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# THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

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WE MUST NOT REVIVE HUMAN SLAVERY . . . . . *Editorial*

THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST UNIFICATION . . . *Clarence A. Manning*

ASYLUM FOR EUROPE'S UPROOTED . . . *William Henry Chamberlin*

UKRAINE IN MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY . . . *Lev E. Dobriansky*

AMERICAN MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT CENTRAL-EASTERN

EUROPE . . . . . *Joseph S. Roucek*

THE MEANING OF "RUSSIA" AND "UKRAINE" . . *Nicholas D. Czubyj*

UKRAINIAN LITERARY TRADITION . . . . . *Stephen Shumeyko*

APPEAL FOR DISPLACED UKRAINIANS—BOOK REVIEWS—UCRAINICA

IN AMERICAN AND BRITISH PERIODICALS

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## CONTENTS

	PAGE
<b>We Must Not Revive Human Slavery</b> . . . . .	305
<i>Editorial</i>	
<b>The Russian Communist Unification</b> . . . . .	311
<i>Prof. Clarence A. Manning</i>	
<b>Asylum for Europe's Uprooted</b> . . . . .	322
<i>William Henry Chamberlin</i>	
<b>Ukraine in Mid-Twentieth Century</b> . . . . .	330
<i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	
<b>American Misconceptions about Central-Eastern Europe</b> . . . . .	342
<i>Joseph S. Roucek, Ph.D.</i>	
<b>The Meaning of "Russia" and "Ukraine"</b> . . . . .	351
<i>Nicholas D. Czubyj</i>	
<b>Ukrainian Literary Tradition</b> . . . . .	365
<i>Stephen Shumeyko</i>	
<b>Editor of the Ukrainian Quarterly Appeals for Displaced Ukrainians in Europe</b> . . . . .	376
<b>BOOK REVIEWS</b>	
<b>The Yogi and the Commisar and Other Essays by Arthur Koestler</b> . . . . .	378
<i>Roman Olesnicki</i>	
<b>The Big Three—The United States, Britain, Russia, by David J. Dallin</b> . . . . .	381
<i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	
<b>The Future of Europe, by Johannes Steel</b> . . . . .	385
<i>Dr. T. Lazare</i>	
<b>The Pattern of Soviet Power, by Edgar Snow</b> . . . . .	390
<i>Roman Olesnicky</i>	
<b>Canada and the Fight for Freedom, by Right Hon. L. W. Mackenzie King</b> . . . . .	391
<i>Honore Ewach</i>	
<b>UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND BRITISH PERIODICALS</b> . . . . .	393

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## WE MUST NOT REVIVE HUMAN SLAVERY

### *Editorial*

**I**N his address to Congress, on January 6, 1941, the late President Roosevelt laid the ideological basis for the entrance of America into the war in the form of the proclamation of the Four Freedoms. The struggle for them, however, has been going on since the days of the Roman Empire. The first signal victory was won for them by the Christian world in the 13th century when slavery was abolished. To be sure, it was not a permanent victory, for slavery was revived by the Portuguese and Spanish conquistadors in the New World, with the Indians and Negroes as its victims. Nevertheless human progress eventually dealt slavery its death blow, particularly from the time when the American Declaration of Independence proclaimed that, "We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and Pursuit of Happiness." Following that, nation after nation began to abolish slavery. Among the outstanding events which hastened its twilight were the American Civil War, the abolition of slavery in the British Empire during the first half of the 19th century, a similar evolution in the Ottoman Empire (1876), and finally in Brazil in 1889.

From that time the abuse of human liberties has been internationally regarded as outside the law. Roosevelt's speech on Four Freedoms, recognized it as such and elaborated upon the extent of these liberties.

The irony of it all, however, is that the very same man, who defined the Four Freedoms, Roosevelt himself, is the one who involuntarily helped to revive a form of slavery in Europe. This took place at the Yalta conference of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. There it was secretly agreed by them that the American and British military authorities had to deliver to the Soviet authorities those persons in the American and British zones of occupation who were Soviet citizens in 1939. To be sure, this agreement was never officially announced, but it is still regarded as official and binding upon America. What is more, it is actually being carried out now. Little did Roosevelt reckon when he was at the luxurious Yalta in the beautiful Ukrainian Riviera of Crimea

that by agreeing to this repatriation measure he was bringing into existence a new form of slavery, for existence of the millions proscribed people under the harsh and totalitarian Kremlin rule is virtually worse than that of the slavery of Pre-Lincoln times. It means either death or slow dying in exile.

For over twenty years the Soviets were sealed off from the civilized world. It was well nigh impossible for anyone to leave the Soviet Union. When the war broke out, it offered the first opportunity for the people under the Soviet regime to break loose of it, and hundreds of thousands of them did so by emigrating abroad. Among them were people of various nationalities, including Russians, White Ruthenians, Armenians and Georgians. But the Ukrainians were the most numerous.

Back in the time of the Russian Revolution the Ukrainians had their own Ukrainian National Republic, and waged war to preserve its sovereignty. When finally it was overthrown by the Russians Reds with the help of a Ukrainian puppet government at Kharkiv composed of Russian and Ukrainian quislings, the struggle for Ukrainian national freedom went underground and continued to offer determined resistance to the Communist Russian occupants of Ukraine.

The sanguinary struggle of the Ukrainians against their oppressors exacted a toll from them of some eight million lives, lost through the state-fostered famine in the early 30's, executions, banishment to the notorious labor camps and wastelands, hardships and privations. The toll was particularly heavy among the intellectuals and clergy. Cultural and religious institutions were among the chief victims. Thus the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church was completely liquidated, while the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was deprived of its native cultural character. All Ukrainian scholars and writers who did not conform to the Party line were either liquidated or reduced to a most miserable existence.

It is only natural, therefore, that thousands of Ukrainians intellectuals and clergymen seized the opportunity which the war offered them to flee from Soviet rule westward, in the hope of being able to find some place where they could labor freely for the advancement of Ukrainian culture. Some fled freely, while others were driven into Germany as forced labor. Most of the refugees, with the intellectuals predominating, at first expected that they would be able to settle in Western Ukraine, among their western kinsmen. But when the Soviets occupied it, they continued their trek westward until they reached their present whereabouts. With the arrival of the Americans and British on

the continent, they flocked to their zones of occupation, in order to live there a free life.

Their displacement naturally perturbed Stalin as it meant so many more potential enemies of his anti-Ukrainian regime. So at the Yalta conference he put through a measure providing for the repatriation of Soviet citizens as of 1939.

Under this provision, whether they want to or not, these displaced persons have to return to the USSR. The tragedy of it all is that among them, especially among the intellectuals, are many who because of their pronounced democratic and pro-free Ukraine views, face the prospect of being hounded to death or killed outright by notorious NKVD. This may sound incredible to the average American, but not to one familiar with Soviet methods.

Such forced repatriation is in process now. In effect it is a revival of human slavery. What is worse, according to reports reaching here, in some sectors of their zone American authorities are aiding Soviet agents in rounding up former Soviet citizens, in a manner reminiscent of the catching of Negro slaves in Africa about a century ago. The democratic character of such victims is of no help to them; they are simply rounded up, herded on trucks, and driven away to meet their fate at the hands of the Reds.

Patently the Yalta decision does not apply to those who came from Western Ukraine and Carpatho-Ukraine, as well as to those who constitute the old pre-war immigration; yet according to reliable reports it is not unusual for them to be seized also during the dead of the night in raids conducted by Soviets agents, and in the American zone itself. As a result, today no Ukrainian refugee is safe from the long hand of Soviet injustice, even if he and scores of thousands like him may be living in the zone over which flies the American flag of freedom.

By way of illustration we quote below excerpts of several letters received from these hapless Ukrainian refugees by the editor of this journal. No names are given, for obvious reasons.

A Western Ukrainian Catholic priest writes from Bavaria:

"As I wrote you before, we continue to exist in danger and uncertainty. For example, in our camp . . . there recently arrived 17 Soviet trucks bearing soldiers (naturally, in American uniforms) and they began to round up our people. A fight broke out, in the course of which some of our people were killed, some committed suicide, and some managed to flee; nevertheless many were caught and driven away. A similar incident is said to have taken place at Passau. That is why

we live in constant fear. In my case fanned by rumors that I am bound to be taken away by the Soviets. That is why the sooner we get away from this place and suspense the better. It makes no difference where, as long as it will be safe and peaceful, perhaps to America, Canada, Argentine or Australia. These are not merely my sentiments but those of everyone here. Therefore I beg you to do everything possible to realize our hopes. For I fear that as soon as the American troops leave this area, we will be compelled some night to flee westward, probably just in our nightshirts, or else the Soviets will seize us and thus again many of us will perish, as happened in Vienna, Berlin and elsewhere. Clearly the Soviets feel themselves powerful enough to seize all of Europe in their hands."

A letter written by a Western Ukrainian leader of the democratic intellectuals and an admirer of Anglo-Saxon culture, states that:

"The plight of the Ukrainians in Germany is very acute. Constantly hanging over us is the threat of forced removal of us to the Soviet Union. Now it appears that only our Dnieperites (Eastern Ukrainians) will be compelled to return to the USSR, but not Polish citizens. *Such a forced return means certain death for them.* Tragic scenes are seen. The people simply do not want to return to "the homeland." The attitude of the Americans here toward us varies: in some cases better, in others worse. They are completely unorientated in regards the Ukrainian situation. If the American Ukrainians do not provide for the removal to the United States, Canada or elsewhere of all the emigrants from Eastern and Western Ukraine, then we shall remain in constant danger of forced removal to the USSR. The Bolsheviki are acting high and mighty in the American zone, sometimes repatriating people by force, raiding private homes, and kidnapping Ukrainians. We are at our nerves' edge. This is worse than the heaviest bombings during the war . . . Now they are trying to make us live in camps. To do this means to run the risk of being forcibly evacuated to the USSR, although the Americans deny this. *Yet the Bolsheviki have the right to enter the camps, to check who is a Soviet citizen. Anyone who is unable to prove that he is not, must go to the Soviets.* In a word the Bolsheviki are acting in a very highhanded manner here in Bavaria. The Americans do not realize that the Bolsheviki are infiltrating into this territory in order to make Bolshevism the dominant power in Europe.

"That is the trend here. I see no force willing or able to oppose Bolshevism. I think that Europe will yet undergo tragic moments.

"We are in a very tragic situation. Our only hope is in God's mercy.



If we are not worthy of it, we shall all perish. *American democracy has been for us a great disillusionment. We were persecuted by the Poles, we were persecuted by the Germans, we were persecuted by the Bolsheviks, and now under democratic occupation our fate is uncertain, for they want to give us up as prey for the Bolsheviks. There is no justice."*

Letters such as those above speak for themselves. European Ukrainians always believed firmly in American ideals and way of life. They regarded the land which produced Washington, Lincoln, and Wilson as the very fortress of freedom and human rights. Now their faith in America has been shaken. Some of them, like the writer of the first letter, refuse to think that the Americans seized Ukrainians for the purpose of delivering them into the merciless hands of the Reds. He is more inclined to think that this was done by Reds masquerading as American soldiers. On the other hand, the second letter writer, versed in American culture and language and up to now an admirer of America, is evidently losing faith in her, and envisions the extension of Soviet power over all of Europe on account of American passivity at this time. It is indeed most disheartening that the appearance of the Star Spangled Banner over the territories of conquered Nazism can evoke such fears among the European intellectuals.

We realize, of course, that such deplorable incidents may be the work of those in the American occupying forces who are fellow travelers, willing to lend themselves to the notorious Soviet methods, even at the cost of compromising America. Nonetheless such a deplorable situation should not be permitted to continue. Beneath the American flag a person should feel safe and be guaranteed his natural rights. *No secret agreements, not even of the Yalta conference, dare to deny the "inalienable" right of a person to liberty.* We believe that Roosevelt never intended at Yalta to deprive anyone of this right but merely to help the people of an allied nation to return as soon as possible to their homeland. He did not foresee what would really happen. Since Stalin looks upon the Yalta decision from a different angle, that of Americans lending themselves to the rounding up of potential slaves and delivering them into merciless hands, he must be made to understand that insofar as the American and British zone of occupation is concerned, the Yalta decision is, to say the least, unworkable. *American public opinion, as well as Congress, we believe, will never tolerate this forced repatriation and ensuing human slavery when it becomes aware of what is going on.*

Naturally, if there be among these refugees any who have broken

international law and are regarded as war criminals, then by all means they should be immediately apprehended and tried by the war criminal interallied tribunals. But where a peace-loving person is "guilty" only of differing politically and religiously with the Bolsheviks, who would on that account settle accounts with him in their usual summary fashion, he should be accorded the protection of the American authorities. This would be in consonance with the traditional American policy in such matters. In any event, the greatest care should be exercised that conditions in the American zone of occupation in Europe do not come to the point where faith in America will be undermined, as that would be an outright negation of the victory Americans won during the war. American might, buttressed by her great moral prestige, should enable her to make her influence felt where it is needed very much, on behalf of the downtrodden and the stateless peoples who look to America for their salvation.

There is no denying that the problem involving the ultimate fate of the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons is unusually difficult and complex for the United Nations to solve. Yet solved it must be. In the interim, as the world's leading and most democratic power America ought to undertake the role of guardian of these unfortunate peoples, who were compelled to leave their homeland Ukraine by brutal Nazi taskmakers or by their Red oppressors.

At present Soviet misrule is in full swing in the recently-occupied Western Ukraine. The head of the Western Ukrainian Catholic Church, Metropolitan Slipiy, has been arrested by the Reds, together with all the bishops. Leading ecclesiastics of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have been compelled to quit their dioceses and churches. Hundreds of clergymen have been arrested and scores of them executed. The plight of the intellectual class, of course, is most desperate.

In the light of all this, the duty devolves upon America and Great Britain, as the only two remaining great democracies, to come to the succor of the victims of Soviet occupation, and to provide for those displaced persons who desire it an asylum, where they will be able to live in freedom and opportunity, a credit to their race, and an asset to the land of their adoption.

Victims of persecution and oppression in the past became the pioneers of this nation. The present-day Ukrainian victims of foreign persecution, we believe, can also become pioneers in the development of the country in which they will be permitted to settle, be it America, Canada or elsewhere.

## THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST UNIFICATION

By PROF. CLARENCE A. MANNING

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**E**VER since the rulers of Moscow decided to take the place of Kiev and assert their authority, they have struggled long and steadily to expand their boundaries and to unify completely their country. To this end they have relied upon their own strength and they have cloaked their progress under all the varying theories of the centuries. Excuses change but the process has gone on relentlessly, while the rest of the world has declined to look behind the popular facade which has been erected to conceal what was really taking place.

It is easy to note the outstanding facts of national psychology but it is difficult to explain their development. Why should the marriage of Sophia Paleologue, a member of the last ruling family of Constantinople, to Ivan III of Moscow in the fifteenth century have built up the theory of the Third Rome that dominated Russian thought for centuries and perhaps to-day? It was a bold conception to hold that the sprawling city of Moscow which had just been liberated from the Golden Horde and the Mongol Empire should declare itself the Christian centre of the universe and decline to learn from the rest of the European World. It gave rise to a peculiar situation which was impossible to maintain in its entirety. It encouraged the tsars to push their military conquests to the east and to strive to drive on to the west. It sharpened the conflict with the western neighbor, the Polish-Lithuanian state which was holding Kiev and Ukraine, and it inspired the Muscovite effort to drive on to the Baltic Sea.

Yet it was the lack of a strong Ukrainian government that was able to bridge the gap between East and West that brought about the tragic events that followed. At the very time when Bohdan Khmel-nitsky was leading the struggle for Ukrainian independence against Poland, scholars trained in Kiev and in Western Europe were being invited to Moscow to give the people their first glimpses of the outside world. It is often forgotten and always overlooked that after the sacking of Kiev in 1169 and the removal of the Metropolitan of the Orthodox Church to Moscow, the Orthodox of Kiev still remained

under the ecclesiastical control of Constantinople, that the Patriarchs of the imperial city on the Bosphorus still sent teachers to Kiev, and that the extremes of xenophobia that marked the history of Moscow never prevailed in the older city.

Moscow had its chance in the failure of Khmel'nitsky and his alliance with the Russian Tsar. The religious element moved the Kozak Host in its opposition to the Poles and the Roman and Greek Catholic Churches and this rendered it possible for Moscow to exploit the Kozak differences and impose upon them such hetmans as it would until the Host was disintegrated and helpless. It was the religious desire to protect the Church Slavonic language as the distinguishing feature of the life of the people that blocked the rise of a Ukrainian language and literature in the seventeenth century and left the people helpless before the changing conditions.

In the eighteenth century the new Russia, centered now at St. Petersburg and outwardly adapted to the manners of Western Europe, continued the same policy. The Ukrainian nobles were won over to the cause of the government. The peasants sank into greater poverty as the rigors of serfdom grew and the old rights were systematically destroyed until even the Sich was no more and the new Russian governmental system was introduced throughout all that part of Ukraine which had passed under Russian domination. Yet at the same time it is instructive to note how many of the successful writers were really of Ukrainian birth and training. An undue proportion of the men who distinguished themselves in literature and cultural work had been reared in the older Kiev tradition and they left their mark upon the life of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Ukraine as Little Russia was fully absorbed, in the opinion of the Russian scholars, into the Russian Empire. Even men like the reactionary historian Karamzin refused to recognize its independent existence. They might speak of Poland or of the Golden Horde but they stubbornly maintained that the course of history in regard to the south was fixed and definite. The principle of legitimacy supported them and it is interesting to note that Karamzin summarized the policy of 1945 exactly.

In the *Opinion of a Russian Citizen*, written as a protest against the idea of Alexander I of setting up a subordinate but more or less free Poland, Karamzin wrote: "These lands belonged to Russia, when the Metropolitan Platon entrusted to you the crown of Monomakh, of Peter, and of Catherine, whom you yourself called the Great. Will

it be said that she illegally divided Poland? But you would act still more illegally if you thought of wiping out the injustice by a division of Russia itself. We took Poland by the sword; that is our right, to which all states owe their existence, for all are made by conquest. Catherine is responsible to God, is responsible to history for her action; but it is done and for you it is sacred; for you Poland is a lawful Russian possession. There are no old rights in politics, otherwise we would be bound to restore the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, the republic of Novgorod, the Grand Principality of Ryazan, etc. Besides by old rights White Russia, Volynia and Podolia, along with Galicia, were once the native property of Russia. If you give these back, they will demand Kiev, Chernigov and Smolensk, for they once also belonged to hostile Lithuania . . . You, who love lawful civil freedom, will you treat Russia as a soulless, speechless property? Will you automatically dismember it and give it to whomever you wish."

To Karamzin it was axiomatic that the passing of control from Kiev to Moscow was a normal succession of normal events for it was the one way that history was to be explained, if Russia was to exist according to the principles of legitimacy. Ukraine or Little Russia had been made an integral part of the Russian land but unlike the situation in the preceding century, it furnished none of the outstanding names of Russian literature, except Gogol. It is not too much to say that during the first century after the annihilation of Ukrainian institutions, the outstanding writers of the country were those who participated in the revival of Ukrainian literature. Russia had a long struggle before it was able to superimpose its authority on that of Kiev and Kharkiv and the constant fear of a Ukrainian revolt, of a reemergence of the old Sich and of the Kozaks deserves more attention than it is usually given.

It is true that Pushkin and the gentleman writers of his school visited Ukraine and the Caucasus. They did it in the firm belief that the Slavonic rivers would flow into the Russian sea or it would dry up. The men who followed, the founders of the revolutionary intelligentsia, had no interest for the outlying parts of Russia as they considered Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc. They paid no attention to the expansion of Russia to the east and west. They did not notice the Russian penetration of Central Asia. They neglected the Baltic. They confined their attention to the two capitals and to the governments around Moscow and they neglected all those areas which were slowly being adapted to the Russian regime. It is interesting to note

that the steadily quickening conscience of these men had no word for the abuses and outrages that were perpetrated against the other peoples of the Empire. They were as blind to them as they were to the qualities of the work of Shevchenko and they deplored his efforts to shape Ukrainian as a literary language and to claim for it those privileges of modernization that they had demanded for Great Russian with such marked success.

Russification was in the air and it could strike with greater force against Ukraine than against the other peoples. Count Valuyev in 1863 could declare that there was never, is not and never will be a Ukrainian language. The Russian censorship could forbid the appearance on Russian soil of all books in Ukrainian and they could follow it up with a prohibition of Lithuanian. For nearly a century it was only Western Ukraine that could offer some opportunity for study and printing and it was there that there were formed such institutions as the Shevchenko Scientific Society. It was there later that Prof. Hrushevsky did most of his best work and it was there that the formal study of the Ukrainian past was organized.

Throughout the century with increasing force the movement for Russification went on but the Empire was not systematic about it. There were periods of relaxation. The demands of the state were evaded, books were smuggled in from abroad. Around the entire periphery of the great Russians, the new movements of national revival prospered underground, while the central regime, loyal to the old traditions of Karamzin and the implications of the doctrine of the Third Rome, ignored the new movements that were at large in the world outside and even within the Empire.

The revolution of 1917 brought down the entire structure of the Empire and it gave free rein to all the centrifugal forces that had been gathering strength for more than a century. There was for a short time the possibility that the world might witness the complete disappearance of the old order in Eastern Europe and that this would be replaced by the rising of new national states that would live in harmony with one another and bring about a time of peace in Europe. It was not to be. The myth of the one indivisible Russia had taken too firm a hold on the minds of Europe and America for them to look intelligently at the situation that arose with lightning speed. Statesmen and people alike were imbued with the idea that the differences between the different peoples of the Russian Empire were negligible and that the Provisional Government could easily master

them. Besides the various class conflicts that broke out in the new states all too often discredited the efforts of their leaders and there was nowhere a clear comprehension of the fact that Russia either had to exist on the old pattern or vanish from the scene. The White Armies fought at one and the same time against the Reds and against the forces that were laboring to build up a new order and a new system of thought and they had the support of many elements, both liberal and conservative in the outside world, to whom the idea of a great, free, united Russia made a strong appeal.

It was under such circumstances that there came the tragedy of Ukraine, of Georgia, of Armenia, of Azerhajian, and of the states of Central Asia. The Soviet leaders in the name of an international communism profited by the debacle and extended their control over a large section of the old Empire. Once that was done, the old Russian mentality reasserted itself but in a curiously changed form.

The leaders of the Communist party, largely Russian by birth and training, accepted as the basis of their ideas the indifference of the world to the cultures of the various peoples of the Soviet Union. By renaming the country and leaving only the Russian Soviet Republic as the Soviet Republic of the Russians only, they won over many of the radical leaders of the other nationalities but they were always ready to throw Russian troops into the breach, whenever they found it difficult or impossible to master the situation. Then when the union had been brought about and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had been established, they began to bring pressure upon the other nationalities to reorganize their lives along the same lines.

