

The

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A JOURNAL OF EAST EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS

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THE CASE OF MYROSLAV MEDVID

Chronology, Facts and The American Press

YURII M. BOHATIUK

1. Introduction

On Sunday morning, November 10, 1985, the Soviet grain freighter Marshal Koniev streamed out of U.S. jurisdiction into the Gulf of Mexico. On board was Myroslav Medvid, the 25-year-old Ukrainian sailor whose dreams of freedom and life in an “honest country” were shattered by the U.S. Immigration Department which returned him to the very ship he tried to escape — and by the U.S. State Department which determined that he was not defecting and should return to the U.S.S.R. through what was almost certainly an agreement with the Soviets.

The “Ukrainian sailor” story generated so much interest that it dominated U.S. television, radio and newspapers for the better part of three-and-a half weeks: from the first reports of a “lost seaman” who was returned to his ship by the Border Patrol — to the State Department’s “official” notification a day later and their interviews with the sailor in a “non-threatening environment;” from the startling revelations of the INS interpreter who originally spoke to Medvid in his native Ukrainian — through law suits, demonstrations and finally the Senate Agriculture Committee subpoena.

The media followed the story closely, reporting and speculating on every new development, only to be as shocked and dismayed as the American Congress and the American people — that the ship with a Soviet defector aboard was given free passage out of the United States.

By the time of the ship’s departure, the following account of the story had been compiled:

Shortly after dusk on Thursday, October 24, 1985, Myroslav Medvid dove off the deck of the Russian grain freighter Marshal Koniev into the icy, hurricane-laden waters of the Mississippi, and swam across the river to reach the shores of Belle Chase, Louisiana.

Once on land he meets Wayne and Joseph Wyman, two local jewelers. Though they do not understand his language, they have enough sense to realize

that the “terrified” sailor was in the process of defecting. When Joseph Wyman asks him whether he is Russian, the sailor immediately shakes his head, pounds his chest and says “No, Ukrainian, Ukrainian!” Wyman also hears Medvid say “policia” and “Novi Orlean” and directs his nephew Wayne to drive the sailor to New Orleans. Moments after they leave, three men confront Joseph Wyman in front of his jewelry store, in search of their “lost comrade” who fell overboard. Realizing that they were Russians pursuing Medvid, Wyman denies having seen the man.

Meanwhile, Wayne Wyman and Medvid are on their way to New Orleans. During an unscheduled stop at a shopping mall, Medvid writes the words “policia” and “Novi Orlean” on the back of an envelope. He circles “policia” and draws an arrow to “Novi Orlean.” In the upper right hand corner of the envelope he writes “USSR” and points to it indicating that that was where he was from. At 9:00 p.m. they arrive at the French quarter police station. Medvid gets out of the car, thanks Wayne Wyman, apologizes for getting his seat wet and says goodbye.

The French quarter police turn Medvid over to New Orleans police who place him in the custody of the U.S Border Patrol in Algiers. One of the Border Patrol agents contacts a Ukrainian interpreter in New York who begins the translation. Medvid tells the interpreter that he wants political asylum, and is very afraid of what will happen to him if he is returned. This is acknowledged by the Border Patrol who tell the interpreter that the man will be detained until the morning and that they will call her again.

Moments later however, the Border Patrol agent signs a “remand order” authorizing Medvid’s return to the ship. The services of two U.S. agents of the Universal Shipping Agency are recruited and they place Medvid on a launch operated by Raymond Guthrie of Port Ship Services in Belle Chase, La.

Realizing he is being returned to the ship, Medvid dives into the water and swims to shore. There he is restrained and handcuffed by the U.S shipping agents and one of the Russians. Medvid starts banging his head against the rocks as the launch returns to the Koniev and enlists the aid of seven more Russians who assault and beat up the “kicking and screaming” sailor and then drag him back to the ship.

The State Department is “officially” notified at 3:40 p.m. EST on Friday, October 25. Though State Department officials and a Russian interpreter board the ship at 10:00 p.m. that night, they only see the sailor briefly on Saturday afternoon (October 26) at which time an incomplete medical exam is performed by a U.S. Navy doctor. American officials convince the Russians to allow the sailor to be transferred from the Soviet vessel onto a U.S Coast Guard ship so that he can tell his story in “an environment free of Soviet coercion.” However this environment includes four Soviets who also board the U.S. cutter and remain with the sailor at all times. Medvid is nauseous on the Coast Guard ship and is transferred to a U.S Naval Facility later that night, where he undergoes another medical examination along with a psychiatric evaluation. He is allowed to sleep

for six hours with a Soviet KGB “observer” outside his door.

The next day Medvid undergoes more interviews — once again not through a Ukrainian interpreter but through a Russian one. There are no fewer than four Russian officials present at any one interview. And at 3:40 p.m. Tuesday, October 29, Medvid signs a Russian language statement indicating his “voluntary” decision to return to the Soviet Union. The State Department then quickly closes the case.

2. Early News Reports

News of the incident began circulating nationally on Saturday, October 26 after the *Times-Picayune* of New Orleans reported that an unidentified Soviet sailor had jumped ship Friday morning in an attempt to defect, but was returned to his ship because Border Patrol agents thought he was a stowaway. On Sunday, Robert McFarlane — national security adviser appears on CBS-TV’s “Face the Nation” saying the incident need not heighten tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union before the Geneva Summit.¹ The *Chicago Tribune* and the *Philadelphia Enquirer* are the first national newspapers to carry the story, but little additional details are known.

On Sunday, the *Times-Picayune* of New Orleans runs a photo of a Soviet Embassy official walking off a gangplank after being ferried from the Marshal Koniev.² CNN cameras then pick up the action as the same official enters a Belle Chase mobile home, assisted by the U.S. shipping agent. After calling his embassy in Washington, the Soviet official quickly returns to the Koniev refusing to answer reporters’ questions in the usual “Soviet” fashion.³

ABC is first to identify the ship-jumping sailor as Myroslav Medvid, a Ukrainian, on their Sunday evening news.⁴ Hours later another ABC report provides more details on the story including interviews with Joseph Wyman and Raymond Guthrie, eyewitnesses to the events of October 24-25. Wyman cannot believe that the would-be-defector was returned to his ship, while Guthrie adds “We couldn’t understand what he was saying, but we knew he didn’t want to go back!”⁵

By Monday, October 28, the story is a headline in all U.S. newspapers. The press reports that State Dept. officials have boarded the ship of the seaman. Newspapers continue to quote Raymond Guthrie, the operator of the ferry which returned Medvid to the ship, with another important detail: that Medvid had gestured to Guthrie by running his fingers across his neck when he was being taken back, indicating that his throat would certainly be cut if he were returned to the ship.

¹ “Face the Nation,” *CBS News*, October 27, 1985, 1:00 p.m.

² “U.S. Officials Meet With Soviet Sailor,” *Times-Picayune*, October 27, 1985.

³ *CNN News*, October 27, 1985, 8:00 p.m.

⁴ *ABC Sunday World News*, October 27, 1985, 6:30 p.m.

⁵ *ABC Late Night News*, October 27, 1985, 11:00 p.m.

The press also carries statements made by various spokesmen of the agencies involved. Thomas Richard of the Universal Shipping Company stated that his agency had been ordered by the Border Patrol to return the sailor early Friday.⁶ INS spokesman Duke Austin said the Border Patrol agents “may have acted properly” when they returned Medvid to the ship.⁷ David Lambert, district director of INS asserted that Border Patrol agents couldn’t communicate with the man and thought he was a stowaway.⁸ Alan Nelson, director of INS refused to comment on the matter.⁹

All major television stations carry the story on their October 28 evening news. State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb is quoted on CNN as saying that the State Department has not yet been able to interview the sailor “in an environment where he can express his will freely.”¹⁰

CBS also reports on the State Department’s desire to question Medvid “out of Soviet earshot” and stresses that the sailor was returned to the ship “kicking and screaming.” CBS also include comments by two Soviet defectors. Walter Polovchak, the 18 year old Ukrainian (who had registered to vote that day) begs President Reagan to intervene in the sailor’s behalf — while Simus Kudirka, the Lithuanian sailor who in 1970 was beaten and returned to the Russians after he tried to defect assesses Medvid’s grim future: “It is death . . . long sentence, death in the end — but before you must suffer and suffer and suffer.”¹¹

ABC also interviews Kudirka along with Wayne Wyman, the man who drove Medvid to New Orleans at his request.¹² NBC briefly reports on the case but erroneously refers to Medvid as Russian.¹³

At 8:00 p.m. EST on October 28, CNN shows a group of men walking down the gangplank of the Marshal Koniev and being transferred to a U.S Coast Guard ship. Attention is focused on the man with the long beard and white sweater who reporters mistakenly think is Medvid, but who in reality is the Russian doctor.¹⁴ The sailor is briefly interviewed on the U.S Coast Guard Cutter *Salvia* that night (October 28) and then transferred to a U.S Naval Base (11:30 p.m., October 28) where interviews continued later that night and resumed in the morning. No other details are given to the press until the next episode of the saga.

The public relations officer at Algiers Naval Base James Geltz is told to refer all reporters’ questions to the Soviet desk at the State Department, who

⁶ “U.S. Officials Meet With Soviet Sailor,” *Times-Picayune*, October 27, 1985.

⁷ “U.S. Aides Question Seaman,” *New York Times*, October 29, 1985

⁸ “Russian Jumps Ship Here: Cops Send Him Back,” *Times-Picayune*, October 26, 1985.

⁹ “Fate of Soviet Seaman is Negotiated,” *New York Times*, October 28, 1985.

¹⁰ *CNN News*, October 28, 1985, 4:00 p.m.

¹¹ *CBS Evening News*, October 28, 1985, 7:00 p.m.

¹² *ABC World News Tonight*, October 28, 1985, 7:00 p.m.

¹³ *NBC Nightly News*, October 28, 1985, 7:00 p.m.

¹⁴ *CNN News*, October 28, 1985, 8:00 p.m.

carefully avoid giving any answers.

Shortly after 6 p.m. EST on October 29, radio and television stations announce that Medvid was returning “voluntarily” to the Soviet Union, after satisfying the State Department of his intentions. Within hours of Medvid’s transfer back to the Russian ship, the State Department releases a misleading report of its involvement in the case, but omits several crucial details. The media for the most part accepts the story that the sailor was returning to the Soviet Union of his own free will and that he made his decision in a “non-threatening environment,” and most newspapers and television stations immediately drop the story.

Some, however, keep on reporting.

3. American Public Outraged

The New York Post reported on October 30, that Myron Wasyluk, director of the Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS), and a group of Ukrainian-American leaders “blasted” White House officials for their careless handling of the Ukrainian sailor.¹⁵ The New York Post also focused on congressional and legal attempts that would prevent the sailor’s return to the USSR, including a law suit filed in Philadelphia on October 30 that would try to halt the departure of the Marshal Koniev until Medvid’s true wishes could be ascertained.¹⁶

The Washington Times also refused to drop the story. In “Effort Mounted for U.S to Get Ukrainian Back,” the Washington Times reports that Representatives Don Ritter (R-Pa), Fred Eckert (R-NY) and Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH) held a news conference and demanded that the Attorney General hold the Russian ship until Medvid could be removed and transferred to a third neutral nation where he could be questioned in a truly non-threatening surrounding — this time with no Russian KGB agents present. In their letter to Attorney General Ed Meese they say, “For Americans of Ukrainian heritage and for all those Americans who trace their roots to lands under Soviet domination, this experience seems as a massive insult.”¹⁷ Representative Fred Eckert sent a separate letter to President Reagan indicating that KGB agents had at least 24 hours with which to “work on” Medvid before U.S officials boarded the ship.¹⁷ Senator Jesse Helms sent a letter to Secretary of State George Shultz asking that the case be fully investigated and said that the freedom of a single individual should not be held hostage to the politics of the upcoming super power summit.¹⁸

The same Washington Times article reports that the Ukrainian-American Bar Association, the Ukrainian Human Rights Committee and the Ukrainian

¹⁵ “Foul Up Over Defector Blasted,” *New York Post*, October 30, 1985.

¹⁶ “D.C. Storm Brewing Over ‘Shanghaied’ Red Sailor,” *New York Post*, October 31, 1985.

¹⁷ “Effort Mounted for U.S. to Get Ukrainian Back,” *Washington Times*, October 31, 1985.

¹⁸ “Soviet Seaman’s Return Raises a Storm,” *Washington Times*, October 30, 1985.

Congress Committee of America filed a joint lawsuit in Philadelphia Federal Court on October 30, asking the judge to order the State Department to remove Medvid from the ship. Andrew Fylypowich, the lawyer who filed the suit, points out that Myroslav Medvid, a Ukrainian, was denied access to a Ukrainian interpreter but was given a Russian one instead. The State Department had similarly rebuffed offers from the Ukrainian-American Bar Association and from Jerome Kurpel, a New Orleans resident, to serve as Ukrainian interpreter for Medvid.¹⁹

In another Washington Times article, Rita McWilliams reviews in detail Medvid's brief sojourn as a free man on American soil.²⁰ With Medvid hopelessly lost in the clutches of the Russians and with the State Department officially pronouncing his death sentence, the Washington Times gives what may have been its final say on the matter. Titled "No Place Like Home," it is an impassioned beckoning for God's help and a goodbye to Myroslav Medvid "who grabbed for precious Liberty and missed."²¹

By October 31, the Washington Times had published more articles on Medvid's defection attempt than any other newspaper, and was the only U.S. newspaper to openly "dispute" the official government version of the case. On October 29, it writes an editorial on Medvid in which it strongly criticizes the U.S. Border Patrol, who should have their "heads knocked together."²² On October 30, political columnist Wesley Pruden says that the State Department version of the story can only be believed by "blowhards."²³ A Rita McWilliams report on October 29 is the first to focus on a "minor injury" reported by U.S. doctors who examined Medvid.²⁴ The "slashed wrists" of Myroslav Medvid become a national headline on November 6, a full week later!

But on October 31, the situation changes drastically. Irene Padoch, the Ukrainian interpreter who first interviewed Medvid hours after he jumped ship, publically announces that Medvid had told her that he wanted political asylum and wanted to live in an "honest country" and that she had conveyed this to the Border Patrol. Padoch had originally been told not to discuss the case, but talked once INS began making misrepresentations about her interview with the sailor.

Up to this point the State Department had not made a single mention of Medvid's actions prior to being returned to the ship or of his conversation with Dr. Padoch. INS, who originally claimed that Medvid was returned to his ship

¹⁹ "Effort Mounted for U.S. to Get Ukrainian Back," *Washington Times*, October 31, 1985.

²⁰ "Seaman's Saga Full of Puzzling Contradictions" *Washington Times*, October 31, 1985.

²¹ "No Place Like Home," *Washington Times*, October 31, 1985.

²² "Yearning to Breathe Free," *Washington Times*, October 30, 1985.

²³ "He'll Learn to Look Before he Leaps," *Washington Times*, October 30, 1985.

²⁴ "Seasick Soviet Sailor Ashore: U.S. Interview will Continue," *Washington Times*, October 29, 1985.

because Border Patrol guards couldn't communicate with him, had changed its story on October 28 to "The sailor had told the interpreter he did not want political asylum." INS had also refused to release an affidavit Padoch had made to INS agents on Sunday, October 27, in which she tells of Medvid's plea for political asylum.

This new development immediately places the "Ukrainian sailor" story back into the national frontline. The press points out that Padoch's statement contradicts "secret testimony" by the two Border Patrol Guards who had authorized the sailor's return to the ship. Immediately, INS tries to discredit Padoch, and Duke Austin, INS spokesman, is quoted: "You talked to her. You can tell she speaks broken English."²⁵ Other journalists who talked to Padoch acknowledge her accent but state that she is easily understandable.

In other developments related to the case:

A spokesman for the Justice Department said that Attorney General Ed Meese had asked INS to provide a full and complete report on the matter... "Then we'll decide how further to proceed."²⁶ In Philadelphia, a federal judge refused a request by lawyers to prevent the Soviet freighter from leaving port in Louisiana.²⁷ Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-NH) commented that INS' role in the matter was shameful and cowardly.²⁸

Given the revelations of October 31, the Washington Times writes the definitive editorials on the Medvid case. Similar editorials will not appear in other U.S. newspapers for at least another week. In the November 1 editorial "Hold the Koniev," the Washington Times points out that the official State Department version of what happened is "materially at odds with eyewitness accounts which tell of a man screaming and struggling as he was pushed up the gangplank." The Washington Times realizes that the incident has a strong "whiff of Geneva" and that Medvid is the first if not the last casualty of the summit.²⁹

Pruden's column is even more forceful. He refers to the case as "A Squalid Sellout in New Orleans." It is clear to Pruden (as it will be to others) that Medvid will be sacrificed for the summit since the American establishment "quivers like a virgin bride in anticipation of what Gorbachev might have in store for them." His finger is pointed at George Shultz whose obsession with Geneva would supercede all considerations of Medvid. It ends by posing a question asked in

²⁵ "Soviet's Translator Says He Wanted to Stay in the U.S.," *Baton Rouge Morning Advocate*, November 1, 1985.

²⁶ "Meese Asks Probe of Soviet's Attempt to Flee Ship," *Washington Times*, November 1, 1985.

²⁷ "Soviet's Translator Says He Wanted to Stay in the U.S.," *Baton Rouge Morning Advocate*, November 1, 1985.

²⁸ "GOP Senators Urge 'Neutral' Zone for Soviet Sailor Who Jumped Ship," *Newark Sunday Star Ledger (UPI)*, November 3, 1985.

²⁹ "Hold the Koniev," *Washington Times*, November 1, 1985.

Washington a day earlier: "How can the U.S pretend to speak for the freedom of mankind when it won't guarantee the freedom of one desperate man on American soil?"³⁰

On November 2, the State Department announces that the president was prepared to use force in getting Medvid off the ship for the interviews on American soil. This carefully timed revelation is seen by many as an attempt to appease conservatives and others who believe that Medvid was returned to the Soviets because of the summit.

The press also reports that late Friday night (November 1), Judge Louis Oberdorfer denied requests by Ukrainian-American lawyers to detain the Soviet grain ship until the sailor could be reinterviewed. Television cameras showed attorneys Fylypovich and Kamenar exiting the courthouse after the judge's decision, vowing to appeal.³¹ Lawyers could not cross-examine Roger Brandemuele, head of the Border Patrol, who testified "in camera." The judge allowed closed testimony from Brandemuele, because government lawyers had used the excuse that his testimony was sensitive to U.S.-Soviet relations. On November 2, the *New York Post* writes a superb editorial titled "Myroslav Medvid's case is anything but closed" — another rarity for its time of publication.³²

4. U.S. Congress in Support of Medvid

Members of the U.S Senate and House had been involved in the Medvid case since the beginning and the press reported it faithfully. UPI reported that on November 1, Senators Gordon Humphrey of New Hampshire, Bill Armstrong of Colorado and Rudy Boschwitz of Minnesota urged the president in a letter, to send Medvid to a third neutral nation "to decide whether he wants political asylum in the U.S. . . . There he would be provided with a chance to rest from adverse effects of drugs he had been given by the Soviets . . . Then let him make a clear-headed decision, free from coercive pressures about what he decides for his future."³³

Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-NY) sponsored a resolution approved by the Senate, calling for the INS to establish "clear and formal rules and procedures for its personnel in order to prevent the forced return of any person seeking political asylum."³⁴

A dozen members of Congress, including conservative representatives Don Ritter (R-PA) and Newt Gingrich (R-GA), signed a letter asking that Medvid's

³⁰ "A Squalid Sellout in New Orleans," *Washington Times*, November 1, 1985.

³¹ "*CNN News*," November 3, 1985, 10:00 p.m.

³² "Myroslav Medvid's Case is Anything but Closed," *New York Post*, November 2, 1985.

³³ "GOP Senators Urge 'Neutral' Zone For Soviet Sailor Who Jumped Ship," *Newark Sunday Star Ledger (UPI)*, November 3, 1985.

³⁴ "Reagan Threatened Soviets On Seaman, Official Says," *New York Times*, November 2, 1985.

ship be detained until his true intentions are known. Representative Tom Lantos said he was concerned “that the sailor have the opportunity to rethink the ramifications of his decision in a non-threatening and calm environment for a reasonable period of time.”³⁵

Democratic representatives from Ohio, Edward Feighan and Donald Pease asked President Reagan to order the detainment of the Russian ship until it can be ascertained whether he is related to two Cleveland women in their district.³⁶

Senator Gordon Humphrey also made public an affidavit by Ukrainian INS interpreter Irene Padoch, who had interviewed Medvid on October 24. In the telephone interview, Medvid had told her without hesitation that he wanted political asylum.

The State Department meanwhile continues to reiterate its original statement that the case is closed. The president directs Attorney General Edwin Meese to “look into the matter.” In the upcoming week Meese is asked at least six times to investigate the matter.

Statements made by a member of the Ukrainian-Congress Committee of America make headlines on November 4. In “Ukrainian Lobbyist Says Sailor Beaten” the following summary of the events of early morning October 25 is offered. As Medvid was returned to the ship the first time, a Soviet official boarded the launch immediately causing Medvid to jump into the water and swim to shore. There the Russian official restrained Medvid while the launch returned to the Russian ship and enlisted the aid of seven more Russians who beat up Medvid on American soil before dragging him back to the ship. State Department spokesman Joe Reap replied that he was unaware of the allegations.³⁷

On November 3 Congressman Don Ritter holds a news conference in Philadelphia, where he distributes copies of an affidavit made by Joe Wyman. The event is reported by the press and is carried by local Philadelphia TV stations. The press reports on a letter signed by Senators Alan J. Dixon (D-II), Paul Simon (D-II), John P. East (R-NC), Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Steven Symms (R-II). They called the INS handling of Medvid and return to the ship over his protests disgraceful.³⁸

An aide to Senator Jesse Helms, Clifford Kiracofe, Jr., is quoted as saying that: “We’re deeply concerned about the lack of due process. It appears that this is just another sacrifice in cold blood to the black mass of summitry.”³⁹ The

³⁵ “GOP Senators Urge ‘Neutral’ Zone for Soviet Sailor Who Jumped Ship,” *Newark Sunday Star Ledger (UPI)*, November 3, 1985.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ “Ukrainian Lobbyist Says Sailor Beaten,” *Syracuse Post Standard (UPI)*, November 4, 1985.

³⁸ “Effort to Restrain Soviet Ship Grows,” *New York Times*, November 5, 1985.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

Washington Times runs a story on Medvid's family in Ohio and summarizes two unsuccessful court attempts by Ukrainian-American lawyers to detain Medvid's ship.⁴⁰ The first news reports of a flotilla sponsored by a conservative group "Save the Oppressed People" also appears in print that day.

Meanwhile, the State Department continues insisting that the case is closed and the Marshal Koniev sails upward to Reserve, Louisiana to load more grain.

5. The Media and Medvid

In the first week of November, television began playing an increasing role in the Medvid Case. Having been restricted to telephoto shots of the Marshal Koniev and of descension and ascension up its gangplank the week before, TV cameras now captured images of Senate and Congressional leaders appealing for the release of Medvid, lawyers acting on a pro bono basis in behalf of the sailor, nationwide demonstrations by Ukrainian-Americans and various activity occurring around the Marshal Koniev. The first pictures of a boat of U.S. citizens approaching the Russian ship are broadcast on national television on November 4.⁴¹ On board were Orest Jejna, an attorney of the Ukrainian-American Bar Association, and three U.S. relatives of the sailor: Paraska Medvid Jerziersky, Anne Kent and Maria Fylypowich. They attempt to present a letter to Medvid and to the ship's captain but are turned away by the Russians. Jejna and Medvid's family had earlier held a news conference which was shown on CNN.

Television also offered contrasting opinions inside the White House. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger is the only Administration official who favors reinterviewing the sailor while Secretary of State George Shultz and various State Department and White House spokesmen contend that the case is closed.⁴²

TV cameras of C-SPAN covered activity on the Congressional Floor where Congressmen Ritter, Eckert, Broomfield, Levin, Lantos and Congresswoman Oakar called for Medvid's release. Unfortunately due to TV restrictions on the Senate side, C-SPAN could not cover similar statements from Senators Humphrey, Bumpers and Simon.

On November 5, C-SPAN broadcasts the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Immigration and Refugee Policy. Testifying at the hearing are Dr. Irene Padoch, Ukrainian interpreter for the INS, Alan Nelson, head of INS, and William Woessner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

Senators Humphrey, Denton, Grassley and Simon sternly question Nelson and Woessner about their agencies' "performance" in the matter and are outraged to learn that no blood or urine tests were done to see if Medvid was

⁴⁰ "U.S. 'Kinfold' Hoping to Meet With Seaman Who Tried to Defect," *Washington Times*, November 4, 1985.

⁴¹ *ABC World News Tonight*, November 4, 1985, 7:00 p.m.

⁴² *Ibid.*

under the influence of drugs, that KGB agents were present at all interviews and that Medvid “slept” with a KGB agent outside his door. Despite this, government officials continue repeating that Medvid was interviewed in a “non-threatening environment.”⁴³ Government officials leave out important details in their statements. For example Deputy Asst. Secretary of State Woessner makes no mention of “slashed” wrists reported by U.S. doctors until specifically told to do so by Senator Grassley.

On November 6, newspapers across the nation make headlines out of the sailor’s “slashed wrists” and other disclosures from the Senate Judiciary Hearing.

Otis Pike in a Newhouse News Service column (November 6) comments that Americans should be able to control events on the Mississippi River if they are to control them anywhere else. He also mentions that Medvid made it very clear in his few hours on American soil, that he was Ukrainian and not Russian.⁴⁴

The Times-Picayune of New Orleans runs an article titled “Soviet sailor seen as a symbol for a free Ukraine.” It is a rare example of the American media acknowledging the precarious situation in which Ukraine, the third largest country in Europe, finds itself. Along with a map of Eastern Europe and Ukraine, the article succeeds in understanding the hell Myroslav Medvid tried to escape.

The authors trace Ukraine’s history back to its status as an independent state surrounding Kiev, the present capital of Ukraine, more than a thousand years ago. They point out that Ukraine existed 500 years before Russia’s formation and examines Ukrainian history through occupation by Mongols, Poland and finally Russia in the 1600. Modern Ukrainian history is examined through two very costly World Wars and finally to Ukraine’s forced annexation by Russia into the Soviet Union. It is clear after reading the Times-Picayune article that Ukraine has suffered and suffers more from Russian Communism than any other nation on earth.

The article quotes Dr. Alexander Sas-Jaworsky from Abbeville, Louisiana: “They (Russians) stole our history. They even stole our alphabet. I am locked in a mortal struggle with the news media and high officials, even the President, to make them understand.” The article expands on Medvid’s assertion that he is Ukrainian and not Russian, and that there is a difference even though some in the press do not think so. “To tell a Ukrainian he’s a Russian is like telling an Irishman that he’s English.” states Dr. Jaworsky.

Ihor Olshaniwsky, president of Americans for Human Rights in Ukraine, says: “We resent being referred to as Russian. There are 45-50 million Ukrainians living in the Soviet Union. We have a different language. We have a different culture!”

⁴³ *C-SPAN News*, November 5, 1986.

⁴⁴ “If You Seek Freedom, Timing Means Everything,” *Syracuse Herald Journal*, November 6, 1985.

Dr Myron Kuropas makes a final comment: “For him (Medvid) to jump ship and say he’s Ukrainian is very heartening for the Ukrainian community. He is a living symbol of the spirit of Ukraine for us.”⁴⁵

Meanwhile, the evening news and the press report (November 6) on another legal attempt to save Medvid. Attorneys Julian Kulas and Mark Holzer asked Judge Martin Feldman for a temporary restraining order for the Marshal Koniev, so that Medvid, whose human rights had been violated, could be reinterviewed. The lawyers produced several key witnesses including Joseph Wyman and Dr. Irene Padoch.

Also testifying at the hearing were Michael Flad, one of the shipping agents who had returned Medvid, acting on what he said were Border Patrol orders, and Raymond Guthrie, the operator of the launch that returned Medvid.

Though important details are confirmed inside the courtroom all in support of the lawyer’s claims — the judge refuses to restrain the ship, arguing on the grounds that it could cause a confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Kulas and Holzer make a statement to the press after the judge’s decision and it is seen on CNN.

The court hearing in Louisiana though unsuccessful, provided new crucial evidence and set the stage for the unprecedented action that would occur the next day.

6. The Subpoena Attempt

All day Wednesday, November 6 and well into Thursday, November 7, the media had been reporting of a possible senate subpoena of Myroslav Medvid. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) was also considering a separate subpoena since late Wednesday. When it was obvious that some members of the Senate would not allow a full Senate subpoena, Senator Jesse Helms began drafting his own Senate Agriculture Committee subpoena citing authority his committee had over U.S. grain trade.

And November 7, at 5:00 p.m. EST, CNN flashes the following “new” development: that the Senate Agriculture Committee has issued a subpoena for Medvid to appear in Washington and that Senate staffers were at this moment flying it down to Louisiana. News of the unprecedented move by the Senate Agriculture Committee is broadcast on all television stations nationwide. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) who had personally been involved in the Medvid case since October 28, is quoted as saying that his intention is to do everything possible to satisfy his conscience that Medvid will be spared because in his judgment “once that ship hits the high seas, he’s a dead duck.”⁴⁶ Senator Simpson

⁴⁵ “Soviet Sailor Seen as Symbol of Fight For Free Ukraine,” *Times-Picayune*, November 16, 1985.

⁴⁶ *CNN News*, November 7, 1985, 5:00 p.m.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

is strongly opposed to the subpoena and contends that Medvid repeated six times that he wanted to return to the USSR.⁴⁷

The “Freedom Warrior,” a vessel filled with conservative members of “STOP” (Save the Oppressed People) and members of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, is filmed on November 7 as it circles the Marshal Koniev in an attempt to see Medvid.⁴⁸ Television stations also show excerpts from that day’s House Foreign Affairs Sub-committee hearing, in which Simus Kudirka and Arkady Shevchenko plea for another chance for Medvid.⁴⁹ The November 7 MacNeil/Lehrer report devotes an extended part of its broadcast to the hearing.

Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA), chairman of the committee and strong supporter of human rights, reacts strongly to Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgeway’s assertion that she is convinced of Medvid’s competency and that the case is closed. Lantos informs Ridgeway that the State Department is out of sync with the American Congress and the American people, and that the case is not closed.

At the hearing, Alan Nelson, head of INS, states that he is still proud of his agency and of the way it corrected its initial mistake of returning Medvid. To that Representative Gary Ackerman (D-NY) replies: “Your pride is matched only by the many millions of people that hope that somehow they can reach our shores and find a better way.”⁵⁰

On Thursday, November 7, the Wall Street Journal prints a column by Vladislav Krasnov. A Soviet defector himself, Krasnov examines the inept way the United States has handled past and present defection attempts and says: “One would have expected U.S policy on defections to have improved since Ronald Reagan moved into the White House. However the record tells a different story.”⁵¹

At 11:30 p.m. on November 7, ABC nightline with Ted Koppel features interviews with Ukrainian INS interpreter Irene Padoch and Simus Kudirka, the Soviet defector from Lithuania. Padoch reiterates her conversation with Medvid on October 24, while Kudirka, a man who lived through a situation similar to that of Medvid’s is adamant that a secret deal has been struck between the Kremlin and the “shadows” of our nation — much to the disbelief of Koppel. During the program viewers are switched live to Reserve, La. where Senate staffers Terry Wear and David Sullivan are seen boarding the Marshal Koniev in an attempt to serve Senate Agriculture Committee subpoena papers to Myroslav Medvid.

During the second half of Nightline, Senators Gordon Humphrey (R-NH) and Alan Simpson (R-WY) engaged in an impromptu debate — one in support

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ *ABC World News Tonight*, November 7, 1985, 7:00 p.m.

⁵⁰ *MacNeil/Lehrer Report*, November 7, 1985, 8:00 p.m.

⁵¹ “Giving Defectors the Back of Our Hand,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 7, 1985.

of Medvid, the other against. Humphrey, though pleased with the Senate Agriculture Committee subpoena, is cautious and hopes that Customs officials weren't "speaking through their teeth" when they announced that they would block the ship's departure if the subpoena was not complied with.

Simpson on the other hand is unyielding in his opposition to the subpoena and in his support of the State Department interviews which he thinks were conducted properly. Simpson is convinced that Medvid's departure was voluntary and uses the following reasoning, "They had him (Medvid) in the U.S.A. with Russian persons present, psychiatrists and six times he said he didn't want to defect."

For Senator Humphrey the issue has a special significance: "If we can't act under those kinds of circumstances then we might as well forget about being a nation that stands for some principles . . . Tommorrow is do or die day for Medvid, either we act or Medvid dies."⁵²

Details of the Senate Agriculture Committee subpoena and its refusal by the Soviet captain appear in Friday's newspapers. (November 8) Newspapers nationwide also carry editorials urging the Administration to remove Medvid from the Russian ship.

Senate staffers Terry Wear and David Sullivan, a volunteer Ukrainian interpreter and Joseph Wyman boarded the ship late Thursday night but were not allowed to see the sailor. The ship's captain would not accept the subpoena but told them that Soviet Embassy officials would be at the ship the following day.

The New York Times reported that the National Security Agency had monitored a call from the Soviet Embassy in Washington to the captain of the Soviet ship instructing him to keep Medvid heavily sedated in anticipation of the subpoena.⁵³

Customs Service had announced on Thursday that it would not allow the Soviet freighter to leave U.S. waters unless the subpoena was complied with.⁵⁴

The American Civil Liberties Union filed a law suit in the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans on behalf of Medvid's family and Senators Bob Livingston (R-La), Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Gordon Humphrey (R-NH).⁵⁵

7. Helms' Staffers Try Again to Serve Subpoena

Friday's evening news (November 8) reports on the second attempt by Senate Agriculture Committee lawyers to serve the subpoena to Myroslav Medvid. Soviet Embassy officials had arrived in New Orleans shortly after 1

⁵² *ABC Nightline*, November 7, 1985, 1:30 p.m.

⁵³ "Some Not-So-Smart Intelligence," *New York Times*, November 8, 1985.

⁵⁴ "Customs Set to Block Soviet Ship," *New York Times*, November 8, 1985.

⁵⁵ "Soviet Cap'n Snubs Subpoena," *New York Daily News*, November 8, 1985.

p.m. but would now allow the Americans on board the Russian ship; instead they were diverted to the offices of the Cargill grain company where fruitless negotiations would continue for three hours.

But Senate staffer Terry Wear had devised a clever ruse. Realizing that the Russians would not willfully accept the subpoena, Wear hid copies of the subpoena in two cartons of Marlboro cigarettes which he presented to Victor Tkachenko, the captain of the Soviet ship. The subpoena had effectively been served.

News that night also focused on the psychiatrist's report on Medvid which the State Department decided to release earlier that day. According to the Air Force psychiatrist, Medvid was "immature" and was "grabbing for the glitter and gusto" when he originally jumped ship on October 24 but was clearly competent to make his decision to return to the USSR. Several days later Dr. William O'Malley, an expert on psychotic drugs, would remark that the conclusions of the U.S. psychiatrist were more characteristic of KGB agents than of U.S. military doctors.

Confusion over Reagan's position on the Medvid issue also reached a peak on Friday, November 8. On at least several occasions Reagan had directed Attorney General Meese to investigate the matter, but it soon became clear that his investigation would be a post-mortem one. Still the media was optimistic. The president is described as "concerned" by Congressional Republican leaders who met him earlier on Friday, while in the next room White House spokesman Larry Speakes reiterates the Administration's position that the case is closed.

Television anchormen interpret Reagan's "concern" to mean something more and report that "Reagan is looking to see if there is any way of getting Medvid off the ship." It was imperceivable to the media that Reagan would not intervene in Medvid's behalf. The New York Post editorial of November 8, is titled "Now that Reagan has the facts he cannot let Medvid go home." "There is no way Reagan can let that ship sail," says Sam Donaldson, "Geneva considerations or not."⁵⁶ Only CBS News has analyzed the situation correctly and reports "President Reagan offered his concern but not his assistance."⁵⁷

On Friday November 8 CNN's "Crossfire" discusses the case of Myroslav Medvid. Guests include Julian Kulas, attorney for Medvid, and Linda Zingerle an INS attorney. Dr. Kulas argues effectively in Medvid's defense and highlights the irregularities in the case along with the fact that no one who saw the sailor in Act I, October 24-25, saw him in Act II, October 28-29. The INS lawyer however is still unconvinced that Medvid wanted to defect and goes as far as to suggest that lacerations on the sailor's wrists may mean that he was psychotic. By

⁵⁶ *ABC World News Tonight*, November 8, 1985, 7:00 p.m.

⁵⁷ *CBS Evening News*, November 8, 1985, 7:00 p.m.

⁵⁸ *CNN Crossfire*, November 8, 7:30 p.m.

the end of the show both liberal Braden and conservative Novak agree that the sailor should be interviewed again.⁵⁸

Customs Service which had only a day earlier announced that it would not allow the ship to leave until the subpoena was complied with, now defers all responsibility to the White House. Spokesman Dennis Murphy states that “the Customs Service would now abide by any decision that comes out of the review process” at the White House.⁵⁹ Meanwhile at the White House an interagency task force of State and Justice Department officials meets and quietly condemns Medvid.

All speculation whether the ship would be detained or allowed to sail was quickly answered on Saturday November 9 when the U.S. State Department gave clearance for the Marshal Koniev’s departure. Reaction to the ship’s departure is swift.

Senator Gordon Humphrey is quoted: “This is a day of disgrace for the Reagan Administration and a day of despair for those seeking political asylum.”⁶⁰ Senator Jesse Helms declares that “The State Department clearly decided that it is more important to appease the Soviet Union than to allow a young man to have an unfettered chance for freedom.”⁶¹

Sviatoslav Karavansky, a Ukrainian dissident who spent thirty years in Soviet prison camps, said of Medvid’s failed attempt at freedom: “The nation he wanted to leave is a great prison and Mr. Medvid will be sent to a psychiatric hospital where he will suffer everyday tortures. He is a normal man and they will cure him.”⁶²

Columnist Richard Cohen states in his editorial: “Medvid is forgiven for thinking in the end his choice didn’t matter. The Soviet Union is not the kind of country that cares about a single sailor. And now it appears neither are we.”⁶³ As the ship sails into international waters CNN gives this closing thought: “The world will never know what Myroslav Medvid really wanted.”⁶⁴

8. Voice of Miss Liberty

The next day Secretary of State George Shultz defends his department’s handling of the case on CBS-TV’s “Face the Nation.” To quote Shultz, “It would look as though he (Medvid) decided somehow that he wanted to come to the United States and after he was subjected to whatever aboard that ship he

⁵⁹ “Smoke Screen,” *Chicago Sun-Times*, November 9, 1985.

⁶⁰ “Soviet Seaman Leaves,” *Syracuse Herald-American (UPI)*, November 10, 1985.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² “Soviets Sail Ship-Jumper Beyond Reach of U.S.” *Newark Star Ledger (AP)*, November 11, 1985.

⁶³ “Who Cares About One Sailor,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 9, 1985.

