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THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL — A BRIDGE TOWARD CHRISTIAN UNITY
— WALTER DUSHNYCK





On October 18, 1963, His Holiness Pope Paul VI received a large Ukrainian group in an exclusive audience in the Vatican. The group included all the Ukrainian Catholic Bishops attending the second session of the Ecumenical Council, Ukrainian scholars and intellectuals participating in the conference of the Ukrainian Christian Movement in Rome, and the religious and lay Ukrainian colony in Rome. The Ukrainian group was introduced to the Pope by the Most Reverend Joseph Slipy, Archbishop of Lviv and Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine (**pictured on the cover with Pope VI**), who was released a year ago from Soviet jails and concentration camps after 18 years detention. The Pope praised the martyrdom of the Ukrainian Church and Metropolitan Slipy as a "defender of the faith." A week before the audience, Metropolitan Slipy received a rousing ovation from the Council Fathers when he rose to address the Ecumenical Council at St. Peter's Basilica (cf. "The Ecumenical Council—A Bridge to Christian Unity" by Walter Dushnyck, appearing on p. 300 of this issue of **The Ukrainian Quarterly**).

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LOOKING TOWARD 1964: PEACE WITHOUT FREEDOM?

Editorial

By all rules of the game, the period of the fall of 1963 to the beginning of 1964 should constitute a turning point not only in U. S. foreign policy but in world politics as well. In this period significant changes occurred in some of the greatest powers of the world. In the United States President Kennedy was removed from the arena by the bullets of an assassin whose motivation is still a mystery to be solved. In Germany intrepid Konrad Adenauer retired, with a new team of policy-makers in Bonn taking over the helm of the ship of state. Great Britain saw the experienced veteran of world politics, Harold Macmillan, replaced by Lord Home, a comparatively green hand in the global game of politics. President Charles de Gaulle of France and Nikita S. Khrushchev of the USSR remain the only

DETENTE AND 'COEXISTENCE'—A GOAL?

With this in mind, the inevitable questions arise: where are we heading and what are our objectives in 1964?

The Johnson Administration is apparently committed to a policy of waging an "unrelenting peace offensive" and of continuing a "dialogue" with the Russians. This course, it is reported from Washington, is not sudden or unexpected: Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other advisers had been urging this policy for some time on President Kennedy. This course, however, necessitates the rejection of other alternatives, for example, the one advanced by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who contended that further negotiations and contacts with the Russians, fruitless as they have been in the past, would only divide the Western allies further.

The new approach has entailed behind-the-scenes preparations and consultations for a "package deal" with Communist Russia, an approach which was contemplated in 1962 by President Kennedy prior to the Cuban crisis but which was swiftly abandoned with the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba. This package would encompass a series of agreements which in effect would endorse the political *status quo* in Europe and which would leave Germany divided once and for all. Among the proposed contents of this package are

a United States-Soviet agreement to prevent spreading of possession of nuclear weapons, a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, an internationalized status of Berlin and the eventual recognition of East Germany, and the establishment of a series of committees which would maintain "technical contacts" between the two Germanys.

These proposals did not make much headway in 1963 because of the strong opposition of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who was opposed in principle to any overtures or negotiations with the Russians. Now, it is contended that the political situation in Bonn has changed; under Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder West Germany is expected to favor a "more flexible" policy vis-a-vis the Russians.

President Johnson, in his meeting with Chancellor Erhard at the Johnson Ranch in Texas at the end of December 1963, prepared the ground by telling the German head of state that while he is not rushing out to meet Khrushchev, nonetheless he would not be deterred "from a search for new ideas and agreements by doubts in Bonn and elsewhere."

In all fairness to President Johnson, his current search for areas of "agreement with Russia" is not of his own devising, but a continuation of a long "dialogue" which was interrupted by the provocative arrest of Professor Frederick Barghoorn of Yale in Moscow a few months ago and by the process of the changing of the guard in Bonn and London.

Yet this development of American foreign policy is in sharp contrast to some of the acts of the President and some of the measures enacted by our Congress. For instance, on December 16, 1963, President Johnson bitterly commented on the House-slashing of foreign aid appropriations by stating:

We cannot oppose the spread of Communism and promote the growth of freedom by giving speeches.

But at the same time Mr. Johnson was concerned about the means of opposing the spread of Communism abroad, Mr. Rusk, President Johnson's chief architect of U. S. foreign policy, was attending a NATO Conference in Paris where he delivered a speech indicating that he was perhaps more interested in establishing a *modus vivendi*, a *detente* with Communism, rather than he was in opposing Communism or promoting the growth of freedom. In his address, incredible as it may be, Mr. Rusk stated:

We in the West should let Moscow know that we are interested in peaceful coexistence.

This glaring dissonance in the course of U.S. foreign policy is undoubtedly a source of confusion not only among the American people but among the members of the U.S. Congress as well. More than one U.S. Congressman who had to vote on the foreign aid appropriation bill may have justifiably asked:

Why should we spend enormous sums abroad to oppose Communism when opposing Communism might not be the objective of U. S. foreign policy at this moment?

Mr. Rusk through his statement at the NATO conference clearly shows the probable direction of U. S. foreign policy in 1964. Clarified, too, is why Mr. Rusk three years ago opposed the establishment of a House Committee on the Captive Nations, and why in a letter to Congressman Howard W. Smith, head of the House Rules Committee, Mr. Rusk insisted that "Armenia, Ukraine and Georgia are traditional areas of the historical Soviet state" and therefore ought not to be connected with any American policy or desire to liberate these oppressed nations from under the communist yoke.

At the moment, certainly unflattering and dangerous is the acme of confusion and contradictions of U. S. foreign policy that has been effected by its two principal executors. In the present climate we are very much afraid that the "dialogue" will end up with Khrushchev doing the talking.

KHRUSHCHEV'S RECORD SQUEAKS AGAIN

In fact, in his New Year's message Nikita Khrushchev played his old long-playing record on "peace and coexistence." Specifically, he proposed to outlaw war as an instrument for settling territorial disputes and to ban military action by one state against another. At the same time, however, he praised the sacred right of the colonial peoples to liberate themselves from imperialist domination, leaving no doubt that the Soviet Union would not hesitate to help such colonial peoples striving for liberation (with the exception of those enslaved by the Soviet Union).

We don't have to go too far back to recall Communist Russia's ugly record of border and territorial conquests and aggressions. Both Czarist Russia and Communist Russia have swelled their despotic empire at the expense of neighboring nations and then of *their* neighbors. The Soviet record is no less shameful and brazen than that of the Russian Czars. Communist Russia expanded by conquering Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cosackia and Turkestan in or around 1920. In 1939-1940 it attacked Finland and the Baltic States, and after World War II it grabbed

East Germany and extended its domination over all Central and Eastern Europe.

In Asia, too, the USSR has chillingly demonstrated how it respects the right of national self-determination of people. It engulfed Manchuria and has enmeshed Mongolia. Until the recent split with Mao Tse-tung Moscow all but ruled Red China, North Korea and North Vietnam.

Now a new theory of "national liberation" has been set forth by Khrushchev whereby Moscow might exercise its control far away from the borders of the Russian communist empire. Africa and South America are current principal targets. While in Africa Khrushchev has failed, at least for the time being, he has been brilliantly successful in establishing a bridge in the Western Hemisphere by making Cuba the first Russian satellite in the Western Hemisphere.

In the face of such undisguised hostility, the wave of appeasement and naivete here is unbelievable. None other than Walter Lippmann, America's most prominent advocate of the present *status quo* in Europe, in his column in *The N. Y. Herald Tribune* (January 2, 1964) characterizes Khrushchev's "peace overtures" thus:

Mr. Khrushchev's remarks in reply to the customary questions at New Year's are exceptionally friendly. They contain no threats and no deadlines, even implied. There is a notable lack of impatience and dogmatism about what should be done...

It is to be recalled that Pundit Lippmann is also a staunch adherent of a two-way settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union without regard for the attitudes and needs of the other European nations.

THE WHEAT DEAL AND U. S.-SOVIET "CULTURAL EXCHANGE"

The decision of the U. S. government to sell about 150,000,000 bushels of American wheat to the Soviet Union cannot, unfortunately, be dismissed as a "gesture of goodwill" or humanitarianism. For the essential fact cannot be overlooked that American and Canadian wheat purchases by Moscow will unquestionably facilitate the aggressive plans of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union needs of food is no accident; Moscow has deliberately and consistently ignored its consumer needs.

With its vast empire of conquered lands and nations the Soviet Union could easily sustain itself were it not for the fact that most of its capital and energy are devoted to manufacturing of war material and equipment and to heavy industry. Moscow is now supplying arms, planes and technical equipment to Indonesia for the

latter to attack Malaysia; to Cuba to foster Communist upheavals and revolts in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America; and to communist guerrillas in Laos.

Although Khrushchev blames bad weather for poor crop yields in the Soviet Union, the fact is that the Soviet Union has maintained a war economy for decades. Food is merely one of a long list of things, both material and intangible, denied its peoples. Khrushchev, too, in order to "overcome the United States" in foreign aid competition, is loath to renege on his commitments to the underdeveloped countries not only of war and technical equipment, but also of food, including wheat.¹

With the West being easily induced to trade with the Kremlin in a variety of commodities, it is little wonder that the USSR should be energetically pressuring for a *detente*. We are so accommodating that settlement of the European problems on terms proposed by Khrushchev no doubt will come to pass this year or next.

Each agreement that we make with Moscow costs us concessions. The image of the old shrewd Yankee trader is a thing of the past; no one these days even mentions a *quid pro quo* exchange.

Former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, observing his 88th birthday last January 5, finally became irate enough to castigate such "capitalist stupidity" (Karl Max said the same thing over a hundred years ago):

Western capitalists are ready to help Khrushchev without any evidence of peaceful intentions, and that is capitalist stupidity.

He added that the Russians constitute a powerful threat to world peace, and that the West, especially the United States, should do everything to "bring the Russians to their senses."

The same position is rigidly maintained by President de Gaulle of France, who manages a kind of glacial indignation at our talks with the Soviet Union. The prevailing opinion in France is that the Soviet leadership is internally in deep trouble, and it is therefore now foolish for any Western power to provide any economic and diplomatic aid to the communist regime.

The weakness of U. S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is demonstrated also by the series of "cultural exchanges." (Talks on the exchanges had been concluded recently in Moscow following the arrest of Prof. Barghoorn on a charge of espionage.) But the draft of the new agreement discloses a continued imbalance in subject study matter, with the United States interested in history, lan-

¹ See: "Warning on Sales to Russia," by A.A. Berle, Jr., *The New York Times*, October 26, 1963.

guage, and so forth, while the Kremlin is eager to get hold of American technological know-how. In his letter to Secretary of State Dean Rusk criticizing the U. S.-Soviet "cultural exchange" program, the Hon. Michael A. Feighan of Ohio, chairman of the hearings held before the House Sub-committee on Immigration and Nationality, stated:

Our inquiry to date reveals glaring examples of imbalance in subjects being presently studied under the exchange program with the USSR and the benefits are so heavily weighed in favor of Soviet Russia as to make continued United States participation in this program ridiculous and certainly not in the interest of our country.²

WEAKNESSES OF THE SOVIET "MONOLITH"

It is paradoxical that whenever the Soviet Union finds itself in a weak and precarious position, its foe, the United States, and the West in general, should be prone to come swiftly to its assistance and support. Despite Soviet rocket feats and the perennial blustering of Khrushchev, the unalterable fact remains that the Soviet Union is in a bad way. If Russian Communism has demonstrated anything, it is that it is unable to create and sustain a decent way of life. Its early promises of "equality and a good economic life" cannot be realized; essentially a warlike, terror state, it cannot even organize its agriculture and feed its own citizenry.

Worse, it is ready to destroy its own inmates. In the 1930's the Kremlin deliberately starved to death over 5 million Ukrainian peasants in order to impose collectivization of agriculture. Food is a means to an end for the Soviets, and if we can save them the bother of producing it, so much the better.

Other sources of Khrushchev's difficulties are Red China and Communist Cuba. The ideological rift with Mao Tse-tung is unbridgeable for the simple reason that long ago it ceased to be an ideological one. It is now an overt contest between two land powers for the supremacy not only of the communist world, but of the whole world.

The all-out economic commitment of the Kremlin to maintain a communist beachhead in Cuba has cost Moscow heavily, and there is no end in sight. Moreover, Castro has been gradually swaying to the Chinese Communist viewpoint; he has never forgotten Khrushchev's capitulation to President Kennedy in the fall of 1962 and the subsequent "loss of face" by the Cuban Communist.

Hence the Berlin dilemma has remained the principal lever of Khrushchev's diplomacy: for many years it has served unflinchingly

² Statement of the Hon. Michael A. Feighan of Ohio, December 13, 1963.

as blackmail against the Western Allies. As long as Konrad Adenauer was in power in West Germany, the Allies were adamant in not making an iota of concession which would imply the recognition of East Germany as an independent state. Now, with the Christmas passes arranged by Mayor Willy Brandt of West Berlin, the situation has weakened. The East German puppet regime of Walter Ulbricht has thus been given tacit recognition by the administration of West Berlin, which, along with the eastern zone of the German capital, at least theoretically is still under the authority of the four victorious World War II powers.

There is also a plan in the works for the establishment of "three Germanys"—East, West and an internationalized Berlin—which has always been the objective of the Kremlin.

Should the West accept a permanent partition of Germany, the overall objective of the Kremlin will have been achieved. Then all of Eastern and Central Europe—the captive lands—would forever be written off as a concern of Western policies, and then the defeatist prophecy of George F. Kennan—that there is a finality to the political situation in Eastern Europe—would be finally and completely realized. And some of Khrushchev's prestige in the communist world will have been restored.

All in all, we cannot see any auspicious augury for 1964. The cliché phrases, such as "peace" and "coexistence," will remain hollow words, because such "peace" and "coexistence" would be deprived of the most important prerogative of mankind—freedom.

Will our Administration in Washington realize this in time?

THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL — A BRIDGE TOWARD CHRISTIAN UNITY

By WALTER DUSHNYCK

The first two sessions of Vatican Council II, held in 1962 and 1963, plus the subsequent pilgrimage visit of Pope Paul VI to the Holy Land, have proved to be epoch-making events in the history of the Catholic Church and of Christianity everywhere. One journal titled its story on the second session of the Ecumenical Council, "Fresh Winds in the Catholic Church." What transpired has tremendous significance to a humanity starved for peace and ensured enjoyment of human dignity.

After the termination of the second session of the Ecumenical Council on December 4, 1963 queries were raised in a number of countries of the world: What has the Ecumenical Council accomplished thus far? It was not to be expected that voting would proceed quickly in an assembly of approximately 2,500 abbots, bishops, archbishops, cardinals and patriarchs. Actually, final action was taken on but two items of a swollen agenda. There were charges, especially by some younger prelates, that the Fathers of the Council, and possibly the Pope himself, were stalling for time and impeding speedy progress of the Council. The charge was also made that "Conservatives" were opposing reforms in the Church proposed by "Liberals."

But all knowledgeable persons and specialists on the subject incline to agree on one point: the very convocation of this Ecumenical Council was a phenomenon of extraordinary importance.

Augustin Cardinal Bea, one of the more energetic personalities of the Council, on a visit to New York in the spring of 1963, had this to say in summary about the achievements of the Council's first session:

a) The establishment of the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity as a permanent and official body set up to deal "not only with Reformed but Eastern Churches as well";

b) Adaptation of a clearly ecumenical outlook as expressed by the presence of other Christian observers inside the Council;

c) "Realization that all Christians of any and every denomination belong to each other."

On the basis of public reports and records of the first session of the Council, it could be ascertained that debates were held on the following subjects: the Liturgy, the sources of Revelation, the Communication Media, Christian Unity, and the Church itself. Some of these subjects were discussed and debated at considerable length whereas others were treated only summarily or else were postponed to the next session and for further study and research.

However, the first session was but a beginning, at which the Council Fathers acquired a growing feeling of interrelationship and an awareness of the Church as a living extension of Christ in the world.

The published results of the Ecumenical Council to date are relatively slim in volume, though rich in portent as regards ultimate achievement. Two important constitutions were adopted and enacted by the Council and then formally promulgated by the Pope at the close of the second session.

One of these constitutions deals with reform and adaptation of the sacred liturgy. It authorizes extensive changes, after study and experiment, in such things as the readings in the Mass to ensure better coverage of the gospel message. It also authorizes wider use of the vernacular language in the instructional parts of the Mass and in the sacramentary generally. Much of this applies primarily to the Latin-rite liturgy, but adaptations in the Eastern-rite liturgies are also suggested.

Certain of the liturgical changes go into effect this February (1964), as promulgated in a *Motu Proprio* (decree "on his own initiative") of Pope Paul VI, dated January 25, 1964. Among such changes are authorization for a bishop to confer confirmation during Mass, if he so chooses, and the placing of the marriage ceremony within the Mass, after gospel and sermon, for all Catholics married at Mass.

As regards contemplated changes in the liturgical texts, or translation of the liturgy into the vernacular, in this same *Motu Proprio* the Holy See reserves to itself the right of granting final approval. This implies some restriction upon the liturgical constitution as it came from the Council, which would have allowed the territorial conferences of bishops to have approved certain changes.

The other major action of the Council thus far was the constitution on mass communication media. It stresses freer exchange of objectively valid news, and also urges wider use of modern communication media in diffusing the Christian message.

Toward the end of the second session, Pope Paul VI on his own authority extended the rights and privileges of diocesan bishops in

a number of matters. They now can regularly adjudicate in certain marriage cases, for example, and as regards the Index of prohibited books, whereas formerly they had to have recourse periodically to the Holy See for such faculties. A number of concessions were also made, mostly in the direction of simplifying procedures in diocesan curias and easing the work load of the Roman Curia.

One of the more contested topics of the Council's deliberation was that concerning the place of the Virgin Mary in the Church and in Christian life. After intensive arguing and debate, the Council by a slender majority of 40 dropped the idea of a separate schema on Mary and decided to cover this matter in the schema on the Church (*De Ecclesia*). The Mariologists and some others wanted a separate schema specifically devoted to the Virgin. In effect, their enthusiasm met with rebuff.

Indicating that excessive emphasis on the Virgin Mary has been criticized by Protestant and Orthodox theologians alike, the Rev. Gustave Weigel, S. J., American theologian and Vatican expert (recently deceased in New York City at the age of 57), stated:

Protestants find that Catholic doctrine tends to obscure the unique mediation of Christ. They feel Mary is in conflict with Christ. They feel that in piling up epithets we are tending to make the Holy Virgin the fourth person of the Blessed Trinity.¹

Council experts maintained, however, that the chapter on Mary inserted in the schema *De Ecclesia* would not minimize one iota the significance and standing of the Virgin Mary in the Church. But it would make things more palatable to Protestants who would find one less reason for objection.

It is interesting to analyze the vote on the question of a separate schema on Mary. Out of 2,188 votes cast, 1,114 Council Fathers voted in favor of incorporation into the schema *De Ecclesia*. The majority of these hailed from the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, West Germany and the Scandinavian countries, where there are strong Protestant Churches and where appreciable Protestant influence is felt. On the other hand, the 1,074 Council Fathers who voted for a separate schema on Mary, come overwhelmingly from the Latin countries—Italy, Central and South America, as well as from Asia, Africa and some countries of Eastern Europe.

What was a novel discovery for most non-Catholics present was the complete freedom of debate and the democratic procedure that

¹ Statement made by Rev. Gustave Weigel, S. J., at the press conference for American newspapermen, held at the USO Headquarters at 2 Via Conciliazione in Rome at the end of October, 1963.

exists within the Catholic Church. For instance, Rev. Charles Balic, a noted Mariologist, was allowed to use the Vatican printing office to put out a pamphlet urging a separate schema on Mary. Moreover, a number of Ukrainian and Indian Bishops printed and distributed at the door of St. Peter's basilica a tract in Latin advocating a separate schema for the Virgin Mary.²

REFORMS AND REJUVENATION OF THE CHURCH

One of the most encouraging and dramatic features of the Ecumenical Council was the evident efforts of the Holy See to encourage a variety of reforms aimed at rejuvenation and a "historic face-lifting" of the Church.

When the late and venerable Pope John XXIII sent out his call for all bishops, archbishops, cardinals and patriarchs to gather in Rome for an Ecumenical Council, he said his primary goal was "to promote the spread of the Catholic faith, a salutary renewal of the customs of the Christian people, the bringing to light of ecclesiastical discipline in a way conforming to the needs of our time."

But, in addition to this primary task, that great Pope had a secondary aim in mind. He said:

This (Council) will be a wonderful spectacle of truth, unity and charity... For those who behold it but are not with this Apostolic See we hope that it will be a gentle invitation to seek and find that unity for which Jesus Christ prayed so ardently to his Father in Heaven.³

Later on, in his inaugural address on June 22, 1963 Pope Paul VI proceeded to specify his predecessor's views on the matter:

The most important part of our Pontificate will be occupied with the continuation of the Second Ecumenical Council of the Vatican, towards which are turned the eyes of all men of good will.

This will be the principal work to which we intend to devote all the energy that God has given us so that the Catholic Church shining in the world like an "ensign to the nations from far," may draw to herself all men by her organic majesty, by the youthfulness of her spirit, by the renewal of her structures, by the multiplicity of her forces, coming "out of every kindred and tongue, and people, and nation." ⁴

² Cf. a tract, "Venerabiles Fratres," signed by Matthew Kavukatt, Archbishop of Changanacherry, Malabar, India; Sebastian Vallapilly, Bishop of Telli-cherry, India; Ivan Prashko, Ukrainian Catholic Bishop for Australia; Neil N. Savaryn, Ukrainian Catholic Bishop of Edmonton, Canada, and Ivan Buchko, Archbishop and Apostolic Visitor for Catholic Ukrainians in Western Europe.

³ Quoted in "Fresh Winds in the Catholic Church." Bob Considine. *New York Journal American*, December 17, 1963.

⁴ *Ibid.*

There is no doubt in the mind of Catholic leadership the world over that the dream of Pope John XXIII increasingly becomes a reality. On the other hand, there are some who do not hide their doubts: that Christian unity is not just around the corner. They maintain that the schisms and separations which have divided the Church for centuries are deeply imbedded in people's minds and seem almost as indestructible as the earth itself.

But the winds bringing fresh air are now sweeping through the global domain of the Church. The centuries-old windows of isolation and insulation are being opened. Lay members of the Church are being given a more substantial voice in the Church's affairs. Non-Catholic Christians are being invited to listen to the official deliberations of the Ecumenical Council. A statement absolving Jews of collective guilt in the death of Jesus Christ was introduced and then considered for discussion in the Council. Since the draft statement had not been part of the printed "Ecumenism" schema circulated in advance to the Council Fathers, it was necessary to have their approval before floor debate could proceed in connection with that schema.

Actually, a certain number of prelates from the Middle East, with Christian communities in predominantly Moslem-Arab countries, raised questions about discussion of the draft statement. Thus, the Catholic Patriarchs Ignace Gabriel Cardinal Tappouni of Antioch, Stephanos I Siderouss of Alexandria, and Maximos IV Saigh of Antioch opposed inclusion of a statement on the Jews in the schema on "Ecumenism." Similar opposition came from Ernesto Cardinal Ruffini of Palermo. They noted that the original draft of the schema had focussed on Church reunion. Nevertheless, the overwhelming sentiment was in favor of some such statement, if not in the schema on Christian unity, then elsewhere.

Another facet in the updating (*aggiornamento*) of the Catholic Church is the changing role of Catholic laity. The Council Fathers generally did not take favorably to that old adage regarding the Catholic layman—"pray and pay." Now he is being encouraged and invited to rekindle in himself the zeal of St. Peter. He is asked, among other things, to show a new love and understanding of *all* Christians—not excluding the Protestant and Orthodox "separated brethren."

"THE CHURCH OF SILENCE" GETS RECOGNITION AT THE COUNCIL

In the discussion of Chapter 3 of the schema on the Church, some powerful voices were heard in defense of the "Church of Silence," namely the Church under duress from communist governments behind the Iron Curtain.

One such voice was that of Bishop Antoni Baraniak of Poznan, Poland. He spoke in the name of the Polish hierarchy, praising the laity in the captive nations:

Nothing is said in the text about the services rendered to the Church by the laity living in very difficult circumstances. There are at best only passing references to situations in which oppression of the Church is the order of the day, and where it is a crime to go to church, have children baptized, send them to religious schools or prepare them for solemn communion. It is all well and good to praise those members of the laity who can collaborate with the Hierarchy but we should not forget those who are deprived of their rights and are practically living in chains. Our text should provide words of kindness and mercy and should recognize the martyrdom, not to say the agony of those who are suffering. It is our task to encourage them, to lift up their hearts and help them face difficulties...⁵

A few days later Bishop Andrew Sapelak, Eparch for Ukrainian Catholics in Argentina, spoke during a discussion of the Chapter on "Sanctity in the Church." He stated:

The Chapter 4 on the schema about the Church is incomplete, because it fails to take into consideration the millions of Christians who are living in the conditions of persecution where roads to sanctity are inaccessible. But the recognition of Christ and His Church among the persecutions demands a heroic love of God and heroic sanctity. The Council should solemnly announce that all those who suffer for Christ are far ahead in sanctity of other Christians, because they imitate closely Christ with their sufferings.⁶

Bishop Sapelak proposed that a statement be inserted in praise of the persecuted and the enslaved defenders of the Faith, who should be the first to receive the halo of sanctity.

