organizations associated with them;*

2) *If we want our appeal to be more than a generalized and vacuous anti-Communism we have to identify ourselves with specific objectives*

which we believe will appeal to the public in the iron-curtain countries, objectives already identified with one or another of the exile groups;

3) *We need the expert knowledge of iron-curtain areas provided only by exiles and fairly recent exiles at that; we need the exiles to write and produce radio programs and literature which will appeal favorably to the target audiences;*

4) *Many American area experts including particularly recent immigrants, have definite biases in favor of, if not active associations with exile groups of one color or another, so that we are involved in the conflicts among the exiles whether we like it or not.*

Since Americans in psychological warfare must make positive choices, and since the various iron-curtain exile groups formulate their policies for reasons which are irrelevant to the interests of welfare of the United States, it follows that we should choose as our allies those groups whose policies seem closest to our own. Most of the iron-curtain groups are committed to the ideals of political freedom, national independence and democratic form of government, which the United States logically supports, however, this is not always the case, particularly where multinational states such as Czecho-Slovakia and the Soviet Union are involved. If the United States policy is unclear, then the person in psychological warfare—be he in a government intelligence agency with “operating” functions or in a private or semi-private research and propaganda organization—must make his own judgment of what the United States policy *ought to be*. For there will be a policy feedback in any case, and the policy resulting there from should preferably be to the benefit of the United States.

If we pick the right allies from our point of view, we can weaken the Kremlin system so that it is less likely to start a war and, at the same time assure ourselves of effective help behind its lines if it starts one anyway. If we pick the wrong ones, we may wreck the anti-Communist unity which it is our purpose to build up.

At this point the author must confess to what some readers may consider a bias. He considers our best bets those iron-curtain political groups who want to get rid of socialism lock, stock and barrel.¹ These groups represent the citizens of the Soviet Union, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and the other satellites who have learned through bitter experience that a government monopoly of political power means a police state. Those

¹ The author's characterization is correct as to the socialists (social-democrats) who base their socialism on the materialistic conception of history. Some socialist groups who deny the Marxian conception of history can be good democrats and opponents of the police-state. (*Editor*).

groups which merely want to replace Stalinist socialism with another kind of socialism are unreliable allies. The "non-Stalinist" Marxists have no respect for human life and do not mind a police state if they control the police. They want to take over the management behind the iron curtain without changing the system. They are usually amenable to deals with Soviet agents, with whom their ranks are often infiltrated.

POLICY FEEDBACK ON CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

The principal American agency conducting psychological warfare directed at Czecho-Slovakia is Radio Free Europe, supported by the National Committee for a Free Europe with funds obtained through the Crusade for Freedom. The Czech and Slovak broadcasts of Radio Free Europe, which are prepared partly in New York and partly in Munich and transmitted from the latter city, have been placed entirely in the hands of the exile politicians of the "National Front" who collaborated with Gottwald and the Communists until 1948. Opposition groups of Czechs and Slovaks have been systematically excluded. The National Front politicians are "Czechoslovakists," which means that they wish to maintain a centralized Czech-Slovak state under Czech domination, Carpatho-Ukraine included; they are adamant in opposing the return of the Sudeten Germans.

There are two serious disadvantages in picking the "Czechoslovakists". The first is that at least 80 percent of the Slovaks (as admitted by Dr. Kvetko, a leading member of the National Front) do not want to have anything to do with the Czechs.^{1a} The second is that the National Front has since well before World War II, based its policy on complete subservience to the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. In 1945 Peter Zenkl, Vice-Premier under Gottwald and now Chairman of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia in the United States, said in a speech:

"The nationally conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that... permanent collaboration with the USSR is necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!"²

Ferdinand Peroutka, the editor who now heads the Czech staff for Radio Free Europe, put the matter even more plainly. In February 1948, shortly before he left Czecho-Slovakia, he explained:

"In Czech politics, in Czech national life, it is urgent that we come to an understanding with the Communist Party... The Communist Party

^{1a} It is obvious that the majority of the Carpatho-Ukrainians prefer to be a part of an independent united Ukraine to whom they culturally belong. (Ed.).

² 7th session of Provisional National Assembly, cited in *Documents*, London, 1951, Slovak Liberation Committee, p. 14.

shall remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our national life... Coming to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our political philosophy."³

In 1947 Mr. Peroutka published a book entitled *Tak nebo tak* (So or So) which is essentially a paean in favor of socialism, the Soviet variety in particular. And in 1949 he indicated that he would endeavor to remove from the Council of Free Czechoslovakia all members actively opposed to socialism.⁴ Hubert Ripka, another leading "Czechoslovakist," wrote during the same year that he still felt that the policy of collaborating with the Communists was correct.⁵

The politicians of the National Front have been forced to take notice of criticism from Slovak, German, Hungarian and Czech conservative groups, the essence of which is that the National Fronters sold out Czecho-Slovakia to the Soviets and that the *Gottwald Putsch* of 1948 marked only the completion of a process of sovietization which the National Front had supported actively from 1945. The excuse generally offered is that the National Fronters opposed the Communists as they could, "given the realities in which Czechoslovak policy had to operate." Peroutka, for instance, has attempted to explain the above-quoted passage as follows:

"As usual the Communists seek an excuse for their attack and as usual they do not admit the attack but assert that they are being attacked. At that time their excuse consisted of the assertion that they had discovered a conspiracy with the objective of eliminating them from the government. And under this pretence they began to mobilize the masses for the decisive coup. The democrats defended themselves by *revealing the truth*, which was *that no one intended to throw the Communists out of the government*. My declaration, in this sense was intended to protect the last position against Communism. The purpose of the sentence was to deprive the Communists of their excuse and to oppose their carefully prepared lie."⁶

By confessing that his only way of fighting Communism was to declare his *genuine* intention to *continue collaboration with the Communists*, Peroutka has admitted the utter bankruptcy of the policies of the late President Benes and his National Front supporters. These

³ *Dnesek*, Prague, February 9, 1948.

⁴ *Navrat*, Paris, July 15, 1949.

⁵ *Figaro*, Paris, April 4, 1949.

⁶ *New Yorker Staatszeitung und Herold*, March 17, 1953, my translation and emphasis.

policies — the liquidation of the Slovak Republic, the expulsion of the German and Hungarian-speaking minorities and the transfer of major sectors of the economy to state ownership, could only be fulfilled with Soviet support. Since the Council of Free Czechoslovakia confirms the correctness of these policies,⁷ the anomalous result is that United States agencies have had thrust upon them the hypothesis of the continued Russian hegemony in Central Europe.⁸ Hubert Ripka, probably the leading theoretician of the National Front, once demonstrated conclusively that Czecho-Slovakia as now constituted (as a centralized state under a Czech "Staatsvolk" and with the Sudeten Germans remaining expelled) could only exist under a predominance of Russian power,⁹ and no one, not even Mr. Ripka himself, has been able to disprove this contention.

The feedback affecting United States foreign policy is both direct and indirect. Directly, the National Front politicians influence the American officials and members of the National Committee for a Free Europe. Through the Committee as well as directly an influence has until recently been exerted on the State Department, which in 1949 furnished Ripka with 14 United States visas "in blank" (the exiles selected by Ripka to be admitted automatically and without security clearance) and which took the advice of the fellow-traveler dominated Council of Free Czechoslovakia on which Czech and Slovak exiles should be admitted to the United States.¹⁰ Through the National Committee, exiles who agree with National Front policies have been provided with research positions which enable them to influence United States policy by daily contacts and by preparation of monographs which serve as "background" for State Department policy makers. Non-socialist Czech and Slovak groups have been systematically excluded from this source of influence. While the United States policy of supporting a Czecho-Slovak state is of long standing, there is considerable evidence that the activities of the "Czecho-slovak Lobby" — a by-product of what is basically a psychological warfare operation — have served to delay the reconsideration of that policy

⁷ The *Muenchener Merkur* of August 29, 1951 quotes Peroutka as saying over Radio Free Europe: "I and my friends will continue from where we left off three years ago."

⁸ On the importance of Russian power as a base for Czechoslovak politics, see *Documents* (cited in Note 1), pp. 14-17.

⁹ *East and West*, London, Lincolns-Prager, 1944, especially pp. 39, 56 and 62. In his more recent book *Czechoslovakia Enslaved*, London, 1950, Mr. Ripka writes (p. 183): "We are not naive enough to believe that our country can be governed without the Communists."

¹⁰ The Council boasts of this fact in its pamphlet *In Search of Haven*, Washington, 1950.

and of the Sudeten question which are dictated by a consideration of American interests.

The effects in Europe of the apparent alliance between American agencies and a political group distinguished in European eyes from the Nenni and Fierlinger parties only by the fact that it is "out" rather than "in" have been little short of catastrophic. Large sectors of the German press, including all expellee papers of importance, suspect what they fear to be continuing anti-German and "Morgenthauist" influences in the United States Government, a fact which has lent dangerous strength to German "neutrality"¹¹ Swiss papers view the mesalliance as evidence that Americans still confuse ears and elbows when they try to operate in European politics. As for Slovak patriots and Czech conservatives (both of which appear to have considerably more following in Czecho-Slovakia than does the National Front group), they are taking a "wait and see attitude" in the hope that the new Administration's "dynamic liberation policy" will produce some practical results.

Since any operating strategy of psychological warfare will produce a feedback, the facts just cited suggest that consideration should be given to shifting support to Czech and Slovak organizations which have not compromised themselves by collaborating with the Communists and which have based their programs on the principle of equal rights of self-determination for all the peoples of pre-war Czecho-Slovakia rather than on that of Czech imperialism which can only survive by allying itself with Russian imperialism. Because the "Czechoslovaks" in the Council are often at swords' points, many Americans have jumped to the conclusion that all exile groups brawl interminably. In fact, however, the Czech Agrarian Party of Joseph Cerny, Professor Chudoba's Christian Democrats, General Lev Prchala's Czech National Committee and the two Slovak organizations of Karol Sidor and Ferdinand Durcansky have good working relationships with each other and with the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft. It is this sector of "live and let live" politicians which promises the anti-communist unity which American interests require.

THE RUSSIAN FEEDBACK AND SOME OF ITS SOURCES

In the Soviet sector, psychwar policy feedback is immediately apparent in the tendency of large sectors of the State Department to treat the peoples of the Soviet Union as "Russians," notwithstanding the fact that almost 60 percent are non-Russians with more or less pronounced

¹¹ See F. A. Voigt, "Germany Won't Fight," *The Freeman*, September 8, 1952, pp. 837-838, also "Keine Soldaten fuer Ripka!," *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*, August 9, 1952.

anti-Russian attitudes. The State Department even responded to a "trial balloon" put out by the Kremlin by stating that the United States does not wish the dismantling of the "Russian Imperium" (Senator McMahon's phrase).¹² This "Russian" ideology has afflicted a large number of journalists who take their cue from the Administration or who digest the products of the various "Russian research" centers charged with planning psychological warfare against the Soviet Union. If we ever fight World War III the way *Collier's Magazine* describes it¹³ we shall probably pay the maximum price in American lives, the price of not mobilizing to the full our natural allies, the Ukrainians, Georgians, Turkestanians and other subject peoples who want to get rid not only of Communism but also of Russian imperialism. It would appear that a number of State Department officials as well as some of the private foundations which have interested themselves in the Soviet Union, have been taken in tow by "Great Russian" exile groups and by American "experts on Russia" (usually of Russian origin) who have associated themselves with their policies.

It is obvious that propaganda directed at the Soviet Union should be planned with regard to what the people there think. Since those inside the Soviet Union cannot be interviewed directly, the next best thing to do is to interview exiles from the Soviet Union living abroad. For this reason the opinion study conducted in Germany by the Russian Research Center of Harvard University has assumed key importance in United States psychological warfare planning. This study could have been extremely valuable if conducted objectively. Unfortunately, however, the selection of interviewees among Great Russian exiles was left largely in the hands of the SBONR, an organization which the author has been able to identify as an extreme left-wing group.¹⁴ The pretention of the SBONR to represent the majority of exiles in West Germany, which a member of the Harvard team told me he considered justified, is in the writer's opinion vastly overrated. Non-socialist Russians in Germany have stated repeatedly their feeling that the Harvard questionnaire was biased

¹² *Washington's Blunder in Psychological Warfare*, ABN Correspondence, Munich (English edition), April 1951, pp. 1, 8-9. *The Pospelov-Acheson Clash*. Editorial. *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, 1951-I.

¹³ *Preview of the War We Do Not Want*. *Collier's*, October 27, 1951; see also "The Non-Russian Nations in the USSR," by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, extension of remarks of Senator McMahon, *Congressional Record*, May 15, 1952.

¹⁴ The bias of Harvard interviewers in relation to the non-Russian peoples provoked a vigorous protest of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, signed by Rector Mirchuk and two professors. *The Ukrainian Free University in Munich and the Harvard University Refugee Project*. — *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 1951-III.

so as to elicit pro-Communist responses, and more than one group has raised the charge that when interviewees expressed free-enterprise attitudes the interview was interrupted and the questionnaire destroyed. Even if we admit that these criticisms were exaggerated — and the writer is willing to accept a certain degree of exaggeration as probable — the evidence still suggests that the team did not succeed in maintaining the impartiality as between competing Russian groups which was necessary to assure unquestioned validity of the study. In answer to an inquiry from the author, the Harvard Center stated that the Institute for the Study of the Culture of the USSR, located in Munich and headed by Dr. Boris A. Yakovlev, leader of the SBONR, “was most helpful in providing DPs to be interviewed.”

As for Dr. Yakovlev, he is a most influential person, who for a time seems to have played a leading role in connection with the preparations for “Radio Liberation,” the new American-financed station which broadcasts a Great Russian program. Yakovlev, alias Nareikis, was a former member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union who was attached to the indoctrination school of the Vlasov Army at Dabendorf near Berlin. There, he appears to have been closely associated with a certain Zykov, who has been described by a leading American authority as “Vlasov’s top ideologue and indeed quite left — a Marxist somewhere between the Mensheviks and Bukharin’s right-wing opposition in the Russian Communist Party in the 1920’s.” Since 1945, Yakovlev has attempted to gain ascendancy in “anti-Stalinist” Russian circles, but his open espousal of advanced socialism and his known anti-American attitude have limited his popularity.

Closely associated with Yakovlev and for a time (perhaps unofficially) with Radio Liberation has been certain Vasiliev alias Bogoljubow, who was formerly a photographic reporter in the Vlasov headquarters. In 1945 he participated actively in a Soviet repatriation mission in Salzburg, the purpose of which was to sort out those Russian exiles wanted for liquidation in the Soviet Union because of their association with the Vlasov movement. Neither Yakovlev nor Vasiliev have ever specifically disavowed Communism. Yakovlev’s institute propounds a somewhat abstruse theory of “ersatz capitalism,” the substance of which is that Communism is not an evil but is historically necessary and justified by sociological considerations.

Although the American staff of the American Committee for the Liberation from Bolshevism are quite sincere in their opposition to Stalinist Communism they appear to have been taken in by Mr. Kennan’s proposition that “the Ukraine is economically as much a part of Russia

as Pennsylvania is of the United States.”¹⁵ Thus, the Committee has made Ukrainian participation in the Coordinating Center for the Anti-Bolshevist Struggle, which manages the programming for Radio Liberation, dependent on the inclusion of certain Ukrainian “federalists” who are committed *a priori* to continued union with Russia and who have no following whatever among the Ukrainian people.¹⁶

The result is that at present Radio Liberation is in the hands of Great Russian groups plus a smattering of non-Russian individuals isolated from their kinsmen, who are willing to support continuation of Russian imperialism. Although certain of these groups, such as the NTS (Solidarists), seem to be free of the left-wing tendencies observable in the SBONR, they are all very fanatically nationalistically inclined, and will tend to use the Radio so as to suggest that the United States supports Russian domination over non-Russian peoples and to “feed back” an American foreign policy matching this suggestion. Since it is in the interests of the United States to mobilize all forces which will fight Communist imperialism and to seek a solution which will reduce permanently the base of Russian power (for Russia will outlive the Communist Party), it is obvious that the Russian feedback operates to the direct detriment of the interests of the United States.

The parallel between the “Czechoslovak” and “Russian” feedbacks is striking. In both cases, Americans engaged in psychological warfare have allowed themselves to be adopted by exile groups whose main objectives are the perpetuation of imperialist systems which they would like to head themselves after American GIs have obligingly removed the Stalinists. The Czech and Russian imperialists are natural allies — it is no mere coincidence that the Harvard Russian Research Institute recently gave a dinner for the Czech imperialist and fellow-traveler Ripka. They have succeeded in impregnating their American friends with a pious horror of “separatists,” as though it were some heinous crime to want the independence of your own country. They seem to forget that the United States of America was founded by separatists and that genuine federation — certainly a desirable ideal — is built from the ground up after the achieving of independence by each nation. In Central and Eastern Europe the pre-condition of lasting federation is that each nation shall decide freely and without coercion *with whom* it wants to federate and *under what conditions*.

¹⁵ George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*, Chicago 1951, p. 135.

¹⁶ Lev E. Dobriansky, “The Success of a Mission and Its Eclipse.” *Ukrainian Quarterly*, Winter 1953, pp. 48-62.

American psychological warfare to date has tended to follow a doctrine of sheer pragmatism. As an official of one of the private American stations in Europe recently indicated to the writer, policy has been a matter of improvisation from day to day. What is needed is clearly a basic moral principle, and the obvious principle is that of equal rights to homeland and to guaranteed self-determination for all peoples, large or small, regardless of who may be offended. America is fighting not for expediency but for justice and durable peace. A clear statement of American ideals of political justice and implementation of these ideals in psychological warfare is the best preventative against the "feedbacks" which up to now have distorted and hampered our foreign policy.

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*By M. OREST**

Translated from the Ukrainian by W. Shayan

Above the skies there rules, unknown — true Freedom;
And down on earth — not only there — is Freedom.

The ocean in its bed, untamed, undaunted,
Awakes the dreaming shores to fight for Freedom.

On summer day the brilliant ripples glitter
On silver rivers uttering: 'tis Freedom.

The woods in June, by ecstasy enchanted,
Reveal to us their friendly message: Freedom.

Thou only, human heart, thou wretched creature,
Why then so rarely dost thou utter: Freedom.

*M. Orest, modern Ukrainian poet living in Germany as political emigrant.

NEW AGRICULTURAL PLANTS AS SOVIET SELF-SUFFICIENCY POLICY

By NESTOR KOROL

It is easy for any one who follows closely the Soviet economic literature and press to discover the dominant principles of Soviet policy. These are:

a) to free the Soviet Union from all economic dependence on the outside world;

b) to undermine the capitalist foundations of the capitalist countries by all possible means at its disposal;

c) to accumulate the necessary currency and to suffocate capitalism through over-production, thereby accelerating the socialist domination of the world;

d) to procure abroad only those essential and indispensable commodities without which it cannot possibly proceed with its preparations for a socialist victory in the world.

This explains the Soviet drive for self-sufficiency. They ignore the needs of the population in the name of the future. It explains the Soviet dumpings on the world market at the expense of the vital needs of its own people — all done to press world capitalism to the last degree and whenever possible.

The efforts to develop new agricultural resources in the Soviet Union constitute one of the phases of this process. New agricultural crops are needed to render the country independent of imports of certain agricultural raw materials — and what is more important — to allow it to compete successfully with foreign manufactured goods on foreign markets. It is obvious that the peoples of these foreign countries cannot be ordered or compelled to buy substitutes for they demand those goods to which they have been accustomed. There is then no other alternative but to offer them the goods they want, often with the familiar trade marks, labels and even packing.

To produce such goods certain sort of raw materials are needed and this started the introduction of new agricultural crops. The Soviets are paying great attention to the acclimatization and domestication of agricultural species of wild plants — which they have placed on a par

with their geological and mining explorations in the USSR. A number of scientific research institutes and countless experimental stations, both well subsidized by the government, have been set up throughout the country for the sole purpose of introducing and acclimatizing new agricultural plants.

Private initiative in this work and particularly in the domestication of the wild flora is wholeheartedly promoted and encouraged by the government, and as a result agriculture has been enriched by new plants such as lallemantia, various ethero-oil-bearing plants and numerous other plants heretofore known only in their wild state. In general, the State Planning Organs have always provided for the acclimatization of new agricultural plants.

Soviet agriculturists consider as new plants either those which have been hitherto neglected by agriculture, as newly domesticated species of the wild flora, or plants which have successfully grown in their native foreign countries in familiar environments and natural climatic conditions for hundreds and thousands of years. Soviet agriculture regards the latter as new, if they can be transplanted from entirely different climatic and natural conditions, from the soil of Egypt, China, Japan, India, Equatorial Asia, Africa and America.

It would not be out of place to note here that some plants feel more at home in their new habitats than in their country of origin. For instance upland rice (shabdar) which yields twice as large crops in the Voronezh region as in its country of origin.

The process of introduction and acclimatization of plants is based on a thorough and careful study of the conditions of growth and development of a selected plant in its native habitat: the climate, soil, natural conditions, and the agro-technical measures applied in growing it.

Efforts are made to find a similar terrain in the USSR. In an analogous or closely approximated region, which conforms to the prevailing conditions in the plant's native country, proper growing conditions are created to acclimatize the plants and if possible, to change its physiology.

As a rule, all available sorts of a given plant are collected at one time and the most suitable ones are selected from among them for a definite terrain. Almost every plant in its new environment requires a detailed study of its phenomenology and biology in flowering, pollination and multiplication. This is the preliminary basis for any work contemplated by the selectors to create new sorts of plants fully adapted to the conditions in the USSR. It sometimes but rarely happens that a foreign imported strain of some plant fully meets the requirements. However, more frequently the selectors immediately commence to create the desired

sort from the imported material. The methods applied in this, are manifold but they need not be discussed here in detail, for they vary with the plant on which the work is to be done — from the upland rice to the Tung tree.