Ukraine was the first sufferer under the new system, for it was the key to the success of the Soviet Union and its policy of forcing the whole Union to obey Moscow. There came the Communizing of the Academy of Sciences and later the change of it into a mere section of the All Union Academy of Sciences. There came the attacks upon the intellectual leaders of the Ukrainians and the silencing of many of the writers.

Perhaps nothing illustrates better the changing conditions than the following passage from a Soviet source. Written by I. Kulik for the Literature of the Peoples of the USSR and published by the VOKS in 1934, it sets forth the new ideas that were then prevailing. (p. 53f)

"The Ukrainian Soviet literature arose, grew and developed in the throes of bitter class struggle. Its young and as yet frail

forces had to blaze their path through the barriers that were raised by the Ukrainian nationalist bourgeoisie, by kulakdom and its ideologists in the domain of literary theory and literary policy, headed by the school of the 'academician' S. Yefremov. Preaching the 'united national front,' they withheld recognition from all forces which, opposing this front, sought to strengthen the proletarian dictatorship and to cement the brotherly alliance with the republics of the Soviet Union. These chauvinists further enjoyed active support of those elements which represented the nationalist deviation in the ranks of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Not without reason did Skrypnyk (the head of the nationalist deviation in the ranks of the Communist Party of the Ukraine who worked hand in hand with the imperialist interventionists) even in 1929 write of the 'diminished' role of literary work. His object was to make out a case for pre-revolutionary Ukrainian literature (which, according to Skrypnyk and Yefremov, supposedly represented the united front of the creative forces of our people'), as though it had been stronger, more influential and effective than the contemporary Soviet literature of the Ukraine. The reactionary roots of these arguments are quite apparent. The ideology of bourgeois nationalism reflected, after all is said and done, the aim of the Ukrainian kulak to fence off his farmyard from the proletarian revolution. It was a reflection of the hopes of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie for unhindered and 'independent' exploitation of the workers and peasants of the Ukraine.

"Quite in accord with this kulak program was another slogan that was launched later by the Ukrainian nationalists (Khvylovy), that of 'orientation psychology of Europe.' This slogan, if carried out, would have meant the transformation of Soviet Ukraine into a colony of foreign imperialism.

"But the Leninist national policy prevailed in Soviet Ukraine, consequently the growth of Soviet culture there has been accompanied by the growth and development of Ukrainian Soviet literature. It has grown into a real and considerable factor for the socialist remoulding of the country, in the ideological re-education of the masses. Its growing strength and its triumph, has prompted the Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalists to renew with greater ferocity their attempts to capture this literature, to subjugate it to their influence, to penetrate into its ranks."



Such a passage coming from a Soviet source is worth more than hundreds of pages by anti-Communist Ukrainians as showing the desperate struggle that was carried on by Ukrainians Communists and anti-Communists alike, to protect the national culture against the standardizing tendencies of the Moscow Russian Communists. It explains the government-made famine in Ukraine, the diluting of all Ukrainian organizations with Communists from other parts of the Soviet Union, the transfer of populations from one section of the country to the other, and the efforts in every way to build up a single and undivided Soviet Union which is to be strictly on Russian models.

The same goal is to be seen in such pamphlets as *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* by Ales Hrdlicka and published by the Smithsonian Institution in Washington in 1942. Again and again the author emphasizes the similarity of the peoples of the Soviet Union "The number of different peoples making up the Soviet Union is but little apparent until one enters the home regions of some of the groups in Asia, and even there, were it not for variation in garments, decoration, beard and hair dressing, and other secondary features, the differences would seldom be of a pronounced character." (p 2). Prof. Hrdlicka warmly defends the idea of Kluchevsky that the Ukrainian Kozaks were simply the descendants of those very Russians who had fled westward from the Dnieper and who retained their nationality and returned to escape Polish and Lithuanian tyranny. Then he adds, "The language of the new population of Ukrainia developed certain dialectical differences. In addition there arose in the course of time in the great territories over which the Russian people were spread some differences in the richness and nature of folk tales, folk poetry, dress, etc.—differences the perception of which by the Ukrainians has for a long time been assiduously fostered by the Germans on the basis of their cherished old 'divide et impera' principle." (p. 14). Yet after all this, he can still say, "the Bielorrussians are in all these respects much like the Great-Russians but there are some differences among the Ukrainians. The latter show less lightness of hair and eyes; there are more plump women among them, and more, even in the country, that are really beautiful in youth. More or less mixture with the Tatars or other non-Russian elements has taken place in the southern districts. In these regions too the people are predominantly of medium stature and brachycephalic, but in their features they resemble more the Slavs of Moravia and the Balkans (p. 27). The key to the whole Soviet policy is found again in these sentences, "Be-

fore the German invasion in 1941, and to a greater extent since that event, the western regions of the Asiatic portion of the Soviet Union have received large accretions of workmen and refugees from Ukraine and most other western parts of the country. Whole establishments with their staffs and workers have been transported there and reestablished. This is particularly true of the Urals, but also of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other portions of Siberia and central Asia. These are permanent displacements that have already much altered the population as well as other aspects of these regions. The Urals are rapidly developing into the industrial as well as the population backbone of the Soviet Union" (p. 24) and there is a natural steady progress toward a general blood union.

This is the goal of Soviet policy and along with it is the creation of a Communist culture, which can know no local peculiarities. It represents a policy of centralization even more severe than were the edicts of the Imperial government during the last century, for it promises the death of all cultures insofar as they cannot be fused with the new Communist spirit and ideology. The attacks on the Ukrainian nationalists, Communist and anti-Communist alike, have brought out clearly that the Soviet Union cannot and will not tolerate those local differences of point of view that were allowed before. It is all very well to talk of the brotherhood of peoples in the Soviet Union and to extol in detail the great leaders of each of them but it is impossible to draw any evidences of local autonomy from the facts.

The history of the past years has turned out to the advantage of Stalin and his associates. His rapprochement with Hitler gave him a golden opportunity for dismembering Poland. Soviet literature has regularly spoken during the past decade of the White Poles who are the enemies of the country and has treated them exactly as it treated the Ukrainian nationalists as advocates of a bourgeois imperialism. The occupation of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, was facilitated by the same rapprochement and all the evidence points to the fact that the intellectual leaders who were not supporters of Moscow Communism have been ruthlessly dealt with or deported from the country.

The boundaries of the countries have been fixed by the will of the Kremlin. Territories have been added or taken away from one of the Soviet Republics by simple decrees of the Council of Commissars and the higher authorities of the Union and they have been unanimously approved by the orthodox Communists who alone have

any effective voice in the matter. Even the creation of the White Russian and Ukrainian armies in the World War seems only a device to degrade these areas to mere administrative formulas, for it cannot be presumed that they did not include Great Russians and many other nationalities. This is a far cry from the early theories of organization when each Republic was supposed to have its own army for the defense of the Soviet Union with its own officer staff, its own personnel, its own distinguishing marks and its own language.

We can well understand the technical advantages of unity. There is always in a great state a constant shifting of populations across the state lines. The development of the manufacturing centers in the Urals could not fail to increase this but it was not only a voluntary movement. Millions of people were moved to the new centers and among them were included those leaders who emphasized the spirit of local autonomy, no matter on how limited a scale. Unity was the order of the day and even where the use of native languages was allowed, the juggernaut of standardization worked to produce identical thinking, identical themes in writings, identical attitudes toward life.

The fate of Shevchenko is typical. With monotonous regularity, the Soviet critics stress his friendship with the Russian radicals of the day. They ignore those of his great works which emphasize cultural differences and historical diversity between Russia and Ukraine. They slur over the names of non-radicals who sympathized with him and his ideals. Such works as the Great Grave where the poet dealt with the past of his country are entirely omitted and he is shown only as a foe of the old order which is one and the same in all portions of the world. So with all of the Ukrainian authors. In the past they stressed their differences from the Russians, they spoke of the contrasts in spirit and in thought, and they showed that these differences exist in all strata of the population. To-day it is different. The spirit of class, the spirit of the new culture wipes out all those differentiations and there emerges a new equality, a new levelling which perverts the very essence of all that has been done before.

There was but one step left. The emergence of the old Russian spirit under the pressure of the war has been progressing. The government has revived military decorations and it has named its new creations after those leaders as Khmel'nitsky and Suvorov who could be interpreted as the conquerors and uniters of the "Russian" land. There is a renewal emphasis on the guilt of all who opposed the centralizing policies of Ivan the Terrible and of Peter the Great. There

is a renewed condemnation of Mazepa for daring to oppose the tsar. It is now the unity of the Russian land that is stressed. History has been cited to justify Russian claims to the Baltic seacoast. In a new film on Ivan the Terrible, there is the definite claim put forth, "From now and forever the seas will be obedient to the Russian realm and the piece ends with the verses,

Ocean-sea  
The blue sea,  
The blue sea,  
The Russian sea.

All available evidence points to a complete fusion of the concepts of Russia and Communism. It is inherent in the early decrees of the Bolshevik government after 1917 but for a decade or more it was hidden behind the facade of local governments dictated by the co-operating Communist parties of the various Soviet republics. That facade has been torn down under the pressure of the war and the patriotic feelings that accompanied it. Stalin has taken his place beside Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great as a collector and stabilizer of the Russian lands, interpreted in the main in accordance with the older unitary imperial tradition.

This time, however, the regime is determined to end for good and all the possibility of the revival of separatist movements. By every form of propaganda and by the development of newer methods of control, the various groups and races of the Soviet Union are to be fused into a single whole. The Soviet Republics are to become mere districts of a single state and the concessions to local autonomy, the granting to the republics the right to maintain diplomatic representatives, the admission to the United Nations of Ukraine and White Russia are intended to serve merely as instruments of policy for the central government in its relations to the outside world, and the same possibilities are inherent in the situation in Asia.

As we might expect, there have been revivals during the chaos of war of patriotic activity among some of these groups. There have been persistent reports of Ukrainian groups fighting against both the Germans and the Soviets. There have been rumors of similar tendencies in Lithuania and elsewhere. Little definite is known of all this, for the veil of secrecy that has lain heavy over the Soviet Union for two decades has not been lifted and it is relatively easy to label all such movements as Fascist or collaborationist in some way, especially

because knowledge of them has leaked out through underground channels. Yet despite all this there is still too much of the old jibe of Shevchenko in his poem, the Caucasus, that there is silence in all languages, because the people are happy.

At all events the Soviet Union is now committed to a process of unification that far surpasses in thoroughness and completeness anything that had even been imagined before 1917. The alternation between Russian patriotism and Communist standardization has furnished a weapon against local customs and local cultures that has never existed before and it has furnished also a convenient means for dealing not only with the other Slav groups outside of the Soviet Union but for extending Soviet influence into non-Slav speaking areas. At the moment when a war-weary world is able once again to dream of peace, this cannot fail to cast a dark shadow over the brightening pictures of humanity.

It may be advisable to ignore it in the height of jubilation at the defeat of Fascist aggression, at the possibility that a new era of goodwill may come for the greater part of mankind but every careful observer must take note of it. It is not too much to say that the future of Europe and of Asia is going to depend upon the policy of the Soviet Union in handling this double-edged sword, in combining communist propaganda and the wellbeing of the Soviet Union. The experience of men like Skrypnyk and many other Ukrainian Communists who sincerely worked for the preservation of local traditions along with a general unified philosophy must ultimately cause the world to pause and study the phenomenon that it presents. Every project for the cooperation of the rest of the world and the Soviet Union sooner or later must face this question fairly and on the final solution of it will come the fate of humanity during the next century.



## ASYLUM FOR EUROPE'S UPROOTED

*By* WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

**T**HE END OF THE WAR in Europe has left behind it a humanitarian and social problem of colossal proportions. This is the fate of many millions of uprooted human beings who cannot return to their native lands with safety or who have been and are being deliberately expelled from their homes. It is a tragedy incomparably greater than anything that occurred after the end of the First World War.

This tragedy would not have taken place if the victory of the United Nations had been accompanied by the realization of the high ideals of selfdetermination for all peoples and respect for human rights which are embodied in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. Unfortunately this has not been the case. Might, not right has been the main consideration in drawing new frontiers. Over a vast area of eastern, southeastern and central Europe the Nazi form of totalitarianism has been replaced by the Soviet form, equally ruthless in disregard of political and civil liberties. Governments have been set up which, as is asserted in recent official statements of the American and British Governments, are devoid of democratic safeguards.

Ruthless persecution of anti-Communist forces has been a common characteristic of the regimes imposed on Poland, the Western Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, the Baltic Republics and other Soviet satellite states. Mass deportations involving millions of people have been carried out. Other millions, including many who fought on the side of the United Nations during the war, have strong reason to fear repatriation to terror-ridden homelands. Some idea of the size of the problem which has been created is reflected in the following comment of the wellknown journalist and writer, Dorothy Thompson, in the course of a recent visit to Europe:

"Lithuanians, Estonians, Slovaks, Poles and many Ukrainians who came as soldiers or slave workers into western Europe are now trying to disappear amongst the western peoples rather than return home."

Mr. Gladwin Hill, in the *New York Times* of August 3, 1945,

estimates that there are some two million displaced foreigners in Germany, "nearly one million Poles, 500,000 Russians, 250,000 Italians, and about 100,000 Yugoslavs." It is highly probable that many of those who are listed as Russians and Poles are actually Ukrainians.

There is reason to believe that Mr. Hill's figures understate the number of dispersed refugees. These would include almost all the Poles who formerly lived east of the Curzon Line and also some ten million Germans and people of Germanic stock, of whom two or three million were former inhabitants of the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia and seven or eight million lived in the regions east of the Oder and the Neisse rivers which have been provisionally assigned to Poland.

There are several Ukrainian Relief Committees in Europe, such as in London, Paris, Brussels and Geneva, all collaborating with the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee. According to their most conservative estimates, there are about two million displaced Ukrainians in Europe and the Brussels Committee, whose president is an engineer named N. Hrab, estimated in a Communication to the SHAEF of June 30, 1945, that the number of displaced Ukrainians is "in the neighborhood of 4,500,000", coming from all regions with an Ukrainian population, from the Soviet Ukraine, Galicia and Volhynia, Bessarabia, Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine. The communication contains the following interesting facts about the plight of the uprooted Ukrainians:

"A considerable number of these refugees do not wish to return to their old homes (which in many cases no longer exist) for political reasons. In many cases already refugees have been threatened and compelled to join those being evacuated to the USSR . . . They are forever in dread of evacuation by force. Innumerable occasions arise when Ukrainians are compelled to go into Polish or Russian refugee camps with complete disregard as to where they came from. In both the Polish and the Russian camps the discrimination at the expense of these unrepresented people is very great."

The Ukrainian Relief Committee proposed several measures calculated to alleviate the condition of these refugees. These included permission for representatives of the Committee to visit camps and bring help to the inmates, the organization of separate Ukrainian camps where the number of Ukrainian refugees warrants it, the inauguration of publications and broadcasts in the Ukrainian language and a clearer

statement by the Military Government authorities as to the United Nations policy on repatriation.

The Position of the Ukrainian refugees is especially difficult and complex because of the revival of the Ukrainian nationalist movement during the war, and because of the changes of sovereignty to which Ukrainian ethnic groups have been subjected. Reading between the lines of the closely controlled Soviet press, one finds hints that the restoration of Soviet rule was not welcome in some parts of the Ukraine.

An editorial in "Pravda" of October 7, 1944, discussing political work in liberated regions, calls upon local Communist Party organizations to preserve "revolutionary vigilance" and to fight against "the sapping activity of enemy agents, and against the false provocative rumors they spread." The Moscow-appointed Prime Minister of the Soviet Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchov, addressing the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine on March 1, 1944, spoke of disintegration in the ranks of the Ukrainian nationalists and promised that leniency would be shown to persons "who joined those nationalistic groups accidentally or were forcibly mobilized or fraudulently lured."

This is an admission of the existence of an anti-Soviet nationalist movement. A foreign correspondent who returned from Russia some time ago, Alexander Hendrick, mentioned a rumor that the mysterious death of the Soviet General Vatutin was the result of a bomb thrown by an Ukrainian nationalist.

Despite Khrushchov's assurances of leniency, it may be imagined that no one who had been identified with the Ukrainian nationalist cause either in the Soviet Ukraine or in other ethnic Ukrainian regions would feel safe in regions which are under Soviet military and police control. The Soviet policy toward Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia was more ruthless than the Polish. Many Ukrainian Socialist and democratic leaders were executed, banished or reported as having died in prison or exile.

As a result of the war all ethnically Ukrainian regions have been united under Soviet rule. The last phase of this process was the annexation to the Soviet Union of Carpatho-Ukraine, which formerly constituted the eastern part of Czechoslovakia. Ukrainian political leaders who are opposed to communism would consequently find safety only in flight or concealment.

Other refugee groups are in an equally difficult plight. There are



some 200,000 Polish troops in Western Europe under the command of General Waclaw Anders; and there is a considerably larger number of Poles who were brought into Germany as war prisoners or forced laborers. Many of these Poles look with doubt and suspicion on the type of government that has been forced on their country and are reluctant to return.

The same situation, on a smaller scale, is to be found with Serbs who prefer to remain in British internment camps, rather than to return to a Yugoslavia that is under the dictatorship of Tito. Finally there is a substantial number of Russians who joined the anti-Soviet army of General Vlasov or otherwise compromised themselves politically.

The United States General Omar Bradley recently stated that from one hundred to one hundred and fifty thousand Russians had been captured by the Americans while fighting with the German Army on the Western front. How such Russians feel about the prospect of a return to their native country is evident from the tragic incident which occurred at Camp Dix early in the summer of 1945. It had been announced that a group of Russian war prisoners would be returned to Europe, presumably to Russia. Three of the prisoners promptly hanged themselves.

The maintenance of the millions of Europe's "displaced persons" is a responsibility of UNRRA and tends to become an important issue of national policy. At a recent meeting of UNRRA the Soviet Union, backed by its satellite governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, took a stand in favor of compulsory repatriation. This was not accepted by the UNRRA, and it was decided to continue support for some months. A British delegate, Phillip Noel Baker, presented the humanitarian case against sending back large groups of people to possible imprisonment, forced labor or death.

A longrange policy in regard to this unprecedented and urgent problem should be framed without delay. If the peoples of Eastern Europe had been assured the right to form governments of their own choosing, if their boundaries had been drawn with reasonable regard for ethnographic principles, this tragic situation would never have arisen. The overwhelming impulse at the end of the war would have been to return home.

Unfortunately the principles of democracy and selfdetermination

have been conspicuous by their absence in the new East European settlement. It is useless to dodge unpleasant facts.

The Union of the Ukrainian people under a single sovereignty has not been accompanied by any restoration of freedom of election, speech and press. The three Baltic Republics, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, have been subjected to ruthless Communist dictatorship. There has been almost no independent foreign reporting from this area; but Baltic refugees who arrived in Scandinavia bring reports of grim proscriptions of all anti-Communist groups.

Discussing Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, the Foreign Secretary of the new British Labor Government, Mr. Ernest Bevin, recently declared:

"The governments which have been set up do not in our view represent the majority of the people and the impression we get from recent developments is that one kind of totalitarianism is being replaced by another. This is not what we understand by that very much overworked word 'democracy,' which appears to need definition. The forms of government which have been set up as a result do not impress us as being sufficiently representative to meet the requirements of diplomatic relations."

It has been extremely difficult for independent American and other foreign correspondents to gain access to countries under Soviet military control. This is understandable as the few correspondents who gained admittance usually report a situation of political terrorism and the prevalence of looting and other bad behavior by Red Army soldiers.

But in all the countries which are under Soviet military occupation Communists have been installed in two strategic posts, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education. The standard form of government has been through a so-called "liberation front", in which the local Communists, acting under orders from Moscow, wield decisive power. It is easy to understand the reluctance of political and intellectual leaders who have opposed communism to risk their lives and freedom by returning to live under such regimes.

It is now widely recognized that governments should aim at the creation of conditions for full employment. Widespread unemployment has often been a contributing factor to the undermining of democracy and the rise of dictatorship. So it is understandable that considerable hopes have been placed in the successful functioning of the Economic

and Social Council, which is a part of the United Nations organization.

Important as it certainly is to ward off prolonged mass unemployment, the problem posed by the millions of uprooted refugees is even more desperate and urgent. Difficult as is the plight of the unemployed worker, it is scarcely comparable with that of the dispossessed refugee who in most cases has lost his home and personal possessions, who has no government, no community organization to look to for the payment of unemployment insurance, or for some form of relief.

There can be little prospect of the genuine European reconstruction that is an essential part of world reconstruction unless a positive solution can be found for the great numbers of people who have been uprooted through no fault of their own. To send them back against their will to persecution and possible conscription would be a sad betrayal of the generous ideals for which the war was supposedly fought. It should be clearly stated as a cardinal principle of Anglo-American policy that no displaced person will be forcibly deported to an undesired country.

At the same time the maintenance of vast numbers of people in internment camps without regular occupation is only a temporary expedient. If one thinks in terms of a longrange solution of the problem there are two possible methods of approach. Both should be tried out by the democratic countries.

The first of these methods is to make political and personal living conditions more tolerable throughout Eastern Europe. In this connection one must greet the repeated insertion of promises of democratic institutions and elections, the assurances of freedom of foreign press reporting, in the communications which were issued after the Big Three meetings at Yalta and Potsdam.

It is true that as yet there is little indication that these promises and assurances are being fully and sincerely carried out. It is, however, a benefit to keep the issue alive and to accumulate as many specific declarations as possible, under the signatures of all the major powers. Backed up by constant and vigorous pressure for freedom of press correspondence everywhere in the world, this represents a means of mobilizing world public opinion and focussing this opinion on the discrepancies between the many promises of freedom and selfdetermination after the defeat of the Nazis and the less desirable realities of the present situation.

No one wants a third world war while intelligent human beings are still awestruck by the fearful possibilities of the atomic bomb. At the same time there are grave political and economic injustices in the peace settlement which must be eliminated. Constant, alert pressure of international public opinion may in time constitute what is so badly needed: a peaceful method of alleviating and redressing grievances.

However, it would be excessively optimistic to expect that conditions for the safe return of the millions of uprooted human beings will be created immediately. Side by side with the effort to liberalize conditions in the homelands of the refugees there must be energetic exploration of the possibilities of resettlement and asylum for those who are unwilling to take the chance of returning to countries which live under the terror of secret police methods.

After the fall of France various private agencies in America undertook the praiseworthy task of saving as many prominent European anti-Nazi political and intellectual leaders as possible from the farflung network of the Gestapo. Now there is need for similar energetic human salvage work on behalf of other anti-totalitarian political, intellectual and spiritual leaders. Many of the individuals, Ukrainians, Poles, Serbs, Croats, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and others who are on the proscription lists of the NKVD (Soviet political police) and its satellite similar organizations in occupied countries are men and women of considerable intellectual and scientific attainments. They would be useful citizens of any country which would give them asylum. It can also usually be assumed that there will be no such good potential democrats as those who have escaped from some form of totalitarian tyranny.