⁶⁴ *CNN News*, November 8, 1985, 10:00 p.m.

changed his mind.” Shultz conceded the mistake of returning Medvid initially but said that then everything possible was done to determine his intentions including extensive medical and psychiatric exams in a “non-threatening environment.”⁶⁵

But the truth was that the medical and psychiatric exams were neither complete nor was Medvid interviewed in a “non-threatening environment”

Lars-Erik Nelson in his column is sickened by the fact that “we let a man sit in a KGB psychiatric cell in the middle of Mark Twain’s Mississippi.” Nelson sarcastically turns to the timeless words inscribed in the Statue of Liberty, “Give me your tired masses, your poor huddled masses yearning to be free . . . Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me . . . I lift my lamp beside the golden door.”⁶⁶

The Washington Times reports on November 11 that the decision to allow the Russian ship to depart was made by a high-level interagency task force headed by Admiral John Poindexter who would in a few weeks be promoted to National Security Advisor.⁶⁷

On Tuesday, November 12, newspapers report that INS has completed an investigation into their handling of the sailor and that Attorney General Ed Meese will soon decide whether a further investigation is necessary. INS also announces that the Border Patrol Agents that returned Medvid are likely to face punishment. Though INS director Alan Nelson concedes that his Border Patrol Agents violated regulations requiring immediate notification of their superiors in Washington, he feels that the second round of interviews by the State Department were “honest” and “fair” and more than made up for the initial error.⁶⁸

On November 12, two major New York newspapers, the New York Post and the New York Daily News write editorials pondering the fate of Myroslav Medvid.⁶⁹ The House of Representatives also passes a non-binding resolution (404-3), expressing the sense that President Reagan should have protected Medvid’s rights including assuring him another interview on U.S. soil.

At the Senate Agriculture Committee hearing on November 12, Dr. William O’Malley, a neurologist, psychiatrist and pharmacologist with a strong background in neuroleptic drugs, analyzed the psychiatrist’s report on the sailor and called it “appalling.” According to O’Malley, not only did the report fail to satisfy the absolute minimum of professional standards but it took absolutely no

⁶⁵ “Face the Nation,” *CBS News*, November 10, 1985, 1:00 p.m.

⁶⁶ “Medvid Missed Liberty” *New York Daily News*, November 10, 1985.

⁶⁷ “Special Task Force Made Final Decision to Let Soviet Ship Go,” *Washington Times*, November 11, 1985.

⁶⁸ “Two Border Agents Face Punishment,” *New York Times*, November 12, 1985.

⁶⁹ “Fate of Myroslav Medvid Should Make Us Feel Ashamed” *New York Post*, November 12, 1985; “There Will Be More Medvids,” *New York Daily News*, November 12, 1985.

account of the fact that Medvid has been given massive amounts of potent tranquilizers which “can tame wild animals,” adversely affect brain chemistry and destroy one’s “will to live.” Excerpts from O’Malley’s testimony are shown on CNN and NBC.

Chairing the hearing was Senator Jesse Helms. “The State Department thumbed its nose at the legislative branch when it ignored the subpoena” were the words of the North Carolina senator. David Sullivan, one of Helms’ aides who had flown down to Louisiana, said that Medvid was probably returned as a result of a secret agreement between the U.S and the Soviets. It is also at the hearing that a picture of Myroslav Medvid is released to the public. The photo is shown at length on CNN and appears in newspapers the following day.

On November 13, the Soviet newspaper “Trud” gives its official version of the Medvid story.⁷⁰ According to “Trud,” Medvid was blinded by spotlights while making electrical repairs on October 24 and accidentally fell overboard. He was then “rescued” by the U.S. Border Patrol who returned him to the ship. The next day “unknown persons got on board and declared the vessel under arrest until Medvid could be questioned by U.S authorities on a Coast Guard ship. We (the Soviets) voiced strong protests against those arbitrary actions but the Americans still compelled us to take the sailor Myroslav Medvid to that ship . . . For 16 days, pirate-style thugs blocked the fairway and tried to cause an accident with the ship.”

The Trud report ends by saying that the Medvid affair was another example of “those who callously trample on human rights, morals and international law.” CNN and CBS mention the Soviet report in their afternoon and evening broadcasts.

The Los Angeles Times makes it clear on November 13, that defections from the Soviet Union are not treated lightly and are punished with long sentences, even death.

The Los Angeles Times follows with another feature article on November 15, stating that it is the policy of American leaders to tolerate defections from the Soviet Union, but not to encourage them. The author, Charles Krauthammer finds it ironic and unfortunate that Medvid didn’t come to the United States with a gimmick. Had he been a dancer like Baryshnikov then he would have been welcomed with open arms. But Myroslav couldn’t “dance.”

An Evans and Novak “Inside Report” subtitled “Medvid Dies Hard” appears in U.S. newspapers on November 16.

On November 19, the press reports on suspensions and pay cuts for the Border Patrol guards who returned Medvid to the Soviets. INS states that it will not disclose the names of their agents because of their “right to privacy,” but they are identified by the Washington Times as Ernest B. Spurlock and J.S. Bashaw.

In its November 20 editorial, the Boston Globe states that it is ridiculous to

⁷⁰ *Trud*, Moscow, November 13, 1985.

think that only the Border Patrol is to blame for the bungling in the Medvid affair.

9. When Medvid Sailed Off, So Did A Bit of Our Honor

On November 21, an article by Congressman Fred Eckert (R-NY) appears in the *Wall Street Journal*. Eckert recalls the events of October 24-29 and focuses on several important facts:

- that Russian KGB agents had at least one full day before American officials boarded the ship, to coerce and threaten Medvid into saying and doing anything they wished.
- that the State Department used a Russian-speaking interpreter who interviewed Medvid in Russian a language that Ukrainians resent!
- that nowhere in the official State Department document was there a single reference to Medvid's actions prior to his returning to the ship.

Eckert refutes the notion that Medvid was interviewed in a “non-threatening environment” and equally refutes the conclusions of the U.S. Navy psychiatrist who examined Medvid. In Eckert's view, Medvid should have been detained, even physically removed from the ship, until the harmful effects of drugs given to him by the Soviets, had dissipated. Medvid then should have had a chance to meet with other Ukrainians in the United States including his relatives. “All these should have been done,” said Eckert, “but weren't.”

“Somewhere out on the high seas the Marshal Koniev is carrying the Ukrainian seaman Myroslav Medvid to the hell that awaits him back in the Soviet Union. The ship is also carrying away a full load of American grain. And pieces of America's reputation, pride and honor.”⁷¹

On November 27, AP reports that Navy Lt. James R. Geltz had been reprimanded by his superior officer for not relinquishing “secret” photographs he took of the seaman at the Algiers Naval Base on October 29, while performing his duties as the Public Affairs Officer.

The first reports of U.S. senators calling for an independent Senate investigation of the Medvid incident appear in newspapers on November 28. Ten senators were already sponsoring what would be known as the Humphrey-Dixon resolution. They were: Gordon J. Humphrey (R-NH), Alan J. Dixon (D-IL), Charles Grassley (R—Iowa), Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala), John Kerry (D-MA), Donald Riegle (D-Mich), Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), Bill Bradley (D-NJ) and Steven Symms (R-Idaho). By late December, the Humphrey-Dixon resolution would have 62 co-sponsors.

On November 29, the *Washington Times* writes its seventh editorial on

⁷¹ “When Medvid Sailed Off, So Did a Bit of Our Honor,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 21, 1985.

⁷² “Navy Officer Reprimanded,” *Baton Rouge Morning Advocate*, November 27, 1985.

Medvid. After reviewing Dr. O'Malley's findings and adding several of its own, the *Washington Times* concluded that the U.S. psychiatrist's report was shameful. The editorial also reviews the way the Administration had handled the Ukrainian sailor and adds "If this has become the government policy towards defectors, God help them and us."⁷³ Three days later on December 2, John Lofton of the *Washington Times* must also hold back his outrage at the psychiatrist's report in "If Frogs Had Wings."⁷⁴

On December 4, the press reports that Polish sailor Leszek Kapsa has defected from a Polish ship and applied for asylum. Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) accompanied the sailor to INS offices in Cleveland, where Kapsa eventually was granted asylum. Metzenbaum said he came along to make certain there were no more Medvids.

On December 4 CNN reports on the Polish sailor defection but devotes most of its story to Medvid, showing excerpts from a Chicago news conference held in the office of attorney Julian Kulas. Also present is Joseph Wyman, Belle Chase jeweler, who holds up an enlarged photograph of Medvid stating that the man in Lt. Geltz' photographs was not Medvid.

On December 4, CNN Crossfire discusses the new appointment of Admiral John Poindexter as a replacement for Robert McFarlane as National Security Advisor. Robert Novak points out that Poindexter chaired the interagency task force that "sent Medvid back to the Gulag." One of the guests, conservative leader Richard Viguerie says that it is an outrage that the Administration should elevate Poindexter to the post of National Security Advisor just weeks after the Medvid incident. Viguerie states the obvious fact that Medvid would not have been returned had he been Jewish. "The Administration knew it could send this boy back to his death and the voices would be small and not very loud . . . It is right for the Jewish community to yell and scream and I'm sorry that the Ukrainians don't have a louder voice."⁷⁷

The Medvid case is a classic example of how the United States, for appeasement or conspiracy purposes deals with the Soviets. The method is a naive and ineffective one which often leaves the Soviets with the upper hand. So too with Medvid.

Long speeches on how great our country is and how the United States will fight the Evil Empire are meaningless. The Soviet Union was brought to the shores of the United States and the Administration was put to a very important test. It failed miserably.

⁷³ "More on Medvid," *Washington Times*, November 28, 1985.

⁷⁴ "If Frogs Had Wings," *Washington Times*, December 2, 1985.

⁷⁵ "Polish Sailor Asking U.S for Asylum," *Baton Rouge Morning Advocate*, December 5, 1985.

⁷⁶ *CNN News*, December 4, 1985, 8:00 p.m.

⁷⁷ *CNN Crossfire*, December 4, 1985, 7:30 p.m.

The press performed admirably and drew its own conclusions. Early references to Medvid as “Russian” were soon replaced by “Ukrainian,” and it seemed for a while that the press understood the difference.

The press showed compassion for Medvid, at a time when the Administration, the State and Justice Departments did not. Reporters seemed taken in with the story of the Ukrainian sailor, who had travelled across the Atlantic in search for freedom and was denied it in the ugliest way imaginable. Medvid had become a symbol to them just as he had to millions of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians and other non-Russian people, whose brothers are trapped in the Soviet Union hoping for a chance at freedom.

NATIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN UKRAINE

ANDREW SOROKOWSKY

I

The subject of national discrimination in the USSR as practiced against the Ukrainian people is vast, and only a general discussion is possible here. Since a purpose of this conference is to marshal some of the evidence about ethnic repression in the Soviet Union, I shall attempt to present evidence of the most concrete and accurate kind available. Because of the limitations of time, however, this evidence shall be largely confined to that illustrating a few aspects of national discrimination only.

First, national discrimination must be defined. Here it is useful to cite the definition of *racial* discrimination used in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ratified, incidentally, by both the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR): “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life” (article 1-1). For our purposes, however, it will suffice to define national discrimination as follows: the differential treatment of persons, groups, cultures or institutions on the basis of their national or ethnic identity. We shall correspondingly divide national discrimination into four types: discrimination against individuals, against groups, against cultures, and against political institutions.

II

Since the approach of this conference is critical as well as analytical, it is appropriate to mention that national discrimination is explicitly prohibited by international law. The principles of the United Nations Charter include equal rights of peoples, sovereign equality of UN members and respect for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.¹ The

A paper presented at the RCDA “Conference on Religious and Ethnic Oppression in the USSR” at Marymount College, Arlington, Virginia, USA on May 16-18, 1984. Andrew Sorokowski is a writer and editor specializing in Soviet and East European affairs.

¹ United Nations Charter arts. 1-2, 2-1, 1-3.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims equal rights for all human beings, and grants freedoms without distinction of any kind, including race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, or national or social origin.² The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights³ and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights⁴ likewise grant certain rights to all regardless of race, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, and so on. In addition, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims equal protection of the law to all, and specifically grants protection against discrimination in violation of its principles, and against incitement to such discrimination.⁵ It also grants everyone the right to a nationality.⁶ The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mentioned above not only grants all persons the equal protection of the law, but requires the law of each country to prohibit any discrimination and to guarantee to all persons protection against discrimination on any ground such as those previously cited.⁷ Under this Covenant, members of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities must not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, profess and practice their religion, or use their own language.⁸ A UNESCO convention forbids discrimination in education,⁹ and an ILO convention prohibits discrimination in employment and occupation.¹⁰ Finally, the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination provides that “no state, institution, group or individual shall make any discrimination whatsoever in matters of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the treatment of persons, groups of persons or institutions on the grounds of race, color or ethnic origin.”¹¹ Both the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR are parties to these instruments of international law.

Soviet law, too, forbids discrimination. Article 34 of the USSR Constitution proclaims all citizens equal before the law regardless of, among other categories, race or nationality, language, or place of residence. Article 36 specifically grants citizens of different races and nationalities equal rights. It makes restrictions of rights, the establishment of privileges on grounds of race or nationality, or the preaching of racial or national exclusiveness, hostility or

² Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN Doc. A/811, 10 Dec. 1948) arts. 1,2.

³ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (G. A. Res. 2200 (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316, 16 Dec. 1966) art. 2-1.

⁴ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (G. A. Res. 2200 (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316, 16 Dec. 1966) art. 2-2

⁵ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 7.

⁶ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15.

⁷ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 26.

⁸ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27.

⁹ UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education (14 Dec. 1960).

¹⁰ ILO Convention No. 111 (25 June 1958).

¹¹ United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (G. A. Res. 1904 ((XVIII) 20 Nov. 1963) art. 2-1.

contempt punishable by law. Under Article 64, every USSR citizen must respect the national dignity of other citizens and strengthen the friendship of the nations and nationalities of the USSR.

Quite apart from the question of enforcement, these legal guarantees must be seen in the light of Soviet nationalities policy — for Soviet law is at least in part an instrument of policy. The Constitution itself refers to some of the relevant policies: Article 36 declares that the exercise of equal racial and national rights is ensured by a policy of comprehensive development and rapprochement of all Soviet nations and nationalities, by educating citizens in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and by the possibility of using one's native language and the languages of other peoples of the USSR. Article 19 announces that the state promotes the strengthening of the national homogeneity of society and the all-round development and rapprochement of the Soviet nations and nationalities. Apparently, the theory of the development and convergence of the nations of the USSR, leading to their ultimate fusion (which is not, however, mentioned in the Constitution) into a single, uniform Soviet nation, remains in force. It seems to influence both administrative practice and the interpretation of laws. One may well ask whether this nationalities policy, now codified in the Fundamental Law of the Soviet Union, is in harmony with the spirit of the international legal principles set out above.

III

Having outlined the legal framework, we can now proceed to examine the actual practice of national discrimination towards the Ukrainian people. A few words must be said, however, about its origins and nature.

Of the three heirs of medieval Kievan Rus', it was Muscovy that eventually subsumed its brothers under the rubric of "Russia." The process of imperial conquest and colonization inevitably involved discrimination against the Ukrainians as well as against other subjugated peoples, cultures and states. The fact that individuals could escape discrimination only by assimilating with the Russian people — that is, by participating in the gradual elimination of their group and their culture — illustrates the mechanism by which individual discrimination in colonial conditions is a factor in group and cultural discrimination. In a multi-national empire, this leads ultimately to the eradication of all national groups other than the dominant one. In a multi-national federation, it involves discrimination against entire political entities as well.

While the state structure of the USSR, with its fifteen republics and various autonomous republics, regions and national areas, is a concession to the aspirations of its nearly 100 nations and nationalities, the actual administration of the Soviet government closely follows the colonial pattern. The doctrine of the drawing-together and ultimate fusion of nations referred to above provides a theoretical justification for continuing the policy of Russification begun under

the Tsars, now ill-concealed beneath the slogan of socialist internationalism. Even a close examination of the formal constitutional structure of state power will reveal a high degree of centralism; the unitary structure of the ruling party reveals it even more.

In view of this, one may well ask, first, whether national discrimination is a systematic rather than an incidental problem of today's USSR, and second, whether national discrimination is inherent in any Russian successor state preserving the basic outlines of the Empire.

This is not to suggest, however, that colonialism serves the interests of the Russian people or that their interests are incompatible with those of the colonized people. Its national identity or affiliation is only one characteristic of the Soviet ruling elite. While this aspect does result, as we shall see, in discrimination against non-Russians, other characteristics of the Soviet elite place it at odds with the interests of the bulk of the Russians as well. In fact, it may be said that this elite represents the interests of no national group, and of no socio-economic or political group other than itself. All the same, this does not prevent it from carrying on certain practices which discriminate in favor of Russians and to the detriment of non-Russians.

IV

What are the forms of national discrimination against Ukrainians? In the category of discrimination against individuals, those persecuted for asserting and exercising basic human rights such as free speech, press and assembly in defense of Ukrainian culture and national rights are best known. The members of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, for example, have been severely persecuted. At times, those who protest national discrimination are themselves discriminatorily punished: the sentences for Ukrainians convicted of political crimes like anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (Criminal Code RSFSR art. 70, Criminal Code Ukr.SSR art. 62) have often been unusually long and have in some cases been imposed successively. Perhaps the most shocking example is that of Iurii Shukhevych, son of an anti-Soviet resistance leader, who has been imprisoned for thirty of his fifty years primarily for refusing to denounce his father's ideas and actions; 99% blind, he remains in exile near Tomsk. There is a further discrimination in that Ukrainian political prisoners must commonly serve their sentences of imprisonment outside the Ukrainian SSR.

While active dissidents are but a fraction of the Ukrainian population, ordinary citizens do not escape discrimination either. For example, in 1970 the share of Ukrainians in the USSR with higher education was only about 75% the share of Russians with higher education.¹² In 1970 the Ukrainian SSR had a

¹² TsSU, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda*, IV (Moscow 1972) p. 13, cited in Whitehouse & Bronson, "Manpower," in I. S. Koropec'kyj, *The Ukraine within the USSR* (New York/London: 1977) p. 143.

smaller share of employment in the “non-productive” sector — health, education, science and art — and in the non-agricultural branches of the “productive” sector — such as industry, transportation, communication and trade — than did the Russian republic. It had a much larger share of employment in the agricultural sector. There, the share of collective farmers in the Ukrainian SSR was more than twice that in the RSFSR. It is well known that collective farmers rank at the bottom of the Soviet social and economic scale. While in 1970 the Ukrainian SSR provided a quarter of the Soviet Union’s agricultural labor force and nearly a third of its collective farmers, it had only a fifth of its agricultural specialists with higher or secondary specialized education. Higher education among the rural population of the Ukrainian republic was below that of the USSR as a whole.¹³ In the 1960’s and 1970’s, Ukrainians had a smaller percentage of college graduates and students than did the Russians in the Ukrainian SSR. Only about 60% of the students in Ukraine were Ukrainians.¹⁴

National discrimination against Ukrainians as a group is evident in demographic and language-affiliation data. Here one can discern continuing Russification. While the overall number of Ukrainians in the USSR increased 3.9% from 1970 to 1979, the percentage share of Ukrainians in their own republic declined from 74.9% to 73.6%. At the same time, the percentage share of Russians increased from 19.4% to 21.1%. According to the 1979 census only about 86% of Ukrainians in the USSR lived in the Ukrainian SSR; 8.6% lived in the RSFSR.¹⁵ A study of the 1970 census revealed that employed Ukrainians with a higher education tended to work outside their native republic.¹⁶ In the 1960’s and 1970’s over a third of Ukrainian scientists in the Soviet Union worked outside the Ukrainian SSR, reflecting a policy of planned resettlement of Ukrainians to Russia and other union republics.¹⁷ The majority of individual inter-republic transfers involving the Ukrainian SSR in 1968-1970 was between the Ukrainian and the Russian republics.¹⁸ Generally, skilled, educated Ukrainians have been encouraged to move out of their country,¹⁹ for example, to Central Asia and the non-black-earth region of Russia, while Russians have transferred massively into Ukraine.

In cases of Ukrainian out-migration to other non-Russian republics such as Latvia or Estonia there is a triple Russifying effect. First, the migrating Ukrainians lose such touch with their language and culture; they are deprived of

¹³ Koropeckyj, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-152.

¹⁴ R. Szporluk, *“Ukraine: a Brief History”* (Detroit: 1982) p. 118.

¹⁵ Solchanyk, “Ukraine and the Ukrainians in the USSR: Nationality and Language Aspects of the 1979 Soviet Census,” *The Ukrainian Quarterly* Vol. XXXVI, No. 3 (Autumn 1980) pp. 272-273.

¹⁶ Whitehouse & Bronson, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

¹⁷ Szporluk, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

¹⁸ Whitehouse & Bronson, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-149.

¹⁹ Szporluk, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

access to Ukrainian newspapers libraries and theaters, while their children can no longer go to Ukrainian schools. In order to communicate with their new neighbors and co-workers they will use Russian, and will most likely send their children to Russian schools. This brings about the second effect of out-migration: Russification of the receiving country by the non-Russian migrants themselves.²⁰ Third, the out-migrants are commonly replaced at home by Russian or Russian-speaking immigrants, who thus contribute to Russification there. Indeed, from 1970 to 1979 the percentage of the population of the Ukrainian SSR, claiming Ukrainian as its native language decreased from 69.4 to 66.3, while the percentage claiming Russian as its native language increased from 28.1 to 31.2. Of Ukrainians throughout the USSR, 85.7% claimed Ukrainian as their native language in 1970; in 1979 the figure dropped to 82.8%. In the city of Kiev, however, both the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian national consciousness apparently increased during that period — although there, too, the Russian language remained dominant.²¹ It must be remembered that Kiev was heavily Russified well before Soviet rule.

The intensified teaching of the Russian language in the schools of the non-Russian republics announced at the All-Union Scientific-Theoretical Conference on the Russian language held in Tashkent in May 1979 signalled a renewed policy of linguistic Russification. The recommendations of the Tashkent Conference prompted action on both the all-union and republic levels.²² At the same time, the number of Ukrainian-language schools, generally held to be inferior to Russian-language schools, was declining in the heavily Russified, urbanized, industrial southeast Ukraine; the last Ukrainian school in Donetsk — a city of over a million inhabitants — was reportedly shut down in 1979.²³

A distinct but related phenomenon is discrimination against the Ukrainian culture. This is evidenced by statistics on the number, language and content of Soviet publications in the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Union as a whole. Such statistics were cited by Soviet Ukrainian literacy critic Ivan Dziuba in 1965 in his work entitled *Internationalism or Russification?*²⁴ To properly assess the significance of these statistics it is necessary to keep in mind the following demographic statistics: in 1979 the population of the RSFSR was about 52.4%; that of the USSR, with the proportion of Russians in the Soviet population likewise at about 52.4%; the population of the Ukrainian SSR was

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Solchanyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-275.

²² Decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU of May 26, 1983; directive of the All-Union Ministry of Education of June 7, 1983; decision of the Council of Ministers and the Party Central Committee of the Ukrainian SSR of June 10, 1983; and decision of the Ministry of Education of the Ukrainian SSR of June 29, 1983 and additional measures, cited in "The Ukrainian Weekly," April 29, 1984, p. 5.

²³ Szporluk, *op. cit.*, p. 126

²⁴ I. Dziuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* (London: 1968) pp. 116-122.

about 19.0% of that of the USSR, while Ukrainians constituted about 16.1% of the Soviet population; Russians made up about 21.1% of the population of the Ukrainian SSR, with Ukrainians constituting 73.6%²⁵ The population of the RSFSR was thus about 2.8 times that of the Ukrainian SSR; the overall Russian population was about 3.3 times the over-all Ukrainian population. One should also consider the figures for native language affiliation cited above.

In light of this, let us examine some official statistics on publishing in the USSR in the year 1982. Of the books and brochures published by USSR publishing houses, some 70.8% of the titles were in the Russian language; only 22.2% were in the languages of the non-Russian Soviet republics. Only in the union republic publishing houses did the figures for book and brochure titles correspond roughly to the over-all population figures: 52.4% Russian-language titles, 44.3% titles in the languages of the non-Russian republics.²⁶ Out of the over-all number of books and brochures published in the USSR, 80.9% of the titles were in Russian. This far exceeds the 52.4% Russian population. Only 2.7% of the titles were in Ukrainian,²⁷ well under the 19.0% of the Soviet population living in the Ukrainian SSR and the 16.1% who are Ukrainians, as well as an estimated 13.3% (author's estimate) of the Soviet population claiming Ukrainian as their native language. It is also less than the comparable figure for 1966, 4.1%.²⁸

An index of the dissemination of national language and culture is the number of translations published. While in 1982 75.8% of the translations from languages of the USSR published in that country were from the Russian language, only 2.8% were from the Ukrainian language. Russian-language works were translated into 104 languages, while Ukrainian-language works were translated into only 20 languages.²⁹

While the proportion of Russian literary works published — 50.8% — corresponds roughly to the Russian share of the Soviet population, the number of Ukrainian literary works was only 7.3%, far less than the percentage of the Soviet population which is Ukrainian or which claims Ukrainian as its native language.³⁰

All examination of the Soviet periodical press — excluding newspapers — indicates an even greater degree of Russification. Some 85.2% of the titles, 82.6% of the issues, and 81.0% of the titles, 82.6% of the issues, and 81.0% of the copies per year published in 1982 were in Russian. Only 2.1% of the titles, 2.5% of the issues and 5.5% of the copies per year were in Ukrainian — again, to be compared with a 16.1% Ukrainian share of the population and an estimated

²⁵ See Solchanyk, *op. cit.*

²⁶ Based on *Pechat' SSSR v 1982 godu* (Moscow: 1983), Table 6, pp. 16-17.

²⁷ Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, Table 10, p. 24.

²⁸ Dzyuba, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

²⁹ Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, Table 11, pp. 28-29.

³⁰ Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, Table 28, p. 98.

13.3% of the population claiming Ukrainian as its native language.³¹

Figures for Soviet newspapers, however, show a lesser degree of Russification in number of titles and issues published — 64.6% and 63.6%, respectively, in Russian — but a similar degree in the number of copies per year — 82.0%. The corresponding figures for Ukrainian-language newspapers follow the same pattern: 15.8% of the titles, 12.2% of the issues, and only 7.0% of the copies per year.³²

Publishing in the union republics reveals Soviet linguistic policy in bolder relief. In 1982 approximately six times as many titles of books and brochures were published in the Russian republic as in the Ukrainian republic, in some 10.6 times as many copies.³³ While in the RSFSR, Russian-language titles constituted some 91.5% of the total, Ukrainian-language titles constituted a mere 25.0% of the total for the Ukrainian republic.³⁴ This latter figure is well below the 40% reported for 1966,³⁵ and reflects a declining trend: 39% in 1968, 28% in 1977, 25% in 1982.³⁶ It compares most unfavorably both with the 73.6% Ukrainian share of the republic's population and with the 66.3% share of the republic's population claiming Ukrainian as its native language. On the other hand, while in terms of number of copies the share of Russian-language works published in the RSFSR is a high 95.3%, the share of Ukrainian-language works in the Ukrainian republic, 65.0% is not so disproportionate to the percentage of the population that is Ukrainian, or especially to the percentage that claims Ukrainian as its native language.³⁷ Nevertheless, it reflects a decline from 1966, when the Ukrainian-language share of the number of copies printed was 72%.³⁸ The share of the number of copies printed in the Ukrainian SSR in Russian is 32.5%, well above the Russian share of the republic's population (21.9%) but very close to the share of the population claiming Russian as its native language (31.2%).³⁹

The fact that the number of book and brochure translations into Russian published in the RSFSR exceeded that of translations into Ukrainian published in the Ukrainian SSR by a factor of over four and a half to one, while the number of languages translated into Russian (101) exceeded the number translated into Ukrainian (41) by a factor of two and a half to one, suggests that access to foreign literature is much greater for those reading in Russian than for those reading in Ukrainian.⁴⁰ This corresponds to the ideological principle that Russian culture is

³¹ Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, Table 35, p. 107.

³² Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, Table 40 p. 117.

³³ Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, Table 43, pp. 124-125.

³⁴ Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, Table 45, p. 138.

³⁵ Dzyuba, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

³⁶ *Encyclopedia of Library and Information Science* (New York: 1981) Vol. 31, p. 299.

³⁷ Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, *loc. cit.*

³⁸ Dzyuba, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

³⁹ Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, *loc. cit.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

to be the non-Russians' means of access to world culture.

Some greater disparities are seen in the relative numbers of periodicals, excluding newspapers, published in the Russian and Ukrainian republics. Periodical titles in the RSFSR outnumber titles in the Ukrainian SSR by a factor of 19.7 to one, and the number of issues is some 18.7 times greater in the former, although its population is only about 2.8 times that of the Ukrainian republic.⁴¹ While the percentages of Russian-language periodical titles and issues are very high in the Russian republic — 93.3 and 93.5, respectively — the percentages of Ukrainian-language periodical titles and issues in the Ukrainian SSR are disproportionately low: 51.8 and 60.8. The figures for Russian-language periodical titles and issues in the Ukrainian republic are correspondingly high: 45.7% and 33.7%, respectively. In terms of copies printed per year, however, the figure for Ukrainian-language periodicals published in the Ukrainian SSR is a high 91.2%, as compared with only 8.7% for Russian-language periodicals.⁴²

The statistics on union-republic newspapers reflect a near-normal pattern in terms of numbers of titles and issues published in the Russian and the Ukrainian republics. In terms of copies per year, however, the RSFSR outstrips the Ukrainian SSR by a factor of 6.8 to one, well over the relative sizes of their populations.⁴³ Within the Russian republic, the percentage share of Russian-language newspapers is high: 93.2% of titles, 90.7% of issues and 98.6% of copies per year. The figures for titles and issues of Ukrainian-language newspapers in the Ukrainian republic — 73.4% and 73.5%, respectively — are normal relative to the percentage of Ukrainians in its population and favorable relative to the share of the population with Ukrainian as its native language. The share of Ukrainian-language copies per year, however, is a disproportionately low 64.5%; the share of copies of Russian-language newspapers is, as expected disproportionately high: 34.9%. This exceeds the proportion in the republic's population of both Russians and those claiming Russian as their native language.⁴⁴

The disproportion of Russian-language publications indicated by these statistics evidences an unequal treatment of the Russian and Ukrainian languages in the USSR. The discrimination is all the more glaring when it occurs within the republic of the disfavored linguistic group. It is true that in some cases, the share of Russian-language publications corresponds roughly to the share of Russians or Russian speakers in the population. That proportion, however, may itself be the result of Russification. Thus, a percentage of Russian publications seemingly appropriate to the nationality structure or language-affiliation pattern of a given population may simply mean that different forms of Russification have proceeded at similar rates.

⁴¹ Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, Table 50, pp. 208-209.

⁴² Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, Table 51, p. 211.

⁴³ Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, Table 56, pp. 233-234.

⁴⁴ Based on *Pechat' SSSR*, Table 57, p. 237.

A closely related phenomenon is the dearth of scientific and technical publications in the Ukrainian SSR. While 31 journals in electronics and related fields are published in the Soviet Union, not one is published in the Ukrainian language or in the Ukrainian SSR. Only one of the 49 Soviet journals on physics is published in Ukraine, and that in the Russian language; only one of the 40 journals of chemistry and related sciences is published in Ukraine and that, too, is in Russian. Not one of the 52 Soviet technical and manufacturing journals, not one of the 26 journals of biological science, is published in the Ukrainian language or in the Ukrainian SSR. Twenty-three industrial journals are published in the USSR, yet the only republic without its own industrial journal is the Ukrainian SSR.⁴⁵

Less easily qualifiable is cultural discrimination in the fields of ideology and the arts. Broadly, it can be argued that the imposition of Marxism-Leninism on the Ukrainian people discriminates against native political and socio-economic traditions. The communal patterns that arose to the north were neither necessary nor desirable in the warmer and more fertile Ukraine. The autocratic tradition of Muscovy was foreign to the heirs of Cossack democracy.

A more specific form of discrimination has been the renewed emphasis on the primacy of Russian culture. This has involved not only the exaltation of that culture, but the neglect and even the destruction of Ukrainian cultural and historical objects such as churches, icons, and documents. The murders of artist Alla Hors'ka in 1970 and composer Volodymyr Ivasiuk in 1979, bearing evidence of KGB involvement, seem to indicate the ferocity of the assault on Ukrainian culture. More subtle has been the falsification of religious, cultural and political history; cases in point are the anti-Catholic crusade, the observances of Kiev's 1500th anniversary, and the reinterpretations of Ukraine's alliance with Muscovy. The total suppression of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic churches, by contrast with partial official tolerance of the Russian Orthodox Church, is a form of religious discrimination along national lines.

The fourth type of national discrimination practiced towards the Ukrainian people is discrimination against the Ukrainian SSR. The centralized state and party structure of the USSR, in combination with the actual dominance of the Russians, nullifies the constitutional guarantees of union republic sovereignty. Thus, the Ukrainian SSR does not carry on significant diplomatic activity outside the East Bloc, and its somewhat anomalous membership in the United Nations invariably serves to support USSR positions. Its constitutional right to secede from the Union (article 72) is purely symbolic. In a strictly formal sense, of course, it is not treated discriminatorily vis a vis its fellow republics, since even the Russian republic has no United Nations representation or major diplomatic contacts. But its membership in the Soviet Union has placed it at a clear

⁴⁵ Arey, "Ukraine — a Victim of National Discrimination," "Smoloskyp," Vol. 6, No. 23 (Spring 1984) p. 8.

disadvantage in relation to other nation-states.

The evidence of discrimination against the Ukrainian SSR is clearest in the area of economics. Broadly speaking, the policy of integration of the USSR into a "single economic complex" provided in Article 16 of the Constitution in effect promotes Russification along with centralization, and further subordinates the non-Russian republics to the desires and commands of the Russian center. In this "system of unequal exchange," the costs and benefits of production are unequally apportioned between the central government and the Ukrainian republic, while the allocation of resources and output is distorted, with a clear disadvantage to the latter.⁴⁶ It has been established that in the 1960' enormous amounts of capital were transferred out of the Ukrainian SSR to other parts of the Soviet Union, with resulting detriment to the Ukrainian economy — for example, in the form of a lower standard of living for Ukrainians that would otherwise have been the case.⁴⁷ While in terms of absolute growth the Ukrainian republic has prospered, its relative position vis a vis the center is disadvantageous, involving an estimated 10% drain of Ukraine's national income — neither repayable nor interest-bearing — to finance Soviet military expenditures, the industrialization of Central Asia, and other ventures determined by the Moscow leadership without democratic consultation with the Ukrainian people.⁴⁸ While this does not of itself establish a discrimination against the Ukrainian SSR in relation to the other Soviet republics, which may likewise be victims of exploitative policies, it strongly suggests that it is deprived of the economic sovereignty enjoyed by comparable nation-state outside the Soviet Union.

V

As the above-mentioned data demonstrate, national discrimination is practiced against Ukrainians as individuals and as members of a group, as well as against their culture and their state entity. The evidence available is, of course, incomplete. Considering that the Soviet authorities are likely to release data favorable to them, the dimensions of the problem could be greater than we realize. Official Soviet sources naturally interpret these data differently, presenting de-nationalization as internationalization, and Russification as a choice freely made in the interests of universal brotherhood — and to that extent, they have no motive to conceal the evidence. They characterize both processes as natural trends — a rather disingenuous assertion in view of stated nationalities policy. There is in fact evidence that these processes are neither natural nor voluntary, but forcibly imposed. Besides, one may question whether in a tightly

⁴⁶ Bandera, "External and Intraunion Trade and Capital Transfers," in Koropecyky, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-264.

⁴⁷ Melnyk, "Capital Formation and Financial Relations," in Koropecyky, *op. cit.*, pp. 287-288.

⁴⁸ Wiles, "Comparison with some Alternatives," in Koropecyky, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

controlled authoritarian state there can be such a thing as a “natural” or voluntary process of de-nationalization and Russification. It is unreasonable to assume that an entire people will freely choose to abandon its identity and adopt that of its historical oppressors. Ethnocide, like its relative genocide, is rarely self-inflicted.

Billed by the Soviet government as socialist internationalism, Russification has elicited a growing solidarity among the non-Russian nations of the USSR. Born out of cooperation among Ukrainian, Russian, Jewish, Tatar and other political prisoners in the multi-national Soviet labor camps, it is well symbolized by the recent additions of the Estonian Mart Niklus and the Lithuanian Victoras Petkus to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. It suggests that the oppressive realities of the regime’s avowed internationalism have given rise to an unofficial internationalism based on equality and mutual respect. In combination with the labor movement — likewise a response to centralism and institutionalized inequality — this new internationalism may indeed contribute to a peaceful yet radical transformation of the USSR.

Be that as it may, it is demonstrated that national discrimination against Ukrainians, their culture and state exists in many sectors of Soviet life, that is, contributes to, and often takes the form of, Russification: and that in it furthers the stated nationalities policy of the Soviet government. Such discrimination violates that government’s freely undertaken obligations under international law. Its ultimate consequence — the disappearance of a nation — would be a loss to all.

THE EAST

JANUSZ SOBCZAK, PIOTR LEWICKI

Nations have always had and continue to have problems with their borderlands. The Hungarian phrase “Nem, nem — soha!” (no, no, never!) was written on house doors as an expression of disagreement with the loss of Transylvania; political-sectarian squaring of the circle in Northern Ireland; Albanian irredenta in Kosovo; dreams of being fellow countrymen with the German Federal Republic; yearnings of the Rumanians for lost Moldavia — these are only some examples affirming the importance of borderlands for states and nations in their collective consciousness. The same holds true for us, when in private conversations, in small hints publicly expressed, we turn our attention to the lands given up to the Soviet Union.

There are probably not many similar problems in present day Poland, which although they do not exist — yet persist, and though they “should not have the right to hurt” — still continue to hurt painfully. Thanks to post war official educational policy, so untruthful that it is completely incapable of hitting the mark, we recently experienced a veritable eruption of still smoldering resentments toward the borderland. This is not surprising, nor shocking, because on the wave of August everything was considered which we should have discussed at least 25 years before.

We are aware of the complexity of this problem. Therefore in regard to everything which happened, or is taking place on the other side of the border, we shall mention only some aspects, and certainly not the most important ones. The assumption must also be made, that looking from a historical perspective at the existence and development of nations, the current status is not likely to last. Certainly, recent events in Poland were also in this respect some of the first warning signals for the Soviet Union, which was the chief, though not the only architect of post war Central and Eastern Europe.

In this context it is not the matter of permanence for Poland's borders which comes to the forefront, but the reminder of a basic fact that our real neighbors to the east continue to be Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians. It is selfevident that not everybody accepts this simple conclusion. Mindful of reality and historical studies we always associate the phrase “eastern border” with Russia. In spite of the soberness of such an assumption it is not difficult to realize that it distorts the picture, and what is even more important, it dulls our

sensitivity and good will to revelations of a desperate struggle for selfdetermination of nations immediately bordering Poland. Meanwhile, as nowhere else in Europe, it was especially there, that the process of forming independent national governments (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine) was brutally suppressed. It was broken off, but not stopped completely, because even great defeats do not disarm nations forever. We give testimony of having forgotten our own history, in addition to a lack of political imagination, if we think that the current formal status east of the river Buh "has been nailed down forever." National feelings have an amazing strength of enduring, and are very susceptible to any, even minimal changes in political constellations.