The closing days of the second session of the Council witnessed extensive discussion of the schema on "ecumenism" or Christian unity and harmony. In commenting on the draft statement on "Ecumenism," the Most Rev. Emile Josef Marie de Smedt, Bishop of Bruges, Belgium, said that a chapter on religious liberty should be included by the Council for the sake of truth, because the Church had always thought of liberty as a principle entrusted to it by Jesus. He added that the document would thus contain a factor of "defense," because the Church "cannot remain silent today when almost half of mankind is deprived of religious liberty by atheistic materialism of various kinds." From the ecumenical point of view, that is from the viewpoint of Christian unity, he said that the statement is essential because "many non-Catholics harbor an aversion against the Church

⁵ Cf. the Summary appearing in the official English-language Bulletin, No. 20, dated October 25, 1963, Rome.

⁶ Cf. Release containing the summary of Bishop Sapelak's statement. The Ukrainian Press Bureau, No. 8, November 4, 1963, Rome.

or at least suspect her of a kind of Machiavellism because we seem to them to demand free exercise of religion when Catholics are in a minority in any nation and at the same time refuse and deny the same religious liberty when Catholics are in the majority."

Concerning the phrase "religious liberty," Bishop de Smedt explained that it does not mean man is free to solve his religious problems according to "personal whim and caprice" and with no "moral obligation to God." What it means, he said, is that man is free to exercise his religion according to the dictates of his conscience, though this freedom is limited by requirements of the "common good" of society.

"THE SEPARATED BRETHREN" AT THE COUNCIL

The success of the second session of the Ecumenical Council can also be measured by the fact that 23 major Christian non-Catholic Churches and agencies from around the world sent official observers.⁷

In addition, the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity had invited a number of outstanding Protestant and Orthodox leaders who attended the Council as private individuals rather than as representatives of their churches.

In addressing the group of non-Catholic observers at the Council His Holiness Pope VI stated, among other things, the following:

... Be assured of Our respect, of Our esteem and of Our desire to form with you, in Our Lord, the best possible relations. Our attitude does not hide any snare,—nor does it yield to the intention of concealing the difficulties for a com-

⁷ According to a list of the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity the following non-Catholic Christian bodies sent their observers to the Council:

1) Russian Orthodox Church (Patriarchate of Moscow); 2) Orthodox Church of Georgia; 3) Coptic Church of Egypt; 4) Ethiopian Orthodox Church; 5) Syrian Orthodox Church; 6) Syrian Orthodox Church of India; 7) Apostolic Armenian Church (Holy See of Etchmiadzin); 8) Apostolic Armenian Church (Catholicosate of Cilicia); 9) Russian Orthodox Church outside of Russia; 10) Old Catholic Church (Union of Utrecht); 11) Mar Thoma Syrian Church of Malabar (India); 12) Anglican Communion; 13) Lutheran World Federation; 14) World Alliance of Reformed and Presbyterian Churches; 15) Evangelical Church in Germany; 16) World Methodist Council; 17) International Congregational Council; 18) World Convention of Churches of Christ (Disciples); 19) Friends World Committee for Consultation; 20) Church of South India; 21) World Council of Churches; 22) International Association for Liberal Christianity; 23) Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A. (*Note: The Ukrainian Orthodox in the U.S.A. was not listed among those non-Catholic Christian churches which sent their observers, but at the close of the Council the Most Rev. Mstyslav Skrypnyk, Archbishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A. was admitted as an official observer at the Council.*)

plete and definite understanding; it does not fear the delicacy of discussion nor the pain of waiting... The esteem We have for you personally and for the institutions and the Christian values you represent, makes it easy for Us to take up with you the great dialogue, the duration of which no one today can determine because of the existence of doctrinal divergences which have not yet been resolved...⁸

In the same vein spoke also Augustin Cardinal Bea, German-born prelate and the only Jesuit cardinal. He heads the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity.

The prevailing sentiments of most non-Catholic Christian observers at the Ecumenical Council were summarized by two of their number, namely, Prof. Kristen E. Skydsgaard, of the World Lutheran Federation, and Very Rev. Vitaliy Borovoy, representative of the Patriarchate of Moscow.

Prof. Skydsgaard, among other things, stated:

... We also rejoice whole-heartedly at the new ecumenical spirit which is manifest in this Council. We find ourselves meeting together at the beginning of a road whose end God alone knows. It is for us to walk together in humility and hope because we believe that our crucified and risen Lord is with us on the way.⁹

Archpriest Borovoy declared:

... We are happy to be able to communicate to the Churches which sent us, to the denominational unions and associations of churches, that here in Rome we are witnesses to the manner in which our Roman Catholic brothers, during the Second Vatican Council, prayerfully and with great pastoral zeal are seeking the best means for the renovation of their Church and for the establishment of a fraternal dialogue on a footing of equality with other Christians to "pray together to the All Holy Spirit..."¹⁰

Yet, despite these laudatory and diplomatic amenities on the part of the non-Catholic observers, some Protestant observers were critical of the Council's failure to move decisively on measures to enhance Christian unity. Thus, Prof. Robert McAfee Brown of Stanford University and representative of the World Alliance of Reformed and Presbyterian Churches, said that the Council's failure to act on certain important issues of contemporary relevance left him in "profound gloom."

But a mood of ecumenical good will pervaded the Council. The spirit of Pope John XXIII, and his short but momentous reign were omnipresent. His encyclicals, notably *Mater et Magistra* (1961), in

⁸ *L'Osservatore Romano*, October 19, 1963, p. 1.

⁹ *L'Osservatore Romano*, October 19, 1963, p. 1.

¹⁰ A release of the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity, dated October 18, 1963.

which he advocated aid and assistance to the underprivileged and undeveloped countries, as well a decent living for all workers, and his *Pacem in Terris* (1963), wherein he held out the hope for peaceful coexistence and a *modus vivendi* with countries pervaded by Communism—were but preludes to what he hoped to accomplish in calling an Ecumenical Council.

Some of the criticisms leveled at the Council's failure to act on a number of issues have been ascribed to an alleged rift between "conservative" and "liberal" wings in the Roman Curia. This rift reportedly was evident during discussions on "collegiality of the bishops" and on the issue of how the Church should be defined in the *De Ecclesia* schema.

Still other critics contended that the Council was failing to take a firm stand on Communism and atheism, despite the fact that in his opening address to the Council Fathers, Pope Paul VI made a strong reference to the persecuted Church. On that occasion he stated:

... Can We be blind and not notice that many seats in this assembly are vacant? Where are our brethren from nations in which the Church is opposed?... What sadness We feel in the face of such suffering, and what displeasure to see that in certain countries... religious freedom... is being crushed...¹¹

Later, on November 16, 1963 Pope Paul VI spoke at a celebration honoring Sts. Cyril and Methodius, two Slavic missionaries who brought Catholicism to the Slavic peoples in Central and Eastern Europe about 1100 years ago. In this address the Holy Father expressed his affection for the Eastern European lands, "where the church, in silence and tears, awaits the dawn of better days." He also said that he wanted to address "words of hope, encouragement and comfort to the hierarchy, the priests and faithful" in the East.¹²

The Pope appeared to be reintroducing the term "church of silence," which Pope Pius XII had used extensively in referring to persecuted Christians in communist lands. The term seemingly had dropped out of usage after the death of Pope Pius XII in 1958, until its use once again in a modified form by the present Pope.

At the close of the second session of the Ecumenical Council there were many indications that 2,500 Catholic patriarchs, cardinals, archbishops, bishops and abbots were under increased pressure to take a stand against all totalitarianisms, and hence by inference, also against communism. The Italian episcopate, comprising some 300 cardinals, archbishops, bishops and abbots, on October 30, 1963

¹¹ Cf. *The N. Y. Herald Tribune*, September 30, 1963, p. 12.

¹² Cf. *The New York Times*, November 18, 1963.

issued a strong pastoral letter denouncing communism and atheism. This was the first overt step in that direction since the late Pope John XXIII's initiative in seeking a new relationship with countries behind the Iron Curtain.

There were strong signs that the next session of the Ecumenical Council will denounce the persecution of religion under totalitarianism. Before the closing of the Council on December 4, 1963 some 200 Council Fathers circulated a petition demanding a strong condemnation of atheistic communism by the Council.

MOSCOW'S EYES TURNED TOWARD THE COUNCIL

The presence of the Russian Orthodox Church, that is, of delegates from the Moscow Patriarchate, in the Ecumenical Council was in line with the recent efforts at *rapprochement* with the West.

It is recalled that at the conference of the Orthodox Churches at Rhodes last fall the Russian Orthodox Church sent a delegate, namely, Metropolitan Nikodim of Minsk. At that conference it was decided that a "dialogue" should continue with the Vatican, despite some strong opposition within the Greek Orthodox Church. Although Patriarch Athenagoras of Constantinople favored the sending of observers to the Ecumenical Council, the Greek Orthodox Church refused to yield ground in opposing such a step. It failed to send representatives even to Rhodes.

The church policy of the Soviet government has long been a puzzle and enigma not only for Catholics but for the Orthodox as well. Numbering about 90,000,000 Russian Orthodox, and controlling the Orthodox populations of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Finland, the Russian Orthodox Church overshadows all other Orthodox Churches by sheer numbers.

In 1962, before the opening of the first session of the Ecumenical Council, negotiations between the Vatican and Moscow began for the purpose of establishing a better relationship. One of the conditions, it is reliably reported, of admitting Russian Orthodox observers was the immediate release of Metropolitan Joseph Sliпы, Primate of Catholic Ukrainians and Archbishop of Lviv. He had been in Soviet jails on trumped-up charges for 18 years.

Sliпы was released in February, 1963, and presently lives in the Vatican. On October 3, 1963 during the second session of the Council Archbishop Joseph Beran of Czechoslovakia was released after 12 years of imprisonment. Also released were several other Catholic Bishops: Karel Skoupý, Jan Vojtassák, Stanislav Zela and Ladislav Hlad. Some weeks later two additional Catholic Bishops were released from communist jails in Czechoslovakia: Bishop Stefan Bar-nas and Ukrainian-rite Bishop Vasyl Hopko.

Trained observers of religious affairs in the Soviet Union are convinced that the Soviet Union is presently engaged in a two-pronged religious policy: a profession of religious tolerance before the world and of continuing to encourage atheism within the USSR.

According to information seeping from the USSR, persecution of religion, including the Russian Orthodox Church, has increased in recent years. Arrests and detentions of persons connected with religious, especially Catholic, activities in Western Ukraine, are often reported in the Soviet press. Moreover, it is reported that in the last two years nearly half of the remaining churches and monasteries were closed, and several church training institutions have been deprived of facilities.

The permission of the Soviet government for the Russian Orthodox Church to send observers to the Ecumenical Council in Rome for the second session is explained in Rome by the desire of Khrushchev to arrive at a reconciliation with the Catholic Church, at least for the time being. It reportedly is a belief of Kremlin leaders that such a reconciliation would substantially help Soviet foreign policy, especially in Central and South America. On the other hand, the Vatican undertook negotiations with Moscow to prove to both the Orthodox and the Catholics behind the Iron Curtain that the Holy See is not indifferent to their sad plight under a totalitarian government.¹³

THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AT THE ECUMENICAL COUNCIL

Special reference should be made for a variety of reasons to the active participation of Ukrainian Catholic Bishops in the Ecumenical Council.

The nineteen Ukrainian Catholic prelates constituted barely 0.8% of the 2,500 Council Fathers, yet their presence was definitely felt in the Council.

First of all, the Ukrainian Catholic Church, numbering more than 6,000,000 faithful, is one of the most numerous and most active of all the Eastern Churches in union with Rome. It is by no means insignificant.¹⁴

¹³ Russian Orthodox Church observers at the last session of the Council were Archpriest Vitaliy Borovoy, Vice-President of the Commission for External Religious Affairs of the Patriarchate; Archpriest Yakov Illich, of the Cathedral of the Transfiguration in Leningrad, and Nikolai Anfinoguenov, Secretary of the Russian Orthodox Church to the World Council of Churches in Geneva.

¹⁴ Cf. *The Ukrainian Bulletin*, November-December, 1963, "Ukrainian Catholic Bishops at Ecumenical Council": The following Ukrainian Catholic Bishops attended the Council: Most Rev. Joseph Slipy, Metropolitan and Archbishop of

The Ukrainian Catholic Church belongs to the Byzantine rite (along with Eastern-rite Catholic Greeks, Melkites, Albanians, Italo-Greeks, Rumanians, Hungarians, Carpatho-Ukrainians [Ruthenians], Russians, Serbs and Bulgarians). Other Eastern rites in communion with Rome are the Alexandrian rite (Copts and Egyptians); the Antiochian rite (Syrians, Maronites and Malankarese of India); the Armenian rite (Armenians) and the Chaldean rite (Chaldeans of Iraq and Malabarese of India).

Thus out of 12,000,000 Catholics of Eastern rite, the Ukrainians constitute more than a half of the total. For many centuries they have been a major bridge connecting the Catholic West with the Orthodox East. Traditions of the Catholic Church in Ukraine and Byelorussia are strong inasmuch as both countries accepted the Union of Brest in 1596. By the Union the primacy of the Holy See was recognized by a majority of Ukrainian and Byelorussian bishops. The Union was renounced by the Empress Catherine the Great, except in Western Ukraine (Galicia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine). There Catholicism was preserved under the somewhat milder rule of the Hapsburg dynasty.

But in 1945-46, with the re-occupation of Western Ukraine by the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian Catholic Church was forcibly destroyed and the faithful subjected to the government-controlled Russian Orthodox Church. Of 10 Ukrainian Catholic bishops arrested by the MVD in 1946 only Metropolitan Joseph Slipy survived. He was released in February, 1963 upon the intervention of the late Pope John XXIII.

Five Ukrainian bishops belong to the important Council Commission for the Eastern Churches: Metropolitans Joseph Slipy and Ambrose Senyshyn; Archbishops Ivan Buchko and Gabriel Bukatko, and Bishop Andrew Sapelak. In addition, the Very Rev. Athanasius Welyky, Archimandrite of the Order of St. Basil the Great is secretary of the Commission, and Rev. M. Wojnar, OSBM, professor of

Lviv; Metropolitan Ambrose Senyshyn and Bishops Joseph M. Schmondiuk and Yaroslav Gabro—the United States; Metropolitan Maxime Hermaniuk and Bishops Isidore Borecky, Neil N. Savaryn and Andrew Roborecky—Canada; Archbishop Ivan Buchko—Rome; Archbishop Gabriel Bukatko and Bishop Joachim Segedi—Yugoslavia; Bishop Platon Kornyljak—Germany; Bishop Volodymyr Malanchuk—France; Bishop Augustine Hornyak—England; Bishop Joseph Martynets—Brazil; Bishop Andrew Sapelak—Argentina; Bishop Ivan Prashko—Australia. Bishops Nicholas Elko and Stephen Kocisko of the Byzantine rite Catholics from Carpatho-Ukraine in the Pittsburgh and Passaic Eparchies, respectively, do not designate themselves as Ukrainians, but they are members of the Ukrainian Episcopal Conference, headed by Metropolitan Joseph Slipy.

Canon Law at the Catholic University in Washington, D. C., is a consultant.

At the close of the second session of the Ecumenical Council Metropolitan Maxime Hermaniuk, Archbishop for Ukrainians in Winnipeg, Canada, was elected a member of the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity.

(According to *L'Osservatore Romano* of December 29, 1963 Pope Paul VI named Metropolitan Joseph Slipy a member of the Sacred Congregation for the Eastern Churches. The Sacred Congregation of Eastern Churches is composed of Cardinals and of Eastern-rite Patriarchs. The head or Prefect of the body is the Pope himself. Three other Ukrainian Catholic prelates had been appointed Consultants of the Sacred Congregation: Archbishop Ivan Buchko (Rome); Metropolitan Ambrose Senyshyn of Philadelphia, and Bishop Nicholas Elko, Byzantine-rite Eparch of Pittsburgh for Catholics from Carpatho-Ukraine.)

Nearly one-third of all the Ukrainian Catholic Bishops are members of Council Commissions.

During the second session of the Ecumenical Council the following Ukrainian Catholic Bishops took the floor to present their views:

October 1, 1963: Metropolitan Maxime Hermaniuk of Winnipeg; October 7, 1963: Bishop Volodymyr Malanchuk of France; October 9, 1963: Metropolitan Hermaniuk (second time); October 11, 1963: Metropolitan Joseph Slipy; October 31, 1963: Bishop Andrew Sapelak of Argentina; November 6, 1963: Metropolitan Hermaniuk (third time); November 12, 1963: Metropolitan Slipy (second time); November 20, 1963 Bishop Sapelak (second time); December 2, 1963: Metropolitan Hermaniuk (fourth time); December 2, 1963: Bishop Andrew Roborecky of Canada.¹⁵

Metropolitan Hermaniuk spoke during the debates on the schema on *De Ecclesia*. He recommended establishment of an "Apostolic College," consisting of Catholic patriarchs, cardinals with dioceses and bishops from mission territories as an advisory body to the Pope. He repeated this suggestion in another address to the Council.

The address of Metropolitan Joseph Slipy was greeted with thunderous applause by the Council Fathers, in recognition of his living martyrdom under the Soviet government. He spoke on the significance of a possible Ukrainian Catholic patriarchate, which he said is "desired by both Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainian faithful."

¹⁵ Release of the Ukrainian Press Bureau, December 12, 1963, Rome.

Rev. Edward Duff, S. J., writing for Religious News Service, reported on the address as follows:

Although the moderator of the day, Giacomo Cardinal Lercaro, Archbishop of Bologna, Italy, had asked the assembly to refrain from applause, the enthusiasm and affection and admiration when Ukraine-rite Archbishop Joseph Slipy of Lviv took the microphone could not be restrained.

Released last year after 18 years in Siberian prisons, the handsome bearded Archbishop was making his first public appearance. In Latin at once, rapid, elegant and sonorous, this patriarchal figure opened his address with the identical words of the first sermon preached by St. John Chrysostom on his return to Constantinople from exile at the end of the fourth century: "Blessed be God."

Without semblance of rancorosity in his heart, the aged metropolitan (offered by Soviet Premier Khrushchev, it is said, the Orthodox Patriarchate of Moscow, if he would abjure his allegiance to Rome) spoke of the glory of his suffering Church which, he recalled, had been represented at the First General Council of Nicea in the fourth century...¹⁶

Metropolitan Slipy's proposal for the creation of a Ukrainian patriarchate created a mild sensation among the Council Fathers. He explained that such a step could do much to satisfy and interest both Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainians who, he said, take great pride in the patriarchal structure of their own Churches.¹⁷

The possibility of a Ukrainian patriarchate was raised again on December 2, 1963 by Metropolitan Maxime Hermaniuk, who also discussed a number of problems connected with the Eastern Churches generally. Furthermore, he said, the text of the schema on ecumenism suffered from the absence of any practical discussion of the spiritual heritage of the Eastern Churches. He renewed his earlier proposal for creation of an "Apostolic College" as an advisory body to the Pope.

On the same day, Bishop Andrew Roborecky of Saskatoon, Canada, said that in our attempts at Christian unity we should not endeavor to prevail upon Eastern Catholics or Orthodox to abandon their traditional rites.

Bishop Volodymyr Malanchuk, Ukrainian Catholic Exarch for France, noted that the draft text on ecumenism omits mention of some Christian groups, which have not only their own episcopate, but even their own observers at the Council.

Bishop Andrew Sapelak, as previously mentioned, spoke about the suffering of the Catholic laity behind the Iron Curtain. He advocated that every possible consideration should be given to them in the Council's exhortation of the laity to sanctity.

¹⁶ *The Catholic News*, October 17, 1963, New York, N. Y.

¹⁷ A comprehensive summary of Metropolitan Slipy's address appeared in the October 12, 1963 issue of *La Croix*, a large French Catholic daily of Paris.

Another aspect of the activities of the Ukrainian Catholic Bishops is their taking part in various religious and national manifestations resulting in the extensive coverage in the Italian press. One such occasion was the audience of some 300 Ukrainians, led by Metropolitan Slipy, with Pope Paul VI on October 18, 1963, on the occasion of a conference of the Ukrainian Christian Movement at Monde Maggiore outside Rome. Another occasion was the Ukrainian-rite Mass in St. Peter's Basilica for the Council Fathers on October 29, 1963. This was celebrated by Metropolitan Slipy, who was assisted by Bishop Isidore Borecky of Toronto and Bishop Jaroslav Gabro of Chicago. On November 25, 1963 a number of Cardinals and other Council Fathers took part in commemorative services honoring St. Josaphat, a Ukrainian Catholic martyr.

Ukrainians in Rome contend that never had the Italian press written so much about the Ukrainians, their Church and their history as during the Ecumenical Council, and in connection with the activities of the Ukrainian Bishops. Such outstanding daily newspapers of Rome, as *L'Osservatore Romano*, *Il Tempo*, *Il Quotidiano* and *Il Messaggero* in reporting on the progress at the Council made every possible use of the reports on activities of the Ukrainian prelates.

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There is little doubt that the Ecumenical Council is a response to the urgent requirements of the moment. The fear entertained by some Council Fathers that their flocks may not be ready to follow them in stretching out a hand to the "separated brethren" has proved baseless.

The Ecumenical Council is a powerful milestone in the Church's continuing quest for harmony and unity of all peoples regardless of their color, race or nationality.

The beginnings laid by the first and second sessions of the Ecumenical Council are hopefully producing fruit in man's search for a better life in peace and freedom.

GERMANY, EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FREE WORLD

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

In the past two years American scholars, writers, and public officials have been meeting with their counterparts in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and other West European countries to discuss the problems of Western European integration and the future of Eastern Europe. The assemblies last several days and have assumed the form of a German-American Congress chiefly because of their major sponsorships. The Studiengesellschaft fuer Fragen mittel-und osteuropäischer Partnerschaft, headed by Professor Gotthold Rhode, and the Foundation for Foreign Affairs in Chicago, of which Dr. Eugene Davidson is president, have been jointly sponsoring these highly productive sessions.

The 1962 Congress took place in Chicago, and the second Congress was held for a week in September, 1963, in Wiesbaden, West Germany. Both meetings offered a broad range of topics that stimulated considerable thought in a rather lively exchange of ideas. Nothing can possibly match such occasions for communion of thought and interest bearing on a subject that is of crucial importance to the position and stakes of the Free World. The results of such intellectual exchange are priceless and enduring, especially when one considers the impact made on both private and official participants in the conferences. The ideas discussed and digested cannot but have an indefinite range of circulation.

It is not my intention here to indulge in any criticism of the meetings as such. For the plain fact is that there is really little to criticize on this score. The unique educational opportunities afforded by the annual assemblies are evidence enough of their inestimable worth. However, it has been obvious to most participants that so far an unfortunate imbalance has been struck in both the programming and ensuing discussions. Whereas the problems of West European integration, entailing the Common Market, French-German relations, the position of Britain and numerous other aspects, have received adequate coverage and treatment, the future of Eastern Europe has remained a subject of secondary and less than equal consideration.

Yet the three general areas—Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Free World—are fundamentally interwoven in the real context of an interplay of forces that cannot be sufficiently understood without a thoroughly balanced analysis.

A GERMAN VIEWPOINT ON EASTERN EUROPE

A good example of the need for such an analysis and also representative of a trend of thought in Western Germany is the paper read by Dr. Boris Meissner at the Weisbaden meeting. Dr. Meissner is a professor at Kiel University, who in the eyes of many Germans is regarded as a top-ranking Sovietologist. Apparently his thinking wields some influence in certain circles at Bonn. A number who listened to his presentation were favorably impressed and with some measure of justification spoke highly of his reputation.

The title of Dr. Meissner's disquisition is "Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy: Ideology and Power Politics." At the Second German-American Congress this presentation was really the only comprehensive treatment given to the subject of Eastern Europe. However, it is a significant piece of writing because it schematizes some of the main preconceptions and ideas prepossessing the minds of uncounted German intellectuals who are concerned with Eastern Europe. One must hasten to state that the outlook depicted in this paper is certainly not shared by all German intellectuals. It represents, thus, a German viewpoint on Eastern Europe.

Should this viewpoint become more generalized and perhaps more effective in the councils of the free German state, then it would undoubtedly lead to certain policy changes that may undermine further the cold war position not only of the Federal Republic but also of the Free World. The theoretic generalizations expressed in this paper, as indeed in any such presentation, necessarily engender within themselves the seeds of certain operational ideas and courses of action that virtually predetermine an outcome for better or for worse. From word to deed, from thought to practice, the road is not as indiscernible as some are wont to believe.

In conveying his viewpoint on Eastern Europe, the professor divides the treatment into five sections. The first deals with what he calls the transformation of Soviet foreign policy since World War II. The next three sections consider in successive order the world revolutionary, nationalist, and world political aspects of this policy. The final one is devoted to the interdependence of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. As one should rightly expect of a German scholar, the arrangement of his topics is neatly ordered and logically constructed; and the dissertation is heavily footnoted in the appendix.

