


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# THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

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VOL. IV—NUMBER 2

SYNOPTIC MAP OF **UKRAINE**



UPPER RIGHT: PREWAR TERRITORY IN REDS      LOWER RIGHT: ENLARGEMENT OF UKRAINE AFTER THE WORLD WAR

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## EUROPEAN FEDERATION AND UKRAINE

*Editorial*

**W**HETHER or not Europe has ended its traditional role of leading the peoples of the world which it maintained through two thousand years of history, with either America or Soviet Russia taking over the leadership, is a question to be decided within the next few years. In any event, we are living through a very important and decisive period of mankind's history. If Europe is able to survive the present crisis, it is safe to predict that Britain will continue to be a lead-in power in that part of the globe. On the other hand, should Europe be overrun by the barbarous Eurasian forces of Soviet Russia, the historic role of Albion will have come to a dramatic end.

Winston Churchill, prototype of a Victorian Britain, took it upon himself to uphold Europe's leading role and at the same time to protect Great Britain's standing as one of the present Big Three. There is no doubt that Winston Churchill, as one of the greatest living statesmen of his country and one of the most outstanding representatives of Europe's cultural community, strongly believes in the vitality and resourcefulness of the old continent; for many generations to come Europe could still be a reservoir of spiritual activity, philosophy, science and literature. Better than anyone else, he realizes that once Europe goes down, our civilization is automatically placed in grave danger. It is difficult to say whether Churchill's solicitude for Europe is dictated by British patriotism or by his belief in the civilizing mission of Europe. Nevertheless, Churchill seems to be totally convinced that the salvation of all Europe lies in a federation of its free peoples.

The first concrete step toward the realization of Churchill's plan was the congress of European peoples held in Hague on May 7, 1948. Prominent statesmen and politicians of all Western and Central European nations took part in the conclave. Some countries from behind the iron curtain were also represented, but unfortunately no representatives were present from those countries which form a component part of Soviet Russia and which also are striving for national liberation.

Winston Churchill's part in the conference was that of leader, and his elaborately prepared speech became the program of the histori-

cally important meeting. The future federation of Europe, as envisioned by Churchill, would be the embodiment of democratic order with a charter which would guarantee the rights of nations as well as those of the individual.

Although this program was clearly opposed to the existent order in Soviet Russia, neither the Congress nor the oratory of Winston Churchill expressed any anti-Soviet attitude. On the contrary, it seems that the organizer of the congress saw as possible a federated Europe existing alongside the anti-democratic and totalitarian regime of Soviet Russia. The Congress of Hague itself, it also appears, had no intention of initiating a crusade against totalitarianism—it wanted instead to recognize the Soviet Union in its present political orbit. At the same time, however, it strove for the establishment of a European Union which would be strong enough to resist further expansion by Soviet Russia.

### Federated Europe and the Kremlin

Yet Winston Churchill has shown himself to be more of a realistic British statesman than a crusader for the salvation of Europe. According to his plan a European Union would become a power second in importance on the continent, replacing pre-war Germany, which was both undesirable and dangerous to Britain. Mr. Churchill's allusions to the "Grand Design" of Henry the IV of France and his minister, Sully, at the beginning of the 17th century aiming at the coalition of Western Europe against the Turks, indicates Churchill's desire that France lead this new federation on the European continent. In such a case, Great Britain would continue to play its traditional role of arbiter between the European Union and Eurasian Russia. In another instance, Winston Churchill indicated his view that the future world would be divided into four spheres: the American continent (without Canada) under the leadership of the United States, the Soviet Union, a federated Europe, and the British Commonwealth of Nations, which through Britain would be closely allied with the European Union.

The conciliatory attitude of Winston Churchill and the entire Hague Congress toward Russia, however, is one of the weakest aspects of the European Union. No one actually believes that a federated Europe, based on a democratic order, alongside the totalitarian Soviet Union is possible in view of Russia's known aims of world conquest for communism and the destruction of the 2,000 year-old Christian

civilization of Western Europe. If the Marshall Plan, aiming at the economic rehabilitation of Europe, evoked such sabre rattling in Moscow, how then would Russia tolerate the existence of a united political federation on her western peripheries? It is safe to assume that the Kremlin will vigorously combat such a European Union with both open and subversive methods.

Another weakness of the Churchillian Plan for the European Union lies in the fact the former Prime Minister does not take into consideration the revolutionary dynamics of present-day Russia, a generator and carrier of a new anti-Christian and anti-European civilization. Churchill's appeasement toward Russia, which characterized all his diplomatic moves at Teheran and Yalta, clearly evident from his published memoirs, flavors his plan for a European Union.

In his opening speech at Hague, Churchill expressed some high-sounding phrases such as democracy, charter of human rights, belief in the superiority of European culture, etc. Yet he lacked the zeal of a foe of barbarism, a barbarism which today has its breeding ground in the Kremlin and which plots the total destruction of the very same European civilization which Churchill purportedly wants to save. In the last analysis, no European Union is possible until the disintegration of the Soviet Empire becomes a political reality.

Furthermore, Churchill already placates Soviet Russia by leaving in her enslavement millions of non-Russian peoples who for centuries have been part of the European community—among them the people of Ukraine, White Ruthenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and others.

### Where are the Eastern Boundaries of Europe?

Once we talk about a political federation of Europe it is important to know what constitutes Europe and where its geographic boundaries are in the East. The problem of the political boundaries of Europe as a political and civilization's entity even today is a moot question of historical science. Yet one thing is certain—these boundaries are much too far to the west of the Ural Mountains, an accepted geographical line dividing Europe and Asia. In the Middle Ages, when the present European civilization was beginning to take root, the Don River and the upper Dnieper River were considered the Eastern boundaries of Europe. It was this territory which was impregnated with all the cultural movements of Western Europe: the crusades, the Magdeburg Law,

humanism, the Reformation, baroque and the culture of the French Enlightenment. Today these boundaries embrace Ukraine, White Ruthenia and Baltic states. East of this cultural divide lies Muscovy or Russia proper and its vast areas extending deep into Asia. The line marked by the Don River and the Upper Dnieper was a political frontier of the Old Ukrainian state, Rus, which was always considered a part of western European *Communitas Christiana*.

For three centuries Kievan Rus-Ukraine shielded the rest of Europe against the onslaughts of the barbaric tribes from Asia. When this barrier of Kievan Rus was finally broken by the invading Mongols in the middle of the 13th century, Ukraine and White Ruthenia, despite the fact that they were under Tartar tutelage, continuously sought assistance and protection from Western Europe. Muscovy, however, reconciled itself quickly to the Tartar yoke and adopted many of the autocratic principles of the Mongol rulers.

Ukraine adopted the Christian civilization of Byzantium and Ukrainized it according to the intellectual pattern of its people. Even after the disruption of relations between Constantinople and Rome Ukraine remained a country where the influence of the West was permanently rooted.

This is the reason why the old culture of Ukraine was so strikingly similar to that of the West with its high moral standards, its chivalry, respect for the individual and an unquenchable desire for liberty. Their traits, common to the spiritual life of old Ukraine, especially in its literature, were entirely different from those found in Muscovy.

Every cultural movement in Ukraine was analagous to the trends in the West. Humanism, the Reformation and the anti-Reformation became the source of the national cultural regeneration in Ukraine in the 16th and 17th centuries. The Renaissance and the baroque influence penetrated to the eastern sections of Ukraine as far as Kharkiv while the culture of the French renaissance reached as far as Eastern Ukraine beyond the Dnieper River. Likewise, contemporary Ukrainian culture continually seeks inspiration in the creative culture of western Europe.

Thus the eastern boundary of cultural and political Europe even today lies on the Don River which is the eastern frontier of Ukraine. Therefore, only with the dismemberment of the present Soviet empire



could the projected European Union extend to its proper easternmost boundaries. Undoubtedly, without Ukraine, White Ruthenia and the Baltic states, a federated Europe would not be complete and to that extent incapacitated in resisting further pressure by totalitarian Russia. Then, too, Russia, deprived of Ukraine and its great natural resources and access to the Black Sea, would be considerably weakened in her westward encroachments. It is only logical to infer that in any federation of European states, Ukraine and other non-Russian countries from eastern Europe should be included if such a federation is to have a reasonable chance for survival.



## POLISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS TODAY

*Editorial*

**S**OME observers who had the opportunity of watching the Second Convention of the Polish-American Congress in Philadelphia over the Decoration Day weekend undoubtedly drew some very unfavorable impressions concerning the political thinking of the Polish leaders. History, it seems, has taught them nothing. As in the past, American Poles once again manifested their devotion to Poland and solicited support from the American people for the liberation of their native land.

Some thirty years ago, an equally important number of Poles had met together and in their zeal and devotion to what they regarded as their first duty so impressed President Woodrow Wilson that at the close of World War I he included, in his now famous Fourteen Points, a clause advocating the restoration of a democratic state of Poland.

However, the newly created Poland, largely supported by the American Poles, committed an unpardonable crime by attacking its neighbors, who, like Poland itself, after the fall of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires, had sought freedom and independence.