It would perhaps be easier to absorb some thousands of intellectuals in the countries of North and South America and in the British Empire than to resettle vast numbers of rank-and-file refugees. But constructive measures can certainly relieve the plight of many of the latter. France is an underpopulated country and attracted considerable numbers of Poles, Italians and Spaniards before the war. Some of the uprooted people from Eastern Europe might find a new home there.

Huge movements of emigrants from one part of the world to another amid the postwar economic dislocations are probably neither desirable nor possible. But planned transfers of population, with careful consideration of the training and capacity of the migrants and

of the needs and absorptive capacity of the countries which may receive them should prove both feasible and advantageous. The working out of the details of such transfers of population might well be one of the functions of the new Social and Economic Council of the United Nations.

The existence after the end of hostilities of large masses of uprooted human beings who cannot safely return to their homelands is an additional tragedy of a war which has already caused such an infinite variety of human suffering. It is a test of civilization and of statesmanship to see that these unfortunate victims are cared for in some way and are not returned to the vengeance of tyrannical regimes against their will.

Firm implementation of this principle by the leading democratic powers, accompanied by the working out of practicable resettlement schemes, may help to humanize the new governments in Eastern Europe and will offer some assurance to the great numbers of dispossessed and uprooted of many nationalities that they may have an opportunity to rebuild their lives in the new world after the war.



## UKRAINE IN MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY: A THEORETICAL EXPLANATION

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY  
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WITH the conclusion of the second World War in this century and the emergence of the manifold changes which it has created, it becomes indispensable for those who are sincerely interested in the liberation of man from bondage of whatever sort and in the firm establishment of international peace and comity to appraise as objectively as possible the paramount socio-economic forms and forces now confronting us. Many thinkers have already tried this from numerous points of analysis and interest, and many more will do so. But with respect to the problem of Ukraine, meaningful and explosive as it is to countless people who understand it, this appraisal is still gravely wanting. Yet it can be only within such a framework that one, devoted to the principle of the genuine liberation of peoples as well as of individuals in national groups, can form a judgement of the character of contemporary forms of bondage and the possibilities for their eventual destruction.

A general analysis of this kind, admittedly purposed to serve the interests of Ukrainian freedom, in itself a hardly ignoble aim even in this unprecedented age of "political realism," must of necessity concern both the internal and external lines of development. The reason for this, in connection with Ukraine, is to be found in the reality of contemporary politics. Ukraine is politically dominated by Russian interests and the character of this subjugation is necessarily determined by the ideologically motivated activity of the latter: on the other hand, externally, the Soviet Union and the western democracies, by the necessity of events, have entered a common sphere of mutual contact, and the friction caused by this will unavoidably affect the status and the future of Ukraine. This undeniable development, then, shaped by the history of our time, determines the method of any scientific investigation of this national problem and concurrently avoids the polaristic pitfalls of airy idealizations and naive generalizations.

### The Internal Russo-Ukrainian Relationship

So much useless literature, thickly tainted with personal speculation and bias in favor of and against the political economy of the Soviet Union—whether it is developing toward capitalism or will remain socialist, whether it is democratic or authoritarian, etc.—has appeared in the last decade that one is forced to re-consider the necessary pre-requisites for an adequate understanding of this imposing structure. After all it is only thus that the basic social relations in the Union, be they between the government and the people or the peasantry and the industrial workers or among the various national groups can be accurately gauged in an intelligible form. Without it, obviously, endless flow of nonsensically isolated and particularized observations and statements, substantially supported by prodigious misinformation, must continue, as is the situation now, notably here in the United States.

Thus for a comprehensive understanding of Soviet political economy, and more particularly the nature of the present Russo-Ukrainian relationship, the essential requisites are (1) an adequate background of the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin; (2) a knowledge of the separate histories of the national groups in the Union, and of the rise of the Russian Communist Party; and (3) the intellectual acumen to interpret current phenomena in terms of the preceding requisites. Only such a course can preclude much wasteful thinking on this subject; only on this grounded basis is the effort made here to present, to be sure quite schematically, an evolution of Ukraine's foremost problems and possibilities in this century.

#### 1. The Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist Ideology

The all-embracing force that has fashioned the political relationship between dominant Russia and Ukraine into an apparently indissoluble bondage for the latter is Marxism with its Leninist and Stalinist revisions. The imperialistic annexation of Ukraine by Trotsky's Red forces in 1921, the horrible ravages of famine resulting from the inhuman collectivization program in 1930–32, and the incessant persecution of Ukrainian intellectuals and citizenry up to the present time are phenomena intrinsically related to the vigorous promulgation of this un-Western ideology. Each of these, it should be noted, is related respectively to a well-organized armed force, an economic plan, and a secret police (the Cheka, G.P.U., and N.K.V.D. successively) executing the orders of a dictatorial Party, and all are harmoniously

fitted into the framework of this composite ideology. This requires a brief explanation in view of the opposition which it naturally calls forth.

The notion that Leninist thought and Stalinist action are in reality radical departures from Marxian orthodoxy and that consequently it is absurd to consider the present Russian regime in terms of Marxian ideology has received wide currency in the last decade. The usual illustrations offered to support this view are the nationalism of present-day Russia, the expulsion of Trotsky, etc. The main sponsors of this view are followers of Trotsky and wishful thinkers of diverse brands. The evidence which they provide will be judged below in its true perspective; here it is sufficient to say in reply that no official repudiation of Marxism and all its implications has been made by the Kremlin which, on the contrary, despite any seeming heretical deviations from orthodoxy, has so far successfully fused the spirit of Marxism with its internal and external politics. To fully perceive the error of this current view and the manner in which the fusion has been, in some respects, and is being, achieved, necessitates a cursory review of Marxian doctrine stripped of its subsequent appendages and re-interpretations.

Free and unhampered socio-economic Western scholarship has subjected, as perhaps in no other case, the synthesized theories of Marxian socialism to such rigorous logical and objective tests of empirical research that it, from an intellectual and scholarly point of view, has collapsed under its own weight. The basic conception of the economic interpretation of history, vastly transformed by socialists themselves from the original contention of Marx and Engels, is about the main contribution that has withstood scholarly criticism. The other socio-economic ideas in the dialectic—the labor theory of value, the theory of accumulation, the theories of concentration, increasing misery, class groups and struggle, and business cycles—have been found to be either fallacious or grossly superficial.<sup>1</sup> On the extensive concentration of industry and agriculture, the socialization of every form of production, the vast accumulation of all capital and wealth in the hands of a very few, the extinction of the middle class, the progressive rivalry between the diminishing bourgeoisie and the enormously expanding class-conscious proletariat, and the increasing impoverishment of the masses, Marx staked the inevitability of ruthless revolution, the

<sup>1</sup> See Simkovich, V. G., "Marxism versus Socialism": Boshu-Bewerk, E., "Carl Marx and the Class of His System": Schumpeter, J. A., "Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy."



dictatorship of the proletariat, and the final victory of socialism. These phenomena he held would inevitably occur under that pressure of economic necessity which he prophetically saw in the historical process of capitalistic production as established in the industrially advanced countries.

This last point is crucial for our analysis. Mere acquaintance with modern history is sufficient to show that Russia did not, since it could not possibly, enter into Marx's mind as the place where socialism was to triumph. Moreover, the same acquaintance easily demonstrates how pathetically incorrect Marx was concerning the West. Actually, socio-economic developments in the western industrialized countries contradicted Marx's theorizations to such an extent that his followers began to resemble the Millerite sect by re-charting their chronology of the downfall of capitalism after each depression in the nineteenth century. If the liberal enterprise system collapses in this century, it will certainly be due to causes un contemplated in the Marxian scheme.

The manifest consequence of the above was the repudiation of many of the basic theories of Marx by his former disciples, e. g. Eduard Bernstein and practically the German Social Democratic party, while the die-hards were destined to bide their time, lonesomely perched on the wreckage of Marxist "scientific" socialism. Apostate socialists in reality became social reformers dedicated to the administering of capitalism, as witness the history of the German Social Democratic party.

#### a) The Leninist Salvage

Frederich Engels, Marx's close friend and collaborator, confessed in 1895, concerning the ripeness of conditions for proletarian struggle in the highly capitalistic countries in which, according to Marxian thought, economic necessity pre-determines the inevitability of socialism: "History proved us wrong, and showed the views which we then held to be illusions. More than that, it not only destroyed our error of that time (1850), but it also completely changed the conditions under which the proletariat was to struggle." (*Einleitung zu Karl Marx's Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich, 1848—1850* [Berlin, 1895] p. 6: as quoted in Simkovitch, *Op. cit.*, p. 253.

But the struggle was not yet lost. Though historical conditions have changed to the discomfiture of the Marxian apocalyptic, the power of human will and strategy could still alter the former to favor the

religiously accepted "truths" of the latter. In other words, political action may be resorted to in order to maintain the spirit of the Faith, if not also to give to abstract ideas approximate validation in an enforced political reality. Instead of the adaptation of the Word to the Deed, as the basic economic interpretation of history demands, there is to be the adaptation of the Deed to the Word. This was to be the task of Lenin and his successor Stalin.

Since objectively Marxian doctrine made a bad mistake in respect to capitalist development, it must be emphasized that, with any claim to truth, there was little else to draw from Marx. His concern was to explain the inevitability of socialism on the basis of what he saw as the unalterable course of capitalist development. Specific elaborations on the nature and details of this socialist paradise are therefore non-existent in his treatises. Thus all that was left of Marx for the revolutionaries was the doctrine of revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. But as both Marx and Engels maintained, these weapons are of use only upon the ripening of conditions along the lines of their numerous prophecies which in the end necessarily spell socialism. A revolution proclaims the dies irae, it is not to create a socialist state!

But what if the conditions fail to fructify, as they overwhelmingly have? Logically, a confession of error would be in order: instead, fabricated rationalizations were employed in the guise of extended Marxian interpretations, a human procedure quite characteristic of chiliastic groups, with redoubled recourse to the revolutionary exhortations of Marx. This barefaced turning into politics of Marxism, shorn of its economic basis, was indeed un-Marxian, but then, what else of Marx could have remained? A neurasthenic religious adherence to the Faith demanded an un-Marxian politicalization of Marxism, infused with revolutionary terrorism.

It was in Russia that the decision was made. After the creation of a Marxist party there, as early as 1883, followed by the Social Democratic party in 1898, largely under the tutelage of Plekhanov and dominated by intellectuals, this question arose, and led to the conflict between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1903. The former, under Lenin, called for the seizure of power by a disciplined intellectual leadership when any occasion presented itself; the latter, the majority following Martov, declared this heretical in the name of Marx. In terms of the composite intellectual system of Marx, the latter were correct, but the system was objectively dead; in terms of the revolu-

tionary political spirit of Marx, the former were correct, for in reality only in their way could Marxism as a political force survive. After all, it was as a theorist of revolution, not as an economist, that Marx began his work. In the last number of his "Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung" (No. 301, May 19, 1849), Marx declared: "We are ruthless and want no consideration from you (the bourgeoisie). When our turn comes, revolutionary terrorism will not be sugar-coated . . . there is but one way of simplifying, shortening, concentrating the death agony of the old society as well as the bloody labor of the new world's bath—revolutionary Terror." To this, practically the only usable vestige of Marx, in addition to his idea of a proletarian dictatorship, Lenin gave his allegiance, rationalizing his act as "Marxism in the epoch of imperialism."

Thus the only mark of objectification that synthetic Marxism could win had to be secured by this un-Marxian particularization of the system, necessarily coated, of course, with an appropriate rationalization. In his "Foundations of Leninism" (pp. 20-21), Stalin states: "But suppose an historic situation arises (war, agrarian crisis, etc.) in which the proletariat, a minority of the population, is able to rally around itself the vast majority of the working masses, why should it not seize power then? Why should it not profit by the favorable internal and international situation to pierce the front of capitalism and hasten the general debacle?"

Notice that it is in the faith that Marxism is "true," rather than in the objective knowledge of any truth it may possess that this statement is made! Stalin again says; (*Ibid.*, pp. 33-34): "Where will the revolution begin? . . . Formerly, the reply used to be—where industry is most perfected, where the proletariat forms the majority, where civilization is most advanced, where democracy is most developed. The Leninist theory of the revolution says—no! The front of capital will not necessarily be pierced where industry is most developed, and so forth; it will be broken where the chain of imperialism is weakest . . ." In this remark, Stalin at once, in one breath, justifies the revolution in agrarian Russia, the objective paucity of Marxist doctrine, and the continuation of the last usable Marxist idea—revolutionary Terror! The theory that imperialism is the last stage of capitalism, was of course a suitable political fabrication rationalizing all of the above, but, as usual, it distorts fact. If it were true that imperialism, whatever that might mean, is the last stage of capitalism, which logically must be a developed one, then how does the theory account for the "im-

perialist" splurges of Holland, Spain, Portugal, and England when capitalism was hardly a babe? In the political arena this is obviously an impossible question.

### b) The Stalinist Execution

By a freak of history, in part attributable to the German general staff, upon the orders of which Lenin was transported to Russia, the coveted political power was seized in 1917, in a spirit in harmony with Marx's revolutionary Terror. What next? The next step was obviously to consolidate this power to implement Marx objectively by establishing his dictatorship of the proletariat. As Marx put it, the leaders of the proletariat must see to it "that the revolutionary excitement shall not subside immediately after the victory is won. On the contrary, this excitement must be kept up as long as possible. Far from stopping so-called excesses, examples of popular vengeance upon hated individual and public buildings, . . . one must not only tolerate these examples but lead and conduct them" (Simkovitch, *Op. cit.*, pp. 195-6). In Russia, after the recuperating period of the N. E. P., during which capitalist activity, that was permitted, made such remarkable strides, and caused even Stalin to fear it (*Leninism II*, pp. 60-64), the firm dictatorship commenced, with Stalin at the helm.

The political realism of the entire trend, as depicted above, stems from the bifurcated condition of Marxism—its objective paucity of ideas and its revolutionary politics. This is the apogee of the entire explanation of the Marxist form as it affects Russo-Ukrainian relations. But, as Marx held, theory and action must be as one. For him, socialized conditions of production were to come first, then the political revolution, but history demurred: thus for the realists Lenin and Stalin, including also Trotsky, operating in the spirit of the Marxist tradition, the political revolution was to come first, and it came, and the socialized conditions next, as history must be forcibly shaped. Only in this light, thus, can one understand the complex phenomena of the Soviet Union. Political force, terrorism, regimentation, and wholesale murder now come to have meaning as Stalin, as indeed Trotsky would also have done, proceeds to create these socialized conditions so that theory and action may be brought into harmony.

Now for some observations concerning this socialist enterprise since 1928. Stalin declared, "In the U.S.S.R. only one party can exist, the Communist Party, which courageously defends the interests of the workers and peasants to the very end" (Report to 8th Congress of So-

viets, Nov. 25, 1936). In Marxian ideology, there was to be left after the expropriation of the property of the few bourgeoisie, only the enormous proletariat upon whom leadership rested. To expand the proletariat, and also socialize agricultural production, a Marxian prerequisite, Stalin embarked upon a program of tyrannical collectivization and rapid industrialization, which he borrowed from Trotsky's program. Only one class—the proletariat—is to exist. What have been the results? The Party, instead of being controlled by the proletariat, it in the hands of a few thousand men (members of the Politbureau, the Central Committee and N. K. V. D.); the quelling of the politically unreliable peasantry into a subservient proletarian group is still unsuccessful<sup>1</sup>; a new class of bureaucratic managers has emerged, contrary to the Marxian scheme.<sup>2</sup> But these are still pending problems for the dictatorship and its class ideology.

In the matter of economic distribution, a further problem presents itself in the wide income, disparities (see Eastman, M., "The End of Socialism in Russia", pp. 30-34), and this receives a typical rationalization in the "Soviet Labor Law" (Moscow, 1939) as follows: "Petty bourgeois equalitarianism in wage policies is the worst enemy of socialism."

These problems, in addition to the seeming deviations on religion and patriotic nationalism, have deceived many into thinking that Marxist ideology in the U. S. S. R. is at an end. They are correct in that the colossal experiment, with its incalculable costs in human life and property, which was undertaken to realize Marxist conditions that should have arisen in capitalistically developed countries and Marxist ideas, such as the labor theory of value, has failed. But sound western scholarship arrived at this conclusion of failure long ago by disproving Marxian thought. They are incorrect in thinking, however, that the spirit of Marxist ideology has subsided—the spirit of violence, hatred, dictatorship and revolutionary terror. It is this political force of Marxist ideology, that alone reconciles the innumerable paradoxes and seeming contradictions of the Russian regime. Articles in the "Propagandist" since 1942 and the popularization of the "History of the Communist Party, Brief Course" (1938) certainly substantiate this conclusion.

In concluding this section, it may be said that socialism, with its advocacy of the nationalization of the means of production, has indeed

<sup>1</sup> Rophe, W., "International Economic Disintegration," p. 149 (based on articles in Pravda).

<sup>2</sup> Binnscock, G. etc., "Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture."

arrived at an impasse. Discussions concerning the possibility of a democratic socialism appear fruitless when centralized direction of production receives its best concrete evidence in Soviet management. Professor Hayek's "The Road to Serfdom" presents stubborn arguments why dictatorial control is a natural accompaniment of such direction. As for recent political trends, viz., in Great Britain, before one rejoices in the apparent victory of socialist principles, he would do well to acquaint himself with the history of the German Social Democratic Party. As for Ukraine, it seems hopeless to think that it can liberate itself from the domination of the imposing socialist machine directed from the Kremlin. To call simply for political liberalization, as Mr. William H. Chamberlin does as a partial solution of the Ukrainian problem, is somewhat too optimistic for it is evident that the concentrated dictatorial power of the Party is based fundamentally upon the concentrated and centralized socialist machine which is an institutional sine qua non for that planned economy that is so cherished by real socialists.

### The External Situation

It is an easy step now, in the light of the foregoing analysis, to evaluate the character and possibilities of the Union's relations with the western democracies, where here alone the promise of Ukrainian liberation rests. On this subject too, much paper is being wasted.

The first important principle to grasp is that the game of internal political opportunism may be very easily adapted for international use. The Russians possess this power. Secondly, when we recall that we were not so long ago asked to read Hitler's "Mein Kampf" to recognize his plan for us and when we are aware of the present propaganda that Stalin always keeps his word, it would do well to review portions of his unpublished "Kampf", also, in order to form a grounded opinion. Concerning the world economy, Stalin teaches: "That is precisely why an international proletarian revolution is needed. Without this there is no use even thinking of the organization and normal development of world economy. However, in order to begin (at least begin) instituting a correct world economy, the victory of the proletariat in at least a few advanced countries is necessary. So long as this has not been achieved, our Party must seek circuitous paths of cooperating with capitalist groups in the economic arena." (*The October Revolution* p. 49). Some will quickly point to the dissolution of the Comintern as counter-proof. Organizationally, yes, perhaps. Func-

tionally, no, as notice the recent distribution from Moscow of the "Agitator's Notebook" to party members throughout the world.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, recall the ostentatious consultations of Togliatti, an Italian cabinet member, and Marshal Tito with the Kremlin before assuming their respective national tasks. Strategy and tactics, circuitous or direct, are the implements of external intervention as forged by the master craftsmen of the Kremlin.

Still trusting in Stalin's word, we find him teaching a portion of Leninism: "We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and it is conceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately, one or the other must conquer." Or more appropriate for the present:

"We have two stabilizations: the temporary stabilization of capitalism and the stabilization of the Soviet system. The setting in of a certain temporary equilibrium between these two stabilizations—such is the characteristic feature of the present international situation . . . at the one pole we find capitalism stabilizing itself, consolidating the position it has reached and continuing its development. At the other pole we find the Soviet system stabilizing itself, consolidating the positions it has won and marching forward on the road to victory. Who will defeat whom? That is the essence of the question . . . the world is now split into two camps: the capitalist camp, with Anglo-American capital at the head; and the socialist camp, with the Soviet Union at the head.

"Whoever has failed to understand this antithesis will never understand the quintessence of the present international situation."

It goes without saying that the last sentence of the above statement really justifies Stalin's claim to political realism and sagacity. The positions, he mentions, are being presently consolidated in Yugoslavia under Tito, by the liquidation of democratic Bulgarian statesmen under the useful caption of "war criminals," in Poland etc. Yes, even in the United States, as witnessed by the recent somersault of our comrades. Any method will do, depending on conditions; even that of Tsarist imperialism as shown by the recent recovery of the integral parts of the old Russian Empire—from Europe to the Pacific. Marxist

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<sup>1</sup> Salzberger, C. L., *New York Times*, June 6, 1945.

politics, nihilistic in essence, all nurture this power-driven opportunism.

Of course one cannot accept an opportunist's word. That the end (Revolution) justifies any means is basic to Bolshevik policy, as many a comrade knows. For example, concerning the national question, when Stalin was still out of power, he fervently declared: "The first question is, how are we to arrange the political life of the oppressed nations? In answer to this question it must be said that the oppressed nations forming part of Russia must be allowed the right to decide for themselves whether they wish to remain part of the Russian state or to separate and form an independent state" ("Marxism and the Nat'l. and Colonial Ques." pp. 62-65). As we well know, Trotsky's hordes settled the question, despite the fact that the above was expressed by Lenin too (Lenin-Stalin, Selected Writings and Speeches, pp. 114-115). Then, as is to be expected of chauvinists, there follows the rationalization: "The question of the rights of nations is not an isolated question, complete in itself; it is a part of the general question of the proletarian revolution, a part which is subordinate to the whole and must be dealt with from the point of view of the whole question," (Foundations of Leninism, pp. 76-77).

The world conflict that began in 1914 with its interim recuperative period between 1918 and 1939 is certainly not yet over. In point of fact, the problems and dangers issuing from this so-called Second World War are infinitely greater than those of the First War. Moreover, the new political factor on the international stage is this socialist colossus of the East, with aims philosophically opposed to the values of the West. As after Napoleon's collapse Russian armies penetrated the heart of Europe and almost brought Europe to the brink of another war between the Russian Empire and a European coalition led by Great Britain, so today, after the defeat of Hitler, a similar penetration has occurred, only to meet the safeguarding bulwark of American might. Today the position of Britain in Europe, as preserver of the balance of power, is occupied by the United States. The meaning of this is best revealed in the statement appearing in an article by Forrest Davis in the Saturday Evening Post, May 13, 1944, which was rumored to have received the blessing of the late President. "Striped to the bare essentials, we fought in 1917 and are fighting now to prevent the mastery of Europe by one aggressive power. Should Russia, as the sole European power, display tendencies toward world conquest, our vital interest would be again called into account."



It would be foolhardy and perilous to trust solely in a belief that Russia will neutralize its dynamistic outlook in the political world. The stakes are too immense. With American power at its peak, every pressure, as Messrs. Bevin and Churchill have already suggested, should be exerted upon the Soviets, e. g., international demands for universal disarmament, political liberties for all peoples etc. Recalcitrance on the Soviet part to accede to these measures, to which other nations must likewise subscribe, would probably mean an earlier showdown: carrying them into effect would mean the end of Marxist ideology at the Kremlin inasmuch as the Red Army, the N.K.V.D., the forced labor camps, and a single-party government constitute the foundation of the present Russian regime's political power.