This study of a new plant may require a full year of experiments in various parts of the USSR (summer in the Ukraine, autumn and spring in Transcaucasia, winter in Central Asia). Besides, there are huge green-houses of which use is made. These facilitate the study of a plant and may cut in half the time required for the work under regular conditions.

When the plant has finally been studied and approved for production, it is then integrated into general agricultural production plan by the State Planning authorities.

Before it can be granted the right of "citizenship" on the territory of the USSR, the plant must meet the requirements as to profit set by the planning organs. However, this under Soviet conditions, of course, is determined by the existing autarchy. Under normal international trade conditions many of these plants would not find a profitable place in the USSR. Yet, for instance, the upland rice even in the region beyond the northern border of Ukraine is not only extremely profitable, but — thanks to its larger yields and its superiority in quality over barley, it will soon force out barley completely. The same is true of the soya-bean, the castor-plant, but not of the cotton plant grown in Ukraine. The cotton strains in Ukraine have short fibers and are known as the Central Asiatic "Guza". The better sorts do not grow there and it is hardly likely that they can be suited to the Ukrainian conditions, because of the shortness of the agricultural season.

However, profit alone is not the ultimate decisive issue when it comes to integrating the plant in the national plan for sowing. Apart from the considerations of profit, and this quite often is the decisive factor, it is indispensable that the branch of industry, which is to use the raw material, give it a more favorable appraisal than the imported raw material of the same type. Only after all these aspects have been reviewed, can the plant obtain the right of "citizenship" in the fields of the USSR.

Each new plant in Soviet agriculture is subject to a thorough study at the scientific research institutions. As a result of such elaborate and all-sided work on one of the new plants, the Soviets have succeeded in finding a raw material for the extraction of strophanthine — used in medicine as a cardiac stimulant — which formerly had to be imported. In another instance, a biochemical laboratory, discovered a very important substance for the treatment of diabetes, podagra, etc.

Failures in introducing some new plants have arisen, in the first place, sometimes from a lack of serious consideration of the basic principles of acclimatization. The Bolshevist saying: "There are no fortresses in the world which the Bolsheviks can not take," has been applied also in the introduction of new plants. As a result, hopeless experiments have been made despite the objections of the staff, merely on the orders of the pertinent planning authorities and these have been doomed to failure beforehand. After a more or less protracted period of study, all work has been suspended without any visible advantages for agriculture.

An illuminating example of such a failure is the case of the "kendyr" plant which at one time stirred up a great deal of uproar not only in the USSR, but also abroad. Kendyr is a relic of the Tertiary age of our planet. It has survived only on low river banks which are constantly flooded with water. These areas are usually scarcely forested with hydrophyte trees as alders, black poplars, etc. Their crowns ward off the rays of the sun. Kendyr — a liana-like plant — has found these conditions very similar to the remote days of life on our earth when the latter was shrouded in thick clouds and the sun struck the soil only through gaps in them. Kendyr has survived only in water-flooded areas of Central Asiatic rivers. The plant gives excellent bast-fibers of extraordinary strength and lightness and almost unrottable because of the tanning acids which it contains.

However, all attempts to make kendyr grow without sufficient protection from the sun rays and without a constant irrigation of the area in which it is planted (the question of life and death for Central Asia) have failed. The remarkable quality of its fibers could not be obtained.

The same can be said of the caoutchouc bearing guayule and hevea plants.

Another plant that will also meet the same fate as the kendyr, is the "koksaghyz," a wild plant of local origin which likewise has caused a great deal of excitement. Koksaghyz is one of the botanical forms of dandelion (*Taraxacum*). A perennial and a native of the mountains of the Kirgiz Altai it grows for several decades and its roots weigh 100 to 150 grams. The dry roots contain 5.5 to 6% of caoutchouc. It is very doubtful whether koksaghyz can be made an annual or biennial (like the sugar beet) plant with the necessary size of its roots and its normal amount of caoutchouc. Almost 20 years of experimentation on the koksaghyz to produce in 2 years a plant with roots weighing over 25 grams have ended unsuccessfully. Furthermore the percentage volume of caoutchouc in the cultivated roots decreases considerably. Besides plant-breeding can hardly overcome in the near future the difficulties

caused by the pollination from the ever present wild dandelion. And the slightest cross fertilization with the pollen of the wild dandelion decreases catastrophically the percentage of caoutchouc contained in the roots of the koksaghyz to a fraction of one percent.

Many of the plants successfully adapted now are grown on hundreds of thousands of hectares of land. Here belong the following plants: castor plant, soya-bean, Egyptian cotton plant, the cotton plant in the northern regions of the USSR, and many others. The success of these plants is, in the first place, due on the plant itself. It does not seem to be difficult, to adapt and force the speedy quick-ripening form of the Central Asiatic cotton from Tashkent and Khorezm, to accustom itself to the shorter growing period, less warmth and light in the Crimea or Ukraine. It seems to be more difficult to cultivate representatives of the wild flora. However, plant-breeding (selection) comes to the aid, and it may be said that this science has achieved quite significant results in the USSR.

And soon as a new plant is successfully grown and yields the raw material so desperately needed, the import of the corresponding raw material immediately diminishes or is even discontinued altogether and is replaced by exporting a few years later. Example: Egyptian cotton and many other plants.

Some raw material furnished by the plants — for instance cotton — is manufactured into textiles for the foreign trade. For domestic consumption the government releases cotton substitutes. In 1933-1934 there appeared on the Soviet textile market cottonized hemp textiles. These differ very little from the poorest sort of cotton: weaving is done on the same machines with no new equipment. It can be assumed that poverty-stricken Europe will probably choose this way of meeting the needs of its population rather than strive to make profits and strangle the "capitalist" world. There is no shortage of hemp in Europe.

New plants from the most diverse botanical families and species — from the annuals to shrubs and trees — are scattered all over the Soviet Union. Yet the majority of them have found a new home in the southern part of the USSR, for almost all of them hail from subtropical or even tropical countries.

These new plants were distributed through the Soviet Union in the following order in 1940:

I. OIL-BEARING PLANTS

a) *Soybeans* (*Glycine hispida maxim*) — 225,000 hectares; Southern Ukraine — 75,000 hectares; Northern Caucasus — 28,000 hectares; Transcaucasia — 24,000 hectares; Far East — 98,000 hectares.

b) *Castor oil plant* (*Ricinus communis*) — 270,000 hectares; Southern Ukraine — 85,000 hectares; Northern Caucasus — 80,000 hectares; Transcaucasia — 5,000 hectares; Uzbekistan — 60,000 hectares; Turkmenistan — 10,000 hectares; Tadzhikistan — 10,000 hectares; Kazakhstan — 15,000 hectares; Kirghizstan — 8,000 hectares; Lower Volga Region — 2,000 hectares.

c) *Peanut* (*Arachis hypogea*) — 150,000 hectares; Ukraine — 37,000 hectares; Northern Caucasus — 30,000 hectares; Transcaucasia — 15,000 hectares; Central Asia — 66,000 hectares; the Volga delta — 2,000 hectares.

d) *Perilla* (*Perilla ocimoides*) — 15,600 hectares; Southern Ukraine 3,000 hectares; Northern Caucasus — 4,500 hectares; Far East — 8,100 hectares.

e) *Lallemantia* (*Lallemantia iberica*) — 16,000 hectares. Until a short time ago it grew in a wild state. It yields an excellent dry technical oil — contained in its seed — which surpasses flax seed oil. Ukraine — 5,600 hectares; Northern Caucasus — 8,400 hectares; Lower Volga — 2,600 hectares.

f) *Litsea* (*Litsea Sebi*) — around 150,000 trees; Transcaucasia (Batum, Poty, Sukhum, Lenkoran), Central Asia (Termez, Deynau).

g) *Tung tree* (*Aleurites fordii*) — around 200,000 trees; Transcaucasia, Central Asia (the same regions and Yolotan and Kizil Arvat in Central Asia).

h) *Chufa* (*Cyperus esculentus*) — 10,000 hectares; Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, Volga delta, Far East.

II. FIBER PLANTS

a) *American-Egyptian cotton plant* (*Gossypium barbadense*) — 420,000 hectares; Central Asia (Yolotan, Chardzhou, Mari, Kaakkkha, Shirabudin, Gissar, Termez, Deynau, valleys of rivers of Piandzhe, Vakhshe, Kafirnigan).

b) *Cotton shrub* (*Gossypium hebrascum*) — 486,600 hectares; Southern Ukraine, Crimea, Northern Caucasus, Volga delta, Kazakhstan (Aktiubinsk, Kzyl-Orda, Aulie-Ata, Alma-Ata), Kirghizstan (Urdzhar, Lepsinsk, Karakol, Western China (Sing Krang).

c) *Kenaf* (*Hibiscus cannabinus*) — 160,000 hectares; Southern Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, Lower Volga, Transcaucasia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan (valley of River Chu). Substitute for jute.

d) *Italian hemp* (*Cannabis sativa* var. *italica*) — 380,000 hectares; Southern Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, Lower Volga, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan, Far East.

e) *Flowering maple* (*Abutilon theofrasti*) — 49,000 hectares; Byelorussia, south-eastern Ukraine, western regions of Altay and central regions of the RSFSR. Substitute for manilla.

f) *East Indian crotalaria* (*Crotalaria juncea*) — Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, southern regions of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan (valley of the River Chu, vicinity of Issyk-Kul Lake).

g) *Jute Corchorus capsularis*, (*Corchorus olitorius*). Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan.

h) *China grass* (*Boehmeria nevaea*) — 27,000 hectares; Transcaucasia (Poty low lands, valley of river Alzan, Adzharia, Lenkozan). Bast fiber of this plant is almost pure cellulose. The length of its elementary fiber is over 100 cm. long.

i) *Kendyr* (*Apocynum sibiricum*). — The cultivation of this plant has failed completely.

III. MEDICAL PLANTS

a) *Opium poppy* (*Papaver somniferum*) — around 50,00 to 65,000 hectares. (Exact data concerning the area sown are kept secret by the planning organs and therefore not available. The secret bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Trade merely contains figures on the amount of raw opium and its derivative products, sold in kilograms. According to calculations based on the finished production, the surface sown with opium poppy-seed amounted to 52,000 hectares in 1940. It is cultivated in the areas bordering on Western China, in Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan (region of Andreivka, Urdzhar, Lepsinsk, Karakol).

b) *Shenshen* (*Panax cinsena*). — Khabarovsk, Blagovyeshchensk, Nikolsk-Ustrisk, Birobidzhan. The roots are sold to China.

c) *Camphoric basile* (*Ocinum cannum*) — 12,500 hectares. Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, Central Asia. On the Central Volga it is an annual, in other regions a perennial.

d) *Camphor tree* (*Cinnamomum camphora*). — Southern Black Sea shores of Caucasus, Transcaucasia (Adzharia, Abkhazia, Georgia).

e) *Astrakhan wormwood* (*Artemisia maritima* var. *Astrachanica*); Chimkent wormwood — (*Artemisia leucoides*). Several years ago these two species of *artemisia* were wild. Today they represent the main raw sources of quinine. The Chimkent wormwood is richer in quinine. It covers a surface of 52,000 hectares: Black Sea shores of the Ukraine, the semi-deserts of Northern Caucasus, bordering on the Caspian Sea, Lower Volga and Kazakhstan, the arid lands of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kirghizstan.

f) *Quinine tree* (Hybrid-*Cinchona Ladgeria* & *Cinchona Succirubra*) — about 230,000 trees: Adzharia, Abkhazia, Georgia, Lenkoran.

Apart from these plants there are cultivated over 200 other species of special medical plants, among them many recently domesticated. Much of this raw material is slated for export. In 1940 the export of such raw material was valued at 740,000 gold rubles.

IV. ETHERO-OIL PLANTS

a) *Blue gum tree* (*Eucalyptus globulus*). Although the chief object in planting eucalyptus trees is for draining of the swamps due to the intensive transpiration of this tree, eucalyptus trees supply ethero-oil which finds its use in medicine and perfumery: Transcaucasia (Georgia).

b) *Damask rose* (*Rosa damascena*): Crimea, Northern Caucasus, Black Sea shores of Transcaucasia, Central Asia. It is cultivated for the extraction of flower petal or rose oil, also used in medicine and perfumery.

c) *Lavender* (*Lavandula vera*, *Lavandula officinalis*) — 10,000 hectares; Crimea, Black Sea shores of Northern Caucasus.

d) *Pelargonium* (*Pelargonium*) — 13,000 hectares; Crimea, Southern Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasia, Central Asia.

e) *Nutmeg sage* (*Salvia muscata*) — 15,000 hectares; Southern Ukraine, Crimea, Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasia, Central Asia.

In addition to the plants mentioned above, nearly 250 species of ethero-oil plants are cultivated; among them are: fennel, coriander, citroen sorgø, anise, etc. only to mention a few, and these cover an area of 185,000 hectares of land. The export of ethero-oil netted the Soviets the sum of 3,000,000 gold rubles.

V. FOOD PLANTS

a) *Upland rice* (*Oryza sativa*, sp. *montana*) — 275,000 hectares; Central Asiatic republics (non-irrigated lands called "boghara"; Ukraine, Crimea, Northern Caucasus, Lower Volga, Transcaucasia. Note: This rice does not need irrigation. It is different from the rice which is cultivated by irrigation in Central Asia and in some places in Transcaucasia.

b) *Guinea grass, chumiza* (*Panicum italicum* var. *maxima* — *Setaria italica*) — 400,000 hectares; Far East, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Northern Caucasus, Crimea, Ukraine.

c) *Blue sweet lupine* (Alkaloidless) (*Lupinus angustifolia*) — *Yellow lupine* (Alkaloidless) (*Lupinus luteus*) — 150,000 hectares; Byelorussia, North-Western Ukraine, Western regions of the RSFSR. The pride of Soviet selectors. In nature alkaloidless lupine did not exist at all until recent times. An alkaloidless lupine was first produced at the Novozybkiv experimental station (Northern Ukraine). Later German plant-breeders succeeded in obtaining a few seeds during a visit to this station. After that sweet lupine also appeared in Germany — from those seeds.

d) *Sugar sorghum* (*Sorghum saccharatum*) — 600,000 hectares; Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasia, Central Asia. It contains 15 to 20% of sugar (which does not crystalize at all). Its use is primarily in confectionary and spirits industry (1,200-1,500 liters of rectified spirits from one hectare).

e) *Sugar cane* (*Saccharum officinarum*). Central Asia (Deynau, Termez, Kafirnigan, valley of the rivers Kakhsh, Piandzh).

f) *Chaiota* (*Sechium edule*, Mexican cucumber) — Crimea, Black Sea shores of Northern Caucasus. Edible fruits.

g) *Sweet potatoes* (*Ipomoea batatas*) — 13,500 hectares; Crimea, Transcaucasia, Northern Caucasus, Central Asia. It is an unsuccessful substitute for potatoes in regions where the latter thrives poorly.

h) *Tea shrub* (*Camelia sinensis*) — 58,000 hectares, Adzharia, Georgia, Abkhazia, Lenkoran, Central Asia.

VI. OTHER PLANTS

I. CAOUTCHOUC-BEARING PLANTS:

a) *Koksaghyz* (*Taraxacum koksaghyz*): Byelorussia, Central RSFSR (including Siberia), the northern regions of Ukraine.

b) *Tausaghyz* (*Scorzonera tausaghyz*) — Southern Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Ukraine, Northern Caucasus.

c) *Guayule* (*Parthenium argentatum*). Despite all efforts the cultivation has failed completely.

d) *Hevea* — complete failure in cultivation.

II. GUTTAPERCHA BEARING PLANTS:

a) *Fuller's teasel* (*Dipsacus fullonum*) — 50,000 hectares: Crimea, Northern Ukraine, RSFSR. Until recently a wild plant.

III. TEXTILE MECHANICAL PLANTS:

a) *Fuller's teasel* (*Dipsacus fullonum*) — 50,000 hectares: Crimea, Northern Caucasus, Transcaucasia, Central Asia.

The crops satisfy completely the needs of textile industry; the excess is slated for export. In 1940 some 635,000 gold rubles worth of the crop was exported.

This survey of the principal new plants which have enriched the agriculture of the Soviet Union is incomplete, but they have freed it from dependence on some forms of imports; they have not only preserved the currency, but also made it possible to export a surplus which increases from year to year.

THE STATE OF THE WORD

By M. OREST

Translated from the Ukrainian by W. Shayan

In rainbows of bliss and glory
The Word is born on the earth,
A new State, — Eternal and Holy
Is brought to light by its birth.

And those, who created its coming
And longed in prophetic dreams,
Behold the fiery summit,
Engulfed by ecstatic streams.

Its halo spreads over the mountains,
Embracing angels and doves,
The dawn-break wells from its bounty,
Each petal lives by its love.

And from the graves long forgotten
Rise thousands of hands in prayer,
While lilies, by blessing begotten,
Are greeting the new gospel: hail!

DEMOCRATIC NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

The nineteenth century was a period of intense contradictions, the importance of which were scarcely recognized in their own day. On the one hand, it was a period of intense colonial expansion on the part of the great empires, and of the preparation for World War I, as the conflicts between the great states increased. On the other hand, it was a period when there grew up an almost unnoticed period of intercommunication, when it was possible for even the humblest citizen, if he had the money, to go abroad and travel freely through much of Europe with a minimum of governmental interference. By the end of the century even passports were only necessary for the Russian and Ottoman Empires and these were regarded as exceptionally benighted states.

The same century witnessed the successful ending of the struggle for the unification of the Germans and of the Italians and for the first time in centuries, Germany and Italy appeared on the map of Europe as united states. The same period saw the revival or rather the emergence into printed literature of the languages of many peoples which had almost been forgotten and the growing demand of these peoples to have their own national states. Despite all interference the Ukrainians, the Baltic peoples, the Czechs, the Poles and the other inhabitants of the Hapsburg monarchy had emerged as conscious peoples, ready to play their part in the world arena, whenever a favorable opportunity occurred.

The result of these contrasting tendencies appeared at the end of World War I, when the British Empire rapidly changed into the British Commonwealth of Nations and the German, Hapsburg and Russian Empires collapsed. With the exception of the Ukrainians in Western Ukraine, all the citizens of the Hapsburg monarchy received their own states. It was only the ignorance and shortsightedness of the conquering democracies that refused this to the majority of the peoples of the Russian Empire and allowed the revival under the guise of the Soviet Union of that old prison of nations in which "all are happy, because they are silent."

These same currents were carried over into the twentieth century and served to produce World War II. The new national states flourished,

the demands of the oppressed peoples of the Soviet Union grew stronger and more acute, insofar as they could be heard from behind the iron curtain. On the other hand, the new Fascist Empire of Mussolini, the Nazi regime of Hitler and the bloody purges of Stalin were insisting upon ever greater and greater suppression of all individual and national feelings and aspirations.

How can all this be explained? It is not enough to attribute it, as the Marxians and their friends, to the influence of capitalism, the rise and decline of the bourgeoisie and the growing power of the proletariat who were destined to be the next ruling class and to produce a world state. There were deeper sources at work, sources that had been evident for centuries but which had been overlooked or forgotten in the past. A new crop of ideas was ripening but the seeds for this had required years of germination until they had taken firm root and were able to break through the harsh soil of apparent reality. To grasp these, we need only to glance back through the centuries and not be misled by the use of different terminologies for different areas and periods.

The conceptions of the Greeks and the Romans were at odds. The sense of belonging to the Greek people, already inherent in the poems of Homer, received a definite flowering in the cooperation of the Greek city states in the wars against the Persians. Yet it was a long cry from this consciousness to an organized state. Rome began in the reverse way. The country spread by force of arms and of conquest but at almost every stage it rewarded its friends with Roman citizenship, even though it slowly extended these rights to the "provincials" whom it brought under its control.

In both cases there was little interference with the language and customs of the people, even though they were regarded as barbarous. Pagan Rome was willing to tolerate and reverence any deity which its worshippers wished to erect in the city, provided only that they would return the same to the official gods of Rome.

On the other hand, the great Asiatic empires of this and succeeding centuries, the rulers of Persia and later of the Mongol Empire and even the Ottoman Empire of our own days, did not care to interfere with the religion, manners and customs of their subjects, provided they paid due tribute and submitted quietly to the excesses of their conquerors. These states lasted for a longer or shorter period but when they fell apart, they vanished completely, until they reappeared in new combinations and under new names, as a new conquering general again reassembled the same territory on the same principle.

With the acceptance of Christianity as the state religion, the situation changed radically. There was felt throughout the world of Europe

a sense of unity and though this was soon broken politically and religiously, its roots remained and it took its external form in the use of Latin in the West and of Greek in the East. When the Slavs passed under Christian influence, those of the east and south accepted Church Slavic which henceforth became the third member of this brotherhood of languages which were used for the higher purposes of theology and government.

Yet it would be wrong to believe that these languages were ever widespread among other than the educated classes. The vast majority of the people, the peasants, many of the lesser nobles, the city population, still used their own dialects and languages; they still lived their own lives and they had little or no reason to concern themselves with what was being done by their betters. They travelled little and those who did were either transported in relatively large groups from one estate to another or they were bold and resolute souls who broke with their homes for good and tried never to return to them. Under such conditions the groups that were moved were allowed to retain as they wished their own faith, their own language and customs and thus there were produced those scattered linguistic islands that have been the despair of the modern historian and statesman.

Each section of the population from the king to the humblest peasant had its own rights, obligations, freedoms and limitations and with the relative lack of communication, they asked nothing more. The state was bound together by the feudal oath which was considered unbreakable and bound the sovereign and each successive class below him to maintain the status quo. The King of France might call himself King of England and vice versa. The Hapsburgs might become Holy Roman Emperors and at the same time Kings of Bohemia and Hungary, etc. It was the period when the multiplicity of titles borne by the rulers of Europe had a real meaning but only in this restricted sense and when politics was largely a game to be played out between the heads of states without affecting to a marked degree the lives of their subjects.