But no matter how far our lack of discernment reaches, we can hardly expect to demand freedom for ourselves if we do not realize its need for others. Therefore the right of Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and the Baltic nations to organize their national existence according to their desires should become a basic part of Poland's policy, and at the same time an organic element of our instinct for self preservation.

We never had a real opportunity to get accustomed to post war eastern borders different from previous ones in such a revolutionary way. Yet we have not forgotten that this borderline was established by a clearcut violation of international law - invasion by the Red Army of the territory of the Polish Republic on Sept. 17, 1939. The Curzon line emerged from the smoke of conflagration, from the dust and fratricidal blood, from a treaty of the victors who were fashioning in Yalta their spheres of influence. Therefore it is not surprising that we shudder when thinking about such a bloody birth.

As a result of the war we have been pushed away, definitely and far from the East. Resettlements included millions of people, yet the border remains — in comparison with generally accepted European standards — closed for the last 40 years; as a consequence the governments of the Polish People's Republic and the USSR deny the existence of Soviet Poles making it impossible to influence and to offer aid to the Polish population which remained on the other side. After all, the "Kresy" had received additional settlers, their forefathers had lived there for centuries, acquiring in this manner the right to the land of their birth.

From post Yalta Europe Poland was born between the Buh and Oder rivers, homogenous by nationality. In the psychology of its inhabitants this at first played a positive role — at least as a factor which cemented a battered society. But then flaws appeared: such as the infamous "Action W" — ostensibly a reprisal for the death of Swierczewski, but actually an application of the Stalinist principle of collective responsibility in regard to the civilian Ukrainian population of Subcarpathia. Ukrainians who had lived west of the Buh before the war were prohibited to return to Poland from Nazi German labor camps. The Greek Catholic Ukrainian Church was liquidated. The policy towards Mazurs and Silesians was also tragically misguided, and to this day, bears fruit with an annual leakage of Polish blood to the "Vaterland."

Of much greater importance appears to be the removal of minorities from borderland territory. For the first time in modern history foreigners remain mainly on one side of the border, and we on the other. This presents an opportunity for assessment: what indeed were the “Kresy” for us? What can they become at present? And to follow this line of thought: what should be the relationship today of Poles to their nearest neighbors from beyond the Buh, Sian and Sheshupe?

Sometimes it happens that a sense of injustice clouds the ability for critical analysis. Such a painful affliction affects us in regard to the former Polish east. Its past is sacred and inviolable, anything else appears to be a stab in the back, and any interpretation which differs from ours — that of an enemy. If accidentally we come in contact with foreign information sources, we consider them suspect because of their communist or nationalist origin. But when it becomes necessary to take a stand for the good of the cause we do it on the basis of sentiments or the nightmarish reminiscences of our fathers — who are of that generation which happened to be active during an exceptionally cruel segment of time of the Poles’ agelong coexistence with their eastern neighbors. This certainly deformed the picture. If additionally we take into consideration that during the post war years official propaganda did so much to have the truth about the borderlands suppressed and distorted, no wonder that to us former dreams of glory became intertwined with common ignorance.

Such unawareness of reality has its history: in the 19th century, being sensitive — and rightly so! — to every quiver of our own captive spirit, we overlooked somehow that all around us swelled a spiritual regeneration of our neighbors. For us the steppe was only of interest as long as in its interior sparked the glory of the Republic. Lithuania and Byelorussia represented only folklore. And in the meantime, in those lands grew with each decade a feeling of distinctness, an ideological “popular movement” of the rebirth of nations. When this process unfolded completely, we consoled ourselves that it was the Austrians who “invented” the Ukrainians; Rusyns, Hutsuls, Lemkos — those were something quite different, and the Lithuanians were ungrateful, because they did not let themselves be completely Polonized.

We think that the “Kresy” were lost to the concept of a homogeneous Poland already long before World War II (although even here interpretations differ). And that the shape of our country after Versailles, achieved by such valiant struggle, was contradictory to this same Versailles philosophy of a vision of national selfdetermination. The Poland of 1918-1939 was an excellent area of experimentation with a borderlands policy. From a contemporary perspective we unfortunately can perceive clearly that at the time no consistent policy of administration had been worked out, no long range plans which would have harmoniously welded together those territories with Poland. Moreover, if we consider the often anti-Polish sentiments of some members of the minorities, the repudiation by them en bloc of the Riga peace treaty conditions, the kaleidoscope of governments before the May coup and the authoritarian regime

until 1926 - then the enormity of our blunders is not surprising. To all this should be added common ambitions and dissensions of a people who had been “let go on its own” after a century and half of captivity. Nor was irrelevant the peculiar paroxysm in regard to menacing reality on the other side of the river Zbruch . . .

The drama of the 1920's was opened by battles to gain control of the city of Lviv, having buried forever the principle *Gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus*. The city being rocked by daydreams of both fighting sides turned into a tragic tangle. But considering the existence and fate of nations, it was only an episode. More symptomatic and important was the backing away by the Polish element of the “Kresy” — in spite of “miracles” on questionnaires of the population census there was a reluctance by Poles to take up jobs there (Holowko: “Kresy are the Polish Siberia”). It was also difficult to oppose effectively Communist agitation and extreme rightist nationalism — a situation fomented on purpose from the outside.

Those who know the subject are aware of many success stories, in spite of persecution of the Ukrainian community during inter war time in the areas of Volhynia and Podillia. Even more far reaching is the guilt which should be borne by the Polish government because of the dishonorable pacification of Ukrainian villages in the early 1930's, the destruction and plowing under of Ukrainian churches by soldiers with the Polish eagle insignia on their caps in retaliation to increasingly terrorist activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. This war changed into a terrible “kettle” into which were thrown growing passions fed by faszist inspiration. From this complicated tangle of relations among nationalities in that part of Europe for us the most important is the Ukrainian question. Let us look, even in an abbreviated form, at the dimensions of the problem. Ukraine is territorially the largest (601,000 km², Poland 312,000 km²) on our continent. It has immense economic potential (produces on the average 50% of all steel in the Soviet Union, pig iron, iron ore and coke, about 30% of coal mined, a similar percentage of turbines and tractors, about 90% of diesel locomotives of the Soviet Union as a whole, 60% of sugar, 50% sunflower seed products, 25% of Soviet butter, grain, vegetables, etc.). From a historical point of view Ukraine is former Holy Rus,' usurped physically and spiritually by Moscow, thank to which (among other advantages) the latter was able during the reign of Peter I to enter the international arena for the first time. A country —like a bridge over which Christianity from Byzantium spread over Eastern Europe, and later Western European values were carried across, before and after the Union of Brest, to the wide territories of Russia. For us today: a nearly 50 million strong immediate neighbor.

Because the Soviet empire is such a close society and its propaganda so intense — a fact not quite completely perceived by us nor abroad — we are facing one of the greatest potential problems of the European continent. Precisely, it was east of the Buh river where the principle of national statehood succumbed to final and cynical outrage. We also agree with the opinion that the so called Ukrainian question is quite open at the end of the 20th century in

Europe. It is necessary to arrive at this conclusion among others, because we need to express ourselves about the form that Poland will take in the near and more distant future. The proper and normal Polish-Ukrainian relations are a key to a desired democratic form of the territory from the Black Sea to the Baltic, and they are the basis of potentially significant importance. Yet these relations are encumbered by conflicts which persist very deeply in the psyche of both nations. Without removing that barrier it will be difficult to talk at all about a rational coexistence of the two most populous nations of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Ukrainian-Polish conflict while intensifying gradually reached its apogee probably in the first half of this century. It consists of many complex factors: territorial, national, class, religious, and cultural (the latter also fostered by the dissimilarity between present Soviet and Polish "Socialisms"). Where are we now? Paradoxically, a reconciliation could be achieved by a fervent belief that the worst has passed, and that we need to start from a point which has been clearly delineated by WWII. Without the iron broom of that international conflict, very likely both we and they would never be in the position of being able to sweep clean the foreground, in other words to exchange millions of people and to mark the line of the border which though controversial to many, still exists.

After almost 40 years of reestablishing ourselves in a new geopolitical configuration, we can more clearly draw up a balance of gains and losses, and also a range of priorities facing both nations. A long range factor is the situation that for Poland the importance of defending its western borders, and for Ukraine of its eastern, will relatively decrease possible pressure on our common borderlands. In the new anticipated circumstances opportunities will undoubtedly arise for economic, technical and other types of cooperation.

These are matters for a still distant future. In the foreground at present is the task through all possible channels honest and reliable information about the history and present status of Polish-Ukrainian relations. There is a whole gamut of problems, even from the most recent times: appraisal of borderlands policy of interwar Poland, the complicated problem of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), "Action W," the lack of a legal status for 150-180 thousand of Ukrainian Catholics in Poland, which is ironical in a country in which officially there are about 30 different denominations, most of which are much smaller numerically. Sad to say, we have even to learn the very word "Ukrainian" without some instinctive rejection.

Although misfortune can never be measured by statistics only, it is necessary to have a factual perception of events (see Konwicki: "There are Ukrainians in Poland, but it is as if they did not exist.") To the general public the actual direct and indirect extent of the tragic conflict in the Bieszczady (Beskyd) Mountains is completely unknown. According to a book published (1973) by the Ministry of National Defense there supposedly perished during the years 1944-1947 99 civilians of Polish nationality, about 1500 soldiers of the Polish Army and members of the security forces, as well as about 4000 fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. In turn it is known that over 200,000 Ukrainians

were resettled by force to lands in western Poland and are deprived to the present day of the right to return to their native villages.

All of us — Ukrainians and Poles should reach a definitive conclusion from that which has occurred. It would be naive and morally wrong to hope that the past will be forgotten. It is also clear that the older generation (which has been touched painfully, and often personally) will not be able now, even with good intentions, to untie the tragic knot of the past. But even the most precious remembrance, and the shadows of Lviv eagles, or the incinerated Ukrainians in the village of Pavlukov, the victims of hecatombs in Volhynia and Podillia during the years 1942-1943, this whole “duststorm of fratricidal blood” stirred up by hate should never screen from us the only alternative for the future. In Polish-Ukrainian relations it is therefore necessary to reach out courageously to positive aspects: common interests of both sides, a shared love of freedom, cultural achievements, historical events, and outstanding personalities.

Slowacki envisioned a renaissance of Ukraine along the same time as the rebirth of Poland; Shevchenko — a genius of peasant origin with a tragic biography worthy of the early Christians; Jaroslaw Dabrowski — began contesting the dogma about a return to the borders of the Republic of 1772; the forgotten comrade of Pilsudski — Holovko — victim of a most difficult brotherhood; John Paul II in his letter to the martyred Cardinal Josyf Slipyj wrote “the time is ripe for difficult encounters . . .” How unifying would be remembrance and examination of the struggle of those most noble patriots of both nations against the constant threat of communism! Such difficult times as the Khmelnytsky period, the struggles for Lviv in 1918, or the alliance of Pilsudski with Petliura could and should also be illuminated more fully from all possible angles, in order to grasp completely the drama and all the lessons which flow from them.

A first step in the direction of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation should be made by the church, just as it was the first one, in the well known letter of the bishops in 1965 to build a bridge between Poles and the Germans. The vision of John Paul II is to attach as much importance to a Europe of Cyril and Methodius, as to a Europe of St. Benedict. Based on these same sources and on historical experiences a readiness should also result to intercede for the rights of Greek Catholics (Ukrainians) in Poland; by the same token — to a certain degree — also for those in other lands of the Baltic-Black Sea area. Such an opportunity presents itself by the Millennium of Christianity of Kievan Rus' in 1988.

On a breathtakingly large scale the future fraternal coexistence of the Polish and Ukrainian nations constitutes a truly historic task, spiritually related to current rapprochements between the French and Germans. This will not be achieved by only one generation, and future ones will have enough to defend and to contribute themselves. Obviously, it would be an illusion to expect that the process of normalization and a positive improvement of Polish-Ukrainian relations will not meet with numerous obstacles. Another danger is also a likely — at a time of political changes — eruption of nationalism in the republics of the

Soviet Union. From our side, as neighbors, there will come into play not only a reaction to a probable euphoria for the “Tident” or the Lithuanian “Mounted Knight;” infinitely more important during such a period appears to be the conduct of a policy of special restraint, good will, and an ability to differentiate between what is important and what is less so.

Other threats which should not be overlooked are the activities of third countries which are not interested in good relations of Poland with those nearest to us in the east. This concerns not only Russia, for whom the maintenance of a Polish-Ukrainian conflict was and will remain one of the pillars of preserving their own empire. In addition, we can assume that the natural result of the appearance of new components on the political and economic map of Europe will draw the attention of governments of several nations with a variety of interests at stake. Obviously, those interests don't always have to coincide with concerns of the Polish state. Such issues will for example affect Germany, a country which traditionally tries to gain influences in the eastern part of the continent. At any rate, Polish-Ukrainian relations have a specific importance for the future security of Poland's eastern borders. At the same time they are the backbone of a desirable geopolitical shape of that part of Europe.

Let us now turn to problems which are caused by Poland bordering on Lithuania and Byelorussia. An examination of the 20-centuries long national consciousness of Poles and Lithuanians unfortunately evokes now and then a feeling of participation in a peculiar tragedy of errors. Even today, each remembrance of the Commonwealth of both nations fills us with genuine pride. Yet for many years the Lithuanians have been asserting the fear that their longtime association with Poland had distressfully hampered their national development. Assimilation processes (Polonization, or less frequently, Russification), caused us at some time during the 19th century to begin identifying the Lithuanians with some regional Polish groups, resembling the Mazurians, Kaszubians or Gorals (Highlanders).

The process of Lithuanians developing a spiritual independence (particularly of the press and intelligentsia, Lithuanization of the church) was usually a laborious deliverance from the bonds — and frequently from undeniable bewitchment by Polish culture. In spite of that, the Lithuanian “Mounted Knight,” though forbidden in the Soviet Union, is nowadays an even more yearned for symbol of nationalism, having for the Lithuanians a special meaning associated with brief independence during 1918-1940, and does not at all constitute a sisterly image to the “White Eagle.” A smaller and a larger nation — the dynamics of expansion versus resistance, recollections of domination (which flatter) and subjection (which hurt) — such is the heritage left to us by history.

The second axis of tension was constituted by the dispute over Wilno — for them an absolute priority, the condensation of deeply felt memories about their own capital since the time when the Lithuanian Principality was called “Great” with good reason; for the Poles, for Pilsudski, “a charming city,” sacred walls of

anti czarist resistance. This problem was truly difficult to solve, and engaged the commitment of young, tense nationalisms. From the distance of time certain episodes sometimes suggest doubt; could Poland have avoided military intervention in the Wilno area in 1919 using methods which so shattered Europe at that time? Why did an insurrection break out (as a matter of fact with the hands of our own youth) in the Suwalki area in August of 1919, and why should the Sejny then have changed hands eleven times in fratricidal strife? Answers to these questions could in present day Poland be of interest only to specialists. But the memory of weaker nations can be more enduring. We should not be surprised if during contacts with our north-eastern neighbors we could still be touched by matters which we ourselves have considered gone long ago.

In effect, war has balanced the accounts, although the price has turned out to be exceptionally high. "To gain a city, but to lose independence is no bargain" — a Lithuanian intellectual could have heard from a Pole when accosted on the Lenin Prospectus (the former Mickiewicz Street) about the judgements of history to which the old city had been subjected. On the other hand, Poles would never have left the capital of Lithuania without coercion. This makes a dialog with any Lithuanian patriot impossible, regardless of his political convictions.

The post war period has gradually removed old resentments, indicating more clearly the direction of future relations. Timid, but appropriate steps have already been taken by part of the community (for example the continued presence of experts on Lithuania in the Parisian journal "Kultura," dialogs between Milosz and Venclova). During the same time in post Yalta Poland there was renewed with increasing fervor the worship of the "Mother of God of Wilno" in the churches of Warmia, Mazuria, and Pomerania. A slight opening of the door to freedom by "Solidarnosc" immediately resulted in declarations, which wanted to examine the good and bad moments of our neighborliness.

That press which is beyond the reach of censorship published a whole succession of particulars from the samizdat "Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania" describing the extensive current persecution of believers in that country. On the other hand, we were unable to publicize sufficiently the epic story of anti-communist resistance in Lithuania during the 1940's and 1950's, the dimensions of which, tenaciousness and drama, are amazing indeed. Lithuania and the Lithuanians were also brought into the sphere of our interests and feelings by John Paul II in his homily in Gniezno during the pilgrimage through Poland in June 1979. Recently, such a "spark of God" has been ignited by starting beatification procedures of Archbishop Matulaitis (Matulewicz), who died in Kowno 1927. This did not happen by chance, nor are accidental the symptoms of anxiety exhibited by the rulers in Moscow because of the growth of religious feelings in Lithuania, which after all borders on Poland's "exploding" Catholicism.

Everything which has been said above, both about the lessons of history and hopes for the future, points to an increasing role for those factors which strengthen good Polish-Lithuanian relations. But while we are constructing a

wider perspective for national matters, we can not avoid raising some problems, the solution of which will determine whether Poles and Lithuanians will be able to live together harmoniously. Among those matters should certainly be considered bilateral guarantees of free development for minorities, settlement by arbitration of inherited disputes in the Kaliningrad area (Krolewicz), and the making of bold plans for technical and economic cooperation of Poland with the Baltic nations.

If we wanted, even briefly, to mention the Byelorussians, it is because usually we know even less about them than about the Ukrainians or Lithuanians. Our forefathers associated them with enchanting nature (the region of Polissia, scout encampments, fabulously low prices for agricultural products), rather than with the population which in census statistics was also included in the strange category of “locals” (about 700,000 in 1931; generally it is estimated that in interwar Poland there were 1.5 — 2 million of Byelorussians). At the beginning of the 20th century this group was deprived of its own intelligentsia, bourgeoisie, land owners, working class and lower middle class. There were only peasants for whom the word “land” had for the time being replaced the word “nation,” and who were usually treated as an “ethnic mass” convenient for Polonization.

Our ignorance now reaps the consequences, both in relation to about 200-250 thousand of Polish Byelorussians, and in regard to the neighboring land of about 208,000 km² with a population of over 9 million. This is not the time to make up for general ignorance; besides, the names which are symbols of Byelorussian spirit and tradition — Skaryna, Kupala, Kolas, Kalinowski, Bohuszewicz, the brothers Luczkiewicz, Taraszkiewicz — do not have any meaning for the contemporary Pole.

From the point of view of the problem discussed here, the borders between Poland and Byelorussia and relations with the Byelorussians reverberate the least in our consciousness. Perhaps that is so because the area beyond the Buh river does not burn for us with such flames of former glory and love, as it does for the cities of Lviv and Vilnius. Another factor is the remarkably mellow spirit of the Byelorussian people, for whom retaliation and hate is alien to their nature. This has made the end of our rule and our mutual parting less dramatic, less painful. In effect we do not have any feelings of animosity towards the Byelorussians, which does not mean that there are no problems waiting yet to be solved. This became clear during the period when “Solidarnosc” was in full bloom, by an unexpected full scale of demands concerning the education and culture of Byelorussians living in Poland, whose Social-Cultural Association turned out to be relatively the most active and resilient.

The fundamental problem of present and future Polish-Byelorussian relations today is in a different area: it concerns the dangerous advance of Russification which has already taken place and continues on the other side of the Buh river and east of Bialystock. Russification is fostered by the indifference of “modern” intelligentsia. Even in the few underground publications one notices the helpless and telling statement that “we have many cadres with higher

education, but few Byelorussian intelligentsia,” or “it is difficult to say when a generation of Byelorussians finally freed from the complex of linguistic inequality, from a kind of national shame will appear.” In Byelorussia more than one and a half as many newspapers and journals are being published in Russian than in Byelorussian, and the degrading content of instruction in schools plays along completely with the words of the Soviet anthem: “An unbreakable union of free republics has been forged together for eternity by Great Russia.”

The few old monuments in Minsk have been destroyed (the old city center, the river Niemen — a symbol of the nation’s beginning - filled in with soil, draining of Polissian marshes has reportedly changed the micro climate of the area). Taking advantage of Nazi atrocities in the village of Hatyn (whole inhabitants were burned alive), booklets in foreign languages are being published about a monument to martyrdom “Khatyn” in order to create a false impression that the Soviet government venerates the memory of the other Katyn, several hundred kilometers distant. This drama is not the only contribution by Byelorussian patriots added to the boundless suffering of the war period (it swallowed up over 1/4 of their nation). It is also our drama — if one regards the fate of one’s own land as something more enduring than your own fate. But this means, that in even completely changed circumstances some stereotypes in thinking, feeling, and customs from the communist period will shape, to a greater degree than in the case of Lithuanians or Ukrainians, the mentality of future generations of Byelorussians. This is of profound importance to us who are their neighbors.

Let us venture a final thesis: no sector of the Polish border will need such great caution and subtlety than the one with Byelorussia. Caution, because in the memory of a formerly orthodox-peasant, and at present of a “modern” nation we have become fixated as assimilators of 300 years duration. Subtlety, because we are dealing with a sore and eroded national organism, which has still a long way to go toward a true liberation of mind and action. On this road let us be helpful and cordial friends to the Byelorussians.

After World War II the shape and position of Poland changed. We should not forget — although jurists may have many different interpretations — that from the political point of view our present eastern boundary is of the same lineage as the western one (Yalta, Potsdam, Helsinki). An encroachment against one would breach the other.

Perhaps that is why there appears in all clarity (although still difficult to grasp by many) the only logic of preserving at any price, and for any foreseeable future, of the present borders of Poland. This concerns equally the sector with Ukraine, and the ones with Lithuania and Byelorussia. It should be accompanied by complete and unconditional repudiation by the nations located between the Baltic and Black Sea of solutions by military means as being unrealistic, unjust, and dangerous to everyone. Certainly, such a position not only excludes the seizure by Poland of Lwow or the captial of Lithuania, but also excludes undertaking of veiled attempts internally or externally which could lead in that

direction. This same principle applies, for instance, in reference to possible Ukrainian claims toward Polish Subcarpathia or the Slovak Preszow area.

All this should not mean that the subject of "Kresy" ought to slip beyond remembrance of our and future generations. Besides, apart from sentimental reasons, this is not possible for the sake of the Poles over there (in the Soviet Union), and the desired pluralism in social and political life of Poland.

Against the background of the Ukrainian question, and not that one alone, the problem of the legal status of national minorities (in Poland and other "real socialism" countries) can be perceived more clearly. On the one hand, we are dealing with an evident and intentional blurring of concepts — for example, denial of the fact by Poland and Rumania that minorities exist (in the latter it is not by chance that a euphemism "co-resident nationalities" has been coined). Bohdan Osadczuk is quite correct when he points out (in the Paris "Kultura") the intentional lack in the Soviet Union of any institution which would regulate disputes among nationalities: "a non-institutional status permits all kinds of abuse and illegality." On the other hand, a tendency can be observed in the world to include the demands of minorities within the more comprehensive area of human rights. In this situation there should be several practical solutions, because the present ones are the cause of injustice to numerous minority groups, and will be impossible to maintain in the long run.

Examining the subject of the East makes us also realize, that at some time, perhaps quite long ago, the wide scope of the "Kresy" has grown beyond us, not by size of territory, but by the scope of problems. Even the best and noblest minds were not able to suggest logical solutions. By paying a high price — it would perhaps be easier for us today to fashion a policy by Poland concerning the East in the range of a country which we truly are, namely that of a medium country. We want to be valued not as those who we sometimes imagine ourselves to be, but for the sense of security and peace which we owe both to us and to our neighbors.

Working out appropriate ways of dealing with our eastern kinsmen will demand especially a keen understanding of the situation, and a clear purpose concerning the desirable geopolitical form of that part of Europe. Along the way to that goal a capability is needed of creating a "functional" policy to last for decades and generations, a skill to conclude and make use of compromises, a readiness to make sacrifices equally with others, patience, and an unflinching good will.

THE DILEMMA OF EAST EUROPEAN TRADE WITH THE WEST

OLEG ZINAM

In this study the term Eastern Europe covers six members of the Comecon — Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The primary objective of this paper is to throw some light on the problems of East European trade with the West by analyzing its economic, political, strategic and ideological implications for the rulers and people of the Soviet Union, for the rulers and people of Eastern Europe, and for the West. The term West stands for the USA, Western Europe, Canada and Japan and no distinction is made between their rulers and people because it is assumed that by and large the aspirations of people and the governments in democratic nations do not conflict.

The Soviet Union needs Western trade and technology for at least three reasons: (1) to modernize its inefficient over-centralized planning methods; (2) to improve the efficiency of its economy as a basis for its military-industrial complex; and (3) to modernize its non-defense sectors without transfer of its best technological talents and resources from the top priority sectors.¹ Eastern Europe needs Western trade and technology for primarily economic reasons. Without the importation of advanced technology from the West, Eastern European nations cannot sustain adequate economic growth to meet the demands of people for improvements in their consumption level.² The need for Western trade is enhanced by (1) the general scarcity of advanced technology in the Communist bloc; (2) the “lack of stimulus to produce quality products” and (3) “inadequate price and monetary relations” among its members.³ In their efforts to expand trade with the West, East European countries are caught in a vicious circle: Without importation of Western technology they cannot attain the quality of exports acceptable in the West; without substantial exports to the West they cannot pay for the import of technology goods. To break this vicious circle they need a substantial extension of loans by the West. Yet their present indebtedness has reached such a high level that further expansion of loans

¹ Oleg Zinam, “Soviet-US Trade: Perspectives and Prospects,” *Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali*, Sept. 1976, p. 877.

² John P. Hardt, “Summary,” *East European Economies; Post Helsinki*, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the U.S., Washington, D.C., August 25, 1977, p. x.

³ Paul Marer, “East European Economies: Achievements, Problems, Prospects,” *Communism in Eastern Europe*, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy, Eds., Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1979, p. 273.

appears to be a risky financial venture, not really justified by expected gains from future trade.

In addition to technology, East Europeans need imports of crude oil, minerals, metals, chemicals and grain. Price inflation in the West makes it increasingly difficult to obtain these products from the West. Moreover, the Soviet Union, the major supplier in the past, is less willing to exchange her materials for light industry, fuels, metals and minerals for East European machinery.⁴ Though the USSR increased its prices of oil, fuel and raw materials in 1975, they are still well below Western prices.

Although present economic growth and technological advance in Eastern Europe are slowing down, one should recognize its considerable economic achievements in the post World War II period. Their economies have been growing at acceptable rates, industrialization has been advancing rapidly, standards of living have been on the rise and most of them joined the family of developed industrial nations. Yet, declining rates of economic growth, an unfavorable balance of payments with the West, substantial hard-currency indebtedness, problems of obtaining advanced Western technology, difficulties in importing energy and raw material supplies from both the West and the Soviet Union and the ever-present pressure from a population desiring an improved standard of living, are formidable obstacles on the road to further economic advance. To continue the economic advance of the past, East Europeans must solve their energy supply problem and substantially modernize their technology. Unfortunately, conditions in both Eastern Europe and in the USSR are not conducive to technological advance which depends on the capability to innovate and to adapt rapidly to changing environmental conditions.

The question of whether to expand or contract trade between the West and Eastern Europe is complicated by ideological, strategic and political factors which can be understood only if placed in proper historical and global perspective. The present dilemma is part of a much broader long-run controversy among statesmen and scholars concerning trade relationship between the West and the Communist bloc in general. The basic dilemma is whether East-West trade and the concomitant technological transfer would lead to political liberalization in the East, a reduction of the danger of war and improvement of living standards within the Communist bloc, or to the strengthening of totalitarian regimes, expansion of military power, increasing probability of military aggression and very little improvement in economic conditions in communist countries.⁵

The proponents of the expansion of East-West trade believe that trade and technological transfer will liberalize, democratize and in general ameliorate the

⁴ Edwin M. Snell, "East European Economies Between the Soviets and the Capitalists," *East European Economies: Post Helsinki*, *Op. cit.* p. 14.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 873.

Soviet and other communist regimes. This view is in harmony with those Western convergence theorists who believe in the inevitability of "rapprochement" of East and West and liberalization within the Communist bloc.⁶ The opponents of free East-West trade point out that the introduction of Western technology and expansion of trade would remove major bottlenecks in the Soviet economy, ameliorate its difficulties of central planning, improve its overall economic efficiency, prevent switching of its scarce technology from high priority sector to neglected sectors, and in general strengthen it to such a degree that it would enable it to continue its relentless expansion of political and military power at the expense of the rest of the world.⁷ Instead of an amelioration of the regime, they believe the oppression of dissidents and the people at large will intensify. Prominent Soviet dissidents — Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn — have taken the same position.⁸ The view of trade opponents is somewhat weakened by Koropecy who believes that even if trade is expanded and access to Western technology given, the Soviet Union will inevitably fail to adjust its economy to the structural changes necessary for expansion of exports needed to pay for the imports of technological goods.

Yet the controversy not only persists but has flared up as a result of present East European economic difficulties and the unrest in Poland closely related to them. To be applicable and relevant for present day problems the theoretical framework behind the controversy must be broadened and substantially restructured. The complexity of the problem is matched only by its paramount importance. In most discussions of detente and expansion of East-West trade the fate of the "captive people" in Europe — Eastern Europeans controlled by the Soviet Union and their subservient governments of the satellite countries as well as the oppressed nationalities within the Soviet Union — was ignored. It is important to analyze the impact of trade on the material well-being, political freedom, security and human values of these people. Their dreams, hopes and aspirations must be included and properly assessed. The efforts of Hungarians, East Germans, Czechoslovaks and Poles to gain some degree of independence and self-determination were crushed by Soviet military might while the West stood idly by, afraid to revive the "cold war."

The major force in East-West relations today is the USSR, led by its Kremlin leaders. These leaders have not abandoned their dreams of world domination, nor of the elimination of capitalism. They still believe in the

⁶ Problems of convergence are treated in more detail in Oleg Zinam, "Convergence Hypothesis in the Light of Functional-Structural Analysis," *Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali*, July 1971.

⁷ Oleg Zinam, "Soviet-US Trade: Perspectives and Prospects," *Op. cit.*, p. 878.

⁸ Michael T. Malloy, "Sakharov's Message," *The National Observer*, September 15, 1973, and Frank J. Johnson, "Kissinger versus Solzhenitsyn-Sakharov," *Washington Report*, December 1973.

attainment of the communist millenium. They are still conducting Marxist-Leninist revolution both domestically and internationally. They continue imposing their revolution on their people and on the leaders of Eastern European nations. Moreover, the Soviet rulers are "organizing the most powerful military-industrial complex in the world, capable of both defense and expansion."⁹ Marxist-Leninist ideology is guiding the "revolution from above" which is resisted by the forces of the "revolution from below." The latter is inspired by modernization operating on two levels, technological and human. The revolution "from below" is inspired by technological requirements of the complex industrial organization and manifests itself in the quest for decentralization and economic reform. On the human side of modernization and the revolution "from below" are such phenomena as the "revolution of rising expectations," growth of "universal humanitarianism," and anomie.¹⁰ Dreams based on the "revolution of rising expectations" and "universal humanitarianism" were crushed by the low priorities assigned to human life and worth of the individual by the executors (and frequently executioners) of the Marxist-Leninist revolution "from above." Disenchantment with the authorities and their ideology has led to anomie and loss of hope that people's dreams can ever be realized under regimes dedicated to Marxism-Leninism. But since people do not give up their vital dreams and aspirations easily, they search for a channel to express their discontent and to reaffirm their aspirations. Since in Eastern Europe Marxism-Leninism was imposed by the Soviet Union, dominated by Russians, nationalism became a new force animating the revolution "from below." This is also true for oppressed national minorities within the Soviet Union. The recognition of nationalism as a major force operating within the Communist bloc and endangering its unity and its long-run chances of survival must be credited to Emil Lengyel who observed the "while the nationalist countries [in the West] were moving toward internationalism, the presumable internationalist countries [of the Soviet bloc] were moving toward an accentuated form of nationalism . . . The economic nationalism of the Eastern bloc countries fits into the general pattern."¹¹

What we are witnessing in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe can be depicted as two revolutions in conflict, the concept first formulated by Constantine Olgin and later further developed by the present writer.¹² The

⁹ Nicolas Spulber, *The Soviet Economy*, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1969, p.4.

¹⁰ Anomie — a term coined by Emile Durkheim, French Sociologist, Anomie means norlessness.

¹¹ Emil Lengyel, *Nationalism — The Last Stage of Communism*, New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969, p. 92.

¹² Constantine Olgin, "What is Soviet Ideology?" *Bulletin*, Vol. XII, July 1965, No. 7, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Germany, p. 15, and Oleg Zinam, "Convergence Hypothesis . . ." *Op. cit.*, p. 697. and "Impact of Modernization on USSR: Two Revolutions in Conflict," *Economic Internazionale*, Genova, May 1973, pp. 298-301-302.

destiny of the Communist bloc nations will largely depend on the relative strength of these two revolutions. Therefore, major decisions on Western trade with Eastern Europe cannot ignore their impact on this struggle. Moreover, these decisions must take into consideration the impact on economic wellbeing, freedom, security and other human values of all participants affected by these decisions. Who will benefit and to what extent and who might be hurt and how badly depends on the complex relationship between power and the preferences of these groups.

From the economic point of view, one of the most important factors which has contributed to expansion of East-West trade has been the "inability of the command system to keep in step with the dynamic development of the rest of the industrially advanced world."¹³ Economic reforms based on the liberalization and decentralization have not substantially improved the system's ability to generate technological advance primarily due to "the incapability of the system to adjust to a changing environment . . . caused primarily by the Marxist anti-market dogma . . . and secondarily by the system's political superstructure."¹⁴

Inability to develop technology and failure to reform the economies to make them more adaptable to technological advance greatly contributed to expansion of East-West trade and helped Communist bloc countries to obtain Western capital and technology. Trade with the West, however, turned out to be a one way flow of capital and goods. Eastern European exports lagged far behind the imports. As a consequence, East Europe has run up a debt to the West in the vicinity of \$50 billion and is forced to export its most competitive capital goods in the West. Despite all these disadvantages, "detente with East-West trade and cooperation remains, at least for the time being, the only substitute for otherwise inevitable economic reforms in the Soviet type countries." Paradoxically, "it is detente," wrote Selucky, "which contributes to the stability of these systems and to the conservation of the status-quo in East Europe."¹⁵

Moreover, successful expansion of East European trade with the West would make them "less of an economic burden they are to the Soviet Union without any significant decline in their ties to the bloc."¹⁶ But if this trade should falter due to indebtedness to the West and inflation in market economies, dependence on Soviet economic support will increase and the East European countries will be forced to blend even more tightly into the Communist bloc.¹⁷

¹³ Radoslav Selucky, "The Dilemma of Soviet-Type Economic Systems," *The Soviet Union and East Europe into the 1980's: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, Simon McInnes, Wm. McGrath and Peter Potichnyj, Eds., Oakville, Ontario, Canada: Mosaic Press, 1978, p.163.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

¹⁶ Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Nationalism and Integration in Eastern Europe: The Dynamics of Change," *Communism in Eastern Europe*, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone and Andrew Gyorgy, Eds., Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1979, p. 325.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

Of course, if detente and trade with the West should be discontinued. "the Soviet-type systems would again be facing the old dilemma of structural socio-economic reforms."¹⁸

Economic integration of the Communist bloc is achieved through activities of the CMEA. It is dominated and controlled by the Soviet Union. Its basic policies are promoting joint planning, "socialist division of labor," technological integration and initiating joint projects of a supranational kind. Collective sections involving several members provide badly needed economies of scale. Since a considerable amount of manufactured goods produced by Eastern Europe is of a quality not acceptable in Western markets, it becomes increasingly dependent on imports of Soviet raw materials, minerals, metals and fuels. Since the USSR does not need these inferior manufactures, it actually subsidizes East European economies. In Rakowska-Harmstone's words: "Economically, Eastern Europe is increasingly a burden to the Soviet Union, but the political tradeoffs involved are obviously considered to be worth the costs."¹⁹

One of the most important political objectives of all communist leaders is "strengthening and expanding of the monopoly power of the ruling elites." For the leaders of individual East European countries this means preservation and expansion of their own power and control over their subjects. The Kremlin's leaders, in addition to the preservation of their power and control over their own country, must attain several other political objectives, among them — maintaining a leading role in the world communist movement, control over Eastern Europe, expanding military might of the state, and exporting revolutions. Since the major preoccupation of the East European governments is maintaining their own power and control over their countries, they are "preoccupied with efforts to generate legitimacy of its own based on a national consensus."²⁰ To achieve this purpose they have to respond to some pressures generated by the revolution "from below", such as "the pressure for national sovereignty; the pressure for political democratization and pluralism; and the pressure for an improvement in the standards of living."²¹ Behind all these pressures stands a powerful drive for national self-determination in Eastern European nations which is met by the strong efforts of the Soviet leaders to integrate Eastern Europe with the USSR and establish "an organic relationship that would incorporate East Europeans into the Soviet body politic beyond the point of return."²² East Europeans perceive the Soviet Union "as a colonial power ruling the empire by military means." Such Soviet policy "leads to the stagnation and

¹⁸ Radoslav Selucky, "The Dilemma of Soviet-Type Economic Systems," *Op. cit.*, p. 171.

¹⁹ Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Nationalism and Integration in Eastern Europe: The Dynamics of Change," *Op. cit.*, p. 313.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 209.

degradation of the peoples of Eastern Europe.” Whenever East European leaders act independently from the Soviet Union and defend national interests of their people, they receive strong popular support.²³

Political integration is achieved formally through the Warsaw Treaty Organization which coordinates and integrates bloc activities primarily in military matters and in foreign policy. “Progress in political integration,” said Rakowska-Harmstone, “has been reflected in the synchronization, throughout the bloc, of constitutional instruments to formally enshrine the ‘leading role’ of the communist part in society, as well as a constitutional treaty commitment to a common, Soviet-directed foreign policy.”²⁴

East-West trade and the transfer of technology definitely permits the Soviet Union to continue building up its military power. It does so by removing Soviet economic and technological bottlenecks and by enabling the Kremlin leadership to postpone badly needed economic reforms. Due to the extreme interdependence of the Communist bloc economies, there is no way to limit technological transfer from the West to Eastern Europe alone, while denying access of this technology to the USSR. Moreover, since Eastern Europe now is an economic liability for the Soviet Union, any Western economic assistance to Eastern Europeans will potentially free Soviet resources for military purposes. Undoubtedly, East European nations can strengthen their own military power by using the advantages accrued through Western trade. Yet, in the final analysis, strong nationalist and anti-Soviet feelings among East Europeans might make their armies unreliable, especially in the case of an aggressive war against Western Europe.

According to Marxist-Leninist doctrine shared by the Kremlin’s leaders, “socialism” is on the march and its inevitable victory over capitalism is assured. East-West trade relations open the door to broader dissemination of communist ideology in Western Europe. They recognize the danger of some “infection” of capitalist ideas generated in the West. Yet, in their view the risk of “infection” is greatly outweighed by the advantages of spreading revolutionary thoughts in Europe. Soviet leaders also believe that the dialogue between CMEA and European Economic Community “would further enhance the socialist bloc’s cohesion and the Soviet leading role within it.”²⁵

The central question of this study is whether expansion of trade and technological transfer between the West and Eastern European countries will help the cause of freedom, economic and political self-determination and democracy, or hinder it. The case cannot be presented in black and white. The

²³ Frantisek Silnitsky, “Introduction,” *Communism and Eastern Europe: A Collection of Essays*, Frantisek Silnitsky, Larisa Silnitsky, Karl Reyman, Eds., New York: Karz Publishers, 1979, p. XI.