The points of eventual friction are numerous. The Balkans, Greece, the Dardanelles, Persia, India, northern China, and the northern Pacific Islands are some of the sore spots. About these and the continent of Europe the flames of the future may soar. To prevent it, in these next few years Anglo-American power may have to display in one way or another its full strength. Force is, after all, what the men of the Kremlin understand best.

For Ukraine, the future rests in this sphere. Internal strife against steel is unthinkable; the opening wedge must come from without. Should a conflict arise between the totalitarian power of U.S.S.R. and the democracies, as there is every indication that it must eventually, the best guarantee for peace after that would be the disintegration of the Union, and the substitution of a completely European federation of nations. Toward this goal, Ukraine and its friends should strive.



## AMERICAN MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE

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**W**HEN the San Francisco Conference opened in the spring of 1945, an important question was the role that education was to play in the post-war world. An intensive campaign was under way, sponsored by leading American and foreign educators, to gain support for the formation of an International Office for Education. Delegates from thirty-four of the United Nations, meeting under the auspices of the International Education Assembly, voted unanimously to sponsor a world education organization. The delegates agreed to bring the issue before the representatives at San Francisco, and to ask for support from scholars and teachers everywhere. Both the National Education Association and the American Council on Education had been invited by the State Department to send consultants to the Conference.

Agitation for a world education office had been going on in school circles for the last two years. The original impetus for this movement came from the United States Committee for World Reconstruction, with headquarters at New York University. Later the International Education Assembly was formed to sponsor this project and coordinate the thinking of those working in this field.

What course the San Francisco delegates would follow was not known when this article was written. But it is important to note that in the memorial the American scholars maintained that if a world security organization was to succeed it would need a certain "climate of world opinion" and that this requires the establishment of some means by which the nations and peoples of the world can attain a higher standard of education and a better understanding of one another.

### What Price the Knowledge of Central-Eastern Europe?

These proposals are strikingly public spirited, humane, and world-minded, but — at no point — specific enough to point out that America has been pathetically ignorant of the conditions of Central-Eastern Europe. Although this European core has shaken our con-

temporary civilization to the very foundations by the fact that both World War I (Serbia) and World War II (Poland) started there, and although the sparks which have twice reached the United States emerged from the embers of Sarajevo and Warsaw, that region still remains a *terra incognita* in the eyes of many ethnocentric Anglo-Saxons.<sup>1</sup>

An editorial in *New York Herald Tribune* approached this problem from a different angle when it stated:<sup>2</sup>

“ . . . Our handicaps will continue, in diplomacy and in commerce and in the less tangible but vital sector of cultural understanding, until a sound tradition of American scholarship in Slavic studies has been developed. Where Germany had stolen the lead and Britain had set out to overtake her, we were caught far from starting line, unaware that the race had begun. The problem is not simply a matter of language courses, although they will prove difficult enough in all conscience, but of broad and accurate knowledge, so that the language becomes a tool sharpened by genuine comprehension. The immediate and growing need for such a program is a challenging opportunity for American higher education.”<sup>3</sup>

### The Causes of Ignorance

On the publication of the fourth article by Professor Ernest J. Simmons, an outstanding Slavonic scholar in the United States, the *New York Herald Tribune* commented editorially on America's ignorance of the conditions in Central-Eastern Europe and the Slavic nations:

“A factor which has held back this logical development toward a better authoritative understanding of the region has

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<sup>1</sup> Joseph S. Roucek, “Foreword,” *The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXXXII (March, 1944), pp. vii-ix, and *Misapprehensions about Central-Eastern Europe in Anglo-Saxon Historiography* (New York: The Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, January, 1944).

<sup>2</sup> “Know thy Neighbor,” *New York Herald Tribune* (December 27, 1944).

<sup>3</sup> See also: Joseph Barnes, “The Study of Russia in the United States, The Cost of Ignorance,” *New York Herald Tribune* (December 27, 1944); Ernest C. Roper, “The Study of Russia in the United States, Scholarships and Trade,” *Ibid.* (December 28, 1944); Sir Bernard Paris, “The Study of Russia in the United States, The British Experience,” *Ibid.* (December 29, 1944); Ernest J. Simmons, “The Study of Russia in the United States, An American Institute of Slavic Studies,” *Ibid.* (December 30, 1947).

been distrust of the Soviet Union and fear of Communist propaganda."<sup>4</sup>

Although this represented a valuable evaluation of the situation, the editorial writer did not go far enough. There are many other causes for this strange situation in which America found itself not only during World War II but also at the end of the war. What do we know, today about the conditions in Ukraine? About the differences between the "Slavish" people and the Slovaks? Who are these strange people known as "Slovenes" and what is their relations to the Slovaks? What is the role which the Slovaks played in the history of Europe and thus also in world history?

It is amazing that so little has been said on this subject in educational circles during the last few years. When the question is raised, no educator disagrees with either of these premises that: (1) the need for Americans to know about Central-Eastern Europe is increasing and that (2) the attention given to the study of this region in American schools is inadequate. The conclusion which follows from these premises is obvious; yet it is rarely articulated, even more rarely implemented. The remarkable fact is that the question is so seldom raised!

### The German Traditions of Scholarship

The neglect and indifference of the average American student to the Central-Eastern European problems can be traced, in addition, to the traditions of historical scholarship. The admiration of Teutonic culture can be traced to the fact that the American system of advanced education has been preponderantly German in its origins and traditions.<sup>5</sup> Until the foundation of the John Hopkins University there was no "graduate work" properly speaking. Many of the original Hopkins faculty had done their advanced study in Germany. During the rest of the nineteenth century and through the early years of the twentieth, a German doctorate was almost a "morceau obligé" in a successful American career. American students found in Germany what their own country was still lacking — the most advanced scientific methods, independence of thought and investigation, love and unselfish devotion to science and learning. From the seventies of the last century to the second decade of our century, there were several

<sup>4</sup> "The Study of Modern Russia," *New York Herald Tribune* (December 30, 1944).

<sup>5</sup> John L. Brown, "Deutschum and America," *Journal of Legal and Political Sociology*, II (October, 1943), pp. 117-135; John A. Waltz, *German Influence in American Education and Culture* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Carl Schurz Foundation, 1936).

hundred Americans every year studying at German institutions of higher learning, at Berlin, Bonn, and Marburg. They were imbued with the idea of the superiority of German *Wissenschaft*, and "even a professor of Romance languages often would by-path Paris for Berlin and would return to the United States speaking French with an authentic German accent. Hence, academically, a kind of intellectual Pan-Germanism began to take root."<sup>6</sup>

Particularly important has been, in this respect, the influence of the Departments of History in America's universities and colleges. The heads of these departments came to their native land imbued with the influence of Ranke. Ranke, in general, maintained in his earliest writings that the Germanic and Romance nations alone form a cultural unit having a common history to be identified with the history of Europe.<sup>7</sup>

This view expressed the attitude of Germany which began to develop already during this period the theory that it has always been Germany's "civilizing mission" to "take care" of the Eastern lands. Academically speaking, owing to the influence of German scholarship, the whole part of Europe east of Germany herself used to be disregarded even in French or English studies of universal history.

These traditions are by no means dead and more than in evidence when we examine the long row of series of textbooks which have dominated during the last two decades the courses on "Western Civilization." How many of them give any place at all to Central-Eastern Europe? How many lines are given to the Slavic peoples? How many explain the important Ukrainian problem? How many imply, directly or indirectly, the relationship between the course of history of Western and Eastern Europe?<sup>8</sup>

### The Antiquated Russian Reactionary View of Central-Eastern Europe

Even if there exists some knowledge of the history, culture, and national relationships in Eastern Europe, there usually prevail in America the antiquated reactionary views of the Russian scholars of

<sup>6</sup> J. L. Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

<sup>7</sup> Oscar Halecki, "Problems of Polish Historiography," *The Slavonic Review*, XXI (March, 1943), p. 223.

<sup>8</sup> For the additional causes leading to the indifference and ignorance of Central-Eastern Europe, such as the disappointment of the American Liberal with the Versailles Treaty, the *Kriegsschuldfrage*, the concept of "Balkanization," and the like, see: Joseph S. Roucek, *Misapprehensions about Central-Eastern Europe in Anglo-Saxon Historiography*.

Tsarist times in the question of Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe is treated as one whole, "the Russian people." For the majority of American Slavists Ukraine does not exist as a separate nation. They find "Russians" not only in Moscow and Leningrad but also in Kiev, Lviv, and even in the Carpathian Mountains. Ukraine for the majority of Americans is an unknown quantity. Ukraine was acknowledged at San Francisco as a separate nation, but despite this the majority of American journalists look at Ukraine as a province of South Russia. Consequently as for tsarism so even more for the majority of American Slavists, both of Slav and Anglo-Saxon descent, there is no Ukrainian people despite the fact that by fighting heroically and continuously for its own freedom during centuries and in our time during last twenty-five years, it has shown that it is truly a nation.

Who now in America knows of the eight-volume history of Ukraine by Hrushevsky? The American Slavists who know Ukrainian literature could be counted on the fingers of two hands. For the majority, as for tsarism, there exist only "Little Russians" and nothing more.

#### The Spell of Western Civilization Complex

As a result, America's college and university students were led to think of Western civilization as being, somehow, identical with universal history. Ever since, the United States has been victimized by this kind of myopia and the Americans have come to think of Western Europe as the world. The average American, as well as the average American historical and political science specialist, have come to think of a single world order based on the concept of Western civilization. It was a sort of cultural dominance based upon an attitude of cultural superiority which, over a long period, tended to become chronic.

When the props were put under this spell of the concept of "Western Civilization" by innumerable textbooks on "The Developments of Western Civilization," thousands after thousands of the college and university graduates came out from the American higher institutions of learning imbued with the idea that all that is "civilized" and worthwhile had its roots in Western Europe (meaning—West of Germany, of course). Since a few lines or pages have been devoted to the nations of Central-Eastern Europe, the inevitable result has been that the American college and University student knows next to nothing about this region — and what is even worse—that they are indoctrinated with the theory that all important history has been made by

the large nations of Western Europe. Central-Eastern Europe has been lost in the general-shuffle for the striving for knowledge.

### The Lack of Specialists and the Trouble of the Specialists

This situation, in turn, led to the further neglect of interest in this region. The specialists in this field, prior to World War II, had been unable to get an appointment in this specialized area of knowledge and had, eventually, to turn their attention and interest to the "popular" and "properly accredited" subjects. Since there were no textbooks systematizing the available knowledge on the region for the average social science and history teacher, very few courses were given. Even today, when the attention of the world is focused on the events shaking the foundation of World Civilization in Central-Eastern Europe, there appear to be less than 100 courses given in this field — and some 40 per cent of these, again, appear to be the language courses.<sup>9</sup>

### America's Concepts of Central-Eastern European Peoples in Regard to Immigration

Not the least of the difficulties faced by those who have been trying to bring the place of Central-Eastern Europe into a more proper focus has been the social attitude resulting from the so-called "Nordic complex" in regard to the immigrants from "non-Nordic Europe."

There always have been forces in America criticizing immigrants for their inability or unwillingness to become "Americanized." Even during the colonial period, hostility to "new" immigrants was ap-

<sup>9</sup> See: Josef Brozek, "Tasks for the Future: Intensification of Czechoslovak Studies in America," *Free Czechoslovakia*, IV (May, 1943), pp. 221-224, which lists the institutions offering courses in "Slav Studies in 1940-1942"; Brozek, "Russian Studies in American Universities," Institute of International Education, *News Bulletin*, XVIII (April 1, 1943), pp. 7-9; Wilbur F. Murra, "Teaching About Russia," *The Civic Leader*, XI (March 6, 1944), pp. 1-3; Russian Economic Institute, *A Survey of Russian Studies at American Universities and Colleges* (New York: Research Bureau for Post-war Economics, 1944 (New York, Vol. II in 1945); all issues of *The Slavonic Monthly*; Josef Brozek, "European Slavs and Student Exchange with the United States," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin*, XXIX (June, 1943), pp. 385-391; Brozek, "Slavic Studies in America," *The Journal of Higher Education*, XIV (June, 1943), pp. 293-297; Brozek, "Slav Culture in American Universities," *Association of American Colleges Bulletin*, XXIX (May, 1943), pp. 241-245; Howard E. Wilson, "The Soviet Union in the School Curriculum," *The Civic Leader*, XII (November 13, 1944), pp. 1-3; William G. Avirett, "Cornell Course on Russia Called Step to Revolution in Teaching," *New York Herald Tribune* (September 24, 1944); Arthur P. Coleman, *The Study of Polish in the United States of America* (New York: Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, 1943).

parent, and the "old" immigrants (that is, colonists) regarded immigrants as "foreigners."<sup>10</sup> The same prejudices have characterized the viewpoints of every American generation in regard to the latest arrivals on the American shores.

Beginning with the 1880's the chief sources of America's immigration shifted from Northern and Western to Southern and Eastern Europe, and within a decade the latter had surpassed the former in volume of movement. In the period just preceding World War I, the racial and eugenic aspects of the "new" immigrants came to dominate all other effects of immigration. Of particular influence here were the findings of the *Reports of the Immigration Commission* (appointed under the Congressional Act of February 20, 1907). In addition to the social and political aspects of immigration, the Commission reported that the Anglo-Saxon stock would not survive in the United States if the present type of immigration were to continue. Heterogeneity of race in itself was coming to be considered harmful and the lack of assimilability in the South and Eastern Europeans was emphasized.

Ever since the members as well as the descendants of these "new" immigrants have not been considered as particularly desirable arrivals or citizens. This, then, explains, together with the traditional hostility of all "natives" against the "latest" arrivals, not only the lack of appreciation of the cultural background of Central-Eastern Europe but also the difficulties confronting the sons and daughters of these immigrants when they aim to break into the positions of learning where they could promote the knowledge of the history of their forefathers.

Furthermore, the findings of the Immigration Commission was not without specific harm to the attitude adopted by the American historians and sociologists — not to speak of the psychologists. In the first place, the idea of the "new" and "old" immigrants has been twisted in the popular mind; it appears that, since the "new" immigrants started arriving here only *after* 1880, their predecessors need not to be considered at all. Yet, it is definitely established that immigrants continue arriving from the countries included under "old" immigration and that most of the so-called "new" immigrant groups date their first arrivals from pre-revolutionary days.<sup>11</sup> But how many

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<sup>10</sup> L. Garis, *Immigration Restrictions* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927), Chapter I.

<sup>11</sup> This thesis is developed in Francis J. Brown and Joseph S. Rausch, *One America* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945).



Americans are aware that Captain Vitus Bering, a Dane, shared with Chirikoff the command of the first Russian-American expedition to America? That, Andreas Agapius Honcharenko, a Ukrainian priest of Kiev, edited the *Alaska Herald*, a semimonthly in San Francisco, in 1868? That a Liberty ship was named after him in the second World War? That Peter Stuyvesant, recognizing Poles as valuable farming and fighting colonists, induced them to settle in New Holland (New York)? That Augustine Herrman, a Czech, reached New Amsterdam in 1633 and was granted by Lord Baltimore a 20,000-acre estate on Maryland's Eastern Shore Peninsula, where he cut the first roads through "New Bohemia" and gave his homeland's name to Bohemia River?

In fact, there is not a single Central-Eastern European national group unable to give definite proofs that they are not "new" — but rather "old" — immigrants.

### The Resulting Inferiority Complex

Such misconceptions about the role that the Central-Eastern European peoples have played in the development of America and in world history have done their harm. The "inferiority complex" of the immigrants from Central-Eastern Europe, and particularly of the descendants of these immigrants,<sup>13</sup> have resulted in the retardation of the much-needed integration and participation in America's stream of life and history.

### The Remedies

Obviously, nearly all American history will have to be rewritten. Most of it has been conditioned by the Anglo-Saxon ideology as influenced by the Germanic influence. More and more emphasis will have to put on the role of the Central-Eastern Europe in world and American history. America's ignorance was a luxury which America could perhaps afford before 1939 — in the years of our indifference. But now, and from now on, we cannot be indifferent and we must not be ignorant!

Of course, there have been various experiments carried on to

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<sup>13</sup> See: Joseph S. Roucek, "Group Tensions in the Modern World," Chapter XI, in *Approaches to National Unity* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941).

increase the knowledge of Central-Eastern Europe in various American educational centers.<sup>13</sup>

But they have been only minor steps in the right direction when we realize that in the vastness of the Allied victory and Germany's tremendous defeat, one curious fact was overlooked. Never before in history have Western Europe and Eastern Europe faced each other except across a buffer of German or Austrian power. For some 500 years most of the history of Europe has been a series of variations, mostly tragic, on this geographic and political fact.

Victory in Europe had finally destroyed this historic pattern. Henceforth Western Europe, Eastern Europe and America must live face to face.

The knowledge of this reality is of utmost importance to every American!

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<sup>13</sup> The most ambitious experiments in this field have been carried on in Cornell University under the direction of Professor Ernest J. Simmons. In 1943 and 1945 Hofstra College arranged during its summer session a special course on "Central-Eastern Europe" in cooperation with the Central and Eastern European Planning Board (headed by Dr. Feliks Gross) and Dr. Joseph S. Roucek of Hofstra. In 1945, the University of Wyoming devoted its whole summer session to The Institute of Central and Eastern European Affairs (under the direction of Dr. Feliks Gross). The University of California, Berkeley, has a strong centre of Russian history developed by Professor Robert J. Kerner, a Slavonic specialist of Czech backgrounds (see: Joseph S. Roucek, "Professor Robert J. Kerner," *The Slavonic Monthly*, II (April, 1945), pp. 11-12).

## THE MEANING OF "RUSSIA" AND "UKRAINE"

By NICHOLAS D. CZUBATYJ

**I**N 1713 Peter I, the founder of the modern Russian Empire, issued an Ukaz, by virtue of which his state formerly known under the name of Muscovy was renamed Russia (Rossiya) and his subjects became Russkiye. The new name Rossiya had been used by the Greeks to designate the ancient Kievan State of the Ukrainian people—Rus. At the time of the renaming of Muscovy Peter had finally managed to obtain an outlet to the sea by seizing the Baltic provinces from the Swedes. He also had strengthened his grip on Ukraine and had drawn nearer to the Black Sea by crushing the abortive attempt of the Ukrainians under Hetman Mazepa to free themselves. Poland, meanwhile, was steadily becoming a mere satellite of Muscovy.

The renaming of Muscovy created surprise beyond Peter's expanding domains, as everyone then knew that Muscovy was never Rus. The name, however, found immediate favor among the Germans, because the German advisors at Peter's court had suggested the new name. In time England accepted the name, too. The last country to recognize the substitution of the name *Rossiya* for Muscovy was France, where the war for liberation by Ukrainians against Tsar Peter was well known, as we can see from Voltaire's accurate portrayal of the freedom-loving quality of Ukraine. It was Voltaire's influence that prompted Charles L. Lesur to write his work on Ukrainian history, "L'Histoire des Cosaques," which was often consulted by Napoleon in preparation for his march on Moscow.

The sluggish acceptance by the western European countries of Muscovy's new name was due to the realization that, on the one hand, by this act Muscovy was attempting to adopt as its own the history and traditions of Kiev, mother of the cities of Rus and, on the other hand, to deny the existence of the Ukrainian people as an independent nationality. Furthermore, it also was quite evident that in doing this Muscovy was giving notice of her intention to claim those Ukrainian and White Ruthenian territories which still remained under Polish rule. This intention was realized at the three partitions of Poland (1772-95).

After the Tsar's ukaz giving Muscovy a new name, Russian diplomats abroad received instructions to persuade and even bribe foreign officials and journalists to use the new name exclusively.

About two centuries later Peter's ambition was finally fulfilled. Muscovy became definitely known as Russia. The term Russia, a medieval Latin name for Rus, became accepted as the English and French translation of ancient Rus and modern *Rossiya*. This further obscured the original meaning of the term involved, for now "Russia" covered both Rus-Ukraine and Muscovy. A further result has been that those who use the term Russia today rarely differentiate between the Russians and the Ukrainians, as is shown by many of the newspaper reports emanating from Russia. Thus the plans of Peter I and his German advisors of some 232 years ago did not miscarry.

Today, with but few exceptions the term Russia covers a land stretching from the White Sea to the Black Sea, from the Curzon Line to Vladivostok, while the inhabitants of this one-sixth of the earth are commonly called Russians. To popularize "Russia" and "Russians" was a task deliberately and thoroughly undertaken by countless Russian bureaucrats, officials, scholars, police, up to and including the Minister of the Interior, Valuyev, who in the notorious order banning printing in Ukrainian said (1863) that "there never was, is not, and never will be a Ukrainian language."

Strange as it may seem, today there are reactionary Russian historians who still cling to Valuyev's view. For them the same Russian people live in Western Ukraine or on the banks of the Dnieper as in and around Moscow and in the Urals. Some of them, in a vain attempt to compromise with reality, divide the Russian nation into three branches: Great Russian, Ukrainian, and White Russian, instead of acknowledging the fact that Eastern Europe is inhabited by three different nationalities. Here in America similar illusory views are taught in colleges and universities.

Nevertheless the fact remains that there is a separate Ukrainian nation, numbering 45 million people. Historically, culturally, in mentality and in language it is independent of the Russian nation. In their native tongue the Ukrainians consistently refer to their northern neighbors as "Moskals" (Muscovians).

For over two hundred years Russia has been trying to subdue the Ukrainians in their struggle for national liberty. Upon the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1917 the dynamic national consciousness of the Ukrainians erupted in the form of the proclamation (Jan. 22, 1918)

of an independent state. Although the democratic Ukrainian National Republic was finally overthrown by the Russian Bolsheviks with the aid of a Ukrainian puppet government at Kharkiv it required the destruction by means of famine, executions and banishment of about eight million Ukrainians for the Soviet rulers to retain their grip on Ukraine during the past quartetr of a century.

Over one million or so of Ukrainian "displaced persons" today in the Anglo-American zones of occupation in former Germany are a vivid reminder of the continuing hostility between Russia and Ukraine. Much as these people love their native land Ukraine, they refuse to return to it; they even prefer to die rather than go back to it so long as it remains under Red rule and Russian occupation.

The difference between Russia and Ukraine is clearly realized by the Bolsheviks themselves, who not through any good will but simply because of the sheer necessity of not offending the Ukrainians any more than is absolutely necessary were forced to apply the term Russia to Muscovy itself and call the entire state the Soviet Union. To be sure, "Russia" still appears on the maps, but that is only as the territory of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, as a separate federative republic, bordering upon Ukraine. This, of course, does not please those Russian scholars in American universities who follow the Valuyev line in regard to the Ukrainians.