It was this feeling at Kiev that allowed the Grand Princes to fight zealously with one another, to replace one another, without any marked plundering of the population. Yet it did weaken the state in its frontier position against Asia and it often allowed such tribes as the Polovtsy to gain unnecessary influence in the conduct of the government. The sacking of Kiev in 1169 by Prince Andriy Bogolubsky was something different. He was a member of the royal family and as such he did have the right to compete for the primacy among the princes *but* he had no intention of allowing to others the same right. He sacked Kiev to cement his position, to strengthen his own capital and to destroy the old freedom of the

nobles. Hence it came about that the rise of Suzdal and Moscow saw the appearance of a new kind of state in which the sovereign was absolute but absolute as the personal owner, rather than as the feudal superior of his nobles. It was a new kind of autocracy that was born and developed in Moscow, where the temper and life of the people was sharply different from that of Kiev and Europe.

Such a state of affairs as prevailed in most of Europe could not be permanent. There were too many political upheavals and at various dates we find the emergence of the various local vernaculars into literature and politics. Great writers and poets appeared as Dante and Chaucer to attract wide notice and to establish literary forms which were eagerly taken up and circulated in preference to the Latin which still remained the official organ of correspondence in both state and church. The Crusades, opened the eyes of many; the fall of Constantinople and the Renaissance had an overwhelming impact and from this moment new theories began to gain ground in all but the most narrow circles.

Meanwhile in Moscow the result of the fall of Constantinople had an effect diametrically opposite to that which it had in the West. In the latter the cultured refugees, the DP's of the day, brought with them their culture and were eagerly welcomed. In Moscow the marriage of Ivan III, recently liberated from subservience to the Golden Horde, to Sofia Paleolog, inspired in him the idea of claiming the privileges of the Emperors of Constantinople. Yet he did not take over the cultural values but proclaimed Moscow the Third Rome, adopted the double-headed eagles, and set himself to demand still greater rights, and to make still greater claims to omniscience and omnipotence.

With the shattering of the still prevailing unity by the religious disputes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a new impact was given to the rise of the vernaculars and a new emphasis was placed upon the political use of language and religion. This led to what we might call a social oppression of the groups that had formerly remained almost independent within the great non-national and feudal states. It led many of the nobles everywhere to accept the culture and the religion of the dominant classes and thus it deprived the Ukrainians of many of their most intelligent and educated men who passed over into Polish lords. The answer was the movement of some of the Kievan monks and the less far-seeing Zaporozhian Kozaks to demand the Treaty of Pereyaslav, for they saw only the Orthodoxy of the tsar and had little appreciation of all that was involved.

An internationalism of manners resulted, following in Europe the French court the native languages, however, were too firmly entrenched by now to yield. The cult of courtesy was too unsubstantial to resist the

popular life; a new period arose in the eighteenth century when such diverse characters as Rousseau and Herder declared for the supremacy of the life and art of the ordinary man. The interest in folksong and new theories as to the equality of man came to the forefront and were confirmed by the successes of the people in the French Revolution and the establishment of the United States.

Again the opposite happened in St. Petersburg, the Europeanized capital of the Russian Empire. Peter had forced on his people European culture with a vengeance but in making the change he had transferred his own power to the political sphere from the patriarchal. The highly Gallicized society of his capital still retained the basic store of Muscovite belief in its own supremacy, and as step by step the peoples of Western Europe sought to make their voices heard and gradually won recognition, even the Russian radicals who tried to adapt the ideas of the Western developments could not fail to get away from that sense of Russian universalism which aimed at a steadily increasing standardization.

Thus at the very moment when such Western empires as that of the Hapsburgs was becoming an anachronism and a newer sense of unity was spreading among the Germans and Italians, more and more rigid attempts at russification were being applied. Pobyedonostsev worked to perpetuate the old monolithic order. Lenin worked for a new monolithic order of the proletariat and though he made some concessions to his European socialist colleagues, it may well be doubted whether he was more than half-hearted in them, for he still thought of the world proletariat as he thought of the monolithic Russian state.

The growth of education in the vernacular instead of Latin in the Western states fostered the revival of those tongues previously regarded as peasant and unlitrary. The spreading of literacy in the village even on a small scale made the students want to write home and it was easier in their own tongue than it was in a state language, once that language had lost the stamp of universality. This led to a demand for political rights and it is significant that it was among the intellectuals of the Hapsburg Empire that these demands first took root. So it was in Russia with the Ukrainian Society of St. Cyril and Methodius but the reaction of the government was more violent. Such actions were not only rebellious. They were sacrilegious and the number of martyrs in the national cause in Russian Empire far outnumbered those in the other countries.

Now we can understand the paradox of the nineteenth century. The Western states, long accustomed to some form of mutual recognition welcomed the opportunities for intercommunication. They built their roads and railroads for commercial as well as military purposes. They

felt that they had little to fear from visitors and reduced the fortified areas to which foreigners were not admitted to a minimum. Russia again took the opposite attitude and as it tried to expand, it aimed to cement its solitary power.

It was a tragedy that this difference was not seen at the end of World War I, when Austria-Hungary vanished and Russia fell, while Germany was weakened. The West thought of the Russian Empire in its own terms and allowed the triumph of Bolshevism and its strengthening.

Then came the other surprising development of the twentieth century, the reemergence from the past for the benefit of the impoverished peoples of the old ideals. Yet no return to the old can be anything but a caricature. It is highly significant that Mussolini sought to revive Italy not in the name of the recent past but in the name of the Roman Empire and the Roman Republic. The Fasces and all the other paraphernalia were indeed the same but the spirit was entirely different. In its most militant days, the Empire could never have thought of the methods by which he sought to make his ideals effective. It was the same with Hitler. There was good reason for him to revert to the days of the First German Empire at Nuremberg and it was to that point that he moved many of the old German banners to hold historic meetings. Yet those meetings were but caricatures of the old feudalism when every German prince despite his feudal oath did what was right in his own eyes and handled his vassals and subordinates as he would. In the year 1,000 a German Emperor living according to Nazi principles and actions would have lasted perhaps one week. He would have been excommunicated by the Pope and outlawed by his own great lords and scarcely a sword would have been drawn in his defence. A Stalin with all of his apparent novelty of ideas is following more closely in the paths of the great Russian tsars and his revival of the cult of Peter I and of Ivan Terrible is a natural outcome of the triumph of the old idea.

On the other hand, the organization of Western Europe is but a renewal in a democratic form of a concept that had dominated Europe from the time of the early Middle Ages when there was a slow but steadily increasing intercourse and travel of traders and of pilgrims from one land to another, when the knights and later the merchants established their own centres and students wandered from land to land. All that was small and disorganized as was the general life of the country. National prejudices oppose it now as they did then but the very opponents were largely the men who travelled and found personal rather than universal reasons for their opposition.

Against this we must place the world organization of the lands within the iron curtain, a great dream of centering everything around Moscow, around the sacred Kremlin, one the seat of the ruler of the Third Rome and now the center of world "progressive thought." At each step for centuries that ruler fought hard to preserve the integrity and the piety and the perfection of his Muscovite culture and he was not alone in this, for the whole history of the Muscovite seventeenth century can be understood only in the frantic efforts of the boyars and the people to preserve the old order. An Avakum, introducing the Russian vernacular into his writings, was doing it from a pious belief in antiquity and the belief that the forms which he employed were of particular sanctity. The adoption of the vernacular elsewhere was as a response to the needs of the people.

It is from this point of view that we can explain almost all the apparently meaningless performances of the Kremlin, the patter of Stalin as to the significance of regional and world languages, the constant iteration that the languages of the non-Russian peoples must be cleansed from all their local bourgeois peculiarities, so that they can properly, by adopting Russian words, secure the right appreciation of Stalinist thought. It is from this point of view that Russians have made all the inventions of the world, although the Kremlin fails to explain why so few of these were ever perfected or brought into use at home.

In this picture we can see clearly the reason why the Ukrainians and the other non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union are so insistent in their demand for a total separation from either a white or red Russia. They understand only too well that a future Russian state will only continue the same general policy of complete domination, under whatever form the state assumes. On the other hand their past throughout the centuries has bound them to that European mode of life which is being worked out through the cooperation of independent national states stumbling and quarreling on their way to a new international order in which the rights of the individual and of the individual nation are duly recognized and protected.

It is the urgent task of modern statesmanship therefore to support and strengthen all of those forces and movements which are working for the harmonious development and coordination of the free and democratic nations and for the addition to their number of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, especially Ukraine. Its accomplishment is urgent, for containment of Russian Communism is not enough. It must be forced to disgorge its conquests and of these Ukraine is the most vital. Then, when that is accomplished, we can well believe that the work of integration and harmonious cooperation can continue to the welfare of the whole world.

A CRIPPLED BEGGAR BEFORE THE SOVIET COURT

By PETRO PEKIW

This incident occurred in Ukraine in 1933, the year of the famine arranged by the Russian Communists. On a high platform in a majestic hall sat a Bolshevik court, consisting of the presiding officer and two judges. All were members of the All-Union Communist Party (VKP). Before them stood the accused, a representative of the Ukrainian peasantry by the name of Unkovsky. He was on crutches, with only one leg, dressed in pitiable rags and even his crutches were homemade and beggarly.

The investigation was ending. The presiding officer was haughtily asking questions—and the accused was answering modestly.

"How old are you?"

"Twenty-five."

"Education?"

"None."

"Occupation?"

"Beggar."

"Why are you not in service?"

"I consider it inadmissible to serve the Soviet government."

On the platform the three heads shook in anger. The procurator asked to include the statement of the prisoner in the protocol. It was done. The defender sadly grasped his head. The case seemed hopeless. The public which overflowed the hall was excited.

"So"—continued the presiding officer, looking like a vulture.—
"You, apparently, are a counter-revolutionist."

"I am,"—answered the accused quite simply.

"You confess yourself guilty?"

"No."

"This is unintelligible. You confess that you are a counter-revolutionist and then you do not consider yourself guilty."

"I see no crime in my acts."

"Oh!"—the presiding officer scoffed—"then tell us exactly of your acts and reasons."

The accused, leaning on his crutches, hobbled nearer to the judge's bench and began:

"I am a beggar and a cripple but I have been around many villages and cities of Ukraine. Wherever I have been, there was everywhere the moaning of the people. It is strange in the cities and villages, there is no bread. Every house is full of sadness, tears cannot be counted; the people are in prison, in exile, they are being shot in the cellars of the GPU."

"That in your idea is usual," roared the judge.

"It is evident. This is the happy, just life of the Ukrainian people. And the government boasts it has given a happy life to all who work. It boasts in newspaper and journals of its accomplishments and I tell you, I counted forty corpses on the street between the prison and this court."

"Where did you see the corpses? We'll ask every one. Comrade procurator, did you see human corpses on the street?" — The judge turned to the procurator.

"Of course not," interrupted the procurator with a furious glance at the accused.

"And you, comrade defender, did you see corpses?"

The poor defender, if he said "yes," he was identifying himself with the counter-revolution; to say "no" was shameful before the public which had seen dozens of corpses lying on the street.

"I went another—a different way"—the defender grasped at the answer and felt easier.

"You notice, no one saw those corpses but you" — said the judge triumphantly. "Continue but don't make up tales."

"All will say 'We didn't see,'" the accused began again. — "Ask everyone whether they are hungry or not. All will say: 'We live happily.' Why? They are afraid. They fear the truth like death. They are cowards."

"And you are so brave that you are willing to answer for all."

"I am ready to pay for the words of truth. I have decided to die but I will speak the truth."

The hall grew still as if something wonderful had passed over it, something fateful and unspeakably beautiful, like a thin ray of light in a spiritual fog.

The procurator rose:

"The accused is agitating. I ask the court to stop him."

The judge turned grimly to the accused:

"You have heard the statement of the procurator. Stop carrying on agitation, I tell you. You will be shot."

"Shooting is easier than starving"—declared the accused sadly but resolutely. "In a Soviet prison a hungry guard eats up the bread of the prisoners. One is free to die in one's cell, on a stone floor, in the cold, to see the tortures of the others and to wait for help from no one. No, shooting is easier."

"Accused!"—insisted the judge—"You are telling lies. You must tell the truth as it is."

"As it is! Fine. I have seen the people fooled. They were promised paradise and given hell . . . They must die, naked and barefoot, fighting for the English miners and the Chinese revolution. I decided. . ."

"What did you decide?" — the judge could not control himself.

"I decided to open the eyes of the people. I made a placard and carried it on my chest. On one side were the words— 'Help a beggar.' On the other: 'Citizens, reflect to what you have come. In Ukraine bread is an object of luxury.' Then I wrote: 'Does not liberty cost too much.' I turned the placard now on this side now on that, the passersby read. . . and thought."

"What did you want?"—asked the procurator.

"I wanted every one to think how sad life was and why it is as it is. I wanted every one to count how many torments liberty costs the people and to ask how much more one had to pay for that liberty. Whether liberty was worth those sacrifices and where would be the end to them. Perhaps the government will tell how many more generations it thinks it will have to destroy for the Bolshevik paradise; that it will tell the price, and then the people may not wish that paradise. . . It is too dear."

"Tell us, why, in your opinion, life is as sad, as you say"—again asked the procurator.

"Because a group of people have seized the government and are compelling people, like clay, to do what they wish and are themselves responsible to no one; they do not recognize God and there is no earthly court above them. They lie without stopping. They have so confused the people that they cannot tell lies from the truth. They are tyrants."

"Who, in your opinion, is this group, the liars, the tyrants—tell us precisely, so that we may know"—asked a second judge.

"THE COMMUNISTS"—answered the accused quietly but clearly.

Then the procurator raised his voice to demand that because of the clearness of his answer, the accused should be asked no more questions.

The court satisfied the plea of the procurator. Then he made a long speech where the word *bourgeoise* was used in all forms of the singular and plural, he told the history of the Communist party and how and why it had given the Ukrainian people a happy life. The party would

later give that same life to the whole world. And it would come, if the court dealt with the accused, this "knife in the back of the revolution."

The defender in a very short speech showed very definitely that he, though the defender, was not involved in this question, did not take his stand with the accused, but on the contrary, always had been for the Soviet government and he asked to mitigate the man's punishment.

As his final word, the prisoner said:

"I appeal to you, judges, I ask you, for the sake of your children the young people whom you love; for the sake of your fathers, who gave you life; for the sake of all that is most beautiful in the heart of every person; perhaps for the sake of your red god of freedom before whom you bow—as a dying man, a cripple, a beggar, I ask you to shoot me".

He gathered his strength and shouted with a terrible tremble:

"I cannot live in injustice"—and his whole thin and contorted body trembled. — "I cannot see any more. I am afraid, you do not understand me, I am afraid you will not shoot me. I ask you again: shoot this one-legged man!"

Suddenly the crutches fell on the floor, and resounded on the parquet—like a revolver shot, and then there was the dull thud of a falling body.

All started as if an attack at shooting had taken place in the eyes of the public.

The physician certified "death from a heart attack."

The court took counsel, thought and then rose and went out. There was on one to punish.

PRESENT RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

By DR. C. C. GREGYS

The question of the equality of rights of the Soviet nationalities can hardly be understood without a discussion of the prominent role played by the Russian language and Russian nationalism today in the multi-national Soviet state.

SUPERIORITY OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

Lenin believed that it was undemocratic to establish one official language — in this case Russian — in a multi-national country like Russia, but he believed that economic factors can always be expected to bring about the use of one common language.¹ In 1917 he promised that “the obligatory (*employment of*) the state (*i.e., Russian*) language (*is*) to be abolished.”² Lenin’s idea about the Russian language as the world language of communism in the future was repeated by Stalin: “The dying of national languages and their fusion into a single common language is not an internal state question, not a question of the victory of socialism in one country, but an international question, a question of victory on an international scale.”³

Soviet jurists and writers are giving more and more praise to the Russian language as a language which “enjoys vast affection among all peoples of the U.S.S.R. as the general property of the Soviets,”⁴ and which “attracts not alone the peoples of the U.S.S.R., but all the toilers of the world.”⁵ D. Zaslavsky made the following statement:

Now no one may consider himself learned in the full and real sense of the word if he does not know Russian, if he does not read in

¹ Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), 3rd ed., Moscow, Gosizd., 1935, XVI pp. 595-97.

² *Id.*, *Collected Works*, New York, Intern. Publishers, 1927-1945, XX, Bk. I., p. 89.

³ Stalin, *Marxizm i Natsionalno-Kolonyalny Vopros* (Marxism and the National and Colonial Question), Moscow, Parizd., 1935, pp. 256-257 and 264-266. Cf. *Pravda*, October 26, 1949.

⁴ A. Vyshinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State*, New York, The Macmillan, 1948, p. 603.

⁵ B. Volin, *Veliky Russky Narod* (The Great Russian People), Moscow, Ogiz, 1938, p. 18.

the original the productions of Russian thought. In the social science Russians occupy an indisputable first place. All future development of these sciences will be determined by the works of the geniuses Lenin and Stalin.⁶

Other writers go further and argue that national differences and separate national languages will die out as all countries see the advantages of the universal tongue, i.e., Russian, and the need for union.

There is scarcely any item in the life of the Soviet Union's nationalities which Communist propaganda has tried to idealize throughout the world to such an extent as the freedom accorded their national languages. It is interesting to observe that this propaganda has been rather successful, even among the so-called specialists on Soviet problems. These people admit that the Soviet Union's nationalities naturally have no political or economic independence, but the usual argument is that they are nevertheless, guaranteed cultural freedom on quite a broad scale. In the eyes of the world the nationalities not only have the right to use their own languages, but they even are urged to develop them, as well as their national literature, art, etc.

Such opinions are erroneous. Naturally, in the formal sense the Soviet regime has done much for non-Russian nationalities. But in reality, the Russian language today is more than a *primus inter pares* language in a multi-national state.

It is true that to all constituent republics, autonomous republics, autonomous regions and national regions, the use of the native national language for all official purposes is secured by the Constitution of the USSR. Constitutionally the native language has become the language of the schools.⁷ The laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR are published in the local languages of the sixteen constituent republics.⁸ Throughout the Soviet Union persons who do not know the official language are guaranteed the services of an interpreter to become acquainted with the material bearing on a court case and also the right to speak in a court of law in their own language.⁹ The native national language of the

⁶ *The New York Times*, February 2, 1949.

⁷ *Constitution of the U.S.S.R.*, Art. 121.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Art. 40.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Art. 110. Cf. *Ugolovno-Protzessyalny Kodeks: Ofitsialnyy Tekst s Izmeneniyami na 1 Noyabrya 1946* (The Code of the Penal Procedure: Official Text with Changes up to November 1, 1946), Moscow, Juridical Publ. of the Ministry of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1947, Arts. 22 and 241; *Grazhdansky Protzessyalny Kodeks: Ofitsialnyy Tekst s Izmeneniyami na 1 Sentabrya 1947* (The Code of Civil Procedure: Official Text with Changes up to September 1, 1947), Moscow, Juridical Publ. of the Ministry of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1948, Art. 9.

respective national territorial units is the official language of the local government agencies, of the press, radio and theatre.

Most of the smaller and culturally-backward racial and linguistic groups never had a written language. The Soviet scholars undertook to provide for this, and in some cases the Russian, in other the Latin alphabets were elaborated.¹⁰ Reversing the earlier trend, the tendency to create separate languages for each little group has since 1936 been discontinued. The Russian alphabet is now used for the publication of books in languages for which the Latin had previously been chosen.¹¹ According to available data, at least thirty nationalities belonging to the Turko-Tatar, Iranian and isolated Caucasian languages groups, living in the Caucasus, the Volga region and in Central Asia, have had to endure this change in their language habits.¹² This is merely one indication of the present trend.

In 1938 the Soviet regime started an intensive propaganda for the use of the Russian language, holding up as a strong incentive the virtues of the Russian people. It was handled as follows: "The Russian language has with full right been estimated as the dominant language. Lenin and Stalin wrote their incomparable works in Russian. The nationalities of the Soviet Union consider it necessary to respect the powerful Russian nation and to know its language, as this gives them the opportunity to share the civilization of the great Russian people."¹³

Parallel with this new policy, the Russian language has been made the principal subject upon which the primary and secondary national schools were to concentrate.¹⁴

Beginning with the second grade of the primary school in all national territorial units the Russian language is compulsory.¹⁵ This means that the children of certain national groups have to learn as many as three languages. For instance, the Armenians in the constituent republic of

¹⁰ "Many peoples, such as the Koryaks, Chukchi, Evenki, Yakuts, Nentsi, only established their written language during the years of Soviet rule" (United Nations, Economic and Social Council, *Report on the Status of Women in the U.S.S.R.: Received from the Government of the U.S.S.R.*, 1949, p. 14).

¹¹ N. S. Timasheff, *The Great Retreat*, New York, E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1948, pp. 186 and 186-89. — On November 26, 1950, the Premier of Mongolia announced that his country's old script had been replaced with a new one based on the Russian alphabet (*The New York Times*, November 27, 1950).

¹² A. A. Kristian, *The Right to Self-Determination and the Soviet Union*, Abetryck, Vagstena (Sweden), 1952, p. 56.

¹³ *Izvestiya*, April 14, 1938.

¹⁴ *The New York Times*, August 2, 1950.

¹⁵ Y. N. Medinsky, *Public Education in the USSR*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publ. House, 1950, pp. 38-9.