²⁴ Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, “Nationalism and Integration . . .” *Op. cit.*, p. 313.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

implications are not completely clear. Yet, an attempt must be made to list the arguments for and against the continuation and extension of Western trade with Eastern Europe.

The extension of trade will help East Europeans advance their technological development and will help them to achieve economic independence from the Soviet Union. Improvement in their standard of living will strengthen and enhance their desire for higher goods, among them, desire for freedom and national self-determination. Rising standards of living in the Soviet Union will, similarly, increase the discontent of presently suppressed national minorities and strengthen the forces of the "revolution from below." If the Soviet leadership also starts ameliorating and becoming more humane and receptive to popular needs, the doors will be open for gradual liberalization and democratization of the Soviet system. This is basically a well-known version of the Western liberal convergence thesis. Its weakness lies in ignoring power relationships within the Communist bloc and the powerful ideology behind it.

The opposite case of curtailing or even stopping Western trade with Eastern Europe can be logically sustained by assuming different reactions of those in control of power. Continuation of trade and technology transfer will make reforms unnecessary and will help the Soviet Union to integrate the Communist bloc politically, economically, militarily and ideologically. Western trade will continue helping the USSR to build up its military superiority over the West, will relieve Soviet leaders of the burden to support Eastern Europe economically while East European governments, with Western help, will be able to consolidate their control over their subjects and with the help from the Kremlin, to integrate the Communist bloc to a point of no return. If those who have power in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union can direct resources created by Western trade and technology toward the attainment of their goals of control and domination, the West might be helping not the "captive peoples" but their jailers.

The dilemma facing Western democracies and the USA as their leader seems to be very perplexing. A choice of protecting people of Eastern Europe by helping their governments to overcome their economic crises appears, on the surface, more moderate, considered and humane. But, in the ultimate analysis, it will perpetuate existing conditions by enabling the Kremlin and East European regimes to carry on, as usual, their Marxist-Leninist revolutions "from above" directed toward eradication of freedom and ultimate global victory of communism.

Such a choice serves the Kremlin purposes and will create an illusion of "reducing the tension" and preserving peace. It will, undoubtedly, serve more as a palliative rather than a serious effort to stop and reverse the present expansion

²⁶ William McGrath and Simon McInnes, "The Soviet Union and East Europe in the Era of Detente," *The Soviet Union and East Europe into the 1980's: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, *Op. cit.*, p. 235.

of forces working for the extinction of freedom. Moreover, such passive adjustments to communist moves and the spirit of appeasement inspiring them can lead to no other outcome than destruction of freedom and unification of the world by the sword.

If all initiative in defense of freedom is relinquished and communist aggression treated in the "spirit of Munich," the outcome will be either WWII or surrender of the West. However, if all available economic, political, psychological and military-strategic means are used to promote the cause of freedom, the possibility of attaining global peace and freedom without another world war can become a realistic goal.

The sooner it is realized that freedom is indivisible and that, paraphrasing Lincoln "the world divided against itself cannot stand," the better are the chances to prevent both "the unification by the sword" and the thermonuclear holocaust. Communist propaganda claims that the West has a choice between "red" and "dead." These alternatives would be applicable only if the West should choose to continue its posture of appeasement. But if the freedom is defended, the choice will be neither red nor dead, but either *strong and free* or *weak and enslaved*.

Within this context, the use of economic sanctions to shake the power of the Soviet empire in the name of freedom is a *must*. The Kremlin and other East European leaders must face the economic consequences of their oppression. Instead of bailing them out, the West should deny them credit and any other economic and technological assistance and force them to make a painful choice between butter and guns within the confines of their own resources. This will slow down and eventually stop the one-sided arms race in which the Kremlin, while receiving credit and technology from the West, uses a disproportionately large share of its resources to accelerate the build-up of its nuclear and conventional weapons. Should this process be slowed down by restriction of Western credits and trade, the defense burden of the West and with it the level of government spending, interest rates and inflationary pressures could also be reduced.

If the preceding analysis is basically sound, Western allies must sober up and stop supporting the Kremlin and its East European satellites by cutting out further credit extensions, requiring repayment of outstanding debts and restricting the transfer of technology. As a consequence, the USSR should be forced to bail out its East European allies by using its own economic resources. Imposition on grain embargoes and prohibition of supplying technological goods needed for completion of the Siberian gas pipeline would also be justified by this type of reasoning.

Granted, an uncompromising stand in the defense of freedom entails considerable risk. Yet, no worthy cause can ever be served without risk and sacrifices. It should be remembered that our Western civilization survived for several thousand years precisely because its best leaders and their followers were willing to risk their lives for causes greater than mere survival.

THE AUTHOR IS NOT MENTIONED

INES AXELROD-RUBIN

At the beginning of the 10th century the Bagdad Caliph Al-Muktadir sent an embassy to the king of the Volga Bulgars. The purpose of this embassy was to establish friendly relations with this remote people and to bring to it the religion of Islam. The embassy left Bagdad on the 21st of June 921 and reached the capital of the Bulgars on May 12, 922, visiting Bukhara and Khorezm on its way. An account of this embassy, written by its member Ahmad Ibn Fadlan, was preserved in extracts which were cited in the works of the famous Arabic encyclopaedist and geographer Yakut, who lived approximately one hundred years later. This account is one of the most ancient sources describing those peoples — Oghuz, Turks Pecenegs, Bashgird, Khazars and Rus' — who lived in the eastern border of what is now called the European part of the Soviet Union. The account became known in Europe only after the parts of it given by Yakut were published in 1823 by Ch. D. Fraehn, one of the first famous Russian Arabists. Yakut himself mentions that in his time several copies of it were in circulation. In 1923, in the library of the Mashhad Mosque in Iran a new manuscript was found which included a much more complete version of Ibn Fadlan's account.

In the USSR a young scholar, A. P. Kovalevsky, a pupil of the famous Arabist I. Yu. Krachkovsky, the head of Soviet Arabists at that time, began to work on the manuscript. In 1937 the work was completed for the most part, and Kovalevsky presented a paper on it at the Second Session of the Association of Soviet Arabists held in October 1937 in Leningrad. In 1939 it was published under the title "*Puteshestvie Ibn Fadlana na Volgu; perevod i kommentarii*" (Ibn Fadlan's journey to the Volga; translation and commentaries) under the direction of I. Yu. Krachkovsky, Moscow-Leningrad, 1939. The name of A. P. Kovalevsky, the translator and author of the commentaries, was not mentioned in the book. In his introduction I. Krachkovsky stressed that the book was a step forward in the research on Ibn Fadlan's work — no less valuable than Fraehn's publication. But in spite of this high praise, Krachkovsky does not mention the name of the researcher either. The reason for such an omission was very simple: at the time the book was published, A. P. Kovalevsky, one of the most promising pupils of Krachkovsky, was arrested. Only with the greatest efforts made by Krachkovsky was it possible to publish the book at all — a case almost unknown in Soviet life at that time — but . . . without the name of the author.

It seems very probable that Krachkovsky succeeded in his efforts because of another concurrence of circumstances, which can not be disregarded. The above mentioned manuscript of Mashhad was found by Ahmet Zaki Validov (1890-1967), a former leader of the Bashkir national revolutionary movement, who later, under the name of Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan, became famous as a world renowned Arabist and Turcologist. He was born in a Bashkir village near Sterlitamaq in the Ural region. From his early childhood he showed a keen interest in the Orient and learned Arabic and Persian in the Medresse of his father. After finishing the gymnasium in 1911 in Kazan he began studying the history of Turks and Tatars. But from 1916, when he began to be involved in political activities, he soon became one of the leaders of the Muslim national liberation movement in Russia. After the 1917 February Revolution he was appointed the head of the government of the newly-formed Bashkirian Republic and took part in the fight against Kolchak on the side of the Bolsheviki. In October 1919 he transferred some of the best Bashkirian national troops to besieged Petrograd at the request of Trotsky. These troops played an important role in the defeat of Yudenish. But afterwards his national and liberal aspirations brought him into an open confrontation with the Bolsheviki, so that in the early 1920's we see him in Turkestan as one of the leaders of the anti-Bolshevik Basmachi revolt. After defeat in 1923, he succeeded in fleeing across the Iranian border. Almost immediately his former interest in scholarly studies revived. He spent some months studying manuscripts in the libraries of Mashhad, Herat and Kabul. It was during these studies that he found the Ibn Fadlan manuscript. Through Afghanistan and India he came to Europe, and the newly found manuscript became the main subject of his doctoral dissertation, which he successfully defended at Vienna University. It seems very probable that Krachkovsky knew of the forthcoming publication of Ibn Fadlan manuscript by Velidi Togan — i. e. "people's enemy" Validov. This may have been one of the arguments which helped Krachkovsky to persuade the Soviet authorities to permit the publication of Kovalevsky's translation, even without his name, since in this way the "Soviet priority" in scholarly work would be established. Whatever the reason, both publications, that of Kovalevsky (without his name) and that of A. Zeki Velidi Togan, were issued almost simultaneously.

Andrii Petrovich Kovalevsky was born on February 1, 1895 near Kharkiv, Ukraine. According to the article "In remembrance of A. P. Kovalevsky,"¹ which was published shortly after his death under the signatures of 7 of his former colleagues, he descended from the family of scholars and scientists well known in Russia: the geographer Yehor Kovalevsky, the geologist Yevhraf Petrovych and the historian and sociologist Maxym Maxymovych Kovalevsky.

¹ Pamyati Andreyi Petrovicha Kovalevskogo (1895-1969) — *"Narody Azii i Afriki,"* Moscow, 1970, no. 3, p. 244-246, port. Signed by: V. A. Astakhov, V. M. Beilis, S. M. Korolivsky, I. K. Rybalka, S. I. Sidelnikov, G. V. Frizman, B. A. Shramko.

We would like to say some words about the latter: Maxym Kovalevsky (1851-1916) was not only a scholar, but also a politician from the liberal bourgeois wing. In 1887, because of his opposition to the autocratic Tsarist regime, he was barred from teaching at the Moscow University, where he was a professor of law, and left Russia. He lectured at different European and American universities and institutions, and his articles were published not only abroad, but also in Russia. He was considered the leader of the liberal wing of the Russian political emigration. In 1901 he founded the “High School for Social Sciences” in Paris; the lecturers were mostly political emigres from Russia, Lenin among others (in 1902). After the 1905 revolution Maxym Kovalevsky returned to Russia, where he became one of the founders of the “Constitutional Democrats (Kadets)” party. In 1906 he was elected to the First Duma, and in 1907 to the Council of State. In the “Great Soviet Encyclopaedia” (in Russian, 2d ed., vol. 21, p. 505) Lenin’s estimation of M. M. Kovalevsky is quoted. He cited him among those political leaders “who have long had one foot in the reactionary camp”.² It is not completely impossible that this relationship to Maxym Kovalevsky was the cause of reprisals brought upon A. P. Kovalevsky after the revolution.

According to the obituary, the beginning of Kovalevsky’s career was quite successful: “A. P. Kovalevsky received his first oriental education at the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages, and his first tutor in Arabistics was Ahatanhel E. Krymsky (. . .) A. P. Kovalevsky completed his oriental training with a general university education: in 1922 he finished studying at the Department of Philology at Kharkiv University. From 1922 to 1930 Andrii Petrovich did his main research work at the Chair for Ukrainian History at Kharkiv University. (. . .) In the 1920’s his oriental education was only partly reflected in his scholarly work, and it was not until 1928 that he dealt with topics that gave him the possibility of applying his knowledge in Oriental studies.”³

In 1934 Kovalevsky came to Leningrad and began to work in the Arabic Study-Group at the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. At the head of this Study-Group was academician I. Yu. Krachkovsky.

Now let us consult another source that also throws some light upon Kovalevsky’s life and scholarly career. We have in mind the very interesting memoirs of A. T. Shumovsky, published in 1975 under the title “The Sea of Arab Studies.”⁴ Shumovsky, a junior colleague of A. P. Kovalevsky since 1936, when still a student of the Leningrad University, also became a pupil of I. Krachkovsky. In his book, a whole chapter — “The Last of the Mohicans” — is dedicated to Kovalevsky. There the above-mentioned period in the life of Andrii

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected works*, Moscow, 1963, vol. 18, p.442.

³ *Narody Azii i Afriki*, Moscow, 1970, no. 3, p. 244-245.

⁴ T. A. Shumovsky, *U morya arabistiki*, Moscow, “Nauka,” 1975, 343 p.

Petrovych looks somewhat different: “It was in 1935⁵ that he for the first time entered the Arabic Study-Group in the Institute for Oriental Studies, the center of Soviet Arabistics, which was founded not long before thanks to the efforts of academician Krachkovsky . . . Here, among plain book shelves semi-lighted by a window with a view of the Neva-quay, the heart of science was beating, the science which was his dream from the early years of his past youth, when he had firmly chosen the work of his life. And nothing could divert him from his aim: neither the fact that he had no possibility of finishing his studies at the Lazarev Institute for Oriental Languages in Moscow, nor that he was forced to acquire another speciality, nor the long years of work in a completely strange field. Working in Kharkiv partly as librarian, partly as publisher and administrator at the University, he at the same time prepared scholarly papers in Oriental studies . . . ”⁶

Neither in the obituary nor in any other article devoted to Kovalevsky there is any mention of exactly when and why he had to leave the Lazarev Institute. But from another source — the article by M. P. Pavlovych “History and Tasks of the New Educational Institutions for Oriental Studies”⁷ — we know that just in 1921-1922 some purges (“chystka”) were conducted at the Lazarev Institute. M. P. Pavlovych, who was the rector of the Lazarev Institute in 1921, writes about these purges: “During the first purge, which was conducted by a Commission headed by comrade Broido under the rectorship of comrade Gismatullin⁸, some students who did not fit the new tasks were thrown out (. . .) After this three more purges were conducted under my chairmanship (. . .) These purges greatly reduced the number of students . . . ” We can only guess whether Kovalevsky was among the victims of one of these purges. But the possibility that this was so, and that his relation to M. M. Kovalevsky was one of the reasons (or at least a pretext) for his expulsion, also cannot be excluded.

It is clear from the above that Kovalevsky’s road to Oriental studies was not easy. When he joined the Arabic Study-Group at the Oriental Institute in Leningrad, he was already nearly 40. According to Shumovsky’s memoirs, Krachkovsky thought his new pupil deserved to receive a doctoral degree in Oriental studies. But many years passed before Andrii Petrovych was able to defend his doctoral thesis — and only after the death of his tutor.

In 1939, when Kovalevsky was completing his research work on the Mashhad manuscript for publication, he was arrested. The obituary refers to this

⁵ Here T. A. Shumovsky apparently is mistaken: in all other sources this year is quoted as 1934.

⁶ Shumovsky, op. cit., p. 336.

⁷ M. P. Pavlovych, “Istoriya i zadachi novykh vostokovednykh vuzov,” in: *Novyi Vostok*, nos. 10-11, Moscow, 1925, p. VI.

⁸ It is worth mentioning that both of them — comrade Broido, as well as comrade Gismatullin became victims of later more serious purges and disappeared in the Stalin death camps.

fact in such a way: “In 1939 A. P. Kovalevsky was exposed to unfounded reprisals and for 6 years was deprived of scholarly and teaching work.”⁹ Shumovsky writes about this even more cautiously: “Two years after its beginning in 1937, the research was finished. It was published in 1939 without the name of the author on the title page, although the man was still among the living. He was only able to return to his scholarly work after the war . . . ”¹⁰

Kovalevsky, indeed, was very “lucky”: in contrast to many other scholars who partook of his destiny, he did not perish in the Gulag Archipelago, and after a relatively short time, as early as 1944, was able to return to a teaching position. Obviously — to a great extent — this was made possible due to the efforts of I. Krachkovsky.

Some idea of this fight for the return of a scholar to his work is given by Krachkovsky’s letters to Shumovsky, which the latter quotes in his book. Shumovsky himself was somewhere in Siberia at that time, probably in exile, following his arrest in autumn 1937 (he does not write about this in his book clearly enough). In a letter sent September 5, 1944 from Leningrad, Krachkovsky writes to Shumovsky: “Kovalevsky, like you, emerged this year in Saransk (Mordovia) as a lecturer at a pedagogical institute. I am trying to acquire for him the status of a postgraduate student at the Academy of Sciences.”¹¹ In the next letter (November 10, 1944) he wrote: “A certain result in the Kovalevsky matter has been achieved: the position of a post-graduate student has been acquired for him. But he still will have to spend the next season in Saransk; maybe after the Institute of Oriental Studies returns¹², as planned for spring-summer ’45, we will succeed in transferring him to Leningrad, although his dwelling was destroyed by shells.”¹³

Obviously, it was not easy, even for Krachkovsky, to overcome the many obstacles — therefore only in 1947 could Kovalevsky return to scholarly work in Leningrad. In the winter of 1947-48 he remained there, teaching at the Oriental Department of Leningrad University. But he did not manage to stay in Leningrad permanently. It seems that the fact of his having no place to live was used against him.¹⁴ Shumovsky writes about this as follows “He did not stay in Leningrad because he had no place to live. Not all of his colleagues felt sorry about it.”¹⁵ In 1949 Kovalevsky returned to Kharkiv. But maybe even in this he

⁹ *Narody Azii i Afriki*, Moscow, 1970, no. 3, p. 245.

¹⁰ Shumovsky, op. cit., p. 337.

¹¹ Shumovsky, op. cit., p. 62.

¹² During the war (1941-1945) the Institute of Oriental Studies was evacuated from Leningrad to Tashkent.

¹³ Shumovsky, ip. cit., p. 65.

¹⁴ For the Western reader it must be explained that until now a Soviet citizen, wherever he is living, even temporarily, needs a permit to stay from the local police authorities. If one does not have a place to live, he can be deprived of such a permit under this pretext. Without one, renting a room privately is also prohibited; it is almost impossible to get a job as well.

¹⁵ Shumovsky, op. cit., p. 337.

was lucky: in 1949-1951 a new wave of arrests took place and most of the people who came back from the camps or exile in 1946-47 and were living near Moscow, Leningrad and other big cities, were swept away by it.

After his return to Kharkiv, Kovalevsky continued to work on his doctoral thesis about Ibn Fadlan manuscript and defended it successfully in 1951. In 1956 "The Book of Ahmad Ibn Fadlan about his journey to the Volga in 921-922"¹⁶ was published. It summed up Kovalevsky's meticulous work which he had carried out on this theme during all those long years. Although it was published after the XX-th Party Congress and Khrushchov's speech, Kovalevsky could not or did not want to restore the truth in it. In all references to his previous translation published in 1939 without his name, he calls the author simply "the translator" without mentioning in any place that this unnamed translator was he himself. He dedicated his book to the memory of his teacher and friend I. Krachkovsky, who died in 1951 shortly before Kovalevsky defended his doctoral thesis. In the introduction he writes: Only because of his (Krachkovsky's) outstanding energy was the first translation of Ibn Fadlan's work published in 1939."¹⁷

The new translation of Ibn Fadlan's manuscript with commentaries, in which all the previous translations and research work on this manuscript were summed up, brought to Kovalevsky well-deserved recognition. His work became the basis for the publication of the original Arabic text (Damascus, 1960) and for the French translation (1958).¹⁸ The following is an account of Kovalevsky's last years, according to the official obituary that we have already cited: "From 1951 until 1964 Kovalevsky was the head of the Chair of Modern History, and from 1964, of the Chair for Middle Ages History, both at Kharkiv University. The lecturers and students highly estimated Andrii Petrovych as a knowledgeable professional in his field and as a brilliant lecturer (. . .) The memory of A. P. Kovalevsky as one of the outstanding representatives of Soviet Oriental studies, a scholar-patriot, and a modest and courageous man will live in our hearts."¹⁹

And now the same period as it was described in Shumovsky's book: "All are dead, all the colleagues of the Study-Group.²⁰ He alone remained (. . .) He escaped the cruel fate of many others, he is alive, he still can think . . . The young man who had to fight for every step in his life became a doctor of history, a professor at the University, an honoured scholar. He is accepted as a teacher, he is

¹⁶ *Kniga Ahmeda Ibn Fadlana o yego puteshestvii na Volgu v 921-922 g. g. Stat'yi, perevody i kommentarii*. Kharkiv, 1956, 345 p.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁸ For more information on this subject see: V. M. Beilis, "P'yat' vidan' knigi Ibn-Fadlana," in: *Ukrains'kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, Kiev, 1965, no. 3, p. 145-150 (in Ukrainian).

¹⁹ *Narody Azii i Afriki*, Moscow, 1970, no. 3, p. 246.

²⁰ The Arabic Study-Group at the Institute for Oriental Studies.

respected . . . But he does not feel happy Because he is alone, without colleagues, and therefore without a scholarly, creative atmosphere.

“Under the pressure of emotional loneliness even a strong personality disintegrates slowly.

Bothered with diverse administrative posts at the University — a lecturer of this, a head of that, advisory member of commissions and committees — he can work in Arabic studies only in snatches. How interesting is this forgotten geographical text, how much can be concluded from it! . . . But the former elan has gone: there is nobody to appreciate the meticulous philological work of a mediaevist — neither in Leningrad, nor in Kharkiv — nowhere.”²¹ In the portrait published together with the obituary we see a man with tired eyes, who has no joy in life. Shumovsky seems to be right in his characterization given to Kovalevsky.

In conclusion we want to add that from all the articles published about Kovalevsky during his lifetime as well as after his death, only in the above-mentioned obituary is any open mention made — although without any details — about the reprisals to which Kovalevsky was exposed. In Shumovsky’s book, as we have seen already, and also in the chapter “Arabistics (1917-1968)” which Shumovsky wrote for the volume “The Asiatic Museum — Leningrad Department of the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR”²² we find only “delicate” hints about some mystical “circumstances” which prevented the scholars from doing their scholarly work. In all the rest of articles written about Kovalevsky, not only are these facts not mentioned altogether, but in some of them the data and places of his work are falsified. For instance, in the obituary published without signature in the *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* in 1970 is written: “From 1934 until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, and after its end until 1949, A. P. Kovalevsky worked fruitfully in Leningrad, at the beginning in the Arabic Study-Group and afterwards as a senior researcher in the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and as an assistant professor at the Oriental Department of the University.”²³

The same “omission” we see also in the “Biobibliographical Dictionary of Soviet Orientalists,” which was published in Moscow in 1975.²⁴

The first translation of Ibn Fadlan’s manuscript, which was published in 1939, is, as a rule, also quoted incorrectly; the name of Kovalevsky as translator

²¹ Shumovsky, op. cit., p. 338.

²² *Aziats — ki Muzei — Leningradskoye Otdeleniye Instituta Vostokovedeniya An SSSR*, Moscow, “Nauka,” 1972, p. 281-304.

²³ *Ukrains'kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, Kiev, 1970, no. 2, p. 158. It is interesting to note that the very same text which seems to have been censored and approved “from above,” without any changes and also without signature, was published in another Ukrainian periodical on history: *Pytannya novoi ta novin'oi istorii*, Kiev, 1971, vol. 13, p. 164-165.

and author of the commentaries is cited as if it in fact would be given in the book itself. Even in the above mentioned article by Beilis (see reference on p. 9, footnote 18), which is especially devoted to all publications of Ibn Fadlan, the translation of 1939 is quoted *with* Kovalevsky's name — without any mention that it is *not* printed in the book — it is, of course, much more comfortable: the trouble to explain why the author disappeared from the title page can be spared! This fact is very typical of the policy of Soviet authorities in regard to the “dubious” past.

In this article we wanted to show what is concealed behind one line — the line with the name of the author — which was omitted on the title page: the fate of a scholar who was lucky enough to return to life, to his work, while many others perished, unable to finish what they began or even to begin what they had planned. One fate — both typical and atypical for that time in Soviet Russia.

²⁴ S. D. Miliband, *Biobibliograficheskii slovar' sovetskikh vostokovedov* Moscow, “Nauka,” 1975, 733 p. It is worth noting that the entry “A. P. Kovalevsky” is in no way an exception in the “Dictionary.” Even when scholars perished in the camps after arrest, this fact is not mentioned in the “Dictionary.” We found out that out of a total 1488 Orientalists included in the “Dictionary,” 65 were subjected to different forms of reprisals during Stalin times; 28 of this number perished in the Gulag Archipelago. For comparison, we can point out that on the front and in subsequent wartime hardships 15 died (out of the same total of 1488).

LESIA UKRAINKA AND FRENCH LITERATURE

BOHDAN ROMANENCHUK

In all likelihood, there is no poet or prosaist among Ukrainian writers who was more knowledgeable about 19th and early 20th century French literature, than Lesia Ukrainka — although a number of Ukrainian writers were interested in, and translated, various works of French literature.

At an early age, Lesia Ukrainka began to familiarize herself with European literature and read much of French literature through Russian translations. In her adolescence, when she was 13 or 14 years old, she learned, with her mother, the French and German languages and, simultaneously, read French writings in their original form; furthermore, she attempted to translate them, if only for personal use.

Within several years, she was very well-versed in French, since learning foreign languages came easily to her; she read everything that fell into her hands in its original form, since she did not have the systematic studies of a school program.

This was due largely to her illness — tuberculosis of the bone — which plagued her during her entire lifetime.

Everything she accomplished was the result of a persevering self-education that had a certain orientation toward middle-school studies, but was so thorough and methodical, that the results were far superior to the scholastic education of existing classic gymnasiums in Russia.

After several years, she became so proficient, along with her mother, in the French language, that she could freely translate for her uncle, Drahamanov, such works as Maurice Verne's *Holy Writings of the Old Testament*.

In 1888 she read the French translation of L. Tolstoy's drama, *Power of the Darkness*, and expressed her criticism of both the actual work and its translation. Within a year's time she was already translating the better works of French literature.

In a letter from Odessa she wrote her mother: "Yesterday I was in the city and received 'Perles de la Poesie' (an anthology of French poetry) from the Komarovs. I have been reading and delighting in it all day. I've read 'Pavres gens', and must absolutely attempt to translate it. It made me very glad to find Alfredo de Musset's 'Lucie' — these poems please me more than any others. There are altogether many exquisite things there, and I am very, very grateful that you sent me this book so promptly..."

(Lesia Ukrainka, 12-Volume *Collected Works*, Vol. 10, Letters, K. 1978, p. 32).

Thus in 1889 she completed a translation of “Les Pavres Gens” and sent it off for publication — as well as translating G. Stahl’s *Life and Philosophical Thoughts of Penguin*. Her program of translations, which she compiled for the literary society “Pleyada (1888-1894) in Kiev, and to which she belonged along with her brother Michael Obachnyj, bears witness to her already unusual, at age 18, knowledge of French literature.

Among other activities, “Pleyada” sought to publish a library of world literature translated into Ukrainian.

In her correspondence with her brother, Lesia Ukrainka discussed these affairs, as well as proposing her additions to his projects — although these additions created an entirely new program to which were admitted the writers most noteworthy in world literature.

In that era, had she been studying in a university, she would have been in her first or second year of studies (at 19 years of age), although her knowledge of European literature was not merely on the level of a first or second-year student, but was comparable to that of a professor.

Instead of the entire program let us merely observe the one pertaining to French literature:

She proposes some of Beranger’s best “chansons”: “Le Vieux Caporal,” “Le Roi d’Ivetot,” “Mon vieil habit,” “Monsieur le senateur.”

She writes in a letter to her brother: “I am not familiar with Paul Bourget’s other writings, and “Disciple” is not worth my translating it, since it is something so “verwegene” (impudent); (con’t.) Hugo: “Les Miserables,” “Notre Dame de Paris” and “Les travailleurs de la mer” — the author himself calls these three novels his Trilogy — Daudet: “Jacques;” George Sand: “Les compagnons du tour de France,” “Lelia” and several folk and fairy tales; Zola: “La peche de l’abbe Mourret” and “L’Assommoir.” Of Lesage I know only the critical works — Moliere: “Tartuffe,” “Le mariage force,” “L’Avare,” and “Precieuses Ridicules;” Musset’s “Lucie,” “Mes prisons” and “Les nuits,” Francois Koppe: several poems; Flaubert: “Madame Bovary” and Education sentimentale;” Theophile Gautier’s poems, Beaumarche: “Trilogy;” Balzac: “La femme de trente ANS,” “Illusions perdues,” “Les paysans;” Lecont de Lille: “Poemes Antiques, Poemes barbares,” and “Poemes tragiques;” Voltaire, Rousseau and Stahl — (whatever you choose).

In this list there is not a single work by Maupassant, since he did not appeal to Lesia Ukrainka, who openly claimed that “it is not worth bothering one’s head over him, for in his writing the pure idea of naturalism is completely destroyed, with the result being something not worth talking about...” (Collected Works, V. 10, 1978, p. 39).

The question may arise: did Lesia Ukrainka know these writings, which she proposed for the program, directly through reading them or perhaps from some perspective of literature in the Russian or German languages — that is, indirectly.

The above list bespeaks the fact that she knew these works in an immediate way, through her own reading, and when she was unfamiliar with an author, she openly admitted it, e.g.: "I do not know Paul Bourget's other works, and "Disciple" is not worth translating, since it is so "verwegene;" she knew only the major writings of Lesage and she completely excluded Maupassant due to his corrupt naturalism.

Two reviews, which she wrote at the invitation of the Russian journal, "Zhysn" (Life), testify even more to the broad range of her knowledge of French literature. One of them, "New Perspectives and Distant Shadows," dealt with the question of women in European literature *Zhyzn* (Life, Nr. 12, 1900), and the second, which was not published during her lifetime, was "Utopia in Belles Lettres," written in 1906. Regarding the first article, we will concentrate only on the part where she writes on French literature and how that question was treated by both past and contemporary French writers. She affirms that lately there had occurred in France a phenomenon, very familiar to everyone who observes the spread of certain ideas in the literary world: that ideas which had been formulated long ago and had for a while illuminated, albeit feebly, several generations, now suddenly flared out, as bright as fireworks, which burn intensely and are as suddenly extinguished.

That light (she writes) traveled to France, where in recent times there was a rebirth of the feminine question in French belles-lettres. Once-stylish themes went out of fashion in France but became stylish in other literatures; they went around the entire cultural world and then returned again to France, along with dress styles of the 1860's and now were regarded as the epitome of fashion. And this style was subscribed to by the French, chiefly as the result of writings on this theme, as witnessed even by the titles themselves: "Femmes nouvelles," "Nouvelle douleur," "Volupte nouvelle," etc.; therefore, everyone who followed changes in literature became immediately aware of this theme.

As to the question of women, the author believes that the attitude towards women in French literature was always backward, in comparison to other literatures, and French belletrists rarely went beyond two positions: "woman on a pedestal" and "woman on Society's bottom level."

This antithesis, claims the author, has persecuted French women for many ages. Moliere places the "learned woman" on an equal footing with a woman who is comically pretentious and for some time was the subject of jest and various "jeux d'esprit," right up to current times.

Only recently the young writer, Remy de Gourmont, has attempted to defend not only "learned women" but "les precieuses" as well, claiming that all their sins were merely a refusal to behave like everyone else — and as regards Moliere, the heroines of his comedy "Les precieuses ridicules" wanted to behave like the rest of the world's women, forgetting their humble status in their small world.

This is why, says the author, that every time a French woman yearned to escape her lowly status and behaved clumsily, she was forced into comical

situations. Then she was told, as the Russians say, to “go back,” as if this were the only way out of the ludicrous situation.

For this reason, the “go back” at one end, and sweet madrigals of the other, created in the French woman a “dependent psychology,” as the author puts it.

In the classical and popular literature of the 17th and 18th centuries, the author does not detect a single example of a woman’s image comparable to that of Cordelia in Shakespeare’s tragedy, “King Lear.” In novels of that era she finds the ideal woman to be either totally faceless and bland or goodnatureedly passive. This was the ideal of the young woman with a placid character and “sheep’s habits” (*beaucoup de danseur dans le caractere et par habitude Moutonne*), which Stendhal treated with futile ironicism in the 1830’s. Rousseau and Voltaire, continues the author, left this ideal untouched, and Beaumarche showed only a repulsive side of this type of woman: the girl who exhibits “ovine (sheep’s) behavior” on the exterior, but is in reality a hypocrite.

This ideal of passive gentleness survived intact until the coming of Romanticism; survived also the Romantic turmoil and continued to remain in French literature.

And whosoever of the French writers was dissatisfied with this type of woman, sought out other specimens in the East, or lost himself in romantic visions of the Middle Ages, when woman was at her pinnacle — although the same alternative was here also: woman on a pedestal or beneath it. Insofar as it was tied into the surroundings, an independent girl was found in the city — either a harlot, a courtesan or an unfaithful wife — which were considered to be the only other possible types of modern woman, and who was either idealized or undervalued but at any rate differed from the colourless mass of “proper ladies.”

Further in her research, the author states that the first to be placed on a pedestal was the harlot: merry and naive Lisette, the muse of Beranger’s songs; Delorm’s courtesan, (the heroine of Hugo’s novel) — in actuality the same type, but with a tragic side — further: the gypsy, or street singer, whose prototype was Mignone (the heroine of Goethe’s novel: *The Years of Learning of Wilhelm Meister*).

This type was often referred to even by George Sand in her search for the “better woman.” Lesia Ukrainka sees another approach to women in Stendhal, who was a contemporary of George Sand; he dealt with the average woman and demanded a normal upbringing for her, as well as a solid, not salon, education which would enable her to be independent. He demanded respect for women and freedom. This female type, states the author, nonetheless did not find acceptance, and had no influence, among his contemporaries, until 30 years after his death when several authors succeeded him, at times reprinting verbatim from the three chapters of his novel, “*De l’amour*,” wherein is discussed the question of education. (*De l’éducation des femmes*,” Vols. I IV, I V, I VI.)

George Sand’s female type, according to Lesia Ukrainka, found no echo in French literature, even when there was a resurgence of her glory in more recent times. Instead, she had a certain influence in German and Russian literature. As

to the rights of the so-called “superior or exclusive woman,” as the French say, Lesia Ukrainka finds that in real life these rights were recognized much earlier than the rights of the ordinary woman; therefore, one could say, according to the belief of Lesia Ukrainka, that real life, as rarely happens, preceded literature, since the concept of how to approach women’s pretensions to authorship or artistic activity was formed sooner in real life than in literature; whereas Stahl, George Sand, Rochelle and Malibrand had already realistically shown what the “exceptional” French woman can accomplish in that area.

Literature accepted this fact from life and granted the talented woman different rights. In particular, the artistic woman came into her own, thinks the author — she was the one hoisted onto a pedestal, e.g.: Alfred Musset defended the French opera star Maria Malibran in his poem, “To Malibran” from the attacks of petty bourgeoisie morality in the name of genius, whose rights are above the code of common morality.

As for other writers Lesia Ukrainka believes that a woman needed a separate qualification — talent — in order to be exceptional.

Victor Hugo praised Marie Malibran’s sister, Pauline Garcia, also a famous singer. Other women without this qualification still remained without rights, legally and commonly, and not only theoretically.

Practically, only the talented woman could be independent — as a singer, actress, or writer. These occupations granted a position of independence and a possibility of earnings equal to a man’s. All other forms of work, according to the researcher, did not have such possibilities and a teaching career was unattainable for the primary reason that a higher education was itself unattainable. All aspects of physical labor gave women such meager earnings that young women were left with no option other than becoming harlots.

In Romantic literature, an ordinary woman at least had a right to “free love,” but she could not freely select a husband. And as for “free love,” this right was not so simple, claims Lesia Ukrainka.

A restriction on the freedom of divorce and adultery or marital infidelity was needed for its practice.

This freedom, says the author, was defended by Balzac, who raised the worldly woman on a pedestal; and the defender of divorce was Dumas’ son, who in his works stated the problems of emancipated women. He demanded political and voting rights for women, as well as scholars’ rights, because then, he avowed, they would have no cause to kill when laws were decreed against killing. But Dumas’ son, thinks Lesia Ukrainka, relates the demands of women to the higher goal of wishing to avenge themselves on men — that is: give us that which our nature demands or that which you are hoarding for yourselves: freedom.

After Dumas, the question of women in France again faded, affirms Lesia Ukrainka in her thesis; there was left only the matter of marital infidelity which contemporary writers were gladly working on — from Balzac to Bourget — but as a phenomenon of a psychological sort, not emancipation. Only Flaubert in his “Madame Bovary” treated the matter somewhat more broadly and linked

marital infidelity with the general societal order.

In conclusion, Lesia Ukrainka states that the question of women in the French prose of the last 30 years had gone neither forward nor backward; but when there came to France an influx of foreign literature on these themes (in translation, e.g. Scandinavian, English, German, Russian), where the woman was depicted as absolutely victorious (England, Norway), or as having to pay dearly for her victory (Germany) - then French prosaists again opened up the theme of women, but insincerely, depicting them as semi-independent. Only a few authors, like Jules Bois, approached the feminine question impartially and psychologically.

This short overview of Lesia Ukrainka's treatise on French feminist literature would be worth continuing, since it is interesting not only for its standpoint on women, but also for Lesia Ukrainka's unusual knowledge of European — and, in particular, French — literature, for she was still quite young, barely 29 years old; but a few words must be said about her second review, which also discusses French literature: "Utopia in Belles Lettres."

The authoress begins her analysis of this theme with the oldest literary form of stories about Eden in ancient Babylonian records — which were later repeated, in various forms, in past cultures (e.g., in the Holy Scriptures, in antique and medieval literature) and (she) reaches modern times by way of the 17th to 18th centuries, stopping finally at contemporary times: that is, the 19th century.

She discovers the first Utopia in the French adherent of Furie, E. Cabe, writer and publicist, Socialist-Utopist, and the author of "Journey to Icarie" (*Le voyage en Icarie*).

This voyage, says Lesia Ukrainka, made a considerable impression in its time mainly because the ideas of Furie and St. Simone were presented to the general public for the first time, in an accessible form. She thinks that this unattractive style harmed the very ideas it was supposed to propagate, because it provoked the jeers of the anti-socialists, and this resulted, says the authoress, in some measure of sympathy toward socialism, so that the ideas of Furie and St. Simon were suppressed for several decades.

The French writer Emile Suvestre, novelist and dramatist, wrote another utopian novel, "The Future World," (1859), a pessimistic Utopia, as Lesia Ukrainka calls it, since the author sees no immediate or long-term alternative for humanity. He traveled with a young couple into the future and showed them the civilized world of the 20th century.

The authoress thinks that Suvestre had no talent for this sort of work, but nonetheless, in her opinion, he brought something new to Utopia — namely, evolution, and showed the future social order from the evolution of its beginnings, which were already evident in the first half of the 19th century. Truth to tell, she finds certain allusions to the evolutionary theory in Thomas More, but she claims that this was only a hazy premonition of the evolutionary theory; and Suvestre wrote his novel when the theory of evolution was already generally acknowledged in education and was spreading among the public. She believes

that paradisiac lands, suspended from heaven and perched on the clouds, no longer interested anyone because the “spirit of the times” imposed its brand on Suvestre’s heroes and on Suvestre himself. According to her, this was the “spirit of analysis” born of the evolutionary theory; but an analysis not completely courageous or free from the traumas of the recent past.

