NEW NATO MEMBERS:
SECURITY CONSUMERS OR PRODUCERS?

Joel R. Hillison

April 2009

Visit our website for other free publication downloads

To rate this publication click here.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI’s homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter/.

ISBN 1-58487-387-6
FOREWORD

Burden-sharing debates are not new for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Most recently, NATO has come under fire for failing to meet troop commitments to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

In this monograph, Colonel Joel Hillison analyzes NATO defense expenditures over the past 10 years and troop contributions of new members during three NATO missions: Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. His monograph specifically focuses on the 1999 wave of new members (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland).

Colonel Hillison concludes that these three members are generally fulfilling their commitments to NATO, including contributions to NATO missions. He attributes their performance largely to the new members’ quest for credibility in NATO and with the United States. Colonel Hillison suggests that as new member capabilities and levels of interoperability have increased, new member states have been more willing to take on additional responsibility and burdens. His analysis of burden-sharing by new NATO members is both policy relevant and timely as these new members celebrate their 10th anniversary of NATO membership.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate over the evolving regional security matters in Europe and Afghanistan.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JOEL R. HILLISON is the current Director of National Security Studies in the Department of Distance Education at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. His most recent operational assignment was as the Comptroller and Deputy Comptroller for the Multinational Forces Iraq in 2004-05. From 1997 to 2000, he spent 3 years as the Budget Officer for the Combined Joint Planning Staff at SHAPE Headquarters in Mons, Belgium. Colonel Hillison is a doctoral candidate in International Relations at Temple University and holds an M.A. in Economics from the University of Oklahoma and an M.A. in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.
In reading the headlines recently, one would assume that all of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies are shirking their commitments to the alliance and relying on the United States to do the heavy lifting in places like Afghanistan. But the reality is more nuanced. The contributions of NATO members vary greatly from country to country, and not all NATO allies can be characterized as free riders. While burden-sharing debates have been an enduring feature of NATO since its founding in 1949, they have become more heated in recent years as the U.S. military finds itself over-stretched in Afghanistan and Iraq and facing tough budgetary decisions due to the recent economic crisis.

The fall of the Soviet Union and the recent enlargement of NATO from 16 to 28 members have increased the challenges faced by the transatlantic alliance. Combined with a larger and less homogenous group of states and a more ambiguous threat environment, NATO’s attempts at crisis management have magnified the challenges of garnering sufficient political will and resources to support its required capabilities and out of area missions.

While there is little that can be done to compel alliance members to contribute, it is important to understand the nature of burden-sharing in the alliance, which celebrated its 60th anniversary in April 2009. This monograph uses a historical analysis of burden-sharing among new NATO member states in the post-Cold War period (1992-2008) to provide insight on burden-sharing behavior to senior leaders in the U.S. military and for researchers interested in NATO issues.
Burden-sharing can be defined as “the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal.” Burden-sharing is essentially a collective action problem. Those who do not contribute to the attainment of the common goal are called free riders. The problem of burden-sharing between the United States and other alliance members has been extensively studied in the context of NATO prior to 1999. However, little has been written about burden-sharing by NATO’s new members.

This monograph tested the hypotheses that large states would contribute more than smaller states and that new members would contribute more than older members, using a regression model of defense expenditures. The results of this model suggest that the larger NATO states (as measured by population and physical area) had higher levels of military expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) than older states. However, the results also suggested that wealthier states had relatively lower military expenditures as a percentage of GDP.

The results of this model also suggest that the new NATO states, on average, had higher levels of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP than older states. This relationship was also true when comparing individual new members (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) to older NATO members of comparable population size (Belgium, Portugal, and Spain). This was partially because of the new members’ need to modernize their armed forces and their desire to develop compatible NATO capabilities. However, it was also due to their desire to establish a good reputation within NATO.

This monograph also looked at new member contributions to three NATO missions: Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Afghanistan. While old members shared a greater relative proportion of burdens than new members in two of the three cases examined, the contributions of the new members, on average, increased over time after gaining membership. In the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, as in the U.S.-led mission Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the new member contributions from the 1999 wave equaled or exceeded those of similar sized older NATO members. These contributions were also qualitatively different from some of the older members in that these forces had few, if any, caveats. The increasing level of contributions by new members over time suggests that earlier disparities were more likely caused by capability shortfalls rather than deliberate free-riding behavior. As new member capabilities and levels of interoperability increased, new member states have been more willing and able to take on additional responsibility and burdens.

The findings suggest that new members have done reasonably well in sharing alliance burdens over the past 10 years. When looking at defense expenditures, while not currently meeting the NATO standard of 2 percent of GDP, new members are spending relatively more than their older alliance counterparts. In looking at troop contributions, especially in Afghanistan, new members have done quite well. Where troop contributions lagged during early NATO missions, this can largely be attributed to a lack of capability versus a lack of willingness to contribute.

However, since new members have earned their credibility in NATO, they may feel less compelled to live up to their commitments if other NATO members continue to free ride. Our focus now should be on building capability in our new NATO partners and
sustaining their willingness to contribute through military assistance, bilateral encouragement, public recognition, and continued cooperation. It is also prudent to remember that burden-sharing is in the eyes of the beholder. While asking how much more allies can provide to NATO, the United States should also consider where it would be without NATO.
NEW NATO MEMBERS: SECURITY CONSUMERS OR PRODUCERS?

Burden-sharing is first and foremost a political issue and has to do with political will.