Georgia have to learn Armenian, Russian and Georgian. Only the Russian children in the purely Russian provinces of the R.S.F.S.R. are unilingual, but the Russian children resident in other constituent or autonomous republics have to learn, besides Russian, the language of the republic in which they reside. This situation can be explained as an indication of the equality of nationalities throughout the Soviet Union. Again, under the new instructions introduced in the school year 1945-46, the Russian language and mathematics were made the principal subjects in the primary and secondary schools.¹⁶ Concurrently, the universal importance of learning "Stalin's language," i.e., Russian, was officially underscored:

Teachers of the Russian language must explain to their pupils the universal importance of the great Russian language. It is the language spoken by the great genius of humanity, Lenin. It is the language in which Comrade Stalin addresses the laboring masses of the world. The Russian language helps the student to understand Russian culture. . . (and) to acquire knowledge of the world's most outstanding science (and) technique.¹⁷

The transfer from a rural primary school to the fifth grade of the incomplete secondary school is made when one passes the final examination in Russian, oral and written. The same rule is applied in transferring a child from the seven-year school to the eighth grade of complete secondary schools. All candidates for admission to the universities and institutes, save those who graduated from secondary school with gold and silver medals, have to pass university entrance examinations in Russian and Russian literature.¹⁸ The 1945-46 instruction clearly emphasizes the superiority of Russian over the regional language and reduces the latter to the status of second-class languages contrary to the provision of the Stalin Constitution and the legislation still in force, protecting the use of national languages in Soviet schools.¹⁹ More than that, the latest

¹⁶ I. A. Kirov, Minister for Education, also called on Soviet teachers to stress the mastery of the Russian language during the year 1950-51. He said that this was one of the lessons to be drawn from the recent pronouncements of Stalin on the subject of linguistics (*The New York Times*, August 2, 1950).

¹⁷ *Rahva Haal* — Organ of Estonia's Communist Party, Jan. 31, 1952.

¹⁸ Nicholas Hans, *Comparative Education: A Study of Educational Factors and Traditions*, London, Houtledge and P. Kegan, Ltd., 1949, pp. 313 and 321.

¹⁹ *Sobranie Uzakonenii i Rasporyazhenii Rabochego i Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva R.S.F.S.R.* (Collection of Laws and Ordinances of the Worker-Peasant Government of the R.S.F.S.R.), Moscow, Publ. of the People's Commissariat of Justice (1917-1938), 1934, No. 42, Text 263. Cf. *Directivy VKP(b) i Postanovleniya Sovietskogo Pravitelstva o Narodnom Obrazovanii za 1917-1947* (Directives and Ordinances of the All-Union Communist Party (B.) and Soviet Government on

Soviet educational policy requires that Russian culture and Russian achievements are to be regarded as the first and oldest in the world and that all other cultures are to be viewed only as derivatives of the Russian. In the same way, in all courses on literature and history it is prescribed that the instructors emphasize the national superiority, originality and greatness of Russian thinkers, writers and scholars and the tremendous contribution of the Russian people to world culture. The pupils must also be acquainted with the Soviet system and its immeasurable superiority over bourgeois ways.²⁰

According to official and private sources, the Cabinet meetings in the constituent and autonomous republics are conducted in the Russian languages, and all official records are printed in two languages, i.e., in the local "official" language and in Russian. In some government agencies, such as the Ministry for Internal Affairs — M.V.D., the Ministry for Security — M.G.B., the railway administration, etc. business can be translated only in Russian. At the post offices all forms are in Russian and must be filled out in Russian. Complaints are countered by the advice to learn Russian as quickly as possible.²¹

It must be recognized, however, that the 2,294 non-Russian newspapers published in 1939 accounted for only about one-fourth (9,376,000 copies) of the total circulation, although the peoples represented in 1939 41.59 per cent of the total population.²² Conversely 74 per cent of all newspapers were printed in Russian, even though the Russian people constituted in 1939 only 58.41 per cent of the population. Thus, despite the growth of the native-language press, a highly disproportionate part of the total is in Russian.^{22a}

Lately the native languages have been forced to incorporate thousands of Russian terms, words and so-called idioms which will not be translated in the future but used in their Russian form. To receive the

People's Education for 1917-1947, ed. N. I. Boldyrev, Moscow-Leningrad, Publ. of the Academy of Pedagogic Science of the R.S.F.S.R., II, pp. 107-9.

²⁰ *Newsletter from Behind the Iron Curtain*, March 1949, III, No. 113 p. 115.

²¹ A. Kaelas, *Human Rights and Genocide in the Baltic States*, Stockholm, Publ. of the Estonian Information Centre, 1950, p. 81.

²² *Tsifyr o Pechati S.S.S.R. (Figures on the Press of the U.S.S.R.)*, Moscow, Ogiz, 1940, p. 14. — In 1947 there were printed 5,204 Russian and 1,949 non-Russian newspapers. This means that the number of non-Russian newspapers has slightly decreased (*Sovietskaya Pechat v Tzifrah.*—The Soviet Press in Figures), Moscow, Ogiz, 1948, pp. 112. Cf. Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 146-47.

^{22a} After the annexation of the Baltic Republics, Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia, Bukovina and Besarabia to the USSR the percentage of Russians in the Soviet Union fell to less than 50% of the total population. (*Ed.*).

proper directives along this line the most prominent philologists of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were summoned to a conference at Riga in 1952 which lasted from February 19-23. In the presence of several Communist Party secretaries the directives were given by emissaries of Moscow, the philologists B. Serebrennikov, B. Gornung and S. Ozdegov, who apparently have no knowledge whatever of the Baltic languages. Thereupon the local functionaries repeated and developed the directives with the addition of examples. The most zealous in this respect was K. Kraulish, the director of the historical institute of the Latvian Communist Party, who announced that in the files of his institute there are 15,000 Russian terms and words "difficult" to translate.

The arguments advanced at the conference were as follows: (a) in the translation of the theoreticians of Marxism strict exactness must be observed; (b) by taking words from the "richest language in the world, Russian," the Baltic languages will increase their vocabulary—and become richer too; (c) the Baltic languages will become purer and at the same time will "get rid of the jargon of the upper exploiting classes dating from the times of capitalist society as well as archaisms of religious vocabulary;" (d) the work of translators will become easier; (e) the people of the Soviet Union will understand one another better. Lastly the conference approved a number of resolutions and a telegram of greeting to Stalin with a request to permit the nations to take over words from the Russian, pointing out that "Arakcheyevism" in linguistics is impossible.²³

The most unscrupulous experiment in this direction was made with the Ukrainian language. The first Ukrainian vocabulary prepared by the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (1928) was confiscated for its Ukrainian character. Its authors were arrested and liquidated „for creating artificial borders between Russian and Ukrainian languages."

The ordered second edition of Ukrainian Language which included thousands of Russian words was not saturated enough with Russianism and was again confiscated. Only the third edition published after the Second World War was satisfactory to the Moscow Russifiers because it totally corrupted the Ukrainian language. Such a Ukrainian language as is found in this third edition does not exist in Ukraine.

²³ *Newsletter*, March 1952, Nos. 270-71, VI, p. 57. — Arakcheyev was a Tsarist general who lived during the reigns of Tsars Alexander I and Nicholas I and introduced a very rigorous regime in Russia. Stalin likes the term "Arakcheyevism" very much, uses it frequently and has repeated it several times in articles on Marxism in linguistics.

RUSSIAN CHAUVINISM

The official emphasis on the superiority of the Russian language over the languages of non-Russian citizens of the Soviet Union has been accompanied by the vigorous stressing of Russian nationalism. It is interesting to trace the development of the concept of Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union. Immediately after the November Revolution, there was a period of confusion. This was apparently because the Soviet theorists of the new regime could not arrive at a synthesis of the internationalism of Communist dogma and Russian nationalism by the dialectical method they themselves sponsored. The internationalism of Communist dogma, however, could not suppress the inherent national feeling of the Russian people even within the ranks of the Bolshevik Party. As early as 1930, Stalin himself had to refer to Russian nationalism in his address to the Sixteenth All-Union Communist Party Congress. At that time Stalin called it "a deviation towards Great Russian chauvinism" and described its essence as follows:

The substance of the deviation towards Great Russian chauvinism consists in the tendency to overcome the national differences of language, culture, customs; in the tendency to prepare the liquidation of the national republics and regions; in the tendency to destroy the principle of national equality and to dethrone the party's policy concerning the nationalization of the administration, the press, the schools and other state and public institutions. The deviationists of that type act on the presumption that after the victory of socialism the confluence of all peoples into one people must take place, and all national languages must be merged into one common language, and that the time has come to liquidate the national differences and to abandon the policy supporting the development of the national cultures of the former oppressed nations.²⁴

But this opposition to Russian chauvinism did not prevent him, only four years later, from equipping the same Russian nationalism with a most powerful weapon — the patriotic concept of Russian history. In May 1934, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and the Soviet government passed a resolution prescribing how history should be taught and setting up committees to prepare history textbooks.²⁵ In January 1936, another committee, under the chairmanship of N. Zhdanov, was established "to examine and improve, and if necessary to rewrite the existing history books for elementary schools." The books had to be

²⁴ Stalin, *Marksizm i Natsionalno-Kolonialny Vopros*, p. 191.

²⁵ *Sobranie Uzakonenii*, May 27, 1934, Text 26.

written in conformity with the ideas on history expressed by the most prominent Soviet leaders: Stalin, Zhdanov, Kirov, Bukharin, Radek.²⁶ Here is how a pro-Soviet author described the results of the competition in textbook writing: "It was Shestakov's history textbook of 1937 which was tangible proof of a change in the Soviet attitude towards history. It was the product of a competition, the entries for which were submitted to Stalin himself for examination. Shestakov's method was to give, on the one hand, an account of revolutionary movements throughout Russian history, and on the other, a general survey of history, in which everything which conduced to Russia's glory and Russia's growth is praised and appreciated. He interpreted the partitions of Lithuania and Poland as the operation of the principle of nationalities, and the conquest of the Caucasus as the liberation of the peoples inhabiting it. He blamed the Tsarist government for neglecting the interests of Russia as a nation, as when Alaska was sold to the USA in 1867."²⁷

Along with the "glorious past" came a considerable revival of the old symbols of the Russian nation. Writers, actors, poets, Party notables, and statesmen have referred at length to "the great Russian people," to Russia's history and achievements in literature, art, science, "the wonderful richness" of the Russian language, and the exploits of old Russian heroes on the field of battle. This development likewise reached its peak after the outbreak of the war. Following the Nazi German attack on the Soviet Union, Stalin concluded a fervent appeal to the armed forces with the following words: "Let the manly images of our great ancestors — Aleksander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin, Dmitry Pozharsky, Aleksander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov — inspire you in this war!"²⁸

From the standpoint of the position of the Russians in the complex of nationalities, the significant thing is that they are publicly credited with having played a leading role in the November Revolution, the civil war, the economic reconstruction and the other programs and endeavors that followed. An authoritative expression of this sentiment was provided by Stalin himself, on May 25, 1945, at the great Kremlin victory banquet, when he offered a toast to the Russian people as "the most outstanding

²⁶ *Ibid.*, March 23, 1936, Text 13.

²⁷ Walter Kolarz, *Stalin and Eternal Russia*, London, L. Drummond 1944, pp. 83-84. However, Shestakov's history book has not eliminated all "bandit elements" from Russian history. These could be found in movements like those of Razin and Pugachev. It was the Soviet historian Prof. E. Tarle, who insisted on the elimination of these elements from history books and on teaching children that "military leaders are heroic figures" (*Ibid.*, p. 86).

²⁸ Stalin, *O Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine Sovetskogo Soyuzu* (The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union), 4th ed., Moscow, Ogiz, 1944, p. 38.

nation of all nations forming the Soviet Union” as one “which has won in this war universal recognition as the leading force in the Soviet Union among all the peoples” of the country. He ascribed to the Russian people “a clear mind, staunch character, and patience,” and thanked them for the confidence they had shown the Soviet government during the trying years of 1941 and 1942.²⁹

The leading role of the Russian nation was stressed again by P. A. Shariya, Chairman of the Credentials Commission of the Council of Nationalities, of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

The great Russian people — the older brother in the equal family of peoples of the USSR, occupies a special place in the Soviet companionship of peoples. The first among all the peoples of our country and of the entire world to have begun the great socialist revolution, it... is tirelessly rendering every aid to the formerly oppressed and backward peoples in the matter of quick economic, political, and cultural development... Every race in the Soviet Union understands perfectly well that the main, decisive role in the achievement of victory over the enemy in the Great Patriotic War — in which the fate of the freedom and independence of all the people of the USSR was being decided — was played by the great Russian people. That is why the prestige of the Russian people is so immeasurably high among the other peoples; that is why the peoples of the USSR bear toward it boundless confidence and a feeling of tremendous love and gratitude.³⁰

The supremacy of the Russian nation has lately been expounded in these words: “In the achievement of universal and historical success by the Soviet country the most important role belongs to the great Russian people as to the most prominent nation of all the nations composing the structure of the Soviet Union... The great Russian people has closely intertwined all the nationalities of the Soviet Empire into one brotherly family and has won their profound love, respect and gratitude.³¹

The Russian people has even been proclaimed as the sole source of development, happiness, and survival of all other nationalities within Soviet Union.

Reunification and unification of the Ukraine with Russia in a united Russian state, said L. G. Melnikov, Ukrainian Party Secretary, saved the Ukrainian people and nation and provided for its flourishing and development. The Ukrainian people have a feeling of great

²⁹ *Bolshevik*, 1945, No. 10, pp. 1-2. Cf. *Ibid.*, 1952, No. 8, p. 20.

³⁰ *Izvestiya*, March 15, 1946

³¹ *Ibid.*, November 2, 1951. Cf. *The New York Times*, September 29, 1952.

respect and gratitude for the Great Russian peoples and consider them their older brothers. Everything there is that is best, everything that the Ukrainian people have which is best was obtained with the help of the Russian people under the leadership of the Party of Lenin and Stalin.

Expressions such as "Glory to the Russian people— people of heroes, people of builders!" are cited abundantly in the Soviet press, in public pronouncements and on posters.

An idolatrous glorification of the Russians has been introduced among other nationalities. This has gone so far that neither Russia nor the Russian nation may be named in the press or radio without prefixing them with the adjective "great," "friendly," "progressive," "helpful," "older brother,"³² etc. This marks the highest official recognition of the prominent rôle played by Russian chauvinism in the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet leader laid the groundwork in the Soviet Union for a new *Herrenvolk*, a role which is being imposed artificially and forcefully upon non-Russian nationals.

On the other hand, *Pravda*³³ lately enlightened its readers with the idea that "racism, this manhating and mendacious theory of the inequality of people on the basis of various biological characteristics is used by the exploiting classes for class and national oppression, for the enslavement of nations."

Comparing this official statement with the preceding ones no comment is necessary.

SOVIET PATRIOTISM

The synthesis of Russian nationalism and Communist internationalism, which the Soviet theorists failed to achieve in the earlier stages of Soviet history, was finally translated into the notion of Soviet patriotism. The concept appears to be one of the fundamental elements of the present Soviet ideology. A. I. Sobolev asserted that it is the task of the All-Union Communist Party and the Soviet government to bring up the working people in a spirit of Soviet patriotism. The aim of this training, according to Sobolev, is "to eradicate the servility to all that is foreign and to destroy every vestige of moral dependence of Soviet citizens on the

³² *Newsletter*, May 22, 1951, V, Nos. 226-27, p. III. Cf. N. P. Farberov, — "S.S.S.R. — *Obrazetz Mnogonatzionalnogo Gosudarstva*" (U.S.S.R. — *Pattern of a Multi-National State*"), *Sovietskoe Gosudastvo i Pravo*, 1951, No. 2, p. 20.

³³ June 4, 1952.

bourgeoisie" developing meanwhile "the high and noble feeling of pride in their socialist fatherland."⁸⁴

The way in which the concept of Soviet patriotism has arisen, and the ideas constituting its substance are most instructive. Sobolev says: "History has clearly proved that the Russian people have produced the greatest material and moral values with no help whatever from foreigners, even in spite of them, and not under their instructions, but in a struggle with them."⁸⁵ The Soviet Russian achievements consist not only of the Marxist-Leninist theory, the social revolution and its results but also the works of literature, art, music and science, as well as Russian military victories and inventions dating back even to the days when Russia was what the Communists call a bourgeois state. The Russian people are allowed to glory in the cultural values and military victories of its bourgeois past, although the cultural achievements of other bourgeois nations are not only banned from the horizon but are to be eradicated from the mind altogether.

Whereas the new concept is called Soviet patriotism and is intended to apply to the Soviet peoples, a term denoting not only the Russians themselves, but also all the ethnic groups now under Russian sway, it is in substance a purely Russian concept.⁸⁶ According to Stalin patriotism on the part of the other ethnical groups "is based on the peoples' profound devotion and loyalty to their Soviet homeland, on the fraternal partnership of the working people of all nationalities in our land."⁸⁷ Consequently the Russian element dominates the whole picture with hardly any reference to the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union or to their cultural achievements.

Other Soviet nationalities' love of their country, veneration and glorification of their past and their historical heroes are not protected,

⁸⁴ A. I. Sobolev in public lecture delivered in Moscow before the Soviet Society for Political and Scientific Research (*O Sovetskoi Patriotizme (On the Soviet Patriotism)*), Moscow, Publ. by "Pravda", 1947, *passim*).

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁸⁶ Among others, the Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov on February 14, 1945, in a speech to a delegation of prominent Russian emigrees made a deliberate distinction between Soviet patriotism and Russian patriotism (*Novoye Russkoye Slovo*,—(New Russian Word), March 7, 1945).

⁸⁷ Stalin, *O Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine Sovetskogo Soyuz*, p. 135. Notion of patriotism in broad sense has been elucidated as follows: "To be a true patriot of one's country is to be faithful friend of the U.S.S.R. But to make common cause with the imperialists against the U.S.S.R. is to be a traitor to one's national interests. One's attitude towards the country of socialism — the Soviet Union — is the touchstone of loyalty to proletarian internationalism and the national interests of one's country at the same time" (*Bolshevik*, 1952, No. 8, p. 26).

sponsored by law, or fully legalized, but are actually suppressed as being an "ideological perversion"³⁸ if they are contrary to the current Soviet Russian nationalism or to Soviet patriotism.

An example in point is the falsification of the history of the Tartu (Estonia) University. On February 7, 1951, the Tallin radio announced without any hesitation that in preparation for the 150th anniversary of Tartu University a special committee had been formed which was to complete articles on the history of the university and especially to stress the priority of Russian science and research in Estonian higher education. There probably is no Estonian adult who does not remember that in 1932 the Tartu University celebrated the tercentenary of its foundation, attended by representatives of many Western universities, the present Swedish king being the guest of honor. Today's rulers in Estonia, however, do not choose to remember that the Tartu university was founded by the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus IX in 1632 and therefore the university has been reduced in age by 170 years and the Russian Tsar Aleksander I declared its founder; actually he did no more than permit the university to resume its activities after an eighty-year interval.³⁹

An extensive effort has been made to replace earlier Soviet histories of the Mohammedan peoples in the Soviet Union by versions that stress two major points: first, that the annexation of the Moslem peoples, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, by Russia during the Tsarist era was a progressive step in the interests of those peoples, while all popular movements which opposed Russian hegemony are now represented as tools of foreign powers; second, the history of the Soviet Moslem peoples has been rewritten so as to rule out any suggestion that their national and cultural development and traditions were in any way related to those of other Mohammedan groups, such as those in Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. It is maintained that the Soviet Moslem peoples built up their own high cultures.⁴⁰

To illustrate the chicanery of the Soviet regime in regard to other ethnical groups it is advisable to recall two recent events. The prominent Soviet historians, B. Bushuyev, R. Magomedov, N. Krovyakov and others, the *Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*, and the textbooks on the Soviet Union's history for the secondary schools and higher educational institutes, have always considered Muridism and Shamil's movement as a

³⁸ *The New York Times*, September 3, 1951.

³⁹ *Newsletter*, May 22, 1951, Nos. 226-27, V, p. III; September 19, 1952, Nos. 295-96, VI, pp. 157-59.

⁴⁰ *The New York Times*, February 23, 1951.

manifestation of progress and a phenomenon of emancipation. Then in 1950 the Stalin Prize Committee for Literature and Art asked the Council of Ministers of the USSR to annul one of its 1950 awards. The work in question was *From the History of the Public and Philosophical Thought of Azerbaidjan in the 19th Century*, by the Azerbaidjani writer Gaidar Guseinov. The Moscow papers said that after considering proposals advanced by Azerbaidjani public organizations, the committee had decided that Guseinov's work had been written from mistaken political and theoretical positions and had distorted the role played by Shamil, who was a rebel against Tsarist Russia in what is now the Azerbaidjan republic, bordering on Iranian provinces of Azerbaidjan. The committee statement said that the idealization by Guseinov of Shamil's movement constituted "in essence reflections of bourgeois nationalistic wavering and must be decisively condemned." The second example of Russian nationalism prevailing over other nationalities is that the annual Stalin Prize for Literature and Art for 1952 was awarded to Stepan Zlobin for his novel dealing with the noted Russian peasant rebel Stenka Razin.⁴¹

Although both Shamil and Razin, were rebels against the Tsarist regime, both did not belong to the Russian nation, and in this lies the reason for the Soviet regime's duplicity. The insurrection of Razin is applauded on the one hand, because the protagonist is Russian, which on the other hand the revolt of Shamil is condemned because he was non-Russian. Today Muridism has been discovered to have been a tool of the aggressive policy of Turkey and Great Britain in the Northwest Caucasus of the nineteenth century, and a most reactionary religious movement as well as a manifestation of Islam's struggling.⁴²

Similarly the All-Union Communist Party Central Committee severely criticized the glorification of the Golden Horde leader as a national hero in the Volga Tatar autonomous republic.⁴³

⁴¹ M. D. Bagirov, "K Voprosu o Kharaktere Dvizheniya Myuridizma i Shamilya" ("The Character of the Muridism's and Shamil's Movement"), *Bolshevik*, 1950, No. 13, pp. 21-2. Cf. *The New York Times*, May 15, 1950, and March 15, 1952. — *Pravda*, August 13, 1951, once again took up the cudgels against the appearance of what is called "bourgeois nationalism" in Soviet literature. It said that more "backsliding" had been discovered in the literature of the Kazakhstan, Azerbaidjan, Armenian and Estonian republics.