What is of determining interest to us, however, is his structure of thought and lines of reasoning in connection with one of the most basic of aspects—Germany, Eastern Europe, and the Free World.

Turning now to the thesis that Soviet foreign policy has undergone a transformation since World War II, it should first be noted that a critical reader cannot be sure of Dr. Meissner's concepts. The title and several passages in the discourse underscore *Soviet Russia's* foreign policy. In reality, there is complete justification for this usage. Unquestionably, the Russians are in command in the empire-state known as the Soviet Union, and what passes for "Soviet foreign policy" or "the policy of the Soviet Union" is realistically Soviet Russia's foreign policy. Except for individual non-Russian collaborators, this policy in whatever form can scarcely be placed in functional association with the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR, which themselves became early victims of this policy.

To pursue this a step further in the order of historical existence and operation, it can be easily maintained that what is interpreted as Moscow's "domestic" policy in relation to the non-Russian nations in the USSR is in actuality the first dimension of Soviet Russia's foreign policy. The second dimension is oriented toward legalistic state entities and sovereign powers beyond the Soviet Union. Precisely speaking, then, Moscow's domestic policy pertains to affairs encompassing the subjects of the R.S.F.S.R., i e. Soviet Russia.

My criticism here is not a package of nominal niceties but rather expresses a position of working conceptions arrived at by historical analysis and perceptions that are conspicuously at variance with those suggested and later substantiated by the Meissner exposition. There is an element of conceptual errancy in any unwarranted confusion of the terms "Soviet Russia," "the Soviet Union," and "the Soviet." Moscow, of course, profits heavily by such protracted confusion, for out of it no decisive cold war measures on the part of the Free World could possibly emerge. Such confusion permeates Meissner's reflections on the subject. It indicates not only a fundamental unawareness of the scope and power of non-Russian nationalism in the USSR but also a pithy familiarity with the origin and genesis of the present imperial Russian state. It is strange, to say the least, that in the light of German experience in two World Wars this confused outlook should persist. Moreover, this point of criticism goes a long way in illuminating the many acute limitations of this particular German school of thought.

One of these limitations is immediately seen in Meissner's view of a transformed "Soviet foreign policy" since World War II. According to him, this policy is "an amalgam of world-revolutionary expan-

sionism and national-imperial power politics." Since the war it is supposed to have assumed a new aspect: "the need for a global balance-of-power policy to maintain the position as a world power gained under Stalin." The "basic transformation" he speaks of is this: "it has become a policy of world-wide scope, which in addition to flexibility of style exhibits a trait of adventurousness that—except for the Berlin blockade and the Korea war—was missing in Stalin's policy."¹

As we shall see more clearly later, in Soviet Russian foreign policy there is really no substantial amalgam of the two cited ingredients, which possess meaning only in Meissner's logical construction. The centuries-old nature of Russian imperio-colonialism has always been expansionist and worldwide. Even Marx perceptively recognized this fundamental truth over a century ago. As attested to by Lenin and others, for the Soviet Russian rulers communism has long ceased to be a practicable end in ideal social reorganization and, instead, has degenerated into another ideologic tool of conquest that today finds its widest application in the so-called underdeveloped areas. In addition, the new aspect of a "global balance-of-power policy," with emphasis placed on globality, is by far more the result of advanced technology and fantastic Western diplomatic errors than any new stature of a "world power" gained under Stalin since the last war. Apart from the accounted globalistic feature, surely the imperial Russian state in the form of the USSR was a "world power" before World War II and was also then concerned with balance-of-power policy. A little refreshing of memory would also enable us to recall Moscow as the center of a world-wide communist conspiracy then.

Concerning the "basic transformation," these points of criticism are enough to show the misuse of words here. Instead of any substantive transformation of policy, what has transpired on the basis of the fortuitous combination of scientific technology and uncanny Western obtuseness is an extension of already well-defined goals that are more realizable today than they were thirty or forty years ago. Moreover, when one recalls Soviet Russian operations in the League of Nations, in all Western countries during the depression years, in Finland and China, and in a pact with Hitler, just to mention a few episodes prior to World War II, adventurousness and flexibility are then not the exclusive features of Khrushchev's handling of the same basic policy. In any such comparisons we must

¹ Meissner, Boris. "Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy: Ideology and Power Politics," p. 1.

always and studiously bear in mind the shifting scales of imperialist enterprise as determined chiefly by relative technologic advances and the opportunities provided by the opponent's weaknesses. These factors account for the marked extension, not transformation, of Soviet Russian foreign policy.

IDEOLOGY AND SUBSTANCE

When we turn to the so-called "world revolutionary aspect of Soviet foreign policy," the misinterpretations abounding in the Meissner paper show not only that history can be badly misread but also that higher notions about "Communist ideology" can lead to some heavy wishful thinking in the cold war—this, again, to the benefit of the Soviet Russian enemy. The German sovietologist seeks to conjure into a driving force of reality the phantasms of communist ideology. The mask of the enemy is to become part of his substance. If one ponders well our criticisms of the first section, he can perceptively appreciate the reasons for them in this second section of the Meissner thesis.

The fallacious premise of this and other sections is instantly seen in this opening statement. "Insofar as Soviet foreign policy expresses a territorially limited power policy determined primarily by specific Russian national interests, it has much in common with Czarist foreign policy. A decisive difference, however, lies in the fact that Soviet policy is dominated by an ideologically motivated basic drive to expand, which was unknown in Czarist Russia."² This is a fantastic statement, contradicted both by fact and theoretic insight. Though the scales of the civilized world were smaller four centuries ago and in the last century, yet the Russianized ideologies of Supreme Orthodox and Pan-Slavism played similar roles of ideologic deception as communism has under the Soviet Russian imperialists. They, too, were sources of self-legitimation for messianic Russian aspirations, but drawn along narrower religious and racist lines, they were obviously less effective than the tool of communist ideology, with its materialistic, millenarian basis. Significantly, both von Clausewitz and Marx saw the previous ideologies of traditional Russian imperio-colonialism in this substantial light, undimmed by accidents of geographical expanse and technologic inefficacy.

What Meissner and many other sovietologists fail to understand is the historical continuity of the basic identity of Russian nationalism and Russian imperialism, with ideologies serving as the smoke screens for the expansionism inherent in the identity. The his-

² *Ibid.* p. 2.

tory of the Russian nation has been the history of the Russian Empire, whether Czarist or Soviet, and totalitarian control, not ideology, has been the principle of cementation underlying the imperial hold and maintenance. When our analyst states that "Soviet foreign policy differs fundamentally from the foreign policy of traditional powers, not only in its goals and methods, but also in its dependence upon the internal totalitarian power structure," he is quite correct.³ Just substitute Czarist for Soviet, and the statement would still be correct.

In support of his misinterpretation Meissner offers a variety of authoritative and empirical points, all of which can be interpreted with entirely different meaning. He quotes, for example, Mr. George Kennan, criticizing Roosevelt and others for underestimating "the ideological seriousness of the Russian Communists." It is noteworthy that Meissner leans on Kennan for his essential authoritative punctuation. I don't know of any American observer of "Russia" who has been wrong so often and so eloquently as Kennan. Quite simply, in this case Roosevelt and other Western leaders failed to know, let alone understand, the historic fabric of Russian imperio-colonialism and its traditional baggage of cold war techniques. More captive nations were added to the Soviet Russian list not because of the immediate presence of Russian soldiers or empowered native collaborators in their countries but because of this fundamental weakness in the Western armor that made such conquest possible.

Further, to point out that all "Communists who claim adherence to the Marxist-Leninist ideology—which is just as true of Tito and Gomulka as it is of Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung—share a common belief in a perfect ultimate society, as the final stage of history within this world" is no proof of the supposed motivating force of Communist ideology. Except for the Russian, we know how the others attained to their seats of power and also, despite their attempted exercise of "independence" either through revisionist or dogmatist utterances, we know, as indeed does Khrushchev, how in ultimate terms they depend on imperial Russian power for their very own survival. While they seek to entrench and widen their own power positions in the farflung imperium, one can hardly expect them to babble anything but the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the self-legitimizing theme song of the club.

The curious feature of Meissner's construction is its unreasonable imputation of deep doctrinal belief on the part of the so-called Communists. This shows up especially in his own reflections on Marxism and Leninism, much of which this writer agrees with. Brief-

³ *Ibid.* p. 2.

ly, Marxism is shown to have been turned upside down by Lenin, and with Stalin "a perverted variety of Marxism is involved."⁴ Not only is the perversion of Marxism underscored, but also emphasis is placed on "the Russification of Marxism in its Leninist version."⁵ Aside from their operational significance in the cold war context, these reflections make far more sense in our interpretative framework, where communism is prominently a tool of ideologic deception and for the totalitarian rulers a necessary badge of doctrinal self-legitimation, than they do in the sovietologists construction, where allegedly communism is both a source of faith and the motivating force of revolutionary expansionism.

How brittle the historical and conceptual grounds are for this sovietological construction can be seen in Meissner's elaborations. For example, concerning Lenin's political opportunism, we are told that in "a multinational state such as Russia, the oppressed peoples represented an additional auxiliary force."⁶ The multi-national state referred to is the Russian Empire and not Russia, where indeed many other peoples reside. Also, what Meissner overlooks is the Leninist prostitution of the principle of national self-determination to attract this "auxiliary force." Another example is this narrow observation: "A drive for mastery of the world in the conventional sense, such as we encounter in history, would never have required such a thoroughgoing standardization of internal structures. It is obvious that in the case of Bolshevik Russia we have to do with a very specific form of the urge to rule the world—one which has its roots in the foreign-policy theory of Marxism-Leninism."⁷ The experiences of the Baltic states and East Germany are cited for the standardization process. For those who are familiar with the institutional standardizations pursued by the Russian czars, bringing serfdom, Russification, genocide, etc. into conquered non-Russian areas, this observation appears rather myopic. It also illustrates an inability to perceive the traditional Russian sources of so-called modern communist practices.

THE EXCESSES OF UNREALISTIC DUALISM

An unrealistic dualism pervades the Meissner outlook and beclouds his own analysis with ambiguities and definite excesses. Toward the close of his presentation our sovietologist speaks of the

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 6.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 5.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 4.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 6.

Soviet Union as "a universal power," "the sense of mission of which is nourished from two different intellectual and ideological sources: Marxism-Leninism and All-Russian nationalism."⁸ He goes on to say that "Soviet imperialism, a synthesis resulting from the amalgamation of these two divergent elements, thus presents two faces."

Well now, it appears that at this stage of the analysis Russian nationalism (only the Lord knows what "All-Russian nationalism" is) also feeds the dubious "universal power" with a "sense of mission." Before this seemed to be restricted to Marxism-Leninism in the dualized amalgam. Also, in this scheme Soviet imperialism, as against Soviet Russian imperio-colonialism, is a synthesis, a new political being with two faces, rather than one face with a variety of ideologic masks, e. g., communism, Pan-Slavism, peace-maker, liberator, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist, advocate of freedom and independence.

This is a case that fittingly deserves the application of Occam's razor—"Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem." To simplify his conjurations, Meissner refers to Klaus Mehnert's simile of an airplane provided with two kinds of motors. "The pilot is free to use one motor, the other, or both, depending on the conditions encountered."⁹ Strangely enough, nowhere does he ask himself the obvious question, "Who's the pilot?" Behind all the philosophical contraptions, cockpitted in the global contrivance of world revolution is the Soviet Russian totalitarian. Without the Moscow center, all else evaporates as an apparition.

It isn't possible here to examine all the excesses of poor interpretation committed by the German sovietologist, but the following should be sufficient to indicate the logical consequences of an historically unfounded construction. Before accounting for these, it should be emphasized that in contrast to numerous other sovietologists Dr. Meissner has moved in the right direction of assigning considerable weight to Russian nationalism as a source of what he calls "Soviet imperialism." I feel quite certain that in time he will place it in proper perspective, especially by virtue of a growing appreciation of non-Russian nationalism in the USSR, and thus avoid the excesses which presently mar his outlook.

Taking cognizance of some of the other masks used by the Russians, he states, for example, "The Soviet expansion program as explained by Molotov was one of the factors inducing Hitler to make

⁸ Ibid. p. 16.

⁹ Ibid. p. 16.

his disastrous decision to attack the Soviet Union.”¹⁰ Now, plainly, the decision as such was not disastrous; what was disastrous was Hitler’s spurning of the very non-Russian nationalism that, theoretically, Meissner himself minimizes in this paper.

As another example—and far worse still for cold war operational purposes—is his fantastic belief that the “traditional expansionist goals of Czarist Russia had never extended so far to the west, nor was there any discernible Russian interest in extending the borders of the Soviet Imperium to the Elbe and the Werra.”¹¹ With uncanny wishfulness of thought, not to say glaring naiveté, he says further that “National Russian interests would doubtless have been satisfied with a safety zone of friendly states in the East-Central European region, and with a neutral attitude on the part of the other states, including Germany.” Ergo, appease Russian nationalism, which he fails to see as being historically coincident with worldwide Russian imperialist expansionism, and “the partition of Germany may be eliminated by assurance that the East-Central European countries will not fully escape from their relation of dependency...”

Yet, what sort of an outcome could one expect from a basically confused analysis that wallows in its own uncertainties. For instance, we are told, without historical justification: “The objectives of national Russian imperialism are more modest than those of the Soviet Communist variety. This does not mean, however, that protagonists of Russian nationalism are in agreement as to whether the Soviet Imperium should be considered saturated in view of its territorial gains in World War II.”¹² Were they after World War I, and why should they be where the goals are one and the prospects of future cold war victories are brighter than ever? Meissner’s observations on Cuba, the “priority of domestic policy” in the USSR, and on the cold war generally also leave much to be desired.

What amazes an American analyst is how little some German intellectuals have learned from the experiences of two wars in Eastern Europe. Many American scholars who have had no such direct experience can, with reservations, be excused for their muddled analyses of “Soviet behavior” and “Soviet foreign policy.”

No matter how characterized, conferences such as the German-American Congress make their solid contribution in this respect to the winning of the cold war.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 11.

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 13.

¹² *Ibid.* p. 16.

I WAS A SOVIET COUNTER-INSURGENCY EXPERT

By YONA LIRON, AS TOLD TO LEO HEIMAN

Yona Liron is a Polish Jew who migrated to Israel in 1951. Born in the Polish-Ukrainian border town of Peremyshl, he was an electrical engineering student at the Lviv Polytechnical Institute in 1939, when World War II broke out, and the Russians marched in from the east, to grab Western Ukraine under terms of the Hitler-Stalin pact.

During the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941, he fled eastward to Central Asia, where he was drafted for service with the Red Army early in 1942. Decorated for bravery in action on the North Caucasus battlefront, he was commissioned as an officer of the First Armored Army following graduation from Vystrel OCS in 1943.

Transferred to "Internal Security" (counter-insurgency) duties in 1944, he saw action against Ukrainian nationalist partisans for five years— first as a captain in the Soviet Army, and then as a major in the Polish Army's KBW (Internal Security Corps).

Following his honorable discharge on medical grounds, as a result of wounds sustained in the fighting, he migrated to Israel where he now works as an electrical plant supervisor near Haifa.

Married since 1952, Mr. Liron is the father of two daughters and a son.

Twenty years ago, my name was Ivan Lirovsky, and I was serving as a Captain with the Red Army's 64th Armored Brigade, deployed against the German forces along the River Dnieper (First Ukrainian Front).

As Operations Officer at brigade headquarters, I saw action in the battles of Kiev, Korosten, Zhytomir and Tarnopol, where I was wounded in the neck by splinters from exploding German shells. I spent two months recuperating from my wounds at the 912th Military Hospital in Proskuriv, and was discharged with a clean bill of health and orders to report to NKVD Colonel V. S. Maslennikov for assignment to other duties. The orders did not specify the nature of my reassignment from front-line armored troops to rear-area "Internal Security" forces, and it was with some misgivings that I approached Col. Maslennikov's headquarters, located at that time in the Western Ukrainian town of Sarny.

I am relating all this today for two reasons:

First, the struggle of Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas against the Soviet Union is the only case of a popular people's war waged

against a communist regime. A central theme of communist partisan strategy is that only progressive revolutionary forces can unleash and spearhead a popular people's war against a hated regime of reactionary oppression and/or colonialist exploitation.

I must say the communist definition of partisan warfare is quite correct. What is not true is that such warfare is, or must be, some kind of communist monopoly. The Ukrainian insurgency against Soviet Russia in 1944-1950 was certainly a clear-cut case of a progressive revolutionary struggle against reactionary oppression and economic exploitation.

My second reason for writing this account of counter-insurgency operations in Western Ukraine is that we live in an era of guerrilla wars and revolutionary brush-fire conflicts. I have analyzed the Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement (UPA—Ukrainian Insurgent Army), digesting the reasons for its initial success and subsequent failure. There are many Ukrainian refugees, now resident in various countries of the Western free world, who can give a coherent account of the UPA's people's war—from their point of view.

But how did it look from the other side of the hill, through the eyes of a Soviet counter-insurgency officer?

I reported to Col. Maslennikov's headquarters in Sarny and was appointed First Staff Section (Cadres and Training) officer of his "Operativnaya Grupa" (Operational Task Force), composed of an assortment of counter-insurgency units from all rear-area services of the First and Second Ukrainian Fronts.

It is clear to me now that the Russians committed the cardinal mistake, common to nearly all counter-insurgency forces in the world, of becoming the victims of their own propaganda.

The presence of anti-Soviet guerrillas in Western Ukraine should not have surprised them at all. For more than two years, the top authorities coordinating Soviet partisan operations behind the German lines were aware of the existence of anti-Soviet and anti-German Ukrainian nationalist units, in the vast area between the Carpathian Mountains in the south, the Pripet Marshes in the north, the Bug River in the west and the Dnieper River in the east.

In fact, the Soviet Union's ten biggest partisan "soyedineniya" (guerrilla divisions) under Generals Kovpak, Fiodorov, Saburov and Andreyev, and Colonels Medvedev, Naumov, Begma, Melnik, Brinsky and Taratuta, were ordered to penetrate Western Ukraine not so much to cripple the German Army's communications in this region, as to wipe out the Ukrainian national "competition" and to pave the way for the re-establishment of a Soviet-imposed administration in Western Ukraine.

The ten Soviet guerrilla divisions accomplished a great deal against the Germans, very little against the UPA. They learned it was much easier to take on the regular German Army, whose freedom of action was limited by overextended communications, vulnerable lines of supply, and stupidity of counter-insurgency methods, than to tackle hostile guerrillas who enjoyed the local population's support and could beat the Soviet partisans at their own game. Since operational, political and intelligence reports from all guerrilla divisions were regularly sent to Moscow by radio, liaison planes or couriers, the responsible Soviet authorities ought to have realized the formidable and tough opponents they would encounter on their way across Western Ukraine.

Alas, the Russians claimed that the entire population of Ukraine was eagerly awaiting liberation from Nazi oppression by the victorious Red Army. The "few isolated bands" in the forest were merely "Fascist gangsters," "Nazi agents," "Gestapo operatives" and "criminal underworld elements" hired by the Germans to assassinate Soviet patriots and communist officials.

Personally, I always managed to keep an open mind and was not easily misled by official propaganda. But even I believed in the above line. By constant repetition, the Russians came to believe in it themselves.

I understand now they could not have acted otherwise. To admit that the UPA was any kind of a popular partisan movement, an insurgent army, or even a *bona-fide* guerrilla formation, would be tantamount to admitting that a large part of the Ukrainian population did not want a Soviet-imposed communist regime, and preferred an independent nationalist Ukraine of their own.

And since the main strength of the UPA was in rural areas, it also meant that its support did not stem from "reactionary, bourgeois and Fascist circles" in the cities, but from the very grass-roots peasantry the Soviets claimed as their own.

Naturally, the Soviets could not admit all this. Therefore, they genuinely assumed that a few small-scale "police actions" would wipe out the "isolated Fascist bands" in the forests, and restore Soviet administration in Western Ukraine.

In March, April and May 1944, the Red Army pushed the Germans out of the Sarny, Rivne, Lutsk, Kovel and Tarnopol districts of Western Ukraine. In June, July and August of that year, the Red Army's westward sweep towards Poland cleared the Stanislaviv, Drohobych and Peremyshl districts as well.

Even before my arrival at Col. Maslennikov's headquarters, attempts had been made by local NKVD chiefs to maintain security

along the Red Army lines of communication and mount some limited counter-insurgency drives with a number of "Istrebitelny" (destroying) battalions.

These battalions, about 300 to 450 strong, were formed out of hard-core veterans of Soviet guerrilla divisions who linked up with advancing Red Army units. Theoretically, the "Istrebitelny" battalions were an ideal anti-partisan weapon. It takes a thief to catch a thief, a fighter plane to bring down another military aircraft, and a tank to knock out an enemy tank on the battlefield.

Ergo, the best counter-insurgency weapons are other guerrillas. However, it did not work out that way at all in actual practice. To begin with, the Soviet guerrillas who were drafted for the "destroying" battalions had no stomach for counter-insurgency operations. They were quite willing to be parachuted once again in the rear of retreating German armies, to raid enemy garrisons, blow up his trains, ambush his military columns. This was no picnic either, but at least the enemy was a tangible one.

To penetrate the forests in search of elusive nationalist guerrillas, to run into their cunningly located traps and ambushes, to behave as the Germans did against suspect villagers—was something no guerrilla veterans were very happy about.

In fact, the "Istrebitelny" battalions showed such great talent for staying out of trouble, and avoiding action with the UPA, that we were forced to reassign them to outpost guard and railway security duties.

Most of them were later transferred to local militia units, or sent to the front.

By the time I reported to Maslennikov, the Colonel was disenchanted with his "destroying" battalions and requested the loan of regular army units and NKVD troops. We got two cavalry regiments (about 1,000 strong) from the First Cossack Corps, a brigade (2,000 strong) of troops from the NKVD Internal Security Forces, with armored cars and jeeps, and three mobile task groups ("zagraditelniye otryady") from the Border Security Forces, with heavy machine-guns and medium mortars.

Including headquarters and administrative personnel, we had some 6,000 men for our first action against the UPA, not counting local militia and whatever remained of the "Istrebitelny" battalions.

This, as I can see it now, was a drop of water in an ocean of needs. But I had no experience in partisan warfare at that time, and it seems that I had been assigned to Maslennikov because the Colonel had requested a battle-wise officer with armored unit background.

The way we operated at first looks pretty naive in retrospect. We had many ex-partisan officers on our staff, and the underground anti-Nazi Intelligence networks set up by the Medvedev and Novak organizations in the Rivne district, by Fiodorov in Kovel, and by Saburov in the Sarny-Lutsk region, were still intact. We just took over the partisan contacts, agents and sources, and used them against the UPA.

We thus had a pretty clear picture of where the nationalist guerrillas operated, and where their main bases were located. This, I realize now, was next to nothing. The Germans had this kind of information against Soviet partisans all along, but could not utilize it, for the same reason that we failed to get to first base.

To illustrate: On July 27, 1944, we received reports that a UPA "band" (we never called them "units," "partisans" or the like, but always "bandits" or "gangsters") raided the village of Horodishche near Lutsk, killed the *Selsoviet* (village Soviet) chairman appointed by the regional communist party administration, disarmed the 12 local militiamen, hanged their commanding officer and beat up the rest with rifle butts. Following which they looted the militia precinct station, burned it down together with the *Selsoviet* building, and warned the villagers that any farmer joining the Soviet-sponsored *kolkhoz* collectives would have his throat slit.

The raiders departed without bothering to cut the telephone wires, linking the burning *Selsoviet* building with a nearby town. The reason for this omission became apparent after the wife of the late *Selsoviet* chairman entered the blazing house to call for help.

A truckload of militiamen rushed to Horodishche to blow up mines planted by the UPA raiders below a rickety wooden bridge, just off the village.

We knew that the raiders came from an UPA unit which called itself "Lisovi Chorty" (Forest Devils) and operated in the Michalkovo forest. We also understood that the raid on Horodishche was an "inside job," because the raiders knew exactly when, where and how to attack. It was obvious that UPA sympathizers from among the villagers "fingered" the objectives for the nationalist guerrillas.

The military damage inflicted upon the Soviet regime was slight. But the political impact was immense. Unless we could prove to the villagers that we knew how to eradicate the UPA and enforce agricultural collectivization, the future of Soviet administration in Ukraine would be in doubt.

If we failed to protect such pro-Soviet elements as *Selsoviet* chairmen and local militia chiefs, the control of Western Ukrainian rural districts would go to the UPA by default.

Naturally, we did not commit the stupid mistakes of the Nazis. The Germans would have razed a couple of villages and massacred a few thousand civilians in retaliation, thus contributing to the further growth of an anti-Nazi partisan movement in the district. Colonel Maslennikov knew better than that. But he was pretty naive in other respects.

We sent to Horodishche a motorized column of some 500 men, with four armored cars, heavy machine guns and mortars. They also had an *Agitprop* section with trained public speakers and a GGU (*Gromko-Govoritel'naya Ustanovka*—mobile loudspeaker van). As soon as the troops moved in to occupy the village and deploy on its outskirts, the GGU started broadcasting popular Russian and Ukrainian songs, martial brass band music and folk dance tunes. All villagers were ordered to attend a "protest meeting" against the killings, and express their "righteous wrath and indignation" against the "Fascist bourgeois nationalist hirelings of Nazi reaction."