Ambassador Claudio Bisognoiro
Deputy Secretary General of NATO

INTRODUCTION

Burden-sharing debates have been an enduring feature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since its founding in 1949. The fall of the Soviet Union and the recent enlargement of NATO from 16 to 28 members have increased the challenges faced by the transatlantic alliance. Combined with a larger and less homogenous group of states and a more ambiguous threat environment, NATO’s new Strategic Concept of Crisis Management magnifies the challenges of garnering sufficient political will and resources to support NATO’s required capabilities and out of area missions. In spite of these changes, the notion of shared risk and shared responsibility remains a “founding principle of the Alliance.” While there is little that can be done to compel alliance members to contribute, it is important to understand the nature of burden-sharing in the alliance as it celebrates its 60th anniversary in April 2009. This monograph uses a historical analysis of burden-sharing among new NATO member states in the post-Cold War period (1992-2008) to provide insight on burden-sharing behavior to senior leaders in the U.S. military and for researchers interested in NATO issues.
NATO has come a long way since its third wave of enlargement in 1999 (the first in the post-Cold War era). At that time, three new members were asked to join the alliance (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland). In 2009, these countries celebrate their 10-year anniversary in NATO. In 2004, seven additional members joined the alliance (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia). These two recent waves of expansion provide an opportunity to study the effects of enlargement on burden-sharing in NATO. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO agreed on another wave of NATO enlargement. While Macedonia is still pending accession, Albania and Croatia became members on April 1, 2009. NATO also made a controversial, yet nonspecific commitment on future membership for Georgia and Ukraine. Therefore, examining the impact of the most recent waves of enlargement on burden-sharing in NATO could provide lessons for the next round of NATO expansion.

WHAT IS BURDEN-SHARING IN NATO?

In the final analysis, how to count contributions to the alliance is in the eye of the beholder. All national contributions are driven by political constraints.3

Dr. Jamie Shea
Director of Policy Planning,
NATO

Burden-sharing can be defined as “the distribution of costs and risks among members of a group in the process of accomplishing a common goal.”4 Burden-sharing is essentially a collective action problem. Those who do not contribute to the attainment of the common
goal are called free riders. The problem of burden-sharing between the United States and other alliance members has been extensively studied in the context of NATO prior to 1999. However, little has been written about burden-sharing by NATO’s new members.

In the wake of the rapid fall of the Soviet Union, NATO has been an alliance in search of a mission. Some international relations scholars, such as John Mearsheimer, predicted that the end of the Cold War would lead to the dissolution of the NATO alliance. Instead, the United States and its NATO allies adopted a strategy of enlargement and crisis management to rationalize NATO’s continued existence. These two approaches have only increased the tensions generated by concerns over burden-sharing. This monograph begins by looking critically at some of the theoretical reasons given for recent contribution levels to NATO. It uses qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze the defense expenditures and troop contributions of new NATO members. The monograph specifically focuses on the 1999 wave of new members (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) due to their longer track record within the alliance and their participation in three major NATO deployments.

When burden-sharing is mentioned in the context of NATO, it often refers to military expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). This is the most common measure of burden-sharing used in the academic literature on NATO. Military expenditures are also policy relevant and have been used by NATO and its member states to evaluate other members’ contributions to the alliance. At the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO established a new benchmark for allied military expenditures as 2 percent of GDP. That standard is still in effect.
Regarding outputs, contributions to NATO missions have been the most recent source of friction within the alliance. One method to judge the relative contribution to NATO missions is to compare the national contributions as a percentage of the NATO force versus the country’s population as a percentage of NATO’s combined population. This monograph uses this measure to evaluate allied contributions. In addition to troop shortfalls, many NATO nations impose caveats on where and when their forces can be used. These restrictions not only hamper military effectiveness, but also cause considerable strain within the alliance. Therefore, caveats are also examined when looking at the individual contributions of new members.

**Burden-Sharing: Defense Expenditures (Inputs).**

The burden-sharing issue will continue to dog the Alliance either until we can successfully redistribute the burden or reduce it. . . .

Jim Moody, 1990

Disparity in defense expenditures among NATO allies has been an enduring issue within NATO. Today, few NATO nations are meeting the NATO standard of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. In NATO’s 2007 report, only six NATO members were at or above the 2 percent standard: Bulgaria, France, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In a May 2008 Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Op-Ed, the lack of European resolve to honor its pledges to NATO was largely attributed to two factors: high European levels of social welfare and the pandering nature of their political systems. (See Figure 1.)
While there is certainly a “guns versus butter” debate in the allocation of resources, the demand for military expenditures is more complex. Social welfare spending competes with other government spending such as defense both in Europe and in the United States. However, that does not equate to a deterministic correlation between social welfare spending and defense spending. For example, France has the highest level of public social spending in NATO (28.7 percent of GDP) and yet spent approximately 2.4 percent of its GDP on military expenditures in 2007. This is well above the NATO average of 1.8 percent and above the 2 percent benchmark standard agreed to at Prague. Conversely, Canada has a slightly higher level of public social spending (17.3 percent) than the United States (16.2 percent) and yet Canada’s military expenditures, at only 1.3 percent of GDP, are well below those of the United States (4 percent) and the 1.8 percent NATO average. Clearly, something other than competing social welfare expenditures is a factor.
Similarly, blaming the lack of military spending on the parliamentary systems in Europe is neither helpful nor convincing. Three of the six NATO members with military expenditures greater than 2 percent of GDP have parliamentary systems (Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey). Nor does a parliamentary system necessarily equate to widely fluctuating military expenditures subject to what have been called the “mercurial passions of the electorate.”\textsuperscript{14} Quite to the contrary, as seen in Figure 2, European military expenditures, as a percentage of GDP, have fluctuated little from the trend line over the past 16 years. Rather than being unpredictable and rash, European military expenditures have been in steady decline since the end of the Cold War.

![Figure 2. NATO Military Expenditures as a Percent of GDP.\textsuperscript{15}](image)

While September 11, 2001 (9/11) served as a turning point in U.S. expenditures (and threat perception), this was not the case for Europe. In fact, much of the increase in U.S. expenditures indicated above can be attributed to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). According to data published by the U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO), U.S. military obligations in support of OIF amounted to approximately $267 billion dollars between 2003 and 2006. This represented about .6 percent of GDP.

Other estimates put the cost of the war in Iraq even higher. For example, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates would increase this figure to .7 percent of GDP. If the costs calculated by Joseph Stilitz in *The Three Trillion Dollar War* were used, the actual figure would amount to approximately $539 billion dollars between 2001 and 2007, or over 1 percent of GDP.