⁴² "Muridism, being the child of frenzied Moslem fanaticism, was used as an instrument for aggression and a device for the enslavement of peoples, and had never had anything in common with the interest of the working people... Exposure of this reactionary role of Muridism is of topical importance in our time... (*The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, February 23, 1952, IV, No. 2, pp. 11-12-).

⁴³ *Bolshevik*, 1944, Nos. 19-20, p. 57.

Soviet historians have undertaken another major reassessment of history, this time dealing with the Crimea and designed to eliminate "distortions," "absolote and untrue propositions," and "mistaken views," principally concerning the respective roles of the Slavs and Tatars in that region. The question of the general revision of Crimean history was taken up at a three-day conference of historians held at Simferopol in the Crimea under the leadership of Academician B. D. Grekov, one of the leading Soviet historians.⁴⁴

The Soviet regime's offensive "to raise the cultural level" in the border republics is proceeding at an undiminished pace. The All-Union Communist Party's Central Committee, pointing out both the extremely limited nature of the theater repertoire in the Union and the constituent republics, and "the passion of the local dramatists for themes from distant past," directed that "translations be made of the best works of Soviet dramatists into the languages of the various nationalities and included in the repertoires of the localities."⁴⁵ This evident trend of Russification of non-Russian republics is called today by the Kremlin "brotherly cultural help" to the non-Russian peoples.

The official anti-Semitism of the Soviet Union comes directly from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, since the attacks are spread throughout the Soviet press, in Moscow as well as in the provinces. The following quotation from *Pravda*⁴⁶ is typical:

"Homeless cosmopolites who know nothing of creative labor or of truth and honor, have crept into our editorial offices, scientific institutions and universities. They are people who feel no duty toward

⁴⁴ *The New York Times*, June 9, -952.

It is obvious that the Russian people had no relation to Crimea because Russia proper is separated from Crimea by the over thousand miles wide territory of Ukraine. It is evident that all cultural, political and economical relations of East-European continent with the peninsula of Crimea can refer exclusively to Ukraine. In order to abscond this Russian Academician Grekov uses the word "Slaves" — meaning Russians. (*Ed.*).

⁴⁵ *Bolshevik*, 1944, Nos. 19-20, p. 57. — In March 1952, a seminar for dramatists from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Karelia and Moldavia was arranged at Dubulti, on the Riga seashore. The writers were trained by the specialists from Moscow: Stain, Kron, Simonov, Glebov, etc. Fr. Rokpelnis, director of the Art Board of the Council of Ministers of the Latvian S.S.R., wound up saying: "In these we again see the unceasing care of the All-Union Communist Party and the great Russian people for artistic progress in the brotherly republics. We are taken up by the hand led through dazzling mines of precious stones — take what you will, all belongs to you, you will get rich and at the same time you will enrich Soviet art!" (*Cina* — Official organ of Latvia's Communist Party, April 13, 1952).

⁴⁶ March 5, 1949.

the nation, the state or the Party. It is our urgent task, therefore, to smoke these bourgeois cosmopolites out of their holes because these individuals without a people or a country hinder the development of Soviet literature."

The anti-Semitic character of this campaign is seen in the lists of "cosmopolites" printed in the newspapers.⁴⁷ Furthermore, if a Jewish critic, artist, or scientist has a Russian-sounding pseudonym, it has become customary to insert his real name in parenthesis.

It is significant that Jews are no longer admitted to schools of diplomacy, to military academies, or to schools of advanced study. Jews are no longer to be permitted to be members of Soviet delegations and foreign missions. There are no longer any Jews among the generals usually mentioned in the Soviet press today, although during the war there were no fewer than one hundred Jewish generals. The Jewish diplomats are no longer mentioned, though they once held important positions in the Foreign Ministry. It is possible that they have already been deported.⁴⁸ From the policy of elimination of the Jews the Russian chauvinistic government has passed to one of perfection; the arrest of Jewish doctors in Moscow, the Slansky trial in Prague, the condemnation of Zionism as equal to the Ukrainian or other „bourgeois nationalisms," prove the trend of Russian nationalistic policy at present.

The findings on the equality of the rights of Soviet nationalities, irrespective of race, may be summarized as follows:

1. The privileged position of the Russian language and the legalized and officially promoted Russian neo-nationalism contradict the doctrine of Lenin and the constitution, and constitute an eloquent proof that in the Soviet Union renascent chauvinism has submerged the dogmas of Communism.

2. The Soviet regime, by destroying national cultural traditions, by making every effort to blunt the sense of national history, and by trying to change the national language, spoken and written, of subject nations, effects what amounts to a carefully-planned Russification of ethnic groups, and imperils the roots of the very existence of these nations.

3. Russian neo-nationalism, equipped with a glorified history and an ideology containing elements of militant nationalism and internationalism, is stronger and more dangerous now than ever before.

⁴⁷ *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, March 9 and 12, 1949; *Pravda*, March 21, 1949.

⁴⁸ Gregor Arenson, *Soviet Russia and the Jews*, New York 1949, p. 35.

THE CONFERENCE OF UKRAINIAN AND GERMAN PSYCHOLOGISTS

(Report of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich)

This Conference held on March 7-8, 1953, was arranged by the Psychological Institute of the Ukrainian Free University with the German psychologists, i. e. the strongest regional group (Bavarian) of the Professional Society of German Psychologists which has its centre in the same place as the Ukrainian Free University (UFU).

This may be regarded as not only a theoretical scientific accomplishment, but as one of the examples of the application of scientific research to "psychological warfare." Its subject was the pressing question of the "*Opposition of the East and the West in the light of psychology.*" Since both "hemispheres" separated by the "iron curtain" are reckoning with the possibility of World War III, psychological research and especially on the psychology of the peoples must play an important role. Military strategy must turn to account the psychic qualities of the peoples of the West and those of the East. This will permit the strengthening of the internal union of the allies and at the same time the weakening of the opposition of the enemy by deepening his internal contradictions. It is therefore now important to study the questions which determine the psychologies of the West and East.

The initiative in arranging the conference was taken by the Ukrainian psychologists. Present German psychology is traditionally on a high level and the entire scientific world pays attention to the German scholars. The idea of the conference came from the Secretary of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Dr. V. Yaniv, who had special qualifications for arranging it as he has been for many years a member of the Professional Society of German Psychologists and has taken part in all of their five post-war meetings.

On the German side, the work was undertaken by Dr. L. Zeise, the head of the Bavarian regional group and sometimes head of the entire Professional Society of German Psychologists.

The program was so arranged that there were three groups of papers, which supplemented each other — one by a Ukrainian and the other by a German. Beside the basic groups, there were two other Ukrainian speakers with additional papers on themes which were especially in-

teresting from the point of view of Ukrainian research. The background of the conference was presented by Prof. I. Mirchuk, the rector of the UFU, who opened the sessions with a scholarly paper on the "Cultural and Historical Role of Ukraine as an intermediary between East and West."

The program was as follows:

Prof. O. Kulchytsky: The problem of the understanding of international spiritual life and the question of the reconciliation of peoples.

Prof. A. Fetter: The spiritual basis of to-day's international tension.

That afternoon there met simultaneously two sessions; the General Meeting of the Bavarian regional group of the Professional Society of German Psychologists (the head of which was again Dr. Zeise) and also a scientific meeting with two Ukrainian lecturers:

Dr. E. Smalko: The position of the philosophy of Skovoroda in the psychology of world ideas in the light of the opposition of East and West.

Prof. O. Kulchytsky: Occidental and non-occidental components in the spirit of Ukrainian individuality.

The second plenary session had two further "pairs" of lecturers:

Prof. H. Vashchenko: The study of psychology in the USSR.

Dr. G. R. Lukkert: The present outline of psychology in the USA.

Dr. V. Yaniv: The opposition of East and West in the light of psychology.

Dr. L. Zeise: The overcoming of the tension between East and West as a psychological problem.

The general discussion on the papers lasted an hour and a half. The discussion was led by Prof. I. Mirchuk.

About 100 Ukrainian and German scholars took part in the conference. The conference was greeted by the Bavarian Prime Minister, and was reported on the Bavarian radio.

The lectures were on a high level and the whole impression was so satisfactory that it received high approval from all the participants. Both the Germans and the Ukrainians emphasized that the cooperation thus begun so happily and successfully should be continued consistently and extended to other fields of knowledge.

H. CON. RESOLUTION 58

A SOLID TEST OF AMERICAN INITIATIVE IN THE COLD WAR

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

"Whenever they (Russians) zig, we zag," declared former Defense Secretary Lovett in his apt characterization of American foreign policy before a Senate committee two months ago. The passive art of zagging that has been, and unfortunately seems to continue to be, the monopoly of the State Department under the perpetuated dominance of the zagistic containment crowd is the very thing the great majority of the American people were determined to eliminate at the polls last November. During the campaign they were repeatedly and in assuring and explicit language promised the substitute and imaginative art of zigging, so that whenever we zig, the Russian Communist would zag. The result proved that they responded to this major promise in the most resounding way, but the unfolding record still shows that this promise is yet to be realized. The mere reactive utterances of "back up your words with deeds" which govern the psychology of the present in our relations with the mortal enemy, are in essence not of the diplomatic species of zigging but rather that of the usual zagging. Again, in their "peace offensive" the Russians zigged, and we, with little show of tangible initiative, just zagged.

THE SMITH RESOLUTION—A POTENT DIPLOMATIC ZIG

House Concurrent Resolution 58 is sponsored by Representative Lawrence H. Smith of Wisconsin who, as one writer puts it, suggests we play some diplomatic poker with the Soviet Union by proposing the establishment of American diplomatic missions in Kiev and Minsk which are the capitals of Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia, nations that we recognize in the United Nations. The proposed resolution reads: "That it is the sense of the Congress that the Government of the United States in support of a policy of liberation should proceed to establish direct diplomatic relations with the Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Government of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and in the creation of posts of representation in the capitals of Kiev and Minsk, respectively, consistent with diplomatic procedure in such matters."

On the surface the resolution appears to be an appeasing gesture, but when thought is given to its background and implications, it is, as Felix Morley describes it, "a clever legislative proposal, well calculated to create difficulties for Soviet Russia..."¹ At the moment the resolution is pigeonholed in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. However, there is good reason to believe that the growing interest in this proposal over the past month will lead to formal hearings on the subject. Many who have bothered to reflect on this proposed diplomatic zig are convinced that Congressman Smith's resolution constitutes the first solid test of an American initiative in the cold war. Investigating the reaction to it at the State Department, Mr. Morley learned that "2 months after the introduction of the resolution it has been discovered by the State Department. And several alert officials there are of the opinion that the proposal should be seriously pressed... Now policy planners at the State Department are saying: 'Why didn't we think of that ourselves?'"²

These disclosures are most encouraging for those who voted in November for an Administration that would have the courage and imagination to initiate diplomatic zigs instead of zags. If it is true that the new policy planners in the State Department see in the Smith resolution the great advantage "that for once it would put the Kremlin on the defensive and give the West the opportunity to call the tune," then one should expect little delay in its formal support by the Department in order that its meaning and significance may be further generalized for public discussion and approval. This step would represent a marked departure from the unimaginative and timid position assumed by their predecessors, and undoubtedly dispel the lingering impression that no basic change in thought and orientation has taken place in the determining make-up of the Department. It would serve notice that in its dedication to a more dynamic foreign policy, it will not passively await any Soviet deeds to justify hollow words of peace. Indeed, it would point to the fact that the most effective course open to us is the selection of deeds we want them to perform in order that, regardless of their performance or not a *net advantage* will nonetheless accrue to our advancing position in the cold war.

This sensible rule of net advantage for an advancing position in the cold war is almost perfectly served by the Smith resolution. In fact it is made to order. The contents of the bill are historically founded and skilfully arranged to precipitate a Soviet predicament. Also, by nature the bill is not predicated on any particular climate of relations in the

¹ "Three Envoys to Russia," Barron's, April 13, 1953.

² "Diplomatic Poker in the Cold War," Congressional Record, April 23, 1953, p. A2251-2.

cold war, but rather is adaptable to varying situations punctuated by the presence or absence of any Soviet "peace offensive." In short, the Smith resolution is in substance a potent diplomatic zig, capable of causing much zagging *within* the Soviet Russian empire.

10 POINTERS ON WE ZIG, THEY ZAG

The soundest way of perceiving the full import of this potent diplomatic zig is by treating and answering the typical questions raised by people in various walks of life when they have had a chance to read the intriguing Smith resolution. These questions and reactions appear to group themselves into ten general types which I regard from much conversation and discussion on the subject as the ten pointers on House Concurrent Resolution 58—or "We zig, they zag." Doubtlessly at this point you are pondering over one or more seeming objections and criticisms to the resolution calling for "We zig, they zag." Well, let us see whether your doubt is represented by one of these questions and can be securely resolved by the answer given to it.

1. *Is not the Smith resolution an appeasement gesture toward the Soviet aggressors?*

No. On the contrary, it is the very opposite. It is obviously not without good reason that the resolution itself refers to a policy of liberation, the spirit of which has been manifestly conveyed by President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, numerous other leaders of the Administration, and many Democratic spokesmen. The resolution penetrates the front-yard of the imperialist Russian base by concerning itself with the two most unstable and sensitive national areas in the entire Soviet Russian Empire. Such demonstrated interest in the weakest links of the Soviet imperialist chain could only produce apprehension and grave concern in the Kremlin. By word and content the resolution definitely places the Soviet rulers on the spot, and however they choose to zag, the net advantage, as measured by the penetration of a double-edge razor into their propaganda fabric, cannot but be ours.

2. *We refuse to recognize Communist China, so why should we recognize the Soviet Ukraine and Byelorussia?*

Because the two cases are by no means parallel. The fact is that we already recognize these two Soviet republics in the United Nations, while we resist similar recognition of Communist China in the same body. The legal framework which differentiates the two cases is really the justifying basis of the resolution, and the provision immediately preceding the body of the resolution itself alludes to this. It reads: "Whereas it is clearly incongruous from every viewpoint to maintain the recognition by this Government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and

the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic in the United Nations without the peace-oriented opportunity to establish direct diplomatic concourse with their respective capitals of Kiev and Minsk: Now, therefore, be it Resolved. . .” Of course this legal argument is not sufficient in itself to warrant the step recommended in the resolution, but it obviously answers this and similar questions of criticism, as, for example, the following one.

3. *Would not this proposal pave the way for more Soviet representation in the U. N. and other international organizations?*

No, since none of the other non-Russian republics in the Soviet Union enjoy current recognition in the U.N. There is no ground for argument that the Soviets would be justified on the basis of this resolution in pressing for the representation of their other republics for, as emphasized before, the resolution is conceived solely within the present legal framework of our recognition of the two republics in the U.N. Resistance against any such efforts can be effectively founded on this crucial fact.

4. *Very well, now what can we gain with two more Ambassadors in the U.S.S.R.?*

A tremendous leverage for our maneuvers in the cold war. That is, of course, if the Soviet sponsors of the “peace offensive” are willing to accept this grounded offer of peaceable relations. Remember, for the reasons given and in contrast to the other republics, Ukraine and Byelorussia are surrounded by steel curtains behind the Iron Curtain. Their capitals are the only “U.N. capitals”—capitals of countries represented in the United Nations—to which diplomats of the free countries have absolutely no access. Thus, as a prediction, it is improbable that the Kremlin would allow this hazardous breach in its steel curtains about the two critical areas from which all foreigners have been and are strictly barred.

However, should this assumption prove to be incorrect, we stand to gain immeasurably by acquiring additional listening posts and, from the viewpoint of psychological advantage, by magnetizing the hopeful support of two rabidly anti-Moscow populations. With regard to the former, Kiev and Minsk are about 300 miles apart and nearly 500 miles from Moscow. The obvious advantage of this geographical factor is that with alert observers stationed in these two capitals, much could be learned about developments in the western non-Russian periphery of the Soviet Union. Significant, too, are the facts that Minsk is closer to the Baltic area, while Kiev lies in the shadows of Rumania and the Balkans. And the sources of information could be multiplied. With reference to the basic non-Russian populations of the two republics, the Byelorussian Central Council captures the significance of the resolution

in its authoritative endorsement of it when it states that "Resolution No. 58 is demonstrating an equitable liberation policy of America for nationalities oppressed in the U.S.S.R." ³

5. *Good, but what benefits do we derive if they refuse to accept our offer for peaceful relations?*

The benefits that we would derive in the probable event of a Soviet refusal are almost equivalent in force to those hinging on Soviet acceptance. One, this step will undoubtedly produce an acute embarrassment for the highly vocal, puppet delegation representing the Soviet Ukraine and Byelorussia in the U.N. In fact, we will have gained a powerful propaganda weapon. As Bob Considine evaluates the resolution in his syndicated column, "It would put Russia on the spot in a variety of ways." ⁴ This surely is one of the ways.

Second, a Soviet refusal would provide an additional lie to its protestations of peace on which we stand to capitalize throughout the entire free world. Third, this circumstance will formally expose the fraud built on the alleged independence of these two major, captive non-Russian nations in the Union — Ukraine itself being the largest non-Russian nation behind the Iron Curtain. This does not imply that Soviet acceptance of the offer would constitute a verification of the genuine sovereignty and independence of these two states. With American Ambassadors in Kiev and Minsk, Ukraine and Byelorussia would functionally be no more independent and sovereign than are Poland and Hungary. From a formal and nominal viewpoint the fraud would be cast in double relief by the expected rejection of this peaceable intention.

Either way, the simple posing of this problem to the Soviets will unquestionably reflect the beginning of a seasoned American recognition of the tremendous power resident in the centrifugal forces operative within the fabric of the Soviet Union and best represented by two of the large non-Russian nations in that forcibly contrived entity. Should they accept the proposal, the two enslaved peoples would be heartened and encouraged by our interest. Should they reject the proposal, the reaction of the peoples concerned would still be the same. Either way, the advantages would accrue in our favor. Signaling in concrete and specific form our interest in the eventual freedom of these two nations, the resolution will, through underground and other media, serve to offset the spurious propaganda now being circulated in these areas to the effect that their hopes and aspirations lie with Moscow rather than Washington, and to a great degree will solidify their natural alliance with us.

³ Congressional Record, May 12, 1953, p. A2642.

⁴ "Encouragement for Slaves," *The New York Journal American et. al.*, April 27, 1953.

6. *Did not the British Government attempt this in 1947 and failed?*

Not exactly. Although the British Government made certain gestures in this same general direction, its meager effort was by no means exerted along the lines of strategic psychological advantage as proposed in the Smith resolution, nor were they at all formalized in terms of the data which are cleverly incorporated in the resolution. The animus and the substance of the British attempt were wholly different. Had it been otherwise, in the way projected here, it could not reasonably have failed.

7. *On refusing our offer, will not the Soviet Government distort this whole matter to the detriment of our real interest in the peoples of Ukraine and Byelorussia?*

To say the least, we should expect such action on the part of the Muscovites. But this should deter us by no means. It is part of the battle of ideas and cunning, truth and falsehood, and the fundamental elements are beyond peradventure of doubt in our favor. For example, we can profit from the evaluated testimonies of recent non-Russian Soviet escapees and refugees that in these hostile areas a heavy percentage of Soviet news material bearing on events in the Western world is discounted and even inverted to attain factual truth. This is facilitated by the element of contradiction when Western radios—VOA, Italian, BBC, Spanish Radio Nationale etc.—penetrate to contradict directly official Soviet newscasts.

In addition to the active penetration by such Western media, underground channels will prove most resourceful in conveying the whole truth to the people. This would fit in perfectly with the views recently expressed by Secretary of State Dulles on the necessity for accelerated propaganda behind the Iron Curtain.

Moreover, it should not be overlooked that the latitude of distortion is determined to a measurable degree by the essence of the proposal, and in this case, formed almost entirely on data drawn from Soviet sources, the resolution lends itself to only a small margin of distortion. As a rule, Soviet propaganda observes the line of consistency, and does not relish excessive indulgence in self-contradiction.

It has been contended that should the Soviet Government reject this proposal in the name of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Governments, this would maintain the fiction of the latter's independence and consequently nullify one of the propaganda benefits mentioned above. This is a misleading objection. For it is common knowledge among the captive peoples themselves that these Governments are no more independent of the dictates of Moscow than are the Governments of Poland, Hungary etc. Therefore, a refusal through such means, regardless of all the fabrications surrounding it, would have rather affirmative effects.

8. *Would the accrued benefits justify the costs of maintaining two more Ambassadors in the Soviet Union?*

They would more than justify them. The general arguments presented here should convince one of this. Of course with a background of knowledge and understanding of these two major areas in East Europe, one would not be disposed even to entertain this question. He would recall from captured German documents and numerous other sources of indisputable evidence the strategic importance of Ukraine alone in any world conflict, be it hot or cold. He would reread the authoritative account by Erich Kern who in his work, "*The Dance of Death*," explains the critical defeat of Germany in East Europe in the determining statement that the "millions of Ukrainians, who by themselves could have turned the scales in the east, were not only being left unused, but were actually being repulsed and disillusioned." To be sure, this is only a small part of the mountain of evidence that exists in connection with this country's invincible fight for freedom and independence. But it surely is enough to demonstrate the inappropriateness of this question.

The argument encased in this question is scarcely tenable at a time when—as President Eisenhower rightly pointed out in his inaugural address—we find ourselves in the greatest state of peril conceivable. The Smith resolution points to an extremely sensitive area—significantly, one situated at the very heart of the Soviet Russian Empire. Need more be said about the insignificant costs of ambassadorial maintenance. However, for the record, it might be stated that this argument emerged from high quarters under the present administration.