The commissar harangued them for an hour against the UPA. He used all the standard names and epithets on the Soviet list of insults (bloodsucking leeches, contemptible bedbugs, Gestapo cutthroats, malicious midgets, nest of vipers, etc.), and whatever effect the meeting might have achieved, the commissar lost it by overdoing the propaganda mudslinging.

Some of the things he pointed out to the villagers were quite true and reasonable. Such as that Nazi Germany was as good as lost, the Soviet Union had triumphed, and it was foolish suicide to support the UPA now. The villagers could see where he was right. But when he started lambasting the nationalist guerrillas as "murderers," "criminals" and the like, the people did not go along with him, although they clapped their hands and cheered whenever he mentioned Stalin's name. Many villagers had sons, brothers and other relatives with the UPA partisans, and did not like to be insulted by an outsider, even if he spoke Ukrainian with a local accent.

The motorized column pushed deeper into the forest on a wild-goose chase after the "Forest Devils." Led by local guides who formerly served with partisan formations, the column came upon a forest clearing where traces of a recent UPA encampment were found. That was all. The task group returned empty-handed, which was just as well, because we learned later that the "Forest Devils" were about 800 strong, and could have made mincemeat of our column in a well-planned ambush, without assistance of nearby UPA groups.

In the first period of our counter-insurgency operations we merely wasted a lot of gasoline, vehicle parts and tires through wear and tear. To be sure, our own informants, former guerrilla agents,

and pro-Soviet elements among the villagers, denounced hundreds of UPA sympathizers to the NKVD. Our motorized units drove into the villages, surrounded them to prevent escapes, conducted house-to-house searches, and rounded up the suspects on our arrest lists.

But this was a security-fringe job and had nothing to do with real counter-insurgency action. The second phase of our activity began towards the end of August 1944. The front lines had been stabilized by then along the Vistula River in Southern Poland, and we could request some heavy-weight assistance from the army.

General Kiryl Moskalenko, former Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Airborne and Parachute Forces, who headed an Army Group on the Ukrainian Front (and 15 years later became Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Rocket Forces), was entrusted by Stalin with the difficult task of "mopping-up" Western Ukraine from UPA "bands."

Moskalenko deployed two cavalry divisions from the First Cossack Corps, two motorized infantry brigades from Katukov's First Armored Army, an infantry division (154th) which happened to be passing through Western Ukraine on its way to the front, and three NKVD operational task forces under Colonels Maslennikov, Skvortsov and Badayev. All former partisan commanders who took over important administrative posts in Western Ukraine, like Colonel Begma in Rivne, or Lt. Col. Kozlov in Kovel, were instructed to mobilize former guerrillas, militia units and village "activists," for the all-out anti-UPA drive. In all, I estimate some 60,000 troops and police took part in this operation, which lasted for five weeks. The official report said some 15,000 "nationalist bandits" had been killed. I suppose this figure included local UPA sympathizers who were rounded up during the counter-insurgency action and summarily executed.

However, there is no doubt that numerous engagements were fought, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. Our military hospitals were full. Gen. Moskalenko himself was wounded in an UPA ambush, and many other officers were killed in action.

Both sides changed their tactics afterwards, and I think that both committed grave errors of judgment and planning. As far as I could see, the Soviet Union, with all the resources and manpower at its disposal, could afford to be wrong. But the situation was more serious where the UPA was concerned.

The cardinal Soviet mistakes were:

—Trying to eradicate what was essentially a popular partisan movement by police-action methods. The number of UPA activists and sympathizers in Western Ukraine was estimated at 300,000. In actual fact, since over a million Ukrainians had been killed or deported by the time the war was over in 1950, it means we had con-

stantly underestimated the enemy's strength or influence. But even for fighting a resistance movement numbering 300,000 activists and sympathizers, we needed at least a million troops and police. Such numbers were never available, the maximum being 100,000 for any single drive. Which is why the war dragged on for five-and a-half years.

—Alienating the Ukrainian intellectuals in the cities by indiscriminate arrests of political suspects.

—Not considering the genuine grievances, aspirations and emotions of the local Ukrainian populace. Segment parts of the Ukrainian population may have welcomed the invading German forces as liberators from Soviet oppression and even cooperated with the Nazis at first. But after the Nazis dropped their friendly mask and showed the true face of the criminal Third Reich, thousands of disenchanted Ukrainian patriots fled to the woods to resist the Nazi-imposed regime. Their role in the struggle against German occupation forces was never recognized by the Soviets. All Ukrainians who were not supporting the Soviet-sponsored partisan movement, were branded as Nazi collaborators, or worse. This attitude alienated a large part of the Western Ukrainian population during the first Soviet anti-UPA drives.

But Soviet counter-insurgency experts learned fast. And while they were not able to correct such mistakes as were inherent in Soviet political dogma (i. e., regarding all Ukrainian patriots as Nazis, all UPA freedom fighters as bandits, etc.), they profited from the mistakes committed by Ukrainian nationalist guerrillas.

The UPA lacked a clearly defined political-strategic program. In fact, it had no strategy at all. Its broad political objective was the creation of an independent Ukraine. But this was a nebulous aim, which did not take into account the international political or military situation, and made no realistic appraisal of existing conditions.

The UPA operated in a strategic-political vacuum. There was no one willing or able to help the Ukrainian patriots in their struggle for national independence. Germany was willing to help only after it had lost the war in Russia, and in any case the German motives were selfish and ulterior, and could not be trusted in the light of past experience.

The Western Allies were more or less sympathetic, but unwilling to spark off a Third World War against Soviet Russia by extending help to a handful of Ukrainian patriots in a forgotten corner of Europe. As if the task of taking on the entire Soviet Union were not difficult enough, the UPA begged for additional trouble by raiding

Czechoslovak and Polish territories (inhabited by Ukrainian minorities) across the border, and provoking the wrath of Polish and Czech armies as well.

The UPA had thus to fight on four fronts—against the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as against pro-Soviet elements in its own backyard. Lacking a realistic political-strategic formula, such struggle was doomed to failure in the long run.

Tactically, the UPA partisans were brilliant, much more efficient than the best Soviet guerrillas of WW II. But brilliant tactics and local victories could not offset political and strategic setbacks.

A grave political mistake was to allow Soviet propaganda to associate the Ukrainian nationalist movement with Nazi Germany. As soon as it became clear after the 1943 Kursk-Orel battle that Germany had lost the war in the East, the UPA ought to have ordered all Ukrainians serving with German-organized military formations or auxiliary police, to kill their Nazi officers, grab their arms and flee to the woods. This was not done.

German Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, Gestapo and SD Security Services utilized many Ukrainians—mainly criminal elements from big-city slums and scum from the jails—such as hangmen, torturers, concentration camp guards, executioners and police informers. Such traitors ought to have been executed by the UPA on the spot. But this was done only in the most extreme cases. The UPA reserved most of its violence for the Russians, resisting the Germans with its left hand, while the right fist hit out against the Russians.

This attitude helped Soviet propaganda to discredit the UPA as a pro-Nazi outfit.

Last but not least, the UPA derived its support from the Ukrainian peasantry in the villages. According to Mao Tse-tung's famous dictum, they were the perfect partisans ("We are the fish, the people are the water"). But most UPA units were organized on a local-territorial basis. They had their parents, children, brothers, sisters and kinsmen in the villages.

Thus, if a village was threatened with permanent occupation by Soviet troops, and its inhabitants with deportation to Siberia, the local UPA unit was honor-bound to protect their families by counterattacking the enemy. In this way they gave up their vast advantage of operational initiative and unrestricted mobility, and tied themselves down to their rural districts. Moreover, by tackling regular troops they committed a tactical error as well. A campaign of highway ambushes and railroad sabotage, coupled with planned arson and assassination of key administration officials, would have hurt the Soviet Union more than attacks on military outposts and garrisons.

Soldiers were expendable and could be sacrificed to wear out and decimate the UPA, especially after Nazi Germany's surrender in May 1945, when Moscow had millions of troops to spare.

It is easy to be wise in retrospect, but it seems to me that the UPA hit out against the Russians too early and too fast. If the UPA had had enough sense and political foresight to go underground and lie low until the war was over, and only then start a campaign of well-planned resistance—in alliance with other oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe—things may have been different today.

But the UPA not only hit out too soon, but alienated the Poles and the Czechs as well. It had no friends, but made a lot of enemies. These are the main reasons for its failure, despite the fact that its case was just, and its war was a popular struggle of oppressed people.

Early in 1946, I was transferred to the Polish Army's KBW Internal Security Corps with the rank of Major, and posted as senior adviser to the Military Commandant of the Sanok District in the Carpathians.

The Poles had a very efficient counter-insurgency method against the UPA. The entire theater of operations between the towns of Krosno, Sanok, Lisko and the Dukla Pass on the Czech frontier was cleared of all Polish inhabitants.

The Polish populace was evacuated to the Western Territories annexed by Poland from Germany along the Oder-Neisse Rivers. They took their livestock and agricultural implements with them. Their villages were then burned, and the crops destroyed by bombers dropping incendiaries and by troops with flame throwers.

Next, all Ukrainian villagers were ordered to report for repatriation to the Soviet-Ukrainian "republic" (in fact, most of them were sent east to Central Asia, or Siberia). Those who failed to report at repatriation points by a certain deadline were regarded as bandits and treated accordingly. Their villages were burned too.

Because of this scorched-earth policy, the Krosno-Sanok-Lisko triangle in southeastern Poland looks like an uninhabited desert even now, 18 years after the events described.

But the UPA units operating there were left without a base of popular support, information, food supply, and manpower reinforcements. Decimated by typhus, starvation, cold, and various infections of skin and blood, the UPA units in southeastern Poland held out for two years, mainly by growing their crops in forest clearings, and raiding Polish military supply dumps. But they were wiped out by the end of 1947, and only isolated groups remained in the mountains till the last anti-UPA drive in 1950.

The Russians in Western Ukraine could not emulate the Polish scorched-earth policy for many reasons. It meant self-mutilation and admission of failure, if carried out within the Soviet Union proper. Reports published in the Western press of razed villages and millions of deported Ukrainians are grossly exaggerated. All casualties—dead in action, dead through execution, imprisoned and deported—in the 1944-1950 UPA war of independence, added up to about one million Ukrainians.

From 1946 through 1950, the Russians pursued a policy of "planned resettlement." Military, internal security and militia units would occupy a number of villages and set up permanent garrisons on location.

Black-listed suspects were rounded up, and executed or imprisoned. Grey-listed ones were ordered to pack up and move with their livestock and families to the nearest railway station, where special trains hauled them to the Kazakh, Kirghiz, Uzbek, and Omsk-Barnaul regions of Central Asia and Siberia.

The remaining villagers were ordered to join a *kolkhoz* collective. Since the UPA could not watch all this passively, it raided the villages and stormed the military outposts. Sometimes the raid would be a success, sometimes a disastrous failure. But even in cases of local successes, the minor tactical victories added up to a major strategic defeat. In place of the destroyed garrison, the Russians sent in new soldiers, who built a much stronger outpost.

The UPA could not afford the staggering losses sustained in attacks on fortified positions. From time to time, Soviet forces took the tactical initiative as well, and—guided by local Communists or renegades from among UPA prisoners—raided a Ukrainian camp in the forest.

Along all main roads and railways, "*zagraditelniye otryady*" of NKVD troops were deployed in "*zavyesa*" (continuous blockade) positions. Movement of civilians from one "*zavyesa*" to the other was restricted to those holding special permits. All others were shot or deported.

Even so, it took the Russians five and a half years to wear down and decimate, but not completely destroy, the UPA. After 1950, survivors of the old UPA went underground, but nationalist resistance and the spirit of Ukrainian independence have flared up from time to time in recent years as well.

All free world students of partisan operations and counterinsurgency methods ought to digest this partial account of my experience against the UPA, to perceive the Soviet Union's most vulnerable spot.

THE SOVIET-CHINESE RIFT

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

The apparent coolness and almost hostility noticed in Soviet-Chinese relations has aroused a great deal of speculation. The two leading Communist empires have been engaged in trading personal insults and charges of disloyalty to Communism and to Marxo-Leninism for some years and both have proceeded to air in the world press even graver charges of incorrectness in their dealings with the capitalist, colonialist and imperialist worlds. These charges have been denied with the same venom with which they have been delivered but so far no one has been able in the outside world to evaluate them completely or to give a final decision as to their cause or meaning.

There are some students in the free world who are inclined to see a great deal of significance in them. Others tend to depreciate them. Still others see profit to the cause of anti-Communism by fostering them in one way or another, if possible, and still others regard them as offering an increased danger of a Third World War and believe that while they should be carefully watched, we have at the present time no criterion for judging them.

There are many reasons for this. There are painfully few individuals in or out of government that have more than a superficial acquaintance with the history of both countries and with the stages by which they have reached their general attitudes on the Communist plane. Students of the Soviet Union have been inclined, depending on their point of view toward the one, indivisible Russia, to interpret Communist history from their own point of view toward the Soviet Union. On the other hand, students of China, whether old China hands supporting the nationalists or leftists and liberals, recognizing and believing in the inefficiency and undemocratic character of the regime of Chiang Kai-shek, have tried at times to stress the aggressive character of Moscow and emphasize the attempts of both the Czars and the Kremlin to take advantage of the difficulties of China and impose upon it the Russian method of government and of conquest without regard for the feelings of the Chinese. Still others stress that the differences over the relations to the imperialists and to peaceful coexistence are only questions of semantics and that

the exceptions made by Khrushchev in all his talks of peaceful co-existence add up basically to the program as promulgated by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.

One thing is certain. The rivalry between the Empire of the Czars and the Dragon Throne reaches far back into the past, and the first servants of the Czar to reach the Pacific Ocean found themselves in conflict with a powerful China under a Manchu dynasty. There were centuries during which the Russians were never able to cross the Amur River and their hold on the Pacific coast of Asia was confined to the Sea of Okhotsk and adjacent regions and it was from there that the Russians extended their holdings into Alaska and Russian America. At the same time China exercised a more than shadowy control over Tibet and much of Southeastern Asia, including what were later Burma and French Indo-China. Russia was more aggressive in the nineteenth century than any European state, even though that aggression was veiled because it was nibbling at the Chinese holdings in Central Asia and not directly at the easily accessible Pacific coastline as did the various European countries with their treaty ports and foreign settlements. It was not until 1840 that the Russians were able to secure control of large areas south of the Amur and establish their Pacific seaport at Vladivostok and yet the area around Vladivostok is always treated by Russians and pro-Russians as an ancient and inalienable part of the Russian Empire. There can be little doubt that this has never been accepted by the Chinese, whether Nationalist or Communist, and that the Chinese as a whole feel that they have accounts to settle with Russia, be it Czarism or the Soviet Union. How closely intertwined all this is is shown by the fact that on the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, Russia which had already put itself in control of Manchuria began to foster an anti-Chinese revolt in Outer Mongolia through that same Semenov who was later to play a role in the Russian Revolution and the war in Siberia. The mass of conflicting treaties and promises made since 1918 between the Soviets and the Chinese over Mongolia and Manchuria shows the growing intensity of the problem as China gradually began to receive back control of the Western treaty ports and enclaves. It is not for nothing that Red China has on occasion emphasized the territory that the Russians held as theirs at the same time as they denounced Western support of those states in Southeastern Asia to which Peking laid claim, including Taiwan (Formosa) and the states carved out of French Indo-China.

There has always been a suspicion on the part of some students of the Soviet Union that the endeavors of Lenin and Stalin to set up Soviet Republics in Turkestan with ostensibly native govern-

ments were intended to give the Soviet Union a foothold in the Chinese province of Sinkiang exactly as Mussolini endeavored to dominate Albania through the Italo-Albanians. Then arguing along the same lines, the attempt of Khrushchev to move large numbers of Russians, Balts and Ukrainians to the virgin lands of Kazakhstan to develop these semi-arid areas as wheat fields were not nearly as much concerned with wheat production or the raising of other grains as they were to provide a European population to prevent a Chinese counter-invasion of these territories and the movement back and forth across the Chinese-Soviet border. The charges and counter-charges arising from it in the Soviet-Chinese polemics are to be interpreted as moves in this mid-Asian confrontation, along century-old lines but with a modern doctrinal base.

Be that as it may, Stalin and Mao never saw eye to eye. The Communists in the Russian Empire won their main support from the relatively small percentage of the then factory workers and the urban proletariat. The first attempts to introduce Communism into China along these lines failed and resulted in the triumph of the Kuo-Ming-Tang, now the Taiwan regime. Mao selected and built up a group based on the Chinese peasantry and after his long retreat to the northwest emerged during World War II to take over the control of the mainland. Stalin could not approve of this different method but he profited by it and there is some evidence that the philological controversy in which he repudiated the theories of Professor Marr was intended not only to improve Soviet philology but to place Chinese and other Asiatic languages higher in the scale than Marr's theories seemed to place them, a sure way to promote international harmony.

Serious difficulties only arose after Khrushchev commenced his campaign of de-Stalinization. Mao resented this, apparently as much because he claimed seniority in the Communist movement and regarded Khrushchev claims to be Stalin's successor and corrector as arrogant and outrageous. In this he may have had the support of the "Anti-Party" (read anti-Khrushchev) group in the Soviet Union which was finally forced out of power but until the present time Mao has to a certain degree maintained the cult of Stalinism in his own particular form with pictures of the dead leader very much in evidence.

As Khrushchev tried to make terms with Tito of Yugoslavia and welcome him back into the Communist fold, Albania, the great enemy of Yugoslavia under any and all regimes, sought for another point of support and found it in Mao's China. It thus became the only supporter of Mao in Europe. It is rather difficult to see how Albania

can hope for much material aid from China but it has remained firm in its adherence both to Stalinism and its support of Mao.

When the controversy between the two major Communist states arose, it came on a doctrinal basis as Moscow and Peking argued over the respective merits of Tito and Hoxha but it soon became easy to read Khrushchev and Mao as the real objects of attack. It was only later that the two rivals began to belabor each other openly and by name with open charges that the revisionism of Khrushchev had betrayed Communism and that the doctrinaire theories of Mao lacked a scientific Marxo-Leninist basis.

In its latest form the debate has somewhat changed ground since Mao claims that Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence has led him to flirt with the imperialists and has thus damaged Communist unity and will to struggle, while Khrushchev claims that he is trying to bring in Communism without allowing the imperialists to destroy all that it has gained and argues that peaceful coexistence is not peace but the ultimate weapon of opposition, for it presumes the right of the Communists to move freely in the non-Communist world but it does not confer the same privilege on the capitalists, once an area has formally joined the Socialist camp. It is in line with this that Khrushchev has issued all his appeals for a renunciation of war by all powers, while reserving to Moscow and its allies the right to send arms to nations struggling against imperialism and has stated that China has the right, if it desires, to recover Taiwan by force. Just what difference there is between the two views in the case of the fighting in Laos and Vietnam, it is difficult to decide for we cannot be sure what part of the Communist weapons are coming from Moscow and what part from Peking, once the two products reach distributing centres in North Vietnam, Cambodia and similar states while China through its boundary with Burma is trying in every way to extend into territories over which it claimed control in past centuries.

In another aspect of the controversy, Moscow was able at the time of the Bandung Conference of Asian and African Nations to secure the admission of representatives of at least its Asiatic Republics on the ground that they were Asiatics. Since then it has assiduously wooed many of the new African states, promising arms to Somalia and help to other states. On the other hand, Mao has stated and is developing the thesis that Khrushchev and Moscow cannot be the friends and trusted advisers of the new African and Asiatic states because the bulk of the population of the Soviet Union is white. Thus Mao is trying to fan a fire of racialism not only against the Western powers and America but against the European part of

the Soviet Union, and his charges of Russian colonialism come very close to those made by the supporters of the European nations enslaved by Moscow, whether they are satellites or swallowed up as Soviet Republics.

Another point on which Khrushchev differs from Stalin is his willingness to stake a great deal on overseas adventures. Under Stalin the Soviet Union was expanding its influence from boundary to boundary, ever pushing outward, and he treated the foreign Communist parties as expendable gadflies to embarrass the free world. To a certain extent Khrushchev still does with the European parties. Even the communizing of Albania was not contrary to this rule, so long as access could be secured across the Communist state of Yugoslavia but once that had been written off, Albania seemed like a fruit destined to wither on the vine, had not events united it more or less closely with China and we must remember that this was the only European state visited by Chou En-lai on his present trip to Africa.

On the other hand, Khrushchev very early recognized the hopes that he could rest on Castro in Cuba and he grasped the possibilities of setting up a bridgehead in the New World long before the United States even recognized that it might happen. Czechoslovak planes had begun to arrive long before the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion and even the settlement of the missile crisis seems to have involved far more American promises to refrain from attacks on Castro than were at first supposed. It has been the same with the present situation in Zanzibar. Here the rebels or some of them seem to have been trained in Cuba, while Cuba is exporting, if not revolution, revolutionists to take charge and profit by all unrest and outbreaks of anti-American feeling. These have apparently had some success in Panama in embittering the crisis and perhaps in other countries in the New World. At the same time by interfering in the Cyprus dispute and claiming Western aggression against the independence of that country, he is once again showing Moscow's power abroad and manifesting the fundamentally militaristic and imperialistic nature of his peaceful coexistence.

Mao, too, has his agents scattered throughout Africa and South America, preaching his racial and militantly Communist theories. It is hard to see what material support these receive but they undoubtedly have some appeal in the less developed states where colonialism and the white race are closely associated. Whether the superior material support they are receiving from the better developed Soviet Union is going to secure the upper hand over the racial theories, it is still too early to say, just as we do not know how hostile

the agents of the two Communist states are to each other in the existing situations or whether in the outlying districts they are cooperating to foster the takeover by Communism.

As a result of this rift many, perhaps most, of the Soviet technicians have been withdrawn from China and that government is forced to develop from its own resources. Yet this is in a way what Stalin felt impelled to force the Soviet Union to do. There does not seem, except possibly along the Soviet-Chinese Asiatic border, any likelihood that more than local disputes will arise, for up to this point both positions have the same goal, the overthrow of the free world, and it is futile for that free world to relax its guard or to look hopefully for help from one side. Any support for either Khrushchev or Mao would be the same as the seeking of support from Hitler against Stalin or vice versa for the two were always able to change positions, even though they were desirous of cutting one another's throat. The West had learned the folly of its continued support of Stalin after World War II and it should beware of being caught again.

The West cannot take any consolation or hope from this doctrinal and national cleavage within the Communist bloc, for it does not have at the present time sufficient unity to decide upon a single course of action. Even NATO is torn by internal contradictions and the hope of creating a strong unified force that can not only protect Europe and the world but even in case of an opportunity throw its influence on the cause of liberation seems to have been relegated to the dim and indefinite future. The stress today in and out of the United Nations is being laid on the reduction of tensions, a reduction which is only on the side of the West, which is all too ready to talk about any compromise in supposed non-essentials to allow anything real to be gained.

The American policy of supporting the United Nations in every one of its major decisions is now returning in a disagreeable form. In Korea, the feeling out of the South Korea and American positions across the armistice line is occurring oftener and oftener. The Vietcong and North Vietnam are not responding to any talk of peace and the embattled South is rightly apprehensive of that brand of neutralism which has been so effectively disproved in Laos. Now that President de Gaulle has accepted this theory and has recognized Mao's China which he hopes to see in the United Nations, the United States will have to adopt a strong policy to save its beliefs and teachings from the morass into which the transformation and universalization of the United Nations has thrown its diplomacy. The hope of organizing a firm and united Atlantic Community on both sides of the Atlantic has also been undermined by de Gaulle's vision of Europe

as growing out from France, West Germany and the other nations of the Common Market as a more or less self-sufficient area and its agreements with the Soviet Union on the atomic test ban has been seriously challenged by de Gaulle's emphasis on a special atomic force for France.

De Gaulle rightly saw the pitfalls and the inconsistencies of the Disarmament Conference and refused to allow France to enter that morass. At the same time he is firmly convinced that negotiations with Moscow to relieve tensions are useless but he has rather sought to strengthen his relations with China especially on behalf of those Southeastern areas that were once included in French Indo-China and in which China is now once again showing interest. It is frankly an attempt to exploit the Soviet-Chinese rift along the lines of traditional French diplomacy as it has been worked out for the past centuries, but it has brought difficulties for other nations, especially the United States which seems to have decided that it was better to try to relieve tensions with Communist Russian than with Red China.

It is impossible to argue both ways. If freedom is to be saved, it must be indivisible. If Communism is to be opposed, it must be opposed without deciding which Communists are good and which are bad, which Communists, if they are to agitate in the rest of the world, are to be tolerated and aided. This is the obvious and simplest statement of the case and the attempts to maintain the position of the West in Berlin while it tacitly allows the strengthening of the defenses of the Berlin wall can win it but a temporary respite. Khrushchev is as adept at nibbling at the rights of the Allies in Berlin as the Pathet Lao is in agreeing with the neutralist government of Laos and on one pretext or another expelling it from important military positions, until it withers away for lack of sustenance and the Pathet Lao takes over to the surprise of all those who believed in the integrity of treaties made by Moscow and the other Communist states.