Using the more conservative number, if U.S. military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are adjusted by .6 percent post-2003, then the average level of U.S. military expenditures as a percentage of GDP would actually be around 3.25 percent (see Figure 3). With this adjustment for OIF, U.S. military expenditures start at 3 percent in 1999 and finish at 3 percent in 2006. This significantly changes the relative rates of military expenditures between the United States and its NATO allies. Had Stiglitz’s figures been used, adjusted U.S. military expenditures as a percentage of GDP would have dropped from 3 percent to 2.8 percent. While these findings suggest that disparities were largely due to U.S. increases in defense spending, the fact remains that few NATO allies are meeting the 2 percent level of military expenditures as pledged at Prague in 2002.
A better explanation for fluctuating NATO military expenditures over time comes from the characterization of NATO as a uniquely privileged group—one having a significantly larger member that is willing and able to bear most of the burdens of providing a public benefit regardless of the contributions of other members. As a uniquely privileged group, NATO members have strong incentives to free ride on the United States, especially when U.S. power is increasing relative to Europe.

The data from 1980 to 2000, shown in Figure 4, supports the explanation attributing free-riding behavior to NATO being a uniquely privileged group. Between 1980 and 2000, the U.S. proportion of NATO military spending roughly paralleled changes in relative economic strength in NATO. As the proportion of the U.S. GDP to NATO’s combined GDP increased, so did the proportion of U.S. military spending compared to NATO military spending (in US $). However,
after 2000, this was no longer the case. U.S. military expenditures, as a percentage of total NATO military expenditures, continued to increase even though the relative size of the U.S. economy (GDP) decreased. Again, this finding could be attributed to higher U.S. defense expenditures in support of the Iraqi War or the War on Terrorism.

**Relationship of Relative Economic Strength to Burden-Sharing**

![Graph](image)

**Figure 4. U.S. Percentage of Military Expenditures and GDP**

**Reduced Threats and Burden-Sharing.**

International relations scholars from the Realist school would explain lagging allied expenditures as a natural reaction to the fall of the Soviet Union and the lack of perceived threat in Europe. In past research, Russian military expenditures have been used as a common measure of threat in studies of burden-sharing within NATO. If NATO spending is primarily attributable to threat perceptions, then NATO spending should vary with Russian military...
expenditures. A statistical analysis of Russian military expenditures from 1992 to 2006 found that they were positively and strongly correlated with U.S. military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. In fact, Russian military expenditures explain 75 percent of the variance in U.S. defense military expenditures as a percentage of GDP (see Figure 5).

![Russian Military Expenditures vs U.S. Defense Burdens](image)

**Figure 5. Impact of Threat on U.S. in Post-Cold War Period.**

What is interesting about this relationship is that increases in U.S. military expenditures as a percentage of GDP precede increases in Russian military expenditures. For example, U.S. military expenditures begin to increase after 2000 and grow at an increasing rate after the terrorist attacks on 9/11. This shift precedes increases in Russian military expenditures, which began in 2002. Additionally, increases in Russian military expenditures preceded increases in the price of oil which began their precipitous climb near the end of 2003. Russia certainly seemed to be reacting to increasing perceived threats from the United States,
while the United States was reacting to more global threats, such as al-Qaeda.

Some Realist scholars would also predict higher military expenditures by new members due to a greater perceived threat from Russia. Stephen Walt’s concept of balance of threat describes threat as a function of four characteristics of the potential enemy: aggregate power, offensive power, offensive intent, and geographic proximity. Any changes to the first two power variables for Russia (aggregate power and offensive power) should have constant effects on all NATO nations. However, intent and proximity should vary from country to country. Without a doubt, the new members are physically closer to Russia than older NATO countries. In addition, most of these countries have had historic security concerns with Russia (as well as with some of their NATO allies). If fear of Russia were the main factor behind military expenditures, then military expenditures of new members would be expected to vary with Russian military expenditures.

However, the military expenditures of the new member states were not responsive to increases in Russian military expenditures. While Russian military expenditures began to rise after 2001, the average defensive burden of these new members continued their gradual fall. While this decline was in concert with declining military expenditures across Europe, it is not consistent with realist expectations. In fact, Russian military expenditures are inversely correlated to changes in military expenditures in all three new members after accession in 1999. This means that as Russian military expenditures increased, military expenditures as a percentage of GDP decreased for the new members. This finding suggests that something besides conventional military threat drove military
expenditures of new NATO members during this period. (See Figure 6.)

![Russian Military Expenditures vs 1999 Wave](image)

**Figure 6. Russian Military Expenditures versus 1999 Wave Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP.**

Collective Action and Military Expenditures.

In his famous work, *Logic of Collective Action*, Mancur Olson demonstrated that the willingness to bear the burdens of providing public goods would be a function of the relative benefit the actor received in relation to the benefit received by the group. Thus larger states would tend to benefit more from a public good and would be willing to bear a greater proportion of the costs. Thus burden-sharing or free-riding behavior was a rational decision based on a cost versus benefit analysis. In Olson’s own words, “Once a smaller member has the amount of the collective good he gets free from the largest member, he has more than he would have purchased for himself, and has no incentive to obtain any of the collective good at his own expense.” This phenomenon results in what he
called the exploitation of the great by the small. Olson suggested that burden-sharing in NATO and the United Nations were examples of this tendency.

In order to test this exploitation hypothesis, this monograph used a regression model of burden-sharing to analyze NATO military expenditures. Data from 25 NATO nations were analyzed from 1992 to 2006; since Iceland does not have military forces, it was excluded. The model was first used in a paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar (IUS) in October 2007 and at the Northeastern Political Science Association in November 2007. This model controlled for economic growth, spillover from other allied spending, distance from Russia, and annual Russian military expenditures. The results demonstrated that large NATO states (as measured by population or geographic area) have higher levels of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP than smaller states. This finding supports the exploitation of the strong hypothesis posed by Olson. However, the results for GDP contradicted this finding. In fact, the richer a country was (as measured by GDP), the lower its military expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Perhaps as the western countries become more affluent, they are adopting more post-modern values and have less of a demand for military power.

NEW MEMBERS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES

The challenge of NATO integration is not so much a question of military equipment modernization . . . but of building a capable military institution that is supported by society and government.