It is already a matter of history how American Poles deceived the government and people of the United States by claiming that all help provided was being used against the Russian Bolsheviks. Whereas the true fact is that whatever aid the Poles obtained from the Allies in 1919 was directed against the Ukrainians. It is with a sense of reproach that we mention the contribution made by American Poles to the unspeakable misery of the Ukrainian people and to the fall of their democratic and independent republic.

We are more than certain that the fate of Eastern Europe could have been much different had the American Poles acted more wisely and with a sense of historical responsibility. Instead of being guided by sentiments of justice, humanity and international solidarity directed toward universal peace, they had apparently allowed themselves to fall under the spell of chauvinistic blindness. As a result the new Poland, created on the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, embarked upon the conquest of Western Ukrainian territory. This attack was timed with the onslaughts of the Russian Bolsheviks who invaded the Ukrainian Republic from the north and east.

### **No Changes Have Occurred**

We have no intention of re-examining at this time the tragic background of Ukrainian-Polish relations. Nor do we wish to add in any measure to the acuteness of the ill-fated and regrettable strife that has for centuries divided the peoples of Poland and Ukraine. On the contrary, as Americans, imbued with the principles of tolerance and genuine freedom, we wish to help in removing the underlying causes that tear the two nations apart.

What are the relations between the Poles and Ukrainians today? Have they improved since the fatal days of 1939? We think not.

Today Germany is gone, and communist, totalitarian Russia has taken not only Ukraine and Poland but has moved farther to the West to points merely dreamed of by the former Russian Tsars.

It would seem time that the Poles should come down to earth and realize once and for all that no one, be it the Germans, Russians or Poles, can indefinitely play the dangerous game of power politics and remain unpunished.

One would logically expect that after the severe blows suffered by the people of Poland, its leaders would have more political wisdom and diplomatic astuteness in dealing with its neighbors. But whoever hoped so was bitterly disillusioned by what occurred at the Polish-American Congress in Philadelphia.

We think that this gathering was an important event. Not only American Poles voiced their views regarding the restoration of Poland, but also the Poles from Europe, Canada and South America attending the congress, thus giving it their unqualified support.

The congress unanimously declared itself for a "big Poland," which would surpass the Poland created by Woodrow Wilson. Concretely, American Poles appealed to the United Nations, asking for the restoration of the pre-1939 Eastern border, which would again include the Ukrainian, White Ruthenian and Lithuanian territories. At the same time, they asked for the approval of the present boundary of Poland up to the Neisse-Oder Rivers. This German territory, it is recalled, was presented by Stalin to his Polish puppets in Warsaw.

In Poland, where any talk for the restoration of the Ukrainian territories is tabu, all claims of nationalistic Poles have centered on the German territory. Even the Catholic Church of Poland, which has been silent up to now on the matter of non-Polish territories, finally came out in support of the annexation of one-fourth of ethnic German territory.

### American Ukrainians Warn Poles

On the eve of the Polish gathering in Philadelphia the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America addressed a letter to the chairman of the convention, urging the Polish-American Congress to repudiate any imperialistic designs by Poland upon the Western Ukrainian territory. The appeal read in part:

We make these observations with a deep sense of our Christian solidarity as well as with concern for America's national interest. We are convinced that continued support by American Poles of anti-democratic and expansionist policies with regard to the Ukrainian people and their ethnographic territory is not only incompatible with pronounced policies of the United States, but is directed against the welfare of Poland itself... We trust that the Polish-American Congress will voice its unqualified loyalty to the principles of American freedom and democracy. It will do so, if in its resolutions, should such be planned, the Congress repudiates any imperialistic designs with regard to Ukraine. On the contrary, it will, we hope, express itself fully and unequivocally as supporting the establishment of a free and democratic Poland and of a free and democratic Ukraine, as equal and independent states.

Amid nationalist clamor and ultra-patriotic frenzy American Poles went on record again as favoring the annexation of non-Polish lands. Not only did they endorse the Soviet engineered conquest of vast German territory—a move in complete contradiction to the official policy of this country—but they also reached for the lands of the Ukrainians, White Ruthenians and Lithuanians which they once ruled with the iron hand of conquerors, also in complete contradiction to the 2nd point of the Atlantic Charter. The shocking events which took place on these territories during the World War II provided sufficient proof of the fact that the population concerned is clearly against Polish domination over these territories.

Today, when the entire European continent, and alas, the whole world, is threatened by the aggressive, anti-Christian forces of communist Soviet Russia, the Poles guided by shortsighted, selfish chauvinism, are playing the role of little conquerors. Meanwhile, Russia is doing its utmost to divide the West and thus split any possible opposition to her aggressive plans. The Poles, it appears, are breaking the anti-communist solidarity of all European people by pursuing an imperialistic folly of their own. It is no longer a secret that, because of this perilous nationalism, the Poles have no real friends among their nearest neighbors. There was a time when they succeeded in convincing a part of the world about the righteousness of their cause. But today, it appears, this task would be much more difficult, if successful at all.

## NOT "DISPLACED PERSONS"—BUT REFUGEES

By DAVID MARTIN

*Secretary, Refugees Defense Committee*

ONE of the most tragic aftermaths of the war which was fought and won in the name of the Atlantic Charter is the plight of the mass of more than 1,000,000 refugees who, behind the barbed wire of their camps, are hanging on desperately to their shattered lives in the hope that some day the democratic world will take notice of them, that some day the democratic world will understand.

The democratic world, it is to be regretted, has displayed an incredible slowness to understand, indeed, it is only now that it is beginning to evince some visible symptoms of understanding. In part its lack of understanding was due to the general ignorance concerning Soviet communism that was prevalent at the end of the war; in part it was due to the fantastic infiltration of communists and fellow-travelers in every sector of the British-American administrative apparatus; to a degree it must be attributed to the bureaucratic mentality which regarded the refugees with hostility because the problem was admittedly a headache. But in a surprising measure it was due to the tyranny of semantics.

Of all the misbegotten definitions that have ever distorted the real meaning of things, the term "displaced person" is certainly one of the most grievous. Far from defining the true nature of the refugee problem in Europe, it so completely obscured its significance that it rendered it infinitely more difficult of solution.

Properly speaking, a "displaced person" is someone who, in consequence of the vicissitudes of war, finds himself at a distance from his homeland when hostilities cease. The obvious solution in such a case—a solution implicit in the term itself—is to terminate the condition of displacement by returning the person to his place of origin. For the hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Belgians and Scandinavians who had been removed to Germany as prisoners of war or as slave laborers, the term "displaced person" was unquestionably appropriate; there was nothing they desired more than to return to their homelands and their loved ones. But for the millions of Ukrainians, Russians, Poles, Balts and Yugoslavs who found themselves in Germany when hostilities ended, the term was a complete misnomer; in their

case there was nothing they dreaded more than repatriation to the clutches of the communist secret police. They were not "displaced persons"—they were *refugees from communist persecution*. Had they been called by this name from the beginning, the democratic world might not have displayed the same stubborn inability to understand their problem or to offer a solution.

It would have helped the democratic world to realize that the problem of the refugees is an integral part of the larger struggle against Soviet totalitarianism. For the simple fact is that if it were not for totalitarianism, there would be no refugees. Men do not flee from democratic countries, no matter how much they may disagree with the politics of the government in power. But men are compelled to flee for their lives from the lands beyond the Iron Curtain because there the penalty for political dissension is Siberia, the firing-squad, or the MVD torture-chamber.

This is an elemental fact. It is amazing how many men who should have known better seemed completely ignorant of this elemental fact. When, for example, a group of DP's in a Yugoslav Camp in North Africa told Fiorello LaGuardia (then director-General of UNRRA) that they could not return home because they did not agree with communism, LaGuardia replied tartly: "That's no reason for refusing repatriation. I've disagreed with the government in my country for more than 20 years now—but you don't see me running away from America on that account."

The policy of the democratic powers *vis-a-vis* the refugees can properly be divided into three phases. The first phase was that of forced repatriations *en masse*; in the second phase repatriation was accomplished by pressures and inducements; in the final phase, upon which we have recently entered, the democracies have begun to display a measure of comprehension and a measure of willingness to find a humane solution.

### The Period of Forced Repatriation

The phase of forced repatriations lasted roughly for the first six months after the cessation of hostilities. Under the terms of the Yalta agreement Great Britain and the United States had obligated themselves to return all Soviet prisoners of war found in their part of Germany and all Soviet nationals discovered in German uniform—in return for which the Soviets had obligated themselves to return all Britons and Americans picked up by their armed forces. All of this sounds

like a fair exchange on paper. But in signing the treaty the democratic representatives overlooked the fact that the Red Army had officially declared that any Soviet soldier who surrendered would be regarded as a deserter—i.e., shot; and they displayed no understanding of the fact that the majority of the Soviet citizens who had donned a German uniform had done so partly in consequence of a blind—but basically justifiable—hatred for Soviet tyranny, partly in consequence of varying periods of starvation in the sub-human POW camps the Germans maintained for Slav prisoners.

The British and American authorities, it is to be regretted, carried out the terms of their agreement almost to the letter. Even the slave laborers, whose repatriation under the Yalta agreement was supposed to have been on a voluntary basis, were shoved aboard box-cars without too many formalities and sent back to the arms of the MVD. Decent British and American officers who took part in these "voluntary repatriations" have told heart-rending stories of how men committed suicide before they could be put aboard the trains, and of the terror in the eyes of those who did not have the strength to commit suicide.