Naturally we do not dream that the Soviets have abandoned hope of realizing Tsar Peter's dream of one empire peopled by one homogeneous Russian people. The Soviet rulers are too much under the influence of Peter's modern disciples in this respect to do that. Being realistic, however, they compromise, and allow the establishment of a fictitious Ukrainian S.S.R., and arrange to have it become one of the United Nations. Nevertheless, they strive by devious methods to achieve the same goal, but they do it in a much more clever fashion than did their Tsarist predecessors. The old slogans about the one and undivided Russia and the one and undivided Russian people divided rather than united its Slav peoples. So now the catch-phrases are based on the "Soviet" people and "Soviet" patriotism, with the Russians, of course, in the saddle and predominant.

That is why today Soviet textbooks do not attempt to deny the existence of national differences between the Russians and the Ukrainians, or that the history of Kievan Rus forms the earliest period of Ukrainian history. What they do claim is that that period is common to the histories of the Russian, Ukrainian and White Ruthenian peoples,

a position which is only partially divergent from that held by Ukrainian nationalist historians.

Let us examine for the moment what the generally authoritative Encyclopaedia Britannica says about Ukraine: "The people of the Ukraine are for the most part descended from the Ruthene immigrants from the north who, to escape the oppression of the Polish and Lithuanian princes and nobles escaped 'to the frontier' where, though nominally under Lithuanian rule they formed free democratic communities, and came to be known as Cossacks. The whole Ukraine formed part of the Polish-Lithuanian empire until 1667, when the portion east of the Dnieper was ceded to Russia by the treaty of Andrussovo. The rest was absorbed by Russia at the second partition of Poland, in 1793." That is the sum total of Ukrainian history according to the Britannica. As to the "Ruthenes" and their relation to Ukrainian history, there is no explanation whatsoever.

Pick up any textbook on Russian history in English and you will read such nonsense as that L'viv, Kiev or Poltava are populated by Russians; or that Volodimir the Great and Yaroslav the Wise were Russian monarchs, notwithstanding the fact that during their time the Russian nation did not even exist as such, but there was only Rus, which, as we shall see later, was synonymous with Ukraine.

The standard World Almanac, as a further example of the ignorance or distortion of the truth of Ukrainian history, states that there are 155 million Russians in the world, although Soviet statistics clearly show that they number only 80 millions. As for the Ukrainians, the second largest East European people, the Almanac completely ignores them.

### Logical Outline of East European History

A feature of any standard book on Russian history published in America is its lack of logic, due to the fact that it is usually based on the reactionary Russian political tenet that there is no separate Ukrainian nationality.

No one can really tell why the beginnings of the history of the Russians, whose homeland is in the northeastern part of Europe, are placed in and around Kiev, the ancient capital of Ukraine, instead of in the very cradle of the Russian people and state, in and around the upper stretches of the Volga, on the territory surrounding Moscow, or within Suzdal itself, their ancient capital. It is there that the ancient history of the Russians lies. Not until the 13th century was their capital

transferred to the region of Moscow. During the succeeding four centuries Europeans knew of no Russia but only of the State of Muscovy. The third period of Russian history, which begins with Peter I, is actually the history of the Russian empire, that is of those territories over which the Russians ruled but which were not populated by the Russian people as Russian historians would have us believe.

Exactly where the Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Georgians, Armenians, and the people of Turkestan enter into this schemes of Russian history none of its exponents attempt to explain. Valuyev's statement that "there was not, is not, and never will be" etc., is the major premise upon which their works are based.

The illogical nature of this approach to Russian history evoked criticism even before the Russian Revolution among some East European historians of Ukrainian and other nationality. The result was that at the turn of this century a new approach was formulated. Its chief spirit was Prof. Michael Hrushevsky, a world famous scholar and the author of an 8-volume History of Ukraine-Rus. He first expressed his theory in a dissertation entitled "The Ordinary Schema of 'Russian History' and the Question of a Rational Order of East European History."<sup>1</sup>

On the basis of exhaustive historical, ethnological, philological, archaeological and anthropological researches and studies Hrushevsky came to the conclusion that East European history should be based on the ethnography of the principal nationalities of Russia, because Russia is not a state of one people but of many peoples. In other words, the history of Ukraine-Rus developed on the present Ukrainian territory, while Russian and White Ruthenian histories evolved within their respective territorial spheres.

The primary stage of Ukrainian history, therefore, begins with Kievan Rus and lasts to the Tartar invasions of Eastern Europe. Before their advance the Ukrainians withdrew to the north and northwest and there established a true successor of Kievan Rus in the form of the Western Ukrainian State which lasted to 1549. After that the Ukrainian people became part of the Lithuanian-Polish federation and then fell under Polish rule where their status finally became that of a stateless people. Their revolution under Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1648, which restored Ukrainian statehood on a portion of Ukrainian territory, ushered in a new period of Ukrainian history. Finally the Russian

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<sup>1</sup> Сборникъ Статей по Славяноведенію Т. I., 1904, Ст. Петербург.

Revolution in 1917 led to the creation of a third Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian National Republic.

Russian and White Ruthenian history began on the same territory where these peoples live to-day. The Russians or Muscovians appeared as a national entity already in the 12th century, in the northern colonies of ancient Rus-Ukraine, which were then inhabited by tribes of Finnic (Ural-Altai) origin mixed with some Slav elements. Their center was the Suzdal-Rostov principality with Suzdal as its capital, later Vladimir on the Klyasma river, took its place and finally, in the beginning of the 14th century, Moscow.

The Ural-Altai tribes, from which the Russians descended, were for over centuries exposed to the influence of the Kievan Rus-Ukraine culture, and from the latter they received their princes, administration, trade, and education together with the Church-Slavonic language and Eastern Christianity.

The disintegration of the Kievan state after the death of Yaroslav the Wise (1054) into petty principalities loosened its hold upon the Suzdal-Rostov principality, so that by the middle of the 12th century the latter had begun to be independent and a rival to the Kievan metropolis. The Tartar occupation led to the final break of Muscovy with Ukraine. Then ensued the Muscovian phase of Russian history, and this was followed at length by its expansion throughout Eastern Europe as well as Asia—the period of the empire.

A similar process of the breaking away took place in the north-western lands centering around Polotsk—where the White Ruthenian nationality came into being—and also in Novgorod in the north. Culturally and politically Novgorod became part of Muscovy. In this manner three nations rose upon the ruins of the Kievan Ukraine-Rus. A common political and religious life arrested the complete separation of the White Ruthenian lands from Ukraine for several centuries. That is why during the 16th and the middle of the 17th centuries the solidarity between the White Ruthenians and Ukraine was so great that in foreign countries no attempt was made to distinguish between them. Both were called *Rusiny*, in Latin *Rutheni*, and were looked upon as an entirely different people from the Muscovites.

This then is the outline of East European history as interpreted by Prof. Hrushevsky and endorsed by all Ukrainian historians. This same schema has also been accepted by White Ruthenian historians as well



as progressive Russian historians. The first of the latter was Alexander Presniakov (1920).<sup>3</sup>

During the first period before the Tatar invasions (1238-40), the entire Kievan Rus was ruled by the St. Volodimir dynasty, which adapted itself to the native population, their culture and their social-economic conditions. However, the princes governing the tribes of Ural-Altai origin in the North which were settled on the present-day Russia proper but which did not speak any Slav language were ruled absolutely with the aid of administrators from Rus with no cooperation from the natives, as was the case in the Ukrainian South, Novgorod and White Ruthenia, where the rulers sought the counsel of the "older men" and at times summoned a *viche* (mass meeting). Thus already during the 12th century within the steadily crumbling Kievan Rus three different forms of government were appearing: absolute, aristocratic and republican. According to Prof. Vladimírsky-Budanov, as early as the Tatar invasions the autocratic system was found in the Russian lands, the aristocratic combined with *viche* system in Ukrainian, and the republican in the White Ruthenian lands.<sup>4</sup>

At that time the cradle of the Russian people, the Suzdal-Rostov principality, was not only breaking away from Kiev but becoming its rival as well. While setting up Vladimir on the Klasma river as capital of his Suzdal state, Prince Andrew Bogolubsky attacked Kiev (1169), wantonly destroyed it together with its churches and monasteries and carried off to the north everything of value. Such a lack of respect on his part for Kiev as the "Mother of Rus towns" showed that he attached no sentiment to the capital of a common fatherland. Several years before that, his father, George Dvohoruky, attempted to sever even religious ties with Kiev by vainly attempting to persuade the patriarch of Constantinople to establish a separate metropolitanate for his principality.

The rise of the Russian and White Ruthenian peoples within the borders of the Kievan Rus Kingdom was very similar to the rise of the Roman peoples in the provinces of the classic Roman empire. Rus-Ukraine was a sort of ancient Rome. Just as the Romanizing influences among the Celts affected them only superficially Kievan Rus held its provinces together but loosely. In both instances the state remained united as long as its center was able to control the provinces. With the weakening of the central authority, the peoples of the various distant

<sup>3</sup> Образование Великорусского Государства, Петроград, 1920.

<sup>4</sup> Владимирский, Будагова История Русского Права, Петербург, 1909.

Roman provinces gradually evolved into French, Spanish and other separate peoples. Similarly the Russians and White Ruthenians came into being with the decline of ancient Rus, their common fatherland.

The rise of the Russians and White Ruthenians can also to a certain extent be compared to the rise of the American nation and the nations of the British commonwealth in the distant provinces of the old British Empire. For them England is still the motherland, just as Kievan Rus is regarded by Russians and White Ruthenians as their motherland.

### Was Ancient Kievan Rus—Russia?

Russian histories in English most always apply the name Russia to the ancient Ukrainian state of Rus of the 9-13th centuries, the Muscovian state of the 14-17th centuries, and the Russian state of the 18-20th centuries. Today American journalists and politicians use the terms Soviet Union and Russia interchangeably. As a result there is much muddled thinking here concerning Russia.

Actually, in its ethnic conception ancient Rus was Ukraine—never Russia. It was only in the political sense that Rus embraced Ukrainian as well as non-Ukrainian lands. There is abundant proof of this in the ancient *Chronicles of the Rus Kingdom* by Nestor.

Customarily these and other such chronicles linked the name Rus in its political meaning with the word "zemlya" (country, state), ergo the Rus-State. Analyzing the word "zemlya," Prof. Budanov comes to the conclusion that it stands for territory, the primary element of a state, used here "pars pro toto" to designate a state.

Nestor, a monk of the Cave Monastery in Kiev, used "Ruska Zemlya" in exactly that meaning on the very first page of his *Ancient Chronicles*, in explaining where the Rus-State originated. Thereby he distinguished the Rus-State from the Polish, Hungarian, Greek-Byzantine and other states. This appears in both the Ipatiev and Laurentiev versions of the *Chronicles*. All the territories which were under the rule of the Rus kings and princes of the time, were part of the Rus-State, although within its boundaries there were some who were not truly Rus people. In any event, the Rus-State had its Rus dynasty, its Rus metropolitanate and its Rus code of laws (*Ruska Pravda*).

When, therefore, upon the death of Yaroslav the Wise (1054), the Rus-State began to break up, it was only natural to see the rise of the new states (zemlya) of Chernihiv, Suzdal, Novgorod, etc. The new names appear in the *Ancient Chronicles*. About the time there was

mention of the "Rus-Zemlya" (State) only when someone was appealing to a sense of moral solidarity as a protection against foreign enemies.

Aside from the political implication of the term Rus-State, it usually meant territory populated by those of the Rus race, and in this case it referred to Ukraine exclusively. Many examples of this meaning of Rus in the 12th century can be found, in the Ancient Chronicles of Nestor and in the Novgorod Chronicles.

In the Ipatiev edition of the Ancient Chronicles we read in the year 1147: "Sviatoslav dispatched [from Novgorod] a messenger to George in Suzdal, saying, 'I shall go to Kiev in Rus'," which shows that Novgorod and Suzdal were not in Rus. Elsewhere the Chronicles clearly differentiate between Rus-Ukraine and Suzdal and Rostov. "In that year George journeyed into Rus with the Suzdalites and Rostovites and with all his children" (Ipatiev, 1154). Referring to Prince George of Suzdal, the Chronicles note that, "That winter, George, upon learning of Iziaslav's death, went into Rus to Kiev" (1155).

In the ancient Rus-State there were two cities with the name of Pereyaslav: one in Ukraine, southeast of Kiev, and the other in Muscovy, in the Volga river basin, known as Pereyaslav Zalisly. Thus the Ipatiev edition notes that: "In that year [1199] Prince Yaroslav Mstyslavich died in the Rusky Pereyaslav." In other words, the other, i.e. the northern Pereyaslav was not in Rus. Similar differentiations between the Ukrainian Pereyaslav and the Zalisly Pereyaslav appear in the Ipatiev edition under the following years: 1201, 1215, 1227, 1228, 1230, etc.

Beside the Ukrainian Pereyaslav, Rus also included Chernihiv and Siversk, in the northeastern part of present-day Ukraine. Under the year 1147 the Ipatiev edition notes that from Novgorod "Sviatoslav journeyed to Nerizhka, after crossing the Oka, and tarried there . . . About that time retainers from Rus arrived and told him that Volodimir is in Chernihiv and Iziaslav in Starodub." Referring to the death of the Suzdalian prince Andrew Bogolubsky, the Ipatiev chronicles states that (1175), "Having seen the death of the prince of Rostov and Suzdal . . . they said . . . our prince has been killed, and none of his children are around here. His young son is in Great Novgorod, while his brothers are in Rus." These latter were in Chernihiv, that is in Rus-Ukraine, whereas Suzdal, Rostov, and Novgorod were not in Rus.

The Ukrainian province of Podilya also was in Rus, on the border of Western Ukraine, but Suzdal was not in Rus (Ipatiev, 1148-1149). Rus also included the Western Ukrainian province of Volhyn—"Rusky

towns of Sumsk, Tikhoh, Vyhoschiw, Hnoynitsia, Bozhak" Ipat. 1152), while Smolensk was beyond the Rus borders (Ipat. 1148).

In 1147 a crisis occurred in the Kievan metropolitanate. Dissatisfied with the autocratic methods of the patriarch the bishops of Ukraine broke away from Constantinople and led by Bishop Onuphrey of Ukrainian Chernihiv, they elected a local ecclesiastic as their Kievan metropolitan, Klym Smoliatych. Not all the bishops, however, took part in this. Only those from the Rus-land Ukraine followed Onuphrey in electing a new metropolitan. Those from the outside, from Smolensk and Novgorod, refused to follow them. Consequently, Bishop Niphont of Novgorod was summoned to Kiev to stand ecclesiastical trial. As the Ipatiev chronicles (1149) recount: "Into Rus journeyed Archbishop Niphont, summoned by the metropolitan, appointed as such by Izyaslav together with the bishops of the Rus-land without any understanding with Constantinople." By this time the term Rus-land covered principalities of Ukraine because another section of the chronicles reveals that the new metropolitan was elected by the bishops of Chernihiv, Bilhorod, Pereyaslav, Yuryiv, and Volodimir Volynsky, all from Ukraine of to-day.

In the early part of the 13th century Galicia, the second Western Ukrainian province, became a part of Rus. Prince Roman Halitsky, the founder of the Western Ukrainian dynasty and state on the territory of Ukraine west of the Dnieper, accepted the title of "Autocrat of the entire Rus-Land." From then the Western European chancelleries, especially the Papal Chancellery, usually alluded to the Western Ukrainian rulers as "princes of Rus" (the Bulls of pope Innocent III of 1207 and 1214) whereas the Suzdal rulers were called "dukes of Suzdal" (*Dux Susdaliensis*).

These few excerpts from the Ancient Chronicles clearly show that during the pre-Tatar period the term Rus covered present-day Ukraine, while there were no ethnic Russian territories in Rus then at all. As can be seen, the application of the English term Russia in the modern sense to that period of East European history is inaccurate and unclear.

### **Russians and Ukrainians Are Two Different Peoples**

The early separation of the present Russian territory from Kiev came about because of the considerable distance separating the two, the different economic conditions, the ambitions of the princes and dukes to rule independently, and, most of all, the ethnical differences between the two peoples. As the Ukrainian scholar, Prof. Vadim Scherbakivsky,

points out, the inhabitants of Ukraine and those of Russia are of two different anthropological types, and their prehistoric pasts differ from one another.<sup>4</sup> The basic element of the Ukrainians is that their early ancestors were the creators of so called Tripilla culture, named after the archaeological finds at the town of Tripila in Ukraine.

When these ancestors arrived in Ukraine from the south-east about two thousand years before Christ, they already possessed a developed agricultural civilization, with a matriarchal social order. They were followed by a new race which brought the Slav language and a patriarchal order. Subsequent racial interminglings among them were of not much consequence, but Greek, Gothic and other cultural influences played an important role in their development. The earliest direct ancestors of the Ukrainians appeared at the close of the Hun invasions during the 6th century under the name of Antae. They were then scattered over most of the present Ukrainian territories. Elements similar to those of the Antae found their way among the southern Slavs, southern Poles and as far west as the eastern stretches of the Alps, together constituting the Slavs.

There is hardly any of this Slav element in the Russian people, a bare 10% in the opinion of Scherbakivsky. Their dominant element is the Ural-Altai tribes. In other words, basically racially the Russians were not Slavs in origin. The Slav element of the Russians, says Scherbakivsky, is a product of a much later period, already historic, as a result of the influence of Kievan civilization on its non-Slavic provinces.

Despite the superficial influence of the Slav culture of Kievan Rus on the Russians, their entirely different ethnic character caused their rapid rupture with Kiev and the founding of a separate nation, psychologically and spiritually different from the Ukrainians.

### Psychological Differences

For centuries prejudice and distrust have existed between the Ukrainians and the Russians. Their relations were never able to attain the level of good neighborliness. Traditionally the Ukrainians have looked down upon the Russians as barbarians while the Russians looked upon the Ukrainians with disdain. Typically, even today the Ukrainians regard the Russians—"katzap" as intellectually mediocre, and conversely the Russians regard the Ukrainian—"khakhol" as not particularly gifted. The first attempt at a closer Ukrainian-Russian relations was begun with the Pereyaslav Treaty (1654). By its terms Het-

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<sup>4</sup>Scherbakivsky, *The Formation of the Ukrainian Nation*, Prague, 1941 (in Ukrainian).

man Bohdan Khmel'nitsky was compelled to place Ukraine, newly freed from Polish rule, under the protectorate of the Muscovian Tsar. This was greeted with strong opposition from the Ukrainian intellectuals, led by the Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchy. It stemmed mainly, however, from the fact that Ukraine always, even before the Tatar period, considered itself a part of Europe, and a member of the West European "Christian community," whereas the Russians were always Asiatic in spirit. This feeling of solidarity with Western Europe is one of the chief characteristics of the Ukrainian people of today.

Usually the different psychologies of the two people are traced to their different reactions to the Tatar invasions after 1240. But that is not the complete answer. At the root of the psychological differences between the Ukrainians and the Russians lie two different civilizations, starting in prehistoric times. Undoubtedly the 200 year enslavement under the Tatars alienated the Russians not only from the Ukrainians but also from Europe. Although meekly submitting to Tatar rule, the Muscovians rulers managed nevertheless to broaden their domains at the expense of their neighbors and thus grow in strength. Rus-Ukraine, on the other hand, remained true to its freedom-loving traditions and waged alone a defensive war against the Asiatic hordes and the organized resistance of her immediate western neighbors. The Western Ukrainian ruler, Danilo, seeking help in Western Europe, petitioned the Pope for aid, and as a result he received the royal crown and united the Ukrainian Church with Rome. From then on Ukraine gained many elements of Western culture, including the use of Latin.

Just as the collaboration of the Russians with the Tatars drew the former closer to Asia, so the collaboration of the Ukrainians with Europe bound the two more firmly. The struggle with the Tatars cost the Ukrainians countless lives. They were a veritable bulwark of European civilization and Christianity during those perilous times. It is no wonder that Pope John XX bestowed the "antemuralae christianitus" accolade upon the Ukrainian princes Lev and Andrew, both of whom were slain in 1323 in fighting the Tatars.

The entirely different reactions of Ukraine and Muscovy to the Tatar invasions determined the final psychological differences between them, in the opinion of Alexey K. Tolstoy, the famed Russian writer. According to him soon after the 13th century there were already two Rus. "One Rus, he wrote, "has its roots in universal, or at least in European culture. In this Rus the ideas of goodness, honor and freedom are understood as in the West. But there is another Rus; the Rus of the

dark forests, the Rus of the Taiga, the animal Russia, the fanatic Russia, the Mongol Tatar Russia. This last Russia made despotism and fanaticism its ideal . . . Certain historical data made it possible to incarnate the first ideal in Rus of old Kiev, and to concentrate all the negative features of the opposite tendency, eastern, despotic in Moscow, that rose on the spiritual ruins of Kiev . . . Kiev Rus was a part of Europe, Moscow long remained the negation of Europe.<sup>5</sup>

This basic difference between the Ukrainians and Russians found its reflection in their social and private life. Thus the Ukrainians are active individualists while the Russians are not but hold that the individual should serve the state blindly. In public life the Russian, favoring absolute rule, is inclined to communism, whereas the Ukrainian places the highest value on freedom, private ownership and husbandry, even if it be on the tiniest bit of land. That is why the Russian considers all land as being "God's and Tsar's," while the Ukrainian says it is "God's and mankind's."

The Communist system in Russia had its predecessor in the "mir" of Tsarist days, a community where land was held in common and apportioned by lot. In Ukraine, however, the "mir" was entirely unknown. It is no wonder then that collectivization proceeded quite rapidly in Russia, whereas in Ukraine it was only at the cost of millions of lives, and the Soviet authorities used the famine to force it upon the Ukrainians.

Characteristically the Kievan law of the *Ruska Pravda* code of pre-Tatar times did not penetrate into Muscovy in later times but remained in Ukraine and White Ruthenia. It was foreign to the mentality of the Russians. The Moscovian law of the 14-17th centuries was based on an entirely different system of justice from the ancient Ukrainian *Ruska Pravda*, a fact admitted by Russian jurists themselves.

The different traditional and cultural backgrounds of the Ukrainians and Russians gave each a different viewpoint on life in general. The Ukrainian is more of an idealist, a sentimentalist, while the Russian is more prosaic and realistic. The Ukrainian possesses a highly developed sense of the artistic, perhaps a heritage from the Greeks, which he adapts to his every day life, to his beautifully decorated national costumes, his picturesque homes, and the like. The Russian does not care much for such things.

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<sup>5</sup> *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. XIX, 1939-40. Kiev, *Mother of Russian Towns*, pp. 71-72.

Foreign travelers who went through both Ukraine and Russia wrote that it was easy to distinguish between a Ukrainian village and a Russian village. The same differences have been observed between Ukrainian and Russian colonists in distant Siberia.

Finally the different ethnic and political development of the two peoples in the course of centuries gave them different approaches to political ideology. The Russian is a natural imperialist. The Ukrainian only aspires to the national freedom of his native land, to which he is devoted wholeheartedly, and does not care to rule over others. This national trait finds expression in the poetic: "Neither foreign things do we covet, nor our own do we renounce!"