Jeffrey Simon

The main area of interest for this monograph is whether or not new member states would share a
greater relative proportion of defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP than older members of the alliance. Rational choice theories would suggest that new member expenditures would be higher between 1992 and 2006 due to a fear of abandonment by their NATO allies. Events like the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007, bilateral agreements between older NATO allies and Russia over energy, and the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 would exacerbate these fears. New member states also have a historic and deep seated fear of abandonment by the West. Certainly there is a historic legacy in states such as the Czech Republic whose sovereignty was sacrificed to appeasement policies prior to World War II and Poland which was left alone to face the onslaught of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939 despite existing security assurances from France and the United Kingdom. States such as Hungary and the Czech Republic also suffered military interventions by the Soviet Union in 1956 and 1968 respectively.

Another reason to expect equitable contributions by new members is their desire to establish their reputation. As in any cooperative situation, a good reputation reduces uncertainty, increases the credibility of promises, and enhances the clarity of commitments. Once an ally has a reputation for meeting its commitments, it is easier for that state to deepen its level of cooperation within the alliance. As Robert Keohane explained, “a good reputation makes it easier for a government to enter into advantageous international agreements; tarnishing that reputation imposes costs by making agreements more difficult to reach.”

New member states certainly had a strong desire to demonstrate their reliability to their fellow NATO members. Prior to 2004, these states were seeking
membership into other multilateral institutions, such as the European Union (EU). Free-riding during this period would have weakened their credibility and perhaps resulted in an exclusion of their state from the economic prosperity promised by membership in the EU. In a 2008 interview, Mr. Bruce Weinrodt, Defense Advisor to the U.S. Mission to NATO, described new member burden-sharing in similar terms. “New members want to show that they are serious about their commitments. . . . Their own historic experience makes them want to deal directly with security threats.”

The hypothesis that new members would contribute more than older members was also tested using the regression model of burden-sharing discussed earlier. The results of this model suggest that the new NATO states (as measured by years of membership) had higher levels of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP than older states. This relationship was also true when comparing individual new members (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) to older NATO members of comparable population size (Belgium, Portugal, and Spain). In a 2008 interview, “the Romanian President gave two reasons for increasing military expenditures: to replace inferior or outdated equipment for deployed troops and that Romania had a commitment to meet NATO requirements.

Burden-Sharing and Contributions to NATO Missions (Outputs).

The NATO Treaty, written in 1949, speaks about “shared risk and shared responsibility” as a founding principle of the Alliance. . . . We need that commitment as much today as we did in 1949.

Victoria Nuland
Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO
The same burden-sharing dilemma holds true for alliance outputs such as contributions to NATO missions. In his January 19, 2009 press reception, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer reinforced the need for members “to step up, with more forces. . . . It is fair, and I think politically healthy, if we have a fair balance of burdens in this mission between the Allies.”  

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has also made repeated pleas to NATO allies to fulfill their pledges for more troops in Afghanistan. He told the Senate Armed Services Committee in early 2008 that he was frustrated that allies had not lived up to their commitments in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). “I worry a lot about the alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance, in which you have some allies willing to fight and die to protect people’s security, and others who are not.” Even new members of the alliance, such as Poland, have expressed concern. In February 2008, Poland’s Foreign Minister chastised other members of NATO for lagging commitments in ISAF, stating that there was “no room for free-riding” in NATO.

To this point, this project has focused on the traditional measure of burden-sharing in NATO, defense expenditures. In essence, these expenditures represent inputs that may or may not translate into alliance capabilities or outputs. However, contributions to NATO missions are relevant alliance outputs and are applicable to the on-going policy debates within NATO today. Each mission carries distinct political and military risk that might encourage free-riding by NATO members. For example, it is difficult to mobilize political will and resources to defend people in a far away land when the imminent threat is not clear. This monograph examines new member contributions to three NATO missions: Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghan-
istan. For purposes of comparison, NATO states whose troop contributions exceed their percentage of NATO population are characterized as providing their “fair share” to the mission.

**PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS: BOSNIA**

After the Oslo Summit in June 1992, peacekeeping became an official NATO mission. The first NATO peacekeeping mission was its intervention into Bosnia. This operation took the alliance outside of the territory of member states for the first time. Because the Bosnia mission began prior to NATO enlargement, it can serve as a baseline for comparing new members’ burden-sharing before and after enlargement.

European states first attempted to deal with the situation in Bosnia through UN auspices from 1992 through 1993. During this early phase, the United States was against involvement in the Balkans and characterized it as a European problem. Because of its experience in Somalia at the time, the United States was hesitant to commit forces, especially ground forces, to the efforts in Bosnia. However given the failure of European efforts, it eventually decided to intervene.

In a juxtaposition of the burden-sharing argument in Afghanistan today, the European nations complained about the U.S. unwillingness to equally share the risks involved in the peacekeeping efforts during Bosnia. Playing to its strategic, comparative advantage in airpower and considering its unwillingness to accept potential U.S. casualties, the Clinton administration recommended a two-pronged U.S. approach: lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, and using precision bombing to punish Serbian forces. The United States did not immediately commit to providing land forces to augment the alliance efforts. “European allies
complained that the plan would endanger their troops while the United States watched from a safe distance. As a result, many allied officials said, NATO should do everything to avoid a situation where European and United States officials do not face comparable risks on the ground.”

Up to this point, most of the land forces in the Bosnia area of operation were European. Many states were upset that the United States, as the leader of the alliance, was initially unwilling to put its own troops on the ground. “It is not burden-sharing to say, ‘You guys go out and take the risk of getting killed, and if there are problems we will provide air support.’ Putting American forces at risk is fundamental to assuring that there is a political commitment from Washington. American feet on the ground [are] vital.” Therefore, this monograph focuses on the land contributions to the NATO mission in Bosnia: Stabilization Force (SFOR).

Two NATO missions, Implementation Force (IFOR) and SFOR, were approved by the North Atlantic Council to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1031 gave NATO a 1-year mandate to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords through IFOR. IFOR’s mission began on December 20, 1995. After the first set of Bosnian elections, NATO approved a follow-on force to take the place of IFOR. SFOR was activated on December 20, 1996, and was authorized by the UN under UNSCR 1088. While containing only half of the forces that were in IFOR, SFOR represented a sustained commitment to the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. In both IFOR and SFOR, every NATO nation with a national military contributed to the mission. This largely successfully mission was passed on to the EU in 2004.
Did New Members Free Ride after Gaining NATO Membership?