At the present time the United States and the other free nations of the world need to make an agonizing reevaluation of their policies. They need to raise again the flag of liberation and not rest content with some vague hope and dream that Communism will change its goals and will in a future time become peaceful, if only the Communists hear sufficient lectures and musical concerts arranged for the purpose of national understanding. Once again the United States must raise a banner to which the wise, the patriotic and the good can repair and hold it there unflinchingly until men are indeed free.

GREEK-UKRAINIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: 1918-1920

By WALTER TREMBICKY

The history of Greek-Ukrainian state relations goes back to the time 900 years ago when there existed on the northern shores of the Black Sea the powerful Ukrainian (Ruthenian) Kievan state (IXth—XIIIth centuries), which maintained normal dynastic, commercial and cultural relations with the Byzantine Empire. These relations were sporadically interrupted by armed conflicts, the normal state of affairs then as it is now. We underscore their *neighborly* relations because in the Middle Ages these two states shared a common frontier on the Crimean peninsula and along the northern shores of the Black Sea—an area of many flourishing Greek (Byzantine) trading colonies, ports and markets where merchants, monks and knights from both states met to exchange their wares, including church books, or to negotiate on behalf of their respective sovereigns.

It is not our intent here to present a historical-economic review of Greek-Ukrainian relations dating back to the time when the Kievan Prince Oleh I (907-914), son of Prince Ruryk, conducted a military campaign against Constantinople in 907 and 911 and whose legates signed in 911 a treaty with the Greeks. Nor shall we dwell on another military campaign undertaken against Greece in 941 by another Kievan Prince, Ihor I (914-946), which terminated with another peace and trade treaty in 944. Nor shall we delve into the causes of the armed conflict between Kiev and Constantinople in 968, when Prince Sviatoslav I the Conqueror invaded Greek Thrace (Dorostol) through Bulgaria, whereafter a new Greek-Ruthenian peace treaty was concluded (971).

Of special interest at this time, however, was the visit of Grand Princess Olga of Kiev to Constantinople, where she became the first Ukrainian ruler to embrace the Christian faith and subsequently initiated the spread of Christianity throughout Ukraine. It was through Byzantium that Christianity took deep roots in Ukraine. The Byzantine rite was accepted officially in 988 by the Grand Prince of Kiev, Volodymyr the Great (the Saint), whose wife Anna was a Byzantine Princess.

With the official introduction of the Christian faith in Ukraine, Greek and Bulgarian bishops, monks and priests began coming into Ukraine to found new parishes, dioceses, monasteries and the like, making the Church Slavonic, or Old-Bulgarian language, the church language of Ukraine. Ushered into Ukraine along with church books were all the other cultural attainments of Greece-Byzantium: schools (the Greek language, liturgy, history, Antic literature), the rite and arts—architecture (Byzantine style), painting, sculpture and domestic craft. The influence of the Greek culture on Ukraine was especially strong in that it was exerted from the primary source. Thus the Ukrainian culture of that time was on a plane with the Germanic and undoubtedly was superior to that of the Western Slavs, Poles and Czechs.

As a result of the Greek influence, Ukraine adopted its national and state emblem, the trident, the origin of which, according to Ukrainian historians, is traced to Byzantium as a symbol of power of the mythological god of the sea, Poseidon. The trident characterized the coat of arms of Prince Volodymyr the Great (979-1015) and appeared on all Ruthenian gold and silver coins of the Xth-XIVth centuries. It became the state emblem of the independent Ukrainian state (1918-1923) by a special decree of the Ukrainian government of March 22, 1918.

But the invasions and raids of the Polovtsian hordes of 1061, the Muscovite princes in 1169 and the Tartar hordes (1223-1240) from the east and then from the Crimea, lasting almost until the XVIIIth century, interrupted inter-state relations between Ukraine and Greece, which itself lost its independence with the seizure of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453. We take up in detail the relations between Greece and Ukraine at the time of World War I.

* * *

Greece and Ukraine resumed relations though for a short time in 1918, when upon the collapse of the Russian Czarist empire a free and independent state of Ukraine, the Ukrainian National Republic, was established by the Fourth *Universal* of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* on January 22, 1918, a time which saw the rebirth also of other Eastern European nations once subjugated by Russia, such as Poland, Lithuania, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Byelorussia.

In the summer of 1918, Kiev, the ancient capital of Ukraine, was host to a number of foreign legations and consulates, which were rapidly being established for the purpose of securing diplomatic recognition of the new Ukrainian state. At that time Ukraine

had already concluded several international treaties with foreign powers: the peace treaty with the Central Powers (Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) on February 9, 1918; and those with Austria (March 3, 1918), Soviet Russia (January 12, 1918), the Don Cossack Republic (August 8, 1918), Poland (October 26, 1918) and Rumania (November 26, 1918).

The Greek government in Kiev was represented by Consul Gripari, whose residence was on Lviv Street. Consul Gripari, as well as all other representatives of the foreign powers, accredited to the government of *Hetman* Paul Skoropadsky and subsequently to that of the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic, was a member of the Diplomatic Corps and took part in conferences called by the dean of the corps, whose members were the embassies, legations and diplomatic missions of the following states: Soviet Russia, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Rumania, the Kuban State, Georgia, the Don Cossack Republic, Byelorussia, Finland, Poland, Azerbaijan, France and England. It included also consuls with extraordinary and plenipotentiary powers of such states as Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain, Persia, Norway, Estonia and Greece.

Ukraine had its own legations and diplomatic representations abroad, the type depending on political relations and conditions of the particular foreign state. Ukrainian embassies, legations, missions and consulates operated in Soviet Russia, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, Georgia (with special authority for Azerbaijan), the Kuban State (with authority for the North Caucasian Republic), the Don Cossack Republic, Finland, Latvia, Argentina, France, the United States, Denmark, Switzerland, Siberia, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, the Netherlands and the Vatican. Ukraine also had its diplomatic emissaries operating within the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople, Turkey, Italy, Greece and the League of Nations.

On March 2, 1919 a Ukrainian Extraordinary Diplomatic Mission arrived in Greece to establish normal diplomatic relations and to renew the ancient state, trade and cultural relations which had been interrupted for several centuries.

Greece was then in not an especially good state. Although an independent state under King Alexander and Premier E. Venizelos, in reality Greece was under the strong control of the *Entente*, which, in 1916, through the imposed famine and a threat of war, compelled it to become an "ally" of the Western states in exchange for a *carte blanche* in pursuing an imperialistic policy in Asia Minor (Smyrna) and directed toward the Albanian Epirus and the Dodecanese Islands. Greece

UKRAINIAN DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN GREECE IN 1919



Members of the Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission in Athens in the spring of 1919: Minister F. P. Matushevsky (seated, center) and on his left is Modest Levytsky, Counselor to the Mission.

did not go along "in spirit," with the *Entente*; under former King Constantine it had been oriented toward the Central Powers. By 1919 with every move of the Greek government being closely scrutinized by the *Entente*, its attitude had become reserved and cautious. Nevertheless, the attitude of the Greek government and Foreign Minister Diomides toward the Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Athens was wholly sympathetic. Thus the official Greek policy, dictated by the *Entente*, was affected by the real attitude of the Greek government and Greek public opinion toward Ukraine, to which Greece was always bound by economic and cultural interests.

The composition of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Athens was as follows: F. P. Matushevsky—minister; M.P. Levytsky—counselor; S. Rafalsky—first secretary; L. Lambrionidis—second secretary; Hrynevych—military attache; E. Glusman—commercial attache; M. Halahan—clerk, and Yu. Reise—translator and interpreter.

At that time Ukraine was engaged in a drawn-out war with Soviet Russia and Poland in defense of its independence. The attitude toward Ukraine of France, the virtual dictator at the Paris Peace Conference, was a negative one, inasmuch as France had adopted the role of saviour of the old Russian empire and creator of a new Poland as a barrier against Germany in Central Europe. As a result, the work of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Athens was made ex-

tremely difficult because of the intrigues of the Russian, French and Serbian legations.

The Ukrainian mission initially established its headquarters at the "Grand Hotel de Bretagne," located not far from the Royal Palace. The arrival of the Ukrainian mission in Athens was noted in the Greek press on March 3, 1919, and an interview with the Ukrainian Minister was reported in a Greek newspaper.

At 11:00 A. M. on March 5, 1919, Minister Matushevsky was received officially and cordially by Foreign Minister Diomides, who proceeded to tell the Ukrainian delegation (Minister Matushevsky was accompanied by his Counselor and Secretary) that he was granting "hospitality" to the Ukrainian mission in Greece and that he was "happy over its presence." Thus the date of March 5, 1919 must be considered as historical, marking "partial" recognition of the Ukrainian mission by the Greek government. Since Premier Venizelos was in France at the time, the accordance of full recognition to the Ukrainian representation was postponed until his return (September, 1920). But, according to reports of the Ukrainian legations in Western Europe, the personal attitude of Venizelos toward Ukraine was wholly favorable.

The Ukrainian mission in Athens received considerable support from the former Greek Consul in Moscow, Zagirianis, who escaping from Soviet Russia to Greece through Ukraine, had found shelter and succor in the Ukrainian Republic. Zagirianis served as intermediary between the Ukrainian Minister and the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan, Meletios, head of the Greek Orthodox Church, a man of high democratic principles and extremely influential in Constantinople patriarchal circles, where the fate of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church was being decided. Through his efforts Minister Matushevsky was received on March 8, 1919 by Metropolitan Meletios, with whom he discussed such vital problems as the position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, its struggle for independence from the Russian Patriarchate, and the anti-state and anti-Ukrainian activities in Ukraine of Russian Bishops Antonius and Eulogius, *)

*) *Antonius Khrapovitsky* was a Russian Orthodox Bishop in Volhynia. He was known as the most reactionary churchman of the Russian Orthodox Church, an ardent advocate of wholesale Russification of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, and an avowed opponent of the Ukrainian national movement. *Eulogius Georgievsky*, Bishop of Lublin and Kholm, was one of the leaders of the "Union of the Russian People," and a member of the 2nd and 3rd *Dumas*, and an open anti-Semite and supporter of the anti-Semitic pogroms in Russia. During the Russian occupation of Galicia (1914-1915) he forcibly imposed Russian Orthodoxy upon the Ukrainian people. After 1920 he lived in France and headed a Russian monarchist organization. (*Bolshaya Sovietskaya Entsyklopedia*, Moscow,

whom the Ukrainian government had been forced to intern in the Ukrainian Catholic monastery in Buchach, Western Ukraine, under the benevolent supervision of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, Ukrainian Catholic Archbishop of Lviv. Minister Matushevsky, although himself of Orthodox faith, was a Ukrainian patriot, and raised his voice in spirited defense of the dignity of the Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitan, Andrey Sheptytsky, who had been arrested by the Russian Czarist police on September 19, 1914, kept in Siberia until September 10, 1917, and at that time was interned in the Russian Orthodox monastery-prison in Suzdal and later in Kursk. Metropolitan Meletios was won over as a friend of the persecuted Ukrainian people, and their Orthodox and Catholic Churches.

Another facet of the activities of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Athens was its relations with the other diplomatic missions accredited to the Greek government. As a rule, it found all the other foreign representatives in Athens friendly, with the exception of the Russian envoy, Prince Demidov, who was spreading malicious slander and calumny regarding the Ukrainian mission and the aspirations of the Ukrainian nation to freedom and independence. The French Minister, under the influence of the Russian envoy, was cool and reserved to the Ukrainian Minister, whom he granted an audience; he never revisited the Ukrainian mission. All the other ministers, notably those of Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Brazil, Persia, Georgia and Spain (charge d'affaires), all not only received the Ukrainian Minister, but in due time repaid the visit. Only the Minister of Yugoslavia, following the traditional pro-Russian policies of Serbia, and undoubtedly under the influence of Prince Demidov, eschewed even social contact with the Ukrainian mission.

Especial attention to the Ukrainians was paid by the United States Minister, Professor Garrett Droppers, professor of economics at Williams College in Williamstown, Mass. He stated to Minister Matushevsky:

I fully understand your position, and I want to repeat again and again that all our sympathies are on the side of Ukraine. We only wish to know what concrete assistance we can give you in general and how can I help in your mission.

Ukraine sorely needed arms, financial assistance, medicines and, most of all, moral and diplomatic support to secure *de jure* recognition on the part of the United States and other *Entente* countries.

1926, Vol. I, p. 92-93; Moscow, 1930, Vol. XXIII, p. 823; *Ukrainska Zahalna Entsyklopedia*, Lviv, Vol. I, pp. 130 and 1182.)

The American Minister was keenly interested in the political situation in Ukraine and, above all, in the Ukrainian-Russian relations. His Ukrainian counterpart supplied him with copious materials presenting the Ukrainian problem in its entirety, especially Ukraine's relations with her neighbors. Much of this material was submitted as well to the other missions by the Ukrainian Minister.

Minister Matushevsky was again received on April 12, 1919 by the Greek Foreign Minister and exchanged thoughts and opinions regarding the recognition of Ukraine by the Greek government, and Greek support for Ukraine at the Paris Peace Conference, where the fate of all of Eastern Europe was being decided. Minister Diomides declared:

All our sympathies lie on the side of the nations of Russia, including the Ukrainian.

On the same day Minister Matushevsky spoke also with Baron Avenano, the Italian Minister in Athens, and on April 14, 1919, the Ukrainian mission was invited by the Rumanian Minister to a reception. The Rumanian Minister expressed his full sympathy for the aspirations of the Ukrainian people to freedom, pointing out that Rumania herself was suffering under the Turkish domination.

On April 24, 1919, the U.S. Minister received Minister Matushevsky for a second time. It was the American Minister's task to explain the anomalous position of the United States at the Paris Peace Conference, at which President Wilson himself took part. It is regrettable that President Wilson's prestige and influence should have been misused in Paris by a number of European statesmen who, while paying lip service to the principle of national self-determination, were mounting their own political schemes and pacts at the expense of Ukraine.

In general, it may be stated that the friendliest foreign ministers toward Ukraine in Athens were U.S. Minister Droppers, Italian Minister Avenano and Georgian Minister Mdivani. The latter was extended many courtesies by the Ukrainian Minister, who helped introduce him to many diplomatic circles; in return the Georgian Minister supported Ukraine at every step. The Georgian Mission arrived in Athens at the end of June, 1919, and enjoyed a more successful reception than the Ukrainian because Georgia had already been recognized *de facto* by the nations of the *Entente*, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy and other Western European states.

In addition to its diplomatic activities, the Ukrainian Mission developed charitable and relief activities to assist Ukrainian prison-

ers of war, specifically, the former Ukrainian soldiers of the Russian Czarist armies who lived in Saloniki. The Mission published a review in the Greek language for the purpose of informing the Greek political and intellectual world as to the newly-established Ukrainian National Republic, its history, economic conditions and its present war of liberation, as well as about the Greek settlements in Ukraine, numbering over 100,000 persons, located principally in Odessa and in other Ukrainian cities on the Black Sea shore. It issued press releases regularly to the Greek press with information on the situation in Ukraine. It also cared for two Ukrainian Orthodox monasteries (Hermitages) at Mount Athos: the Monastery of St. Panteleimon and of St. Illia.

Minister Matushevsky died unexpectedly on October 21, 1919 in Athens of a heart attack. He was succeeded by Modest Levytsky, who continued the operations of the mission with equal zeal and dispatch until his departure from Greece on August 1, 1920.

Minister Matushevsky was buried in Athens. In his archives which remained in Greece is his library and a set of *The Ukrainian Greek Review*. Fedir P. Matushevsky was an outspoken Ukrainian patriot and editor of the first Ukrainian daily newspaper, *Hromadska Dumka* in Kiev, which was allowed to be published by the Russian government in 1906. A member of the Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party, he contributed greatly toward the political and national rebirth of the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church.

Relations between Greece and Ukraine again were suspended as a result of the takeover of Ukraine by Communist Russia in 1920; such relations, however, can easily be resumed because of their many historical ties.

ON THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT MAN-MADE FAMINE IN UKRAINE

By DMYTRO SOLOVEY

(Conclusion)

3. UKRAINE—SOURCE OF TROUBLES FOR THE KREMLIN

With its Third *Universal* (November 20, 1917), the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, the revolutionary parliament of Ukraine created in the spring of 1917, established the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), located within the boundaries of the democratic Russia. But after Lenin's brutal ultimatum demanding Ukraine's complete subordination to the Bolshevik rule and after the Bolshevik armed attack on Ukraine, the *Rada*, while conducting a defensive war, declared the Ukrainian National Republic to be independent of Russia and signed a peace treaty with Germany and its allies.

The armed defensive war of the UNR against the Red Moscow forces lasted several years. Finally, in 1920, the Bolsheviks defeated the young Ukrainian army. The Ukrainians had fought on fervor alone, for they had had no peace-time in which to organize the army properly, and had felt the need of armaments, ammunition and medical supplies. Overrunning the Ukrainian territories in 1921-22 the Bolsheviks were able to disperse the uncoordinated insurgents who had continued to spring up from among the Ukrainian peasantry.

In the following years (1923-30), with the final complete loss of Ukrainian political independence and the establishment at the end of 1922 of the centralized USSR, the main energies of awakened Ukraine quickly returned to the fight for Ukrainian national and cultural independence. A clear echo of this fight was heard even at the XIIth congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), convening April 17-25, 1923, where the nationality question was raised.¹⁴

After the 1917 revolution, the Ukrainian national and cultural renaissance, which had been checked and throttled by the Czarist

¹⁴ See *Dvenadtsatyiy syezd Rossiyskoy Kommunistycheskoy partii (bolshevikov)*. *Stenograficheskoy otchet*. (The 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party [Bolsheviks], *Stenographic Report*). Moscow: 1923. See also *VKP (b) v rezolutsiakh i rishenniakh zyzhdiv, konferentsiy i plenumiv Ts. K.* (ACP[b] in *Resolutions and Decisions of Conferences, Congresses and Plenums CC*), Part II; Kiev: 1941.

government, took giant steps forward. This mighty process of awakening in Ukraine seriously disturbed all the Russian imperialists, expansionists and chauvinists. It also disturbed the upper echelons of the Party, including Stalin. It was this ruling Bolshevik clique in the Kremlin that planned the cruel *pogrom* of Ukrainian life, especially of the Ukrainian peasantry during the collectivization. This peasantry was the backbone of the Ukrainian nation; it never let itself be affected by Russification and assimilation to the extent that, unfortunately, the educated strata of the Ukrainian populace did.

From the very first days of the 1917 Revolution Ukrainian schools began to spring up—first through the resources of the citizens, co-operatives and local assemblies (*zemstvos*), later through the state. Also appearing in the cities and villages of Ukraine were community enlightenment organizations—the *Prosvitas*. These bodies organized Ukrainian libraries, courses, amateur dramatic and choral societies, and even publishing houses in the larger centers.

At that time, too, Ukrainian orthography and the Ukrainian literary language were made official under the Ukrainian National Republic. The language quickly seeped through all the forms of community and state life: the schools, churches, theaters, scientific institutes, government, courts, diplomacy, post office, railways, army and navy. Intensive effort was put into the development of scientific and technical terminology. Up to the revolution all this had been forbidden by the Czarist authorities. And although after their occupation of the Ukrainian territories the Bolshevik authorities had relegated the Ukrainian language once more to a second-class status, they were unable to halt the development of the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian literature and writings, for example, continued to grow through new works of fiction, technical books, textbooks, scientific publications and publicistic pamphlets.

The national consciousness of the Ukrainian people at large, severely repressed until the revolution, began to crystallize. This whole great process of rebirth also touched the then small, urban population and the denationalized educated layers.

By the end of the first decade after the revolution, the Ukrainian peasantry had furnished thousands of the youth to the new Ukrainian intelligentsia who with great swiftness and ardor acquired a secondary and higher education and technical training and began to take over the leadership in the flowering of their national culture.

This process was clearly reflected in the numbers of Ukrainians attending the “technicums” (vocational high schools) and the universities of Ukraine. (Unfortunately, exact data for the early 1920s are unavailable.)

PERCENTAGE OF UKRAINIANS IN UKRAINIAN TECHNICUMS,
UNIVERSITIES AND INSTITUTES

Year	Technicums	Universities and Institutes
1924	57.0	30.0
1933	68.0	55.0
1934	70.0	60.0

In order to brake to a stop this process of the Ukrainian national renaissance, the CC of the ACP(b), led by Stalin, formulated a plan as early as 1920 which would destroy all the cultural achievements of the Ukrainian nation and kill off a significant portion of the population:

1. An attack was launched on all the Ukrainian linguistic work. Publication of the basic, multi-volume Russian-Ukrainian academic dictionary was stopped in 1924. The same fate befell the publication of the historic dictionary of the Ukrainian language, whose first two volumes appeared in 1930-32, as well as the publication of numerous terminological dictionaries. The use of dictionaries already published was forbidden. The Institute of Scientific Language at the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN) was closed.

2. In 1930 all the work of VUAN, especially its humanities branches, was totally destroyed.¹⁵ The work of the other Ukrainian cultural and national organizations met the same end.

3. A massive physical destruction of the Ukrainian scientific and cultural cadres was started. Its beginning was marked by the trials, specially set up by the GPU, of members of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU)," trials which were followed by a host of others.^{15 a}

4. Last but not least in the plan was the horrible annihilation of millions of Ukrainian peasants through a man-made famine.

These limitless and ruthless terroristic actions were part and parcel of Bolshevik rule from the very start. Let us recall, for example, the order, dated September 3, 1918, of Soviet Russia's internal affairs minister about which Steinberg wrote in his *Workshop of the Revolution* (New York: 1954, p. 148): "There must be neither hesitation nor doubts in the utilization of mass terror."¹⁶

¹⁵ See Prof. N. Polonska-Vasylenko: *"Ukrainska Akademia Nauk. Narys istorii, Ch. 1 (1918-1930) (The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. An Outline of History, No. 1 (1918-1930) No. 2 (1931-1941). Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1955 and 1958.*

^{15 a} See, for example, Hryhory Kostyuk: *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine. A Study of the Decade of Mass Terror (1929-1939)*, Munich, 1960.

¹⁶ *Narodna Volya*, No. 22, May 30, 1963; p. 6.

In order to make everything concerning the peasant appear normal from the outside, Stalin and the CC ACP (b) made especially flagrant use of such methods in the 1931-32 and 1932-33 agricultural years. The Party organs purposely estimated high yields for the still unharvested grain. From those unrealistically high estimates the Party established maximal supply quotas. According to statistics compiled by P. Berlin, the authorities took from the Soviet peasants the following proportions of the harvest (after accounting for the sowing): in 1928—17.6 per cent; in 1929—27.3 per cent; in 1930—(after collectivization) more than 30 per cent and in 1931—more than 40 per cent.¹⁷ (He was unable to determine the exact percentage of the grain taken in 1930.) But these statistics apply to the whole of the USSR. In Ukraine, where the pressure on the peasants was incalculably greater, these percentages could not but be far higher. When the collective farms and the few remaining private holdings inevitably were unable to meet their quota of grain and other agricultural products, the peasants were accused of stealing, hoarding, sabotage, and so forth. Then, as punishment, the authorities confiscated all the food that could be found, leaving the peasants and their children to face certain death from hunger. This was a conscious, planned pogrom of the Ukrainian nation, with overriding political aims.

4. MASS PARTY AND GOVERNMENT MEASURES DURING THE STARVATION IN UKRAINE

The planning for the 1932-33 action was a thorough affair. First of all, in order to lay the ground for the most austere economic regime possible, all sales of food and other staples on the open market were forbidden at the beginning of the first five-year plan. Monthly rationing for families was instituted for the distribution of food products. But it would be a mistake to infer that the rations were allowed all citizens. Far from it.

The individual holders, the *kolhospniks*, the unorganized craftsmen in the state-approved unions—these did not get any ration coupons. Among the villages only Party members, government officials and employees of the machine-tractor stations (MTS) could receive the state-supplied products.

Even city-dwellers did not all receive ration coupons—favored only were those who worked in the state factories and those who were government employees. But even with these there was no equality. Most of the citizens received only very dark rye bread. (White

¹⁷ *Narodnaya Pravda*, No. 6 for 1949, p. 2: P. Berlin: *Vo chto Stalin oboshelsya Rossyy. K semydesyatyletyu J. V. Stalina.* (Of What Use Was Stalin to Russia. On the 70th Birthday of J. V. Stalin.)

bread, made from well-milled grain, is more expensive and rare in the USSR—translator's note.) Some received 125 gr. of this bread per day per person, others 250 gr., and heavy industry workers received 400, 600 and even 800 gr. Members of their families received less, or the minimum set for the locality. Scientists and engineers were entitled to much more than the average. As an added diabolical touch, one was required to buy the bread every day. Those who were financially unable to pay for their ration of bread on a given day and those who were not fortunate enough to get to the counter before the shelves emptied were those who were not allowed to receive rations the following day. This led to constant, unnerving fear and the need to wait in bread lines for hours in order not to miss the day's ration.

Besides bread, other food products and staples were distributed on a strict ration basis. These, too, were distributed unequally. Nor did acquiring the coupons mean that a person would be able to afford the food; they conveyed merely a right to buy. Many could not exercise it.