Here Scherbakivsky accepts the sociological theory of Schmidt and Kopper that certain nations are inherently war-like and predatory, others are peaceful by nature and ideals. A good example of the first are the Russians and the Germans. Peaceloving peoples fall victims of such predatory powers. The latter are creators of empires, which enslave peaceloving peoples for centuries. Only some unusual combination of political factors enables them to regain their freedom.

Thus the differences between the Russian Muscovites and Rus-Ukraine are not only superficial or on the mere political plane but they result from deep causes which have existed for centuries and millenia and furnish the best reason why Ukraine should be truly an independent nation in the family of Europe.





# UKRAINIAN LITERARY TRADITION

By STEPHEN SHUMEYKO

From the 11th century, when the loftiness and beauty of Kievan culture excited considerable astonishment among travelers, down through the centuries to the present day, the Ukrainians have always impressed foreign observers with their cultural ability, their mental alertness, the liveliness of their thoughts and emotional reactions, and their talents for expressing themselves.

Others observed in the Ukrainians their strong preference for extreme individualism, freedom,<sup>1</sup> and equality; their initiative, industry, thrift, and cleanliness; their earnest, careful minds, capable of sustained activity; their happy nature, tempered somewhat by a melancholy begotten of oppression; and their willingness to fight and sacrifice, even their lives for the sake of their convictions, as well as for their home, family, and nation.

Such are the Ukrainians, as seen by numerous foreign observers, not to mention the native ones, ranging from the Greek and Arabian traders and travelers who passed through Ukraine in the earliest days of the Kievan dynasty, to the many European travelers and writers who visited Ukraine during the later stages of her national development, up to and including the modern times.<sup>2</sup>

## Oral Literature

A mirror of their turbulent and colorful national life, the literature of the Ukrainian people truly reflects all their trials and tribulations, as well as their thoughts, strivings and aspirations.

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<sup>1</sup> Voltaire, in history of Charles XII of Sweden, wrote: "L'Ukraine a toujours aspire a etre libre."

<sup>2</sup> Among them can be mentioned Beauplans Levasseur, author of "Description de l'Ukraine" (1640), translated into English in 1704; Pierre Chevalier, who wrote "Historie de la Guerre des Cosaques" (1663), tr. into Eng. in 1672; Jean Sherrer, author of the "Annales de la Petite-Russie ou Historie des Cosaques de l'Ukraine" (1788); English travelers such as Edward De. Clarke and Joseph Marshall; historians such as Bernhard Connor, professor at Oxford; and diplomats such as Charles Whitworth. During the 19th century, Prosper Merimee and Alfred Rambaud of France, and W. R. Morfil and George Rolleston, professor at Oxford, of England, wrote about Ukraine, to mention a few.

Especially is this true of their oral literature, the roots of which lie buried in the ancient, pre-Christian past, and which consists of a rich and varied store of myths, tales, legends, anecdotes, droll sayings, fables, riddles, incantations, and songs.

By far the richest, and perhaps the largest class of oral literature are the folk songs. Originating and current among the common masses of the Ukrain people, they typify their life, interests, sorrows and enthusiasms down through the ages. They are a genuine contribution to the world's literary treasury.

Of the different categories of these that exist, the oldest are the ritualistic songs. Originally, before the coming of Christianity, they were sung in honor of the various gods and on the occasion of the periodic changes of nature, interpreting and praising the same. The *kolyadki*, for example, were sung near the close of December in honor of *kolyada*, which signified the rebirth of the sun's power. With the arrival of Christianity, however, Christmas replaced the *kolyada* festival and today the *kolyadki* are Christmas carols. The carolers go from house to house singing and wishing everyone "a neat little profit and happiness galore from *kolyada* to *kolyada*." A similar evolution was undergone by the *vesnyanki* and *hayivki*, pagan songs expressing the joy and gladness at the coming of spring, which in time became interwoven with the picturesque and gay Easter holiday festival on the village greens.

Songs revolving around family life touch upon all its phases. The typical cradle song usually expresses the great love which the mother bears for her child and the worry which she undergoes about what fate awaits it when it grows up. Funeral songs, drawn mainly from mythological as well as Christian sources, are not very plentiful, but very moving in tone, and usually liken the deceased to the sun and the moon, or to a raven, witch, or even a snake. In striking contrast to the meagerness of the funeral songs is the multitude of wedding songs and chants, which from the point of richness in musical style and variety reign supreme.

Lyrical songs, including those of love, are not only the most numerous of all folk songs but also the most beautiful, for they are replete with anacreontic grace, beauty of diction, pretty little comparisons and the fine phrases of a true and loving heart. There is no trace of sexuality within them; for they glorify not the physical but the spiritual beauty of a woman. Most of them, it is worth noting, were composed by women while their men were away at the

wars, and this may account for the strain of sadness which runs through many of them.

The moral-religious songs or canticles are usually sung by itinerant *lirnyki* to the accompaniment of the *lira* — a guitar-like instrument, producing a type of hurdy-gurdy music by the turning of a handle — and their themes deal usually with the lives of the saints, the beginning and end of the world, and general religious and moral issues.

Of the historical songs the most colorful are the *dumy*, which deal mainly with the Kozak wars for freedom and reflect in their inimitable clarity and poignancy of style all of the phases of that heroic age. In them we find many striking comparisons, allegories, synonyms, epitaphs, and symbolism. In them, too, the Kozaks are knights, strongly united, highly courageous, contemptuous of death, and gloriously free and equal.

The post-Kozak period left in its wake, aside from the many *kripaky* (serf) and *haydamaky* (peasant-revolutionary) songs, also many *chumaky* songs, which were based upon the adventures, both serious and humorous of the *chumaky*—those who traveled by caravan to the Crimea and the Don for salt. Among the most recent in the field of Ukrainian historical songs are those of the *Sichovi Striltsi* (Riflemen of the Sich—stronghold of the Kozaks), and deal with the Ukrainian war for independence at the close of World War I.

It is a striking fact that practically all of these songs are distinguished by a richness of motifs, perfection of form, depth of meaning, and high moral tone. In most of them can be found a fantastic dreaminess, and a glorification of the loftiest feelings of the human spirit. No wonder, then, that the Polish sociologist, Prof. F. Bujak, declared that the "folk culture of the Ukrainian is at present richer and better crystallized, than the Polish folk-culture," and that this "superiority is manifest in the lively folk songs, in which respect the Ukrainians are, along with the Serbs, the best endowed of the Slavic races."

"History has been cruel to the Ukrainians, crushing out their ancient liberties and glories," wrote the eminent Canadian scholar and poet, Prof. Watson Kirkconnell, "but the pent-up emotions of a thousand years, the passion of freedom, the poignancy of broken hearts, the tears of joy at the beauty of spring and love and at the nightingale's song — these have gushed forth in song that is worthy of living forever."

And, he might have added, it is this song that has greatly helped

to preserve the Ukrainian heritage and traditions when the Ukrainian literature had well nigh perished beneath the bludgeonings of Russian and Polish persecution.

### Written Literature

The Ukrainian written literature commences with the official introduction of Christianity into Ukraine (988), although a primitive form of writing did exist before that time, and was used, for example, in the various commercial treaties with the Greeks.

The Ancient Period produced a literature mainly of an ecclesiastical nature, with translations of Zolotoust, and others, and original works by Ilarion Smolyatich and Turiwsky, with but a scattering of works of a secular nature. All of it was written in the so-called Church Slavonic. Despite their general religious nature, most of these literary works had a great deal of native color in them, and with the passage of time there came into them an infiltration of the living tongue spoken among the people. But it was not until the beginning of the 19th century that Ukrainian literature appeared in the language spoken by the people.

Among the outstanding secular works of that ancient period worth citing are the famous Chronicles of Nestor, which aside from its value as a historical source opened new vistas in Ukrainian literature by showing unmistakable evidence of the growing strength of the popular tongue. Noteworthy, too, is the equally famous Song of the Armament of Ihor, the work of some unknown but highly gifted bard, which by reason of its native character and sheer poetic worth constitutes Ukraine's first real contribution to world literature; and, finally, the lesser known Galician-Volhynian Chronicles, written in the heroic style and with an abundance of expressions drawn from the popular language.

This most auspicious start, however, was brought to a standstill by the Tatar invasions, with the result that at the time when most of Western Europe was on the threshold of a great cultural renaissance, Ukraine, its bulwark against the acute Asiatic danger, passed through a period of intense spiritual darkness.

The middle Period of Ukrainian Literature, ushered in by the introduction of the printing press, the Reformation, and the religious union of Ukrainian Church with Rome (1596), was marked by the definite appearance of nationalist trends. The writers were no longer mainly of foreign but of native extraction, while their works began

to take on more life and vigor than previously, and came closer to the daily existence of the people. The popular speech, too, partly by its own vigor and partly because of the Reformation influences, steadily developed as the literary medium of the Ukrainian people.

This renaissance centered for awhile around the Volhynian town of Ostrih, whose Prince Constantine established the first Ukrainian Academy and the first Church Slavonic printing shop in Ukraine. From the former emerged some of the leading literary, ecclesiastic and political figures of that day, while from the latter was produced the famous Ostrih Bible (1580). Its general excellence caused the Muscovites to reprint it (1663) for their own use.

With the death of Constantine (1608), however, Lwiw in the West and Kiev in the East became the centers of the Ukrainian literary and cultural renaissance. From them, as well as from Ostrih, came a flood of polemical writings, a result of the religious struggle between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, which helped to improve the moral conditions of the Church and bring about an intellectual awakening of the people.

In 1619, Meletiy Smotritsky produced the best Church Slavonic grammar up to that time. For over two centuries it was considered as authoritative not only in Ukraine but in Muscovy as well. In 1627, Pamvo Berinda, the monk-philosopher of the Pecherska-Lavra Monastery, produced his "Lexicon of the Slav-Rusi Language," which was often reprinted and has historic value as the first attempt at a dictionary in the Ukrainian language.

Another outstanding personality of that period, Metropolitan Peter Mohyla (1597-1647), caused Kiev to regain a great deal of its ancient glory as the cultural center of Eastern Europe, by his pedagogic, literary and other cultural activities. He also founded a Ukrainian Academy, based on western standards, whose fame as the "law-giver of literary forms and tendencies" spread far abroad. At every step he strove to introduce Western European culture, and despite the limitations in his methods, this brought new conceptions into Ukrainian culture, especially through the many students that Mohyla sent abroad to study.

During this Middle Period, too, many valuable historical works were produced, even more in number than those of an ecclesiastic nature. This was a healthy sign of the growing national consciousness of the people. The two most worth mentioning here are: the "Kozak Chronicles," of which the best from the historical and literary view-

point are by Samilo Velichko (1728); and the "History of the Rus' People" by Gregory Poletika (1725-1784), which not only was successful in arousing national consciousness among the Ukrainians then but also lasted in popularity well into the middle of the 19th century.

Just as the First Period of Ukrainian Literature was brought to an abrupt and untimely end because of a foreign invasion, that of the Tatars, so likewise the Middle Period was brought to a similar end, but this time by the invasion of the Muscovites (Russians), following the Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654). The Muscovite penetration ravaged the Ukrainian nation far more severely than the sporadic incursions of the wild nomads, for its object was not merely to loot and burn, but to destroy the Ukrainian nation both physically and spiritually. The Ukrainian language, one of the chief pillars of the Ukrainian national consciousness, was the object of the most relentless persecution by the Russian tsars, with the result that the renaissance of Ukrainian literature was nipped in the bud. And it is precisely at this point that Russian culture received a great impetus to its hitherto sluggish growth as a result of the work of Ukrainian intellectuals who were forced to express their native talents and heritage through Russian mediums.<sup>3</sup>

This whole period of darkness of Ukrainian culture and national feeling is illuminated only by the rapidly rising development of the popular literature, and by the figure of the wandering Ukrainian philosopher Gregory Skovoroda (1722-1794), whose writings though numerous are nowhere near as important as the example of his own life, for by it he taught courage in the face of adversity, love of freedom, simplicity, and quiet dignity. This was the attitude of the Ukrainian people during this period of great oppression, denationalization, and ruin.

The Modern Period or the New Renaissance of Ukrainian Literature was launched with the appearance of Ivan Kotlyarevsky's travesty on the "Aeneid," (1798), which by its patriotic spirit and its use of the living tongue clearly pointed out the road for the Ukrainian writers to take. This entire period, with its changing aims and conceptions, can only be understood in the light of the social-political conditions throughout Ukraine then and now.

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<sup>3</sup> "Ukraine," wrote Prof. Alexander Bruckner, the Polish scholar, in his book on the Europeanization of Russia, "was the equivalent of a school for Russia," especially after the Treaty of Pereyaslav when many Ukrainian students of the western theology, medicine, and science migrated into Moskovy, and helped to Europeanize it.

Its earliest stage was characterized by sentimental feelings for the peasantry, with such representatives of it as G. Kvitka-Osnovnyanenko (1778-1843,) the father of the Ukrainian novel (such as "Marusia," tr. into French by P. Merimee and into English by T. R. Livesay), who according to the Russian Imperial Academy, "combined the characteristic traits of the Ukrainian soul, humor, and strength of feeling." P. Artemovsky-Hulak (1790-1866), was a keen satirist of social themes; E. Hrebinka (1818-1848) the finest writer of Ukrainian fables. This stage also produced the first Ukrainian Grammar (1818), by A. Pavlovsky, and collections of native folk songs by Tsertelev, Maksimovich, and Sreznevsky.

The second stage, the so-called "Romantic," — a reaction against the former pseudo-classical and dry forms, and characterized by strong national tones, — was ushered in by Taras Shevchenko's (1814-1861) "Kobzar," (1840), which immediately raised Ukrainian poetry to a term of equality with the best of European poetry and marked Shevchenko not only as the national prophet of his people but one of the great masters of world poetry. The latter fact, however, was generally overlooked by his contemporaries, who saw in his work only a mighty protest against the intolerable social and political conditions of that day.

To raise Ukrainian prose to a similar rank was the next step, and this task was begun quite successfully by P. Kulish (1819-1895), whose clarity, originality, and breadth of vision appears to a good advantage in his works, ranging from popular stories to the historical novel "Chorna Rada." His translation of Shakespeare is unsurpassed, while those of Byron, Goethe and Schiller are commendable. What Shevchenko did with his lyrics, Marko Vovchok (1834-1907) did with her "Popular Stories" a powerful protest against social oppression, which are characterized by such purity of language, perfect technique, and deep emotion, that she was called the Harriet Beecher Stowe of Ukraine.<sup>4</sup>

All this while, it must be borne in mind, numerous other writers were springing up and contributing their share to the new renaissance

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<sup>4</sup> About this time there arose in Polish literature and so-called "Ukrainian School," composed of writers who, attracted by Ukrainian life and nature, wrote on Ukrainian themes. Among them were three poets: B. Zaleski, A. Malczewski (whose "Marja" was translated into English by Dr. and Mrs. Coleman) and S. Gosczyński; while the prose writers were ably represented by M. Czajkowski. Similarly in Russian literature N. Gogol, M. Grabowsky, and Pushkin wrote on Ukrainian themes.

of Ukrainian literature, especially in the field of ethnographic and historical writings. Among the more outstanding of them were M. Kostomarov (1817-1865), historian and author of the "Book of Genesis of the Ukrainian People," and the guiding spirit of the Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood, which advocated democracy and certain social reforms; S. Rudansky (1834-1873), after Shevchenko one of the finest poets of Dnieper Ukraine; L. Hlibiv (1827-1893), another Hrebinka; A. Svidnitsky (1834-1871), a good novelist and poet; A. Storozhenko (1805-1847), a short story writer; A. Konisky (1836-1900), a good fiction writer and poet, and one of the founders of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

All these writers, however, were of the Eastern Ukraine. Galicia, under Austria, also underwent at this time a literary renaissance. It had its inception with the appearance of Markian Shashkevich (1811-1844), who did for his part of the country what Kotlyarevsky had done earlier for his; and used the living tongue for literary purposes and national rebirth. Shashkevich is also remembered for his labors towards bringing closer cooperation between the sundered parts of Ukraine.

A little later Bukovina produced the powerful figure of Osip Fedkovich (1834-1888), a fine lyricist intensely fond of his native land, whose role in Bukovina can be regarded in the same light as those of Kotlyarevsky and Shashkevich in their spheres. Among those who continued in his spirit were the Vorobkevich brothers.

It should be noted here, however, that by this time the Romantic Stage of the new Ukrainian renaissance was giving way to a more realistic and modern school of writers. And all this while, too, Russia was striving with might and main to destroy not only Ukraine's literary and national renaissance but even her language itself, a persecution which culminated in the notorious ukase of 1863 banning the printing of works in Ukrainian. Despite all such persecutions, the renaissance had advanced too far to be throttled.

Denied the right to write in Ukrainian in Russian Ukraine many of its writers emigrated to Galicia under Austria and elsewhere and there continued their labors. Among them was M. Drahomaniv (1841-1895) the foremost director of the Ukrainian rebirth of his time, a leading scholar and publicist.

Here in Galicia, was born the third stage of the modern Ukrainian literature. This was marked by strong Western European re-



alistic trends, and introduced by that most prolific writer who in poetry and influence on the Ukrainian national and literary rebirth is only second to Shevchenko,—Ivan Franko (1856-1916).

Franko—a man of the most varied and remarkable talents whose poems are among the finest in world literature—is the first Ukrainian writer to have embraced so successfully such a wide field of literary endeavors: epic and lyric poetry, novels, short stories, drama, translations, and science; the first to make such an intensive study of foreign literature as he did; and the first who was able to introduce into his works those basic ideals of Ukrainian nationalism and modernism for which he fought so unswervingly as an unsparing critic and leading public figure of his time. He was also the first to use city dwellers as the central characters in his stirring and beautiful lyrics, the emotional experiences of an intellectual; even though his stories of village life are among the best written in penetrativeness, style, and humor. In a word, his position in Ukrainian literature is that of modernism personified.

As a result of his influence, Ukrainian literature became invigorated and Europeanized to a very marked degree, producing such figures as; N. Kobrinska (1855-1920), capable writer and first organizer of Galician feminist movement; A. Chaykovsky (1857-1935), a writer mainly of popular historical novels; O. Makovey (1867-1925) short story writer with a keen sense of humor; V. Stefanik (1871-1936), the finest of Galician short story writers, who used the most modern literary technique to describe the tragedies of village life; his contemporary, L. Martovich (1871-1916), sharply satirical in his short stories; M. Cheremshina (1870-1927), who dwells in his stories mainly on Hutsul (mountaineer) life; M. Vorony (b. 1871) a true poet-aesthete, "art for art's sake"; V. Hnatiuk (1871-1926), leading ethnographer; B. Lepky (1872-1941) writer of novels revolving around the heroic exploits of the Kozaks, also a good poet of autumnal melancholia and the recollections of lost youth; and A. Oles (1878-1942) the foremost contemporary lyricist, who sings of the beauty of the Ukrainian nature and of the Ukrainian revival.

From Russian Ukraine emerged M. Kotsyubinsky<sup>5</sup> (1846-1913), the greatest of all Ukrainian novelists when it comes to the range of subjects treated, and a psychological analysis of various human types,

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<sup>5</sup> "He was one of those rare people who at your first meeting with them arouse in you a bliss of spiritual contentment . . . Humanity, beauty, people, Ukraine—these were the most favorite topics of Kotsyubinsky's conversations." (Maxim Gorky).

composition and style. A similar position in lyric and dramatic poetry is occupied by Lesya Ukrainka (1872-1913), who in a masterly and poignant style deals with such psychological questions as those of beauty, duty and sacrifice. Another woman, and a brilliant exponent of modern trends in literature, is Olga Kobilansky (b. 1862) of Bukovinian origin, who with her impressionistic and highly idealistic treatment of modern woman in her stories has won considerable fame for herself. Drahomaniv's sister, Olena Pchilka (1849-1930) is also worth mentioning here. A translator of Dante's "Divine Comedy" and a writer of works rich in content was V. Samiyenko (1864-1925). The father of the Ukrainian romantic novel, I. Nechuy-Levitsky (1837-1918), found two worthy successors in the person of P. Myrny (1849-1920) and B. Hrinchenko (1863-1910). The revolutionary period of Ukrainian literature at the turn of the century also produced in Eastern Ukraine the figure of V. Vinnichenko (b. 1880) the leading contemporary novelist, whose themes range from sex to studies of social contrasts and sharply etched characters. And finally there looms the mighty figure of Michael Hrushevsky (1866-1934), the founder of modern Ukrainian scholarship, one of Europe's outstanding historians, a writer on many cultural and scientific topics, organizer and a great political figure—who died a miserable death as a result of Soviet Russian persecution.

The war for Ukrainian independence a quarter of a century ago, although ill-fated, gave inspiration to Ukrainian literature for awhile, and produced a new crop of talented young writers. Among the most promising of them was Ulas Samchuk, novelist, who died recently. Once the Soviets obtained full control of Eastern Ukraine, however, the rising young writers found themselves unable to give full rein to their talents because the Soviets forced them to write on those themes and in that manner which was regarded as politically reliable by the authorities. Some of them refused, and soon met their end. The talented prose writer, Mikola Khvyloviy (1893-1913), because of persecution finally shot himself. Gregory Kosinka, a workingman who became a promising short story writer, was executed for patriotic activities in the purge of 1934. Mikola Voroney, poet, writer and critic, who hopefully returned from L'viv to Soviet Ukraine, soon found himself in Siberia. Those writers who adopted themselves to what was required of them by the Soviets survived, but their work of course never attained the summit of its potentialities. Among them can be mentioned Paul Tichyna (b. 1891), who started out brilliantly;

Maxim Rilsky (b. 1895), an accomplished stylist; also V. Polischuk, M. Zerov, P. Philipovich, O. Vishnya, H. Chuprinka, V. Pidhomylny, D. Zahul, T. Osmachka, Y. Savchenko, V. Soshura, G. Shkurupiy, M. Semenko, O. Slisarenko, V. Atameniuk, M. Yohansen, A. Dosvitny, and S. Wasilchenko. It is worth noting that in their works the workers, the machine and the factory have won pre-eminence as themes over the "counter-revolutionary village."

The recently concluded war disrupted literature of Ukraine as it did that of other lands, probably more so since Ukraine suffered the most from the war. As to its future, worth quoting here are the words of Prof. Clarence A. Manning in his excellent book on *Ukrainian Literature* (Harmon Printing House, Poughkeepsie, N. Y.). Wrote he: "Its (Ukrainian literature's) revival depends upon victory and the triumph of the human spirit over regimentation. When that moment comes, Ukrainian literature will take its next step and march hand in hand with the other great literatures of the world."

The spirit of Ukrainian literature today is that of its creators, of a people highly talented, active and strong, and yet prevented from giving full play to these qualities within them, because, as Voltaire once said, they "are still dragging the irons of subjugation."