NATO’s intervention into Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) started prior to the first wave of enlargement in 1999. Prior to this, states from the 1999 wave were members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. As these states vied for membership in NATO, one would expect strong contributions to demonstrate their credibility to the alliance. However, once these states became members in 1999, they might be tempted to free ride. Therefore, only new member participation from 1999 onward is analyzed.

![Figure 7. Relative New Member Troop Contributions to SFOR](image)

In their first year of NATO membership, new member participation in SFOR was at approximately the same level as in 1998 when these countries were not yet members of NATO. However, during the 6 years following accession to NATO, the 1999 wave’s troop contributions to SFOR never exceeded their percentage of NATO population. The contributions of
the 1999 wave to SFOR averaged 3.9 percent of the total NATO force throughout the post-membership period. This average level of contribution is well below their percentage of the total NATO population (7 percent) but is approximately at the same level as when these countries entered NATO. This indicates that while new members did not necessarily provide their fair share of the burdens (as defined earlier), the new members did not free ride at a greater rate after membership. To further examine these findings, it is necessary to compare the contributions of new members with those of existing NATO members.

New Versus Old.

Figure 8 compares the troop contributions of two new members with NATO members of similar population size. From 1999 to 2001, the Czech Republic and Hungary provided troops at a comparable level to Belgium and Portugal. However, the commitment level of both new members dropped in 2002, 3 years after membership. On average over the period, the Czech Republic and Hungary provided 1.0 percent of the NATO force while each comprised approximately 1.3 percent of the NATO population. This commitment was relatively less than the two existing NATO members of similar size.

On average, Belgium and Portugal provided 1.6 percent of the NATO force, while each comprised approximately 1.3 percent of the NATO population. This suggests that old members shared a greater relative proportion of burdens than new members. This finding is primarily due to the drop in new member commitments after 2001. From 1999 to 2001, these new members contributed at a similar level as older members to the NATO mission.
Figure 8. New vs. Old Member Troop Contributions to SFOR.\textsuperscript{44}

The picture is different when comparing Poland and Spain, despite the fact that these two nations had a comparable population size (see Figure 9). On average, Poland provided 1.9 percent of the NATO force while comprising 4.4 percent to 5 percent of the combined NATO population. This commitment was significantly less than their fair share (as defined earlier) and less than the contributions of Spain. On average, Spain provided 6.5 percent of the NATO force while comprising 4.8 percent to 5 percent of the combined NATO population. However Spain’s contributions declined over time, narrowing the gap between Poland and Spain.

One plausible explanation for the lower troop contributions from the new member states is the lack of interoperability and low military readiness of these former Warsaw Pact forces. Most new members entered the alliance with outdated Soviet equipment, Warsaw Pact operating procedures, and limited English skills.
If capability is, in fact, the reason new members lagged in troop contributions versus the desire to free ride, this gap should have closed over time as new member capabilities increased. However, it could be that troop commitments to SFOR were constrained by concurrent commitments to the other NATO missions, such as Kosovo. If the drop in contributions to SFOR was due to Kosovo, the 1999 wave should have increased their commitments to the KFOR mission in 2002.

**PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS: KOSOVO**

The next case study examines NATO’s intervention into Kosovo. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission presented more problems for the alliance than SFOR. The KFOR mission was conducted without a UN resolution. Many European countries felt that a UN resolution was necessary to legitimize the use of force. There was also greater domestic political opposition to the NATO
mission in Kosovo. KFOR took place in the same year that three new members were added to NATO. Given these greater problems, this should have led to greater free-riding behavior.

Decline of Burden-Sharing after Accession.

NATO’s intervention into Kosovo began during 1999, the first year of NATO enlargement. In their first year of NATO membership, new member participation in KFOR comprised approximately 3.6 percent of the NATO force, similar to the 4 percent level of contribution to SFOR in that year. There was no precipitous drop after membership; in fact, relative contributions increased steadily beginning in 2002 and continuing through the next wave of NATO expansion in 2004. This indicates that the new members did not free ride at a greater rate after membership and that some of the decline in SFOR contributions could be attributed to increasing requirements of KFOR.

![KFOR - 1999 Wave Burden](image)

Figure 10. Relative New Member Troop Contributions to KFOR.\(^{46}\)
It was only following the second wave of NATO enlargement in 2004 that the 1999 wave’s relative contributions to KFOR exceeded their percentage of NATO population. This level of contribution represented an increase over the contributions made to SFOR and supports the argument that as capabilities of these new members increased, so did new member contributions to NATO missions. This finding also suggests that the desire to demonstrate credibility to the alliance continued even after new members entered NATO. A statement made in 2001 by Hungarian Ambassador Andras Simonyi supports the conjecture that the new member states wanted to demonstrate their credibility to the alliance during the KFOR operations. “Hungary was also a brand new member that had to prove itself. But we also had to prove that enlargement was not a mistake, and that Hungary together with Poland and Czech Republic will not weaken the solidarity and cohesion of the Alliance.”47

**New Versus Old.**

When comparing dyads based on size (see Figure 11), contributions by the Czech Republic and Hungary were consistently below the level of Belgium, but their involvement increased over time and surpassed the contributions of both Belgium and Portugal in 2006. On average, the Czech Republic and Hungary provided 1.43 percent of the NATO force, while each comprised 1.3 percent of the NATO population.

This commitment was relatively less than the two existing NATO members, Belgium and Portugal, but
represented a fair share of the NATO force. On average, Belgium and Portugal provided 1.92 percent of the NATO force, while each comprised 1.2 to 1.3 percent of the NATO population. This finding suggests that old members again shared a greater relative proportion of burden during KFOR than new members, even though the new members’ percentage of the NATO force increased in every year after 2001. These findings support the conjecture that new member contributions increased as military capability increased and domestic constraints waned.

The comparison between Poland and Spain is also telling. Poland consistently contributed less to the SFOR mission than Spain. On average, Poland provided 2.3 percent of the NATO force, while comprising more than 4.4 percent of the NATO population. During KFOR, Spain provided 3.9 percent of the NATO force, while comprising 4.8 percent to 5 percent of the NATO population. It is interesting to note that Spain’s contribution to KFOR spiked in 2001, after President
Aznar was reelected with a majority government, and began a gradual decline after President Zapatero was elected in 2004. In any case, the gap between these two countries was significantly less than it was during the SFOR mission. (See Figure 12.)