To make this matter of uneven distribution more palatable, the government established "closed stores" in which only certain categories of customers were able to shop. There were separate stores for the employees of the people's commissariat, the Central Committee and the *Oblast* Party committees, and the members of the GPU-NKVD (state police) and the local militia. The other privileged classes to whom these stores were open were the military staff officers, managers of state factories, engineers, scientists, etc. These stores had better supplies, with larger centers having correspondingly greater quantities. Thus the whole population of the country was deliberately divided into many socio-economic groups with varying privileges. One's position could range from the comfortable to one of destitution. There were millions in the last category.

These measures were adopted to forestall the development of a dangerous all-pervading discontent. With this system in operation, certain social groups which were important to the state tended to be on the side of the Party. Moreover, this system was calculated to create antagonism between city dwellers and rural people—the so-called petty bourgeoisie. Party propaganda added fuel to the flames by loudly proclaiming that some villagers did not want to work, that they wanted to destroy Soviet authority, that they were deliberately creating food supply shortages, and so on.

Knowing well that the terrorist action directed against the peasants would result in shortages of food in the city, the CC ACP (b) hit upon a happy scheme. Throughout the country they had stores opened with the deceptive name "Torgsyn" (*torgovla s inostrantsamy*, or

“trade with foreigners”). In these stores any citizen was at liberty to buy, in unlimited quantity and without ration coupons, complete selections of the best available food products, clothes, and other goods. But all payment had to be either in gold, silver or foreign currency. Moreover, every customer had to give his name and address.

By this method the government garnered the precious metals. It was done inexpensively, for the Torgsyn prices were high, and the precious metals were given a low valuation. On top of this, the GPU-NKVD swooped down on the premises of those who had been able to buy in the special stores and would confiscate any remaining valuables.

In order to take from the Ukrainian peasants the maximum amount of grain, and yet seemingly do it “in a legal way,” the CC ACP (b) began to hike up the harvest estimates at the very beginning of the five-year plan. Just how this was done is told by an expert planner who worked on the executive committee of Novo-Sadzhariivsky *rayon* for many years:

Up until the time of the first five-year plan, or 1928, each *rayon*, drawing on the help of its agricultural experts, would compile a balance sheet of grain harvest, in which the general harvest was listed as well as the liabilities, such as the needs of the population, the cattle, the seeding, and so forth. The People’s Commissar for Lands would hand down the norms required to feed the people and the cattle. The harvest estimate was calculated on the bases of crop observation and actual trial threshing, with more weight given to the latter. This scientific method gave the actual state of the crops and reliable estimates for the harvest yield of *rayon*, *oblast* and republic. But with the development of the “socialist attack on the villages” this realistic method was deemed undesirable and things took on a much simpler form through the “proletarian estimate.”

Here is how this was done in my *rayon*. In 1931 the general harvest of the eight grain crops—spring wheat, winter wheat, rye, oats, barley, buckwheat, millet and corn—stood at approximately 20,000 tons. But the grain supply quota for the Kharkiv *oblast* was set at 30,000 tons. The *rayon* executive committee directed me, as an expert, to write up the argument that the plan for 30,000 tons was without any grounds and wholly abnormal. We received an immediate reply by wire to our complaints: “You have not calculated the grain the peasants left over from previous years.” And the *oblast* planning commission wrote me a separate letter charging me with trying to confuse the presidium of the *rayon* executive committee.¹⁸

The Novo-Sadzhariivsky *rayon*, which was assigned a quota higher than the actual harvest yield, was no exception to the rule. It reflected a general trend resulting from a CC ACP (b) directive.

¹⁸ H. Sova: *Do istorii bolshevytskoi diynosti (25 rokiv zhyttia ukrainskoho hromadianyna v SSSR) (On the History of the Bolshevik Reality—25 years of a Ukrainian Citizen’s Life in the USSR)*; Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1955, p. 14.

As early as the fall of 1931 the shadow of famine had begun to fall upon the Ukrainian villages. The people began to glean the already harvested fields. Their diet soon consisted chiefly of potatoes, beets, and pumpkins: those less fortunate had to be satisfied with substitutes. The people also began to travel in masses to neighboring *rayons* in the RSFSR, where the state robbery of the peasants was far milder and thus where some food products could be bought or traded. In the spring of 1932 people began to die. When the spring plowing and planting started, the peasants began stealing the seeds, stowing them away in their pockets to take home to their children and, being famished, chewing the grain on the spot. When the grain in the fields ripened, the hungry people began eating the heads of the wheat for nourishment.

The CC ACP (b) and Stalin knew about all this from information and reports received from the grain-growing areas, and they used this intelligence before the harvest of 1932. How?

1. The 1932 state grain supply quotas were increased over those of 1931.

2. As soon as the grain began to ripen in the summer of 1932, the Party ordered watch towers erected in the fields. Armed guards selected from the privileged classes of the village—Party, *Comsomol*, and *Komnezam* members—kept constant watch for pilfering.

3. On August 7, 1932, the government of the UkSSR passed a law which stated:

a. The possessions of the *kolkhosps* and co-operatives (the crops in the fields, community surpluses, cattle, co-op stores, warehouses, etc.) are to be considered as state-owned, and watch over them is to be increased.

b. The penalties for thievery on *kolkhosps* and of co-op property are to be increased in the interest of social protection—execution by firing squad and confiscation of all possessions, and where greater leniency may be advisable, loss of freedom for at least 10 years along with confiscation of all possessions.

Behind this harsh law was an attempt to find some means of coping with the hungry populace, which was driven to steal from the state itself. For after taking away all the grain and food products from the peasants, the authorities did not supply them with any rations, not even with the minimal allowance given the lowest echelons of city workers and state employees. In practice, the August 7, 1932 law was invoked not only against petty thieves, but even against those who gleaned already harvested fields. Andrei Vyshynsky, then attorney general of the USSR, himself admitted the stupidity of these penalties.¹⁹

¹⁹ See: *Revolutsyonnaya zakonnost na sovremennom etape (Revolutionary Justice in the Present Stage)*, 1933, pp. 102-104.

There were enough victims of this heinous law in Ukraine, because the famine affected a million peasant families and because the Party demanded that this law be applied without exception. Here is an example of its application. In order to insure plowing and sowing in the spring of 1933 Stalin ordered the *Zahotzerno* (grain supply houses) to send a quantity of fodder grain (oats and barley) to Ukraine for the *kolhosp* horses. In connection with this, on January 20, 1933, the CC ACP (b) in the person of Stalin sent a secret memorandum to S. V. Kossior, secretary of the CC CP (b) U, party secretaries of the *oblast* commissariats, city party committees, the people's GPU commissar, and the attorney general of the republic. It said in part:

Pay special attention to this fodder grain in the *kolhosps*, so that it be not used for any other purpose. All those guilty of stealing, selling or using it for any other than the assigned purpose, shall be ruthlessly brought to trial by you and charged with the August 7, 1932 law.²⁰

To Stalin and the CC ACP (b) the *kolhosp* horses were more valuable than the *kolhospmiks*, who at that very moment were dying of famine.

4. In order to shut off starving Ukraine from those regions of the USSR where the CC ACP (b) was not inflicting such drastic measures and where the food shortage was not as severe, various means were adopted to make movement difficult for the Ukrainians. Train tickets were sold only to those who had written permission to travel. GPU border guards, stationed at border terminal points, checked travellers' documents, detained all those travelling "unlawfully," and confiscated any food products carried by those returning to Ukraine. Even carrying loaves of bread was illegal, being branded as "speculation" by a decree of August 22, 1932. Numerous sworn statements by eyewitnesses testify to such confiscations and the suicides of the hapless victims of the wanton dictatorship.

5. The first signs of the climbing death rate in Ukraine appeared during the collectivization terror of 1930. But what was the reaction of the CC ACP (b), headed by Stalin? They forbade the publishing of statistics on the natural growth of population—the number of births and deaths. These vital statistics became a closely guarded secret for the next 25 years, both for citizens of the USSR and foreigners. The Party leadership alone had an idea of what they were.

When the deaths due to famine took on major proportions in Ukraine in 1932-33, physicians certifying the cause of death were

²⁰ Quoted in *Ukrainsky Zbirnyk (The Ukrainian Collection)* Book 2, Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1955, p. 97.

forbidden to name the killer—starvation. The very word *holod* (hunger) was decreed a counterrevolutionary rumor, and no one valuing his own life and those of his relatives dared use it publicly.

When news of the famine reached Canada in the summer of 1932, Ukrainian-Canadian farmers approached the USSR Red Cross with an offer to send grain free of charge for distribution among the starving people of Ukraine. The offer was rejected by Moscow.

Early in 1933 the Ukrainian National Women's League sent a memorandum on the famine to Congressman Herman Copleman. The Congressman in turn submitted it to Soviet Minister of External Affairs Maxime Litvinov, who coolly replied that the memorandum "was full of lies spread by counterrevolutionary organizations."

The CC ACP (b), and the government dependent on it, did all they could to maximize the results of the famine at the same time they strove to hide the fact of the genocide from foreign eyes.

6. In his speech on January 11, 1933, before the joint plenum of the CC ACP (b), Stalin stated that in 1932 "there were some crop losses in the Kuban, Terek and also some *rayons* of Ukraine owing to climatic conditions," but that they were not of decisive importance. On the contrary, he said, in general the grain harvest was good, with more grain in the 1932 than in the 1931 harvest.²¹

S. Kossior told the CC CP (b)U plenum in February, 1933, that the general grain harvest of Ukraine in 1932 had to reach 807,800,000 poods at an average yield of 7.3 cwt. per hectare. Of that harvest, Kossior said, 255,000,000 poods had already been collected, but this was not enough for the Party, which required much more. In addition, 145,000,000 poods had to be collected for seeding, because the seeding supply of grain had been taken away from the *kolhosps* by the Party in order to fulfill the quotas set.²²

Along with this from Kossior's speech at the February 1933 Plenum of the CC CP (b)U and with P. Postyshev's speech at the June 4, 1933 Plenum of the CC CP (b)U, we have learned that local Party officials reported the 1932 harvest to be poor in many areas, and the grain supply quotas set at the center to be wholly unrealistic. We now know that after the drought of 1932 a catastrophic shortage of food developed right after the grain was collected by the state in some *rayons* of Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava. The local Party workers fell into a panic. Some of them, confronted by the horrors of famine, felt morally responsible and took their own lives.

²¹ J. Stalin: *Pro robotu na Seli* (On the Work in the Village), *Hospodarstvo Ukrainy*, No. 1-2, 1933, p. 29.

²² A metric cwt. equals 100 kg. or 2.84 bushels. A ton equals 10 cwt.; a pood—16.38 kg.; a hectare—2.47. acres.

But the CC CP(b)U, as Postyshev reported, forbade in a circular the removal from the *kolhosps* of seeding grain in order that quotas be fulfilled.²³ It lashed out at the "rotten liberals" with mass purges, arrests, jail sentences and executions. In his speech of January 11, 1933 (as the scourge of famine spread) Stalin read his "commandments":

... do not let your attention wander with worries about funds and provisions of various kinds; do not stray from the main task; work on the grain supply from the first day, expedite it, because the first commandment is—fulfill the grain supply quotas; the second commandment—store the seeding grain—for only after the completion of these conditions can you begin to develop the *kolhosp* trade.²⁴

But Stalin made no mention of payment for the starving collective farm members for their labor. And from S. Kossior's speech at the February 1933 plenum of the CC CP(b)U we learn that "profit" distribution among the collective farm members amounted to only 5.2 per cent in the Odessa *oblast* and 18.4 per cent in the Kharkiv *oblast*. Only in the Vynnytsia *oblast* did it reach as high as 31 per cent. (There was no information about the other *oblasts*.) It was of little interest to the Party what, if anything, the *kolhospniks* were paid. The Party was interested solely in the grain supply.

Any talk among Party members on the exaggeration of the calculated general harvest and the impossible-to-realize grain supply plans was described as inventions of the counterrevolutionaries. And Kossior, at the February, 1933 plenum of the CC CP(b)U, echoed the words of Stalin:

We now have new forms of struggle with the class enemy as regards the grain supplies... When you come to the *rayon* on business to talk about the grain supply, the officials there begin to show you statistics and tables on the low harvest which are compiled everywhere by enemy elements in the *kolhosps*, agricultural branches and MTS's. But these statistics say nothing about the grain that was in the fields or that which was stolen or hidden. But our comrades, including various plenipotentiaries, not being able to understand the false figures thrust on them, often become champions of the kulaks and defenders of these figures. In countless cases it has been proven that this arithmetic is purely *kulak* arithmetic; according to it, we would not only not get the amount of bread as set in the quotas, but we would not even get half the estimated amount. False figures and blown-up statements also serve, in the hands of the enemy elements, as covers for thefts, for the wholesale stealing of bread."²⁵

²³ P. Postyshev: *V borotbi za leninsko-stalinsku natsionalnu polityku partii*. (On the Struggle for the Lenin-Stalin National Policy of the Party); Party Publishing House, CC CP(b) Ukraine, Kiev, 1955, p. 24.

²⁴ *Hospodarstvo Ukrainy*, No. 1-2, 1933, p. 30.

²⁵ *Hospodarstvo Ukrainy*, No. 3-4, 1933, p. 32.

The cynicism and deceitfulness of all these statements and accusations in the face of the then existing reality needs no commentary.

Thus in the spring of 1933, at a time when the people in the villages of Ukraine were dying by the tens of thousands under the inexorable pressure of the CC ACP (b) in Moscow, the estimate of the general harvest of Ukraine of the 1932 crop was raised (according to the statistical collection *UkSSR in Figures*, Kiev: 1936) from the fictitious figure of 807,800,000 poods (at 7.3 cwt. per hectare) to an even more fictitious figure of 894,000,000 poods (or 8.1. cwt. per hectare), with the grain supply quota being set at 385,000,000 poods.

These blown-up figures of the crop at the height of the general famine were needed by the CC ACP (b) to justify the fantastically over-estimated grain quota of 385,000,000 poods.

By collecting in Ukraine—with the help of armed force and heavy repressions—255,000,000 poods from the 1932 harvest (according to Kossior's statement made in February, 1933), and an additional 145,000,000 poods from the grain set aside for seeding, the Party rulers actually took away from the peasants at least 130,000,000 poods of grain which had been destined not for sale but as provisions for the peasants. Kossior himself revealed this indirectly when he stated that, based on reports sent in from the grain-growing areas, the state apparatus would not have been able to collect even a half of what it did manage to collect.

With the above-mentioned methods the Party leaders from the CC ACP (b) consciously and premeditatively created the heinous famine in Ukraine.

5. RESULTS OF CC ACP (b) ACTION IN DESTRUCTION OF UKRAINIAN POPULATION

Many articles and books have been written in the past 30 years about the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33, which saw whole villages and countless farms erased and widespread cannibalism and the eating of cadavers. Many have been written by foreigners who then lived in the USSR. Others were later written abroad by Ukrainians, those who witnessed it and those who lived through it. This writer himself saw the famine and its victims with his own eyes.

In fulfilling his duty to nation and humanity, he did something towards collecting the evidence of the famine and projecting the various phases of this awesome tragedy. Unfortunately, all the factual evidence published by various authors at various times has not as yet been fully collected, researched and published in one critical and capital scientific work, which would serve as a reminder to future generations and as a fitting memorial to the dead.

Ukrainian refugees who witnessed the famine or whose relatives succumbed to it are now scattered over the whole free world. They are not forgetting this national tragedy. From time to time, as now in this year of 1963, they recall it to the world. But they are unable to provide the actual number of persons who died in Ukraine as the result of this inhuman, vengeful and terroristic action of the CC ACP(b). The occupation authorities have covered up all the evidence in Ukraine and have kept it so for more than 30 years. Hence it is possible to give the number of the dead only approximately.

In his book on Stalin,²⁶ Boris Souvarine says that the American socialist Harry Lang returned from his stay in the USSR completely despondent. In *Forward* (New York) Lang wrote that he had heard from a high Soviet official about a famine in Ukraine that had claimed at least 6,000,000 persons. He did not specify, however, as to what period of the famine this figure referred. The writer himself learned of the death of 6,000,000 persons in Ukraine from the Derzhplan (state plan) of the UkSSR (which was made secretly by unknown persons) back in the spring of 1933, a time when the famine had not yet run its devastating course.

Souvarine also writes that former American communist Adam T. Long, while in Ukraine, was told by Mykola Skrypnyk that 8,000,000 persons had died of famine in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus (part of which was the Ukrainian Kuban). And Balytsky, head of the GPU (state security police) in Ukraine, calculated the number of famine victims in Ukraine alone to have been between eight and nine million persons.

Skrypnyk and Balytsky, holding top posts in the Soviet administration of Ukraine, had access to the most reliable information. But at the same time it must be remembered that the registration of deaths was quite disorganized between 1932 and 1933 because of the desperate movements of the hungry throughout the country who frequently died in the woods, in the fields, and on the highways; because of the disorganization of the administrative apparatus (in some cases entire villages and settlements were wiped out); because of the concealment of statistics on the orders of the CC ACP(b).

It may be noted here that Mykola Skrypnyk was greatly moved by these events. He found himself in constant collision with Stalin's and the CC ACP(b)'s policy toward Ukraine. Despairing, he committed suicide on July 6, 1933.

²⁶ Boris Souvarine: *Stalin, A Critical Survey of Bolshevism*. Translated by C.L.R. James, New York: Alliance Book Corp., Longmans, Green and Co., 1933.

Taking the official population data according to the December 17, 1926 census (29,494,800), the January 17, 1939 census (30,960,200), and the average natural increase before the collectivization terror of 1924-27 (2.36 per cent per year), it can be calculated that Ukraine (within its former area, or aside from Kuban, the Crimea, the Ukrainian ethnographic territories of Voronezh, Kursk, etc.) lost 7,500,000 persons between the two censuses. This loss is accounted for by the number dead of famine, the number killed and exiled during the repressions, and the decrease in the number of births.

But this figure of 7,500,000 would be more or less accurate only on the following conditions:

1. The figure of 30,960,200 for the population as of January 17, 1939 be completely reliable, and not inflated. We ourselves have little confidence in it. We recall that soon after the completion of the census, a much lower figure was given (in the *Kommunist*, we believe), a figure which was subsequently increased. No breakdown for the individual territories of Ukraine was ever printed. As for the possibility of the inflation of the January 17, 1939 census, the following may be meaningful: the data of the 1937 census, which reflected the ravages of the Party terror, were termed "harmful" by the CC ACP(b), the people in charge of the census were repressed, and the figures were forbidden to be published. Unfortunately, there is no way now to determine the degree of inflation of the January 17, 1939 census (inflated in order to conceal the results of terror and famine).

2. Similarly, the 7.5 million figure could be accepted for the population of the UkSSR if between these two censuses colonists from the RSFSR and other republics had not been brought into Ukraine. The influx of colonizers was well marked in those years. At the beginning of this paper we established that between 1926 and 1959 at least 3.7 million Russian colonizers were brought into Ukraine. How many of this number came between 1926 and 1939? Probably no less than a million and a half.

Thus the actual loss of population on the territory of Ukraine probably reached 8.5 to 9 million, and of that number at least 6.5 million human beings died of hunger.

P. Postyshev, sent to Ukraine by Stalin and the CC ACP(b) in 1933 to administer its death blow, summarized the reasons and results of this action thus:

In past years our enemies more than once have tried to organize a separation of Ukraine from the Soviet Union...

During two years of this period—1931 to 1932—Ukraine suffered an acute breakdown in the basic streams of economy and cultural development. Ukraine

successfully overcame this breakdown in 1933 and stepped out on the broad path of the victorious building of socialism...

The year 1933 was the year of the destruction of the nationalist, Petlura, and other elements of the class enemy who took root in various areas of the building of socialism...

There is nothing to add to these cynical statements of Postyshev. They clearly indicate just why Stalin and the CC ACP (b) organized the mass genocide in Ukraine. It was a colossal pogrom inflicted on a nation which strives to emerge from colonial dependence on Moscow, which eternally wants to organize its own life freely and independently.

BOOK REVIEWS

AN AMERICAN IN THE MAKING: The Biography of William Dzus, Inventor.
By Ronald Lawrence Bern. William Barton Marsh Co., Inc. New York, 1961, pp. 139.

The history of the United States of America is rightly depicted by authors, historians and chroniclers as a saga of personal courage and determination, a triumph of men in freedom and equal opportunity. America was built by men who defied difficulties and risks, by men, who in search of economic betterment and personal freedom, had left their countries of origin to start here a new, adventurous, and often hazardous life.

This combination of freedom, opportunity and pioneering spirit made for the creation of a new, powerful and dynamic nation, built from and by men of many countries of the world.

An American in the Making by Ronald Lawrence Bern is the personal story of one such man. He is William Dzus, a humble immigrant from Ukraine, a man of unpretentious beginnings who turned out to be a man of dynamism and many gifts.

In 1913 William Dzus came to Canada along with thousands of Ukrainian compatriots and other immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Austro-Hungarian empire who were irresistibly drawn by the powerful challenge of a new life in the New World. Because of the restricted U.S. immigration quota William Dzus first landed in Canada, eventually obtaining a U. S. visa and going to Newark, N. J., to join his older sister. He enrolled in a night school for immigrants to learn English and the American way of life. Soon he was hired by the Hyatt Roller Bearing Company in Harrison, N. J., where he first grasped the meaning and complexities of machinery. After going to a trade school, he became a qualified lathe operator in the Crackavila Dynamo Company in Orange, N. J.

From that time on, William Dzus gave himself no respite. He studied and made researches in machinery, fascinated by blue-prints and charts, as he went from one company to another, always improving his mechanical knowledge and deepening his interest in machinery. In 1917 he married Eva Skaletska, a Ukrainian girl from his native village, who soon bore him a son, Theodore. But their happiness was short-lived; his wife died of tuberculosis, and William himself suffered an injury resulting in the loss of sight in one eye.

In 1927 William Dzus married Mrs. Anna Resnick, a widow of a friend who had drowned, so that little Theodore had a mother and a step-sister. At that time William already had his own automobile repair business, as well as a patented invention, a lathe attachment. A series of other inventions and patents followed, which he continued to perfect after securing employment with the American Airplane and Engine Co. in Farmingdale, N. Y., a division of Fairchild Aircraft. It was there that William was struck by the sound planes made while landing, a sound like the rattling of many tin cans.

He discovered that the sections covering the engines, known as the cowlings, were secured by wire pins, lengths of wire straps and other inadequate fastening devices. He continued work on his own fastener, similar in form to a cranking device which he had designed as an automobile mechanic. When the first model of the Dzus Fastener was completed, it was acknowledged that it had the three basic requirements for effectiveness: strength, safety and simplicity. In addition, the new fastener was compact, tight under vibration, inexpensive to manufacture, and easy to lock and unlock, requiring only a quarter turn in either direction.

Then, William Dzus had to fight for the right to keep the invention, inasmuch as the company tried to induce him to sign his patent rights over to it. Eventually, he had to resign from his job.

By 1932 William Dzus had established his own modest plant in Babylon, Long Island. The going was not easy, as he needed capital for machinery. But with the resourcefulness and determination typical of the man, the Dzus Fastener Company was born in a little garage on Hawley Avenue, in West Islip, L. I., N. Y. Soon patents on the Dzus Fastener were granted in France and England, and the little garage shop developed into a powerful company. The success of the Dzus Fastener in the field of commercial aviation finally attracted the attention and interest of the U. S. Army Air Force, and the Dzus fasteners were installed and tested on military aircraft. The aeronautical engineers immediately approved the Dzus device and ordered all Air Force planes rebuilt for installation of the fastener.

During World War II the Dzus Company expanded its business manifoldly. There were some unpleasant incidents—such as the investigation by Thurman Arnold of the Senate Patents Commission, and adverse publicity in the American press, charging that the Dzus Fastener Co. was “blocking the war effort,” spurious charges resulting from a mishandling of the company’s application for a priority certificate. The FBI also investigated the company because one of its employees, a man named Weber, was involved in a plot to supply radio transmission equipment to German agents in this country. But the investigation established that the Dzus company was in no way involved. Unhappily, during the course of the investigation, especially the Senate hearings, the company received much unfavorable publicity which eventually affected the progress of production. The Dzus Fastener Company, however, managed to contribute greatly to the war effort: some 500 employees worked in the plant during the war.

The invention of William Dzus found yet another application: use in bone surgery by U. S. Army doctors, especially during the Korean war, at which time the Dzus Fastener Co. again found itself deeply engaged in war production.

For the past quarter of a century William Dzus has been a powerful and influential figure on the Ukrainian-American scene. Mr. Dzus’ deep interest in Ukrainian culture impelled him to purchase a mansion at 5th Avenue and 79th Street, New York, for the seat of the Ukrainian Institute of America, which he serves as president. It is a thriving center of Ukrainian art, music, literature and handicrafts. It also provides educational grants to talented and outstanding young men and women of Ukrainian extraction.

In 1955 another important event occurred in the life of William Dzus, the American inventor: the marriage with his second wife ended in divorce. In 1957, however, he married Ivanna Sheparovych, a recent Ukrainian immigrant. Since his son Ted assumed the presidency of the Dzus Fastener Com-

pany, William Dzus has had more time to devote to his activities as a philanthropist and patron of Ukrainian culture.