**EDITOR OF THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY  
APPEALS FOR DISPLACED UKRAINIANS  
IN EUROPE**

June 16, 1945

**HARRY S. TRUMAN,**  
President of the United States  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

The author of this letter is a Western Ukrainian, and a former professor of the Greek Catholic Theological Academy in Lwow, and now the editor of the Ukrainian Quarterly. In both capacities, as a member of the Executive Committee of the International Catholic Organization, Pax Romana, and as leader of the Western Ukrainian Delegation, I came to this country in August, 1939, to attend the International Congress of the above-mentioned organization. The war and the occupation of Western Ukraine by the Reds prevented me from returning to my country. I decided to live in this free and hospitable country and expect to acquire the dignity of American citizenship within a short time.

The despairing cry of my Ukrainian brothers and sisters, which has reached me through letters, presses me to turn to you Mr. President, with an entreaty for aid for these unfortunates in the name of Christian love for your neighbor and in the fundamental justice of our civilization.

According to my information, a few hundred thousand displaced men, women, and children from both Western and Eastern (Soviet) Ukraine are living in German territory occupied by the American and British armies. They find themselves in want and above all are living in mortal fear as to their future. These people are opponents to Communistic dictatorship over Ukraine; therefore, they are ruthlessly hunted and persecuted by Soviet authorities.

I am convinced that the American nation, through its agencies, is doing all in its human power to alleviate the suffering of these and like people. However, I consider it my humane duty to turn your attention to the future of these people.

Judging from the letters which I have received, these people all agree that the most important problem of their existence is fear that

they might be handed over to the Soviet authorities against their will.

The extradition of these people into the hands of the Soviets would practically mean sending them to their execution or at least to a slow death in exile, in Siberia, at a slave labor.

The hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men, women, and children who have safely found themselves now under the protection of the Star Spangled Banner are the most devoted patriots of their country and the most active elements of the Ukrainian nation which has always sought freedom and democratic order. Now they are begging the American nation to assure their Sacred Law of Asylum.

These people are unable to communicate with you, Mr. President, and to explain their situation to you. Therefore, I, as their brother, in the name of humanity, beg you, Mr. President, to take them under your kind protection. I am certain that these people, after the war, will find a haven outside of Ukraine and will be worthy loyal citizens of that country which will give them shelter.

I believe, Mr. President, that you will not disregard their plea sent to you through my modest words.

Respectfully and sincerely yours,

NICHOLAS D. CZUBATYJ, Ph.D.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

In reply refer to WRB

July 19, 1945

My Dear Dr. Czubytyj:

I have received by reference from the White House your letter of June 16, 1945 concerning the present unhappy situation of certain persons of Ukrainian birth.

The Department welcomes the expression of your views in this matter and desires to assure you the persons in question will be accorded every appropriate consideration.

Sincerely yours,

MARSHALL M. VANCE

*Assistant to Adviser on Refugees  
and Displaced Persons*

Dr. Nicholas D. Czubytyj  
Editor of the Ukrainian Quarterly,  
Post Office Box 656,  
Mahwah, New Jersey

## BOOK REVIEWS

**THE YOGI AND THE COMMISSAR** and other essays, by Arthur Koestler. The Macmillan Company, New York 1945. 247 pp. \$2.75.

This collection of essays is divided into three parts. The first two, "Meanderings" and "Exhortations" contain material written for and previously published in American and British periodicals. While these two first parts contain essays of penetrating thought, yet their theme does not have bearing on subjects of direct interest to this magazine, and for this reason they will not be reviewed here, except to the extent that they have connection with the third part of the book "Explorations." This third part deals exclusively with matters pertaining to the Soviet Union, and is so revealing that this reviewer is tempted to suggest a change of its title from "Explorations" to "Exploitations leading to revelations."

Before an analysis of this part of the book dealing with the Soviets is made, it might be proper to make a short digression into the background and philosophy of its author. On the basis of over a half dozen excellent novels, written mostly on themes connected with the war Mr. Koestler is already assured of a place in world literature. This book of essays, however, lifts him into a higher niche, which in time may bring him close to Emerson. What makes Mr. Koestler most valuable and trustworthy as an analyst of the Soviet Union is his political and philosophical ideology, which is very much to the left, so much so in fact that in its championship of equality, human rights and unadulterated socialism it has to part company with the Soviet brand of socialism even more sharply than any rightist or nationalist ideology would do.

Mr. Koestler studies the Soviet system and its development out of an ideological curiosity. To him and many western European idealists there was a time when "Soviet myth and Russian reality were fairly congruent," when prophets of equality, the rights of man, and other ideals no longer had to visualize abstractly how the revolution of mankind might look; Russia was "it" and there all ideals were to be realized. Thus came to be a new religion among the idealists of western Europe. In Mr. Koestler's words: "Progress had recovered its lost religion: Soviet Russia became the new "Opium for the People." While to others, how-

ever, Russia and everything Soviet became a faith, Mr. Koestler continued studying developments there, mostly first hand by being on the spot when such events as the famine of Ukraine took place in 1932.

It is now apparent, thanks mostly to Mr. Koestler's revealing efforts to appraise the reason for the emergence of the so called "pink decade" of the 1930's. It was all a question of faith. Frenchmen believed in the necessity of the "popular front," they believed in the necessity of sabotaging their own war effort in 1934-1940 because Nazi-Soviet policy decreed it so, and in their faith they almost succeeded in committing suicide on a national scale.

Mr. Koestler's long association with leftist ideologies permits him to see more of the inside workings of the Soviets than those who come prejudiced would be able to see. Therefore his selection of a method of approach to Soviet reality seems to this reviewer to be a precept which should be accepted by all who wish to study the Soviet system and not to remain mere dupes of Russian propaganda. According to Mr. Koestler any inquiry into the workings of Soviet reality has to overcome a number of obstacles which surround and shut off the truth in concentric rings. There are, ranging in intensity and purpose, outer and inner rings to the sum total of six. It would well do to quote Mr. Koestler's maxim of rings here in full, so as to give students of Soviet affairs an opportunity to examine practical examples of their workability. The first ring, or outer defense consists of a propaganda barrage concentrated on any subject of Soviet reality which though not having any connection with socialist achievement, is made to appear to have. To quote Mr. Koestler:

1. The Soviet people and particularly the defenders of Stalingrad, defeated the Germans because they "knew what they were fighting for"; the Russian victories prove the excellence of the Stalinite system and give lie to its critics. If this kind of topical argument is found to be too superficial to withstand serious inquiry, the inner defenses come into action. They are:

2. *Camouflage or denial of facts* (which are sometimes later admitted) e.g. the famine of 1932-33.

3. *The doctrine of "esoteric" and "exoteric" truth.* Official statements which sound too fantastic to the Western mind are justified as being aimed at home consumption only, with a reference to the backwardness of the Russian masses. E.g.: Zinoviev was an agent of the British Intelligence Service.

4. *Distinction between socialist strategy and tactics.* All reactionary

measures of the Soviet regime are justified as "temporary expedients." E.g.: capital punishment for strikers.

5. *The End justifies the Means.* Means which are damnable if employed by a capitalist state, automatically become commendable if they serve the cause of the Soviet state. E.g.: The Stalin-Hitler pact.

6. *The doctrine of the unshaken foundations.* This is the last line of defense of the sophisticated apologist. It is also the tie which links dissenters—Trotskyites, Socialists, critical fellow-travellers—to the Soviet myth. Weaknesses, failures, even crimes of the Soviet bureaucracy are admitted but claimed to be mere surface symptoms which do not affect the fundamentally progressive nature of the Soviet Union, guaranteed by the nationalisation of the means of production and the abolition of the profit-motive. It is argued that as long as these foundations survive, Russia is still to be regarded as a socialist country and hence the special concern of the Left all over the world (pp. 131-132).

Mr. Koestler proceeds to examine closely all aspects of Soviet reality by first pushing his way through the defenses of any number of these rings, until he arrives at the truth. The results of Mr. Koestler's probings are revealing in all respects but some details concerning Ukraine are worth quoting here. E.g. p. 137, "I spent the winter of 1932-33 mainly in Kharkov, then capital of Ukraine . . . the peasants . . . were dying of starvation and typhoid, the number of deaths in Ukraine alone is estimated at about two millions." In discussing the rigorous provisions of the new divorce laws of 1944 Mr. Koestler makes an appropriately ironical remark: "the Soviet citizen's chance of secession from his spouse will be about equal to Ukraine's chance to declare her independence."

The general conclusions of Mr. Koestler's study of the Soviet Union are: economically the Soviet Union represents State Capitalism, which is not very different from the same kind of State Capitalism toward which Hitlerite Germany was rapidly moving; the socialist experiment in Russia went wrong and has been given up. In external politics Mr. Koestler justly considers the question "how far Stalin intends to go" as naive, because "the expansion of great empires follows certain dynamic laws," and this expansion has already reached a point where "the demarcation line between the Russian and Western zones of influence has already shifted from the Vistula to the Elbe; from the Black Sea to the Adriatic and Mediterranean, from east of Warsaw to west of Prague." With the revival of Pan Slavism as a political weapon employed by the Soviet Union or rather Russia in place of the Com-



munist International, with the reemployment of the Orthodox Church into the service of the state, there is no more reason to keep alive the illusion that the foundations of socialism have remained unshaken in Russia. Russia is an empire pure and simple with all imperialistic attributes and should be treated as such, something which does not of course preclude doing business with her as long as she does not directly endanger those who do business with her.

Just as Russia gobbled up Ukraine before, she is now in the process of gobbling up most of mid-eastern Europe: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia etc.etc., but this fact of imperialist growth will probably be not fully realized by the nations of the Western world until they feel the breath of the bear on their own necks. We can be thankful to Mr. Koestler for showing us what paths Russia has trod before and we can draw our conclusions as to what paths she is likely to tread in the future.

ROMAN OLESNICKI

**THE BIG THREE—THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, RUSSIA,**  
by David J. Dallin, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1945.

Once again Dr. Dallin, the competent Russian refugee analyst, marshalls his widely diversified knowledge and inexhaustible literary resourcefulness to produce this work as an additional contribution of his own toward the enlightenment of the American public on foreign issues. As in his several previous works, the qualitative substance of his treatment stands in sharp contrast to the shallow idealism, deliberate distortion, uninformed wishfulness, or/and misinformed nonsense that so unashamedly characterizes much of the recent literary output on international affairs. Yet, however, despite its numerous favorable points, this book, as those before it, suffers badly from the author's apparently circumscribed knowledge of the historical background of contemporary Russia.

With an easy effort exerted at maximum objectivity and serious, non-sugar-coated evaluation of the more than adequate crucial data he presents, Dr. Dallin arrives, on the basis of his well-developed analysis, at several significant ultimate *conclusions* on present-day international problems. These are as follows: (1) we are and shall be in a "period of armed peace"; (2) the Big Three can be only a wartime combination that will eventually dissolve as the ideological and diplomatic cleavages surge to the surface in this period of peaceless peace; (3) the United Nations organization as a logical result will be as weak as the League

of Nations was; (4) current Soviet expansionism in Europe, as the Napoleonic and Hitlerite previously, entails an internal dynamic to push farther which will be stopped only by World War III; and (5) autocracy in whatever form, namely Soviet "proletarianism," eventually of necessity leads to war. These ultimate conclusions are soundly based on his convincing combination of empirical historical evidence and cautious interpretations which produces his more immediate conclusions.

The three areas of conflict between the democracies and Soviet totalitarianism are (1) Europe, (2) the Middle East, and (3) the Far East. The United States, by virtue of World War II and its technologic and military prowess has emerged as the senior partner in the Anglo-American coalition, which Dr. Dallin demonstrates with abundant evidence. In the case of Europe, therefore, former British policy, based on the maxim that the strongest state of Europe is the chief enemy of Britain, will now become an American policy. The author's evidence and reasoning here are forcefully correct. Thus the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Dardanelles, and the principle of small nations become objects now of vital American interest.

Counteracting this are the objectives and aims of Soviet policy. Foremost among these is the sustained Soviet view of the inevitable conflict between capitalism and communism which really began in 1917. Second is the Soviet technique of implementing this "circuitously" through the principle of "intensive revolution" in foreign countries, viz., Poland etc., giving them the semblance of independent national governments but really responsible to Moscow. This convenient substitute for the Comintern couples exceptionally well for former routes of Tsarist expansionism with the Leninist-Stalinist views on "national revolution" in backward areas for the eventual world-wide "dictatorship of the proletariat." Here Dr. Dallin errs in viewing this as having been first applied in China in the 30's (p. 223). Actually, had his Russian education been liberal enough to equip him with a true understanding (which the Bolsheviks quickly acquired) of the historical and ethnographic differences between Russia and the Ukraine, he would properly view this deceptive technique as having been first applied in the Ukraine in 1919-21. For the Ukrainians, what is presently being executed in Poland, Bulgaria etc. is an old story of Communist opportunism which Lenin advocated then (p. 84). The third objective is naval expansionism linked with an outlet to the oceans. The author's disclosures of the naval mania in the Soviet and the communist-inspired

Greek EAM-ELAS aims are indeed illuminating, and show that the "peaceful prelude" to World War III has actually begun.

In the Middle East, the scramble for strategic positions on the part of the Big Three had begun even during the war, and the author's description concerning the "sore-spots" of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, etc. leaves little to be desired in appreciating the present conflict between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American coalition. With respect to the Far East, his disclosures of the connections between the Chinese Communists and Moscow and America's present position in this region place in clear perspective the motives underlying the recent Soviet-Chinking pact, another "circuitous" Soviet act not without precedent in this area (p. 221). Here too, then, the stage is set for eventual American-Soviet conflict, as previously between Tsarist Russia and Britain.

As a necessary climax to his well-balanced analysis, Dallin proceeds to debunk the various brands of "klyukva" being offered today to cast a rosy picture of past Russo-American relations. His survey of these relations shows concisely that "real organic relationship" between the United States and the Russian Empire commenced at the beginning of this century, previously only a common antagonism against Great Britain tended to bring the two together. Since then conditions have certainly changed. For, in the last 45 years, only 12 at the most can be regarded as good times in this Russo-American relationship. His evidence here is impregnable.

Though the main body of this work demonstrates objectively that no historical basis exists for any optimism in Soviet-American affairs, and this in itself renders the book uniquely valuable for a sober understanding of future developments, as against much of the emotionalized rot appearing in the literary market today, one of Dallin's recommendations for the solution of the European problem, which he feels is yet at present possible, suffers invalidity on the basis of his oft-repeated error mentioned above and his own reasoning as a consequence. As a healthy requisite condition for international peace he underwrites the necessity for the USSR to exclude historically and ethnographically alien peoples from its sphere of influence and to embrace only "the whole of three Russian nationalities—Great Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians," in addition, commenting in a footnote, that if political conditions were different in the USSR, the Ukrainians of Eastern Poland would overwhelmingly vote in a free ballot for Russia.

Now, first, Dr. Dallin would do well to overcome his educational handicap by acquainting himself with the ethnographic and historical differences between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, even at the fountain of unsuppressed Russian scholarship. As a matter of fact, by correcting these erroneous views and thereby eliminating this recurring deficiency in his works, he could enhance doubly the strength and effectiveness of his sincere accomplishments by simultaneously precluding the justified but undermining attacks of those who are aware of these basic differences, by dispelling this untrue but common notion in the interests of sound public enlightenment, especially here in the United States, and by completing his own analysis in a fuller historical perspective, as witness my criticism above concerning the application of intensive revolution earlier in the Ukraine. Secondly, his reference to "three main Russian nationalities," whatever that may mean, is obviously ambiguous and contradictory to the actual political composition of the USSR along national lines. And thirdly, concerning the fulfillment of his own reasoning, Dallin himself shows that Russian expansionism into Europe was accelerated by its forcible annexation of Finland and a large part of Poland (p. 277). In the full historical perspective, this train of thought could be carried out to its logical end by showing, as Dallin cannot due to his handicap, that these annexations in turn were enabled by Russian conquest of the Ukraine in the 18th century. Then, as he points out, Russia was pushed back during World War I, losing even part of Ukraine and White Ruthenia, only to push westward again in 1939-40 through Poland and Finland. Correct—but can he historically and interpretatively ignore the reconquest of the Ukraine by Russia in 1921 which really facilitated this latest aggression westward? Carrying out Dallin's reasoning in an uncircumscribed perspective, one is forced to the unavoidable conclusion that European peace is in the last analysis connected with the independence of the Ukraine, or, in other words, the dissolution of Russian hegemony there. After all, Germany's main objective in both wars was the Ukraine: also, Russian European expansionism in three centuries has been operating from this strategic Ukrainian base.

As Dallin rightly declares: "Real progress can be achieved only through abolition, down to the last vestige, of internal political suppression and subjection, of all forms of autocracy, in the soil of which warlike tendencies and lust to conquest are bound to ripen" (p. 284). This can only mean from his own analysis carried to its logical conclusion the destruction of Russian communist despotism, the true liberation of basic

Ukraine, Poland, etc., and the moral leadership of the United States toward the free balloting of all nationals as to their chosen governments (which Dr. Dallin could hardly deny as a real test even for the Ukrainians both in Galicia and eastern Ukraine), the federalization of these free peoples in Europe and possibly elsewhere, and the heavy disarmament of all nations even by means of "atomic pressure" while it is still solely available to us, which of course would mean the sudden collapse of the Bolshevik stratocracy, based as it is on the Red Army, the expanding Red Navy, the NKVD etc. World peace can then become durable.

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THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, by Johannes Steel, published by Henry Holt and Company, New York, N. Y., 1945. 256 pages.

"The Future of Europe" is a very ably written synopsis of the multifarious and complex European problems of today. The author's task is as complicated as an involved income tax return, yet his theme unfolds itself before our eyes in a kaleidoscopic array of facts and date, marshalled on the horizon of the contemporary political history as far as the limited sight of our vision of the future solution of these problems permits, in the manner of a telenews presentation of the graphic March of Time. For it is an up-to-date book which has more to do with the dynamic present than with the bankrupt distant past. Yes, it is the present and the immediate past that occupy the author's alert mind sharpened by a keen observation of, and a clear insight into, history on the march. His estimates, however, of the future of Europe are offered with diffidence, as he puts it, and all his information is the fruit of insatiable curiosity. Coupled with a good style and a clear perspective, the result of his literary effort is a compendium of the current European political history which goes a long way to meet the requirements of a good reference work on the subject.

There is nothing "psychic" or highly speculative in this inquiry into the future of Europe, because Mr. Steel assumes that only by understanding the facts of the past and present will we be able to draw conclusions about the future. So he deals with the concrete problems of modern Europe against the cosmopolitan background of world politics and diplomacy.

The book contains eleven chapters, three of them devoted to Germany, the last to the role of churches. It is, however, a conspicuous fact that Russia should be excluded from Mr. Steel's treatise perhaps because "it is partially in Europe but certainly not of Europe." Yet Russia has perhaps more to do now with the shaping of destiny of the future of Europe than any other nation in the world. The omission, therefore, is highly regrettable. England is likewise excluded from the general scheme of this book, in which mostly figure: Poland, the Balkans, the Baltic states, Finland, Czechoslovakia; Germany and France, or the nations whose future is not so certain as compared with the neutral states.

It is worth noting, in passing, that the book under consideration was published shortly before the termination of war, and consequently some of the problems discussed therein have been settled, notably the occupation and partition of Germany, the delineation of Poland's boundaries, and many other such items which remained obscure before the Yalta, San Francisco, and Potsdam conferences.

The book deals with the political, social and economic aspects of the future of Europe. Naturally, racial and geographic problems have also been taken in consideration.

Mr. Steel maintains that the question of markets and raw materials has received too much emphasis. It remains even today the chief preoccupation of many politicians and economists, in spite of the fact that much has happened during the last few years to change the whole concept of economics and world politics. The fact is that we are now living at the beginning of a new industrial and scientific epoch. Magazines and newspapers have recently been carrying accounts of a vast number of new products and new techniques. At the same time, raw material, as they become simpler and more basic, will by that very token be more universally available, and the struggle for control of them that much the less obsessing.

New technological discoveries, atomic energy, transmission of power by radio, plastics, synthetic rubber, and the general scientific progress will help in solving many besetting economic problems. Technical and scientific advances will take care of most of them. Therefore the countries whose political and economic importance was in the past based upon the possession of such raw materials as oil, iron, cotton, or coal will lose influence and significance in the new world of economy. There will be cheap synthetic substitutes

and plastics to make less economically rich countries independent of the previous monopolistic states.

It remains to be seen whether some of the questions, however, raised in Mr. Steel's book receive true or workable solutions. He says that "On February 1, 1944, the Kremlin granted autonomy to the constituent Soviet republics. That step made a deep impression on the peoples of Poland, Hungary, and Rumania in particular, and the peoples of Europe in general. It immediately accelerated the process of polarization around Russia by providing machinery for the closest possible relations between such sections of the Soviet Union as the White Russian and Ukrainian republics on the one hand, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria on the other. It held the same potentiality for the Baltic republics in their relations with the Scandinavian nations.

"Some European nations reacted unfavorably to the new Soviet blueprint, but all were impressed by the unusual fact that the world was confronted by a tangible act of policy. This act of policy helped the rest of Europe to make a choice of the direction in which its members wanted to go in their increasing polarization around Russia and England."

This "autonomy," it seems, which is supposed to provide "machinery for the closest possible relations between the Soviet Union and the White Russian and Ukrainian republics" appears to be a little "too close" for comfort; for we had recently an occasion to see this "tangible act of policy" in operation in the settlement of the eastern Polish frontier and Carpatho-Ukraine as well. As in 1939, so in 1945 the eastern Polish territories were annexed by Soviet Ukraine, but the "autonomous" Ukrainian republic had nothing to do with the determining of the boundary line or with the signing of the Polish-Ukrainian treaty, for the whole transaction was executed by Molotov himself. Ukraine, according to the Soviet constitution, has the right to her own foreign representation, she has a commissar for foreign affairs, but when it comes to signing pacts regarding her own boundaries, the constitution does not apply to her newly-won rights. It does not, therefore, seem likely that the constituent Soviet "autonomous" republics have much to say regarding the matters concerning them.

It is true, however, that "the process of polarization around Russia" has been greatly accelerated, but that was due chiefly to the Russian forces of occupation. We can see now that that acceleration

would have "polarized" those nations much faster in favor of Soviet Russia had not the "free election" in Poland, Bulgaria, etc., been postponed indefinitely on demand and by the direct interference of the western democracies, England and the United States. These are tangible facts that cannot be denied. Of course, at the time of writing his book, Mr. Steel could not have possibly foreseen the outcome of "free elections" in occupied Europe.

The Ukrainian problem is only indirectly touched upon by Mr. Steel. As stated above, there is no chapter on Russia which comprises the Soviet Ukraine, but it is discussed at some length in the chapter on Poland.