9. *Wait now, will not the presence of two more Soviet missions in the U. S. increase our internal danger?*

Not really. As a matter of fact when the U.N. Assembly is in session, the delegation of Ukraine and Byelorussia establish themselves as independent missions in New York. Any opportunity they might have to engage in espionage, in a sense already exists. On the merits of the case one cannot, however, compare two additional American Embassies in the Soviet Union, situated in Kiev and Minsk, with two more Iron Curtain Embassies in Washington, certainly not from the viewpoint of impact on and importance to the specific peoples involved. Again one must remind himself that it is not without reason that air-tight restrictions are maintained against the presence of foreigners in these two sensitive areas of Ukraine and Byelorussia. The environments of the respective Embassies are not in the least similar, and the area of contacts for American missions in Ukraine and Byelorussia is virtually virgin territory, while that of a Ukrainian and Byelorussian Embassy in Wash-

ington has surely been exploited beyond the point of diminishing returns by the already established Soviet Embassy.

And certainly not to be overlooked is the advantage of such a position at a time when the Soviets are pressing for the admission of Red China in the U.N. Not that our opposition to this is without foundation today, but that our position can become stronger, especially in the eyes of our allies, by the clever use of complicating issues such as the Smith resolution is capable of creating to the disbenefit of the Soviets.

10. *Speaking of allies, how would they react to the Smith resolution?*

It would seem quite favorably. After all, the resolution constitutes on our part an open intention to establish peaceful relations with the capitals of two allegedly independent states which we now recognize as members of the U.N. Indeed, it opens the way for them to do likewise. Moreover, they cannot help but recognize that this resolution will serve as a valid test of the currently publicized intentions of peace on the part of the Soviet Union. Also, as intimated above, the probable consequence of this resolution may provide us the necessary leverage of argument for the continued denial of Red China's admission into the U.N. While we might appear to be thrown on the defensive concerning this issue of Red China's admission, we undoubtedly will have the Soviet Union on the defensive concerning the issue of Ukraine and Byelorussia. The two issues might conceivably offset each other, and this would be a benefit to us under the conditions that appear in the offing.

NOTHING TO LOSE, EVERYTHING TO GAIN

By now in thinking through on this resolution you are probably possessed with the feeling that actually there is nothing for us to lose and, within possibilities in the case, there is everything to gain. You are not alone with this feeling. For example, serious-minded students of the Georgetown University International Relations Club arrived at this feeling, and addressed a number of questions to the Ukrainian and Byelorussian delegates at the U. N.⁵ Result? — as anticipated, no reply.⁶ These "independent" spokesmen could not decide whether their "independent" countries are open to American diplomatic representation. In a sense, unofficially we zigged and couldn't even zag. To make possible an official zig requires first the attention of the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee who, it is hoped, will view the resolution as one editor has: "it deserves a better fate than to be laid on the shelf. It should be studied on its merits."⁷

⁵ Washington Star, May 18, 1953.

⁶ Congressional Record, May 25, 1953, pp. A3067-69.

⁷ The Democrat and Chronicle, March 30, 1935, Rochester, N. Y. (Editorial).

MY JOURNEY TO KOLYMA

By PETRO KOLYMSKY

When I was ordered to gather up my things in the Tyurpid of the NKVD of the UkSSR, everyone in the room, including myself, thought that I was going home and so they at once began to give me their addresses. All thought this, because I was the only one in the room who had not testified against himself, and no one would admit that if a prisoner had denied everything, he would be condemned. Later all were convinced of their mistake. Instead of going home, I was transferred to the Lukyanivka Prison of the city of Kiev.

IN LUKYANIVKA PRISON

Just as on the first day of my arrest, I went through the whole system of control, and of search. I was stripped naked and all my wretched things were carefully examined; then I was ordered to dress and taken through a courtyard to a building called the spetskorpus — special unit.

On entering, I was surprised that no windows were to be seen in this building. Instead of windows there were hanging outside iron wedge shaped shutters, called vizors. I was taken to room 5 on the fourth floor usually called the collector. When I entered the room, I was surprised to see the sense of the vizors. These were iron coverings of the windows which at the top were 30-35 cm. from the windows and were tightly fastened to the wall at the bottom. If a person was standing more than 2-3 metres from the window, he could not see out, even the sky. To see the sky, he had to walk right up to the window but even then he could see only the sky and nothing on the ground. Only a little band of daylight fell from above and weakly lighted the space under the window. Even in bright sunlight, it was half-dark in the rooms.

The room which I entered was several times larger than the tyurpid and there were many people in it. The next day after the check, the count showed 47. Just as in the tyurpid there were only in the spetskorpus "enemies of the people", who were undergoing investigation or

waiting for sentencing. Around the walls of the room were couches in pairs and between each pair a space of 15-20 cm. There were in all 27 cots and 47 prisoners. So at night 2 prisoners lay on each cot. On each cot there was only a mattress and nothing else, while in the tyurpid there had been all the necessary bed furnishings.

On the second day all the inmates of the room were taken out for a walk in the court of the prison, the area which was assigned to large rooms. It was a raised and elongated eclipse in the centre of which stood two large tree stumps. We had several prisoners who had been arrested in March and April, 1937. They had been in the Lukyanivka the whole time and until July, they had taken their walk in the shadow of two luxurious chestnut trees which had been growing there for decades. In the spring of 1937 the centre was planted with flowers around which the prisoners walked under the guard of bayonets.

One day, however, in the beginning of July, 1937, when they went out for their walk, the prisoners missed the chestnuts and the flowers. The trees had been cut down level with the earth and the flowers had been torn up by their roots the same night. However, the strong roots of the chestnuts still continued their old function of providing water. Almost to the end of the summer the ground around the stumps was damp. The prisoners called them "the weeping stumps" which were sorrowing for human sufferings, and there were many prisoners who wept like little children in unison with the "weeping stumps".

When the vizors were put on the windows of the spetskorpus, which looked into the prisoners' courtyard, there was no sense in closing them. That was the period of the mad black reaction of the Stalin regime when absolutely innocent people were deprived of their liberty and everything that was like human life. It referred to what the renegade Ukrainian P. Lyubchenko had said in May, 1937, namely, that it was necessary to arrange such conditions that absolutely innocent people would never forget them till their death. It was not in vain that there was spread legally on the walls of the prison and secretly under the conditional "liberty" the phrase: *"He who had not been here, will be, and he who has been will never forget."* Actually any one who did not commit an anti-governmental or anti-human crime, but fell into the tortures of the NKVD will never forget it so long as he lives.

In comparison with the tyurpid or the solitary cells of the spetskorpus, there was a somewhat easier regime in the large rooms. The individuals who went at night for examination, could during the day crawl under the bed and get enough sleep to stand the coming sleepless night in the office of the investigator. There as in the tyurpid or the solitary cells, it was impossible to do this, for the guard waked one every

2-3 minutes. As a result the prisoners in the large rooms made their confessions not under the pressure of sleeplessness but of savage tortures.

In the Lukyanivka prison as a whole there was an easier regime than in the tyurpid. Although the tyurpid was clean and the beds had the necessary furnishings, there was less food. All the prisoners felt the terrors of hunger, for the actual food was only 600 grams of bread and they received nothing else but water. In the Lukyanivka they received 600 grams of bread, 20 gr. of sugar, tea twice a day and some thick soup each day. So the transfer from the tyurpid to the Lukyanivka must be considered the prisoner's good fortune.

THE FORMING OF THE DETACHMENT

Dec. 5, 1937, I was again called from the room with my things into the corridor. For the first time since my arrest I met other unknown prisoners from other rooms. I was surprised that they did not conceal them from me but vice versa. We were collected in the fourth corridor to the number of 30 and taken downstairs, where there were about 80 men. All the prisoners there had been called with their things. At once we felt a new period in our prison life. Usually we were taken to a collecting point and savagely forbidden to speak aloud. Now no one objected if we spoke in normal tones.

From the spetskorpus we were taken to the general prison the so-called detachment corridor. We were taken into a room of about 70 sq. metres, which under normal conditions was assigned for 18-20 men. In the room there were no beds or tables but by the door was a toilet and a tank of water. There were over 100 men in the room. No one of the prisoners had ever been in such a crowd. But this was not the end. About 8 o'clock in the evening, so many more people were crowded in that there was no room to sit and it was necessary to stand. By 11 o'clock the room was so jammed that it was impossible to turn around, for the bodies were so crowded together on all sides that they were subjected to the movement of the general mass.

Among us were men with stomach trouble who often could not wait to force their way to the toilet, for to do it required good strength and considerable time. As a result there was so much foul air in the room that before 8. A.M., 29 had fainted. The only medical help for these unfortunates was to be carried into the corridor where they recovered in the fresh air, only to be shoved back into the same room.

In such a crowded position there was no question of sleeping either day or night. No one slept, although it was possible in the press to be suspended between the bodies and doze for one or two minutes.

The night was passed in this standing and crowded position and was very hard on all the prisoners. At 8 A.M. we were allowed to go into the assembly room and at the same time were checked. The result showed that there were 279 men in a room assigned for 18-20. That meant 4 people to one sq. metre. In spite of the filth in the assembly room, it was a pleasant experience for us, for it was large and we did not feel as crowded as in the room. Our limbs in a standing position all night found a good rest. Many prisoners, leaning against the wall, slept for few minutes. The cold water used for washing gave us back our strength and we passed the day more cheerfully.

When we were sent back into the room they gave us at the entrance bread for the whole day. In the room near the door beside the toilet was a tank of tea, but there were not more than 40 cups. When all were in, those who were nearest the door, drank tea normally and then began to pass it over the heads of the prisoners for those who were further away. More tea was spilled on the heads of the prisoners than was drunk. Those in the corners received almost no tea or soup.

In this crowded state we spent 2 days. These were relieved by standing in the offices of the investigators. The second night of our crowded existence we attempted to sit in turn on the floor. One quarter sat, and the three quarters stood. Every hour those who were sitting stood up and another quarter sat down. This went on all night. The sick were placed near the toilet and so the second night passed somewhat more easily. The third day we were taken to the assembly room to prepare the detachment for travel. All passed through a medical commission which acted only formally. The prisoners were stripped to the waist. The doctors glanced at them and ordered them to dress. Those who complained of illness, received no answer. Many suffered from tuberculosis or had ruptures but no attention was paid to these and on the medical blanks there was stamped "healthy".

From the medical office we passed to the photographic room. Every one was photographed in front view and profile with the corresponding prison number. From there we went to be fingerprinted. There in five copies were taken finger prints of both hands, first with the fingers together and then of each finger separately.

Then we were sent to a large room in the middle of which was a table with 2 men seated at it. There we were told to sign a long list of some 60-70 pages. In this were written our names and surnames, and opposite them was usually the number 10 and more rarely 8. Many prisoners asked the authorities what we were signing but the answer was that we would find out later. Some refused to sign and they were not compelled to do so. We saw that we were being prepared for a

journey and each understood that without any trial or impartial investigation we were being shipped to an unknown region and so no one tried to guess the mystery of the list

THE PREPARATION FOR THE SIBERIAN JOURNEY

After signing, we were told that we were being sent from the Kiev prison and that we should collect our private belongings that were in the storeroom. All the prisoners went there and so did I for I felt that my wife must have given me some warm clothes. So I asked for them. The assistant to the chief of the prison, Egorov, answered that my wife had given me up as an "enemy of the people" and had left nothing for me. So they gave me nothing, although my wife had left in October in the Lukyanivka prison a full set of winter clothing which was returned to her in May, 1938. I did not believe the story of Egorov about my wife but I assumed: 1) that she had been arrested and sent away from Kiev or 2) that she had been forbidden to leave anything for me.

In the evening of December 8th we were placed in freight cars at the Lukyanivka station. The doors of the cars were open and it was as cold inside as outdoors. In the middle of each car was an iron stove but there was no coal or wood in the car. On both sides were two tiers of bunks so that 44 men could be crowded into the usual 16 ton car. The packing of the people in the car reminded us of the last stage of the preparation of the detachment. In the unheated car, however, it was even better for the people crowded together and kept one another warm all night.

Before dawn the train passed through the main station of Kiev to the freight station. Despite the early hour, we saw through the window of the car a great mass of women and children who had come in the hope of seeing their relatives. There were some 5,000 in the crowd. They stood on a broad square about 70-90 metres from our train. Many in our car looked in the crowd for their family or friends and by shouting established contact with them. I knew that if my wife had not been arrested, she was working and I made it my object to inform her that I was on the train in Kiev. One of the prisoners in the car, Chaykivsky, had a small piece of lead pencil hidden. On a scrap of paper I wrote: "Am in the Kiev freight station, bring me warm clothing." There was no way of sending this message legally, for we were forbidden to have any contact with our families. No one from the crowd came near the train, for between it and them walked men of the NKVD with dogs about 25-30 metres apart. At 10 o'clock they brought some coal to the car. I took a small piece, fastened my note to it and flung it violently through the

window toward the crowd. It fell between an NKVD man and the crowd. The people in the crowd saw the note in the air but the NKVD man noticed it only after it struck the ground. He rushed for it and so did a boy of 8-9 years. The boy reached it first and disappeared with it in the crowd. That evening the boy's mother brought it to my wife.

The note brought my family both joy and despair. — Joy, because they knew that I was alive, and despair, because I was being taken off without warm clothing, which was already in the prison storeroom. With the help of neighbors and friends, they collected some warm things and at 10 P. M. my wife took them to the station. I recognized her at once and called from the car but the guard at once drove her away.

THE LONG UNKNOWN JOURNEY

The next day my wife came while it was dark, but as previous evening was not allowed near the car. She was told to bring my clothing next day. On the third day she was told that they would accept articles for all prisoners at noon but we left Kiev at 11 A.M. So I started without warm clothing on my long unknown journey. When all was finally ready, our train consisted of 87 freight and 4 passenger cars.

GOOD-BY MY DEAR UKRAINE!

When our train pulled out of Kiev, it proceeded to the station of Bakhmach without a stop. There it waited 10 minutes and its next stop was at Voronezh beyond the borders of Ukraine.

The commander of the train apparently had orders to get us as rapidly as possible out of our native land. The thousands of people at the station in Kiev and the 3500 prisoners on the train did not know where they were being taken, on what charge and for how many years. When we had left Ukraine, the train began to move slowly. At Voronezh we waited more than 16 hours, before we went on. At Penza we stayed a whole day. On the fifth day of our trip we passed the high stone boundary column between Asia and Europe, the Ural Mountains.

When we passed Zlatoust and Chelyabinsk, we were in real Siberia as was shown by the landscape around us. The cold was already 40° Celsius. The cars were unheated and the wind blew in on all sides. It was so cold that the exposed parts of our bodies began to swell. The inside of the car was covered with a coating of ice which served to keep the car warm. We could of course heat the car but this required a lot of coal and we were only given 12 kilograms a day. The staff of the train were criminals from the Kiev prison. They used to bring us coal and bread and water. To have enough coal, beyond the Urals we began to

sell the staff various articles in return for more coal. This helped us, so that the car was kept more or less warm.

If we ate badly in the prison, the food on the journey was several times worse. We were given a hot dish once in 3-4 days. Daily we had bread and water. If any one had any coins, he could get bread from a workman. I had no money and I began to sell my last possessions. This helped me, for I could get a little additional bread. Each person who bought anything gave a certain amount to those who had nothing, and there were seven or eight such persons in the car.

The 44 men were distributed in the car, 11 to a bunk. In the centre between them 5 men could lie with difficulty and so we slept in turns. Some slept and others sat on their legs and vice versa. If the five lay down, they were so crowded that no one could turn over separately. All lay on their side and all turned according to the movements of one of the sleepers.

During the journey there was a great deal of spare time and to occupy it with something, we began to tell a cycle of stories from our own and foreign literatures. Bertran, an electrical engineer, began a series of lectures on his profession. Geologists told us of the geological structure of the Far Eastern district and these were to some degree useful when the men were digging ballast for the railroad in the Far East and getting out gold in Kolyma.

Peasants from the Ayutynsky, Vasytkivsky, Berezansky, and Bilotserkivsky regions told us of the difficulties of life on the kolhosps and why they were arrested. All had belonged to kolhosps, some as ordinary workers, others as brigadiers, and still others as heads of kolhosps and they had done nothing which would separate them from the other members. All were considered Ukrainian nationalists, although they had done nothing to overthrow the Communist government. All as one man, affirmed that they had never belonged to the organization of which they were accused and many did not know that it was nationalist. The heads of kolhosps, besides being condemned as Ukrainian nationalists, were also charged with causing damages which they had not done and even did not know of what same consisted. Among them was one who when drunk, had hummed the melody of the Ukrainian national anthem: — "Ukraine has not perished yet."

SIBERIAN SCENERY

Through the small window of the freight car we could get a glimpse of the scenery. After passing the Ural Mountains and the city of Chelyabinsk, we saw a mountain of stakes, a barbed wire fence and

guard towers. From this point on at every station or crossroad there were watch towers and barbed wire and so it was the entire 7,000 kilometres from the Urals to Vladivostok. Along the entire trip we were greeted by tortured, miserable, ragged prisoners who were working under armed guard as slave labor. On our way I saw about 400 camps along the Siberian route. How many more were scattered in the distant corners of Siberia 1,500-2,000 kilometres from the main line! . .

After passing Novosibirsk, we overtook three trains from Central Asia. Almost 2/3 of the prisoners were from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev or Odesa who at the end of 1936 and the beginning of 1937 were sent with their families to Central Asia. In the autumn of 1937 the NKVD had put them in prison and accused them of forming counter-revolutionary organizations in the camps of the NKVD. They were condemned by a troyka (a commission of three) which gave them 10 years imprisonment and held their families in the camps of the NKVD.

Beyond Irkutsk, we began to see trains of Koreans who were being taken from the Far East to Central Asia. They were being convoyed with their wives and children in closed cars. From Central Asia trains were moving with the peoples of that region to Ukraine to camps of settler-specialists, while the Ukrainians were being taken to Central Asia and the Far East and the Koreans to Central Asia. People were being torn from their native lands, taken to foreign soil and there turned into slaves deprived of all rights.

Our train, as the others, was escorted by a strong guard of about 70 men of the NKVD with the same number of dogs. On every third car stood a guard with a machine gun. Every guard was provided with a telephone connected with the car of the train commander, who in turn was connected with the locomotive and in case of an escape could stop the train at any moment.

It was especially unpleasant to feel the guards with their wooden hammers at every stop. After Penza they tested to see that there was no crack or break in the cars.

Because of the season and region, we met intense cold which reached to 55° C. Beyond Krasnoyarsk we entered the zone of eternal frost. On the inside of the car the ice reached a thickness of 20-25 cm. It began again to get cold inside, although the stove burned the whole day. The coldest area was around Lake Baikal which we passed on January 22-23, 1938. The landscape around Lake Baikal impressed me by its wild and impetuous beauty. The masses of mountains, covered with pine trees, made fantastic pictures on the shore of the lake which was covered with thick ice. We can never forget the impression made by the river Angara which flows out of Lake Baikal. There where the waters of the lake were

narrowed between the stony banks of the Angara, the water did not freeze even at the height of the January cold. When we passed the place on January 22, 1938, we could see a great stretch of unfrozen water.

IN BIROBIDZHAN

Beyond Baikal, at the end of January, beside the conifers we began to see signs of deciduous trees. Now and then appeared birches, aspens and still more rarely dwarf oaks. The unfallen leaves of the dwarf oaks consoled us for we had passed the eternal frost and were again approaching a zone of temperate climate. But we did not see any real oaks until we reached Birobidzhan.

On February 6, 1938, out of the total of 3500 prisoners, they took off at Birobidzhan 600 including myself. We were placed at the disposal of the Bamlag (Baikal-Amur Line), which had its camps in Birobidzhan. After we had been taken from the cars, we were formed in one column, surrounded by armed men of the NKVD with dogs and taken to the administration of the 13th Division of the Bamlag.

It was already late at night and we were driven into an empty wooden shed, which was very cold, for there was no heat. The next morning we were given 400 gr. of bread and tea for the entire day. After the meal commenced the individual reception of the prisoners.

Each man walked between tables, filled out the appropriate questionnaires and at the last table received a card of identification. On this was stated when and for what he was arrested, when condemned and the length of the sentence. Almost all were condemned by local troykas of the NKVD and all had sentences of 10 years except Altshuler, a Jew from Kiev who was accused of Ukrainian nationalism. He had received 8 years. My card read that I had been accused of K. R. (counter-revolution) condemned by the Kiev district troyka of the NKVD and sentenced to a term of 10 years.

During our two-month journey, each had assumed that he would receive at most 2 years (for no one of us had done anything against the state and people). No one had paid any attention to the figures which were written opposite our names in the Kiev prison. But in looking at the cards, every one realized that he had seen the same number opposite his own name. Tears came to the eyes of many and all had on their lips the question: Why? What have I done? How have I acted against the government which has punished me so cruelly? My life and stay in the Bamlag until I was removed to Kolyma, will be described in the following issue.

DR. STEFAN BARAN (1879-1953)



On June 4th of this year Dr. Stefan Baran, a Ukrainian statesman, publicist and scholar died in Munich. He was at the time of his death the President of the Executive Organ of the Ukrainian National Rada (Council), i. e. the Ukrainian Parliament in Exile and as such he held the post of a premier of the Ukrainian Government in Exile.

Dr. Baran was born in 1879 in Western Ukraine of a peasant family. During his years of study at the University of Lviv, the capital of Western Ukraine, he took an active part in the then hectic life of the Ukrainian students.

At that time there was a serious conflict between the Ukrainian and Polish students over the national character of the University.

The Austrian Government was unable to make peace between the Ukrainians and Poles and began to make plans for the establishment of a separate Ukrainian University. The Austrian Ministry of Education appropriated special funds to prepare talented young Ukrainians for the post of professors. Among the candidates was Stefan Baran who received a fellowship to study economics in the University in Berlin.