![Figure 12. Poland vs. Spain Troop Contributions to KFOR.](image)

During KFOR, the average annual contributions by older NATO members again exceeded those of new members of equal size. The findings also demonstrate that declining new member contributions to SFOR were partially attributable to the competing demands of KFOR. The Czech Republic increased its ground forces in KFOR in 2002 by 225 soldiers, while troop levels for both Hungary and Poland in KFOR remained relatively stable from 2001 to 2005. It is also interesting that, on average, the relative contribution of new member states increased after enlargement.

PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS: AFGHANISTAN

The NATO mission in Afghanistan represents an ideal case for free-riding behavior to occur. ISAF is NATO’s first peacekeeping mission outside of
Europe. While the core mission consists of stability and reconstruction, NATO forces are also more or less involved in combat operations depending upon the location of the forces and the caveats imposed by their governments. These two factors have placed significant strains on NATO’s cohesion and the ability to field sufficient forces to accomplish the mission. In this regard, it should have been difficult for NATO to overcome the rational incentives to free ride during ISAF. If free-riding were ever to occur, it should occur when the domestic political costs are high (due to rising casualties and diminishing public support) and the potential benefits are hard to articulate (due to the distance from both Europe and North America and lack of clear connection to national interests). The European incentives to free ride should be even greater due to the gradual mission-creep in ISAF and the growing frustration with increased levels of violence.

The U.S.-led mission that deposed the Taliban government in Afghanistan was called Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). OEF was launched in the aftermath of the attack by al-Qaeda on the United States on 9/11. Beginning in October 2001, this was a largely U.S. operation with limited participation of coalition partners. OEF, in addition to its stabilization and reconstruction mission, always had a counterinsurgency component against the Taliban and remnants of al-Qaeda. While NATO nations participated in these missions, OEF was not a NATO operation.

The ISAF mission in Afghanistan was created under UN Security Council Resolutions 1386, 1413, and 1444. It was established in the aftermath of the invasion as a parallel mission to the on-going OEF U.S. mission. While ISAF was initially led by successive NATO nations—the United Kingdom, Turkey, and
Germany/Netherlands—the NATO alliance did not take responsibility for the mission until August 2003.\textsuperscript{50} Once NATO took command of ISAF, it began to gradually expand its role in Afghanistan. During Stage One of ISAF, NATO took control in the northern part of Afghanistan with predominantly French and German forces. The purpose of this mission was largely to provide security to the government in the capital of Kabul.\textsuperscript{51} The mission later expanded with the deployment of provisional reconstructions teams (PRTs). These civil military teams were designed to help extend governance and reconstruction efforts throughout the country. In Stage Two, NATO expanded into western Afghanistan under UN SCR 1623, with Italy and Spain providing the bulk of the forces. Both of these sectors were largely peaceful when NATO assumed control. This stage lasted from May 2005 until July 2006.\textsuperscript{52}

Starting in July 2006, Stage Three brought the deployment of NATO troops to southern Afghanistan, an area with significant Taliban activity and the focal point for OEF operations. U.S., British, Canadian, and Dutch forces represented the largest contingent of the NATO force in southern Afghanistan. The beginning of Stage Three also heralded a divergence of views within the alliance. While the allies largely agreed on the mission, they disagreed on the strategy to accomplish that mission. Many NATO nations imposed caveats on where and when their forces could be used. These restrictions not only hampered military effectiveness, but also caused considerable strain within the alliance. Finally in Stage Four, NATO assumed control over the entire country in October 2006. Over the past few years, the level of violence has increased considerably in Afghanistan. In addition, national caveats continue to frustrate NATO commanders.
Did Burden-Sharing Decline after Accession?

In the first year of ISAF under NATO command, the troop contributions of the 1999 wave comprised approximately 3.7 percent of the NATO force, similar to their level of contribution to KFOR in its first year. There was a drop in the percentage of the total NATO force contributed by the 1999 wave, down to 2.4 percent, coinciding with the second wave of recent NATO enlargement in 2004. However, this decline was attributable to a dramatic increase in U.S. contributions (which grew by over 113 percent), rather than declining new member contributions. In fact, the combined contribution of the 1999 wave increased in 2003. While the contributions of the 1999 wave were consistently below their proportion of the NATO population, they did steadily increase after 2005 until 2008 when they were nearly equal to their percentage of population. This indicates that the new members did not free ride at a greater rate after membership. (See Figure 13.)

Figure 13. Relative New Member Troop Contributions to ISAF.
This was also true for the contributions of the 2004 wave of new NATO members. As was the case earlier, the relative contribution of new members increased after they became NATO members (see Figure 14). Lithuania’s National Military Representative to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Colonel Jurgatis, gave this explanation for Lithuanian support to ISAF. “Sending forces to ISAF was a hard decision because interests in Afghanistan were unclear to the Lithuanian people. But our leaders argued that we were members of NATO and had to participate.” These findings support the explanation that troop contributions increased as capability increased and that new member burden-sharing was more an issue of capability than willingness to contribute.

![Figure 14. Relative 2004 Wave Contributions to ISAF](image)

**New versus Old.**

During ISAF, troop contributions by the Czech Republic and Hungary were consistently at or above
the level of troops contributed by Belgium and Portugal (Figure 15). This level of contribution is impressive given that contributions by both the Czech Republic and Hungary were constrained by participation in OIF. For example, the Czech Republic committed 300 troops to OIF in 2003, while Belgium did not send any troops. Between 2003 and 2008, the Czech Republic, on average, contributed about 1.5 percent of the NATO force in ISAF while comprising between 1.2 percent and 1.3 percent of NATO’s population. On average, the Czech Republic’s annual contributions to ISAF were 378 troops, although this has increased to 415 in 2008. At the request of the Dutch government, the Czech Republic also increased the size of their forces in southern Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{56} Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek stated that the proposed increase in contributions was due to “growing responsibilities in the region and obligations to our allies in NATO.”\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure15.png}
\caption{Figure 15. New vs. Old Member Troop Contributions to ISAF.\textsuperscript{58}}
\end{figure}

Hungary’s participation in ISAF was also constrained by contributions to OIF. Hungary committed
500 troops to OIF in 2003 and approximately 290 in 2004 and 2005 before withdrawing its forces. As the Hungarian National Military Representative to SHAPE stated in an interview, “because the U.S. was involved [in Iraq], we had to be there.”