This chapter begins with an arbitrary statement made. ("Poland is the key to Europe," by Napoleon.) It is, however, "the key" to Europe in the geographical rather than the political sense of the word. It describes the precarious Polish situation between the two World Wars, explaining that the "Jagiellian" idea had a particular influence on Joseph Pilsudski, who considered himself a successor to the old Polish kings. So he was imperialistic and bent on conquest, but his Kiev campaign proved disastrous to the Poles. Nevertheless, the Polish leaders never gave up their hope for a "Great Power policy." This policy finally led to a mutual non-aggression treaty with Hitler's Germany. Under cover of the German-Polish pact, Poland could force Lithuania to accept the incorporation of Wilno into the Polish state and she could steal a part of Czechoslovakia.

But the Polish leaders saw that Poland could not maintain its independence against both Germany and Russia, therefore Victor Rosing proposed the disintegration of the Soviet Union. "Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Latvian, Georgian and Caucasian nations must return to an independent life."

In order to keep Germany and Russia apart, the Polish politicians conceived a plan of "balance," a sort of the revived "cordon sanitaire", comprising the nations between the Baltic and the Black seas, under Polish leadership. Obviously this policy was directed against Russia. But this bloc of predominantly agricultural states would be equally powerless against either of its great neighbors, so they would still have to choose between Germany and the Soviet Union.

The Polish "Great Power policy" plan is called adventurous and Utopian by the author.

The Polish trend toward the West was essentially defensive,



toward the East traditionally expansive, involving imperialist expansion and merciless oppression of the Ukrainian and White Russian peasants. As Mackiewicz put it: "In the East, we have never been a nation of peasants or mining workers; but of masters."

The Polish anti-Soviet policy in this war is illustrated in the following paragraph:

"A close watch was kept on all Poles suspected of 'Soviet sympathies,' anti-Semitism was rife, and there was discrimination against soldiers of Ukrainian or Byelos-Russian nationality. The latter were told that in the future there would be no Ukraine or Byelo-Russia, and that they must fight only for Poland."

The question of Polish-Russian boundaries is the most controversial problem in Polish politics. The controversy really concerns the Ukrainians more than it does the Russians, for the disputed territory is mostly and predominantly inhabited by the Ukrainians, Mr. Steel writes: "Even according to official Polish statistics, the territories incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic had a Ukrainian majority before the Second World War; of 7,280,000 inhabitants in 1931, 56.7 per cent were Ukrainians and 32.5 per cent Polish." (Polish Ministry of Information, Concise Statistical Year-Book of Poland, September 1939—June 1941, London, 1942).

The above statement refers to the partition of Poland in 1939 and the incorporation of the Ukrainian inhabitants into the Soviet Ukraine. A similar transaction took place in 1945 when the Curzon line was again recognized as the basis of the disputed boundary settlement.

Mr. Steel writes that "Under Soviet occupation in 1939 and 1940, radical land reforms took place in the Western Ukraine and White Russia. The property of the great landlords was confiscated and repartitioned among the Ukrainian and White Russian peasants, who gained 1,800,000 acres of land. The average peasant family received more than 10 acres, and 33,000 agricultural workers became landowners for the first time."

So far so good, but the trouble with the Soviet land distribution is that one year they give the peasants extra land, and the next year they take it all back including the original holdings, and turning them into state collective farms, which means that finally the farmer has a lot less than before, for he loses everything.

"The Russian riddle is a mystery wrapped in an engima." How true it is when it comes to land "reforms" and other such benevolent

acts. Lest we forget the Russian "Danaid gifts" of land "grants," let us remember that about 13 years ago the Russians starved a few million Ukrainians by a forced famine, trying to force the Ukrainian peasants into submission, when they resisted the confiscation of their land collective farms. Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes. It might as well be said, "Time Russos."

A gift of free land would only be valid, if the peasants were allowed to keep that land without having it later taken away from them with compound interest including all their previous holdings.

In conclusion, Mr. Steel's "The Future of Europe" is a very good refresher on the study of contemporary political science, and as such, despite a slight tendency to accept the Soviet point of view, it is highly recommended to the readers.

Detroit, Mich.

*Dr. T. Lazare.*

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"THE PATTERN OF SOVIET POWER" by Edgar Snow, Random House, New York, 1945. 219 pp. \$2.75.

There are, it seems, two ways of writing books about the Soviet Union these days. One is to try and find out the truth behind the smokescreen of Soviet propaganda, control and censorship and unveil before the world whatever of the truth one has found; the second is to write so as to please the Kremlin, the Soviet censors, get your copy out of Russia and never mind how much truth there is in that copy, as the average American reader will never get to Russia to check on it. The first way of writing on Russia was Mr. White's "Report", Mr. Koestler's "The Yogi and the Commissar" and perhaps two or three other authors'. Mr. Snow's latest volume, which consists of reports previously published in the "Saturday Evening Post" over a period of a few months, does not seem to belong in that first category. This reviewer did not come across one word of criticism of anything Soviet throughout the length of the book, which seems to indicate that the author is either following the "party line" very closely and of his own volition, or else has fallen victim to Soviet propaganda. For, preparing the articles for publication in book form, Mr. Snow no longer had to keep one eye on the Soviet censor, but could have added some opinion, observations or criticism of his own, which unfortunately he failed to do. No argument is made against figures published by Mr. Snow, as these can easily be checked, and the same figures are

given out by the Soviet bureaus to all comers. For this reason the Ukrainian Quarterly took as proved Mr. Snow's report on Ukraine's damage in this war (Vol. I No. 2). Outside of figures, however, the material contained in Mr. Snow's volume does not seem able to convince anyone, except possibly the author and his publishers.

New York, N. Y.

*Roman Olesnicki.*

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**CANADA AND THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM**, by the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, Premier of Canada, 1944, *Duel, Sloan, and Pearce*, New York, 326 pages.

This is a book of speeches delivered by the Premier of Canada from September, 1941, to June, 1944. But it is not an ordinary book of speeches. The speeches are of vital importance to both Canadians and Americans, as some of the subjects treated concern not only Canada, but also the United States. Premier King's speeches are neither pedantic nor biased. They treat the vital Canadian and American subjects from the practical point of view.

Premier King is the leading Canadian statesman. His father, John King, was a lawyer and a lecturer in Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. After graduating with honours in Political Science from Toronto University, Mackenzie King continued his studies at Chicago and Harvard Universities. He made a special study of labour conditions. His education was rounded up in Europe. He has been connected with the federal parliament of Canada since 1908. He was elected to the Canadian House of Commons for the first time in 1908, at the age of thirty four. When Sir Wilfred Laurier died in 1919 Mr. King was chosen leader of the Liberal Party. Two years later the Liberals were returned to power. Since then they have been out of power only from 1930 to 1935. It was under Mackenzie King's premiership that Canada became a full-fledged nation of the British Empire. Since 1931 Canada has been a self-governing nation, with full autonomy. Its connection with Britain is only through the Governor-General who represents the king, but is appointed on the recommendation of the Canadian government.

In 1938 President Roosevelt assured Canada of America's support in case of attack. By the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1941 the United States and Canada set up the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. In other words, Canada, under Mr. King's leadership, always gladly cooperated with its nearest neighbor, the United States. That is why Mr.

King's book of speeches is also of great interest to the American readers.

The Prime Minister of Britain, Winston Churchill, had this to say to the British Parliament in 1944 of Premier King: "He has brought Canada to the greatest development of her power. It is extraordinary to think what Canada has done in this war. The unending crash of events . . . makes us incapable of appreciating a tithe of what is going on, what has been going on in Canada, under its government headed by one who has been twenty-five years the leader of a party and eighteen years Prime Minister of the Dominion."

Mr. King has won not only the hearts of his own people, but also of the British and of the Americans. His practical, just, and adroit approach to every phase of life has endeared him also to the Canadians of Ukrainian birth. To his call to arms during the last war over 35,000 Ukrainian volunteers stepped forth. Ukrainian boys fought in defense of their Canadian home on land, on sea, and in the air. They fought well and bravely, for they were sure that they were fighting in defense of the right cause, thinking that by their participation in the war they would also help their European kinsmen in Ukraine to attain more rights and autonomy.

HONORE EWACH

Winnipeg, Man.

## UKRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND BRITISH PERIODICALS

"Judgment"—*The Nineteenth Century and After*, London, August, 1945.

The matter of Ukrainian national independence recently served as one of the basic issues before the High Court of Justice, King's Bench Division, London, July 12, 1945, with Justice Birket presiding, in the libel case of the editor of the *Nineteenth Century* magazine, Frederick A. Voigt, as plaintiff, against Cedric Belfrage, journalist, the *New Chronicle*, as well as the *Daily News* in London, as defendants.

As reported in the above entitled article, Voigt charged Belfrage with libeling his magazine by comparing its contents with the Nazi propaganda of "Lord Haw Haw," and by quoting in the *Chronicle* the Minister of Information Brendon Bracken's statement in Parliament that the magazine is "Lord Haw Haw's favorite paper." A further charge was the distortion by Belfrage in the *Chronicle* and *News* of an article by Voigt in the *Nineteenth Century* of August 3, 1942.

When Hitler was marching on Ukraine, Voigt wrote then that there would be "probable rising by the Ukrainians and Georgians, who have suffered under the Moscovite despotism." This statement Belfrage distorted to suit his Sovietophile views in the matter of Ukrainian independence. He wrote that—

"Hitler went to war with Russia not only because he wanted peace—his peace—with her, but also because he wanted an alliance with her, or rather, with the Federation that will emerge from the ruins of the Soviet Union if he has his way. He is determined to bring Russia into the Pax Germanica—usually known as the 'New Order.' It will, if he is victorious in the field, be easy to restore Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as independent states. Whether he will be able to establish an independent Ukrainian State is, for him, the all important question. If he cannot, then he cannot achieve final victory, no matter how completely he may be victorious in the field. If he can, he will be master of Russia. It will be not enough to set up a Puppet Government at Kieff. He cannot succeed in the Ukraine if the Government he establishes has little support amongst the population. Some support

it would certainly have, for the Ukrainians have suffered much at the hands of Muscovite despotism. It is reliably computed that 5,000,000 of them perished in the famine ten years ago (even the statistical ingenuity of the Webbs cannot reduce this figure to less than one million). Unlike other Russian famines this famine was not the result of draught, but of Stalin's agrarian reform—it was the instrument which the Central Government used to break any attempt to resist 'the collectivisation' of farms. Ukrainian nationalism has never quite died out. But the Ukrainians also have a strong sense of Russian nationalism, which the famine impaired but did not kill. The younger generation and most of the men who have served in the armed forces during the last ten years are Russian first and Ukrainian second. Hitler's chances of political success in the Ukraine depend on the ability of Ukrainian, as distinct from Russian, national sentiment to provide a sufficient, solid foundation for an independent state. The German must occupy Georgia also, not only because they need the oil, but also because its a base from which they can develop a most formidable threat to vital British interests in the Middle East."

After quoting this from the *New Chronicle*, the presiding judge declared that, "Again it is said that there is a partial but misleading statement of facts, and if the true facts had been stated quite different conclusions would have arisen in the minds of the readers." A better defense of the Ukrainian cause can hardly be expected than this statement by the judge.

Belfrage's reference to the alleged intent of Hitler to establish an independent Ukrainian state has no basis at all, for Hitler never had it. From the very outset he schemed to make Ukraine a mere colony of Germany. Plans for this were drawn up well in advance of the war. Also, there was considerable discussion then on the "mistake" Kaiser's Germany had made in allowing an independent Ukrainian state to rise at the close of the last war. This "mistake," argued the Nazis, must never be repeated.

Belfrage's allusion to the Russian patriotism of the Ukrainians is difficult to understand when one considers that the chief opposition to Russian rule has been from the Ukrainians.

In one respect, Belfrage is correct. That is when he states that without allowing the creation of an independent Ukraine, even his field victories would have been of little avail. By regarding Ukraine as a potential Reich colony Hitler antagonized the Ukrainians to the extent that led to his debacle there.

"Arming Against Russia," by Norman Thomas. *The Annales*, September, 1945.

The entire issue of this periodical is devoted to the question of compulsory military training in this country. Although opposed to armaments and war, Thomas sees sense in America arming herself on account of the danger from the Russians. The latter, he says, make very little effort to conceal their plans in opposition to capitalistic America, while the system they are setting up in Eastern Europe is, in Thomas' view, a distinct threat to world peace. Therefore, although he is opposed in principle to compulsory military training, yet on account of the foregoing Thomas can see considerable justification for it. America can have peace for some years yet, he says, but what then? The best solution would be immediate and complete disarmament for all. Russia, however, will never agree to this as long as it keeps millions of non-Russians in virtual slavery.

"The Russian Translation Project of the American Council of Learned Societies." *The Russian Review*, Vol. 4, No. 2.

Here the author describes this project supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, aimed at giving the American reading public the best possible translations of leading Russian literary works. Apparently in reply to those who wonder why the project is being limited to Russian works only, Mr. Huntington explains that the term "Russian" in this connection should be regarded in the political, i. e. "Soviet," and not linguistic sense. Accordingly one may expect that some Ukrainian works will also be included in the proposed translations. That is as it should be, for then the Americans will be able to see the USSR and its various peoples in the true perspective. How differently, for example, would Anglo-Saxon scholars look upon East European history if they were to become acquainted even with Hrushevsky's historical schema booklet on "Zvichayna schema 'Ruskoyi istoriyi' i prava ratsionalnoho ukladu istoriyi skhidnoho slovianstva," vol. 1 of the collection of papers on Slavonic studies, St. Petersburg, 1904.

"The Jews in a Changing World," by Louis Boudin. *Ort Economic Review*, August, 1944, published by ORT.

For a magazine published by a long established institution of a high humanitarian character, i. e. the improvement of the lot of the Jewish poor throughout the world, it is rather strange that in the

above titled article, written by the journal's editor himself, there appear certain slurs upon the Ukrainian people who through their own national sufferings have more than an ordinary sympathy for the plight of the Jews. Recounting the sufferings of the Jews down through the centuries, Mr. Boudin sees fit to recall the massacres of the Jews in Ukraine during the revolutionary period of Hetman Khmelnitsky, 1648, the Haydamaki peasant revolts of 1768, and finally he also cast the onus of blame for the pogroms at the close the first World War upon the generalissimo of the Ukrainian National Army, Simon Petlura, who was assassinated in Paris in 1926 by the Bolshevik agent, Schwartzbard.

Petlura has too long and too well been cleared of any blame in this connection, and by some prominent Jews themselves, to make necessary any defense of him here. As for the massacres during the Kozak and Haydamaki times, we venture to suggest that references to them should tell more than half the story. They should be complete and tell what led to such tragic events. The fact remains that in those days the Jews acted as agents and overseers of the wealthy Polish landlords and abused the peasants very much. Ukraine under Polish rule then was, in the words of some old Latin verses, "Coelum Nobilitorium, Paradisus Judeorum, Et Infernum Rusticorum" (heaven for the nobility, paradise for the Jews, and hell for the peasant.) Jewish historians themselves admit this. To this day, for example, the Ukrainians sing an Easter folk song from that period expressing the gladness of the peasant over the fact that Zelman, a Jewish tavern-keeper, was coming to the village church. Why? Simply because he was coming to open the church, which he had padlocked and refused to open until heavy tribute was paid him. This was quite common then and but one of the many abuses of the peasants by such overseers, tavernkeepers, money-lenders, and the like. Therefore in recalling the massacres one should also recall the reasons behind them.

Today when despite the collapse of Nazism, anti-Semitism is still sweeping Europe, it is worth noting that Ukrainians are obtaining special credit for their friendliness to Jews from Jews themselves, such as Stefan Szende, who in his book "The Promise Hitler Kept" (1945, Roy Publishing Co., New York), tells how Ukrainian peasants and priests protected the Jews from Nazi persecution and death even at the risk of their own lives.

Outside America the largest number of Jews is concentrated in Ukraine, where they have dwelt from the earliest of times. It is, there-



fore, to the mutual advantage of both peoples that the Ukrainians and the Jews live in common tolerance and understanding.

"Lwow," by Dr. S. Wolf. *The Contemporary Review*, August, 1945, London.

"Lwow, L-w-o-w, is the right spelling of the name of that ancient city. It is pronounced Lvoov, the Latin name in Leopolis, the German Lemberg; and it means the City of Lions."

With this explanation Dr. Wolf begins his article of Lviw, capital of Western Ukraine, founded over seven hundred years ago by the Ukrainian King Daniel, monarch of Galicia and Volodimiria, and not as Dr. Wolf erroneously dubs him, "Duke of Kiev."

Though Lviw is the center of territory with a population predominantly Ukrainian, the author gives only its Latin, Polish and German name, but not Ukrainian.

The origin of Lviw's name is not at all obscure. It is not named after any lions, which Lviw never saw, except perhaps at the circus. The name is derived from King Daniel's eldest son, Lev, after whom the city was named by his father, who founded the city as a bastion against the Tartar invasions. He then named it "Lev-Horod," that is "Lev-burg," which in Latin during that time was called "Leoburg."

The city lies in the Western Ukrainian province of Galicia. For some reason the author associates the origin of the name "Galicia" with the annexation by Austria of Galicia together with Lviw. That is wrong. The name is old, extending back to the 12th century, when it was known as Halich-land after its capital then, Halich. Already then Latin sources were calling it Galicia, Latin equivalent of Halichyna, which is the way it has always been called by Ukrainians.

"The historic name of all of the southern part of Poland—with Lwow as its dominant city, is Malopolska," the author claims, contrary to fact that even when Galicia was part of the Polish kingdom it was always called Red Ruthenia (Chervona Rus) and not Malopolska. Another error the author makes is in saying that for its defense against the nomadic horde invasions Lviw became known as the Polish "antemurale Christianitatis." Actually that accolade was given to the Western Ukrainians rulers, Andrew and Lev II by Pope John XX in 1323 for their unflinching struggle with the Tartars.

It is true that Lviw became an important cultural center for the Poles. It should be borne in mind, however, that at the same time Lviw has been the spiritual center of the Western Ukrainians and the

very incarnation of their centuries-old independence movement.

Reading such articles as "Lwow" one cannot help but wonder whether Polish interests, in respect to their demands upon the Soviets for Western Ukrainian lands, are well served.

'Russia Sunset or Dawn,' by Nina Toumanova. *America*, July 14, 1945.

The authoress here draws some interesting comparisons of the many sided Russian national character. Thus, Stalinist terrorism and bloody liquidation of all opposition is contrasted by her with the brotherly love and idealism of such Russians as Soloviev, Chadaev, Leontiev and others. Similarly, narrow chauvinism, as represented by the "Soyuz Ruskoho Narodu", and, on the other hand, Russian messianism to save all humanity; or the backwardness of the Russian masses during Tsarist times and the high intellectual level of the upper strata of society.

On the whole it is difficult for an outsider to solve the enigma of Russian nature. Generally speaking, however, it can be safely assumed that the idealists and the great intellects are not the rule among the Russians; on the whole the Russian masses are prone to slavish obedience and subservience to the knout, intolerant of views different from theirs,—good material to go into the making of a totalitarian state.

The authoress falls into the error of seeing Russia everywhere she looks, whether it be on the shores of the White Sea or the Black Sea. Ukraine apparently does not exist for her as a national entity.

"Russian Nationalism Under the Soviets," by N. S. Timashew.

*Thought*, Fordham University Quarterly, September 1, 1945.

Prof. Timashew is an unquestioned authority in the matter of the ideological background of Soviet Russia, and his current article has a wealth of information. During the first post-revolutionary years, he points out, conceptions of the fatherland, tradition, patriotism were regarded as counter-revolutionary, well-nigh punishable, for the official Bolshevik doctrine was based on internationalism and classlessness. After 1934, however, a change took place, and there began to develop a Russian nationalism which was more extreme than ever before. Today every method is used to cultivate it, including the press and motion pictures. Treason to one's country is now a

crime, whereas formerly only treason to the proletariat was regarded as such. The cult of the old Muscovian rulers, as well as to the later-day tsars, creators of the Russian empire, is being revived. During the recent war Russian nationalism as the official Soviet ideology became so clearly defined that a Russian writer, Fedeaev, was able to write that "Russia has obviously proved to be a more solid ground than Communist Utopia."

Perhaps the most arresting conclusion drawn by the author is that "the Soviet Union and the great Russian country appear as interchangeable terms." If such is the case, there appears no room for national existence of the non-Russian peoples, notably the Ukrainians. For them Alexander Nevsky, Dimitriy Donsky, Minin, or Prince Pozharski are but foreigners, while Peter I and Catherine II are enemies. No wonder then that between the Russians and the Ukrainians there is a constant and irreconcilable conflict.

The reversion to Russian nationalism in 1934 — it is worth noting — coincides with the beginning of the planned obliteration by Moscow of all national and cultural gains the Ukrainians had made till then, accompanied by the terrible famine (1933), the shooting of such Ukrainian poets as Vlyzko and Falkivsky, the suicide of the writer Kvyloviy, and the suicide of the Commissar of Education of Ukraine, Mikola Skripnik, an old Bolshevik but a nationally conscious Ukrainian nonetheless.

"Poland and Russia in the Past and Future," by Manfred Kridl,  
*Journal of Central European Affairs*, July, 1945.

This article has its basis in the already—old Soviet-Polish frontier dispute, about which there has been plenty of comment from all sources during the past three years. The weakness of the Polish position in this dispute has always been that the Poles, despite all their artful methods and juggling with statistics, cannot get away from the basic fact that despite some 600 years of Polish rule over it the Western Ukrainian territory involved in the dispute remains to this day historically and ethnically Ukrainian. Moreover, national consciousness among the Western Ukrainians is so high that Polish domination there is impossible without constant struggle with them.

This reality has been better realized by the Russians. Although Russia, like Poland, has not the slightest intention to allow the Ukrainians to rule themselves, still realizing the true situation it has cleverly set up the fiction about the "freeing of Ukrainians and White

Russians," not so much by herself as by Ukraine and White Russia; ergo, the hitherto sundered parts of Ukraine and White Ruthenia have at last been reunited with their motherland. Against the Polish position of complete denial of the real status of Western Ukraine, the Russian fictions have proved to be superior in the dispute.

Therefore although Prof. Kridl takes a more realistic attitude toward the situation than the Poles have done thus far, he is already too late to do much good, for the border dispute has been "settled," particularly since the present Warsaw government has renounced in the name of Poland any pretensions toward Western Ukraine and White Ruthenia.

Although the author is really the first of the Poles to "discover" Ukrainians in Western Ukraine, together with their aspirations and their opposition to both Polish and Russian rule, nevertheless he has not the courage of drawing the proper conclusions from it all. The solution of the Ukrainian problem in form of a united and independent Ukraine, he considers as impossible. Actually it is just as possible as it would be to retake Western Ukraine from the Soviets. A prerequisite to this, of course, would be the complete decline of the present Russian power, which could only happen as a result of another war or some internal cataclysm.

Although the article is replete with historical inaccuracies, still there are not at all as many of them as there are in the works of his predecessors writing on this subject.