Of all the refugee groups in Europe during this period, the Ukrainians were by far the largest and in many respects the most representative. How many there were when hostilities ceased no one knows; estimates range from a minimum of 2,000,000 to a maximum of 5,000,000. They had their origin in every land in Europe where there were Ukrainians: they came from the Soviet Ukraine, the Polish Ukraine, the Carpatho-Ukraine and Bessarabia and Bukovina in Roumania. Among them were Red Army soldiers who had been taken prisoner, there were slave-laborers, there were refugees from the time of the first Russian revolution, there were men who had been conscripted for service with the German Army—and finally there were the hundreds of thousands who had fled westward in 1944 to escape the return of Bolshevik tyranny. Many of these latter, it is true, had fled alongside the retreating German Army. But what alternative had they after the massacres perpetrated by the Soviets in Lviw, Tarnopol, Odessa, Kiev and many other cities at the time of their first retreat in 1941?

The treatment and disposition of the Ukrainian refugees was characteristic of the treatment meted out to the general mass of the refugees from the East. During the first months of peace, when Allied policy in the field was making a mockery of the officially declared policy of voluntary repatriation, the Ukrainians, too, were rounded up and returned wholesale: so that from several million in September

1945, the number of Ukrainian refugees dwindled within a year to somewhat over 200,000.

### The Second Phase: Operation Carrot

Although there were instances of forced repatriation as late as May, 1947, on the whole this policy had come to an end by mid-1946. The phase which succeeded it can perhaps most properly be described as "repatriation by pressure and inducement." Whereas the forced repatriations of the initial phase had been the work of harassed military bureaucrats who looked upon the presence of so many millions of displaced persons as an impossible administrative problem, the repatriations of the second phase, though less brutal in manner, were far more sinister in motivation. To a very large extent the pressures that were brought to bear on the refugees during this period were the work of the many fellow-travellers and crypto-fellow-travellers who had infiltrated the UNRRA administration.

The pressures employed by UNRRA to break the resistance of the displaced persons and induce their repatriation can be subdivided under several headings.

1. There were repeated screenings, the brutality of which resulted in a number of mass petitions from the displaced persons, and which in certain camps deprived over 40% of the personnel of their DP status and cast them out upon a hostile German world. General Sir Frederick Morgan, who retired as UNRRA Director for Eastern Europe, had this to say about the screening methods employed by UNRRA (*The Times*, London, Feb. 15, 1947): "So many of these displaced persons have already been reduced to a state of mind verging on despair by years of screening that has, in the main, as its objects, the elaboration of excuses for withdrawing assistance not only from those manifestly unworthy of it, but also, regrettably, from many of those who are thoroughly genuine victims of circumstances brought about by others than themselves."

2. There were mandatory transfers of personnel from camp to camp, frequently carried out in the dead of winter, and under conditions sadly reminiscent of the manner in which the Nazis treated human beings. While UNRRA always denied that these transfers had anything to do with repatriation pressures, the U. S. Army was somewhat more honest in its appraisal. We quote from an analysis of the first UNRRA repatriation drive (October 1 to December 31, 1946), which appeared in the monthly report of the U. S. Military Government for



February 1947: "An evaluation of this drive indicates that the 60 day ration offer was not the primary inducement, but rather that decisions to return were more directly related to news from home, persuasive propaganda, and mass psychology. The mandatory uprootings of many groups, necessitated by the consolidation of centers, also induced repatriation."

3. Schools were closed, school books were withdrawn, vocational training courses and cultural activities were curtailed or discontinued.

4. Miniature totalitarian regimes were established in the camps. Refugee papers critical of the governments in their homelands were suppressed. Those who were considered "anti-repatriation elements" were segregated—and this in most cases meant the segregation of the intellectual elite of the community, and in this way making organized community life impossible. The author has heard that at one point the military authorities confiscated an entire edition of 5,000 copies of George Orwell's *Animal Farm* which had been translated and printed by a group of enterprising Ukrainian DP's.

At the same time, propaganda put out by the countries within the Soviet sphere was distributed with official UNRRA approval, Soviet films were shown, meetings were organized for Soviet liaison officers and their satellites.

"We have long been aware," said Mr. Elliot Shirk, formerly American Zone Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, "of forces at work in our camps inimical to the human and legal rights of the displaced persons. Lately these forces have been weighted so heavily in favor of the USSR that freedom of speech is disappearing and active fear replacing it."

5. Finally, the UNRRA officials attempted to bribe the refugees into accepting repatriation by offering them 60 days rations as an inducement. In UNRRA's operations book, the project was officially described as Operation Carrot."

• • •

The entire pattern was somewhat too consistent to have been accidental. Such policies could have been laid down only by men who accepted the Soviet viewpoint. And the fact is that there were men in UNRRA, right up to the very top echelons, who *did* accept the Soviet viewpoint. Mr. Paul B. Edwards, UNRRA Director for the American Zone was quoted by the *Stars and Stripes* (May 15, 1947) as saying the following: "We agree with the Russians. We support their claims. These anti-repatriation groups are not the product of democratic

processes but are rather the remnants of pre-war regimes that reflect Nazi and fascist concepts."

It speaks volumes for the character of the refugees and for their hatred of Soviet communism that despite all the pressures that were brought to bear on them, the final UNRRA repatriation drive which lasted from April to June 1947 was a complete failure.

### Phase No. 3: The IRO

The collapse of the final UNRRA repatriation drive, the changes that were made at the top when the Provisional Committee of the IRO took over from UNRRA and the fact that the Soviet Union and its satellites are not participating in IRO have combined to produce a much more tolerant policy towards the long-abused refugees. There have been occasional delinquencies, it is true, but on the whole the new administration has wisely accepted the fact that those who remain in the camps today constitute a hard core of irreparable refugees for whom the only solution is immigration and resettlement.

But it is a long step from accepting this viewpoint to finding governments that are willing to assist in the program of large-scale resettlement that must be worked out if there is to be any solution of the refugee problem. Of all the countries, Great Britain has unquestionably done the most; to date it has accepted and found work for more than 100,000 Polish, Ukrainian, Baltic and Yugoslav refugees. On a pro-rata basis, the Canadian Government would rank second to the British; the 30,000 refugees for whose entry it has already made provision would be equivalent, in population terms, to the admission of over 400,000 into the United States. But the American Congress, in whose power it lies to provide an example which would lead to the early liquidation of the entire problem, has thus far debated and tarried, and tarried and debated.

As these lines are being written, however, it seems reasonably certain that the present session of Congress before it adjourns will pass legislation providing for the entry of 200,000 European refugees over a period of two years. If this legislation should be passed, other governments will unquestionably follow suit. After three years of being forgotten, the refugees are about to be remembered by the democratic world.

## THE FORMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE

By VADYM SHCHERBAKIVSKY

**F**ROM time immemorial the Ukrainian people have been a settled and agricultural race. Settled and agricultural peoples used to be in their social structure and mentality quite different from nomadic races. These hardly ever change the structure and mentality of their original tribe in spite of the changing surroundings of the places which they inhabit; they live endogamously, i. e., marry within their own restricted circle; and thus, by not allowing marriages with foreigners, they find it easier to preserve their racial characteristics, their marriage, customs, etc.

Agricultural peoples live a settled life on the same patch of earth which they abandon only with great reluctance under some inexorable compulsion. We must therefore look into the history of their territories and into the mixture of races inhabiting them to understand fully any particular people.

The Ukrainian people have occupied their territory since time immemorial; and in order to understand their structure and mentality, we must of needs examine the past of their territory. The recorded history of this embraces only 2,500 years. The history of the preceding times has to be sought within the earth itself, and it is partly revealed by archaeological excavations.

These show that the territory of Ukraine in the Paleolithic (Old Stone) Age was thickly settled by the hunters of mammoths and other gigantic animals. The remains of the material civilization that have been uncovered, are similar, both in form and content, to the cultural remains of the Western European population of the same period. Hence we can deduce that both racially and spiritually the populations of Ukraine and of the entire Europe were similar.

If we admit that the Paleolithic population of the whole of Europe represented the ancestors of the Indo-Europeans who then possessed some kind of pre-Indo-European language, perhaps it would not be too great an error to admit that, together with some differences in art, there were likewise differences in speech. The population of Central and Western Europe belonged to the group of tribes which spoke the *Centum*<sup>1</sup> language, while the population of Eastern Europe spoke

<sup>1</sup> This is because the word for hundred is *centum* as in Latin. In the Semitic languages, the word has an "s-c" as in Ukrainian *sto*.

languages which belonged to the *satam* group. Excavations made in the U.S.S.R. during the last twenty years have afforded much new material for the understanding of the Paleolithic culture of Eastern Europe and of Western Siberia. They permit us to assume that the first pre-Indo-Europeans had their cradle not around the Himalayas, but in diluvial Europe, including Western Siberia.