In that era, she observed that the old Romanticism was dying out in belles lettres; and young naturalism had yet to have the final word. She saw this same “spirit of the times” which dominated Suvestre in all other young utopists, since none of them dared to sever their Utopia from a world which was steered by the laws of evolution; except that in some works they paid attention to the evolution of learning, and in others, the evolution of society.

For the modern utopists, continues the authoress, who were raised according to an evolutionary world-view, it was even harder to depict a future without evolution and, especially, to exhort readers to believe in the possibility of a future without human evolution. We cannot, she says, understand the future and the ideas of unknown people, since we are able to understand it only from the standpoint of our present outlook. Lesia Ukrainka, examining Utopian writings, paid special attention to artistic truths and 19th century utopists, in her opinion, paid little heed to artistic truth; for this reason, she regarded them skeptically: that is, if someone discusses a dream in terms of a politico-economic tract, a thoroughly worked out scheme of societal order, then he is contradicting artistic truth as it relates to belletrism and does not “affect the reader.”

When a writer deceives us as to this basic artistic principle, then the reader is righteously prepared not to believe in the validity of separate details, or the truth of the writer’s ideal, since (the authoress) believed that a betrayal of artistic truth was indelibly imprinted on the fate of that work, or on the purity of its basic idea.

Ignorance of artistic truth was the reason that she sharply criticized “Chto Delat” (“What to Do”), the novel of M. Chernishevsky, Russian socialist-utopist, and reproached his deliberate lies.

Further in her review, Lesia Ukrainka mentions a few other second-rate French writers such as Schpronk, Mocleare and Harevi, who built the future fate of the world on the basis of contemporary social problems, such as French-Russian relations, but in her opinion, they conducted other politics in their Utopias, for example, Harevi ascertained that the betterment of social welfare would lead the masses to a moral downfall.

Anatole France was believed to proclaim that these Utopias reflected an earnest pessimism of the soul, dominated by worldly woes, but she herself believed otherwise — that this was an “outdated lamentation” of a decayed group and a desire to frighten readers with the horrors of socialism.

These politicizing Utopias, as she calls them, are worth attending to from the viewpoint of politics, but artistically are totally uninteresting.

The utopist who closest approached T. More — V. Maurice was, in her opinion, Maurice Maeterlink with his Utopian novel, “Les Rameaux d’olivier”

(“The Olive Branch”), written in the language of a poet-philosopher, with prophetic inclinations, a language filled with artistic images. In his Utopia he laid the foundation of an entirely distinct artistic expedient — not a contrast between a bright future and stormy present, only a dark past buried deep in the ages and a bright present, which illuminates the future.

She discusses Maeterlink’s Utopia quite thoroughly and places it above all others, for she saw in it a “starting point” for the belletristic Utopias of modern times.

Later she turned her attention to Anatole France, in whose belletristic Utopia she detected certain signs of the victory of modern over old-world principles. Anatole France named his Utopia “*Sur la pierre blanche*” (“On the White Stone”), but in her opinion it had a lifeless character from a literary-psychological point of view; her explanation for this is that the author’s emotions did not take part in the creation, that is, development of this theme: rationality vibrated through it and subsequently was lost in a vast expanse.

She, therefore, expresses her own Utopian thoughts on what genuine Utopian writing should be like: she believes that utopist-reasoners would do better to lay out their thoughts in special summaries, whereby specialists, philosophers and moralists could then evaluate them. Among her own thoughts she finds not a few worthy of attention — pertinent and even original — but she claims it is not worth painting these schemes with haphazard, temporary colors and presenting them as genuine art.

Many other examples and facts could be given of Lesia Ukrainka’s knowledge of French literature, as opposed to the polemics of the Ukrainian literary critic and publicist Serge Ephremov, who from a sociological viewpoint was opposed to modernists, knowing them only second or third-hand; since she was a modernist to a degree, acknowledging Neoromanticism. She also knew French and other European modernists first-hand, and rejected Ephremov’s critical arguments about modernism as being unfactual; she presented modernism in accordance with her own unrivaled knowledge of modernistic writing.

Looking over these reviews of Lesia Ukrainka, we have not attempted to go into details of individual Utopian novels which she had analyzed, as well as writings on the feminine question — since this was not our intention.

We merely wanted to show the deep familiarity of our Poetess with the French and progressive literature of her times; she loved it, read it gladly, translated some of it, and steadily maintained an interest in it and for this reason acquired an extensive literary background, which no other Ukrainian writer, except I. Franko, had at the time — although many Ukrainian writers were interested in French poetry in general.

Among us, Lesia Ukrainka stands in first place.

YAKHNENKOS AND SYMYRENKO: INNOVATORS IN THE UKRAINIAN SUGAR INDUSTRY

ZENON KARPYSZYN

In comparison to other agriculturally related industries, the Ukrainian sugar industry is fairly new. This is true not only for Ukraine, but for all the other European sugar industries that are based on sugar beets. It was only in 1747, that A. Margraff in Germany, discovered a process of producing sugar from sugar beets. It was the Prussian, Carl F. Achard in 1797, however, who improved on Margraff's process and was able to produce an appealing product. This new food industry was given a strong impetus by Napoleon, who during the course of the Continental Blockade during the Napoleonic Wars established sugar beet plantations in France and provided subsidies to promote its growth. In a short time, sugar mills were established in France and Germany and later were established in other European countries.

To the reader who is interested in Ukrainian economics, the sugar industry, as one of the major branches of the food industry, presents a rare insight into the nature and potential of the Ukrainian economy. In the annual production of sugar, Ukraine is one of the chief producers in the world today. This fact in itself is a valid reason for studying this industry in depth. Secondly, the sugar industry is the only industry of Ukraine, that neither tsarist Russia nor the Soviet regime could successfully transfer from Ukraine. This can be explained by the fact that Ukraine has all the needed factors for the establishment and continued growth of this industry: the right soil conditions and climate which insure a good harvest, the necessary density of agricultural population for intensive cultivation and a large internal market. The sugar industry of Ukraine differs from other industries also in that it not only supplies the necessary raw material, the sugar beets, but also the finished product, that being refined sugar. In contrast to sugar cane, which can be transported long distances, the sugar beet is easily destroyed during transport and loses a great deal of its sugar content. For this reason, sugar refineries have to be constructed as close to sugar beet fields as possible, to achieve the maximum sugar production from the crops. This characteristic of the sugar beet resulted in the construction of refineries in Ukraine and not solely in Russia. The sugar refineries in turn, created a demand for various machinery parts which promoted the establishment of a machine-building industry in Ukraine.

From the purely human aspect, this industry gave Ukrainian merchants the opportunity to fully utilize their native talents in commerce and industry, which in other industries were either limited or restrained. It was in the sugar industry that such individuals as the brothers Yakhnenko, Symyrenko, Kharytonenko, Tereshchenko and others were able to fully realize their entrepreneurial potential. Finally, for the majority of the population, the peasants, this industry provided a source of cash income for their crops as well as opportunities for seasonal labor, which were of major importance to them after the abolition of serfdom in 1861.

In the history of the Ukrainian sugar industry a special place is held by the firm of the brothers Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko. They differ from the other sugar manufacturers in that they were descendents of non-landed gentry and that they acquired their notable economic position solely as a result of their own efforts, initiative and natural talent for commercial activity. It is necessary to stress that, until the abolition of serfdom in 1861 in the Russian empire, the attainment of a leading economic position by members of the lower classes was a rare phenomenon. Furthermore, the history of the firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko gives a good illustration of the evolution of factories in Ukraine, their close ties with agriculture and their influence on the Ukrainian sugar-beet industry. The greatest commercial-industrial activity of the firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko occurred in the first half of the 19th century, that is, before the major socio-political reform of 1861.¹

The brothers Yakhnenkos were born into serfdom on the estate of Count Samoilov in the town of Smila. They were descendents of well-to-do peasants of the southern region of the Kiev guberniya, and their son-in-law, Fedir Symyrenko, was a descendent of an old Kozak family. His father, Stepan Symyrenko, was a kozak for over 20 years at the Zaporozhian Sich, and after its destruction in 1775, became a carter or chumak. Together with his family, he became a serf of the Countess Vorontsov in the town of Horodyshe.²

In the 1820's and 1830's, the brothers Yakhnenkos together with their brother-in-law, Symyrenko, leased a mill, traded in flour and were engaged in the transport of hides, the making of boots and in addition, maintained produce gardens. Obtaining from these various activities the necessary funds, they bought freedom for themselves and their families from serfdom. After acquiring freedom, they were engaged primarily in the leasing of mills in the town of Smila. At the same time, they performed a number of commercial commissions for Count Samoilov and his descendents as well as for the Counts Bobrinskys.³

Continually saving their earnings, in order to broaden their commercial activities, the Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko near the end of the 1820's had

¹ O. O. Nesterenko, *Rozvytok promyslovosti na Ukraini*, Naukova Dumka, Kiev, 1966. v. II, p. 108.

² Volodymyr Kybijovyc, *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, New York, 1976. v. VIII, p. 2810.

³ Oleksander Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, Kiev, 1925. p. 149.

managed to save 7,000 rubles.⁴ With this amassed capital their economic activity began to increase. They were assisted in this by the unfavorable conditions of the grain market throughout the first quarter of the 19th century, which was beneficial to them and gave them profitable results. Besides their activities in the grain market, they were engaged, as before, in the sale of leather goods. At markets in the nearby vicinity, they traded in fur coats, boots and other leather goods.

Having notable success, they began to trade in the larger Ukrainian trade fairs, in the so-called "Romensky fairs." At the same time, in various towns they purchased cattle and drove it in herds to other towns and cities, especially to Odessa and Warsaw. The commercial-economic activities of the brothers Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko every year took on greater dimensions. The result of this was that one of the owners of the firm had to continuously reside in Odessa, in order to oversee the firm's commercial activities and protect its growing interests.⁵

Clearly perceiving the great financial opportunities and benefits in the agricultural crisis of the 1830's, they began to involve themselves more intensively in the grain market. In the 1830's, together with the miller Lashyn, they leased a mill in the area of Uman.⁶ The precarious economic condition of the estates of the nobility gave them the opportunity to purchase wheat at extremely low prices. In this economic activity can already be seen their interest in the maximization of agricultural production through the application of the latest technology in the production process. This interest in technical progress was to become the major trademark of all of their enterprises.

By advancing the mill's technology, they raised its production levels and thus were able to sell grain on the foreign market at very profitable prices. The general change in prices for wheat in favor of the nobility in the 1830's and 1840's opened for them broad new perspectives and greatly enriched the firm. In cities such as Odessa, Mykolaiv and Sevastopil were founded branches and warehouses of the firm, whose capital at the beginning of the 1840's already exceeded one million rubles. As a direct result of the success of their firm, the brothers Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko were regarded as merchants of the First Guild, that is, the guild of the highest rank.⁷

In the 1840's the agricultural crisis abated. Prices for wheat began to rise to such an extent that it was not possible to foresee any stability in the market. The large scale trading in wheat began to lose its primacy in the firm's activities, since the rise in prices would lead to a substantial reduction in profits. They decided to

⁴ Ibid., p. 149.

⁵ Ibid., p. 149.

⁶ Volodymyr Kybijovyc, *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, v. VIII, p. 2811.

⁷ *Kiiivskaia starina*, 1896. v. I, pp. 106-14. (O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 149.)

embark on a new enterprise; besides trading in wheat, they began trading in sugar.⁸

The trading in sugar proved itself to be very profitable and useful for the firm. At the beginning of the 1840's the firm began to take an ever greater interest in the future and success of the sugar industry. The sons of Fedir Symyrenko during their foreign studies had the opportunity to become familiar with the production of sugar in France. Platon Symyrenko studied the sugar industry in France and later became one of the technical directors of the firm. His brother, Vasyl Symyrenko, graduated from the Polytechnical Institute in Paris which gave him a great deal of technical expertise.⁹

The project of the organization of a sugar refinery was conceived on a large scale. It was decided to construct a large sugar refinery equipped with the latest Western European technology and in accordance with the production methods of the French sugar refineries. The steam-powered engines and other machinery were imported from France. There were also hired in France 30 various technicians in sugar production. The first director of the refinery was the Frenchman Salzar. The firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko leased the necessary quantity of land for 12 years from the Berezovsky family, the landowners of the village of Tashlyk. In 1843, the Tashlyk refinery, which was the first steam operated refinery in Ukraine, began regular production.¹⁰

Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko began their new enterprise with a fixed capital of 6,000 rubles. The first production attempts of the new venture were not successful. This was due to the fact that the production of the refinery was based on the French model and the sugar that was produced was yellowish in color, of a soft texture and consequently sold poorly on the market. The firm then decided to hire from St. Petersburg a German refiner, Mayer, who was named the director of the refinery with an annual salary of 12,000 rubles. The production and sales of the refinery improved and it became more profitable.¹¹

The first year of production of the refinery did not yield any profits but there were no substantial losses. During the following two years, under the management of the refiner Mayer, the invested capital of 600,000 rubles yielded to the firm a net profit of 800,000 rubles.¹² The Tashlyk refinery held the foremost position in the sugar market and in a short time the firm leased for a period of three years the Orlovsky refinery of Count Potocki. This lease also proved to be beneficial and gave the firm additional profits.¹³

⁸ *Kiiivskaia starina*, 1896. v. II, pp. 251-55. (O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 150.)

⁹ Volodymyr Kybiiovyc, *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, v. VIII, p. 2810.

¹⁰ O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 150.

¹¹ *Kiiivskaia starina*, 1896. v. II, pp. 255-58. (O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 151.)

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 255-58.

¹³ O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 151.

The 1840's were the decade of the greatest growth of the sugar industry in Ukraine. Landowners and various businessmen began to take an avid interest in the sugar industry. This was the period of the so-called "sugar fever or sugar mania" which gave many businessmen the opportunity to enter into this profitable industry.¹⁴

The varied and financially strong commercial activities as well as the broad economic sphere of the firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko, soon evoked the interest of one of the largest landowners of the Kiev region — the Cosunt M. S. Vorontsov. He readily comprehended the economic significance of large-scale production and the inherent benefits of the new industry for his own estate. For these reasons, he began discussions with the firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko which resulted in a agreement of the firm to build a sugar refinery on his estate. A contract that was valid for 23 years and 9 months (until July 1, 1871) was signed on September 30, 1848. For the construction of a sugar refinery an area of 150 desiatyns was allocated (1 desiatyna = 2.7 acres).¹⁵

Payment for the lease was established at 500 rubles annually. The mill had the rights to utilize the suitable construction wood and trees from the forest up to an area of 960 desiatyns, divided into 24 sections of 40 desiatyns each. The payment for each lumbered desiatyna of forest was fixed at 75 rubles. The management of the refinery was obligated to utilize sugar beets grown on the landowner's fields on the scale of 500 desiatyns. The mill was obligated to accept the harvest from these fields at an agreed upon price. The management of the mill was also obligated to buy sugar beets in the amount of no more than 20,000 berkovets (1 berkovets = 400 lbs.) annually, and also from the landowner's peasants if they grew sugar beets on their own land. In a short period of time there emerged a new town around the newly established mill.¹⁶

The mill owners did not have the right without the consent of the landowner to sell their mill, place it as security to credit institutions or use it as a guarantee for private loans. Beside the mill, the leasees had the right to place other buildings connected with the sugar industry. They did not have the right, however, without the approval of the landowner to create new enterprises which could result in losses for the landowner or hurt the interests of his peasants. The agreement also touched upon the question of labor. When the sugar refinery needed additional seasonal labor, the management was obligated to give preference in employment to the peasants of the landowner who had voluntarily applied.¹⁷

¹⁴ O. Ohloblyn, *Kripatska fabryka*, Kiev, 1925. p.135.

¹⁵ *Kiievskaya starina*, 1896. v. II, pp. 259-62 (O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, pp. 151-152.)

¹⁶ O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 152.

¹⁷ *Statisticheskoe opisanie Kiievskoi gubernii*, v. III, pp. 61-64. (O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 153.)

As is evident from the above-mentioned clauses, such agreements were very beneficial to the landowners. They gave them the guarantee of a steady income from the lease of the land and forests and a constant buyer for their sugar beets at fixed prices. They were also able to minimize their costs by taking advantage of the free labor of their peasants on their sugar beet fields and thus increase their profits. This was their primary concern since the steady income insured their economic standing and made possible the maintenance of the air high standard of living.

The price of sugar beets was more or less stable while the prices of wheat were dependent upon the political situation, the weather and the high cost of transportation. Throughout the 1840's the sugar industry rescued from bankruptcy many landowners, who did not have to sell any of their land in order to pay off their debts. It can be stated with a great degree of certainty, that in this aspect, the sugar industry did not generate significant changes in the socio-political system of the Russian empire, but conversely assisted in the retention of large landed estates. It should be kept in mind however, that firms such as Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko were the exception and that the majority of the landowners did not have the opportunity to conclude such favorable agreements as in the case of Vorontsov.

The Horodyshe refinery was opened in 1849 and the firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko invested into this refinery a total of 600,000 rubles of which 166,500 rubles went for construction and 153,000 rubles for machinery. The refinery was operated with steam-powered engines. The steam-powered engines and other machinery were imported from France and the maintenance and repairs of this equipment were done by foreign mechanics. The delivery and assembling of the machinery doubled its cost, because during the long transport some of the machines were damaged and there were mistakes made during the assembly process. In 1860, the number of full-time, non-seasonal workers stood at 850. The large, for that time, dimensions of the venture, its advanced technology and the well organized factory town amazed contemporaries and the refinery became an exemplary model of a sugar industry enterprise.¹⁸

At the very outset this new sugar refinery had very favorable and convenient commercial conditions. In 1848, Denmark during the course of the Danish-Prussian War blockaded the Prussian seaports which interrupted the maritime transportation between the North and Baltic Seas. As a result of this action, the importation of sugar to St. Petersburg was virtually stopped and the price of sugar greatly increased. The firm thus had the opportunity to sell its sugar at higher prices and thereby receive greater profits. The end of the 1840's and the beginning of the 1850's is the period of the greatest growth of the firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko. The fame and reputation of the firm were

¹⁸ *Zhurnal ministerstva gosudarstvennogo imushchestva*, 1852, no. XLV, chapter 2, p. 92. (O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 153.)

spreading throughout the Russian empire and it held a leading position in the industry of the empire.¹⁹

Always keeping in mind the importance of technical modernization and utilizing every opportunity to enlarge their enterprises, the firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko in addition to the sugar refinery, constructed a machine-building factory in Horodyshe. This factory carried out various technical tasks for the Tashlyk sugar refinery and prepared some machines for the Horodyshe mill. In this new enterprise a major role was played by Vasyl Symyrenko, who learned the technology of sugar refining in France. The craftsmen for this factory were imported from France, Belgium and England.²⁰

This enterprise not only satisfied the technical needs of the sugar refineries, but was also able to completely produce machines. Included among them were steam-powered machines for use in factories and plants, agricultural machinery, steamboats etc. It was precisely this machine-building factory which enabled the firm to have steamboats in the Dnieper River. The first steamboat was built in 1853 and was named "The Ukrainian." These steamboats were used primarily for the transport of sugar and wheat.²¹

The financial crisis near the end of the 1850's had a major impact on the activities of the firm. The existence of a capitalistic enterprise within the confines of a serf economy, coupled with the general disinterest of the government to non-gentry enterprises in contrast to the tacit support given to the landowners, further worsened the crisis. Especially hurt by this development were the wood-burning sugar refineries and those which were built on credit and now did not have the necessary credits and abundant markets to dispose of their output. These firms were rapidly dissolved. Payments were also stopped by such major sugar manufacturers as the firm of the Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko, who had debts in the total sum of 7 million rubles and in the banking house of Halperyn in the sum of 6 million rubles.²² For this reason, when at the beginning of the 1860's the bankruptcy of the firm appeared imminent, there was a general astonishment among contemporaries. No one could believe that this leading firm with all of its past successes and diversity of activities could be faced with such a financial catastrophe.

The Firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko utilized all possible means to save itself from bankruptcy. In a letter to the Minister of Finance on October 26, 1861 Yakhnenko wrote: "Living in such critical circumstances, we have decided to appeal to the government, in the person of the Minister of Finance, with a

¹⁹ O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 155.

²⁰ Volodymyr Kybiiovyc, *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, 1976, VIII, p. 2810.

²¹ *Kiiivskaia starina*, 1896. v. I, p. 104, v. III, p. 361. (O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 156.)

²² K. H. Voblyi, *Narysy z istorii rosiisko-ukrainskoi tsukroburiakovoï promyslovosti*, Kiev, 1930. v. II, p. 109.

request for a long term loan in the monetary sum of one million 500 thousand silver rubles.”²³

In this letter it was noted, that throughout the previous year and a half, there existed a stagnation in the economy as a result of the general monetary crisis. In direct connection with this, the sale of sugar in 1861 experienced major obstacles. “Otherwise it cannot now be sold” — it is pointed out in the letter — “but only on credit for a long-term period, which we, who have been involved in the sugar industry for more than 18 years, have never before experienced.”²⁴

The firm of the Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko did not receive the necessary credit and did not have any operating funds whatsoever. The reason that the firm did not receive a loan from the government is not clear. Still, this can be explained to a certain extent by the fact that a financial crisis existed throughout the Russian empire and that the landowners in regard to loans and credit had priority over merchants. Consequently, in the case of the firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko, there ensued collapse and bankruptcy of the firm.

The value of the movable property of the firm was quite large for that particular time. The value of the refinery in Horodyshche in the Kiev gubernia together with the steam-powered mill, warehouses and living quarters amounted to 1,933,955 rubles. the value of draft animals and agricultural inventory was 92,300 rubles, the mechanical equipment — 563,330 rubles. The sugar refinery in the village of Ruska Poliana was valued at 937,730 rubles and the factory in the village of Tashlyk at 562,000 rubles. A mill, two steamboats, stone buildings in Kiev, Odessa, Rostov-na-Donu and in Kharkiv cost 288,870 rubles. The general value of only the enumerated assets approached 3,978,185 rubles.²⁵

Some Russian authors, taking into account the fact that this firm was Ukrainian and that its owners were former serfs, quickly placed the entire blame for the catastrophe of the firm on its owners. Thus, E. Andreyev, the author of the article “O sveklosakharnom proizvodstve” in the first volume of “Obzor razlichnykh otriaslei manufakturnoi promyshlennosti Rosii” (1862) writes about the Yakhnenko brothers and Symyrenko:

“They did not limit themselves to small secondary matters, to the reasons, which were commonly noted in the press of that time.” “Having reviewed the crisis in the sugar industry at the end of the 1850’s, Andreyev links the catastrophe with the firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko, strongly criticizes them and further writes: “The affairs of this firm were not based on serious principles; this was a great delusion, which for a long time was upheld not to correctly expand the enterprise, but in order to prolong somehow its pitiful existence, until it was still possible to rely on earlier credit.”²⁶

²³ O. O. Nesterenko, *Rozvytok promyslovosti na Ukraini*, v. II, p. 108.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, v. II, p. 108.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, v. II, p. 108.

²⁶ O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 160.)

In his review, Andreyev had a valid point only in regards to credit. The banking reform of 1859 had an extraordinary effect on all enterprises. This reform brought about the consolidation of bank deposits in 5% bank notes, which took out of circulation large sums of capital. For this reason, bank credit was very hard to obtain. But there were still other reasons for the collapse of the firm. Without doubt at the beginning of the 1860's, the technology of the enterprise of the firm was somewhat outdated and the directors of the enterprises had aged and lost the necessary unity and flexibility. A still more significant factor was the competition on the part of other sugar refineries. In the middle of the 1850's there were established in Right-Bank Ukraine several additional refineries. They entered into direct competition with the firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko not only in the sugar market but also in the credit market. As a result, in the second half of the 1850's the credit of the firm began to decrease.²⁷

It should also be kept in mind that the business enterprises of the Brothers Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko represented only a small phenomenon in the total economic system, which was based on the nobility and serfdom. These institutions had the full support of the Russian government and among themselves the nobility had a tacit understanding about the absolute need for the common support of their social class. For this reason, a capitalist structure based on serfdom could only exist on its economic uniqueness and a favorable grain market.

The first formal act which indicated the judicial nature of the firm with the goal of correcting its economic position was the agreement concluded on July 14, 1858 between Kondrat and Terent Yakhnenko and Fedir Symyrenko. This agreement established the continuation of business and trading activities of the enterprises of the firm of Yakhnenko and Symyrenko. The capital of the firm was set on October 1, 1857 at 1,472,200 rubles and was divided equally among the three partners. The agreement exactly stated the capital status of the firm and the rights and obligations of the members of the commercial house. This agreement lost its validity due to the lack of accord among the founding members and their heirs. This was basically an attempt to strengthen the legal position of the firm which was being undermined by the weakening of those family ties upon which the firm had maintained itself up to that time.²⁸

The position of the firm at the end of 1861 according to facts presented by the commission, which was elected by a meeting of the creditors of the firm, was as follows: assets amounted to 5,800,745 rubles and 47¼ kopeks, and liabilities totalled 4,408,265 rubles and 64 kopeks. The assets consisted of the value of fixed property of all three plants at Horodyshche, Tashlyk and Ruska Poliana; the houses and other buildings in different cities; various types of factory and other materials; steamboats, barges and launches on the Dnieper River; and all

²⁷ Ibid., p. 161.

²⁸ *Kiievskaia starina*, 1896. v. III, pp. 370-73. (O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 163.)

types of engines, refinery equipment, indebted property and cash sums. The circulating capital amounted to about three million rubles. The proprietors' equity accounted for 1,392,479 rubles and 83¼ kopeks.²⁹

The payment of dividends on the shares of the firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko, executed by the administration, revealed that the owners-entrepreneurs were in a worse financial situation than was previously thought. The measures undertaken by the administration had only a palliative effect and touched upon only the most pressing activities of the firm. The administration of the firm then decided to place 15% of the net profits in a capital reserve fund, and the rest, that is 85%, to pay to all the creditors as a 4% return on invested capital. To save the firm, it was necessary to obtain bank credit to pay for ordered sugar beets, but the government did not agree to this and the firm did not receive the credit.³⁰

All the attempts by the owners to keep full control of the activities of the firm ended in total failure. They failed due to the refusal of Prince Vorontsov to conclude an agreement with the firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko and to establish a new joint stock company. The firm existed until the 1880's but it never fully recovered from the collapse of 1861, and it did play a major role in the economy of Ukraine. When the complete liquidation occurred, the firm paid off its creditors in full and all of its debts.³¹

The firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko played a major role in Ukraine not only by its economic activities, but also as an active supporter of Ukrainian cultural causes. In the first half of the 19th century, several landowners who were descendents of Ukrainian Kozak officer's families, cultivated and supported Ukrainian culture and education. The Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko took an active part in this movement and by their financial contributions were of great assistance in the publication of works of Ukrainian literature and provided financial security to the centers of Ukrainian culture.

As to the amount of their contributions we do not have sufficient data to give an approximate figure, but taking into account their financial status, we can assume that they were substantial and continuous. The sons of Fedir Symyrenko, Platon and Vasyl, took an active part in Ukrainian affairs. Platon Symyrenko (1821-63) financed the publication of the "Kobzar" of Taras Shevchenko in 1860 and continually assisted Ukrainian cultural activities.³² His brother, Vasyl Symyrenko (1835-1915), was a noted patron of Ukrainian culture and he was known in the Ukrainian circles as the "Big Khors" (the God of Sun). Throughout forty years of his life he regularly donated one tenth of his income for Ukrainian cultural causes. He was repaying the deficits of such Ukrainian journals as

²⁹ O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 163.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

³¹ *Kiievskaia starina*, 1896. v. III, pp. 374-76. (O. Ohloblyn, *Predkapitalisticheskaia fabrika*, p. 167.)

³² Volodymyr Kybiiovyc, *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, v. VIII, p. 2810.

“Kiievskaia Starina,” “Ukraina,” “Rada,” “Hromadski Dumky,” “Vik” and others. He supported financially Ukrainian activists and authors such as Mykhailo Drahomaniv and Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky.

In 1912, through the mediation of M. Hrushevsky, Vasyl Symyrenko donated 100,000 rubles to the Shevchenko Scientific Society for the purchase of a new building. In Sydorivka he established one of the finest national folk theaters, and all of his property in the value of about 10 million rubles he bequeathed to Ukrainian cultural causes. His foundation was to be under the trusteeship of the *Tovarystvo Dopomohy Ukrainskii Literaturi, Mystetstviu Nautsi*. But due to World War I, the Revolution of 1917 and the Ukrainian War for National Independence, this foundation was never established.³³

The heirs of Symyrenko also played an important role in the agriculture of Ukraine. Levko Symyrenko (1855-1920), the son of Platon Symyrenko, was a distinguished pomologist and geneticist. He established in Mliiv a collection nursery orchard which became the most famous institution in the Russian empire and had one of the richest pomological collections in Europe. In his orchard he organized a school for orchard keepers which trained highly qualified experts in the field. Under the Soviet regime, his property was nationalized and was converted into the Mliiv research station of orchard culture.³⁴ His son, Volodymyr Symyrenko (1891-1943), continued his research in orchard-culture and published many scholarly works on the subject. Following World War I and the Ukrainian War for National Independence, he was the primary reconstructor of orchard-culture in Ukraine. He organized a series of middle and upper-level schools and institutions of orchard-culture and edited journals concerned with fruit cultivation.³⁵

The families of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko were exceptionally talented and had a wide variety of interests. It was in the sugar industry, however, that their influence had the most significance for the economy of Ukraine. The firm of Yakhnenkos and Symyrenko was instrumental in establishing and popularizing this new industry. Their breadth of vision as to the commercial opportunities that this industry offered served as an example and inspiration for future Ukrainian entrepreneurs in the second half of the 19th century. The commercial success of their ventures gave the newly established sugar industry financial credibility and insured its position in the Ukrainian economy as well as its future growth and development.

The present preeminent position of the Ukrainian sugar industry in the U.S.S.R. and on the world market is due in part to their early successes. Today despite attempts by the Soviet regime to transfer this industry to other regions of

³³ *Ibid.*, v. VIII, p. 2810.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, v. VIII, p. 2811.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, v. VIII, p. 2811.

the U.S.S.R., Ukraine still produces over 62% of the sugar in the U.S.S.R., and remains one of the major sugar beet producers in the world. No less significant for the future of the Ukrainian sugar industry, was the recognition by them of the importance of technology in production and of a rational system for its implementation in industry. Their refineries became models for other sugar refineries in Ukraine and helped to contribute to their success. For this reason, they have often been called the “Fords of Ukraine” by various authors. These convictions were passed on to their heirs, who played a major role in the agriculture of Ukraine.



Dr. Walter Dushnyck: 1908-1985

In Memoriam

Shakespeare suggested that life is but a dream. If it isn't, then certainly it is the stuff of dreams, whether realized or unrealized. Walter Dushnyck — scholar, writer, journalist and activist — was fortunate in having been able to pursue a particular dream shared by many here and abroad, — the restoration of a free Ukraine.

This dream led Walter from a village in Western Ukraine, which was under Austro-Hungary in 1908 (subsequently under Poland and now under the Soviet Union). His journey was somewhat impelled by the Poles, who jailed him briefly along with fellow Ukrainian student-patriots for protesting Polish oppression, a yoke that was highlighted by the notorious “pacification” of this rebellious region. [Western Ukraine would become the home base of the forces of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought both Nazis and Communists, the latter exclusively after the war's ostensible conclusion in 1945.]

Walter began writing early in life. Under various pen names, his articles appeared in such Ukrainian publications that were tolerated by the Polish authorities as *Novy Chas* (New Time) and *Smoloskypy* (The Torchlights), both in Lviv, and *Ukrainsky Holos* (Ukrainian Voice) in Peremyshl.

Advised to leave Ukraine by both his parents and the local Ukrainian Catholic clergy (later to be ruthlessly destroyed by the communist Russians, he resolutely remained until he finished the *gymnasium*, in Berezhany and passed his *matura* in Lviv. It is a measure of the man that he quickly outgrew whatever resentment he might have felt for his treatment at the hands of the Poles, appealing to them in later life to join with Ukrainians and all other oppressed peoples in the face of the common foe — the Soviet Russia.

With the help of his family at home, well-wishers and particularly his older brother, Eugene, who already was in America, Walter made his way to famed Louvain University in Belgium, where he earned his B.A. degree in political science in 1935. While matriculating at the famed Jesuit school, he mastered French even as he applied himself to the study of English in anticipation of his inevitable destination — the United States, then and now the bastion of liberty. It was in Belgium that his dream took on a more concrete form.

Becoming a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), he met and was inspired by such OUN leaders as Colonel Eugene Konovalts and Generals Mykola Kapustiansky and Victor Kurmanovych. Other veterans of the struggle for a free Ukraine who always remained vivid in his memory were Captain Riko Yary, Dmytro Andrievsky, Volodymyr Martynets, Professor Eugene Onatsky, Volodymyr Kushnir-Bohush, Yaroslav Baranovsky and Oleh Kandyba (Olzhych). These august figures set the course of his life.

Some 50 years later, in March 1985, at a testimonial dinner tendered him by the Ukrainian American community in gratitude for his outstanding service to both Ukraine and America, Walter expressed *his* debt to — especially — Konovalts for the fatherly advice, sagacity and vision he had offered. Do what you can for us in America, the colonel counselled with no little prescience; he was to be assassinated by a Soviet agent on May 23, 1938 in Rotterdam.

Walter first saw the Statue of Liberty on July 30, 1935. He arrived here as America was confronting its greatest crisis since its internecine struggle under Lincoln. It was a time when it was still fashionable to debate whether the country was a “republic” or a “democracy”; when the Great Depression instilled earlier immigrants, that is, earlier Americans, with a belief that newcomers were unworthy because they would work for almost nothing (the problem was a prostrate economy); when the Communist activists in the country, capitalizing as usual on misery and confusion, astonishingly had garnered some one million card carrying members. Ukraine, as a nation, was unknown.

It was a time to try men’s souls, including Walter’s, especially when in the vaunted land of free expression Ukrainian organizations came under fire as being undesirable or even worse, potentially treasonous. The Organization for the Rebirth of Ukraine (ODWU) — and by extension all Ukrainians — were being charged as being “Fascist,” that is, were being lumped together with the totalitarian enemies, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

The “crime” the Ukrainians committed was to warn all Americans that Nazism and Soviet Communism were but flip sides of the same coin. For American officialdom of

the time the overriding objective, of course, was the defeat of Hitler. Nothing else really mattered, even if the price of victory meant having the Soviet Union as a bed partner.

Thus, the so-called Popular Front, composed of American Communists, fellow travelers and the inevitable attendant flotsam-jetsam of the disgruntled, disillusioned and depressed, had a field day in denying their own American heritage and their very identities as they assailed the Ukrainians and other ethnic groups.

Now in his thirties, Walter might well have decided, as many a lesser man might have, to pursue a more pedestrian path. But he already had allied himself — or naturally gravitated to — a brilliant and dedicated galaxy of Ukrainian American leaders. For a shining example, consider Dr. Luke Myshuha, who, as editor of *Svoboda*, the oldest Ukrainian daily in America, had published Walter's articles sent from Belgium. A man of erudition, great wit and personal charm, Myshuha had come to the United States in 1921 as the diplomatic emissary of the exiled Vienna-based government of the Western Ukrainian National Republic. Where Konovalts had provided direction, Myshuha added dimension.

Then there was Stephan Shumeyko, the youthful achiever who edited *The Ukrainian Weekly* and who had so quickly grasped the nature of America — its language, its mores, its media. And that charismatic figure, Dmytro Halychyn, who had fought for and had been wounded as a soldier of the free Ukrainian state (1917-1921).

In associating with these men of principle, Walter himself came of age: he realized, as had they, that in the most fundamental sense America was Ukraine itself. Considerations of size or time were irrelevant, whether America was larger physically or whether Ukraine was older in terms of experience with nationhood, free or submerged. What equated the two was the spiritual dimension of freedom. If men were not free, history would deteriorate into a doleful account of man's homicidal and genocidal tendencies. If, on the other hand, men of good will could create and maintain a binding social framework that would foster and depend on free speech, then life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness would be assured.

Shortly before Walter's death, Myron Kuropas, the Ukrainian American activist and writer, wrote the following in *The Ukrainian Weekly*:

For Dr. Dushnyck, there was never any conflict between devotion to Ukraine and loyalty to America. "Nationalism is a love of country and a willingness to sacrifice for her," he wrote in a 1936 issue of the *Nationalist*. "A person brought up as a Ukrainian nationalist will make a 100 percent better American citizen than one who was taught no nationalism at all."

. . . Dr. Dushnyck asked: "Was it 'Nazism' that guided Washington, Lincoln and other American patriots? Or was it American nationalism?"

. . . Dr. Dushnyck helped define the essence of Ukrainian nationalism for my American-born generation in a way that made it easy for us to comprehend, appreciate and accept it.

True to his convictions and abiding faith in America, Walter served with the U.S. Army in the Pacific during World War II. Always physically brave himself, he later

would say in private conversation of his experience on Okinawa: “I know this may sound trite, but I now know [emphasizing the word] that one really cannot appreciate courage until he knows fear.”

In their wartime reminiscences, soldiers always “end up” somewhere. Walter wound up as a Russian-language translator on General MacArthur’s staff in Tokyo.

In 1945 America was triumphant. Most of the boys were back home. Prosperity visibly was rounding the corner, even for the returning dozen million in uniform. A year after Walter shed his uniform for the last time along with many other Ukrainian-Americans, Winston Churchill ringingly identified the other enemy of our time — the Soviet Union. The cold war had begun. The Ukrainian community in America had been vindicated.

True, the FBI had exonerated ODWU, the OUN and UHO (United Hetman Organization) of the baseless charge of subversion, but only after countless office and home searches, interrogations and other harassing indignities. True, the Displaced Persons Act had salvaged the lives of hundreds of thousands of refugees and slave laborers left thrashing about in Central Europe with the collapse of the “thousand-year” Reich.

But also true was that many thousands of Eastern Europeans — deemed “inferior” as humans by Hitler and to this day as “undesirable” immigration by certain quarters in America — were allowed by Allied occupation authorities to be “reclaimed” by the Soviet Union as “countrymen.” These met the same dire fate as most German prisoners-of-war in the Soviet Union. And, what was worse, both parts of Ukraine, Western and Eastern, disappeared in the Soviet maw.

For America, the war’s end signaled a welcome return to business as usual. For most here it meant an opportunity to gratify long-deferred material needs. For Walter, it meant one of two choices: either to place all things Ukrainian on the back burner and participate in that uniquely American dream — achieving status and means as defined by a house of one’s own, a couple of cars and other luxuries or to continue to devote himself to a more fulfilling life — the cause of Ukraine.

For Walter, of course, the choice was merely a theoretical one.