While Hungary contributed a much smaller proportion of the NATO force in ISAF, on average 0.4 percent, its contributions still exceeded those of Portugal. In ISAF Hungary’s contributions increased from 130 troops in 2004 to 240 troops in 2008. This level of contribution (averaging 152 troops per year) was between that of the Czech Republic and Belgium on one end and that of Portugal on the other.

These results suggest that new members were burden-sharing at a greater rate than existing NATO members of similar population size during ISAF. As the former U.S. Ambassador to NATO stated in 2007, “we have been impressed by the commitment of all our new Allies to bring as much as they can to the table. Some countries are really punching above their weight class, like Lithuania, which runs its own Provincial Reconstruction team in Ghor Province in Afghanistan.”

The findings differ when comparing Poland and Spain. On average, Poland contributed less than 1 percent to NATO forces between 2003 and 2006. While Poland’s initial level of contributions to ISAF might suggest free-riding behavior, a better explanation is that Poland’s contributions were also constrained by commitments to the U.S.-led operation in Iraq, OIF. (See Figure 16.)
Poland had one of the largest contingents in Iraq under the Multinational Forces (starting at over 2,000 troops and ending the mission with approximately 900 soldiers in 2008). Poland also assumed a leadership role in charge of the multinational sector in Iraq. At U.S. request, the government twice delayed its planned withdrawal from Iraq before finally withdrawing in 2008 after the election of the Civic Platform Party in 2007.

While early Polish contributions to ISAF were constrained by commitments to OIF, Poland gradually shifted the focus of its efforts to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. In September 2006, Poland responded to requests from SACEUR to fill increasing ISAF requirements. At the request of NATO, Poland again agreed to significantly increase its contributions to ISAF in 2007 and in 2008. Shortly after becoming the Minister of Defence, Bogdan Klich stated that Poland
would remain committed to the NATO mission in Afghanistan “with the view to Poland’s credibility in NATO.”\textsuperscript{62} Poland also committed to providing eight badly needed helicopters in support of ISAF, with the first two arriving in August 2008.\textsuperscript{63}

**SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES**

While old members shared a greater relative proportion of burdens than new members in two of the three cases examined, the contributions of the new members, on average, increased over time after gaining membership. In ISAF as in OIF, the new member contributions from the 1999 wave equaled or exceeded those of similar size older NATO members. The increasing level of relative contributions by new members over time suggests that the earlier disparity was more likely caused by capability shortfalls rather than deliberate free-riding behavior. The findings also did not support the hypothesis that new member burden-sharing would decline after accession into NATO.

**Review of Findings: Inputs and Outputs.**

At the end of the day, political solidarity is more important than specific notions of equal numerical contributions.\textsuperscript{64}

Dr. Jamie Shea  
Director of Policy Planning, NATO

While the results vary between measures used and by the strategic context under which burden-sharing was examined, there is some support for the hypothesis that new members will share a greater
relative proportion of burdens than old members. Certainly, new members fared better in trying to meet NATO’s spending targets. This was largely because of the need to modernize their armed forces and their desire to develop compatible NATO capabilities. Regarding troop contributions to NATO missions, as new member capabilities and levels of interoperability increased, new member states have been more willing to take on additional responsibility and burdens. This is also supported by the fact that new member contributions to NATO missions generally increased after gaining membership.

According to the NATO Deputy Secretary General, “the new members have a lot of political will; their approach as new members of the club is that they want to show that they are up to the task of being members of NATO.” In a 2008 interview, the Supreme Allied Commander, General Brandtz Craddock, specifically mentioned new members that were “carrying their weight, although they have limited capabilities. Some good examples are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania.” During a web chat in 2008, Ambassador Nuland stated that “we have been impressed by the commitment of all our new Allies to bring as much as they can to the table.”

**What to Expect in the Future.**

New members are generally doing well. However it is difficult to characterize them as a group because they comprise a variety of states with unique institutions, capabilities, and history.

General Sir John McColl
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
Grousing over lagging allied contributions will not go away. Nor will the enormous strains on the alliance lessen in the near future. On January 27, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates told the Senate that the mission in Afghanistan would “be a long and difficult fight.” The question then becomes what can be expected with the next wave of NATO enlargement. It is reasonable to expect that the leaders of the alliance, especially the United States, will continue to bear a larger proportion of the burdens especially in areas where they have a comparative advantage: air and sea power, precision munitions, and other high technology capabilities. However, new members can and should be expected to provide commensurate contributions in areas such as ground forces and niche capabilities. As the NATO spokesman stated in December 2008, the “Secretary General would like to see an increase, not only from the Americans, but also from other allies, in particular the Europeans, to ensure we have a political, as well as military sharing of burdens within this mission.”

It is also likely that new member states will be eager to contribute to the alliance, but will be constrained by political and military capability shortfalls. The two newest members (Albania and Croatia), and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, face similar obstacles to integration as did the 1999 and 2004 waves. All three have significant economic and political reforms to make to meet alliance standards. All three members in this group are also relatively less wealthy than other NATO members, with a per capita GDP of $15,500 for Croatia, $5,800 for Albania, and $8,400 for Macedonia. All three of these countries share a common socialization experience with the previous waves of NATO enlargement. Each is a member of the PfP (Albania since 1994, the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia since 1995, and Croatia since 2000) and has gone through the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Therefore they have benefited from the lessons learned with previous rounds of NATO expansion. One of the two most recent invitees to NATO, Albania, is a good example. In a 2008 visit to NATO Headquarters, Albanian representatives were “very proud to say they are meeting the 2 percent (GDP) benchmark as well as deployment and sustainability criteria.”