The book, *An American in the Making*, is a vivid testimonial to the American dream—the triumph of the individual over handicaps and adversity. This inspiring story should be read by all Americans, both those born here and those who have become Americans by their own choice, because the story of William Dzus is the saga of free America.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

J.F.K.: THE MAN AND THE MYTH. By Victor Lasky. Macmillan Company, New York, 1963, pp. 653.

De mortuis nil nisi bonum properly dominated the hearts and minds of all Americans who were literally stunned by the brutal assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Whatever our respective political persuasions, we honorably and loyally mourned the death of a man slain by a communist. Morally, nothing but the good should be said about the dead, whether in a period of official mourning or beyond. For no mortal can pass judgment on the soul of any man, whether dead or alive. This is entirely within God's power and province.

The author and publisher of this comprehensive work on the late President showed good moral taste and behavior when they suspended its further publication during the official mourning period. This popular book was already running into a dozen printings. Quite properly, too, its publication has been resumed, and its printings continue to soar. The American public is and should be vitally interested in the deeds and misdeeds of the man who became our 35th President. What he did or failed to do is an entirely different question from that of showing even tearful respect toward the man as such.

Needless to say, if President Johnson should persist in his claim of perpetuating the policies of the Kennedy Administration, the facts and interpretations contained in this book would then share the currency they enjoyed prior to the November, 1963 tragedy. What Mr. Lasky provides in this massive and well documented work in an intelligible background to the policies, or lack of them, pursued by the late President. If Johnson veers in any substantial way from these policies, a most unlikely eventuality, this remarkable work would still be of considerable value and importance. For years to come the type of leadership offered by Kennedy will be scrutinized and assessed. Particularly will this be true in the area of foreign policy, where the ultimate answer to our survival as an independent nation is being forged.

The author's descriptive portrait of JFK may be conveniently divided into three major sections: the family, domestic politics, and foreign affairs. Each sphere is packed with detailed facts and fair and moderate generalizations. The reader will find the analysis of the family and its predominant traits most absorbing and highly explicative of the thought and performances of the man, both as a legislator and President. In addition to numerous noble traits, there can be no doubt about the notable ones of powerful financial exercise, an almost neurotic competitiveness, and a basic operational pragmatism that finds satisfaction for competitive pressure. If one is looking for a rounded philosophical preparation and all that that involves in terms of an unfolding vision, broad and well-founded conceptions, he will not find it.

Among the many authentic quotes in the book, the following examples are sufficient to equip the reader with the necessary perceptions. Jack's sister,

Eunice, is aptly quoted as recalling this: "Daddy was always very, very competitive. The thing he always kept telling us was that coming in second was just no good. The important thing was to win—don't come in second or third, that doesn't count, but win, win" (p. 68). Win toward what end, toward what good? This and many other examples never provide an answer to this fundamental question. It was an open political secret before the President's tragic assassination that above all else his consuming ambition was to be reelected in 1964. To win, regardless of the costs of further reverses in man's struggle against the twin imperialisms of mainland China and Soviet Russia.

With this psychological upbringing, buttressed by the power of ample money, one can well imagine what the family consequences might have been if Jack had the opportunity to test his chronic one-upmanship in 1964 and failed. Money, rather than the power of ideas and constructive achievement and leadership, has always been the Kennedy political wedge. Vividly shown in this work are the almost puerile notions of the elder Kennedy concerning questions of war and peace. One, for example, left indelible imprints on the policies of his son. In 1938, Joe Kennedy's pragmatic formula for peace reads as follows: "It has long been a theory of mine that it is unproductive for both the democratic and dictator countries to widen the division now existing between them by emphasizing their differences... Instead of hammering away at what are regarded as irreconcilables, they could advantageously bend their energies toward solving their common problems by an attempt to re-establish good relations" (p. 53). We then read the supposedly perceptive observation on international life: "After all, we have to live together in the same world whether we like it or not."

Secretary Ickes wrote, "Before long, Kennedy was saying that Germany would win, that everything in France and England would go to hell, and that his one interest was in saving his money for his children" (p. 56). This fits neatly into the myopic Kennedy outlook. As stated in the book, "in politics, money atones for many deficiencies." The devious route Jack Kennedy took to become a Congressman from Boston will undoubtedly fascinate the reader. He didn't even possess a bona fide legal residence there. As one Boston politician complained, "He's the first carpetbagger voter to get to the White House."

The legislative record of Kennedy was less than mediocre. Perhaps no more revealing part of this work shows this than the summary of Kennedy's legislative career as provided by the then Senator Johnson of Texas. Pages 392 on are well worth reading carefully for they show how vacuous the Kennedy legislative record was in the eyes of the Party's leading figure on Capitol Hill. This is not a Republican recitation.

In the area of foreign policy, Kennedy's views and conceptions of the world and its struggles are extraordinarily vulnerable, indeed. In fact, there is much more material regarding his mistaken notions about communism, the Soviet Union, and the cold war than the author seems to be familiar with. To his death he clung to the notion that the Soviet Union is a nation made up largely of Russians and held to such myths as "the Russian memory is long, and many of the leaders of the present government remember the years after the last war (World War I) when they fought in the Red Armies against the invading troops of many nations, including Britain's and the United States" p. 87). As a Senator, he was for Khrushchev's coming here. It is a generally known fact, too, that as President, Kennedy tried desperately to play down the captive nations. His mistakes and his grave omissions constitute a heavy price we shall

yet have to pay. This invaluable work lays a foundation of background for an understanding of these many mistakes that today are already manifesting themselves in the disintegration of the Free World defenses against both Moscow and Peiping.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

UKRAINA V DOBI DYREKTORIJI UNR (Ukraine in the Period of the Directorate of the Ukrainian National Republic). By Dr. Matthew Stachiw. Volume II. Shevchenko Scientific Society. Toronto, 1963, pp. 348.

The present volume is the second book of a series dealing with the modern history of Ukraine in the period of its national rebirth written by Dr. Matthew Stachiw, noted editor and author.

At the outset the author gives a short reference to the first volume and briefly describes the members of the Directorate who, on the average, were young men of 30 to 35 years of age. Youthfulness was a characteristic of the top level leadership of all Ukrainian political parties and of the Ukrainian army as well.

The Corps of *Sichovi Striltsi* (Sich Riflemen), which was assigned to garrison the Ukrainian capital of Kiev, was staffed by young and ardent officers, totally devoted and dedicated to the cause of Ukrainian freedom and independence. Hence the Corps was highly successful in maintaining peace and order in Kiev, despite the revolutionary times and the presence of hostile elements in Kiev which overtly and covertly combatted the young Ukrainian state. As a result the work of the Directorate was enabled to proceed almost normally.

On January 16, 1919, the author reports, a government meeting was held for the purpose of reorganizing the state apparatus. A proposal, introduced by Dr. Osyp Nazaruk, representative of the Corps' Military Council, called for a three-man Directorate, instead of five, consisting of Simon Petlura, Col. Eugene Konovalts and Col. Andrew Melnyk. After a thorough discussion, however, the proposal was withdrawn by the Corps' delegate.

The overall situation was extremely complicated. The Russian Communists, preparing a military aggression against Ukraine, organized a powerful army composed of battle-tested elements of the Red Guards, which were put under the command of Antonov-Ovsienko, who subsequently in his memoirs confirmed that the army invading Ukraine consisted of the so-called international Red units of Latvians, Hungarians, Rumanians, Chinese and others.

War operations against Ukraine were begun by Soviet Russia on November 20, 1918. A month later Moscow withdrew its recognition of the Ukrainian independent state. On November 29, 1918, the Soviet government created a Communist puppet government for Ukraine headed by Russian Communist George Piatakov and seated in the city of Kursk. The Soviet military operations were initially directed against Left-Bank Ukraine and the industrial city of Kharkiv.

Independently of the front operations important events were taking place in Kiev and throughout Ukraine. According to a provisional constitution of Ukraine of December 26, 1918, a general election was held throughout Ukraine to elect representatives to the so-called Labor Congress which in effect was a parliament of Ukraine. The electoral law was based on the so-called curial system, which assured a proportionate number of mandates for the peasants, workers, and intelligentsia. Thus it was the social classes rather than the politi-

cal parties which were favored by the electoral system. The Labor Congress met on January 22, 1919, the first anniversary of Ukraine's independence.

Another important act of the Directorate was the Act of Union proclaimed on January 22, 1919, whereby all Ukrainian lands united into one independent and sovereign state of the Ukrainian people. This act was preceded by a preliminary agreement between the representatives of the Ukrainian National Republic (the Directorate) and the Western Ukrainian National Republic (Galicia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine) which was signed on December 1, 1918, in the city of Khvastiv. Its signatories were Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Simon Petlura, Fedir Shvets and Panas Andrievsky for the Directorate, and by Dr. Longin Cehelsky and Dr. Dmytro Levytsky for the Western Ukrainian National Republic.

The Ukrainian National *Rada*, as the parliament of Western Ukraine, had ratified the preliminary agreement regarding the Act of Union on January 3, 1919. In the text one reservation was made, which read as follows:

"Until the Constituent Assembly of the United Republic meets, the legislative authority on the territory of the former Western Ukrainian National Republic will be exercised by the Ukrainian National *Rada*. Also, until that time, all civil and military administration on the above-mentioned territory shall be exercised by the State Secretariat, established by the Ukrainian National *Rada* as its executive organ."

On the same date, January 3, 1919, the Ukrainian National *Rada* appointed a delegation of 35 members who were dispatched to Kiev to take part in the signing of the Act of Union.

On January 22, 1919, the Act of Union was solemnly proclaimed at St. Sophia's Square in Kiev. The law on the union of all Ukrainian lands had become a political reality:

"From now on, the parts of a single Ukraine, separated from one another for centuries, namely, the Western Ukrainian National Republic (Galicia, Bukovina and Hungarian *Rus*) and Great Ukraine on the Dnieper, merge into one."

Subsequently, the author analyzes on the basis of official sources and materials the efforts used by the Directorate to normalize relations between Soviet Russia and Ukraine. It is to be recalled that the military aggression of Moscow against Ukraine began with no formal declaration of war. When the Ukrainian government protested the Russian military aggression, Moscow cynically replied that no such aggression was committed, and that the war in Ukraine was waged between the Directorate and the army of the "Ukrainian Soviet Government." Eventually, Moscow agreed to negotiations with Ukraine regarding the situation in Ukraine, and a Ukrainian delegation headed by S. Mazurenko (Yu. Yaroslav was its secretary) came to Moscow on January 15, 1919, for that purpose. A series of drawn-out and protracted parleys, however, failed to halt the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Dr. Stachiw also describes in detail Ukraine's defensive efforts against Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian military forces were in an embryonic stage of formation, but despite their inferior numbers they gave a good account of themselves in battle against the seasoned Russian communist troops.

Some of the newly-organized Ukrainian military units that had been under the influence of Bolshevik propaganda showed no eagerness to fight. These had to be disarmed in order to prevent further demoralization in the military ranks. The Ukrainian government had considerable difficulty also with a number of rebellious *otamans* (chieftains of partisan groups), such as Zeleny or

Alexander Danchenko, commander of the Second Dnieper Division, who refused to take orders from the General Staff of the Ukrainian army. He was placed under arrest, and his division broken up and dispersed throughout the other Ukrainian units.

An especially negative role in this period of Ukrainian statehood was played by the anarchist chieftain, Nestor Makhno, who fought against the Ukrainian government and often sided with the Bolsheviks.

The book by Dr. Stachiw is a valuable contribution to the study and evaluation of modern Ukrainian history, being based on official documents and sources of the Ukrainian government and also on accounts of the men who participated in the formation of the Ukrainian state forty-odd years ago.

VASYL MUDRY

GRIFF NACH DER WELTMACHT: DIE KRIEGSZIELPOLITIK DES KAISERLICHEN DEUTSCHLAND 1914-1918 (*Bid for World Power: War Aims Policy of Kaiser's Germany, 1914-1918*). By Fritz Fischer, Duesseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1961, pp. 896.

Dr. Fritz Fischer's work is an impressive study of Germany's attempt to advance from the status of a European power to that of a world power in World War I.

It opens with a brief but pithy account of the social, economic, political, and diplomatic situation of Imperial Germany at the end of the 19th century. We see the sudden surge of Germany's industrialization, a phenomenal growth of Germany's economic strength and expansion at home and abroad. We see also the social unrest and the feeling of insecurity in German international relations in spite of this success. Many leaders of German industry and business felt that their access to the world's raw materials and their share of international trade were artificially restricted by the older, entrenched colonial powers. The land-owning German aristocracy saw their importance in politics overshadowed by powerful business and industrial circles. The lower middle class was made insecure and bewildered by the rapidly increasing numbers and gaining importance of the German workers. Thus many hoped that an Imperial government, through its territorial and economic expansion, would add to Germany's security, promote national solidarity, and help the challenged classes and strata of German society to redefine their social meaning and importance in a positive way.

The author also emphasizes the theoretical contributions of German publicists and educators in defense of German expansionism. These theories bolstered the expansion designs of Imperial Germany on the European continent. An expansion in Europe was to provide a large enough "home base" to sustain the German *Weltpolitik*, a guiding *motif* in the plans of the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and the German Emperor, Wilhelm II. Bethmann-Hollweg supported the idea of a "Mittel-Europa," meaning the consolidation of most of the European states under German leadership.

The chief obstacles in the path of such an imperial design could be expected to be France, Russia and Great Britain, as was borne out by the creation of the Entente Cordiale in 1904 and of the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907. Bethmann-Hollweg hoped to split the English-French-Russian alliance primarily through the neutralization of Great Britain. But in this he was hampered considerably by Wilhelm II. The Kaiser committed himself to several moves offen-

sive to Great Britain. This was partly due to the influence of German Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz and partly to his own desire to prove himself a champion of German world politics. Great Britain was annoyed chiefly by the Kaiser's feverish build-up of Germany's naval power and by his interference in areas of British colonial expansion. Nonetheless, Bethmann-Hollweg was able to convince Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1914 that, because of Great Britain's colonial preoccupation and some German concessions to the British in the Near East, no interference from her was likely should Germany get involved in a war with France and Russia.

The author cogently shows how mightily the German leaders strove to exploit the assassination in Sarajevo in order to bring about an Austro-Serbian war and thus indirectly to create an opportunity for a military encounter of the Central Powers with Russia and France. He presents a step-by-step account of the German-Austrian diplomatic correspondence revealing the strong German pressure applied on Austria to propel her into war with Serbia.

World War I quickly proved disappointing to Germany. Great Britain did intervene, the war was prolonged beyond original expectations, and the initial victories proved indecisive. With the passage of time military and economic setbacks began to mount. In spite of this the ambitiousness of the German plans for expansion at the expense of others nations did not abate. Various German patriotic groups and political parties indulged in open speculation on the spoils of war and annexations.

From the abundant documentary materials provided in the book, the reader may get some insight into the various schemes for occupation, exploitation, resettlement, and colonization considered by Germany in the event of victory. The author skillfully illustrates how little the "Mittel-Europa" concept had to offer to the other European nations. Theoretically conceived as a scheme for closer cooperation and integration of the nations of Eastern and Central Europe, nevertheless this plan was devoid of a unifying principle which could have motivated any nation during World War I to cooperate with Germany in the long run.

The feverish concern of Germany with territorial aggrandizement made it extremely unresponsive to peace feelers from the Western Allies and to President Wilson's attempt to arbitrate—even when, from the German point of view, the war had reached a critical phase. Determined believers in the primacy of military force and material factors, the German leaders seemed to have forgotten the political realism of Bismarck, who knew the limitations of force and political ambitions, as well as the importance of diplomacy and compromise. Elated by their triumph over the disintegrated Russian Empire, they had no idea of how closely they faced their own disintegration. Instead of promoting the emancipation of the nations emerging on the ruins of this empire, Germany was determined to build her own empire. German statesmen supported governments which they intended to utilize temporarily or which they hoped to transform into puppet governments. Thus, German Chancellor Hintze, who urged a continuing support of the Bolshevik government, wrote:

"It is politically expedient to exploit the Bolsheviks, insofar as we are able to get something from them... In the meanwhile we have no reason to desire or to induce an early end of Bolshevism" (p. 764).

The opportunism of Hintze was matched by that of the Kaiser and General Ludendorff. After the German-sponsored *coup d'état* supplanting the more in-

dependent Central *Rada* Government in Ukraine with the regime of *Hetman* Paul Skoropadsky, the Kaiser and General Ludendorff planned also to abandon Skoropadsky after a certain time and to promote an All-Russian government in Ukraine (pp. 758-761).

Force alone could not solve such problems as the lack of confidence and enthusiasm of the German allies and the revolutionary mood of the masses in Eastern Europe. Germany continued to win some battles while she was losing the war. A case in point: after conquering the famous oil center of Baku in September, 1918, the Germans found that they could not transport the oil to Germany because of the capitulation of their ally, Bulgaria. It was the German military leadership which, finally faced with a collapsing Western front and loss of almost all their allies, determined when the German Foreign Office should open negotiations with the Western Allies.

Fritz Fischer brings into focus the loss of the "middle way" in German political behavior, something the Germans have not been able to overcome despite the terrible lessons of World War I. Relative to Germany, the author not only helps us to understand the nature of World War I but, indirectly, also the nature of World War II.

In relation to the author's use of materials we must note that they are carefully evaluated and interrelated, upon the basis of very rich and many-sided primary sources. This applies, however, only to *German* ideas, intentions, plans, policies, and personages. Dr. Fischer is less reliable in the evaluation and description of peoples, governments, and states involved in the German Imperial schemes.

First of all, this applies to the author's interpretation of the principle of national self-determination. He provides abundant documentary evidence indicating that Imperial Germany used this principle to detach from Russia the Baltic countries, Poland, Ukraine, and Finland. The Germans were determined, however, to dominate the above-mentioned countries themselves. Proving this point beyond a doubt, the author then makes some random remarks which create the impression that the ones who really stood for the right of national self-determination were the Bolsheviks. Dr. Fischer sees an indication of this in the Soviet insistence at Brest Litovsk on a genuinely free referendum of the non-Russian peoples under German military occupation. Unfortunately, whether the Bolshevik government held such referendums in the non-Russian territories occupied by the Red Army, he does not say. (They did not!)

Also to be cited is the author's remark that the Ukrainian Central *Rada* had no popular support in Ukraine, but that the Bolshevik Ukrainian Government in Kharkiv enjoyed strong support from workers and peasants (small holders) (p. 708). The author does not mention in this connection the referendums which took place in Ukraine after the overthrow of the Czarist regime; nor does he consider their nature and their results. Neither does he explain why the Bolshevik Ukrainian Government in Kharkiv was dependent mostly on the Red Guards imported from Soviet Russia in the military campaign against the Central *Rada*.

Similarly unsupported by evidence are the author's quotations and remarks implying that the Central *Rada* was nothing but a "club of political adventurers" involved in a large-scale "business speculation," and that the German authorities in Ukraine tended to lose their popularity among the Ukrainian masses because of their support of the Central *Rada* (p. 711).

The author's terminology is sometimes inconsistent and misleading. For example, in one instance he refers to the Central *Rada* as the Ukrainian Government, and on the other hand, in mentioning the disagreement between the *Rada* and the Russian Provisional Government, he refers to it as a dispute between "Russians in Petrograd with the Russians in Kiev" (p. 654). This may be a significant slip.

It is unfortunate that such a monumental work as this should be marred by many inaccuracies and unverified generalizations. However, the main topics of Fischer's book, namely, Germany's motivations and behavior in her venture in World War I, are treated with the care, the depth, and the systematic approach of a scholar.

Central Michigan University

IHOR KAMENETSKY

BERLIN AND THE FUTURE OF EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by David S. Collier and Kurt Glaser. Published in cooperation with Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Inc. Chicago. Henry Regnery Company, 1963. Pages x + 251.

This edited volume consists of twelve papers by various European and American scholars delivered at a Conference held in Chicago in 1962 under the combined auspices of the Johann Gottfried Herder Research Council and Institute of Marburg, Germany and the Foundation for Foreign Affairs of Chicago. They form a very interesting series.

As the title suggests, the Conference sought to explain and evaluate the present developments in the history of Berlin and Eastern Europe or more accurately what is to be expected of the Western and Eastern blocs and the future position of those countries which received independence after World War I only to lose it during and after World War II, when they were reduced to Communist satellites. The aim of the authors is not to condemn but to point out the probable course of events as can be determined from the present situation.

We may say that to all the authors the future of Europe is connected with the growing sense of unity in political and economic relations, a sense that today has been perhaps weakened by the revelation of the plans of President de Gaulle and his special views on Europe and the world. Yet many of the statements made here are still valid and will undoubtedly recur again and again until they are put into practice. This is particularly true of Prof. Glaser's "Search for Pluralist Solutions" in which he draws upon the past as well as the present.

Eugen Lemberg's "Eastern Europe: A Battleground of Contemporary Ideologies" contains perhaps the most statements that can be questioned. His theses of the various processes of the growth of nationalism and the role of language perhaps understate the significance of language. The increase of education and literacy amid part of youth certainly did much to inspire them with a desire to write in their own language and in some cases this was almost the first step. On the other hand he realizes how the Kremlin is using and perverting the romantic nationalism for its own purposes, while it invests Marxian Internationalism with a Russian content.

Other excellent articles are by Stefan T. Possony, "Berlin: The Focus of World Strategy," Prof. Mosely's "Soviet Foreign Policy since the Twenty-Second Party Congress" and Gilbert Niemeyer's "Long Range Objectives." Perhaps the best and most striking is Colonel Kintner's "The Strength of the West." He points out that the West at the present time is far stronger than the Soviet bloc but

it cannot allow itself to fritter away its opportunities by leaving all initiative to the Communists and basing a policy on Soviet scowls and smiles. "Thus far, the Soviets' very real fear of nuclear hazards has been balanced by the Soviets' calm reliance on the West's capacity for self-intimidation" (p. 112).

The book suffers also from a failure to realize that the position of the captive nations forced into the Union of Soviet Republics as Russian colonies does not differ from the satellite states essentially. The position of Ukraine does not differ from that of the Baltic Republics or Poland. By concentrating for reasons of brevity on this one row of border states, the former cordon sanitaire, the authors handicap themselves and give a distorted view of a situation, where Khrushchev and/or Mao are trying to strike the West through other continents in the traditional form of cavalry raids against the enemy's rear. Until the West sees this and commences its own nibbling and raiding, Communism need not worry but it can continue its present game. The West must seek not peace but freedom, if it is to succeed in its vision.

Columbia University

CLARENCE A. MANNING

CHINA ON THE EVE OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. A. Doak Barnett. Frederick A. Praeger. New York, London. 364 pages. \$6.95.

In the preface to his book, Prof. Barnett says that few thorough or systematic studies have been made of "the tragic period of Nationalist collapse and Communist takeover on the China mainland." (There are sections of a number of books about this period which, if excerpted and combined, would go a long way toward filling the gap.) Since the publication of Barnett's book, two more have appeared: *How the Far East was Lost* by Anthony Kubek, and *America's Failure in China: 1941-50* by Prof. Tang Tsou of the University of Chicago.

A. Doak Barnett grew up in China, became correspondent for *The Chicago Daily News* and a Fellow of the Institute of Current World Affairs, traveled widely on the mainland, even to the far west and northwest, and is today Associate Professor of Government at Columbia and chairman of the Communist China Studies Committee of its East Asia Institute. From 1947-49 he wrote approximately 40 reports from Peiping, Shanghai and China's hinterland. Twenty-three of these are now published in book form.

The very detail which made his keen observations and numerous interviews valuable to the Institute may keep his book from being popular reading for the general public. It will hardly make the best seller list. But for writers on China and scholars doing research on contemporary Chinese history, as well as for all who, like myself, have made China their home or field of study, these reports are rich with material and supplementary information. Barnett is painstaking in making his statements accurate and specific. Not a proper name is missing or misspelled. When it comes to a study of Sinkiang province in the far northwest, he not only names its mountains, but practically counts its 7,500 glaciers. He places the provinces geographically, naming the countries or provinces that border it; he names its various ethnic groups—the Kazakhs, Mongols, Kirghiz, Uighurs, White Russians, Tatars, Uzbeks, Han Chinese, etc—describes their characteristics and gives the percentage of each group in the total population. This report on Sinkiang alone covers 45 pages of his book. He is equally thorough with Ningshia, Sikang, Chinghai and Szechuan. He finds out all about a tenant farmer and his family, and does the same for his landlord, and more or less the same for the other inhabitants of the small village.

He makes keen observations of China before the Communist conquest. In one minute's time on a Shanghai street, he counted 77 vehicles (of all types) streaming past (where streets are nearly empty today, with almost no motor traffic). Unlike the many writers who have had nothing good to say of the Nationalists after World War II, Barnett is eminently fair. In that postwar period of economic chaos and spiraling inflation, he writes: "One might expect to see evidence of widespread poverty in Shanghai under existing conditions... The average Shanghai citizen seems to consume more and live a more comfortable life than he did before the war... This fact is confirmed by economists, businessmen and bankers." Shops, stores and markets were filled with all sorts of consumer goods and foodstuffs. Again "most people agree that many officials and officers are honest and long-suffering, though there are many that are not," adding that "government employees are terribly underpaid" and attributing a good deal of the existing corruption to this fact. Coming from Prof. Barnett, this can hardly be dismissed as pro-Nationalist enthusiasm.