Since polemic writing goes hand in hand with advancing an idea or championing a cause, he always had pen in hand. Even as a student in Belgium he had contributed not only to student publications but also to *Literaturno-Naukovy Visnyk*, a Lviv journal edited by Dr. Dmytro Dontsov. As noted above, he had sent pieces to *Svoboda*, the daily spokesman for the Ukrainian community in far-off America. (Thus, arriving in America in 1935, he came as no stranger.) And prior to his army stint, he had served as editor of two ODWU publications, the *Nationalist* (in Ukrainian) and the *Trident* (in English).

Journalism was not only his *metier*, but it clearly was also a means of gratifying his spiritual needs. he received lifelong reinforcement in his career decision from his wife, Mary. An American by birth, her roots in Ukraine, Mary emerged in her own right as a forthright spokeswoman for Ukraine and Ukrainian causes.

Walter’s life thenceforth was intensely productive, predictably frenetic and agonizingly frustrating — for the dream of the restoration of a free Ukraine is still to be realized. It became a life consumed, at the daily level, by the writing of hundreds of

memoranda, pamphlets, petitions and press releases. Consumed, as well by innumerable speaking appearances before Ukrainian American gatherings, attendances at congresses here and abroad, radio talks and interviews and continuing contacts with leading figures, both American and ethnic American (should a distinction here need be drawn).

Some examples: he was a member of the American Council to Combat Coimunism, the American Council for the Liberation of the Non-Russian Nations in the USSR, the U.S Council for World Freedom, and an executive officer of the Conference of Americans of Central and East European Descent (CACEED).

Congresses: as a delegate of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), he took part in the congresses of the World Anti-Communist League in Mexico City, London, Washington and Rio de Janeiro; attended the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) and the U.N. Human Rights Conference in Teheran (1968), and was one of the four-man delegation dispatched on a mission to the Ukrainian emigration in Western Europe (1952-53). (The other members were Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, Dmytro Halychyn and Stephen Jarema.)

He also testified and presented statements on Ukraine to the platform committees at both Democratic and Republican national conventions.

At the grass roots level, Walter was, in a word, ubiquitous. But through his writing and editing he reached a far greater audience.

Four major titles he authored come to mind: *Martyrdom in Ukraine* (detailing the destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine; probably "must" reading for the clergy); *In Quest of Freedom* (an explication of the Ukrainian cause); *Death and Devastation on the Curzon Line*, and *The Ukrainian-Rite Catholic Church at the Ecumenical Council, 1962-1965*.

Of all his activities, however, Walter in later years preferred the mantle of editor, which provided oases of relatively quiet times in which to reflect upon and attack the problems of the postwar Ukrainian American community. In this overall endeavor, which was to last all his life, he worked closely with Dr. Dobriansky, the Georgetown University professor who long served as head of the UCCA and who now is the U.S Ambassador to the Bahamas. Both saw an overriding need for the unification of the Ukrainian American community and for the organization of a solidified front. Leo (as the scholar is known to his intimates) always wanted a strong Ukrainian voice, hence the need for unification. The need persists.

While still editing *The Ukrainian Bulletin* (a copy of which always reached the desk of every U.S. senator and congressman, not to mention scores of members of the fourth estate), Walter assumed the editorship of *The Ukrainian Quarterly*. A primary goal of this scholarly journal, founded in New York City in 1944, always has been, through truth and scholarship, to refute — and explain the underlying reasons for — the Soviet Russian propaganda subverting the history and cultural and political developments of the Ukrainian people, among other oppressed nations. In providing invaluable source materials documenting the legitimacy of the Ukrainian aspirations to freedom and restoration of statehood, this journal has attracted — and thus joined together on its pages — some of the finest minds from every discipline from many countries. Ever growing in depth and scope, it has been quoted and referred to by encyclopedias, the

press at large and history books.

Even by the Communists themselves. Complimentarily, the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in Prague listed *The Ukrainian Quarterly* and its publisher, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, among the dozen top “Kremlinologist” centers in the United States. *Slovansky Prehled* (in a 1966 article by Emil Sip) ranked the journal and the UCCA with such prestigious American institutions as the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, the Hoover Institution, the Russian Institute at Columbia and that at Harvard, the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University, and Rand, among others.

For the present Ukrainian generation, such recognition must be understood. When Walter first stepped on these shores, Ukraine was a *terra incognita* for the American and Western academic and political worlds. Even as immigrants here Ukrainians were an unidentifiable or misnamed group. The public school teachers of their children never heard of Ukraine.

All that has changed, thanks to Walter Dushnyck and a legion of dedicated men and women like him.

In its 1960 survey the U.S. Census Bureau officially recognized Ukraine as a separate country and the Ukrainian language as a separate tongue. Courses in Ukrainian history, language and literature are offered at a number of American (and Canadian) universities and colleges, including the Ukrainian Studies Chair at Harvard. And each year the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence (January 22, 1918) is commemorated in the U.S. Congress, with scores of senators and congressmen introducing special resolutions and statements into the *Congressional Record* in resounding approval of Ukraine’s right to freedom and independence. Ukraine, indeed, is finally on the map.

Walter somehow found the time to serve as associate editor of the *Encyclopedia Slavonica* (1949) and of *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia* (1963 and 1971). In 1975 he contributed two extolled chapters on human rights in the USSR and its satellites to *Case Studies of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, published in English in The Hague, the Netherlands. In 1982 he wrote a chapter entitled “Ukrainians and Ruthenians” for *America’s Ethnic Politics*, a series on Contributions in Ethnic Studies (No. 5).

At the last, and true to form, Walter was serving as editor of one of the most ambitious scholarly ventures ever undertaken by the Ukrainian American community. Entitled *The Ukrainian Heritage in America* and enlisting the expertise of dozens of contributors from every discipline and cultural arena, this work is meant to be no less than a comprehensive depiction of the Ukrainian immigration in America from the days of Father Agapius Honcharenko. A seminal work, it cannot but prove both invaluable and inspirational for scholars, journalists, the clergy, students — in short, anyone and everyone with an abiding interest in that rich pluralistic democracy that is America.

To recall Walter is not merely to see him surrounded by piles of galley proofs, to hear him confess to some fatigue and then, as he flashed his boyish grin, to hear him add: “But someone has to do it.”

What we really see is that integrity, steadfastness and valor may go hand in hand, that love of country is an imperishable value and that the possession most to be prized is an uplifting, ever-restoring dream.

DR. EDWARD O'CONNOR
Leader of Displaced Persons Agency
1908 - 1985

Dr. Edward Mark O'Connor, who served as United States commissioner of displaced persons after World War II, died on November 25, 1985 at his home in Buffalo. He was 77 years old.

Dr. O'Conner headed war relief services for the National Catholic Welfare Council during World War II. In 1948 President Harry S. Truman appointed him commissioner of displaced persons. He served until 1951, helping to draft the Displaced Persons Act, which enabled thousands of Europeans who had been driven from their homelands to emigrate to the United States.

Dr. O'Connor was a member of the National Security Council staff from 1951 to 1960. He later served as staff director of the Joint Congressional Committee on Immigration Policy.

He is survived by his wife, the former Geraldine Marie Murphy; a son, Mark, of Buffalo; a daughter, Maureen Bailey of Silver Spring, Md.; eight grandchildren, and three great-grandchildren.

BOOK REVIEWS

GALICIA: A HISTORICAL SURVEY AND BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE. By Paul Robert Magocsi. Toronto-Buffalo-London: University of Toronto Press, 1983. 299 p.

This is an important book the implications of which go well beyond the limits of a historical survey and bibliographic guide. It is a pioneering study in which Dr. Paul Robert Magocsi presents the record as well as the results of his research. The object of his study is Galicia, an eastern European region which has been ruled by Austria, Poland, Ukraine, and the USSR at various times. Historically it has played an important and often crucial role in Ukrainian national development.

The book is “not a history of Galicia. Nor does it pretend to provide an exhaustive bibliography of the subject.” It is intended “to direct the reader to the major published primary and secondary sources” (p. xiv) dealing with Galician problems. It retains the careful outlines of system-building so well practiced in Dr. Magocsi’s other books. Its most original contributions lie in the critical sorting of the entries by subject and importance as well as by discursive insights.

Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide has ten chapters and their arrangement is basically chronological. The first two chapters deal with bibliographic and archival aids and with general studies. The following seven chapters are dedicated to specific periods: early history to 1340, 1340-1772, 1772-1848, 1848-1918, 1919-1939, 1939-1944, and 1945 to the present. Chapter 10 deals with the literature on minorities who lived in Galicia — Poles, Jews, Armenians, Germans, and Karaites. At first glance the careful reader notices that the author has not included a separate chapter on the Ukrainian statehood of 1918-1919 but has incorporated it into the 1919-1939 period. It seems to us that such a chapter would have strengthened the author’s position and made his work more balanced and more objective in its entirety.

The work as a whole emphasizes political, socioeconomic, literary, linguistic and archeological developments, recorded in fourteen languages. It encompasses more than 3000 references, 1000 notes, a detailed thematic and name index, and six maps which portray the historical development of Galicia. It goes on to deal with historiographical studies, national bibliographies, subject bibliographies, archives, libraries and other cultural institutions. Then Dr. Magocsi proceeds to scholarly journals, reference works, historical surveys, church history, cultural history, and regional and urban history. The first two chapters, in other words, outline the undertaking and introduce the author’s distinctive approach to the subject. In his prudent treatment of the material, Dr. Magocsi is sometimes also critical and his observations along this line are fine contributions to the increasing perception of the importance and coherence of the works

cited. For example, in discussing education, he writes: "While there are excellent studies on certain periods, a general history of education in Ukrainian Galicia remains to be written" (p. 37). In another instance, discussing regional and urban history, he is evaluative by saying that among the regional works "the volumes on Stanyslaviv, Buchach, Terebovlia, Zbarazh, Berezhany, and Pidhaitsi" are "the best in this genre" (p. 40).

Beginning with Chapter 3 and proceeding through Chapter 9, Dr. Magocsi's methodology is consistently better-rounded, his explicit interest rises constantly, and his endeavor becomes broader and more scientific. He is more inclined to bear on the object of the inquiry by using various methods of investigation. This combination of several methods, and the fact that he resorts to a sampling technique, account for the sustained interest with which one reads the book. The author's learning in these chapters is considerable. Far from looking at Galician history in a vacuum, he repeatedly shows his familiarity with all facets of life relevant to his concerns. He is well acquainted with the vast critical literature on the subject. And, above all, he has read widely and deeply in the many works he indicates in the notes.

As is often the case with a successful breakthrough, which this is, the idea which gave rise to it is a simple one and the by-products tend to be greater than the main objective. One of these is that the method affords us a better insight than heretofore into the fascinating but elusive world of the bibliographic guide when it is properly combined with a historical survey. Another and at the same time more immediately interesting by-product is a new categorization of the bibliographic material. The result of this is a challenge to the commonly accepted idea: regarding the realistic achievements of the various periods in order to produce a healthy effect on the scholar who will use them, and who perhaps will better understand how and why they occurred. This is the basic question to which Dr Magocsi is trying to find a solution when he says, "The literature dealing with the historiography of Galicia as a whole is underdeveloped, and only in general studies of Ukrainian historiography can a discussion of works by Galician historians (and usually about Galicia) be found" (p. 1).

The last chapter of the book brings to our attention the fact that Galicia was also the homeland of other national groups and that each of them "has a literature dealing with its 'own' history" (p. 224) in that region. The author treats each group in separate by examining it critically against its past and by integrating it both historically and socially into the continuum which is the chief object of his investigation.

Although *Galicia: A Historical Survey and Bibliographic Guide* is a contribution of unusual merit, it is not a definitive study. No one is more keenly aware of this than the author himself, as he reveals when he says that the book is to serve as an introduction to the historical problems of Galicia. It is to be hoped, however, that the work will not only be widely read and used as a reference book, which it is sure to be, but that it will also stimulate and encourage other scholars to continue the research. The book as a whole and its author's learning are true indicators for high standards of scholarship and breadth of knowledge. It was published in association with the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

THE GENOCIDE OF THE ARMENIAN PEOPLE. Special issue of the *Armenian Review*. Spring 1984, Vol. 37, No. 1-145. 202 p.

This special issue concerns two aspects of the genocide of the Armenian people during World War I. The first two articles are by Irving L. Horowitz, Hannah Arendt Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Political Science at Rutgers University, and Prof. James Reid of Lehigh University. Articles by Armen Hairapetian and Armen Hovannisian deal with the extensive U.S. State Department file on the Armenian genocide committed by the Turks.

Prof. Horowitz deplors what he calls a "danger in the massification of Holocaust studies," noting that books, plays and television dramatizations "pour forth relentlessly," approach the fad stage, and are not always objectively presented. He charges that there are those who engage in "moral bookkeeping" by comparing the six million deaths among the European Jews with the "estimated one million deaths among Armenians," although the number of Armenian victims amounted to 50 percent of the population, or only slightly less than the percentage of Jewish losses (60 percent).

Horowitz's article is largely a polemic directed against Emil L. Fackenheim's "What the Holocaust Was Not," a bulletin issued by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. He disputes Fackenheim's claim that the Holocaust was not a war. It was a modern one "waged with subterfuge and deception by a majority power against an internal minority with little power." "The precedent for this war against the Jews was the Turkish decimation of the Armenian population. Like the Nazis, the Ottoman Empire did not simply need to win a war and distribute power; it had an overwhelming amount of power to begin with. A war of annihilation is a war. To deny the warlike character of genocide is to deny its essence: the destruction of human beings for statist goals."

Observing that just as the Armenian genocide occurred after the Turkish defeat by Bulgaria in 1912, the most massive destruction of the Jews took place after the German defeat at Stalingrad. "When the major object of the war, defeat of the allied powers, was no longer feasible, the more proximate aim, destruction of the Jewish people, became the paramount goal." Horowitz asserts that what Fackenheim failed to notice "and that requires emphasis" is that a holocaust is now more likely to happen to people other than Jews and Armenians. "It was more likely to happen to Ugandans, and it did, to Cambodians, and it did, to Biafrans, and it did . . . there are other peoples victimized by the very model created by the Turkish and Nazi genocides."

While he has praise for South African-born Prof. Leo Kuper's book, *Genocide*, Horowitz points out the inaccuracy of equating apartheid with genocide but agrees with Kuper's assessment of why the United Nations has been ineffective in combatting genocide: ". . . the United Nations is committed to the sanctity of state sovereignty . . . has established commissions to deal with complaints about human rights violations which are themselves highly politicized as well as controlled by a clique of powerful nations whose vested interests are instilling voices of opposition."

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Prof. Reid writes that the main culprit of the Armenian genocides was the Ottoman autocratic elite, especially the nineteenth century rulers who sought to build a society based upon conformity to a totalitarian ideal. Where previously the minorities were kept in isolated and segregated communities, this policy was reversed in the 1890s and early 1900s with a Turkish goal seeking Turkification of all citizens. “Subjects who continued to maintain the old culture were looked upon as a burden to the state, an obstacle to the creation of a state and society based upon citizen involvement and cultural assimilation. It was not long before this ideal caused organized efforts to eradicate non-assimilated communities.”

Hairapetian discusses the many files in the U.S. National Archives that pertain to the Armenian Question. Of interest is “the cloudy issue” of the role of the German government in the massacres. He says that while the Young Turks had great admiration for the Germans, no one has conclusively proved the degree of their subservience to the Germans. “Consul Jackson and U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau were highly suspicious of German involvement. Jackson was quite perturbed about the German role, especially after the German consul in Aleppo wrote to him justifying the deportations because of the Armenian ‘rebellion’ at Van. The German Consul thought the Armenians were totally unworthy of the ‘protection’ and ‘safe-conduct’ provided by the Turks.”

Hairapetian continues: “As the evidence accumulated of a plot more sinister than any could imagine, Morgenthau feared the worst. He realized that the deportations were not a plan to assimilate the Armenian people among Turkish villages in order to kill them culturally and ethnically, as he once believed. Instead the plan was simply to kill them.”

Hovannisian’s article emphasizes the importance of the reports of American and European missionaries and those of U.S. Consuls J.B. Jackson (Aleppo) and Leslie Davis (Harput) in documenting the Armenian genocide. Just as in World War II the reports of the Polish underground Home Army concerning the fate of thousands of Jews sent to Majdanek, Treblinka and Auschwitz were at first disbelieved by both the Allied governments and by Jewish leaders in England and America, so were the reports of Consul Davis and others. “When he (Davis) tried to relate how it took a while for the various United States agents to become aware of a systematic genocide, he remarked, ‘I have since been told that the news contained in my first communication about the situation in Harput was so appalling that it was not fully believed until confirmed later’.”

The thirty-eight pages of selected State Department documents which conclude this special issue give a horrifying but convincing account of the incredibly brutal atrocities perpetrated upon the Armenian people. Especially moving are the accounts of missionaries Mary W. Riggs and Isabelle Harley.

POLAND'S POLITICIZED ARMY: COMMUNISTS IN UNIFORM by George C. Malcher (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984) 286 pages.

Much too little has been said about the internal function of the Army in a socialist country, let alone about one that oversees the ruling political party. To this end Malcher's primer *Poland's Politicized Army* is required reading, for it is a blueprint of control and raw power. The work is important since it describes fully the depth and extent of the Polish crisis of the 1980's; and it paints a portrait of "know how," adding an experience factor, for future use in other countries.

Poland's Politicized Army is a serious attempt to inform the West about the organization, functioning and effect of a politicized-military system, which in reality has no Western counterpart. It is a discussion about a cadre of politically trained soldiers within an army, which had been honed by Jaruzelski for years, just for this moment. Malcher logically takes the reader from the concept of Army leadership within the Polish defense system through discussions of the political activities of the active and retired officer corps to military-political organizations within the system which monitors reliability of the chosen.

We note with special interest the discussions on how the political army, after delays in assessing the impact of workers' unrest, was able to destroy the organizational structure of Solidarity; curb Poland's aspirations to freedom by insuring Soviet hegemony; and, its ability to hold the influence of the Polish Catholic Church. Malcher shows that the introduction of marshal law, in essence, gave the political-military apparatus virtual control over state administration and key sectors of the economy thereby creating an excuse for new legislation, institutions and procedures.

The author concludes by highlighting a number of items which should correct misconceptions still common in the West about Poland being Poland in the 1980's. A wealth of Appendices from Polish sources presents supplemental data which supports the thesis of the book. All in all, *Poland's Politicized Army* is an initial probe for answers to questions which must be considered in the future, if our understanding of Eastern Europe is to be complete.

Atlanta, GA

STEPHEN P. HALLICK, JR.

Edward Prus. WLADYKA SWIETOJURSKI. RZECZ O ARCYBISKUPIE ANDRZEJU SZEPTYCKIM 1865-1944 (A Greek-Catholic Metropolitan: Life and Activities of Andr Szeptycky, 1865-1944). Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Zwiqzkow Zawodowych, 1985, pp. 336. Illustrated. Price: 280 zlotys.

Neglected in old Poland, and persecuted in Russia, particularly under Catherine II and Nicholas I, the Uniate Church gradually became a powerful institution in Eastern Galicia. It had been created at the Synod of Brest in 1596. It was free to preserve its Orthodox liturgy in exchange for a recognition of papal supremacy. After taking possession of Galicia in 1772, Empress Maria Theresa took the Uniate Church there

under her special protection, thus adding to its prestige and respectability. She even changed its name into that of the Greek Catholic Church. The latter gradually became a protector of, and a spokesman for, nascent Ruthenian nationalism. The term Ruthenian was gradually replaced by Ukrainian. As Ukrainian national consciousness progressed, more and more Ukrainians began to dream about reunification with their brothers under Russian rule. As Ukrainian nationalism could prosper under Hapsburg rule, Ukrainians came to consider Eastern Galicia as the “Ukrainian Piedmont.”

In spite of the size of historical Ukraine and its large population, the objectives of Ukrainian nationalism were not easy to achieve because of internal and external factors, the most important probably being the Ukraine’s geopolitical location. However, there also existed religious and political differences between the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia and those under Russian rule. Those in Galicia were largely Westernized and looked with favor upon the Papacy, while their brothers under Russian rule were predominantly Orthodox and deeply attached to the values of Eastern Christianity. In addition, the idea of Ukrainian statehood had two powerful enemies: the Poles and particularly the Russians. As nationalism is often blind, most Russians were simply unable to conceive the idea that, though close to each other, the Ukrainians and Russians had developed into two distinct nations. Last but not least, Russia could never voluntarily agree to grant independence to the Ukrainians, and particularly to hand over Kiev to them, because Kiev is not only the historical capital of Ukraine but also the cradle of the Ukrainian people.

World War I and the subsequent fall of the Romanovs gave Ukrainian nationalism a unique chance in history, because the greatest enemy of its own statehood was in turmoil. However, internal divisions, religious differences, Polish-Ukrainian hostility in Eastern Galicia, and skillful Bolshevik propaganda with regard to self-determination prevented Ukrainian nationalists from exploiting their great chance. Little wonder that many Ukrainian nationalists became strongly alienated and frustrated, and that the most determined among them turned to revolutionary struggle in order to achieve their objectives. Such methods brought no tangible results. The defeat of Nazi Germany established Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. The Ukrainians lost not only their “Piedmont,” but in addition, Stalin abolished the Greek Catholic Church in March 1946. Since then, both Ukrainian patriots and the Greek Catholic Church could only function freely in the Ukrainian diaspora.

It fell upon an aristocrat to head the Greek Catholic Church between 1900 and 1944. Metropolitan Andrii Szeptycky (1865-1944) was born into a Catholic, patriotic Polish family, and was baptized as Roman Maria Aleksander. Count Andrii Szeptycky was a descendant of an old Ukrainian but Polonized, boyar family which in the eighteenth century had included Metropolitans Athanasius and Leo and Bishops Varlaam and Athanasius Szeptycky. He embraced Greek Catholicism in 1888, joined the Basilian Order, and adopted the name Andrii, very popular among Eastern Slavs. Szeptycky was a man of enormous energy, leadership abilities, and intellectual curiosity. He was very tall and endowed with personal charisma. The future metropolitan gained rapid promotion within the Greek Catholic Church. Pope Leo XIII selected him to become its leader at the age of thirty-five.

Metropolitan Szeptycky soon became a controversial figure. Ukrainian nationalists initially accepted him with mixed feelings, or at least with cold reserve. It was almost an insult to appoint a Pole as their shepherd. When Szeptycky began to identify himself with Ukrainian nationalism, he angered and alienated Poles in turn. It should be explained that Poles and Ukrainians lived side by side in Eastern Galicia, and as Ukrainian national consciousness increased, reciprocal hostility grew stronger. Many Polish nationalists could not understand that a grandson of Count Aleksander Fredro (12793-1876), a popular Polish playwright and patriot, and a brother of General Count Stanislaw Szeptycky (1867-1950), could not only change his faith, but turn his back on his own people as well. The metropolitan expressed his own feelings in this matter to a relative of his: "I love Poland, Polish history, and literature, but the tongue and songs of the people that I have been surrounded with since my childhood, have become mine. I am like St. Paul, who was a Jew for the Jews, a Greek for the Greeks, and a savior for all."

Although human motives are difficult to ascertain, all seems to indicate that Szeptycky's main objective was to bring about unity between Rome and Eastern Christianity. He was in a unique position to accomplish this objective because he came from that region, was well versed in Christian theology, and showed both patience with, and respect for, Orthodoxy. At the same time, the Archbishop came to understand that his supreme spiritual mission could not come to fruition without his unconditional support for the well-being of the Ukrainians. Because of circumstances, Szeptycky was forced to become involved in politics.

Metropolitan Szeptycky has had numerous detractors and admirers, the former, of course, writing mainly within the USSR, and the latter chiefly in the Ukrainian diaspora. A scholarly conference devoted to him was held at the University of Toronto between November 22 and 24, 1984. Organized by Professor Robert Magocsi, it was attended by scholars from numerous countries, and attracted large attention among members of the Ukrainian community in Canada.

Edward Prus has developed an interest in Ukrainian nationalism, the Greek Catholic Church, and Archbishop Szeptycky. He has published articles and is currently preparing a book of the OUN (The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). Prus's writings straddle the threshold between journalism and genuine scholarship. He has an important asset, however, namely access to Soviet archives, a favor not easily granted to foreigners.

Prus's work is based on manuscript and printed sources, as well as secondary works. As previously mentioned, he has done research within the USSR, particularly in Kiev and Lviv, and Poland. He could also study microfilmed records of the former German Foreign Office (Auswartiges Amt). The author stresses the denigratory nature of works on both Szeptycky and the Greek Catholic Church within the USSR, and he claims that similar works written in the Ukrainian diaspora are too complimentary. He is more positive about J.A. Armstrong's *Ukrainian Nationalism 1939-1945* (1955), and Hansjakob Stehle's *Die Ostpolitik des Vaticanus 1917-1975* (1975). The work is composed of the editor's foreword, an introduction, four chapters, a conclusion, footnotes, bibliography, and illustrations. Prus has adopted both a chronological and topical approach. Although the author can not claim to answer all the pertinent questions

related to Szeptycky's life and activities, he hopes to bring him closer to the Polish reader, to whom the work is mainly directed.

The author discusses the origins of the Uniate Church, and its role in the Habsburg monarchy; speaks about the Vatican's Eastern policy, aimed at bringing about the unification of Catholicism with Orthodoxy; deals with Szeptycky's upbringing, his attitude toward the Habsburgs, Imperial and Soviet Russia, and Polish and Ukrainian nationalism. Subsequently, Prus analyzes Szeptycky's attitude toward the Ukrainian struggle for statehood, the emergence of the Second Polish Republic, and terrorism. The last chapter deals with Szeptycky's stand with regard to the Soviet-German war, Ukrainian nationalism and its internal divisions, as well as with the Metropolitan's fears for the future of both the Ukrainian nation and the Greek Catholic Church. The study ends with Szeptycky's death, the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church within the USSR in March 1946, and the subsequent deportation of the entire Greek-Catholic hierarchy, together with Szeptycky's successor, the late Cardinal Josyf Slipyi (1891-1984).

One ends Prus's work with mixed feelings. He certainly has literary talent, and can tell his story in an interesting way, but an informed and critical reader can not stop thinking that all the research, as well as the selection of illustrations, was done with a preconceived idea, aimed at discrediting both Szeptycky and the Greek Catholic Church rather than evaluating both fairly. The author is too intelligent to use primitive denigratory methods, but he certainly shows no sympathy for the great church leader. If one were to believe the author, Szeptycky was truly loyal only to the Hapsburgs, and pursued the Vatican's aim of Christian unity with great devotion and self-denial, though even here he was not free from personal ambitions and vanity. He wanted to become patriarch of Ukraine, and perhaps even of all Eastern Slavdom. It is true that Polish nationalists could not like Szeptycky; Prus skillfully exploits this fact by indicating his anti-Polish actions, but it is also true that the Metropolitan never advocated violence, condemned terrorism, and was happy when occasionally Poles and Ukrainians collaborated, as was the case between Marshal J. Pilsudski and Ataman Symon Petlura. Szeptycky took his responsibilities seriously, and stayed at his post, thus exposing himself in face of the changing regimes in Eastern Galicia. He guided his people in peace and war, always trying to use his influence to alleviate their sufferings. He could expect nothing from Nicholas II or Stalin, and if he wrote to them, he did it for his Church and the Ukrainian people with whom he came to identify himself. One can hardly blame him for writing letters to Hitler, Himmler, and other Nazi officials; neither Hitler nor Himmler ever replied. Once more, the welfare of his people was at stake.

The author condemns Ukrainian terrorism, exposes the collaboration of some Ukrainians with the Germans, trying to implicate Szeptycky, members of the Church hierarchy, as well as individual clergymen. At the same time, he says nothing about the Soviet policy of mass deportation and persecution of religion. Fairness certainly is not Prus's virtue. He prefers to expose, to insinuate rather than to explain or to evaluate objectively. Much violence happened in Ukraine during World War II, but similar behavior could be witnessed elsewhere, particularly in Yugoslavia. Yugoslav historians do not hide the fact that more Yugoslavs perished of ethnic violence than because of foreign rule in 1941-45. The frustrated Ukrainians could be compared to the Croats, who

had once dreamt about a common future with the Serbs, and then came to detest them.

Szeptycky was ready to hide a fleeing Jew and to write to Himmler defending them from persecution. Like the Pope, Szeptycky did not have divisions behind himself, but only disposed of an enormous moral authority that he used.

No full evaluation of Metropolitan Szeptycky is possible until both the relevant Vatican and Soviet archival materials are open for research. Prus has had access to Soviet archives, but he made his research selectively. He knew what he wanted to find. In another writing, Prus accuses Stepan Bandera of wishing to assassinate General Stefan Grot-Rowecki at Zellenbau at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. In this book, he tells the Poles how they were butchered by Ukrainian nationalists during World War II, and that Szeptycky's only advice to the persecuted Poles in Eastern Galicia was to get out of there. His aim seems to be obvious. Prus wants to keep the Polish-Ukrainian hostility alive, though more and more Poles and Ukrainians have come to realize that both were wrong in the past, that both have become losers, and that Russia has benefited from their reciprocal hostility.

The panelists at Toronto in November 1984 tried to be objective and understanding. Prus is not. One can forgive the author some factual errors, and the lack of an index of names and places, as well as a glossary of terms and organizations, but not his partiality, and lack of objectivity. Early in his life, the young, dashing hussar officer decided to serve a great ideal. He remained true to this ideal throughout his long trying life. Metropolitan Szeptycky still awaits his historian.

Vanderbilt University

ADAM A. HETNAL

ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION, by Ed. A. Hewett, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1984), 228 pages

The current crisis of the Soviet system has two aspects, a political one and an economic one. The publication of this work is timely and discusses many intertwining aspects of the above. Five areas are addressed. First, there is an overview of the energy problem, Soviet performance and the possibility of its reform. Second, Soviet energy supplies are detailed. Third, Soviet energy consumption in world perspective is studied. Fourth, the energy balance is discussed; and finally, the relationship of energy, as a whole, with its impact on Soviet Foreign policy is explored with the author attempting to predict into the 1990's.

There are a number of unique discussions which merit attention. Most notably is Hewett's position which challenges 1977 CIA estimates of Soviet oil production and its analysis. In essence his study expands the debate to the entire spectrum of Energy (oil, gas, coal etc.) as a tool of Foreign policy. He feels production and export of gas will become prominent in the future. Recent news articles tend initially to uphold his hypothesis.

The delicate balance of maintaining priorities between Soviet military needs and consumer client states with internal USSR requirements is highlighted. In the final

analysis he feels the Soviets will remain a net exporter of Energy, at least through the decade. Hewett's identification of problems, discussions of solutions, use of graphics and charts are impressive. According to him the prevailing and chronic problems of labor shortage, inadequate infrastructure, poor equipment and inept organization remain unsolved. Also of note is the status of the various gas lines being constructed (p. 77), which reflects the above.

The author concludes with a warning that the US may in the final analysis be relegated to an "observer status" in the influence of Soviet Energy development, albeit early US business interests during Detente and later US Government opposition. He feels all technologies required by the Soviets are available within the USSR or obtainable from Japan or Europe.

Throughout Soviet history, at each critical juncture in its development, the Kremlin has been able to advantage its position by "playing off" the capitalist states against one another. Hewett's book links the export of Energy, its manipulation, hard currency revenues and Soviet industries' modernization to Foreign Policy. In today's world of Energy interdependence and competing systems, the implications between Energy-economics and Foreign Policy requires special attention and understanding.

Atlanta, Georgia

STEPHEN P. HALLICK, JR.

ON FREEDOM, Edited by John A. Howard. (Devin-Adair Publishers, 6 North Water Street, Greenwich, Connecticut 06830, 1984). 161 pages.

The Rockford Institute, directed by Dr. Thomas Flemming, is a study center situated at 934 North Main Street, Rockford, Illinois 61003, which bases its inquiries on the principles, traditions, and institutions of Western society on the proposition that culture—not politics nor economics *per se*—is the primary denouement of the organization and character of a society. Cultural factors such as religion, education, human beliefs, literature and the arts transmit moral values and codes of conduct that allow a free society to function. In other words, as Professor Richard Weaver pointed out in a book of like title, ideas have consequences. History is largely the outworking, the denouement and consequence, of the ideas by which men live.

Among other things, the Institute publishes a monthly journal, *Chronicles of Culture*, and two monthly newsletters, "Persuasion at Work," which seeks to persuade businessmen that free enterprise principles can function only in a morally sound society, and "The Religion and Society Report" edited by Richard Neuhaus. *On Freedom* is the result of an Institute sponsored conference, titled "For Your Freedom, and Ours," held in the Federal Republic of Germany, November 18-20, 1982.

Described by Robert A. Nisbet, who wrote the foreword, as a "veritable feast of philosophic insight, historical comprehension, and unswervable devotion to democratic freedom," *On Freedom* is presented under the organizing themes of: I, "Towards a New Philosophy of Freedom," II, "Freedom and the Market," III, "The Cultural Substances of Freedom," IV, "Freedom and Unfreedom." Contributors include Nikolaus

Lobkowitz, professor of political theory and philosophy at the University of Munich; Leszek Kolakowski, research fellow at Oxford University; Paul Johnson of the American Enterprise Institute; Arthur Shenfield, John Howard, Richard John Neuhaus, and Melvin J. Lasky.

The collectivist state, Shenfield contends, may set out to be the people's provider and benefactor, but it inevitably becomes their master, moving in scope and power from omniscience to omnipotence. Paul Johnson finds it a matter of historical record and observation that free-market systems, in contrast to command systems, have the qualitative decision-making for getting goods to the right place at the right time. He observes that the Soviet Union, with more land under cultivation than any nation on earth, experiences chronic food shortages, and avails itself of the market economies of the free world; that the Soviet Union must employ consumer rationing of most consumer goods by the ubiquitous line or queue or by occupation (shops selling scarce goods open only to party functionaries or those with access to foreign currency).^{*} Government restrictions on the market are likened by Johnson to "forms of censorship, suppressions of truth, or attempts to poison wells," which are illustrated by various forms of market rigging.

Melvin J. Lasky, "Confronting 'the Russian Question': The Ideological Journey of a Generation," observes the frequency with which Western intellectuals have become mesmerized and enamored by the promise of totalitarianism. Lasky tells the Story in terms of "my own generation of Americans . . . whose involvement with Marxist ideas, liberal ideals, and ideological passions generally . . ." which have tended to posit such decadence in the structures of freedom, and contrasting glory in the ethic of collectivism.

. . . Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was very impressed with Joseph Stalin ("Uncle Joe," as he called him) and he thought he would have made a very fine U.S. Senator. John Reed, a witness of the October Revolution, was convinced that the "Ten Days that Shook the World" would issue in a new social order fulfilling all the ideals of the French and American Revolutions. Lincoln Steffens looked at Soviet Society as if it were a practical piece of machinery and made his famous pronouncement, "I have seen the future and it works!"

Lasky notes that he, as a young American lieutenant in the Germany of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement was almost court-martialled by the U.S. Army for refusing to refer to the Soviets as "our gallant Soviet ally" and as a "freedom-loving democracy." Two years later he was almost expelled from the U.S. Occupation Zone "for going so far as to condemn *all* totalitarian censorship, Soviet as well as Nazi."

These essays address some of the more salient philosophical and practical issues on the role of freedom in modern civilization.

Jackson, Ms.

TOMMY W. ROGERS

* One area in which Soviet citizens do seem to fare well, however, is that of medical care. The contrast with the United States is not indicative of the inferiority of free enterprise in medicine, but of the fact that free enterprise in medicine does not prevail in the United States, rather, medicine is organized for the benefit of the cabal of provider functionaries government.

WEALTH AND POVERTY: FOUR CHRISTIAN VIEWS OF ECONOMICS. Edited by Robert G. Clouse. Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1984, 228 p. \$5.95 (paper).

Four spokesmen make a case for four different economic systems, and each system is critiqued by the other three contributors. Contributors are Dr. Gary North (free market); William E. Diehl (democratic capitalism); Art Gish (decentralist economics); John Gladwin (British socialism or centralist economics).

Dr. North contends that biblical principles which are cross-culturally binding set out the ethical requisites of economic relationships, which blueprint, according to North, requires that government limit its tax extractions to not more than ten percent, requires a system of self-government under biblical law, and requires a privatized economy. In North's view, scripture provides permanently binding laws or blueprints, and Christians have the task of discovering ways to apply these ethically binding principles economy by economy, civilization by civilization. The other three contributors reject the notion of biblical law, and then set forth *their* preferences.

North feels that economic prosperity is primarily a matter of ethics or values: faith and cultural prosperity on the one hand, or ethical rebellion and cultural poverty, on the other. He rejects increasing tax extractions on citizens of the West (whose tax penalty now doubles that of ancient Egypt, perhaps the most tyrannical bureaucracy in the ancient world) for the benefit of the "poor" in backward areas. Such taxation results in government-to-government aid (money down the devil's rathole, North has said elsewhere), and builds up the wealth of "pro-socialist, Western-educated political leaders who dominate so many of the Third World's one-party 'democracies.'" In sum, poor people in the West are taxed to provide political support to wealthy politicians in the Third World.

Diehl thinks North is overly concerned with freedom rather than justice. He thinks "welfare" must become a hallowed word, honored at home and abroad, without taking a close look at the "justice" which the welfare produces. He does not want total centralization, just enough centralization to be good for monopoly capital. He compares U.S. and Soviet agricultural output to illustrate the greater efficiency of nations which have an agricultural system based on the market rather than centralized management. Gladwin and Gish unite in a concern for what they have deluded themselves to believe is "social justice." Gladwin and Gish think North anti-Christian. Gish appropriately points out some flaws of monopoly capitalism, and contends that Western values are demonic and destructive. He does, implicitly, make something of a case for Westerners to mind their own business, particularly with respect to development. He does not mind if El Salvador is liberated after the Cuban model.

Dr. North's essay easily sets the economic, moral, and biblical challenge to which the others must respond or default. In general, they default, and, at times, North's pen is so acerbic that it is devastating. For example, in response to Diehl's claim that in fact Christians through the centuries have lived lives of faith in various kinds of economic systems, North pins him with the wallop of a wet bag of cement that is overwhelmingly devastating in substance and analysis. North answers that of course Christians can live

“lives of faith within all kinds of economic structures” as is dramatically illustrated by Alexandr Solzhenitsyn. North then asks, “if Christians can just get ‘freedom, justice, and responsibility’ operating in the Gulag, will all be well? But if these three principles were imposed in the Gulag, could the Gulag survive?”

Our initial response might be: “No, the Gulag would not survive.” But this response is premature. Until these three words are *defined*, meaning until we can provide *explicitly biblical content* for them, how can we be sure that the Gulag wouldn’t survive? After all, the Communist society which has created and sustains the Gulag has always promoted its cause in terms of phrases such as “freedom, justice, and responsibility.” This is one of the points Solzhenitsyn makes clear” (p. 112).

North argues for biblically defined substantive content to such generalities as justice, freedom, and responsibility. He states that biblically defined freedom and justice would destroy “both the Gulag and the Communist civilization which created it and sustains it.” The whole Communist system, being morally corrupt (Konstantin Simis, *USSR: The Corrupt Society*, 1982), would collapse. Application of biblical principles to all corrupt or tyrannical economic systems would transform them from top to bottom.