In spite of the challenges faced by these aspiring new members, it can be expected that they will try to demonstrate their credibility to NATO. Through their participation in PfP, MAP, and NATO missions abroad, they have been able to enhance their interoperability and military capability. While contributions to NATO missions will necessarily be constrained by military and economic factors, all three should be expected to contribute. In fact, all are currently participating in Afghanistan at a level roughly equal to their percentage of the NATO population (Albania has 140 troops, Croatia has 200 troops, and Macedonia 135 troops deployed).

**Future Research.**

One of the interesting auxiliary findings from this project concerns the impact of threat on burden-sharing decisions. In the immediate post-Cold War period, it appears that NATO states have become less sensitive to increased military expenditures by Russia. With the recent deterioration of NATO-Russian relations, especially after the invasion of Georgia, this phenomenon may change. The impact of a more assertive Russian foreign policy on burden-sharing decisions in NATO needs further examination.
Two possible outcomes are foreseeable. First, as insecurity and dissention increases, NATO members may become increasingly polarized between those seeking accommodation with Russia and those states seeking to take a firmer stand. Many older NATO allies have advocated a more cautious approach. On the other hand, many new members have sought a firmer stand by NATO against Russia. For example, Poland’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrzrej Kremer, stated on February 2, 2009, that Poland wants NATO to update its contingency planning. In addition, many new members are hedging their bets by strengthening their bilateral ties with the United States. For example, Poland and the United States signed an agreement in February 2009 increasing cooperation between their special forces.

Second, new NATO members may shift their focus more towards territorial defense and be less inclined to approve and provide forces for expeditionary NATO missions. This is especially true as larger European nations seek bilateral arrangements with Russia over such issues as energy and demonstrate a lack of resolve in standing up to Russian provocations. This might lead the former Warsaw Pact countries to eschew the development of niche capabilities to focus on more conventional deterrent forces. This would not only be detrimental to alliance unity, but also to its collective military capability as much of this capability would be redundant. In this context, new members may seek NATO and U.S. affirmation of Article 5 security guarantees.

Another interesting area for further research is the impact of the global financial crisis on relative levels of military expenditures in NATO. Since the election of President Barack Obama, speculation has been
that the United States might cut its defense budget by up to 10 percent. The President has also pledged to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq. If NATO is a uniquely privileged group, as discussed earlier, the relative decline in U.S. economic power, as well as declining requirements in Iraq, might lead to a decline in U.S. military expenditures relative to NATO. It would be interesting to examine whether or not NATO allies will increase their levels of burden-sharing in response to these changes. On the other hand, given the greater fiscal demands facing all NATO allies, non-U.S. NATO members might continue to prioritize domestic programs over military expenditures. These pressures might also lead to reduced support to NATO peacekeeping operations. For example, Poland’s Defense Minister Bogdan Klich announced on February 4, 2009, that Poland would “end its military missions in Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and Chad as part of the Government’s plan to cut spending in response to the global economic crisis.”

**SUMMARY**

There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them!\(^{74}\)

---

Winston Churchill

The findings of this monograph suggest that new members have been fairly sharing alliance burdens over the past 10 years. When looking at both inputs and outputs, new members have done quite well. Where troop contributions lagged during early NATO missions, this can largely be attributed to a lack of capability versus a lack of willingness to contribute. In
sum, it appears that new members have earned their credibility in NATO. As time goes on, however, these new members may feel less compelled to live up to their commitments if other NATO members continue to free ride. While asking how much more allies can provide to NATO, the United States should also consider where it would be without NATO.

One of our enduring national interests has been a peaceful and stable international system. In particular, a free, peaceful, and stable Europe has been a vital interest. The 2006 National Security Strategy called NATO “a vital pillar of U.S. foreign policy.” NATO represents more than just a typical military alliance. It represents a security community of democracies that have shared values, histories, and political interests. Thus preserving NATO is itself a critical end-state of U.S. foreign policy. Our focus now should be on building capability in our new NATO partners and sustaining their willingness to contribute through military assistance, bilateral encouragement, public recognition, and continued cooperation.

ENDNOTES


8. Forster and Cimbala.


13. Ibid.


15. “NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence.”


25. Ibid., p. 9.

26. Ibid.


28. These results were robust using both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Vector Decomposition methods both with and without U.S. data included. Using OLS, only population and area were statistically significant at the .05 level. Vector decomposition increased the statistical significance of all variables to the .001 level. Vector decomposition is a process developed by Plummer and Troeger which allows the estimation of time invariant variables in a panel using fixed effects.


32. However, the results were only statistically significant using the Vector decomposition. Results were statistically significant at the .05 level with the United States and at the .001 level without the United States included.

33. Colonel Vasile Roman, interview by author, U.S. Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 11, 2007.

34. Nuland.


41. Ibid.


44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.


48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.


55. The Military Balance. See also “ISAF Troop (Placemat).”

56. Ibid.


58. The Military Balance. See also “ISAF Troop (Placemat).”

59. Brigadier General Ujfalusi, Hungarian National Military
Representative, based on interviews conducted at the SHAPE Headquarters, Mons, Belgium, January 28, 2008.

60. Nuland.

61. *The Military Balance*. See also “ISAF Troop (Placemat).”


63. “Poland Sends First Two Helicopters for Afghan Contingent,” Polish Press Agency, August 4, 2008, accessed through U.S. Open Source Center on November 4, 2008, https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_215_0_0_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011.opensource.gov/content/Display/9461925?highlightQuery=eJxtjU0OwiAUlhK%2FyvsgqOQagVNtBQjHGJSJSEPkyICz29TaeHavJfjfkqkbeM%2BC6A8r7veRajY7rD6FEvGK4gY335ZxTIGAsELng1c%2FPzQwe7wQBkflpNIgzEE7e2oDXZnio6YAu1CwTN%2BNhtd%2BWiXnjSusczUZfU8C%2F6CffLp0ZlGBevNY97w%3D%3D&fileSize=3856.

64. Shea.

65. Ibid.

66. General Brandtz Craddock, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, based on interviews conducted at SHAPE, February 1, 2008.

67. Nuland.


70. “NATO Seeks More Burden-Sharing in Afghanistan,”
71. Senior Diplomat and Member of the NATO International Staff, interview by author, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, January 31, 2008.

