Voltaire Network

Covert Action

Although the principle of state sovereignty lies at the heart of international law, the super powers have not refrained from corrupting governments, destabilising societies, eliminating their leaders and even overthrowing regimes by means of covert action. While this form of interference is relatively inexpensive when weighed against the potential gains, it inevitably undermines trust among nations.
The Anglo-Saxons have become the masters of the game. As joint signatories to a 1948 secret military pact (UK-USA + Canada, Australia, New Zealand), they fashioned espionage and covert action tools to serve their common project: the Cold War. They were rivaling in this field against the Soviet Union, over which they had already attained undeniable superiority. Both Maoist China and post-colonial France also resorted to analogous means with a view to securing zones of interest, mainly in Africa.
The landscape changed completely after the demise of the USSR. China stopped financing armed revolutionary groups all around and concentrated on pragmatic intelligence efforts to sustain economic cooperation development. France withdrew from its private reserve in Africa to leave room for the European Union. Having outlived the Yeltsin abyss, Russian intelligence set about restructuring at the national level and in their historical area of influence (newly independent ex-Soviet states) by mobilizing against external intrusions rather than interfering in the affairs of other countries.
As of 1995, the Anglo-Saxons invested massively in their secret services, whose budget tripled over a 15-year period. In addition, they have drawn the Israeli services into their structure either as full members or as subcontractors. In 2009, the Anglo-Saxon services (except Israel) operate on an employment level of 250,000 men and a budget exceeding 100 billion dollars (i.e. 15 times higher than Russia’s, virtually their main competitor). In effect, espionage and covert action have become the essential tools of forced globalisation.

The Treasure of Japanese Criminals
Golden Lily Operation
by Denis Boneau
Golden Lily Operation 8 November 2004
After the 1930’s, while the Japanese imperial army looted Southeast Asia, Emperor Hirohito launchd “the Golden Lily Operation”, aimed at recovering and hiding his war booty. At the end of World War Two, US general McArthur’s troops took hold of the treasure and raised funds to finance the struggle against communism. “Yamashita’s Gold”, considered a simple legend for many years, allows you to understand how the Japanese Democratic Liberal Party, despite the great corruption of its elite, kept an exclusive control of the Japanese “democracy” for half a century. This is part three of a series of articles on Japanese war criminals, their links with the Mafia, their political power and the American support they received to commit their misdeeds, under the pretext of fighting against communism. The history of “democracy” (...)
Washington and Paris overthrow Aristide
Coup d’Etat in Haiti
by Thierry Meyssan
NED: National Endowment for Democracy
The networks of "democratic" interference
by Thierry Meyssan
Social Control and Interference
Sects, a Different Approach
by Agnès Deurveilher
Sects, a Different Approach 17 October 2002
The sects are today a major concern for states, to the extent that it has established structures to study and fight them. However, the usual approach of the sects in terms of psychical manipulation does not allow understanding such concern. The commissions that have studied the problem do not suggest a precise definition of the sects and do not avoid contradictions. Usually it is observed that the current legislation is enough, although the adoption of new laws is requested. A different approach based on the monitoring of activities held by certain sects in public life may be suggested. The interference of different groups with the political life of some countries allows, in fact, to better understand the concern of the States. The specialization of certain organizations in professional training for high tech sensitive companies is also another particular concern. Finally, the ties that link some of them with the intelligence services deserve special attention. Is it possible (...)
Washington D. C. (États-Unis) | 21 April 1950