Jackson, Mississippi

TOMMY W. ROGERS

THE GREAT POWERS AND POLAND, 1919-1945; From Versailles to Yalta by Jan Karski. Lanham, Maryland, University Press of America, 1985. 697 pp. \$28.75

Jan Karski’s book is a remarkable monograph. It is the first comprehensive study of the rebirth of an independent Polish state in 1918 and of its gradual decline, culminating in the Yalta agreement.

Karski has shown how pernicious great-power politics can be when they are based on feelings of superiority and the domination of and contempt for smaller nations. At the end, as in a Greek tragedy, everybody was punished, victims and bullies alike.

Although he is a Polish patriot, the author has abandoned the most common and self-destructive trait of Polish historiography: the portrayal of a Poland suffering because of its innocence and idealism, brutally abused by a sinful, careless world. The author decided that for the sake of Poland’s and Europe’s freedom he should perform a vivisection without narcosis. He exposed the internal weaknesses of the Polish regime, the irresponsibility and outright stupidity of the center and right-wing parties, the treason of the communists, the increasing autocracy and authoritarianism of the ruling group, the shameful pogroms against the Jews and the “pacification” of the Ukrainians, the mindless imitation of the Nazis and the construction of the concentration camp in Bereza Kartuska, as well as many other such policies and acts.

He convincingly shows how Poland was undone by its neighbors, allies, and enemies, how the old culture-and freedom-loving nation was compelled to act against its own interests.

Chamfort remarked about one of his heroes that he was an example of how to live beyond marriage and without celibacy. The French politicians and their English mentors did not even want to give the Poles a chance to preserve decency and independence at the same time. They pushed the Poles with the determination of Furies into the arms of Hitler and Stalin simultaneously. On the basis of enormous and exhaustive research in six languages, Karski presents facts and describes how the decay of straight political thinking was corrupting everybody in the West and East, including the Polish leaders. It is to Karski's credit that he also condemns Polish participation in the partition of Czechoslovakia and Polish gloating after Czechoslovakia was overrun.

Jan Karski is an authentic war hero whose activity in the Polish underground in World War II made him one of the first to see and report to the world the beginning of the process of slaughtering European and especially Polish Jews in the years 1939-1942. He delivered his report on *Aussiedlung* (i.e., extermination), including his observations of the gas chambers in Treblinka, in person to the British government after a trip that would tax the credulity of devotees of Hollywood thrillers. His was, indeed, the first complete and authenticated report on the Holocaust which reached the West. Unfortunately, for many reasons the allies ignored the dimensions of the disaster. They failed to respond as they should have. Today, in Israel, Karski is honored in the Alley of the Righteous Gentiles among the nations. He symbolizes the best traditions of Polish humanism and tolerance.

This book is a result of Karski's scholarly activity over a period of almost forty years; since 1952 he has been professor of government in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; he has lectured in Africa and Asia.

The gist of Karski's presentation is summed up by him in the Preface:

"It seems that from Poland's resurrection at the end of World War I, to its demise following World War II, only once were the Poles able to determine their own fate by themselves. That was during the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1919-1920. In all other instances Poland was unable to play an independent and effective role in the international arena, regardless of the merits or demerits of its policies . . . its fate depended on the Great Powers — their short or long-range goals and their interrelations."

Step by step, Karski shows how the Great Powers of the Versailles World were wheeling and dealing among themselves and how highhandedly they treated the small European nations. He shows how the French, British, Italian, and the German Weimar politicians behaved like generals who prepared to fight the previous war. Western politicians were unable to comprehend that, after the disaster of World War I, the victory of the Russian Communist Revolution, and the advent of Fascism, everything had changed and the old axioms concerning a "balance of power," the "European concert," and "spheres of interest" had become obsolete. One could apply Talleyrand's quip to the way Western diplomats were thinking: It was worse than criminal, it was a blunder.

Their series of criminal errors started when France and, especially, England tried to outwit each other and, at the same time, to deceive their present and former allies and

adversaries. A rule so important in internal politics is also valid in the international arena: You cannot fool all nations and governments, all friends and enemies, all of the time. Without De Gaulle's intelligence they followed his rule: War is against one's enemies, peace is waged against one's friends.

France, England, and Italy did not want to guarantee the Polish western frontiers formally. In this way they encouraged the German revanchists and nationalists to regard Poland as a *Saisonstaat*, an ephemeral state, an easy prey thrown to them, a bait to encourage Hitler's efforts to crush Soviet communism.

Primitive West European anticommunists were unable to understand the roots of communism and the real sources of the strength and weaknesses of the Soviet system. They did not distinguish between the social essence of Fascist and Stalinist authoritarianism. They believed naively that they would be able to provoke a war between the two which would bleed both to death. Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, and Romania were treated like objects, pawns, in the geo-political calculations. The basic immorality of this approach was enhanced by the catastrophic political miscalculation which underlay it. The Western powers consciously deceived the Poles who were living in a world of self-delusion; meanwhile the Polish centrist and rightwing parties were euphoric because of Hitler's and Goering's courtesy.

Karski meticulously describes all these facts, quoting diplomatic reports, diaries, and other important sources. He provides more than enough data to support his conclusions. Some of them are, however, expressed tersely: the affinity between ideology and a lack of democracy and political responsibility constitutes a ground for cooperation, but the result of such a collaboration can be only one: in Shakespeare's phrase, the stronger and wilder "rascal people, thirsting after prey," will try to devour the weaker. The fact that minister of foreign affairs, Josef Beck, and his ideological partners failed to grasp this simple truth is improbable, but it is a fact that Chamberlain, Halifax, Daladier, Bonnet, and the other Western "appeasers" fell into the traps which they and their imperial predecessors had successfully practiced innumerable times in the past. Is it possible that political ideology and anticommunist passion could blind otherwise clear-sighted and intelligent leaders to such a degree? Could their fear of communism deprive the ruling elites of common sense, leading them to believe that the only sure weapon against despotism could only be another type of tyranny, not freedom? How could they believe from 1919 until 1939 that the people of Central and Eastern Europe would behave like obedient tools, that the corpse of Poland could serve as a king of manure that would fertilize freedom, blooming on the ruins of both Fascism and communism: dispatched to a common grave one by the other? Anyone who doubts that such a theory and policy might seriously have ever been debated, accepted or followed should read Karski's masterly monograph.

The cause of freedom owes a lot to Jan Karski. More than forty years ago he brought evidence out of the very furnaces of Treblinka that the scale of crimes and genocide was unlimited. Today he has presented the evidence, compiled with boundless industry and enormous erudition, that the errors made even by the most seasoned politicians can be incalculably large. Nothing in politics is self-evident. Even Cartesian clarity must be argued, as Belgian thinker Ch. Perelman used to repeat in his life-long

struggle against the “obviousness” of common-sense conclusions.

Jan Karski, by presenting the recent history of Western diplomacy toward Poland, helps to reinforce one of the most important philosophical premises of freedom: freedom is inseparable from rationality and argument; it must consistently question all axioms and “obvious” premises; the immoral shortcuts supposedly justified by noble ends are usually the most expensive and inefficient means in the long run.

Queens College, New York

Mieczyslaw Maneli

CONFERENCES

Ukraine During World War II Conference at the University of Illinois

June 4-8, 1985 at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, the Fourth Conference on Ukrainian Studies was held. The Conference "Ukraine During World War II" was sponsored by the Ukrainian Research Program at the University of Illinois. More than eighty scholars actively participated in 20 panels. The range of topics discussed by the attending professors and researchers covered a wide spectrum of Ukrainian subjects. The papers were read in either English or Ukrainian.

The opening remarks were made by Dmytro Shtohryn, the organizer of the Conference and the Chairperson of the Ukrainian Research Program. They were followed by welcoming remarks by Chancellor Thomas E. Everhart, Ralph T. Fisher Jr., Director of the Russian and East European Center, and Marianna Tax Choldin, Director of the Summer Research Laboratory.

The papers dealt with: "Ukrainians in Foreign Armed Forces;" "Ukrainian Churches During World War II;" "Social Aspects of Ukraine in World War II;" "Jews, Poles and Ukrainians in World War II;" "Problems of Collaboration and Political Orientation;" "Nazi-German Policy and Plans Toward Ukraine;" "Oral History: Memoirs and Personal Accounts;" "Ukrainian Cultural Activities."

Also, "Literary Works on War Events in Ukraine;" "Occupation Forces in Ukraine;" "Soviet-German Policy Toward Ukraine;" "Atrocities of the Occupation Forces in Ukraine;" "Ukrainians in American and Canadian Armed Forces;" "Ukrainian Authorized and Underground Publications and Press;" "Education and Relief Work;" "Carpathian Ukraine, Bukovina and Ukrainians Abroad;" "Historical Accounts, Gains and Losses;" "Conclusions Panel."

The guest speaker at the Conference Banquet was Bohdan Futey (Washington, DC), Chairman of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States. The Ukrainian Bandurist Ensemble from Chicago performed at the evening concert. Publications and documentary materials on Ukraine during World War II were on display in the University Library.

N.G.B.

Conference on the Ukrainian Millenium held in Rome

After the conclusion of the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the St. Clement Pope Ukrainian University and Pontifical Seminary in Rome hosted a scholarly conference on the forthcoming Millenium of Ukrainian Christianity in 1988.

The conference took place October 5-8, 1985.

On October 5, the Opening Remarks were made by the Rector of the Ukrainian Free University, Volodymyr Yaniv (Munich), followed by the Welcoming Address delivered by Archbishop Maxim Hermaniuk, Ukrainian Catholic Metropolitan of Canada. In the First Session, Bohdan Osadchuk (Berlin) read a paper "Ukraine Between Moscow and Rome: Perspectives of the Ukrainian Millennium Between Communist Atheism and the Rechristianization of Eastern Europe."

On October 6, the Second Session was chaired by the Rev. Ivan Muzychka (Rome). Two papers were presented: "The Role of the Equal to the Apostles Cyril and Methodius in the Christianization of Ukraine" by the Rev. Dmytro Blazheiovsky (Rome), and "The Meaning of the Cave-Patericon" by Petro Cymbalysty (London).

On October 7, the Third Session chaired by Olexa Horbatsch (Frankfurt) included the papers: "Ecumenism and Public Activity as Ideals of the Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine" by Andrew Sorokivsky (London); "Christian Characteristics of Grand Prince Volodymyr in Western Sources" by the Protoarchimandrite Isidor Patrylo, OSBM (Rome), and "Church Organization in Rus' in the X-XII Centuries" by the Archimandrite Ivan Choma (Rome).

At the Fourth Session chaired by Mykhailo Marunchak (Winnipeg), the following papers were read: "Holy Liturgy in the Ukrainian Church: Is Reform Possible?" by Johannes Madej (Paderborn), (in the absence of the author, the paper was read by Rev. I. Muzychka), and "The Rebirth of Christian Thought in Current Ukrainian Poetry" by Ihor Kachurovsky (Munich).

On October 8, the Fifth Session was chaired by Ihor Kachurovsky (Munich) and included two papers: "Language Style of Modern Ukrainian Bible Translations" by Olexa Horbatsch (Frankfurt), and "Pastoral Letter of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky 'Thou Shall Not Kill' as Illuminated by History" by Mykhailo Marunchak (Winnipeg). Bishop Isidor Boretsky (Toronto) in his closing remarks expressed gratitude on behalf of the Synod of the Bishops of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and pledged further support for the Millennium Congress.

N.G.B.

Harvard Conference on Ukrainian Economics

October 25-26, 1985 a Third Conference on Ukrainian Economics, *Integration Processes of Ukrainian Economy: A Historical Perspective* was held at Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Cambridge, MA.

In the First Session on *Kievan Rus'* chaired by Omeljan Pritsak (Harvard University), four papers were presented; "The Economy of Kievan Rus': Evidence from the 'Russkaia Pravda'" — Daniel H. Kaiser (Grinnell College); "The Role of Kiev in the International and Domestic Trade of the Pre-Mongol Era" — Thomas S. Noonan (University of Minnesota); "Aspects of the Nomadic Factor in the Economic Development of Kievan Rus'" — Peter B. Golden (Rutgers University); "Economic Orientation of the Galician-Volhynian Principality" — Miroslav Labunka (La Salle College).

The Second Session, chaired by Frank Sysyn (Harvard University), was devoted to *the Hetman State* and consisted of three papers: "Trade and Moscovite Economic Policy Toward Ukraine During the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century" — Kira Stevens (Colgate University); "Cossack Ukraine and the World Market in the Mid-Seventeenth Century" — Stephen Velychenko (University of Toronto); "Mercantilistic Policies of the Moscow Government Toward Ukraine During the Eighteenth Century" — Bohdan Krawchenko (University of Alberta).

The Third Session on *the Nineteenth Century*, chaired by Olga Crisp (University of London), included five papers: "Migration and Population Change in Ukraine in the Nineteenth Century: Ethnic, Social, and Economic Implications" — Ralph S. Clam (Florida International University); "Regional Inequality between Ukraine and Other Regions of the Tsarist Empire" — Martin C. Spechler (Tel Aviv University); "Cities and the Ukrainian Economy in the Mid-Nineteenth Century" — Boris P. Balan (University of Michigan); "South Ukraine as an Economic Region in the Nineteenth Century" — Patricia Herlihy (Harvard University); "Economic Development of East Galicia" — Richard L. Rudolph (University of Minnesota).

The Harvard Conference on the Ukrainian Economics was organized by Ivan S. Koropeckyj (Temple University), who also was the editor of the Proceedings of the previous two conferences on Ukrainian Economics.

N.G.B.

Ukrainian Scholars Participate in the World Congress of Slavists

October 30 — November 4, 1985 the Third World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies was held in Washington, D.C. with more than 3,000 scholars attending the five-day event. It followed the First World Congress, which took place in Banff, Canada, in 1974, and the Second World Congress held in Garmisch, Federal Republic of Germany in 1980.

"The object of the III World Congress is to provide and expand opportunities for the exchange of information throughout the international community of scholars concerned with Soviet and East European studies. The Congress serves as a forum for the presentation of recent research findings and for discussion of scholarly topics. It seeks to promote the advancement of knowledge in the Soviet and East European field by encouraging interdisciplinary and comparative studies as well as work within the scientific disciplines."

Over thirty Ukrainian professors and researchers from the United States, Canada and Europe took part in the program of the Congress presenting papers, acting as discussants or chairing panels. The Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh), The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (UNIHU) and the Association for the Study of Nationalities (USSR and Eastern Europe) sponsored panels dealing with the Ukrainian topics.

The Ukrainian scholars participated actively in 17 panels such as "Michael Hrushevskiy, 1866-1934: Contributor to Ukrainian and East European Historiography"

(R. Shporluk, S. Horak, O. Subtelny); "The Uniate Churches between Moscow and the Vatican Since World War II" (B. Bociurkiw, V. Markus, A. Pekar); "The Christianization of Rus'" (I. Sevchenko, O. Pritsak, M. Labunka); "The Development of Book Studies in the Soviet Union" (E. Kasinec, D. Shtohryn); "Soviet Management of Land and Biotic Resources" (I. Stebelsky); "Nationalism and Bolshevism" (R. Shporluk); "Women, Work and Family in Prerevolutionary Russia" (C. Worobec); "Technology Transfer and Innovation and Its Impact on Economic Growth in Eastern Europe" (N. Bohatiuk); "Christians, Jews, and Muslims in the Soviet Union: Their Contacts With Co-Religionists Abroad" (B. Bociurkiw).

"Trends in Political Participation in the USSR" (B. Harasymiw); "The Roles of Party Apparatchiki" (B. Harasymiw); "The Nature of Decline in the Soviet System: A Radical View" (B. Krawchenko); "New Perspectives on Ethnic Relations in the USSR" (V. Zaslavsky); "Russian Explorations in the North Pacific in the 18th Century" B. Dmytryshyn); "Western Studies of Non-Russian Nationalities of the USSR in the Soviet Literature: Motives and Responses" (Y. Bilinsky); "Bibliographical Projects and Collections — Information Session" (S. Mardak); "Slavic and East European Archives — Information Session" (M. Momryk); "Editors' Workshop" (O. Pritsak). Shevchenko Scientific Society, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and "Smoloskyp," among others, had separate booths with their publications on display.

N.G.B.

PERTINENT DOCUMENTS

PRESIDENT REAGAN EXPRESSES SOLIDARITY WITH BRAVE PEOPLE OF UKRAINE

Washington, D.C. — On the occasion of a mass demonstration and a Great Concert of Ukrainian music and song — in tribute to the liberation struggle of Ukraine against Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, during and after World War II, October 6, 1985 in New York, President Ronald Reagan sent to the UCCA a message, which was read at the Concert in Carnegie Hall. The message reads as follows:


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 27, 1985

It is an honor to join with members of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America as you gather to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II.

In his farewell address to the cadets of West Point, General Douglas MacArthur reminded us that "The soldier, above all other men, is required to practice the greatest act of religious training -- sacrifice... he must suffer and bear the deepest wounds and scars of war." More than forty years ago, your brothers-in-arms gave flesh-and-blood meaning to General MacArthur's words as they offered their last full measure of devotion in resisting the twin tyrannies of Nazism and Communism that ravaged their homeland. In the darkness of untold hardships, their spirit of courage and self-sacrifice shone brightly.

Although the shadow of tyranny continues to darken your ancestral lands, a spirit of hope and the yearning for liberty live on to inspire a new generation. I wish to express my solidarity with the brave people of Ukraine in your resolve to advance the cause of freedom and self-determination for your beloved homeland. God bless you.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned at the bottom right of the page.

UCCA STATEMENT ON THE CASE OF MYROSLAV MEDVID — A VICTIM OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION

The widely publicized plight of the young Ukrainian sailor Myroslav Medvid, who twice jumped the Soviet freighter, the “Marshal Koniev,” wishing to defect to the United States, concluded tragically, due to the gross mishandling of his case by U.S. Government agencies.

Despite efforts on his behalf by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, the Ukrainian American Bar Association, and a number of other organizations as well as Mr. Medvid’s relatives, the U.S. District Courts of New Orleans and Washington, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court all failed to act in defense of 22-year old Medvid, claiming that the matter was one of “national security” and international relations, therefore not within their jurisdiction.

On the other hand, a very favorable response was received from various senators and congressmen who spoke in support of Medvid in Congress, demanded the detainment of the young Ukrainian sailor in the U.S., an investigation into the inhuman, and questionable treatment of Medvid by the U.S. Coast Guard, Immigration and Naturalization Service officials, and the State Department’s negative approach to the matter, as well as appealed to President Reagan to intervene on Medvid’s behalf. Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee was particularly insistent in his efforts, going as far as issuing a subpoena requiring Medvid to appear for a hearing before the Committee, in attempt to stop the departure of the Marshal Koniev and determine that Medvid was leaving of his own accord, unharmed.

Immediately after the press reported about Medvid’s attempt to escape from the freighter and his return to the Soviet authorities, the UCCA appealed to the President to investigate the behavior of the Immigration officials, and to grant Medvid asylum, with the assurance that the UCCA would assume full responsibility for his welfare in the U.S. Contact was made with congressmen and senators, appealing for their help in Medvid’s plight, and in cooperation with the Ukrainian American Bar Association, the case was taken to court. In addition, a number of people were sent to New Orleans to lead a protest action and probe into the details surrounding the case.

The Medvid case received very favorable, supportive and even sympathetic media coverage, underlining the plight of the young, Ukrainian sailor, informing the public of his attempts to escape, reprobating the actions of the immigrations officials, condemning the position of the State Department, that did not want to strain relations between Moscow and Washington on the eve of the summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Geneva.

No matter what explanations the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the State Department have to offer, the facts in the Medvid case speak for themselves:

1. On October 24, 1985, Myroslav Medvid jumped off the Soviet freighter, the “Marshal Koniev” into the Mississippi River and clearly stated to the U.S. Immigration officials, through the Ukrainian interpreter, his wish to defect. In spite of this fact, he was returned to the Soviet ship.
2. After the American media’s spontaneous reaction in Medvid’s defense, and the

support of the U.S. Congress and several Ukrainian agencies in efforts to detain the ship and seek the release of the sailor to American authorities, and after an interview was conducted with Medvid, he was returned to the ship just the same, even though he jumped a second time and had to be forcibly returned to Soviet custody.

3. American doctors examining Mr. Medvid, attested to the fact he was exhausted and sick, and that confirms the information that the Soviet embassy in Washington had ordered the captain of the ship to drug Medvid, weakening his willpower, and causing his forced statement of his wish to return to the USSR. There was also evidence of slash marks on his wrists.

4. The State Department's decision to "wash its hands" of the Medvid case, as Pilate "washed his hands" so many years ago, and to offer up a young sailor that had made it clear he was Ukrainian, not Russian, as prey to the KGB was a violation of the most basic human rights and principles of individual freedom on which the United States was formed. Senator Jesse Helms stated this clearly when he charged that, "The State Department clearly decided it's more important to appease the Soviet Union than to allow a young man an unfettered chance for freedom."

At a time when President Reagan officially proclaimed the 100 anniversary of the Statue of Liberty, emphasizing her importance of welcoming "all those in pursuit of freedom" to the shores of the United States, it was especially disheartening for the Ukrainian community to realize the true position of U.S. government agencies. The State Department has undermined the faith in the American system of the nations enslaved by Russia and communism, displaying the hypocrisy of their policies in their words and actions. Granted, the United States may not be capable of bringing about human rights in the USSR, but why do they deny these rights within their own territory, in the United States?

If the government officials involved in the Medvid case think this was an isolated episode, with no consequences in the future of US-USSR relations, they are gravely mistaken. The life of an individual, a community and a country is governed by certain moral standards, which in our case here are clearly defined by the U.S. Constitution. The violation of those statutes threatens the foundations of a system, and could precipitate its eventual downfall.

In the face of the total disregard for basic human rights principles, which are so often emphasized in official statements and declarations, and still deeply troubled by the tragic fate awaiting Medvid, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America appeals to the Congress and President of the United States, to thoroughly investigate the forced return of the Ukrainian seaman Myroslav Medvid to Soviet custody, to ascertain the responsibility for this case and to establish directive guidelines for the handling of defectors so that the tragic experience suffered by Myroslav Medvid, does not recur in the future.

November, 1985

National Executive Board
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America

UCCA LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

October 28, 1985

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing you regarding the case of the Ukrainian seaman who recently jumped ship on the Mississippi River seeking political asylum in the United States.

We are displeased with Immigration and Nationalization Service officials who are responsible for returning this brave individual back to the Soviet freighter. It should have been obvious that anyone jumping ship twice is not interested in returning to the Soviet Union.

I strongly recommend the clarification of official government policy regarding the handling of cases involving political asylum since this is not the first instance of a bureaucratic fowl-up resulting in peoples' lives being jeopardized. We would be happy to work with Administration officials to set up a hotline method of communication in order to facilitate the handling of political asylum cases dealing with the Soviet Union.

We are pleased that the case is now under the control of National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane and the State Department. We are fully supportive of Mr. McFarlane's position regarding an investigation by proper U.S. authorities.

On behalf of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, we would be more than happy to send a representative to New Orleans in order to facilitate in translation and to alleviate any language barriers that may exist. The young seaman has identified himself as a Ukrainian, therefore, we feel the appropriate sensitivities regarding his position need to be exercised by U.S. officials.

Should there be any consideration of burden or responsibility, please be assured that the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America will take upon itself sponsorship of this individual and will pay for all related expenses necessary to allow him to stay in the United States.

Sincerely,

Ignatius M. Billinsky
President
National Executive Board

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE REPLIES
REGARDING M. MEDVID**

November 25, 1985

Mr. Ignatius M. Billinsky, President
National Executive Board
Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc.
203 Second Avenue
New York, New York 10003

Dear Mr. Billinsky:

I am replying to your letter of October 28 to President Reagan regarding Soviet Seaman Miroslav Medvid.

From the first moment the Department of State was informed of this case, we were determined to provide Seaman Medvid an opportunity to decide freely whether he wished to remain in the United States or return to the Soviet Union. Over several days, we took extraordinary measures to ensure that Seaman Medvid was interviewed in a neutral, non-threatening environment under our control, first aboard the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter *Salvia* and again at a U.S. Navy shore facility.

In our questioning of Seaman Medvid, he repeatedly expressed his desire to return to the Soviet Union. The U.S. military doctors who examined him had no doubt as to his ability to make such a decision. All officials involved, both in Washington and New Orleans, concurred the United States should allow Seaman Medvid to return to the Soviet ship.

We were obviously unable to recreate Seaman Medvid's original frame of mind on October 24. We will never know what pressures may have been exerted on Seaman Medvid while he was on the Soviet ship, nor did we ever discount the fact such pressures may have influenced his final decision. We are under no illusions about the repressive nature of the Soviet Government and its willingness to use coercion and threats to control its citizens. There was always the possibility Seaman Medvid would wish to return to the Soviet Union and we would have to respect that choice, recognizing in cases such as this, only the individual involved can truly weigh the risks taken for himself or for others. The U.S. Government cannot and should not do this for him.

For your further information, I am pleased to enclose a copy of a chronology of the Department of State's role in the Medvid case.

Sincerely yours,
George B. High
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs

A CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN THE CASE OF SOVIET SEAMAN MIROSLAV MEDVID

At 3:40 p.m. Friday, October 25, when it was first informed of this case by the Border Patrol Section of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Department of State immediately requested the U.S. Coast Guard and Treasury Department to take steps to prevent the departure of the M.V. Konev from the Belle Chasse area of the port of New Orleans. We also immediately dispatched a Russian-speaking Foreign Service Officer and an Assistant Legal Adviser to the scene.

The Department of State representative arrived in New Orleans and boarded the M.V. Konev at approximately 10:30 p.m. CST that night; from then on, the United States had a team of at least six officials aboard the Soviet vessel at all times until Seaman Medvid was transferred to the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter *Salvia* on October 28. This team included representatives of the Department of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Treasury Department (Customs Service) and a U.S. Navy doctor. From the evening of October 26 an expert interpreter retained by the Department of State was also on the scene to ensure there would be no difficulty in communicating with Seaman Medvid. Of Ukrainian heritage himself, this interpreter was fluent in both Russian and Ukrainian and was able to communicate with Seaman Medvid in both languages.

Prior to our arrival on the scene, INS officials had observed Seaman Medvid on the M.V. Konev during the afternoon of Friday, October 25, and they reported that he was in bed and appeared to be sedated; there was a bandage on his left wrist and it was reported that Seaman Medvid had inflicted a laceration on his forearm. The Department of State representative first saw Seaman Medvid on Saturday, October 26, at approximately 3:00 p.m. CST. A U.S. Navy doctor conducted a preliminary physical examination and reported that Seaman Medvid was alert and that he appeared to be in generally good condition; he did not appear to be sedated or under the influence of drugs. During that examination Seaman Medvid told the Department of State representative that he wished to return to the USSR and asked whether we had any questions for him. Our representative replied that we would reserve our questions until we could arrange a formal interview off the Soviet vessel.

From the start we made clear to the Soviets that Seaman Medvid had to be removed from the Soviet ship to be interviewed in a non-threatening environment under our control. In diplomatic discussions with the Soviet Embassy, we made clear that if Soviet officials did not agree to this demand, we were prepared to remove Seaman Medvid from the M.V. Konev by force if necessary. As a result of these diplomatic discussions it was agreed that Seaman Medvid would be transferred from the M.V. Konev to the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter *Salvia* for an interview in an environment where he would be free from coercion. The transfer occurred without incident at approximately 4:30 p.m. CST on Monday, October 28 after Hurricane Juan, which was passing over the New Orleans area, abated. Upon arrival on the *Salvia*, Seaman Medvid was offered some refreshment and an opportunity to rest or relax, which he declined.

The interview was conducted by a State Department representative in the Ward

Room of the *Salvia*. Also present were a U.S. Navy medical doctor, an INS official, our interpreter, and four Soviets: two officials from the Soviet Embassy, a Soviet doctor and the Master of the *M.V. Konev*. We allow the Soviet presence during such interviews in order to ensure our very important rights to similar access to Americans in the Soviet Union. However, the meeting was structured so that at no time were the Soviets present allowed to intimidate Seaman Medvid. Not present during the interview but aboard the Coast Guard Cutter to assist if required were two additional Department of State representatives, including an Assistant Legal Adviser, and also a U.S. Air Force psychiatrist, and representatives from INS, the Border Patrol, and the U.S. Customs services. The interview was conducted through the U.S. interpreter in both Russian and English.

Shortly after the interview began, however, Seaman Medvid said he felt nauseous, and he asked to go outside for some fresh air. At that time, the sea was still rough as a result of Hurricane Juan and the Coast Guard vessel was rolling as a result of the turbulent waters. Seaman Medvid was escorted to the deck and attended to by the U.S. Navy medical doctor who recommended that he lie down in the ship's sick bay. The Soviet medical doctor was present as an observer but did not participate in his treatment. After approximately a half hour, Seaman Medvid indicated that he was prepared to resume the interview and the U.S. doctor concurred that there was no medical impediment to continuing the interview.

When the interview resumed, Seaman Medvid was repeatedly assured by the Department of State interviewer that he was not under arrest, that he was free to remain in the United States, that he was free to depart immediately with the U.S. representatives and that he would not have to return to his ship or to the USSR against his will. He was also questioned extensively about the events of the preceding days, particularly why he first jumped from the *M.V. Konev* and what had happened when he was returned to the ship. Seaman Medvid replied that he had fallen overboard while making some electrical repairs on the ship and that he could recall almost nothing from that time until he woke up in the sick bay of the Soviet ship. He repeated stated that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, because we wanted to be absolutely certain that Seaman Medvid understood that he had a clear choice, and considering his nausea earlier that evening, the Department of State in Washington decided that Seaman Medvid should be given an opportunity to get a good night's sleep on shore. A near-by U.S. Government military facility was selected for this purpose.

Seaman Medvid was given supper on the Coast Guard Cutter and at approximately 11:15 p.m. EST on October 28, he and the accompanying U.S. and Soviet representatives were transferred to a nearby Naval Support Facility, travelling first by launch and then by motor vehicle. At the naval facility, Seaman Medvid was given a thorough physical examination by the U.S. Navy medical doctor, which lasted approximately 45 minutes, and a psychological evaluation by a U.S. Air Force psychiatrist which lasted approximately one hour. The medical doctor determined at that time that Seaman Medvid did not appear to be under the influence of drugs. The Soviet doctor was allowed to observe but not participate in these examinations.

Seaman Medvid was housed overnight in a comfortable suite in the Bachelor Officers Quarters (BOQ). He slept in a room by himself. No more than one Soviet representative was allowed in the living room area outside his bedroom and then only when an American was present. The other Soviet representatives were quartered in a separate room at the BOQ. Before going to sleep and again in the morning, Seaman Medvid relaxed by watching T.V.; he was especially interested in viewing T.V. coverage about himself. In conversations with the State Department representative that evening and again the next morning, Seaman Medvid kept up a steady stream of informal conversation, and he frequently opined that things in the USSR were better than in the United States. He also repeatedly expressed his desire to return to the U.S.S.R.

At approximately 1:00 a.m. CST on October 29, he went to his room where he slept until around 8:00 a.m. CST. After breakfast Seaman Medvid participated in an extended interview with a U.S. Air Force psychiatrist; the Soviet doctor was present only as an observer. Through extensive questioning, the psychiatrist determined that Seaman Medvid was alert, capable of doing calculations, and in touch with reality. He did not appear to be sedated or under the influence of drugs. At one point Seaman Medvid strongly objected to questions by the U.S. psychiatrist which he interpreted as implying that he might not be in control of his faculties. The U.S. psychiatrist determined that Seaman Medvid was capable of making important decisions about his future. Following this examination, Seaman Medvid continued to watch T.V. and converse informally with the American and Soviet representatives present.

At approximately noon CST on October 29, the U.S. representatives reconvened the interview with Seaman Medvid. The U.S. interviewer questioned him extensively concerning his wishes and assured him he would not be subject to prosecution or forced to return to the custody of Soviet authorities against his will. If he chose, he could leave immediately with U.S. authorities. He was alert and was determined by U.S. medical, legal and other representatives to be competent to make a decision concerning whether he wanted to remain in the U.S. During the final interview, Seaman Medvid reaffirmed his repeated statements that he wished to return to the USSR; he specifically expressed his desire to return home to see his mother and father. On instruction, the U.S. representatives then adjourned the interview to seek advice from Washington.

At 3:45 p.m. EST on October 29 the White House, the Department of State, the Department of Justice and INS instructed the U.S. representatives to reconvene the interview and to tell Seaman Medvid that he would be allowed to return to the Soviet ship as he had repeatedly requested. Seaman Medvid was asked to sign a statement in Russian and English confirming his wishes and his understanding that he would be free to leave with U.S. representatives immediately if he chose to do so. After insisting on a few changes in Russian to the text of the statement, Seaman Medvid signed it. These were changes in the verb tenses and an additional sentence which repeated that he had decided to return to the USSR. Medvid said he wanted these changes to make it clear that he had never waived in his determination to return to his country. The Department of State representative then accompanied Seaman Medvid and the Soviet representatives to the M.V. Konev in accordance with Seaman Medvid's wishes, where he was greeted with cheers by the Soviet crew.

CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS

Papal Encyclical: The Apostles of the Slavs. On June 3rd 1985 the Vatican published the papal encyclical titled *Slavorum Apostoli (the Apostles of the Slavs)* devoted to the Christianization of the Slavic East by SS. Cyril and Methodius, the Apostles of the Slavs. The carefully-crafted and well documented encyclical addressed to “the bishops, priests, the religious orders, and all the faithful Christians” diligently records “the evangelical work of the SS. Cyril and Methodius.” It focuses on the work of the saints in the East, including in such countries as Bulgaria, Romania, and “the ancient Kievan Rus’.” The encyclical also states that “in a few years, exactly in the year 1988, the millennium of the Baptism of St. Vladimir the Great, the Prince of Kiev, will take place.” The encyclical also addresses the future of Christianity in the East. It states that at present the situation may “appear grave and dangerous and filled with incertitude,” but it expresses hope, by placing the fate of Christendom in the hands of God. A special article on the missionary work of SS. Cyril and Methodius and a commentary on the encyclical titled “An Encyclical Rich in Significance” was written by the Slovak Cardinal Jozef Tomko.

“Ukraine: A Historical Atlas” by Dr. Paul R. Magocsi. — The University of Toronto Press published the first historical atlas of Ukraine in English, entitled **Ukraine: A Historical Atlas**. The handsomely designed volume includes 24 full color maps, each with commentary, and gazeteer. **Ukraine: A Historical Atlas** was authored by Paul R. Magocsi, Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto, who determined the content of each map and prepared the commentaries. The maps were designed and executed by Geoffrey Matthews, chief cartographer at the University of Toronto, and one of the leading map-makers on this continent. Matthews is the cartographer for several major atlases by Nelson, Prentice Hall, and the forthcoming multimillion dollar government-sponsored Historical Atlas of Canada.

This informative atlas covers Ukrainian historical development from earliest times to the present and the accompanying text relates the maps to the historical data, so that a comprehensive survey of each successive period is presented at a glance.

1984 Yearbook for Ukrainian Studies Published in Munich. — The Arbeits- und Foerderungsgemeinschaft der Ukrainischen Wissenschaften, a Munich-based society for Ukrainian Studies affiliated with the Ukrainian Free University, has recently published its annual *Jahrbuch der Ukrainekunde (Yearbook of Ukrainian Studies)* for

1984. Although the *Yearbook* as such has appeared since 1982, the publication has a long-standing, respectable tradition inasmuch as it is the successor to another annual publication of the Society which appeared from 1965 through 1981 under the title, *Mitteilungen*. The editor of both series is Hryhorij Waskowycz, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the Ukrainian Free University.

The 1984 *Yearbook* contains material on Ukrainian studies in both German and English languages. It is divided into several sections. The first contains Fr. Werenfried van Straaten's requiem sermon delivered on the death of Patriarch Josyf Slipyj and the "Spiritual Testament of His Beatitude Patriarch Josyf." The second is comprised of seven articles dealing with Ukrainian history authored by various Ukrainian scholars residing in the free world, while the third section offers four articles on Ukrainian literature; also included are articles on economics, arts and book reviews.

International in its scope and Ukrainian in nature, the 1984 *Yearbook of Ukrainian Studies* covers some of the most important current topics, such as the upcoming Millennium of Christianity of Ukraine, the status of the Ukrainian Church in the Soviet Union, and the Russification of Ukrainian culture by the present Soviet Russian regime.

Congressional Remarks on June 30th Act of Proclamation.— Four U.S. Congressmen entered their remarks and statements of solidarity with veterans of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) on the occasion of the 44th anniversary of the June 30th Act of Proclamation which restored Ukrainian statehood for a brief period during World War II. Congressmen Frank Annunzio (D-IL), William Broomfield (R-MI), Thomas Manton (D-NY), and Gerald Solomon (R-NY) remembered the Act of Proclamation issued in Lviv on June 30, 1941 by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. As a consequence of the June 30th Proclamation the Nazis were brutal in their attempts to suppress the Ukrainians for their show of independence, and many of their cultural, religious, and political leaders were sent to concentration camps." stated Congressman Frank Annunzio. Stepan Bandera, leader of OUN, and Yaroslav Stetsko, Prime Minister of the Ukrainian Provisional Government were sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp for the duration of the war because they refused Hitler's demand that the June 30th Proclamation be revoked.

When the government of free Ukraine went underground by the end of 1941, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army took to the field, and for a time exercised control over some 100,000 square miles of territory and 15 million people," cited Congressman Gerald Solomon. Congressman Broomfield cited that of "extreme importance" was the UPA's "two-front resistance against both the Nazis and the Soviets."

Congressman Tom Manton, newly elected representative from New York, stated his support for Ukrainian independence and the efforts of the UPA. "Today, the West is threatened as never before. It is in the interest of freedom loving people everywhere to recognize the struggle of the Ukrainian people to throw off their age-old yoke, to unite with them in their struggle, and to admit them to a new Europe and a union of free and democratic nations."

Council to Coordinate Ukrainian Anti-Defamation Efforts.— The Council of Representatives from Major Ukrainian Organizations is a newly formed unit which is to coordinate efforts of various Ukrainian groups against the defamation of Ukraine and Ukrainian-Americans, which recently has escalated to high proportions.

Other duties of the new Council will be to protect the reputation of the Ukrainian-American community; insure that due process is carried out in all pending cases against Ukrainian-Americans who have been charged by the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI); research appropriate materials which would detail the role of Ukrainians during World War II; publish pamphlets and relevant materials regarding Ukrainian Americans.

The new Council will oversee various functions such as the collection of relevant materials and publications, provide legal counsel on cases involving defamation; it will join the current effort for Congressional oversight hearings into the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) which has been at the root of many defamatory press stories about Ukrainian-Americans.

Cooperation between Keston College and Harvard Ukrainian Studies Fund.— Andrew Sorokiwsky, the Ukrainian researcher at Keston College, England, recently visited Munich and Rome in order to broaden research activity and institutional contacts. Under an agreement between the Ukrainian Studies Fund at Harvard University and Keston College, he began a four-year term at the British-based center for the study of religion in communist countries. The project involves research and publication on contemporary Ukrainian religious affairs as well as liaison with church and scholarly institutions, in connection with the Millennium of Christian Rus'-Ukraine. Andrew Sorokiwsky visited the Ukrainian Free University, one of the European institutions most active in organizing Millennium observances. In Rome he visited the libraries of St. Clement Ukrainian Catholic University, the Pontifical Ukrainian College of St. Josaphat, the Studite monastery near Castelgandolfo, and the Pontifical Oriental Institute; also the General Curia of the Basilian Fathers, the Ukrainian Minor Seminary, the Centro Russia Ecumenica, and Polish Institute for Christian Culture was also received by the Most Rev. Archbishop Myroslav Marusyn, Secretary of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches.