### Neolithic Age

In the next period of human life, the so called Neolithic Age, which is known in the archaeology of Ukraine as far back as the third millenium B. C., several different cultures, brought to Ukraine by new peoples, become quite apparent. The most important of the cultures brought by those newcomers was the culture of painted pottery which, apparently, came to Ukraine from two directions. From the south, the Aegean cultural area left hundreds of already discovered settlements in the basins of the Dniester, of the middle and lower Dnieper, and of the southern Buh. The second culture came from the Mesopotamian circle of civilization, and has left rich and splendid specimens in the graves and mounds of its princes in the basin of the Kuban, and traces on the lower Don, and it reached the Dnieper, and even crossed it. Thus near the village of Tripilya there have been found painted pottery of the so-called "frame-work" style, and near by the bones of a camel, an animal which was not native to Ukraine, but belonged to the trans-Caucasian region. This is the so-called *Tripilyan Culture*.

Both peoples producing the painted pottery were agricultural, lived in conformity with the then prevailing high agricultural civilization, had good houses, and knew a technically fine and well developed art of ceramics decorated mostly with spiral ornamentation. In the remains of their houses there have been found grains of wheat, barley and other cereals. The people that came from the Aegean region were long-headed (anthropometrically), and buried their dead (inhumation); and the people that came from the Mesopotamian cultural circle were round-headed and burned their dead (cremation). Since the round-headed agricultural population of the Mesopotamian region had a matriarchal social system, we have therefore full right to think that the Ukrainian round-headed agricultural population likewise had a matriarchal system. This is to be emphasized, because other tribes, about which we shall speak further on, certainly were not matriarchal, but patriarchal. This fact is important for the under-

standing of the entire ensuing formation of the Ukrainian people, as well as for the understanding of the difference between the psychic structures of the Ukrainian people and of the neighboring Russian people who, contrary to the Marxist-Stalinist theory in the U.S.S.R., were never under a matriarchate, but always were subjected to the patriarchal system.

The Tripilla people, coming from beyond the Caucasus, became the first colonists in Ukraine and they brought with them new breeds of domestic animals, as for example—the sheep and the goat, they tamed the bull—*tur*, used oxen, and perhaps domesticated the pig. Obviously all these peasant comforts made it possible for this population to increase rapidly and to populate thickly both the prairies and the wooded steppes, and even to move as far north as the forests of the present-day Kiev region and of the southern part of Volhynia.

Besides the Paleolithic ancestors of the Indo-Europeans and the inhabitants of the Tripilla culture, towards the end of the Neolithic Age two more races from the north moved into the territory of Ukraine.

### The Tribes of the "Battle Axes"

One of these races was known as the people of the "battle axes" and of the "corded ware." It lived formerly in Thuringia, and later a part moved eastward. The characteristic feature of the culture of this people in Thuringia was its battle axes fashioned out of stone with a hole bored through them for the purpose of inserting a wooden handle. Another feature was the corded ware, i. e. pottery decorated by the impressions of a cord before the baking of the clay. This population increased quite rapidly. It probably lived by fishing, and hunting; we find their remains in Volhynia and farther south between the Dniester and the Dnieper. The tribes of the "battle axes" increased likewise in the north-east, and we come across of them in the whole of Muscovy where they are known under the name of the Fatyanov culture. These tribes buried their dead in a bent position, in quite a deep grave, and then heaped up a mound over it and surrounded it with stones from 4 to 12 metres in diameter. The skeletons are often covered with red ochre; and beside them we find ornaments of bone and of copper and, at times, of silver, as well as battle axes. This people is also interesting because it apparently crossed the Caucasus into Asia Minor where it established the Hittite and the Mittanean states. Since according to the researches of the Czech scholar Hrozny, the Hittite tongue was a language of the *centum* Indo-European group, we may

safely conclude that these martial tribes in Ukraine likewise belonged to the *centum* group.

### Megalithic Culture

Towards the end of the Neolithic period, another race from the north entered Ukraine and settled in Volhynia. It brought the so-called Megalithic culture in the last stages of that development, which we can trace in northern Germany and Scandinavia. The skeletons in the chest (box) graves of this people reveal them as long-headed and belonging to the Nordic type. Having taken firm root in Volhynia, and leading an agricultural life, they increased to such an extent that they moved further southward and, along the shores of the Dnieper, reached the rapids of that river, and even beyond, and settled far and wide in that area. In the later stages they likewise employed cremation, but still buried the ashes in stone boxes. At the beginning of the Bronze Age there are settlements in which the three cultures exist simultaneously and merge, namely: the Megalithic culture, the culture of the "battle axe," and the culture of the painted pottery. Of course, the three tribes effected here a certain symbiosis. At the same time, such mixed settlements probably developed a mixed language which perhaps became the initial pre-Slavic speech.

### The Bronze Age

The Bronze Age is the least known period in Ukraine. But we can gather some details of it from the facts given us in the fifth century B.C. by the Greek writers, especially Herodotus. The peoples whom he enumerates as living to the north of Greece, in the Balkans, in Ukraine and further north, had already passed through the Bronze Age, and were in the Iron Age.

The greatest and most powerful people were the Thracians who were composed of many tribes which Herodotus enumerates by name. The Thracians did not like agriculture and lived by various means; among others, by preying on their neighbors, as is done even now by the present nomads. Next in importance were the Cimmerians. From the very vague geographic description of Herodotus, we may guess that the Thracians lived to the west of the Dnieper, and the Cimmerians to the east of it.

In the beginning of the Bronze Age there began to press from the east, from beyond the Urals, the Mongoloid races, and from the far

north—the Finns. The basin of the upper Volga in times of Herodotus was densely populated by the eastern Finns, also known as the Ural tribes, among which Herodotus mentions the tribe of the Melan-khlens.

### **The Greek Colonization in Southern Ukraine**

Before the Scythians invaded and settled Ukraine from the lower Danube to the Don (VIth century B. C.) life to the north of the Black Sea was stabilized to such an extent that Herodotus was able to write about the peaceful Hyperboreans, as he called the general mass of all the agricultural tribes living north of the Black Sea. These even enjoyed cultural relations with the Greeks, since every autumn they sent a delegation to Greece with festal wreaths of wheat as a religious gift to the goddess Demeter on the island of Delos. With the coming of the Scythians to the shores of the Black Sea, these Hyperboreans were cut off from the Greeks, and Herodotus speaks of the Scythians who had already driven the Cimmerians from the steppes and destroyed the pre-Slavic Thracian tribes of the Black Sea coast. Herodotus did not sympathize with the Scythians who were far more predatory and rapacious race than the Thracians, and for that reason hindered the peaceful development of the Greek Ionian colonization on the northern coast of the Black Sea as well as the active trade in grain and preserved fish which were being supplied by these colonies. But the victory of the Greeks in their war with the Persian king Xerxes and their hatred of the Persians for the destruction caused by the Persian troops makes Herodotus present the Scythians as heroes and victors in their war, in 512 B.C., against the Persian king Darius who, in fact, had shattered the Scythian power as is recorded on the silver tablets recently found, during the English excavations, in the grave of king Darius I. It appears that the establishment, in the year following the invasion of Darius, of the new Ionian colony of Pantikapeia, on the Crimean shore of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, i. e., on the Kerch peninsula, likewise confirms that the Scythians were very much weakened after the defeat inflicted upon them by Darius. It may be taken for granted that the coming of the Scythians to the Black Sea region checked for a long time the cultural development of the pre-Slavic tribes which up to then had been developing rapidly both agriculturally and culturally in close cooperation with the Greeks.

We may safely state that there was brought to that region a culture and an art of a higher quality than had formerly prevailed there, but

it was not due to the Scythians but to the Ionian Greeks who colonized the Black Sea coast, as well as thanks to the Alarodian emigrés who, in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., fled from the Urartu state, which was destroyed by the Assyrians, and from other countries of Asia Minor. Pantikapeia, which was established in 511, organized around itself the tribes of Meots, Sinds, Kerkets and other minor groups into the so-called state of the Bosphorus which existed for some 800 years and which really proved a cultural factor in the Black Sea region.

In the times of the Scythians the Volga basin was firmly occupied by the Ural-Finnish tribes which lived exclusively by fishing and hunting. This is shown by the so-called bone-filled towns of the Volga basin. These bones come from various animals. In the settlements of the Ukrainian territory nothing of the kind is to be noticed but there is to be found time and again great quantities of burnt grain. In Ukraine, the fluctuation of the population, caused by the attacks of the nomads, took place only in the strictly steppe areas. In the forest region the Ukrainian population held firmly, and cultivated the forest clearings.

The invasion of Iranian Scythians (6th cen. B. C.) starts the pressure of Iranian nomads from the East on Ukraine. The Scythians were two hundred years later annihilated by nomadic clans of Iranian Sarmats; their remnants withdrew to the North Crimea as well as Dobrudzha where they were finally destroyed by Phillip II of Macedonia. A new Iranian horde of Alans pressed (1st cen. A. D.) the Sarmatians from Ukraine westward, but after two hundred years the Alans met the same fate too. They were defeated by German Goths and expelled from Southern Ukraine to the west. Some of Alans clans reached even Spain.