From 1913 to 1918, he was General Secretary of the Ukrainian National Democratic Party, the largest party in Western Ukraine. At the outbreak of World War I the Ukrainians organized a multi-party political representation of Ukrainians from Austria and Russia, General Ukrainian Council. Dr. Baran was a Secretary of this organization.

When on November 1, 1918 the Western Ukrainians, after the liquidation of Austria-Hungary, established the Western Ukrainian Republic, which soon combined with the Eastern Ukrainian Republic as a single state, Dr. Baran became Minister of Agriculture in the Government of the Ukrainian Western Republic and presented an outline of a Constitution for United Ukraine. Under Poland from 1928 to 1939, he was a delegate from Western Ukraine to the Polish Diet in Warsaw. He was the author of several books as *The Ukrainians and the Year 1848*, *Metropolitan Andrey Sheptycky and others*. The Ukrainian political emigration has lost in the death of Dr. Baran one of its educated statesmen.

N. C.

PETRO POLTAVA

"*Suchasna Ukraina*" a Ukrainian newspaper edited in Munich, Germany, reported on May 17, 1953 that the Foreign Representation of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR) had announced that P. POLTAVA, Major of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), and vice-chairman of the General Secretariat of the UHVR was killed in battle by the Russians during the winter 1951/52, in Ukraine.

P. Poltava, pseudo of the Ukrainian leader whose name now can not be disclosed, was the most prominent intellectual leader of the Ukrainian underground which has been waging a relentless struggle against the Soviet rule in Ukraine to secure a genuine national independence.

The name of Major Poltava has been widely known during the post-war years in Ukraine among the fighters for Ukrainian independence and in the Ukrainian emigration as well. Some political and intellectual circles of the Western countries have also become acquainted with his name, since some of his writings were translated into English.

The main theme of his writings was that Bolshevism can be successfully fought first of all with the ideological weapon. He pointed out that while the Soviet masses of the non-Russian peoples were longing for a genuine national independence and social justice, the idea of their national statehood and of a new social order which would let them enjoy the social gains of a free man, was the most powerful way of urging the Soviet masses to fight Bolshevism. He repeatedly emphasized that the Soviet prison house of nations should be reconstructed and the national states of all peoples, including Russians, should create a new basis for their mutual respect and co-operation.

As chief of the Bureau of Information of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, Poltava sent a letter to the State Department in the fall of 1950 with a series of suggestions as to what the Ukrainian people and other peoples of the USSR would like to hear over the "Voice of America." He severely criticized the practice of some sections of that agency of silencing the liberation movements of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR whose activities behind the Iron Curtain were in the interest of the free world. "It may be noted here" — he wrote at that occasion — "that the Ukrainian resistance, deprived of all assistance from abroad, cannot continue indefinitely, if the present world situation remains unchanged."

Poltava's premature death leaves a great gap not only in the ranks of the Ukrainian fighters for freedom but also in the world forces preparing to balk the Soviet Russian drive for world conquest.

M. P.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RUSSIAN MENACE TO EUROPE by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. A Collection of Articles, Speeches, Letters and News Dispatches. Selected and Edited by Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz. Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, pp. 288.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, as the creators of the philosophy of historical materialism, which was based upon the theory of the class struggle with the destruction of a class society and the creation through a world revolution of a new classless-Communist society, called into existence the Social Democratic Proletarian movement in the world. After their death they became the obvious fathers of Russian Bolshevik theory. All the larger and smaller works of Lenin, and also his articles and speeches, were intended to prove that the Russian Bolshevik party and its program and tactics were nothing but the logical application of the theories of Marx and Engels to life in the old Russian empire and in the whole world. After the victory of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in November, 1917 and the reconquest of the non-Russian peoples of Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Caucasian countries and the peoples of Central Asia, Marxism was proclaimed as the official philosophy in the Soviet Union and all citizens were compelled to learn it. Lenin became the infallible interpreter of Marxism and after his death Stalin took the same post as the infallible guide to all three fathers of Bolshevik theory and gave it the name of Marxo-Leninism and his flatterers have even in his lifetime added to this Stalinism.

Yet despite this pious faith in Marxism and in every letter of Marx, the Russian Bolsheviks have never allowed the publication in the USSR of a complete edition of the works of Marx and Engels. All the editions of the works of these two leaders of proletarian socialism and Communism were incomplete; they have omitted all those articles, letters and speeches by the two men which did not fit into Bolshevik practice and especially those which did not cater to the new Russian nationalism and the imperialism of the Bolshevik dictatorship.

Here for the first time in English we have a collection of the works of Marx and Engels with quotations forbidden in the USSR. They are well selected to show the problem of Russian imperialism and its menace to Europe and the Near East. The articles of Marx and Engels on this subject were written in 1848 and so are over a century old. Yet they can be read to-day with great interest, for they have not lost their cogency. Then as now Russia was seeking the same territories for the immediate object of her imperialistic expansion: "The setting up under Russian domination of a Slavic empire from the Erzgebirge and the Carpathians to the Black, Aegean and Adriatic Seas" (in the words of Engels). In addition to its military might Russia also made use of the cleverly devised psychological factor of Pan-Slavism in its foreign policy and with it created a fifth column in the neighboring states of Turkey and Austria-Hungary and partially in Germany.

Marx and Engels realized this great threat for Europe which contemporary Russian imperialism under the guidance of the tsars presented. They both appealed to the democratic West not only to halt this imperialism but to take active military

steps to meet it. From this point of view the present American Communists would have full right to call Marx and Engels "warmongers." Their characterization of the policy of the nations in Europe threatened by Russia is still valid. Russians nourished their ideas for a long time and they regarded the postponement of their decision to the future as the main principle. The Crimean War fought in defence of a Turkey threatened by Russia reminds us now of the war in Korea. The West employed hundred years ago the same tactics as those which America is applying in Korea.

The keen analytical minds of Marx and Engels allowed them to understand Russian imperialism and to reveal its closest and direct goals. In this connection both writers were ahead of their time up to World War I. Yet these articles show that neither Marx nor Engels foresaw in their own time the importance of the nationalist movements among the enslaved nations and their dynamic force. Both authors even disregarded it and condemned the "non-historical" nations to an inevitable historical death as the prey of the ruling nations, German, Hungarian and Turkish. They only excepted the Poles but they foresaw inevitable Germanization for the Czechs.

Yet these creators of "the dialectics of historical materialism" proved themselves shortsighted in another question. They assumed that the socialistic revolutionary movement in Russia would put an end to Russian Pan-Slavic imperialism and so they considered the Russian socialists as allies in the defence of a Europe threatened by tsarist Russia. The reverse happened and out of the teachings of Marx in Russia grew the new dynamic threat not only for Europe but for the whole world from that same Russian imperialism which Marx and Engels feared a century ago guided now by their socialist pupils.

From this point of view the Ukrainian historian and sociologist, Prof. Mykhaylo Drahomaniv showed more vision in the 1880's in judging the future of Russian imperialism. He saw the salvation from this threat in the transformation of the Russian Empire into separate autonomous national units.

MATTHEW STAKHIV

SOVIET CIVILIZATION, by Corliss Lamont. New York, Philosophical Library, 1952, pp. 433 xviii.

We have here the new book of Corliss Lamont, a millionaire and a Communophile in one person. This time he has tried to give a picture of Soviet civilization for which he has unconcealed sympathies, although in the introduction Henry Pratt Fairchild declares that Corliss Lamont is not a Communist.

The author says that he has approached the Soviets critically and has tried to give only the truth. We may fully accept his statement with the one reservation that there are two main conceptions of truth; one is scientific truth based on objective facts as accepted in the west and another, the truth of dialectic materialism as it is understood in the USSR. Truth in the Soviets is always what is useful for the Communist party and its one and infallible interpreter is the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Which truth is in use by Corliss Lamont is not easy to discover.

In reading this new book by Corliss Lamont, we can say that it is rather based on this second truth, which comes from dialectic materialism for he accepts all the events in the Soviets and all the Soviet institutions uncritically exactly as the TsK VKP wishes them to be believed by the world. Thus in his opinion the cause of all the difficulties between the USSR and America is that America does

not know the truth about the USSR, of course not the truth in the understanding of "bourgeois" science, but the truth according to dialectical materialism. In his opinion no one in America can tell the truth about the USSR or he would be "smeared as subversive and un-American" (pp. 14-15). In his former book on the national problems in the USSR he glorified the internationalist Soviet Union as an example in the solution of the national question, he now glorifies the Communist nationalistic Russia. This is in accordance with the truth of Communist dialectics. Formerly he saw different peoples in the USSR; now "the different minorities are monolithic." Still despite these changes, "anti-Semitism and other forms of racial prejudice and discrimination have almost entirely disappeared in *Soviet Russia*." (pp. 26-27).

Concentration camps obviously do not exist in Soviet Russia, but are an invention of the bourgeois. All the unpleasant aspects in the USSR are, in accordance with Bolshevik dialectics, due to the hostile encirclement of the Soviets by the bourgeois forces.

The author tangles himself badly in the question of Soviet democracy and he justifies the existing dictatorship because the chief object in the USSR is the carrying out of socialism.

In the section on "Soviet Ethnic Democracy" Lamont repeats his own old paeans in honor of the solution of national problems in the USSR, but he now justifies the Russian ethnic imperialism and even finds justification for the liquidation of entire national republics in the USSR after World War II and the occupation of the Baltic Republics, which he says, had fascist governments and were lands that had been acquired by the tsars for Russia.

In the section "Soviet Russia and Religion", he declares himself an atheist and justifies militant atheism. In spite of this at the end of this section he praises the development of the Russian Orthodox Church and even is glad of its successes. He probably has in mind the violent suppression of the Ukrainian and Rumanian Greek Catholic Churches with the forcible conversion of almost six million Eastern Catholics to Soviet Orthodoxy.

The author expresses similar kinds of truth in the matter of Soviet economics, cultural progress and foreign policy. This last has always been peace-loving, for it is the fatherland of Lamont—America—that wishes war. Of course Marxist truth predicts the fall of capitalism but by peaceful means and not by war. This is the truth of the materialistic dialectics.

At the end in a special section "Soviet Socialism and Fascism" he denies with heat the assertions that Soviet Communism and Fascism are own brothers. Their similarity, according to his dialectics, is only superficial. In reality they are like heaven and earth. The juxtaposition of Communism and Fascism is a crime of the capitalists; it gives to the warmongers arguments against the labor state of Soviet Russia and lets them agitate for war. Here is the difference: Communism works for the people and Fascism against it. Among other arguments he cites the argument of a lecturer at Columbia University: "If there were no difference between the USSR and Spain, they would not study in Spanish schools the Catholic religion but dialectic and historical materialism" (p. 247). The difference between Communism and Fascism is that the former has fellow-travellers, and the latter does not.

The conclusions of the author, that the USSR must not be dismembered but left the right to hold all lands it has occupied and we must wait for the death of the bourgeois world, for Marx and Lenin said that Communism will triumph without war.

This is the content of Soviet civilization according to Corliss Lamont. We need add no critical remarks, for he expounds the truth of Bolshevik dialectics, that Russian Communism will conquer the world, while you bourgeois will wait to be liquidated by the Communists without war. We Ukrainians from our East European experience know that the first victim of this liquidation will be the son of a millionaire, Corliss Lamont.

E. LOGUSH

THE IRON CURTAIN AND AMERICAN POLICY. By Kurt Glaser. Public Affairs Press. Washington, D. C., 1953. Pp. 36.

The author maintains that at the beginning of World War II America had quite clear war aims — an effort to build a new free world of democratic states. This idea was defined in the Atlantic Charter. But the alliance of the democratic states with the tyrant Stalin against the other tyrant Hitler led to the loss by America of its idealistic war aims and in finishing one tyrant, it aided the other to become still more formidable.

Britain, whose constant aim in regard to the continent of Europe has been the maintenance of the balance of power, lost its purpose for by accepting the principle of "unconditional surrender," it destroyed the balance. Red Russia became doubly strong, when Germany was fully destroyed. Only Russia was left on the continent. In the same way America unnecessarily destroyed the power of Japan, which was the balance in the Pacific against Russia. This policy of Roosevelt led to many tragic consequences in the entire world and they are now the source of troubles in international life.

The first result was the approximately twenty million of homeless exiles from their native lands, and among these the 12 million Germans, chiefly driven from their homes across the Oder and Neisse and the Sudetenland, in the first place. This evil is not so easy to correct, for the Sudeten and the Eastern provinces of Germany are now inhabited by a new population and Poland and Czechoslovakia have become the direct prisoners of red Moscow, as they want to keep these provinces for themselves.

America is making its greatest mistake in its Czecho-Slovak policy, for it is now supporting those Czech emigrants, who up until 1948 had a 100% pro-Communist policy with the denial of all those freedom-loving principles on which a future Europe must be based. We cannot pass over without consideration the Sudeten Germans and the efforts of the Slovak people to become an independent nation. The author regards the best solution as a Central-European Federation, into which the Czechs, Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and the other peoples of Central Europe would enter and then this would become a component member of a European union.

The former "containment policy" of the Truman administration preserved the unhealthy position created by the alliance with Stalin and his post-war Czechoslovakia. The new American policy of liberation must clearly and unequivocally proclaim the right of all peoples to be free and consequently it must embody this principle in its psychological struggle and in its foreign policy.

N. CHUBATY

"CAN RUSSIA SURVIVE? *An Examination of the Facts and Figures of Soviet Reality.*" By F. B. Czarnomski. New York, 1953. 128 p. \$2.75

This book is indeed "an examination of the facts and figures of Soviet reality." In his review and analysis of a great mass of factual data on questions connected with the Soviet Union, the author shows a good orientation in his subject and in places comes to new and interesting conclusions.

In 1939 the Soviet Union had a population of 170 millions and there were 7 million more women than men. On the basis of various data the author places the population in 1945 as scarcely 160,050,000 with 100 million women. He counts the number of Poles, Jews and Ukrainians deported to Asia from the territory of Eastern Poland as one million. Of this number not more than 200,000 left the USSR in 1942 as soldiers of the army of General Anders and their families. He places at 3,000,000 the Poles who emigrated west from behind the Curzon Line whereas, official sources place the number at 2,000,000 maximum. He makes no mention of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians violently deported from their ancestral lands to the Soviets by the Polish Communist government.

The author mentions the struggle of the UPA against the Bolsheviks. "Since the Soviet armies expelled the Germans from these formerly Polish territories a bitter war has been and still is being waged between the Soviet military and police forces and the Polish Ukrainians. Unknown numbers of them have been killed in guerilla fighting in the forests of the Carpathian mountains, countless thousands have been deported to camps in Asiatic Russia. Today after six years of this pitiless war, no one knows how many Ukrainians remain in the erstwhile Polish provinces. Their Church, the Greek Uniate, has been abolished, their Archbishop and their Bishops and the majority of their clergy were either killed, imprisoned or exiled" (p. 37).

Unfortunately we do not find in the book, except for a reference to Anti-Semitism, "which was always endemic in Russia," anything about the national relations in the Soviets. The Western reader of this very interesting book will not learn that the Russians form scarcely half of the total Soviet population. And this leads us to one of the weakest points in the volume, its absolutely chaotic terminology. For one and the same conception the author uses the terms Russia, Soviet-Russia, Soviet Union. He goes so far as to write in one place of Ukraine as a part of Russia and calls the population of Ukraine Russians.

The question of concentration camps, the poverty of the workmen, the religious persecution, the rigid framework in which Soviet science must work and also the question of finances and the prices for articles of use are presented very clearly and convincingly.

In his last section, the author sharply condemns the responsible leaders of the democratic countries for observing idly what is going on in the USSR of not informing themselves properly and of protesting. "The fate of the Crimean Tatars and the Caucasian Chechens is a flagrant example of this neglect... There was not a single voice raised among the United Nations against the inhumanity of this ruthless measure."

The book ends with a strange conclusion. In the opinion of the author there must be created a "Free Russian Government outside the frontiers of Soviet Russia," composed of Russian democrats in exile. This idea of the author ruins his entire book. He does not wish the return of prerevolutionary Russia but he treats as non-existent the struggles for liberation of the non-Russian peoples

and the definite creation of independent states of Ukraine, Georgia, etc... in 1918. Do the Russian emigres now represent the population of the USSR and especially the population of the non-Russian republics?

J. FEDYNSKY.

HITLER AND THE NON-RUSSIAN PEOPLES. By Dr. Peter Kleist. Atheneum Verlag, Bonn 1950, pp. 344.

WEN SIE VERDERBEN WOLLEN. By Jurgen Thorwald. Steingruben Verlag, Stuttgart 1952, pp. 605.

PANZER LEADER. By Heinz Guderian. E. P. Dutton and Co., New York 1952, pp. 528.

Today there is no longer any doubt that Hitler lost the war against the Soviet Union primarily because of both his ineptitude and his unwillingness to co-operate with the enslaved peoples of the USSR. This is the opinion of these three German authors, two of whom played an important role in the Second World War. Their accounts are long lists of accusations of their leaders for their incalculable blunders and lost opportunities.

The first weeks of the German campaign brought tremendous successes to the invader. The population of the Soviet Union greeted the Germans with bread and salt. In the battle near Kiev in September 1941, 665,000 soldiers of the Red Army surrendered to the Germans (Guderian pp. 193, 225). The proclamation of the Ukrainian national independence in Lviv was met with "an enthusiastic approval of the population" (Kleist p. 131). Ukrainians, Baltic peoples, White Ruthenians, Caucasians, Turkestanians expressed their willingness to fight Bolshevism in order to rebuild their independent states. The Russian soldiers also surrendered to the Germans. Only Red Commissars and those who wanted to preserve the Russian prison of nations were ready to resist obstinately from the very beginning of the war. "Now we are fighting for Russia and in that cause we are all united"—declared an old Russian general to the amazed German panzer leader in Orel in the summer of 1941 (Guderian p. 250).

However, the aspirations of the enslaved peoples of the USSR were spurned by Hitler. Even in 1943, after several setbacks in the East he said: "I cannot acknowledge any right of sovereignty to the peoples of the East... The only conclusive problem in the East is for me that of space" (Kleist pp. 224, 225).

Simultaneously Hitler made a strategic blunder when, after his first victories in the summer of 1941, he decided to advance into central and southern Ukraine instead of veering northward in the direction of Moscow, as advised by his best generals. This view is shared by the well-known English war critic Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, who believes that a German panzer attack on Moscow in the summer of 1941 could have caused the collapse of the Red Army. (Guderian p. 11). This is also corroborated in judgement of the red General Vlasov (Thorwald p. 384).

Hitler's colonial policy stiffened the resistance of the Red Army and accelerated the wave of the liberation movements of the oppressed peoples of the USSR. "German methods, particularly those of Reichscommissar Koch, had turned the Ukrainians from being friends of Germany into our enemies" (Guderian p. 289). Thus started the scourge "of the partisan warfare" (Guderian p. 194). The first guerillas who fought the Germans in the East were disappointed nationalists and not Soviet agents" (Kleist p. 190).

There were two important groups among the prominent Germans who were aware of the fatality of the Hitler policy in the East. Nevertheless they were not unanimous as to the final plans for the USSR. On the contrary they were constantly feuding, unable to resist Hitler successfully. The first group was mostly composed of the staff officers of the Wehrmacht, some of whom were of Baltic origin, or former officers of the old tsarist army. They dreamed of a new Russian empire as a future German partner in ruling the European nations. (Thorwald 65-70, 81-84, 183, 313-323). Their views were shared by prominent aides of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, J. Ribbentrop. Their opponents were gathered around A. Rosenberg, Minister for the Occupied Territories. Mostly students of Soviet Russian Affairs for many years, they fostered the idea of several national states of Eastern Europe and Asia (Russia, Ukraine, White Ruthenia, Caucasus, Turkestan etc.). (Kleist pp. 141-143, Thorwald pp. 19-27).

In view of Hitler's contempt for all the peoples of the Soviet Union neither of the two groups was able to carry out its conception. But during the second half of the Eastern campaign Rosenberg and his intellectual colleagues fell completely into disfavor, while the first group gained influence. This happened in 1944, when the chief of the Gestapo Himmler and his lieutenants decided, though reluctantly, to support the idea of a new Russian empire. (Thorwald pp. 418, 419).

This shift of the official Nazi policy meant the beginning of the career of the Russian General Vlasov during the last period of the World War II. Though his attempts to ally himself with the Germans dated back to 1942, only Himmler's consent and the German urgent need for more divisions enabled him to become the chief commander of the ROA (Russian Liberation Army). (Thorwald p. 377 ff). Nonetheless he succeeded in creating little more than two divisions. First, the whole action was too much belated. Secondly, Vlasov as a Russian imperialist, ran into difficulties when he attempted to act in the name not only of the Russian people but of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR as well. (Kleist p. 215). He wanted all the national committees of these peoples to acknowledge his leadership. But "all of them refused to exchange even one word with Vlasov" (Thorwald p. 422). Under these conditions the Gestapo began to use pressure against the representatives of the non-Russian peoples to make them co-operate with Vlasov. This being without result, Vlasov had recourse to Quislings among the non-Russian emigres. (Thorwald p. 424).

It should be pointed out that while Vlasov attempted to subordinate to his command not only Russian but also non-Russian soldiers of the peoples of the Soviet Union, "the number of non-Russian volunteers (ready to fight Bolshevism —M. P.) was almost double when compared with Russians" (Kleist p. 216). Besides, even the ROA, which was always formerly regarded as pure "Russian", actually was composed of Russians, White Ruthenians, Ukrainians, Caucasians, Tatars (Kleist p. 205).

It goes without saying that the concise integrated presentation of the abortive German attempts to organize anti-Bolshevist forces among the peoples of the Soviet Union should be of great interest for the Western reader cognizant of the present difficulties in attaining unity of action between the emigre leaders of the non-Russian peoples and the chronically imperial-minded Russians.