It is gratifying to find one who, in that hectic period following the long eight-year war, could note mitigating causes and sincere efforts to solve the overwhelming problems. Insurance savings, for instance, were wiped out by the inflation: "A Chinese friend of mine," Barnett says "whose insurance policy was worth roughly U.S. \$1,000 before the war, estimated that it was then worth U.S. \$00.0064, less than a penny." While Peking was still under the Chiang government, Barnett found that many people felt the old "pao-chia" (neighborhood & street) system was "neither democratic nor efficient," yet he writes: "The wonder of it is that the system works at all... Streets are cleaned, garbage is collected, refugees (from Communist areas) and destitute persons are cared for, order is maintained, utilities operate with relative smoothness and dependability," though the city was nearly bankrupt at the time.

Barnett makes it clear too that it was the "intellectuals"—not the farmers (whom he does not denigrate as "peasants")—who were hoodwinked by Communist propaganda and went over to the Reds before their victory. Many students favored the Chinese Communists, not so much ideologically, but because they believed they would bring in "liberal, parliamentary democracy." They dealt in slogans.

His last chapter reports a conversation with a young Chinese who had graduated with the highest academic record in Peiping, and was about to join the Communist Party, "if he could qualify." Barnett pressed definitive questions on him. What did he mean by "qualifying"? He must "completely rid himself of individualism." Pressed on this, he equated individualism with selfishness.

"What do you mean when you say the Party is democratic"? "Certainly democratic, because it represents the people," said the youth. "Can the people disagree with a policy after it is formed... or dissent?" "Of course not... (Mao) considers the welfare of the masses."

This was the great delusion. The "workers-peasants" were 90% of the people, and presumably had been "exploited." "How?" asked Barnett. "If you hire people to work for you, the income you derive is exploitation, because *they* earn it, and *you* take it away from them." Barnett said "The workers or farmers I know are interested in their daily millet... they have a lot less concern for other workers than you do." But when you pressed students like this one beyond the slogans, or asked what constructive proposals they had for China now, they threw up their hands or shrugged their shoulders.

A HISTORY OF THE CROATIAN PEOPLE. By Francis R. Preveden, Vol. II. New York Philosophical Library, 1962. 8, 5'x11', xiv + 240 pp.; illustrated \$7,50.

Professor Preveden, born in Croatia in 1890, came to this country in 1923 after studying in Russia for six years and at some West European universities. At the University of Chicago his doctoral dissertation in 1927 dealt with "The Vocabulary of Navigation in the Balto-Slavic Languages." He taught at several American universities. An excellent linguist who mastered more than a dozen languages, he died while employed as an interpreter for the U. S. Navy in Washington, D. C. in August, 1959.

In 1955, the Philosophical Library published the first volume of his life work, *A History of the Croatian People*. Although a scholarly work, presenting Croatian history up to 1397, the book was hardly noticed by the reviewers in the field of Slavic studies. His second volume, appearing posthumously, is divided into three sections: history of Croatia and Slavonia from 1396 to 1644; Bosnia and Herzegovina from ancient times to the end of the Croatian War in 1699; and Dalmatia from 1380 to 1718. The central theme of his discussion is the time of the Ottoman invasions, during which only the most western parts of Croatia remained free from Turkish rule, Dalmatia came finally under the rule of Venice, while Bosnia and Herzegovina developed as Turkish provinces. In regard to the Bogomils, Preveden develops his own theory which is somewhat in contrast to other present scholarly interpretations of this problem. He also treats Bosnia as a continuation of the Croatian state, extinct in 1102, and gives some very interesting examples of hundreds of former Croatian Christians who managed to attain the highest positions in Ottoman political and cultural life.

Well written (description of the Battle of Mohacs is a good example) and well documented, the book is handicapped by an unusual form; most of the numerous annotations, too many long quotations, and the discussion of the historiography of Bosnia and Herzegovina should have appeared in an appendix or annotated bibliography. The bibliography is incomplete.

Preveden left behind the manuscripts for volumes III-V. It is to be hoped that they will be better and more critically edited than this one, and that soon someone will write a comprehensive one-volume history of the Croatian people which is badly needed in this country.

John Carroll University

GEORGE J. PRPIC

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REFERENCE MATERIALS FOR RUSSIAN AREA STUDIES. Compiled by Peter Goy, M.L.S., Cataloguer of the Slavic Collection. The City College Library, the City University of New York, 1962. 55 p., folio size.

This fairly extensive compilation of reference tools such as bibliographies, encyclopedias, indexes, periodicals, biographical dictionaries, dissertations, etc. is pertinent to the Eastern European area, the Soviet complex in particular, with the main emphasis upon Russian materials that are available in the Libraries of the City University of New York and elsewhere in the country or abroad. It covers, however, more than its key-word "Russian" in the heading implies.

Actually, the broader coverage is indicated by the subtitle of the compilation: "a preliminary checklist to which a selective list of periodicals and

newspapers published in the USSR and by emigres abroad is appended." The latter category is substantial, covering pp. 39 through 55. Specifically, the list comprises the titles of selected current periodicals published by the Soviet government and by political emigres abroad in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian languages as well as in Russian.

Of all the reference materials only those listed in part I (pp. 4-11), which are published mainly in Russian and English, are to be found presently, in the City College Library. The main body of selected literature, as listed in part II (pp. 11-38), does not represent the holdings of the Library.

The bibliographic list is not free from certain shortcomings, such as incompleteness of entries (reference tools dealing primarily with the 20th century), casual and ambiguous application of terminology (as in the case of "Russian," "Soviet," and "emigre" idioms where a distinct non-Russian complex is present), and problems in transcription and transliteration with which Mr. Goy copes, e.g., the internationally adopted "i" for rendering both Russian "и" and "ї" (see "Alfavitnyi sluzhebnyi...", p. 25, or "pervoi poloviny"): here "y" as the equivalent of Russian "ї" in the endings of numerals or adjectives would be a far better choice. Again, the compiler disregarded Russian pronunciation in transliterating the genitive case of Russian masculine adjectives (for instance, "sovetskogo," "sovremennogo," "russskogo," pp. 37-38) and in the case of such a genitive ending as *ф-аво* (e.g. *sovetskavo*, *sovremennavo*, etc.), thereby raising the problem of inaccurate phonology. All in all, however, the compiler obviously did his best to place a useful and far-reaching tool into the hands of English-speaking readers. They will find that the USSR must not be identified with Russia alone.

Any "Russian area study," in order to be complete and free from bias, badly needs inclusion of other, non-Russian, sources of information such as the Ukrainian or the Byelorussian, that would counteract frequently falsified facts as well as events offered by Russian data. It is probably with this intention in mind that Mr. Goy listed a variety of non-Russian sources that cover Russian area studies. This we consider to be an asset of the bibliography under review. As a matter of fact, Russian sources of information (red or white, they are the same) only too freely avail themselves of the historical and cultural aspects of the non-Russian peoples within the USSR, bringing them under a common Russian denominator and obliterating their national identities. Unfortunately, many a Western publication based on traditional usage of Russian source material repeats all kinds of fallacies which have been expressly fabricated for implementation of Russian policies, and, in so doing, helps to advance the Russian imperialistic master plan to enslave all mankind. Literature about the Soviet complex that does not take into account non-Russian source materials, particularly of Ukrainian or Byelorussian origin, which reflect the point of view of the major captive nations within the USSR, neither serves the cause of the free world nor upholds the principles of free research. The bibliography under review is to be commended in that it differs from many compiled in the field by meeting, at least half-way, this basic need of a comprehensive study.

UKRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"SHEVCHENKO, A MONUMENT TO THE LIBERATION, FREEDOM, AND INDEPENDENCE OF ALL CAPTIVE NATIONS." Remarks by various Members of Congress. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1964.

This interesting work of 119 pages was prepared and edited by Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky of Georgetown University, with the able assistance of Miss Vera A. Dowhan of Washington, D. C. It contains all the vicious editorials that appeared in *The Washington Post* against the Shevchenko memorial statue in the Nation's capital and also all the pungent replies to the insular campaign waged by the paper's editor, Mr. James R. Wiggins. These replies constitute only a fraction of those sent in. Word has it that *The Post* has never received so many letters in response to its editorials.

In sharp contrast to the policy of the Washington paper the sponsors of the monument and this work open to the public both sides of this episodic controversy. Despite its extensive editorials and supposed news accounts, *The Post* refused to publish most of the replies that were acceptable from a literary point of view. This work makes up for the unfairness of the paper's policy, and since its nation-wide distribution in February there has been a tremendous demand for it.

Events surrounding the Shevchenko ground-breaking ceremonies in September, 1963 are vividly described in this valuable source of information. The addresses of Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Congressman Thaddeus J. Dulski and many others are incorporated. Replies to *The Post* by Congressmen Dulski, Derwinski, Flood, and Lesinski make for absorbing reading. In addition, the informative letters of Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki of Marquette University, the Honorable Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin, Rev. Dr. Frederick Brown Harris of the United States Senate, and of numerous others show how pitiful some of the argumentative points used by Wiggins are.

One of the several decisive factors contributing to the defeat of *The Post's* bigoted campaign was the editorial stand taken by the other large and influential Washington newspaper, *The Washington Star*. Its magnificent editorial on the subject and the articles by its columnist, Robert J. Lewis, are prominently featured in this work—a veritable monument of defense for a monument.

"RED HAT FOR SLIPY," a commentary by Dan Brigham. *New York Journal-American*, In *The World Today* column, New York, February 4, 1964.

In an historic move Pope Paul VI elevated Archbishop Joseph Slipy of Ukraine to the title of Major Archbishop. This new rank for the Ukrainian prelate is an ecclesiastically old one, similar to the Patriarch in the Eastern Catholic Church. News of this most recent elevation, as shown in this column, was immediately construed as a springboard for a full cardinalate in behalf of the 71 year old Major Archbishop.

Over the past few months, during the second session of the Ecumenical Council in Rome, much has appeared in European papers about Archbishop Slipy, the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and the problem of Ukraine generally. This is as it should be. For one would be naive, indeed, to think that these subjects are separable. Moscow didn't release the Ukrainian prelate, who spent some 18 years in Russian labor camps, for its own charitable pleasure.

For example, the Catholic review *l'Osservatore della Domenica* published on September 22, 1963 a long article on "The Great Metropolitan Andrew Sheptytsky—Apostle of Unity." Earlier, the Italian weekly *Il Centro* carried in its September 8 and 15 issues articles on the 30th anniversary of the man-made famine in Ukraine. Then, later, the popular Italian weekly *Orizzonti* featured in its September 29 issue a large photo of Metropolitan Joseph Slipy and captioned it "Monsignor Slipy—from Siberia to the Council."

Many questions still remain to be answered with regard to Slipy's presence in the Vatican, his new title, and above all his future duties and location. Accurate answers to these questions have a direct and crucial bearing on Moscow's cold war pursuits. At the moment it can only be hoped that no serious ecclesiastical blunders will be committed to the net advantage of the Russian cold warriors.

"JFK AGAIN SHUNS RED CAPTIVE NATIONS," an editorial. *Newsletter*, Republican Congressional Committee, Washington, July 12, 1963.

The late President Kennedy is taken to task in this lengthy front page editorial for his weak Captive Nations Week Proclamation of 1963. He is charged with throwing "cold water on the hopes of eventual freedom held by peoples behind the iron and bamboo curtains by issuing a 'Captive Nations Week' proclamation which studiously and admittedly evaded reference to Communism." The editorial enumerates all the captive nations specified in the resolution, including Ukraine and other captive non-Russian nations, and emphasizes that the Congressional resolution calls for their liberation.

Objectively speaking, there can be no doubt that the word "communism" is vitally important for a proclamation, particularly where it should fall in accord with the underlying resolution. As a tool of ideologic deception, communism is a formidable weapon of the Kremlin masters. To ignore it is to weaken our own cold war position. The facts do show that the Eisenhower proclamations incorporated the term.

However, on the other hand, what this editorial omits is the fact that the Eisenhower proclamations diluted the resolution by addressing themselves to the relatively few captive nations in Central Europe. Moreover, Ike's proclamations were issued even later than JFK's. Briefly, then, there have been shortcomings on both sides of the fence. It will be interesting to see what President Johnson will do for the fifth anniversary or the sixth annual observance of Captive Nations Week, scheduled for July 12-18, 1964.

"THE NEXT MOVE," an article by Lev E. Dobriansky. *Washington Report*, American Security Council, Chicago, Illinois, January 6, 1964.

Moscow's move for a non-aggression pact with NATO is analyzed in this article. The author views the test ban treaty and the wheat deal as two major diplomatic blunders. They're accomplished facts. The greatest blunder of them

all is only in the talking stage at present. He warns us to talk out thoroughly this next move by Moscow or we'll face a cold war crisis that will make all else appear as mere strolls in the park.

Referring to present Russian troubles, the writer points out its old aspects and stresses, "Whereas these periods, including the present one, should have been seized as our opportunities for the advancement of world freedom and thus genuine peace, they invariably have turned into phases of Russian power consolidation." A non-aggression pact with the world's prime aggressor would be, in his view, disastrous. And, as he puts it, a "politico-moral acquiescence to the Soviet Russian Empire will take us a long way on this disastrous course."

The last part of the article is devoted to the lessons of Captive Nations Week. In concise form the highlights of Moscow's turbulent reactions to the Week are presented to show how foolish it is for us to make deals with the archaggressor without exacting a heavy toll of concessions. The material is highly useful for forthcoming Captive Nations Week observances.

"FATHERS SALUTE EX-CAPTIVE PRELATE," a report. *New York Journal-American*, October 11, 1963.

"Amid thunderous applause" is the adverbial manner in which this report recounts the first address made by Archbishop Joseph Slipy to the Ecumenical Council in October, 1963. The prelate expressed hope that the world-wide assembly of Roman Catholic dignitaries would help 'in the struggle against atheism.' He also underscored the need for unity throughout Christianity.

What, according to this report, seemed to startle the assembly was the suggestion raised by the Ukrainian Catholic prelate concerning a Ukrainian patriarchate. The Metropolitan's reasons were oriented toward pleasing the Orthodox, "who take great pride in the patriarchal structure of their own churches." If true, there was good reason for the assembly to be startled. Whether pleasing or not, patriarchates in the Soviet Union are excellent channels for Soviet Russian propaganda and cold war objectives. If he were to return as a Patriarch to the USSR, Slipy, with all the disadvantages of old age in this field, would become a serious pawn in the conflict.

This first public address by the Metropolitan received wide coverage. The Vatican's organ *l'Osservatore Romano* emphasized the ovation given to Slipy. Others pointed out that the Archbishop has proposed the establishment of a Ukrainian Catholic patriarchate. Later in the month of October, Vatican and Italian papers reported on the audience given by Pope Paul VI to a large Ukrainian group. These and other events point in the right direction of Western religious concern for Ukraine; the momentous questions of cold war effect and determination remain, for better or for worse.

"SHEVCHENKO AGAIN," an editorial. *The Washington Post*, Washington, November 12, 1963.

In the hot controversy started by the chief editor of *The Washington Post* against the Shevchenko statue, this editorial was the last of a series. As the writer was identified, namely Mr. James R. Wiggins, and it became generally known that he was carrying on a one-man campaign, he decided to desist editorializing and instead continue the campaign by way of editorialized "news accounts."

This last editorial is worth careful reading. All the plugs of a malicious campaign are pulled out. For example, "Congress, the Planning Commission, and the Interior Department have been misled by one of the most artful and arrogant lobbies ever operated by a minority group." With unexcelled fatuity, Wiggins then attempts to paint Shevchenko as "a Communist hero."

The so-called Shevchenko Affair was really closed the first week of January. It was unfortunate that *The New York Times* report of January 11, 1964 on "Germany's Split on Shakespeare" could not be used in the controversy. Its subcaption explains the essence of the report: "Communists Seek to Exploit His Plays for Propaganda." In September, 1963, *The Washington Post* raised the question as to why a statue is not being founded for Shakespeare on the 400th anniversary of his birth, if one could be for Shevchenko on the 150th anniversary of his birth. Here is additional evidence of how Moscow and its puppets exploit poets.

"DEFEAT THE TREATY OF MOSCOW," a full-page appeal. *The Washington Post*, Washington, September 5, 1963.

Appearing not only in this organ but also *The New York Times* and others across the Nation, this full-page appeal on the part of prominent American writers, educators, and leaders calls for the rejection of the nuclear test ban treaty. It stresses "we must be prepared to test to achieve a break-through at the critical frontier of military technology, the anti-missile missile. Half of the statement dwells on the non-military aspects of the treaty, a fog created by Moscow to push in the new "Spirit of Moscow" its aggressive cold war operations in British Guiana, Venezuela, Berlin, Laos and elsewhere.

Few have taken notice of the legal defect and misrepresentation that mark Article IV of the Treaty of Moscow. It states: "Each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty..." Since when does an empire-state, such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, made up of many nations, possess the attribute of national sovereignty?

"KHRUSHCHEV: THE RED RIDDLE," an article by Richard Harity and Ralph G. Martin. *Look Magazine*, New York, November 19, 1963.

As popular articles go, this one fares well in terms of accuracy and perspective. It scarcely adds anything to the literature dealing with Khrushchev, but at least it summarizes the Russian leader's criminal background. As always, those who know virtually nothing about the subject will benefit by this article; those that do will at most take comfort in the fact that the uncritical reader will not be grossly misled, which is often the case with glamorized popularizations.

Ukraine, Ukrainian tragedies, and Ukrainian events are cited throughout. This is unavoidable since Khrushchev spent much time there. The "country bumpkin," as the writers dub him, built "a career on confusion, conniving, and subterfuge." About solving this riddle, they make the point at the very outset that "Ukrainian cemeteries hold many who died trying."

The highlights of Khrushchev's early life are interestingly presented: born on April 17, 1894 in Kalinovka, village in the Kursk *oblast*; father was a blacksmith, mother a factory worker; Nikita worked at a variety of jobs and became an expert at dancing the *hopak*, "a lively Ukrainian folk dance"; in 1911,

he went to Kharkiv and by 1918, at 24, he joined the Bolshevik party. Strangely enough, in giving all this and more the writers seem insecure about definitely defining Khrushchev's nationality, which is without question Russian. Instead, they throw themselves upon the inaccurate work of Victor Alexandrov, *Khrushchev of the Ukraine*, and in a quoted fallacy present Khrushchev as "a descendant of the proud Zaporog Cossacks." Actually the writers can't even trace back to Nikita's eight brothers and sisters.

Another limiting example is the writer's unawareness of Khrushchev's reputation in Ukraine. Despite their commendable use of certain genocidal data, they apparently haven't come across the Russian dictator's title "The Hangman of Ukraine." Furthermore, they could have used more adeptly the second and succeeding parts of "The Crimes of Khrushchev," prepared by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In short, the article is good but hardly startling.

"AN ENTIRE ISSUE ON RUSSIA," series of varied articles. *Holiday*, Philadelphia, Pa., October, 1963.

In the fall of 1963 several popular magazines displayed a rash of interest and indulgence in what they erroneously dub "Russia." They serve a purpose in dispensing tidbit information about parts of the Soviet Union; they also do the American reading public a grave disservice by perpetuating myths, which can only be sweet music to the ears of the Kremlin. This whole issue on "Russia" typifies this.

Harrison E. Salisbury's article on "Russia: A Tormented History" represents the typical mass of information that is long on meaningless details and acutely short of genuine understanding. In tune with the usual fiction, the reader is told that "it was not until the 7th and 8th centuries that the nucleus of what was to become Russia began to shape itself at Kiev..." Later we read "Kiev, Novgorod, Suzdal, Vladimir—every great city of Russia perished under Mongol flame and sword." It is truly amazing how such sophisticated tripe passes for an ostensibly authoritative exposition.

The other articles are largely on the same order of uncritical, simplistic mishandling of facts. It is no wonder that protracted ignorance in the West about "Russia" has for years been a most powerful weapon for Moscow. When one views the map inserted in this series, he can quickly estimate the depth of such ignorance and confused thinking. The map is of the USSR; the ridiculous caption is "All the Russians." If a way is to be found by our enemy guaranteeing our inability to defeat him, this series is it. Moscow couldn't enjoy a more effective medium for its own purposes.

"SOME TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION." an editorial. *Daily News*, New York, July 27, 1963.

For common sense and blunt intelligence this paper often surpasses the more verbally embroidered ones when it comes to U. S. foreign policy, particularly in relation to the USSR. It expresses concern here over Moscow's pet project of a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact states. "That would mean recognition of Communist East Germany, an end to any hope of German unification, and abandonment by the Western Allies of all of Khrushchev's Captive Nations."

There can be no doubt about these inevitable consequences. The urgency of continually writing and talking against such a pact cannot be too strongly emphasized. We cannot have this pact slipped off on us as the test ban treaty was.

"SPECIAL ISSUE ABOUT THE SOVIET PEOPLE," a series of articles. *Life*, New York, September 13, 1963.

What was said about the Holiday special issue above applies to this one. There is no such herd as "the Soviet people," but this spectacular issue is nevertheless devoted to a myth. To see how utterly confused the writers are, one need only begin with the editor's note. In one paragraph alone a hodge-podge of thoughts is provided—"to show how Soviets really live," "few select foreign correspondents... are admitted to Russia." Who are the Soviets and since when is the USSR "Russia?"

This type of nonsense is reminiscent of a college sophomore trying to organize his concepts in economics or some other science. He has some of the prominent facts, but he lacks the working concepts for a structure of understanding. The editorial "Why We Must Put Holes in the Iron Curtain" is somewhat comical since "the Soviet people" are identified as the Russians, and yet some of the articles describe the Ukrainians, Georgians and others. In brief, if holes are to be put into the Iron Curtain, we must first begin to plug up our mental holes.

"U.S.I.A.: THE BIG PROBLEM IS BELIEF," an article by George V. Allen. New York *Herald Tribune*, New York, August 4, 1963.

Mr. George V. Allen was the head of the United States Information Agency at the close of the Eisenhower Administration. What he sets forth here are his old pet ideas which Congress rebuffed in 1958. According to him, we should broadcast to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain "primarily in our own language," that is English.

The hearings in October, 1958, frustrated Allen's naive program. It is interesting that Allen gives vent to these frustrations in this article. He takes Congresswoman Edna Kelly and Congressman Michael Feighan to task for succumbing to minority pressures in their districts. He quotes Feighan as follows: "The Russians are imperialist," he exclaimed. "Pay no attention to them. Broadcast in Ukrainian, Georgian and the minority languages of the U.S.S.R. These groups hate the Russians and will rise against them at the first opportunity."

It is doubtful, to say the least, that Feighan referred to any "minority languages of the U.S.S.R." The facts contradict Allen's post mortem observations. All one need do is simply read the Foreign Affairs hearings of October, 1958. Allen's performance was weak and pitiful.

"UKRAINE IS NOT COMMUNIST," an interview. *Ideal*, Granada, Spain, December 3, 1963.

This interview was given by Mr. Walter Dushnyck, editor of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, to Cesar de la Lama, a representative of the Spanish news agency

CIFRA. Mr. Dushnyck was a correspondent for the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America at the Ecumenical Council in Rome. In transit to the States he lectured in Germany, spoke over several European radio stations, and visited Madrid.

Among the topics covered in this interview are the persistent struggle of Ukrainian nationalism against Russian domination, the captive nations movement, and the work of Americans of Ukrainian background with regard to the directions of U. S. foreign policy.

"MANY OPPOSE JFK PEACE EFFORTS," an article by Drew Pearson. *The Washington Post*, Washington, D. C., August 10, 1963.

The only reason for bringing attention to this article is the remarkable capacity of this writer for inaccurate reporting. As to his thesis on certain American opposition to the late President's peace efforts, this could be discounted one hundred per cent. The political strategem involved will do considerable harm to America's position in the cold war. The columnist's reference to the Captive Nations Week Resolution is what concerns us here.

Nixon once again is brought up in connection with the resolution. As the writer puts it, he "even apologized to Khrushchev because Congress has passed a Captive Nations Week resolution urging aid for the satellite nations." True that Nixon apologized, but if the columnist had ever read the resolution, he would have understood that it goes far beyond the so-called satellite nations. Is it little wonder that readers become confused?

"MEMORIAL PROPOSED TO HONOR CAPTIVE NATIONS," an article by Robert E. Ramsey. *The West Virginia Register*, Wheeling, West Virginia, July 12, 1963.

A very stimulating and also very important article is written by Mr. Ramsey, the new editor of this Catholic organ, on his idea for a memorial to the captive nations. As he presents it, this should be "a permanent memorial to the Captive Nations, which would rise as a beacon of hope to the enslaved while at the same time become a constant reminder to the people of the U.S. that all of us should be ever aware of these nations and that we should work and pray for their liberation." Mr. Ramsey proposes that the memorial be built on Ellis Island. The excellence of both the idea and the location is obvious. The project is under consideration.

L. E. D.

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