On Iranians many inscriptions are preserved upon stone monuments in Greek Pontian colonies as in Olbia, Pantikapeia etc. The Iranians as nomads were unable to have any important cultural influence on Ukrainian population.<sup>2</sup>

### The Goths

In the second century A.D. the Goths moved on Ukraine from the direction of the Vistula: some settled to the east of the Dniester and in the Crimea and were called the Eastern Goths (Ostrogoths), and those who settled to the west of the Dniester were called West Goths (Visi Goths). The Ostro Goths, together with Geruli, destroyed Olbia, Tiras

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<sup>2</sup> M. Rostovtzev: *The Iranians and Greeks in South Russia.*



and other towns on the Black Sea coast in 251 A.D., and later conquered the Bosphorus state of Pantikapeia. They continually tried to eradicate the local ruling families. Thus it happened that the king of the Goths, Vinitar, killed the king of the Antae, Boz, and his children. In Ukraine the Goths organized a great state, but they themselves represented in it only a thin ruling layer, while the entire mass of the population was non-Gothic. The Goths did not bring into Ukraine a superior culture of any kind; on the contrary, they threw on the culture of the Greek colonies, which supplied them gold and silver art products. Thus did the Goths appropriate the Greek culture.

Here the Goths, likewise from the Greeks, accepted Christianity and literacy. It is quite possible that it was then that the first Gothic letters, the so called *runes*, were first discovered. The east Goths who lived in the Crimea had their Christian bishop, Unila. The west Goths had bishop Ulfila who translated the Sacred Scripture into the Gothic language. From a Gothic fable, known under the name of *Hervaragsaga*, we learn that the Goths had a town called Danaprastadir. It appears from the name that it was situated on the Dnieper (*Danapra*), and that on this river was concentrated their main strengths.

The Goths had a greater influence on the formation of the Ukrainian people than had the Scythians. They left in the Ukrainian language many of their words, like *knyaz'* (prince) from the Gothic *kuniegaz*. It also seems that under the influence of the Goths there began to take root in Ukraine the Indo-European marriage system, in which the family is established by the husband who becomes its head (patriarchate). This is a very important fact.

The Huns, an Asiatic race, put an end to the rule of the Goths in Ukraine in 375. The Goths were forced to withdraw very rapidly to the Balkans beyond the Carpathians. With them they took those objects which gave rise to the various local styles generally known in Europe under the term of Merovingian. But a part of the East Goths remained in the Crimea until the fourteenth century. These Crimean Goths were probably known by the author of the twelfth century of the epic *The Tale of Ihor's Raid*."

The Huns began a series of invasions of Ukraine by various Mongol and Turkish races.

It is possible that the beginnings of Ukrainian writing were somewhat influenced by the Crimean Goths. They left a huge grave mound in the Crimea, near Suuk-Su. During the Gothic period the Bosphorus state of Pantikapeia finally disappeared. Its last ruler was Asander who

died *circa* 360 A.D. But even if the Pantikapeian state disappeared, the tribes which lived in Pantikapeia and around it did not, but continued to exist especially on the island of Taman, along the Kuban river, and the coasts of the Sea of Oziv. There remained the tribe of the Cherkesi, which the Greeks called Kerkets, and which has preserved its name to this day and evidently had a great influence on the formation of the later phase of the local population known in the tenth century under the name of Tmutorokan' Rus'.

### The Antae

Together with the Slavs, the Antae became known in history by their attacks on the northern boundary of the Balkan dominions of Byzantium. The well known Byzantine author Procopius writes that the Antae extended from the Sea of Aziv to the Dniester and even to the lower Danube. This is repeated by the Byzantine Emperor Mauritius. The Antae, together with the Slavs, made inroads across the borders of the Byzantine Empire under Justin I, Justinian and Justin II. After 660 the Antae are not mentioned, but their name lingered in history for some 300 years. Procopius states that the Slavs and the Antae spoke the same language. As regards the name of Antae, the Slovenian ethnologist Zupanic thinks that they originated from the Caucasian Antae, i. e., the Cherkesi. This is quite possible because various tribes came to Ukraine from the Caucasus. In addition, the Byzantine Procopius says that the Antae extended from the Sea of Oziv to the Dniester. Archaeologically, we can also couple with them some cultures which stretch northward from the Sea of Aziv and which have been traced to the Kiev and Poltava regions, and the ceramic art of which clearly belongs to the Caucasian style (as the findings near the village of Mat-chukha, south of Poltava). In addition, these cultures belong to the period from the third to the seventh centuries A.D., i.e., they coincide with the date of the Antae. To us it is important to know that in the sixth century they already spoke the same language as did the Slavs. This means that even if the Antae were a purely Caucasian tribe with a language quite their own, in two centuries they had become totally Slavonized, or, to be more exact—Ukrainianized; because on the territory which was purely Ukrainian there could exist only that pre-Ukrainian language which evidently was spread at that time even farther north within the boundaries of the Ukrainian territory. That language must have been the language of old Christmas canticles (*kolyadky*), spring ritual songs (*vesnyanky*), *New Years' songs*

(*schedrivky*), midsummer (*kupalsky*), harvest (*obzhinkovy*), and wedding songs; because these tribes remained in the same territories up to our very day, and these songs and their language could not but reach us in an almost unaltered condition.

During the time of the Antae, Ukraine was crossed by the savage tribe of Obry, or Avars, which has left some mention even in our chronicles of the eleventh century. Byzantium came to know them for the first time *circa* 568. In the eighth century we no longer hear of the Antae, perhaps because these Antae tribes received another name. But the term "Antae" is somewhat similar to the name "Wendae" which was applied to some northern Slavonic tribes, if not to all. The southern term "Antae" may have covered, in the eyes of the Byzantines, many other Ukrainian tribal denominations. This does not change the situation, but only shows that the Ukrainian territory in the sixth century was already occupied by consolidated Ukrainian tribes which spoke the pre-Ukrainian language. This language was, in addition, the speech of the other Slavs, especially of the Balkan Slavs. Thus the Ukrainian language was the pre-Slavic tongue and also must have been general among both the Balkan and Ukrainian tribes. In other words, the pre-Slavic language was the pre-Ukrainian language. A distinguished Ukrainian philologist, Prof. Stepan Smal-Stocky, arrived at that conclusion, and shortly before the Second World War some of the prominent Czech philologists accepted that view.

### Ukrainian Neighbors—The Khozars

After 670 the lands which lay between the Volga, the Caucasus and the Sea of Aziv were occupied by a new wave of the Turkic races, the Khozars, who organized here a powerful state in which there lived a substantial portion of the Ukrainian agricultural population, if one may judge by their speech. The Khazar capital was called Itil' and was situated on the Volga, and the Volga itself, in the Khazar language, was called Itil'. The Khozars accepted the Jewish faith and slowly began to settle the territory and occupy themselves with agriculture. They maintained armed forces on the Volga in order to prevent the Asiatic nomads from crossing to the western side of the river. On that account, as a result, in the seventh and eight centuries the Ukrainian steppes became more peaceful, and the population again began to expand out of the wooded steppe region into the open prairie land, and in about two centuries reached the sea and the Danube. The chronicle mentions Ukrainian tribes: the Uhlichy and the Tivertzi who lived by the sea.

The Khazar state maintained itself until the tenth century. It stood and weathered the first blows of the Varangian princes from Kiev, but these weakened the power of the Khozars to such a degree that the latter could no longer restrain the Pechenigs, Torks and other Asiatic nomads beyond the Volga. The Khazar state could not then resist the attacks of these nomads, and perished. The remainder of the Khozars escaped to the Crimea where, in small numbers, they still exist even to our day under the name of Karaims. The Pechenigs and other nomads, after destroying the Khazar state, moved further west into the steppe region and there destroyed the Ukrainian tribes of the Uhlich and Tivertzi and many a time threatened Kiev itself.

### The Ukrainian Nation Appears Under the Name Rus

In the ninth century, near the city of Kiev, there began to be organized a Ukrainian state. The Chronicle of Ancient Times (*Litopis' Vremennykh Lit*) says that the Ukrainian tribes of the Uhlich and the Tivertzi lived along the Dniester and the Bog, and reached as far as the Sea, so great were they in numbers. The Chronicle states that "their cities exist even to this day." From this it appears that they had existed, but that at the time of the writing of the Chronicle, they had ceased to exist. The Novgorod edition of the Chronicle relates the migration of the Uhlich from the lower Dnieper beyond the Buh in the first half of the tenth century, and states that this migration happened under the pressure of the Pechenigs. That fact demonstrates how under the pressure of the nomads, the fluctuation of the Ukrainian population from the prairie land into the wooded steppe region and to the Polissya was continually taking place. The chronicle mentions nothing about the Antae, but enumerates the following tribes:—Polyany, Derevlyany, Siveryany, Drehovichi, Volinyany, Novhorodtzi, Polochany, Buzhany. The name "Antae" evidently had become merged in the new tribal names.