Teacher's Guide Ignores 7 Million Victims of Russian-Made Genocide. The decision of the New York State Department of Education to omit from the final draft of the *Teacher's Guide for "Teaching About the Holocaust and Genocide"* curriculum a section on the 1932-33 forced famine in Ukraine was criticized by thirty of New York's 34 congressmen who have signed a letter of protest to Gordon M. Ambach, NY State Commissioner of Education, and to Governor Mario Cuomo. The letter which was initiated by Congressmen Fred J. Eckert (R-NY) from Rochester stated:

"Seven million Ukrainians died in 1932-33 as a result of Stalin's forced starvation. This event marks perhaps the largest mass murder in this century; indeed, more people

died under Stalin's policies in Ukraine than died in the Nazi Holocaust. As members of the New York State Congressional Delegation, we respectfully request that you resist this effort on the part of the Department of Education to minimize the overwhelming historic tragedy of the murder of 7 million Ukrainians. We ask that the appropriate sections be restored to their former status as an integral part of the educational materials on the subject."

Ukrainian Graduates With Top Honors from The International Institute of Management. — *Dr. Bohdan Hawrylyshyn*, director of the International Institute of Management in Geneva, Switzerland, announced that among the graduates of this prestigious institution was one Ukrainian *Eva Skira* from Australia. The school, which only accepts students who hold University degrees and have experience in the field, usually receives 300 applications annually. Fifty students are chosen from among the applicants. During graduation ceremonies Ms. Skira was awarded top honors, making it the first time in the school's history that a woman achieved such a distinction.

"King Solomon" by World-Renown Ukrainian Sculptor Alexander Archipenko on Exhibit.— A fourteen-foot, one-and a-half-ton abstract bronze rendering of "King Solomon" by the world renowned sculptor Alexander Archipenko was installed on the University of Pennsylvania campus in Philadelphia, Pa.

"King Solomon" is on extended loan to the University from Mr. and Mrs. Jeffrey Loria, parents of a Penn student. It is an enlarged version of the artist's four-foot original, completed after Archipenko's death under the supervision of his widow. The statue is Archipenko's largest extant work.

Archipenko, a Ukrainian native, is now recognized as one of the most important innovators in the development of modern sculpture. His four entries in the famed 1923 Armory exhibit in New York led eventually to his move to the United States, where he became a citizen in 1928. Archipenko is credited with establishing art schools in Paris, New York, Los Angeles and Chicago. Until his death in 1964, he was a resident of Woodstock, N.Y.

Ukrainian Community Reacts to Removal of Chapter on Ukrainian Holocaust.—

Despite pressure from the sizeable Ukrainian-American community of New York State and state legislators and officials, Edw. T. Lalor, director of program development for the New York State Education Department, announced that the department will stand on its decision to delete a section on the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 from the first volume of the teacher's guide on *"Teaching About the Holocaust and Genocide."*

In his statement, Dr. Lalor outlined the structure of his department and his responsibilities in planning the curriculum for the state schools. He stated that he and his associate George Gregory felt that the removal of a 16-page chapter on the forced famine in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Holocaust, with plans to include it in a future third volume devoted to "Case Studies of Genocide" (yet unpublished) was better from a pedagogical

point of view. The representatives of the Ukrainian community assured the director of program development that they would continue their efforts to reinstate the material on grounds of discrimination against Ukrainian-Americans. At the present time volume of the guide on "Teaching About the Holocaust and Genocide" contains 500 pages on the Jewish Holocaust at the hands of the Nazis and 40 pages on the Armenian Genocide.

Ukrainian Women Participate in Two Conferences in Nairobi, Kenya.— In July, thousands of women met in Nairobi, Kenya for two conferences to mark the end of the United Nations Decade for Women. One of the conferences was officially sponsored by the UN, and the other was a parallel meeting of non-governmental organizations called Forum '85. Close to 3,000 delegates registered for the UN meeting, another 10,000 arrived for Forum '85.

Ukrainian women, members of three organizations—the Organization of Women for Four Freedoms for Ukraine, the League for Liberation of Ukraine, and the World Federation of Ukrainian Women's Organizations present at these conferences, conducted several actions to bring to world attention the plight of Ukrainian political prisoners and other pertinent contemporary issues. A seminar was held on the topic of "Political Prisoners in the Soviet Union and the Fate of their Wives and Children." In conjunction with this seminar, Ukrainian delegates dressed in national costumes organized an exhibit of the portraits of Ukrainian female political prisoners and a peaceful demonstration on their behalf near Kenyatta Center. All three actions were staged by OWFFU and the LLU.

At the second seminar, organized by WFUWO, the role of women's organizations in the developmental process was explored. Also held were a press conference and reception at the Hilton Hotel for all delegates. Informative leaflets and pamphlets were distributed. Twenty-two Ukrainian women, mostly from the United States and Canada and one delegate from West Germany were present in Nairobi. The Ukrainian American delegate paid a courtesy call to the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, and gave two interviews to the "Voice of America."

132 Congressmen Appeal for Release of Oksana Meshko.— A letter was sent to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on August 5 by 132 members of the U.S House of Representatives asking for the release of Oksana Meshko from her internal exile in Ayan, a remote area in the USSR. Initiators of the letter were Congressmen Christopher H. Smith and Bernard J. Dwyer, both from New Jersey. The entire congressional delegation from New Jersey, 14 in all, were co-signers to the letter.

The letter asks that Oksana Meshko, in frail and deteriorating health, be released under Article 100 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure which states that persons suffering from grave illness may be released by a court. Oksana Meshko was sentenced on January 6, 1981 to six months in a labor camp and the five years in internal exile. The reason for her sentence was her promotion of human rights through a group she co-founded, the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords.

Harvard Ukrainian Summer Institute A Success.— Coming from as far away as Argentina, West Germany and the People's Republic of China, 69 students took part in the eight-week intensive Harvard Ukrainian Summer Institute program this year. 28 men and 41 women attended the Ukrainian program this year.

1985 marks the fifteenth consecutive summer that courses in Ukrainian Studies are offered as part of the Harvard Summer School. Since 1971, over 1000 students have participated in the Ukrainian program.

Students ranged in age from 17 to 46. While the majority were college students earning extra credits which could be transferred to their own university degree programs in the fall, a growing number of program participants (16 this year alone) were older graduate students who were here to receive training in an area usually not taught in their own universities or professionals "taking a summer off" to study Ukrainian language, history, and literature.

Students normally sign up for two of six available courses. 49 students were enrolled in one of three language courses: Beginning, Intermediate or Advanced Ukrainian (taught by Luba Dyky, George Mihaychuk and Dr. Bohdan Struminsky, respectively); 55 students took a history course, either Prof. Yury Boshyk's survey of Modern Ukrainian History or Dr. Ostrowski's "Topics in Ukrainian History to 1800"; Prof. Omry Ronen's course in Ukrainian literature had 10 students.

In addition to regular academic instruction, the Harvard Ukrainian Summer Institute sponsored evening lectures and film series. Student involvement in extra-curricular events was also very high. A number of students became active in the newly-formed Ukrainian Media Action Coalition of Boston.

Conference Preparatory on the Millennium of Rus'-Ukraine Meets.— The Ukrainian Orthodox Center of South Boundbrook hosted in June a conference preparatory to *the celebration of the Millennium of Rus'-Ukraine*. Over fifty Ukrainian scholars representing various institutions of learning and learned societies came to this center to deliberate and to discuss the ways and means to ensure a dignified and effective way to mark the Millennium. This Committee includes the hierarchy of both the Ukrainian Orthodox and the Ukrainian Catholic Churches as well as representatives of Ukrainian Protestant communities.

The organizations and institutions which comprise the Committee include the Ukrainian Free University. Represented by professors Dr. Volodymyr Janiw and Dr. Hryhorij Waskowycz; the Ukrainian Catholic University by Rev. Dr. Ivan Hrynioch; the Shevchenko Scientific Society by Dr. Jaroslav Padoch and the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences by Prof. Yaroslav Bilinsky. The Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute sent Professors Lubomyr Hajda and Yuurij Hajetsky; also represented were: the Ukrainian Canadian Institute at Edmonton and various institutes and societies from Europe, Australia, Argentina, Brazil and the United States, and Canada.

Several scholarly papers were read and each paper was followed by a discussion period during which the Rev. Dr. Kravchenko of Edmonton presided. The assembled

scholars had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the Church-Monument, the Museum, and the surroundings of this Ukrainian Orthodox center.

French version of Award-Winning Documentary Film “Harvest of Despair.” — A French version of the *award-winning documentary film Harvest of Despair* is presently being made at the National Film Board of Canada in Montreal. Narrators chosen for the French-version are Ronald France and Vincent Davy, both well-known for their work in Quebec and France. Translation of the female voice is performed by France Nadeau, actress and wife of the highly respected Quebec journalist Pierre Nadeau. The script translation into French was done by Montreal writer and translator Francoise Jakimiw.

Preparation and direction of the French version was begun in August by Yuriy Luhovy and *Harvest of Despair* has been invited to enter a competition of French-language productions at NFB. The film is also slated to be shown on French CBC after being aired nationally in Canada on the English network. Both France and Switzerland have expressed interest in purchasing the film.

Harvest of Despair, produced by Slavko Nowytsky and Yuriy Luhovy for the Ukrainian Famine Research Committee of Toronto, depicting the 1933 famine-genocide in Ukraine, has had outstanding success. The documentary took part in the World Film Festival Market held in Montreal from August 25-31. The film has also been officially invited to participate in the prestigious New York Film Festival at Lincoln Centre in the documentary section. The NY Film Festival is presented by the Film Society of Lincoln Centre with the cooperation of the Motion Picture Society of America.

Joint Resolution Criticizes the Use of Soviet-Supplied Evidence. — On September 4 a joint resolution concerning the use of Soviet-supplied evidence in United States and Canadian court actions against their naturalized citizens was approved and adopted by the Ukrainian American Bar Association and the Ukrainian Advocates’ Society of Canada, a branch of the Ukrainian Professional and Business Club of Toronto. The resolution, which was sent to the American and Canadian governments, was drafted in the wake of defamatory statements against Ukrainians which have recently appeared in the press and media as a result of the admission and use of Soviet-supplied evidence by the Office of Special Investigations of U.S Department of Justice in proceedings against alleged Nazi collaborators. The use of such evidence is presently under consideration by Canada’s Commission of Inquiry on war criminals, popularly known as the Deschenes Commission.

The resolution states that such Soviet-supplied evidence is “inherently unreliable and untrustworthy” and “should be declared inadmissible in our courts” because: “the Soviet Union has demonstrated that it has a compelling state interest in discrediting Ukrainian and other Eastern European communities as opponents of Soviet violations of human rights which include forced Russification and denial of religious freedom; the Soviet Union seeks to accomplish this objective by assisting the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) in initiating and prosecuting denaturalization proceedings against

United States citizens for alleged wartime collaboration with the Nazis by providing the OSI with documentary and testimonial evidence; the Soviet tactic of assisting in the prosecution of individual United States citizens is intended to defame the entire community . . .”

The resolution continues to contrast the difference between the judicial system of the United States and that of the Soviet Union and proves that it is practically impossible to conduct “discovery proceedings in the Soviet Union in accordance with American law.” In view of the OSI’s collaboration with Soviet authorities which have engaged in purposeful disinformation and even distortion and fabrication of evidence, the resolution calls for a Congressional hearing into the activities of the OSI.

Peter Jacyk Finances Printing of Ukrainian Historical Atlas. — *Peter Jacyk*, the successful Canadian businessman of Ukrainian background, has once again shown his concern for education with a major grant to the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto.

The newest project supported by the Canadian-Ukrainian educational benefactor is the first work of its kind in English, *Ukraine: A Historical Studies*. Mr. Jacyk donated \$55,000 to subsidize the printing costs of the handsome full-color atlas published this fall by the University of Toronto Press.

Peter Jacyk is well known for his support of Ukrainian higher education and scholarship. He is a major donor to the Ukrainian Studies Program at Harvard and to the Ukrainian Encyclopedia in Sarcelles, France. He is also the largest single donor to the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto. In 1882, he provided \$47,000 to make possible a Chair-sponsored project to microfilm all western Ukrainian newspapers and journals from the years 1848 to 1918 at the Austrian National Library in Vienna. That resulted in an invaluable research collection with a descriptive catalog on pre-1918 Ukrainian culture, known as the Peter Jacyk Collection of Ukrainian Serials. Housed in University of Toronto Robarts Library, “the Jacyk collection,” according to library officials, “is the most heavily used in the Microtext Division.”

The newest Ukrainian atlas project funded by Peter Jacyk is in commemoration of the beginning of the second millennium of Christianity in Ukraine-Rus.’ The success of this atlas together with previous projects reveal the positive manner in which community activists promote Ukrainian scholarship.

B. Struminskyj and J. Mace Address Meeting of Polish-Americans. — *Drs. Bohdan Struminskyj and James E. Mace*, research associates of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, addressed the fifteenth annual meeting of Polish-Americans held in Bethlehem, Ct., in July 1985 and sponsored by the Polish-American Congress, the Studium Study Center for Polish Affairs, and the Connecticut chapter of Solidarity International.

Dr. Bohdan Struminskyj addressed the topic of the historical background of Polish-Ukrainian problems. Noting that Polish-Ukrainian relations were for the most part friendly from the tenth to fourteenth centuries when Poland-Lithuania dealt with

politically independent Rus' principalities, he traced the beginning of Polish-Ukrainian antagonism to the annexation of Halych by the Polish King Casimir III. The expansion of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into Ukraine was in the long run desaterous for both nations, because it replaced the initially friendly Ukrainian politics to the Commonwealth's East by a hostile and expanding Muscovy which was ultimately able to enslave both nations. The Cossack revolution and Bohdan Khmelnytsky's turning to Muscovy in 1654 resulted from Polish oppression and led to a fundamental shift of the balance of power in East Central Europe.

Attempts at Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation have been a history of missed opportunities, overshadowed by mutual antagonism. The abortive Union of Hadiach in 1658, which would have transformed the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into a Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian policy in which Ukraine would have been an equal member, came too late. Again, the Pilsudski-Petliura alliance of 1920 came a year and a half too late; it could have succeeded only before the territorial and military losses suffered by the Ukrainians transformed any Polish-Ukrainian agreement into a pact between forces which were greatly unequal in power. Given that the European civilization embodied by both Poles and Ukrainians face a common enemy in the fundamentally anti-European Russocentric Soviet state, this opportunity must not be allowed to slip through our fingers.

Dr. James Mace was speaking on the topic "Ukrainian Dissent and Poland's Struggle." "Astute Poles have long recognized that, while Poland might be free even if Ukraine remains enslaved, Poland can never be secure if its eastern border is dominated by a Russocentric empire commanding the entire North Eurasian land mass; Poland can have freedom and security only if the nations which lie between Poland and Russia are able to enjoy cultural vitality, national freedom, and political independence. In the heyday of Solidarnosc, Poles attempted to contact Ukrainians by almost every means imaginable, even tying bundles of Ukrainian-language Solidarnoso literature to helium balloons which would carry them eastward. But they virtually ignored the only real organic connection between Ukraine and Poland, the 400,000 Ukrainians who often have close ties of family kinship and personal friendships with Soviet Ukrainians. If Poland wants to stimulate developments in Ukraine, it must recognize that the stimulus is most likely to come to Ukraine through the Ukrainians already living in their midst."

"When we speak of nationally conscious political non-conformity in Ukraine we are really speaking of Western Ukraine and the city of Kiev. In the rest of Ukraine, we hear little about the Ukrainian national movement, although past experience both in 1917 and during the Second World War indicate that long quiescent areas of Ukraine can rapidly become strongly assertive of their Ukrainian nationality if given a chance. Of seventeen underground groups of Ukrainians whose members were arrested from 1958 to 1973, ten were located in Western Ukraine."

He concluded that a national movement remarkably well developed by Soviet standards has arisen and continues to exist in Ukraine, especially in Western Ukraine; that Poland's Ukrainians have close connections with friends and relatives especially in Western Ukraine; and that the most effective way for Poles to overcome the mutual prejudice that has arisen between Ukrainians and Poles, as well as to stimulate the

defense of human and national rights in Ukraine, is to recognize the importance of and to work for the improvement of the status of the Ukrainian community in Poland.

Cultural Forum On Budapest Hears Speeches in Defense of Soviet-Ukrainian Writers. — In November 1985 at the *Cultural Forum on Budapest*, author William Least Heat Moon made a statement naming specific cases of imprisoned writers in the Soviet Union, among them Mykola Horbal and Vasyl Stus. He said, “I have the question Why has Mykola Horbal, the Ukrainian, been imprisoned for 13 years? Is it because he once wrote a poem to honor Ukrainian minstrels who were executed in the 1930’s for playing the bandura? These minstrels were old men who accompanied their ancient instruments with song celebrating their own, distinctive culture.”

About *Vasyl Stus*, Mr. Moon said, “And last, I have a question about the Ukrainian poet Vasyl Stus, who died in prison only 2 months ago. Please notice, that he is one of four members of Helsinki Monitoring Groups in the USSR who have died in the last 18 months. This man’s death touches me. Vasyl Stus was my age, he wrote about his homeland as I write about mine. In this lovely singer I see myself. In him I see, but for the chance of birth, all of us writers here.”

The Soviet reaction was immediate. Soviet Ukrainian poet V. Korotych criticized Mr. Moon for his interest in Ukrainian and other East European people and not his own American Indians. In response to the case of Vasyl Stus, he claimed that it was U.S. “disinformation.” The British delegate Francis King reacted to Mr. Korotych’s statement by asking why there is such a high proportion of “criminality among Soviet writers.”

Washington Association of Ukrainian American Professionals Steps Up Their Activities. — The Washington Group, an Association of Ukrainian American Professionals, continues its rapid growth in the nation’s capital. Organized a year ago with 54 members and as a professionals’ organization for the Washington area, TWG has grown and expanded. Its current membership stands at 187, full membership of \$50 dues annually.

TWG President Natalie Sluzar stated: “The Washington Group began as primarily a Washington organization. During the past year, we have received associate membership applications from around the U.S and three other countries — Canada, France, and Saudi Arabia.” According to TWG records members come from thirteen states including California, Texas, Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, and Minnesota. We have gone international to three continents. Perhaps the name should be ‘TWG International’.”

Public Relations Director Eugene Iwanciw pointed out that the monthly newsletter, TWG News has been beneficial in keeping the membership informed of events and activities. The latest issue has expanded to fourteen pages. Vice-President Ihor Procinsky points out that continued growth is essential if the goal of “networking” is to be realized. The first step toward that end, will be the publishing of a “TWG Directory” with the names, addresses, professions, and businesses of all TWG members. “TWG can become an essential organization for Ukrainian American professionals in their careers.”

Walter Polovchak — “The Littlest Defector” Sworn In As U.S. Citizen. — On October 3, Walter Polovchak, who has waged court battles for six years to remain in this country when his parents returned to the Soviet Union, turned 18 and thus became eligible for U.S citizenship. While in Los Angeles for the taping of a TV interview, Walter immediately filed such an application, which was reviewed and accepted. On October 8, the long-awaited moment finally came, and Walter Polovchak was formally sworn in as a U.S Citizen in a ceremony in Washington, DC.

News of this event was carried by all news networks and major newspapers. Philadelphia’s news station KYW broadcast an excerpt from an interview with Walter. When asked why he fought so long and hard to stay in this country, the youth answered that he was a Ukrainian Catholic and the Catholic church was abolished by the Soviets in his native land. In the United States, said Polovchak, he is free to practice his religion.

UKRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

“YOUTH’S STATUS UNDECIDED; BID TO END FIGHT OVER SOVIET BOY UNRAVELS,” by Kevin Klose, *The Washington Post*, September 10, 1985.

Ukrainian born Walter Polovchak has recently been the center of controversy involving the right of a minor to remain in a free country rather than returning home to communist controlled Ukraine with his parents.

Walter Polovchak, also known as the “littlest defector,” arrived in the United States in 1980, however, when his parents decided to return to Ukraine, young Walter, then 12, and his sister Natalie decided to remain in the United States.

Pleading the case for young Polovchak was Chicago attorney Julian Kulas. Opposing Polovchak’s stay in the United States were the U.S. Department of Justice and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The six year court battle is finally coming to an end with the yearning for freedom prevailing over communist subjugation.

“SOVIET STOWAWAY ESCAPES TO FRANCE: UKRAINIAN SAYS HE SWAM AFTER LEAVING GRAIN SHIP,” an Associated Press report in *The Washington Post*, December 23, 1985.

A 30-year-old Ukrainian stowaway had spent 10 days without food or water in a wooden crate in the hold of a Soviet grain ship before swimming to French territory when the ship was docked off Rouen, France.

The man said in an interview that he was raised by an anticommunist family in the Western Ukraine. The man did not reveal his real name to French authorities because he didn’t want his family in Ukraine to be harassed.

The Ukrainian had disguised himself as a dockworker in the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda. He said a sailor friend on the Soviet ship Ivan Pokrovski slipped him aboard the ship and that he hid in a crate of machine parts, huddled in a sleeping bag.

“A SOVIET-CREATED ORDEAL BY HUNGER: 7 MILLION UKRAINIANS DIED NEEDLESSLY, BOOK SAYS,” by Charles E. Claffey, *Boston Sunday Globe*, September 15, 1985.

The full page article on page A-2 of the *Boston Sunday Globe* discusses Moscow’s imposed famine of 1932-33 which claimed the lives of more than seven million Ukrainian farmers and peasants. Claffey writes, “At the time, reports of the mass murders by starvation were mostly suppressed, and it is only recently that the full story of the directed famine in the ‘bread basket of Europe’ has begun to emerge.”

The author points out that, “recent newspaper and magazine articles, demonstrations by Ukrainian-Americans in U.S. cities at the time of the 50th anniversary of the famine in 1983, and a Canadian documentary film have helped to call international attention to the famine — as well as to latter-day applications of the forced famine techniques in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Ethiopia.” The author further points out that the Ukrainian famine has steadfastly been denied by the Soviet government for years.

The article makes reference to the recently formed U.S. Congressional Committee to study the Ukrainian famine. Reference is also made to Walter Duranty the *New York Times* Pulitzer Prize winner and Louis Fischer of *The New Republic* who both “did all they could to discredit talk about the famine.”

Mentioned also is the favorable reporting of *Manchester Guardian's* writer Malcolm Muggeridge as well as a reference to Nikita Krushchev and Josyf Stalin's knowledge of the Ukrainian famine.

UTILIZATION OF SLAVE LABOR — EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY,” by Sviatoslav Karavansky, *The Congressional Record*, Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, First Session, November 7, 1985.

In his remarks on the floor of the House of Representatives, Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA) raises the issue of the United States' importation of goods made in the Soviet Union using slave or convict labor. Congressman Wolf, along with a handful of Congressional colleagues, has recently shown interest in having slave labor-made goods banned from being imported into the United States. Incidentally, the Smoot Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits the U.S from importing goods made with slave labor, however, the U.S. Treasury Department has refused to enforce the law in this particular case.

Congressman Wolf submits for the record, an eyewitness testimony by former Soviet political prisoner Sviatoslav Karavansky, who spent many years in the *gulag* for his activities with the OUN/UPA during and after World War II.

Karavansky breaks down his testimony into five categories including the wood industry; extraction of useful minerals; the heavy, chemical, and wood pulp industries; light industry; and the food industry. In his testimony, Mr. Karavansky states, “I, as a long-term prisoner of the Soviet Gulag (concentration camp system), know that the labor of prisoners is used on a large scale in a whole series of concentration camps of the Soviet Government.”

“UKRAINIANS ANGERED BY ‘SMEAR’ TACTICS,” letter to the Editor by Bohdan Vitvitsky, *The Newark Star Ledger*, May 18, 1985.

The World Jewish Congress (WJC) had announced in a press release that it was outraged that mainstream Ukrainian and Baltic-American organizations were engaging in anti-Semitic tactics by openly lobbying against the U.S Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations (OSI).

In his rebuttal to the charges of the WJC, Mr. Vitvitsky points out that “if the Jewish Congress had taken the trouble to find out just what Ukrainian community attitudes have been and are presently towards the OSI, it would have discovered that when the OSI began its investigations and prosecutions four or five years ago, there was little if any opposition in the Ukrainian community to its work.”

Pointing out the Ukrainian community’s attitudes towards the OSI, Mr. Vitvitsky states that “today, it is probably fair to say that many or most Ukrainian Americans are strongly opposed to certain aspects of the OSI’s work.” He sites two prevalent factors in the community’s opposition. “First, the community’s astonishment and horror that our own country’s Justice Department has been actively collaborating with Soviet police and prosecutors in the gathering and production of evidence used against defendants in OSI proceedings; second, the community’s anger at the sometimes irresponsible pronouncements of officials formerly or presently associated with the OSI.”

Mr. Vitvitsky also states “Ukrainians view our Justice Department’s collaboration with the Soviet police and prosecutors the way the Jewish community would view similar collaboration with the Nazis.”

In concluding, Mr. Vitvitsky writes, “to claim, as did the Jewish Congress, that Ukrainians oppose the OSI because they fear exposure of their alleged ‘extensive collaboration’ in the killing of 6 million Jews constitutes a perversion of history on a scale that would even make Orwell sit up. Ukrainians who collaborated with the Nazis are estimated by the Israel War Crimes Investigations Office to have numbered 11,000. Ukrainian civilians who perished at the hands of the Nazis are estimated to have numbered 3 million; Ukrainians who were pirated off by the Nazis for slave labor in Germany numbered about 2 million; additional millions died in battle against the Nazis or as POWs of the Nazis.”

“UKRAINE: THE FIRST VICTIM,” letter to the Editor by Peter Paluch, *The Wall Street Journal*, December 5, 1985.

The author writes to the Wall Street Journal in response to an editorial regarding the first victim of Soviet aggression. Mr. Paluch writes, “following the dissolution of the Russian Empire, Ukraine declared independence on January 22, 1918, and sent its own delegation to the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 13, 1918, concluding World War I on the Eastern Front. Moscow promptly ‘unreservedly recognized the independence and autonomy of Ukraine.’ Trotsky, head of the Russian delegation, declared that ‘in full agreement with the principle of granting every nationality the right to self-determination, including that of secession, (the Russian delegation) has nothing against the participation of the Ukrainian delegation in the peace negotiations.’”

Mr. Paluch follows-up by writing “Simultaneously, the Red Army invaded and occupied Ukraine. Russia did not mince words : ‘By one way or another, Ukraine must be returned to Russia. Without Ukrainian coal, iron ore, grain, lard and the Black Sea, Russia cannot exist. In regard to the necessity of the Soviet government to export grain from Ukraine, all means can be considered legitimate.’”

Regarding U.S. attitudes towards Ukraine and the Russian empire, Paluch writes that in 1920, U.S. "Secretary of State Colby reaffirmed the principle of no independence for some of the largest countries in Europe: 'The United States feel that the friendship and honor require that Russia's interests must be generously protected, and that, as far as possible, all decisions of vital importance to it, and especially those concerning its sovereignty over the territories of the former Russian Empire, be held in abeyance.'"

"CLERGY AND COMMISSARS: STATE RELIGION ISN'T RELIGION," by Frank E. Sysyn, *The New Republic*, June 10, 1985.

Mr. Sysyn relays his observations of a Harvard lecture. He writes, "The audience in the Harvard lecture hall seated itself according to political convictions. To my right were the Ukrainians, Latvian Baptists, Soviet Jews, and Russian priests whom I have seen at rallies for Soviet political prisoners and Solidarity. To my left were some members of the Harvard religious community and peace movement, and many unknown people of a type — ladies in sensible New England dress and gentlemen who populate presbyteries and parish councils of Wellesley and Lexington."

Mr. Sysyn points out that the deep split in the Western religious community about how it would maintain contact with the clergy and church-goers of the Soviet Union is likely to continue. Mr. Sysyn states that, "as long as the American church groups refuse to understand the reasons for the emigres protest, similar meetings between the leaders of the two countries' churches will be the scene of heckling and recriminations." He further writes, "Soviet-American church dialogue on peace must be based on the truth, and many American church leaders are evading some truths about the Soviet Union."

A lack of information is surmised as the cause of America's naivete regarding religion in the USSR. However, the author points out that information on the Soviet persecution of religious believers is ample and evident, a prime source being Keston College in Kent, England under the directorship of the Reverend Michael Bourdeaux.

Mr. Sysyn takes issue with the National Council of Churches, and in his concluding statements writes, "Through its contacts, the National Council of Churches affects Soviet religious life and international affairs. It would appear that it has done so with little thought about the consequences of its actions. Even more dangerous, it has been willing to sacrifice truth for short-term goals."

"THE MEDVID CASE: AMERICAN HONOR LOST," by Cong. Fred J. Eckert (R-NY), *The Wall Street Journal*, November 21, 1985.

The article by New York Congressman Fred Eckert is one of several articles which appeared throughout the American press regarding the attempted defection of 25-year-old Ukrainian sailor Myroslav Medvid. Medvid had jumped from the Soviet freighter Marshal Koniev on October 24, 1985 to the Mississippi River's shore in Belle Chase, La. Medvid's first encounter on U.S. soil was with jewelers Wayne and Joe Wyman.

Congressman Eckert, who was active in raising the public's attention to the entire Medvid affair, details the sequence of events in the Medvid case.

In concluding his article, Eckert writes, "We should have announced the immediate suspension of those government employees responsible for this fiasco — pending dismissal proceedings. Mr. Medvid should have come off that ship and into U.S. custody even if we would have had to physically remove him. We should have detained him until the effects of the drugs inside him had dissipated. And we should have demonstrated to him that most Americans are not as dumb and insensitive as the Border Patrol agents who handed him back the first time and not as feeble and deferential toward the Soviets as the U.S. officials who handed him back the second time. And we should have let him meet with Ukrainian-Americans, including those who say they are related to him. We should have done all this not only to give Myroslav Medvid another chance for freedom but also to give ourselves a chance to atone for disgrace and dishonor. We should have. But we didn't."

Eckert writes further, "Somewhere out on the high seas the Marshal Koniev is carrying Ukrainian seaman Miroslav Medvid to the hell that awaits him back in the Soviet Union. The ship is also carrying away a full load of American grain. And pieces of America's reputation, pride and honor."

"SECULAR INHUMANISM: THE SOVIET UNION'S WAR AGAINST CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS, AND JEWS," by the Reverend Michael Bourdeaux, *Policy Review*, No. 34, Fall 1985.

Keston College's General Director, the Reverend Michael Bourdeaux, compiles an article of the most current abuses of religion within the Soviet Union.

On the subject of religious suppression in the USSR, Rev. Bourdeaux writes that "the most effective way in which religion is suppressed in the Soviet Union is by greatly restricting the number of churches licensed to operate." He states, "there are approximately 14,400 churches in the Soviet Union for a Christian population of 58 million; one church for every 3,973 believers. In 1917, before the Bolsheviks took over, the Russian Orthodox church alone had 54,174 churches. Most of these are now secular buildings or have been destroyed." Rev. Bourdeaux points out that "religion does not dwell in buildings, however, but in the heart. Despite enduring difficulties faced by believers, the Soviet Union has not succeeded in eradicating religion."

Referring to the various religious denominations within the Soviet Union, with respect to Catholics, Rev. Bourdeaux writes, "the symbol of Catholic resistance was Archbishop (later Cardinal) Iosyf Slipyj, the most senior of hundreds of Eastern Rite clergy who were imprisoned. He was released by Krushchev after repeated requests from the Vatican and went to Rome, where he became the symbol of Ukrainian resistance until his death in 1984, age 92."

Bourdeaux later writes, "far from being terrorized into silence, the Ukrainian Catholics have become even more determined (in presenting their plight - ed.). In January 1984 (though it took over a year for the text to reach the West), the activists launched a new clandestine journal, the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine*. Eight issues have been produced so far, though the last announces temporary suspension because of the confiscation of typewriters and materials by the KGB. The publication,

very similar to the 10-year-old *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*, gives massive new information about the Catholic religious situation in Ukraine as well as listing arrests of Baptists, Orthodox, and Jehovah's Witnesses."

Bourdeaux concludes his article by stating, "religious practice is being constantly suffocated by the Communist authorities, but religious worship continues, sometimes covertly, sometimes in brazen defiance of the rules. The enormous resources the Soviet state devotes to exterminating religion, and the harsh punishment it metes out to believers, show the extent of its antipathy to basic human freedoms. But the fact that it has failed to stamp out religious belief shows the irrepressibility of the human spirit — a spirit which endures even in the face of totalitarian resistance."

VASYL STUS DIES IN SOVIET LABOR CAMP, "*The Ukrainian Echo*, September 25, 1985.

"The tactics of the Soviet Union have resulted in the sacrifice of yet another life. Dead is Vasyl Stus — poet, literary critic, Nobel Prize nominee and member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

"Stus died September 4, 1985 at the age of 46 while serving a ten year term in labor camp No. 36-1 in Perm. Although the cause of death was not mentioned, Stus' condition was reported to be grave earlier this year in April when he was suffering from neuritis — an illness impairing the nerves and senses. He also had a history of stomach problems.

"The persecution of Vasyl Stus began in 1965 during the wave of political arrests which swept over the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Although Stus himself was not arrested at that time, he strongly protested the arrests of fellow Ukrainian literary and cultural activists.

"His protests included letters to high ranking members of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Soviet Union, as well as to editorial boards of numerous journals and newspapers. Stus spoke out in defense of Ivan Dziuba, Valentyn Moroz, and Nina Strokata-Karavanskyj, to name only a few.

"The accomplishments of Vasyl Stus were recognized in the West by many organizations and universities which invited him to lecture in North America. He was an honorary member of the International P.E.N. which nominated him for the prestigious Nobel Prize in literature.

"The U.S. State Department immediately reacted to the death calling on the Soviet Union to 'end its disregard for human rights and human life.'"

"FAMINE MEMOIR RECALLS SUFFERING OF ONE UKRAINIAN VILLAGE," by Jurij Dobczansky, *The Ukrainian Weekly*, August 25, 1985.

Mr. Dobczansky reviews the current release of Miron Dolot's, *Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust*, a book about Moscow's imposed Ukrainian famine of 1932-33.

Dobczansky writes, "Miron Dolot's 'Execution by Hunger' stands apart from the others because it provides a complete narrative by detailing the experience of one family living in one village. Both the Ukrainian reader (who, one would assume is already familiar with the famine) and the general reader will find a gripping personal account of a recent event. Mr. Dolot has had 50 years to supplement his recollections of a boyhood experience with appropriate research and documentation. This becomes obvious when he uses quotations from published sources and footnotes."

Mr. Dobczansky gives the reader a good description of the book and completes his review by writing, "Mr. Dolot and other survivors of the Great Famine have before them the monumental task of bearing witnessing before an often disinterested world. It must be remembered though, that Mr Dolot and the survivors are not meant to carry out this task alone. All Ukrainians owe it to the memory of the 7 million victims to ensure that memoirs such as 'Execution by Hunger' gain the universal recognition they deserve."

"SOVIET SUPPLIED EVIDENCE IS INHERENTLY SUSPECT," by Ihor G. Rakowsky, *The Ukrainian Weekly*, June 9, 1985.

Mr. Rakowsky, a member of the Ukrainian-American Bar Association, presents a copy of his article which was included under Exhibit E of the submission by the Information and Anti-Defamation Commission to the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals.

The attorney raises several problems in OSI cases and the use of evidence supplied by Soviet authorities. He points out, "Firstly, a number of OSI prosecutions have been filed only after the Soviet Union has conducted its own investigations following which the Soviet authorities have turned over purportedly factual information and documentation to the Justice Department."

"Secondly and most disturbing of all," writes Rakowsky, "is the fact that the discovery process in the Soviet Union is not conducted in accordance with American law as it is supposed to."

Thirdly, although evidence coming from the Soviet Union may be corroborated by non-Soviet sources, the defendant is severely hampered in not being able to search out and depose witnesses in the Soviet Union favorable to the defense," continues Mr. Rakowsky.

In his concluding remarks, Rakowsky writes, "Fourthly, while it is the trial court which determines the admissibility and reliability of all evidence — testimonial and documentary — in each particular case, it is unfortunate that with few exceptions our courts have failed to recognize that Soviet-supplied evidence is inherently suspect for the reasons noted above."

"One cannot help but wonder how the United States government, while castigating the Soviets for blatant violations of human rights and disregard of fundamental concepts of fairness and due process, can at the same time rely so heavily on evidence supplied by that same system in seeking to strip nationals of their right to citizenship."

DATELINE WASHINGTON: ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE AIRWAVES," by Lars-Erik Nelson, *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1985-86.

Mr. Nelson, Washington bureau chief of the New York Daily News, writes his latest defamatory interpretation of history for the Carnegie Endowment's quarterly, *Foreign Policy*.

Mr. Nelson has recently taken up the issue of alleged anti-Semitism at Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Belonging to those who would rather do away with the radios, Mr. Nelson writes, "the simplest solution to (the) problems (at the radios — Ed.) is to abolish the station." In supporting his thesis, one endorsed by some liberal Congressmen and Senators, Mr. Nelson relies on the popular tool of anti-Semitism as a means to defame and discredit most of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty's recent accomplishments.

In a section of his article titled, "Anti-Semitism or Nationalism?" Nelson takes out of context various passages from several broadcasts and sites them as being anti-Semitic for describing the mindset of Cossacks who allegedly murdered Jews.

Mr. Nelson later takes up the issue of Ukraine's liberation struggle during World War II and the formation of the Galician division. While Mr. Nelson generalizes about the extent of Ukrainian-Nazi collaboration, he later patronizes the Ukrainian reader by stating that, "by the time the Galizien Division was formed, Hitler's intentions toward the Ukraine had been made manifest: Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians had been murdered by the SS; the Ukrainian people had been publicly declared to be subhumans; and the Germans often used horse and dog whips on Ukrainian workers." However, Mr. Nelson does not point out that many members of the Galician division were forced to join the Division or face the consequence of being sent to labor camps in Germany where millions of Ukrainians perished. Nor does Mr. Nelson bother to mention that both the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) had severely protested the formation of the Galician Division and urged Ukrainians not to join its ranks.

Mr. Nelson later takes up the issue of the Proclamation Act of Independence which was issued in Lviv on June 30, 1941. His blanket labeling of Nazi collaboration and anti-Semitism leads the reader to the conclusion that the author is either not knowledgeable about Ukraine's history during World War II, or he is intentionally misleading the reader with his biased interpretation of history which misrepresents facts with broad generalizations.

To add to the damage of this prestigious quarterly, Nelson misquotes, takes out of context, gives improper dates and cites publications that do not even exist. The reader is left with the clear impression of being duped by the author, however, this conclusion is reached only after several readings and the examination of the authors alleged facts.

M.W.

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