MYROSLAV PROKOP

THE RIGHT OF NATIONS TO SELF-DETERMINATION. Selected Writings by V. I. Lenin. International Publishers, New York, 1951, 128 pp.

What an American means by the term "full right of self-determination" — Selbstbestimmungsrecht, as the Germans call it — is not the mangled and twisted conception generally nurtured by the average Russian politician, be he emigre or otherwise. The logically true and honest concept held by the American is in part expressed by Lenin in these articles from the pre-World War I period, and for anyone who seeks an elaborate and historically detailed account of this difference in meaning and candid understanding, this volume is recommended highly for careful study.

Naturally Lenin's analysis of the substance and meaning of self-determination is cast in the Marxian mould of historical interpretation, but one can easily abstract this logical concept from its peculiar context, evaluate it on its own merits and see its logical identity with the notion as generally understood by Americans and others in the free world. In Lenin's own words, "if we want to learn the meaning of self-determination of nations not by juggling with legal definitions, or 'inventing' abstract definitions, but by examining the historical and economic conditions of the national movements, we shall inevitably reach the conclusion that self-determination of nations means the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, the formation of an independent state" (p. 11). This was a rallying point in Lenin's position against what he properly regarded as chauvinist thinking by Russian politicians and apologists of the sacred empire. Needless to say, once in power himself he quickly adopted that chauvinist strain of thought that conceives of self-determination only within the fixed territorial framework of the empire, and placed himself in the swollen ranks of the Purishkeviches and the Kokoshkins of his time and of today.

In showing up the semantic twists and word play of the Russian Cadet opportunists of his day, Lenin furnishes an excellent background for the reader to discern and judge the intellectual dishonesty with which Russian emigres of this and other brands still view the right of national self-determination. Those familiar with the leading contemporary Russian chauvinists could readily substitute their names for the Kokoshkins of Lenin's pre-war days, and history would suffer no disfigurement. The nonsense peddled by contemporary Kokoshkins on the right of federation within "Russia" — in other words the empire — is not without precedent nor without the able answer which Lenin provided while he was still politically sober. As he put it, "it is not difficult to see why... the right of self-determination means neither federation nor autonomy... The right to federation is, in general, an absurdity, since federation is a two-sided contract" (p. 52, f. n.). In defiance of simple logic and reason this advocacy of a federated "Russia" is the same blind and means of political deception by which imperialist Russian emigres in this country and in Western Europe strive to obtain unwitting support for the preservation of an empire that is historically doomed to suffer the fate of all empires.

The key to Russian freedom, to the liberation of the long tyrannized masses of the Russian nation, is the liberation and independence of the oppressed non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union and Empire. This formula rests on solid rational and historical grounds. Even Marx and Engels, in the progressive precincts of their philosophical thought, recognized this when they soundly declared, "No people oppressing other peoples can be free." And how well the successful Lenin

grasped this for Russian history when he observed that "It is this Great Russian poison of nationalism that is contaminating the entire all-Russian political atmosphere. It is the misfortune of a nation, which, in subjugating other nations, is strengthening the reaction throughout Russia" (p. 62). Proponents of an indivisible "Russia" are in essence advocates of perpetuated tyranny for their own people as well as for alien peoples, and this despite all the verbal democratic professions used to garb this advocacy. The best historical example of this casual relationship is the Soviet Union itself, in effect the "federated Russia" created by Russian politicians equally glib with democratic espousals.

These major ideas Lenin discusses in great detail in his account of the many controversies which raged among East European thinkers of the pre-World War I period. The reader cannot but observe that Lenin and his Bolsheviki used all the progressive and democratic ideas and arguments on this basic question in their quest for power. They formed an integral part of their revolutionary program — "We demand the freedom of self-determination, i. e., independence, i. e., the freedom of separation for the oppressed nations, not because we dream of an economically atomized world, nor because we cherish the ideal of small states, but on the contrary because we are for large states and for a coming closer, even a fusion of nations, but on a truly democratic, truly internationalist basis, which is unthinkable without the freedom of separation." (p. 72). Lenin fulminates against chauvinists who scorn this sane formula of independence preceding federation, only to degenerate into one himself before the boundless temptations of aggrandized power. In a remarkable way the stage of controversy is the same today as it was in this period, only the actors have changed. The American reader can profit immensely from this well edited work.

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LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

THE CHURCH UNDER COMMUNISM. Report of the Commission of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland by George M. Dryburgh and Crawford Miller. New York, Philosophical Library, 1953. Pp. 79.

The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland appointed in May, 1949 a Commission with George M. Dryburgh as Chairman and Crawford Miller as Secretary to study the religious situation behind the iron curtain and to give practical indications how the Church of Scotland could work to protect its faithful in its church. This book is the report of that Commission.

The authors give a survey of the religious and church life in the USSR including the territory annexed after World War II and then in order in the satellite states and China.

In discussing the religious and church life in the Soviets the Commission reviews the legal and actual situation of the Church before 1941, during the war and after it. With the outbreak of the war the position of the Orthodox Church improved and also Protestant confessions found it more possible to work. The position of the Catholic Church is treated superficially and no mention is made of the Catholics of the Eastern Rite, although this Church in Western Ukraine was the object of a special attack by both the state organs and the Russian Orthodox Church. Likewise the authors have not stressed the special role of the Moscow Patriarchal Church in the subjection to itself of the Orthodox Churches in the satellite states and also of the Catholic Churches of the Eastern Rite in Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria. This is an extremely interesting

question, for it shows how the Moscow Patriarchate on one side is in the service of the Russian Red imperialism and on the other, how it takes advantage of the help of an atheistic government to spread its own spiritual life.

The report of the Commission to the General Assembly gives a picture of the zeal of the Protestants of Scotland for the preservation of the Christian faith among its members.

M. CHUBATY

WHITE BOOK ON THE RELIGIOUS PERSECUTIONS IN UKRAINE. Translation from Italian. Rome 1953.

This new book on religious situation in the USSR deals with the religious persecutions in Ukraine, especially after the end of the World War II. The publication puts a new light on the matter inasmuch as those events are only superficially known to the Western world. All material concerning the liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Western Ukraine is carefully assembled. We are informed that the whole Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy in Western Ukraine composed of seven bishops, among them the Head of the Church Metropolitan Joseph Slipy, were imprisoned; four of them died in prison.

Similarly the Catholicism of Eastern Rite in Carpatho Ukraine was liquidated. The bishop of Uzhorod killed, two others imprisoned. Comparing the persecution of Eastern Rite Catholicism in Ukraine with the persecution of Eastern Catholicism in Rumania and Bulgaria, we are able to trace the old historical policy of Tsarist Russia — to carry a total war against the Eastern Rite Catholicism (Uniate Church) the most dangerous competitor of Russian religious idea: *Moscow — The Third Rome*.

One section of the book treats also the problem of persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalic Church; this matter, however, is not so fundamentally elaborated as the persecution of Ukrainian Catholicism.

The White Book is a worthy source of information about religious matters in the Soviet Union.

N. CHUBATY

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"THE FATE OF EMPIRES," by George Fedotov. *The Russian Review*, April 1953. New York.

As the last will and testament of a celebrated Russian author and scholar, this essay is beyond all doubt a work of intellectual integrity, balance and sound perception. The eulogy preceding this article is most interesting and informative. The eulogist writes that "While it may be true, as Berdyaev contended, that a great many Russians tend towards such extremes as nihilism or eschatology, Fedotov was always able to achieve a sound balance through logical and critical thinking. This kind of thinking is far from typically Russian: and even writers of towering genius such as Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky were lacking in real balance." That the element of balance prevades this remarkable article of the late George Fedotov is its most striking feature and in view of the subject analyzed, its most glaring achievement.

The late author examines the question, "What fate awaits Russia in case of her defeat? He allows for the real possibility of Soviet victory in the titanic struggle, but predicates his entire exposition on the probability of its defeat and its inevitable consequences. The results will be necessarily different from those amending the defeat of Germany or France chiefly because "Russia is not a national state but a multinational empire, the last remaining empire in the world after the liquidation of all others." Justified criticism is lodged against Russia's progressive intelligentsia for its neglect of Russia's imperial history which was monopolized by "historians of the nationalist persuasion" who cultivated a "biased scheme of Russian history" so that "it came about that in the minds of the liberal, and even partly the revolutionary intelligentsia, the idea took root that the Russian Empire, unlike those of the West, had been built up not by force but by peaceful expansion, not through conquest but through colonization." He points out in particular how incomprehensible the awakening of Ukrainian nationalism was to the Russian intelligentsia that was deadened by this artificial scheme, and observes that instead of Poland, it was "Muscovy with her Oriental despotism that was alien to them."

Ukraine as a nation is an unquestionable truth for him. Its centrifugal power, along with that of the other non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union, is pre-determinate to the eventual collapse of an empire built on force and terror. He shows quite convincingly how this will eventuate. Among other founded arguments advanced by the writer is the realistic one that even if "no separatist trends were in existence, they would have to be created artificially; the dismemberment of Russia will be a foregone decision in any case" — to insure the peace against resurgent Russian fascism and nationalism. The concluding statements that follow are worthy of constant repetition because they emerge from the depths of wisdom and intellectual purity to which the mind and soul of Fedotov penetrated. "For Russia herself, the preservation of her imperial structure by force would signify the sur-

render of all hope to win freedom for her own people . . . The loss of the Empire means moral purification, the liberation of Russian culture from a crushing load distorting its spiritual image . . . More than one generation may have to be re-educated to enable the Russian to revive the smothered tradition of his culture and to find a way back to Russian Christianity. For this great task the Russian intelligentsia in exile should prepare itself right now—instead of chasing after the phantom eagles of empire.”

“THREE ENVOYS TO RUSSIA,” by Felix Morley. Barron’s, *National Business and Financial Weekly*, April 13, 1953, New York.

A very interesting treatment is presented here of House Concurrent Resolution 58, introduced by Representative Lawrence H. Smith of Wisconsin. This unique resolution seeks the establishment of diplomatic relations with the capitals of Soviet Ukraine and Byelorussia. As the author subcaptures his stimulating article, “A Mid-West Congressman Suggests We Play Some Diplomatic Poker.” And this is precisely the theme of the resolution which is critically and favorably analyzed in this article. The advantages and seeming disadvantages surrounding the recommended diplomatic step are carefully weighed, with the former overbalancing the latter. According to Mr. Morley, “Now policy planners at the State Department are saying: “Why didn’t we think of that ourselves? The great advantage of the idea is that for once it would put the Kremlin on the defensive and give the West the opportunity to call the tune.” This resolution serves as a good test of the much advertised “new, dynamic foreign policy.” We’ll see whether it exists.

“THE WORLD’S DILEMMA AND A WAY OUT: *Liberation of the Peoples of the Soviet Union.*” The American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, 1953, New York.

This latest apologetic rendition by the American Committee really carries the invisible title, “The American Committee’s Dilemma And a Way Out.” For, as a matter of fact, the Committee’s caught in a serious dilemma, and this piece of propaganda, overflowing with pretty phraseology and high-sounding objectives and methods that spell out only pure rectitude of purpose and thorough fairness of heart—for all good and unsuspecting Americans to read and agree—has apparently been prepared for wide distribution in order to fend off an anticipated broadside of founded criticism against the actual operations and biases of this hopeless outfit. But, in the nature of the case, no amount of literary oratory can overcome the stench generated by two years and more of futile effort undertaken by this mismanaged group at considerable financial cost affected by a public interest.

The real issues, involving security risks, unsavory methods, disproportionate costs, and the Russia First bias engulfing this organization, are matters that are carefully avoided in this pamphlet which naturally presumes their non-existence. However, more than adequate data on these determining issues will reach the American public in due course for a fair evaluation of the realities surrounding this group. Unquestionably the actualities of the case will prove by far more interesting and of practical value than the holy pretensions embellishing this timed statement.

This pamphlet represents an improvement over the earlier one issued by the Committee under the title “The Free World’s Secret Weapon: The Peoples of

Russia," as measured by degree of error and purposeful slanting or omission of fact. By the measure of true reporting and sound factual interpretation, it reveals still the indelible marks of the Russia First propensity. A minute analysis of this latest production would require space afforded an average article, and one will be forthcoming in this journal, but a few examples will suffice here to substantiate the preceding observation.

We are told incessantly that the menace is Soviet totalitarianism and that its Achilles' Heel is the peoples of the U.S.S.R. This is the simple appeal made to the unknowing American reader who, it is hoped by this committee, will not begin to differentiate between the outstanding problem of the captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union as distinct from that of the Russian nation. Overwhelming facts are available to demonstrate the potent force of traditional Russian imperialism, participated in chiefly by flesh-and-blood Russians and a few quisling non-Russians, an imperialism that destroyed the independent republics of the non-Russian nations in the years following World War I, but this predominant historical phenomenon is necessarily overlooked within this theoretical Russia First context. For the paramount reason that a recognition of this determining fact invites the uncalled-for notion of the dismemberment not of Russia, as it is often falsely stated, but of the Russian Empire. The examples cited in this pamphlet on the resistance of the people to the regime make choice reading for those familiar with events in the Soviet area these past thirty-five years. The puny Kronstadt rebellion of Russian sailors in 1921 is mentioned twice, but nowhere can one find any mention of the voluntary surrender of over 2 million Ukrainians and other non-Russians in World War II or the unsurpassable record of patriotic Ukrainian insurgency over the past decade.

Furthermore, the evident attempt to equate by nature and degree the plights of the non-Russian peoples and the Russians is suggestive of the motives involved. One can strive for anti-communist unity without grossly distorting historical facts for the benefit of a Russia First propensity. First, it is patently untrue that the Russian people were the first victims of Bolshevism and that their victimization has been equal to that of the captive non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. Scholars, such as Father Walsh, Berdyaev, Fedotov and others, have clearly demonstrated that the victory of Bolshevism would not have been possible without the widespread support of the Russian people. As Fedotov candidly states it "The ideologists and builders of the Party were mostly Russians. Moscow and Petersburg succumbed easily to Bolshevism. While the borderlands offered desperate resistance to the new rulers, Great Russia was hardly touched by the Civil War." Moreover, it is appropriate to ask which of the life-long students of Russian affairs belonging to this committee can offer a single piece of evidence of Soviet genocide perpetrated on the Russian nation. Also, let us scan the scope of Russification and the peculiar composition of the slave labor camps, as disclosed by former inmates, as to whether equal suffering has taken place. In short, this pamphlet is another product of the Russia First bias which seeks to minimize and dishonestly omit or even distort the basic reality in the U.S.S.R. Unfortunate as it may be, more truth on this basic split in the Soviet structure is obtainable from *Pravda* and the three eulogies on Stalin than from this source.

If, as is stated, the "most basic task is that of helping the peoples of the Soviet Union to understand that their interests and ours are identical in regard to those things most important to them," then truth and reason demand that we seek to liberate Russians for their democracy and civil freedoms and the non-

Russians for their national independence and similar political freedoms. These are the ends in accord with this basic task, and any thinking American might ask himself whether this is not further in accord with American principles and traditions. What this committee in its Russia First bias understands but wishes to conceal under a nonsensical cloak of "no pre-determination" and a thoroughly negativistic title for the organization is that peoples do not fight and die simply for what they are against but rather for what they are for.

The eyes of many observers and committees are focused on the current desperate attempts of this committee to lure the Ukrainian National Council into the Munich Center. The American Committee's life is at stake, and with the opportunist assistance of backstage operators in New York, the committee is endeavoring to drive a wedge into the solidarity with which Ukrainians have opposed it and its misdirected activities. The Council is already on record for (a) general acknowledgment of "the fact of the aspirations of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. toward the restoration or creation of their own independent democratic states," (b) the principle of voting parity, and (c) bona fide representation in the Center. These contradict everything the American committee has stood for. The results should be most interesting—for all concerned. The American committee is truly in a dilemma, and is frantically seeking a way out.

"THE SOVIET MAN—PORTRAIT OF A MYSTERY," by Frederick C. Barghoorn.
The New York Times Magazine, May 3, 1953, New York.

It was evident from a previous article on "Estimating Russia — A Tough But Vital Task," which appeared in the February 22 issue of this magazine, that the writer, although quite versed on Russian affairs per se, is scarcely familiar with the larger non-Russian sector of the Soviet Union. For instance, in that article hardly more than a sentence was devoted to non-Russian opposition to the Moscow yoke as a factor in the rather superficial tally presented. Yet, almost daily, official Soviet organs attack what is erroneously called "bourgeois nationalism."

In this article the writer does not seem to fare any better. Though he recognizes national differences to be of "major significance," yet it is strange from the standpoint of scholarship for him to counter-balance the easily established position of Ukraine and other non-Russian entities as states submerged by Soviet Russian imperialism with the grossly untenable Russian emigre position "that the borderlands have so long been associated with Russia that they are really part of Russia." Certainly the length of time under tyranny is no criterion of a sense of belonging, as the histories of the Baltic countries, Poland and others clearly show. Indeed, the contrary is truer to form, and the type of "Soviet man" portrayed here could scarcely apply to non-Russian patriots whose hatred of the imperialist Muscovite yoke is boundless.

"NATIONAL DEVIATION IN THE SOVIET UNION," by John S. Reshetar, Jr.
The American Slavic and East European Review, April 1953, New York.

Written by the scholarly author of the *Ukrainian Revolution*, this article is an excellent account of the course of Ukrainian deviation since the establishment of the Soviet Union. Well equipped with factual evidence, the writer covers all the significant events of Ukrainian "Titoism," or more accurately "Shumskyism," and

demonstrates the continuous conflict between Ukrainian cultural expression and the Russification program engineered by imperialist Moscow.

Numerous determining facts are adduced to complete the balanced picture of developments described here. The heavy Russian composition of Trotsky's marauding Red Army which destroyed the independent non-Russian republics after World War I, the insignificant native membership in the Communist Parties planted in the non-Russian states, the dominance of Russians in positions of control in the non-Russian republics and similar outstanding facts are put forward to substantiate the understatement that "it would appear that the regime has become more dependent upon the Russians and is placing greater trust in them than in the other nationalities." The key to the undermining of the shaky Soviet structure becomes obvious after reading this detailed account of deviation in the U.S.S.R. It is to be hoped that the writer will develop this subject further as a powerful sequel to his authoritative work on the Ukrainian Revolution.

"CAN AMERICA LIBERATE THE WORLD" by James Burnham. *This Week Magazine*, February 8, 1953, New York.

Verbally supported by President Eisenhower ("Our Government... must tell the Kremlin that we shall never recognize the slightest permanence in Russia's position in Eastern Europe and Asia. The day must come when the peoples of the enslaved lands will have the opportunity to choose their own paths into the future."—American Legion, N. Y., Aug. 25, 1952) and by Secretary of State Dulles ("We could make it clear... that U S. policy seeks as one of its peaceful goals the eventual restoration of genuine independence in the nations of Europe and Asia now dominated by Moscow, and that we will not be a party to any 'deal' confirming the rule of Soviet despotism."—("A New Foreign Policy," *Life*, May 19, 1952), the author of *Containment or Liberation* sets forth as the goal of a genuine policy of liberation "freedom for the peoples and nations now enslaved by the Russian-centered Soviet state system." He meets squarely and cogently every major argument that was advanced in the last campaign against the policy of liberation. It is a veritable tribute to his logical clarity and intellectual prowess that adverse criticism of his latest work on this subject fell entirely into the category of rhetoric rather than rational persuasion.

"ENEMIES OF FREEDOM," by Sandro Anageli. *United Caucasus*, January-February 1953, Munich, Germany.

This interesting article is a direct reply to one A. Primorsky, a typical Russian emigre, writing under the same caption in the December 1952 issue of *Russkaya Ideya* (No. 24). For American readers it is most instructive to observe the identity of views on the non-Russian issue in the U.S.S.R. between the present Soviet Russian imperialists and the Russian emigres. As quoted in this article, Mr. Primorsky writes that "The Soviet citizen pays least attention of all to what kind of nationality he is shown to belong in his passport... there is now practically no national enmity in the Soviet Union." Malenkov, Beria and Molotov who are likewise concerned over the preserved indivisibility of the Russian Empire, in its guise as the Soviet Union, significantly stressed this identical theme over Stalin's bier.

As shown here, it is revealing, too, that this representative Russian emigre is apparently irked by the monumental work of Professor Smal-Stocky on "The

Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism." Mr. Primorsky asks: "In view of this have not the Russians an incomparably greater right to say, Professor Smal-Stocky, to speak about international communism, which has enslaved the Russian people and threatens the entire world?" This is obviously a silly question for anyone has the equal right of intellectual inquiry. But if the scale of victimization is the implied basis of this so-called right, then truly the Russians, as Mr. Anageli so well demonstrates, are the least qualified to speak. For as the Russian scholar, Fedotov, had the honesty to observe: "There must have been something in the Great Russian tradition that provided more food for Bolshevism than the soil of the rest of the Empire: serfdom, the village commune, Tsarist autocracy." Of course the Russian masses are enslaved now as they were before, but grievously more so are the doubly oppressed non-Russian nations.

"THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM OF THE SOVIET UNION AND RUSSIAN COMMUNIST IMPERIALISM," by Roman Smal-Stocky. A review by Stuart R. Tompkins, *The Annals of The American Academy*, January 1953, Philadelphia.

The reviewer of this eye-opening work praises the author's solid contributions, and is in agreement with the author on the necessity for expanded studies on the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R. He states, too, that "we agree with him also that the current policy of the State Department which frowns on exploiting national differences is a mistaken one and will have to be revised." This work has been widely distributed among governmental officials here and in Western Europe, and the reaction to it has been equally favorable. It is a remarkable contribution to the avoidance of the tragic error committed by the Nazis during the last war, and as Erich Kern shows in his book on "The Dance of Death," they were advised by Russian emigres.

L. E. D.

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