In the ninth century there appears a new name to designate the territory of Ukraine. That name is Rus'. Scholars variously explain the origin of that name. The Ukrainian Chronicle has this to say about the appearance of that name:—The Rus'-Varangians came from Scandinavia under the leadership of the Princes Rurik, Sineus and Truvor. From Novgorod the Varangians-Rus' came to Kiev, and so Rurik's descendants began to rule in the Kiev region. The greater Novgorod itself was founded by the tribe of Slovenes shortly before that happened. The Slovenes came there from the south, and their speech was very

close to the then Ukrainian tongue. The Varangians-Rus' appeared first during the reign of the Byzantine Emperor Michael, in 856. The chronicler says that the Slovene speech was then spoken only by the following tribes: Polyany, Derevlyany, Siveryany, Drehovichi, Volinyany, Novhorodtzi, Polochany, Buzhani. Then he goes on to say that the Polyany now, i. e., at the time when the Varangians came to Kiev, began to be called Rus', and that for that reason the Slovene and the Rus' languages are quite the same.

### Ukrainians and Russians

These Varangians began to expand their dominion, and they moved down the Volga even into Persia, and later conquered the Volga basin with its Finnish tribes. Through them the culture of the Ukrainian tribes moved further northward, and the Ukrainian speech, still in its pre-Ukrainian form, was accepted even by the White-Ruthenian tribe—the Krivichi. A portion of this tribe, together with the tribe of the Vyatichi withdrew to the Oka river and there, becoming intermingled with the Finnish tribe of Mordva, gradually Slavonized it, and imposed upon it its own dialect which later became known in scholarly circles under the name of the Southern Great Russian dialect (in which the unaccented "o" is pronounced "a" of the Great Russian language). Thus did the formation of a new people, the Muscovites, now called Russians, begin on these territories. As a part of the political organism of the Kievan Rus', they fell under the influence of the culture which reached them from Ukraine through the civil administration and the Church.

The following Finnish tribes lived in this area: on the Volga—the Merya, Murom, Mordva, Moksha, Cheremisi; further north—the Chud, Vod, Yam, Ves, Perm, Yugra, Pechora, Korel, Samoyad, Ziryane, Erza, etc. The farther north it reached the weaker did the Slavonization of the Finns become, and even now there are some that have not yet become completely Russianized. Even on the Volga there were until recently many oases of the un-Russianized Ural population, and even in the province of Moscow itself the Soviet government has recently discovered such autochthonous oases. These Finnish tribes, in fact, became the basic substratum of the present Muscovite (Russian) people, and this origin makes its mentality so distinct and different from other Slavic peoples. Under the influence of this substratum the Krivich and the Ukrainian languages changed phonetically and became

a new dialect, a Muscovite dialect which later developed into the Great Russian tongue.

This theory is at variance with the usual Russian contention posed specially for an imperialist purpose and in order to give a scholarly basis and justification for the assimilation by Moscow of all other Slavic peoples. The Russian theory is erected as a geneological tree. It is represented thus: from the Indo-European trunk there emerged a separate pre-Slavic branch, out of which there sprang three separate branches: the branch of the southern Slavs, the branch of the western Slavs, and the branch of the eastern Slavs, or the pre-Russian, and from the latter there again sprang three branches: the Russian (Muscovite), the White Ruthenian (Krivichi), and the Ukrainian or the Little Russian. The artificiality of this theory becomes only too evident in its very systematic arrangement, as well as in the fact that these branches of races appear to grow like a real tree in mid-air, which can freely spread out in an empty space; besides, it is not at all considered that at that time there lived on those territories peoples who must have represented the substratum of the population which altered according to the phonetic or, to be more exact, phonological rules the Indo-European language imposed upon them.<sup>3</sup>

We see that archaeology and ethnology do not allow any grounds for such a contention, and that even philology rejects this Russian claim; for if the pre-Slavic language had risen in the north, it would have had to bear the influences of the Finnish tribes, and that, as has been noted above, is not at all in evidence. Ethnology reveals that cognate anthropological and ethnic traits between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples were, and still are, non-existent; and that would have been imperative if these two peoples had sprung from the same root. What was shared, however, was only the language which was brought there later by the Krivichi, and the Christian faith of the Greek rite, together with the customs attached to it, which was brought to the Muscovites by the Kievan princes.

This claim is also confirmed by the opinion of the Russian archaeologist, professor Spitsyn, the greatest expert on the archaeology of the earliest beginnings of the Muscovite Principate. Having delved into the material of seven thousand grave-mounds which were excavated by Count Uvarov in the Rostov-Susdal province in the region of the upper Volga, i. e., in the very center of the Muscovite realm, he writes as

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<sup>3</sup> Schachmatov, *Zu seltesten slavisch—keltischen Beziehungen*. *Archiv fuer Slavische Philologie*, B. XXXIII, 1911. 3.51 ff.

follows: "In the tenth century the Rostov province was inhabited by substantial masses of the Smolensk Krivichi who at that time occupied not only Rostov (of the Yaroslav region), but also Yaroslavl, Susdal, Yuriev and Pereyaslav (of the Zalisya region); and in the eleventh and twelfth centuries this country, besides the natural increase of the (Krivich) population, increased by means of the assimilation of the aborigenes (Meri and other Finns), . . . but neither the Vyatichi, Radymichi, nor the Siveryany had any relations with the above-mentioned province." And further, "there are no grave-mounds of the tenth century in the Vladimir province, i. e., along the Klyazma river, which might be attributed to the southern Russian and the Middle Russian (i. e. to the Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian) tribes".<sup>4</sup>

All that can be reduced to something similar to what had been quite rightly stated by the Russian scholar Prof. Seredonin: "The main Russian river, the Volga, bears a Finnish name . . . In a word, the entire huge basin of the Volga must be excluded from the number of those areas where we may suppose the Siavs to have taken their primeval rise".<sup>5</sup>

Now let us turn our attention to the fact that the Volga and all its larger territories bear Finnish names, as do the towns and cities upon it, and that all this area was Slavonized by the Krivichi. It follows that the Great Russian language could in no way have been the branch of some separate pre-Russian root, but only a branch sprung much later (i. e., in the tenth and eleventh centuries) from the Krivich (White-Ruthenian) branch. A thing can only branch-off from something that existed previously, i. e., only from the White-Ruthenian (Krivich) and Ukrainian languages.

All this is well corroborated also by anthropology, as presented in the works of such older Russian scholars as Anuchin, as well as of the younger ones—Chepurkovsky and Bunak.

The cities of Yaroslavl, Susdal, Yuryev and Pereyaslav, as their names indicate, were in reality Slavonic colonies amid the mass of the Finnish population which lived in villages or, to be more exact, in the forests, because that population lived almost entirely by hunting. The Slavonic population had to live in fortified towns among the hostile Finnish population. In order to force the Finnish population to turn to agriculture the administration of the Slavic Principate reduced the

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<sup>4</sup> Spitsyn: *Vladimirskije Kurgony*, pp. 168 and 171. Izvestiye Imperatorskoy Archeologicheskoy Komissiyi.

<sup>5</sup> Seredonin: *Istoritcheskaya Geografya*, SPB. 1916.

Finns to the category of serfs, and thus introduced the economic system of serfdom.

It is quite evident that the Muscovite state was composed of two elements: the Finnish substratum which lived by wild game hunting; and the thin layer of the agricultural Slavic hyperstratum which later melted almost completely into the substratum of the Finnish layer, but which nevertheless imparted to the Finns its Slavonic tongue, but by no means its mentality.

It therefore follows that between the Ukrainian people and the Great Russian (Muscovite) people there is nothing in common, either ethnically or anthropologically; and as a result of this, there can be no psychic relationship between them. Such being the case, the Ukrainians cannot bear any responsibility for the actions of the Russian state, regardless of the form of the Russian government system, because even now the behavior of the U.S.S.R. is conditioned by the Muscovite (Russian), and not by the Ukrainian national mentality.

The Ukrainian people, in their mentality, are a peaceful and predominantly peasant folk. The Russian people are aggressive conquerors and hunters which have only recently, and only partly, turned agricultural.

That which outwardly appears to be held in common by the Russians and the Ukrainians is only the later veneer of a thin layer which resulted after a century and a half of Russian state schools and state laws which had an annihilating effect on the upper classes of the population. But that levelling effect was only outward and superficial; the inner world of the Russians remained different from that of the Ukrainian, as is revealed both by the contemporary history and by the events which are happening to-day before our very eyes.





## UKRAINE AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

**M**ANY UKRAINIANS and friends of the Ukrainian cause are often mystified at the treatment that this oppressed people receives in America official channels. On the one hand, they realize that there is a growing understanding of the Ukrainian situation and its importance to the peace of the world, quite unlike the situation that prevailed at the end of World War I. On the other, there is a constant disinclination to take any definite steps to support and encourage the Ukrainian struggle for liberty and independence.

It is natural to assume that this negative position is largely influenced by memories of the old Russian Empire and by the various Russian emigrés from the imperial regime and also from the circle of Kerensky and the elements that rallied around him in 1917. In part it is a true suspicion but the extent of its validity can only be known, once the Soviet government has vanished and the task of remodelling the Soviet Union begins. It cannot be wholly discounted but at the same time it is powerfully reinforced by other factors.

In his memoirs, the former Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, alluded in passing to one of these imponderable factors which operate against the recognition of Ukraine, even though he makes no mention of that specific problem. He does it by linking up the American policy toward the Soviet Union with the general line of American foreign policy and with the general goals toward which diplomacy was striving before there came the present cataclysms and the drawing of the iron curtain across the half of Europe.

The growth and extension of democracy in Western Europe and America during the nineteenth century developed in many countries a general disinclination to interfere with the internal management and life of other countries except in cases where some notable injustice had been committed and even there any interference or protest was far more apt to be informal and almost personal in its character than it was purely official, for the latter was regarded in most quarters as a prelude to some strong action, if not to war. This was a great step forward in international relations, for it ended the flagrant interference of one country with another that had marked certain periods in the past and had always characterized Russian diplomacy. It was a sign of a growing sanity in the world and the triumph of a fairly

well informed public opinion. It certainly resulted in the acceptance of the boundaries of Western Europe which except for the eternal problem of Alsace-Lorraine between France and Germany remained almost stable from the time of the Napoleonic settlement.

This tendency was strongly accentuated in the United States by reason of its geographical position. By the Monroe Doctrine the United States had warned Europe against any attempt to recover the colonies which had declared their independence of Spain in the early part of the nineteenth century. Yet these had not emerged as a united organization but the disputes of the revolutionary leaders had set up a large number of countries, which were often bitterly opposed to one another and even threatened war over still unsolved boundary disputes. American foreign policy was directed toward the ending of these struggles and the establishment of sound governments and of peaceful methods of settling disputes.

It is hard to foresee what might have been the results in Central and South America, had the United States followed any other policy. The application of this principle was not always perhaps happy but the only new state which has appeared since the middle of the last century was the Republic of Panama and the speedy recognition of this by President Theodore Roosevelt aroused storms of protest not only in South America but also in the United States.

Thus by the time that the United States developed into a world power and was compelled against its will to pay serious attention to European affairs, American thinking was already oriented in a definite direction and this was true not only of the professional diplomats but of large masses of the population. It is often forgotten both at home and abroad that in the original Fourteen Points of President Wilson there was only a demand for an independent Poland. Even the call for the disintegration of Austria-Hungary was given in a supplemental explanation, since originally there had been only a call for the fullest autonomy of the people within the Empire and autonomy was not understood at the time as meaning independence.

It was this tendency to lay the main emphasis of American influence upon the development of democratic institutions and of peaceful means of settling disputes that made so unrealistic the American policy toward Russia after the Revolution of 1917. While the Western Allies were chiefly concerned with the new balance of power that would result from the dismemberment of Russia, the United States concerned itself rather with the hopes of increasing and strengthening the de-

mocratic character of the regime. It was not therefore until 1922 that President Harding formally recognized the independence of the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which alone of the various minorities of the Russian Empire had succeeded in maintaining themselves as independent political entities.

Likewise in dealing with the countries to the south, the United States had found useful the policy of not recognizing governments that had come into existence by revolution. This was applied to the undemocratic rule of the Soviet Union and so it was not until the first administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt that formal recognition was extended to the government of the USSR.

There can be no doubt about the importance of this recognition in view of the developments of Nazism and of Fascism in Germany and Italy, for the train of events was already leading to World War II. Yet this recognition clearly postulated a difference between the government of the Soviet Union and the world movement of Communism. There was not only tacit acceptance of the principle that neither government would engage in unfriendly acts against the other but it was specifically provided in the act of recognition that this should be the policy of the two states exactly as provisions were made for setting the various other matters that had remained in dispute since the ending of World War I.

At the time there were many doubtful persons who could not accept the differentiation between the acts of Stalin and his associates in the government of the Soviet Union and their acts in the Comintern and the Communist party which was engaged in worldwide propaganda. Yet it must be remembered that at the time Moscow was making every effort publicly to maintain this differentiation. Stalin contented himself with being merely the most influential member of a political party. He was not in any post that corresponded to that of Prime Minister in the other countries and the negotiations were carried on in the name of Kalinin, who as the head of the state received officially all foreign diplomats and performed those functions which were elsewhere the prerequisite and duty of the highest executive. Elaborate steps were taken to show that the American Communist Party was not an organ of the Soviet government and if its ideas coincided with the line of the Moscow party, it was purely for ideological reasons.

The Soviets were very obviously playing upon words during the following years, for step by step the excuses became more and

more flimsy. More and more the Communist Party ceased to bother with the various pretexts of being other than the Soviet government and the fading away of the Comintern was only a sign that its functions were being handled more and more openly by the Communists in the Soviet government without any attempt to dissimulation. By the time that World War II started and when in 1941 Hitler attacked the Soviet Union and Stalin took over the highest offices in the state, there was no longer the slightest shadow of doubt that Communism and the Soviet Union formed part of the same machine and that any attempt to deal with one or the other involved the closest relations with both.

Yet wishful thinking dies hard. Statesmen of great countries and of the small continued to hope that under the storm and stress of a World War, it might be possible to separate again the Soviet Union from the Communist movements in their own countries. Hence came the agreements of Teheran and Yalta. Stalin had signed the Atlantic Charter. He had made many other promises. He had brought the Soviet Union into the United Nations. There were so many superficial indications, as there had been during the past quarter of a century, that some cooperation could be effected that even many serious thinkers allowed their hopes to gain the mastery over their logic and their knowledge.

Yet that misjudgement of the real aims of Communism which had never been denied in any authoritative statement was the cause of newer and newer misfortunes. It was responsible for the plight of the displaced persons. They had known from personal experience at home the meaning of the Communist regime and in vast numbers they declined to return home at the very time when the people from the various nations of Western Europe were only too happy to be repatriated.

It was responsible for the spreading of the iron curtain over the Soviet Union. The government in exile which represented the various political groups in their own lands at the beginning of World War II realized perfectly well the significance of the so-called governments set up under Soviet influence out of Communist exiles who had lived for years in Moscow as citizens of the Soviet Union. The nations liberated by the Red Armies were all too well aware from the first moment of the meaning of these new groups of Communists that were selected to teach them the new ideals and the method of carrying them out. Others like Czechoslovakia were induced by Pan-Slavic

sympathies to believe that the Slavic Communists would not interfere with their traditional mode of life but would merely strengthen their bonds with Russia and aid them in developing their own peculiar genius.

So runs the gloomy record of the last years, until now there is no longer any hope that the Soviet Union working through its twin weapons of armed force and Communist ideology does not mean what it says when it asserts that it is destined to introduce a new period in humanity and human history, in which its ideas will alone exist. The growing awareness of this fact will steadily exercise an increasing influence upon the foreign policy of all countries including the United States.

Secretary Hull made clear what has long been the definite policy of the United States, the working out of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other governments. It was in the fulfillment of that rule that the United States made the agreements at Teheran and Yalta which were intended to broaden the structure of the governments of the liberated countries by including in them representatives of the Communists and the Moscow-oriented parties on the chance that they might have grown stronger during the war years but with the provision that free and impartial elections would restore a proper balance. The Soviet method of elections and their misuse and distortion of the word "democracy" have rendered all such hopes vain and have merely allowed the Soviet officials to include all of these countries within their definite orbit.

The failure of the Soviet attempt to carry through a successful revolt in Greece at the moment of liberation for the first time made clear the methods by which the new governments elsewhere came into power. This was not because it differed in kind or in degree but because by the very nature of the role of Greece in the war, and by its geographical position on the sea, it was possible for the Western Allies to be aware of what was going on. A further direct result was the barely concealed intervention of the Soviet satellites of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria in the conflict despite the actions of the United Nations.

In one sense the attack on Greece was a digression, for the country did not lie on the direct route of Soviet expansion toward the West. It served, however, to open the eyes of the West in a region that could not be so easily blanketed by the Soviet smokescreens. Here was a non-Slav country which was standing firm to the best of its

ability while Czechoslovakia was allowing itself to be infiltrated, only to fall without a blow.

To-day the need of stopping Communism is felt everywhere. It is back of the elimination of the Communists from the governments of France and Italy. It is back of those clauses of the Marshall plan and the European Recovery Program which forbid aid to those governments that admit to their membership Communists. It is felt in all the measures that are being taken to strengthen the lines of democracy in Western Europe.

The process cannot stop there. The life of Western and Central Europe is so closely interwoven that the continent cannot live and flourish to-day any more than in the past on the fringe of the Atlantic Ocean. Communism by its direct and indirect modes of assault must break through that barrier or recoil. Exactly as the Soviet armies after their defeat at Warsaw in 1920 were compelled to recoil, so their decisive failure to penetrate Western Europe and reach the Atlantic Ocean will force again a retreat, but this time the world must see that it is a real retreat and not a mere armistice for twenty years.

That retreat, if it is to be made effective, must be combined with a rolling back of the iron curtain. Democracy cannot rest satisfied, while the states that entered the war because of Nazi aggression still remain the prey of a still more ruthless despotism, which can deport their population at will with the docile consent of a puppet regime. Already Senator Bridges of New Hampshire has called upon the government of the United States to cooperate with the discontented peoples under these anti-national regimes, in the case of Yugoslavia much to the annoyance of the Stalin-Tito picked ambassador to the United States.

Yet the merest attempt to check by direct or indirect method the Soviet system of penetration and attack which was worked out successfully against the Ukrainian Republic in 1919 and 1920 must lead to a break in the old American tradition of refusing to interfere in other lands and compel it to interpret its obligations to the world society of nations far more broadly than in the past. The continued Soviet aggression is leading to a reconsideration of all aspects of international and American diplomacy and as the intensity of the conflict increases, we can be sure that public opinion which was so indifferent in 1919 and was still barely lukewarm in 1911 will become more interested and willing to act.

Once it is generally recognized that the old diplomatic tradition

is no longer a safe and sure guide, then the way will be open for an assault upon the citadel of Communism, the hold which Moscow exercises over the nations which had previously been subjugated by the Russian tsars. There may be again howls of anguish from some of the Russian imperial friends but we can confidently predict that a world which has been badly shaken by the excesses and claims of Communism operating from the old capital of Moscow will insist upon a definite solution for good and all before it sets out on a new path of world organization that can be menaced at any moment by an autocratic regime in Moscow. It is perhaps not too optimistic to say that the very plans of the Communist leaders may prove in the last analysis a boomerang and may come to the assistance of a disturbed world. In their desire to prepare a plan for their ultimate domination of the world, they relied upon a system of quasi-independent republics, all dominated by the same Communist party headed by Moscow. It was a beautiful plan on paper to combine a temporary decentralization and a permanent Russification. It seemed so simple to recognize the differences within the Russian Empire as a means of sweeping within its confines as many other peoples as they could corrupt or master.

It was and is undoubtedly the hope and aspiration of all the Soviet leaders to include ultimately as independent Soviet republics all those countries that they have succeeded in bringing within the iron curtain. It is not so simple a task as the absorption of the three Baltic states, even though these had already won international recognition. It requires more time and energy, a more careful preparation both of the populations concerned and of the opinion of the world. At the present moment, it is probably advisable to rest with handpicked governments in the various lands to the West which can proceed toward the destined goal as rapidly as Moscow gives the signal.

There is no reason why the democratic powers cannot reverse the process and this time not stop at the borders of the old Russian Empire but continue within to give freedom and independence to all the races and nations selected by the Soviet Union for its experiments. The task would be relatively simple in the case of the sixteen Soviet Republics. It might be more difficult with some of the lesser Autonomous Republics.

Yet when it is done, the menace of world Communism, whether

it regards itself as a new institution or the development of the Russian Empire, will be removed or greatly lessened.

By its persistent reports of the nationalist heresy in Ukraine, Moscow itself has confirmed the Ukrainian desire for independence. The Ukrainians themselves have shown that they were willing to fight for it and that their desire has not diminished but grown with time. Their record in the World War II, the operations of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army since the war, the activities of the Ukrainian displaced persons all bear the same testimony.

It is high time that a world which is seriously interested in stopping the advance of Communism should take note of this gallant struggle of the Ukrainian people and should count them as allies in the great task of the present day. There is no nation that has paid more dearly in lives and material sacrifices than the Ukrainians and every day that there is delay in working a proper use of the Ukrainian resources only increases the damage that is wrought by the masters of the Kremlin.

The old arguments against such assistance have fallen away of themselves, once the United States and the civilized nations realize the hopelessness of the idea that they can accomplish anything by accepting as legal and just the Soviet jurisdiction over any foreign peoples while the Soviets reserve and maintain the right of interfering wherever they wish. The old theories on which American diplomacy operated during the past century when it was dealing with countries that accepted their geographical boundaries are no longer valid in the face of the Soviet claims and actions. More than that Ukraine has already been admitted into the United Nations as a sovereign state. If it is right and desirable to hope that the Soviet yoke should be removed from those states which it mastered during and after World War II, it is surely even more right and more desirable to make sure that those peoples who have had the longest experience with Moscow should have the same opportunity as the others to express their detestation of the regime and do their parts in its overthrow, and have their own representatives in international gatherings.

To-day as never before there is a growing consciousness of the contributions that each nation can contribute to the world through a world organization, whether it be the present United Nations or a world federation. It conflicts sharply with the Soviet idea that all the nations must speak with the voice of Moscow on all matters, important and unimportant. In this worldwide clash, the old rules



have been superseded and whatever might have been the motives of American policy at the end of World War I, to-day it is sound common sense and practical democratic diplomacy to seek for allies and friends within the hostile camp. It cannot increase the hatred of Soviet propaganda but it will show to the world as never before the steps by which that propaganda has won its success in the past. It will show the falsity of Soviet claims already shattered by the testimony of the displaced persons and it will be an act of justice when Ukrainian spokesmen speaking for the Ukrainians will be allowed to make their cause and their contributions known in the gathering of the democratic peoples of the world.



### IN THE STEPPE

By MYKOLA ZEROV

(Translated by *Mira Hordynsky*)

The wide and level steppe, a row of grave mounds green,  
And dreamy space beyond, that with blue wings of mist  
Allures and calls me on, to old Hellenic towns.  
Dark silhouettes of horses on the far horizon,  
Of wagons and of tents and Scythian strong ploughmen.  
Home bound from out the south, the herons wing their way,  
A hot impatient wind blows landward from the seas.  
But of what use to me the raging gusts of wind,  
The singing of the lark, the growing of the grass?  
With what great happiness I would all this exchange  
For a port's tumult and the turquoise of the bays  
And for the stone-paved streets of ancient Kherones.

## UKRAINIAN SCULPTURE IN EXILE

*By SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY*

**A**MONG the many Ukrainian artists, who chose individual freedom and freedom of artistic creation, and voluntarily emigrated from their native country, there is a number of sculptors. During the eventful and troubled war years none of them were able to save any of their works, and found themselves on the other side of the iron curtain with only bare hands and their talents, to carry on their life's work and start it again from the very beginning. Nevertheless during three years of exile, often spent in crowded and noisy camps, they have been able to create many works of high artistic value, that equal in quality the best contemporary sculptures, seen at Parisian and New York expositions. We will even venture to state, that they have brought into West-European art—which is often tired from overspeculation and consequently has reached the absurd in many of its aspects—new and healthy elements.

In the past Ukrainian sculpture did not have the opportunity to develop to such high levels, as the pictorial or graphic arts. The reason for this was in a large measure the specific circumstances created by the occupants of Ukraine; the denationalization of Ukrainian cities and, as a result the pre-ban on the erection of Ukrainian monuments. In L'viv (Lemberg), for instance, not one Ukrainian monument could be erected. The Polish administration did not even permit the placing of a bust of Shevchenko in the square before the Scientific Institute of Shevchenko. On the other hand, in Soviet Ukraine such monuments were merely one more opportunity for propaganda to glorify the Soviet regime. But even in these cases the execution of such monuments was seldom entrusted to Ukrainian artists. For Kharkiv the colossal monument of Shevchenko was done in Leningrad, and not by Ukrainian artists, and for ideologic correctness the memorial was embellished by the figure of a "Red Guardist" in full uniform and with a rifle and bayonet in his hands. This obvious anachronism creates a definitely comical effect.

Consequently the Ukrainian sculptors expressed themselves in limited studio forms—in portraits and figures, and rarely produced works of monumental proportions.

The most prominent Ukrainian sculptors in exile in Western Europe are FEDIR YEMETZ, HRYHOR KRUK, ANTIN PAVLOS and BOHDAN MUKHIN. They represent different styles, but all are near to realism.



FEDIR YEMETZ: MOTHER  
*Terra-cotta*

The "modern" aspect is connected with urbanized and technical civilization to such a degree, that it becomes foreign and unreal to the peasant Ukrainian majority, which is essentially still near to nature. The Ukrainian has his own rich world, deeply rooted in folklore and mythology, where the real and the unreal are still inseparably entwined with each other. Creative realism, based on healthy and organic bonds with nature, leads art back to the sources of beauty and strength. It creates its own artistic style, interpreting the metaphysical and enigmatic structure of the tangible world in terms of human emotions and thoughts. As always, however, much depends here on the individual talent.

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Among the sculptors mentioned FEDIR YEMETZ is the oldest and most experienced. He attained his artistic maturity in the period between the two World Wars. Kruk, Pavlos and Mukhin, on the other hand, reached

their artistic heights in the recent war and in the post war years. Yemetz has been in exile since World War I. He studied and worked in Germany, and was nominated a professor of the Berlin Academy of Fine Arts before World War II. His style is distinguished by its fluency of line, which is typical of Ukrainian art. In bronze he is not only an artist, but a master; the mechanically cast work of art is raw and unfinished, but Yemetz is well aware how much importance the ancient masters attributed to the hand finishing of bronzes, which gives the cast the individual touch. The "Mother," reproduced here, emerges

as one harmonious rhythm, like a Gothic Madonna. It is one of his most recent works, and has been shown in an art exposition in Salzburg, Austria.



GREGORY KRUK: WOMAN'S HEAD—Plaster

HRYHOR KRUK studied likewise in the Berlin Academy of Fine Arts. His works are truly monumental. This he achieves by a bold simplification of forms, often consciously archaic. His style can be called a "condensed realism," where the maximum of expression is attained through the minimum of means—the goal of every serious sculptor. His numerous heads are characteristic of this style. How much inner expression, energy and power one feels in these blocks, so simple in form! Kruk likewise carves many figures, in which he portrays a specific world. One could almost define it as a "peasant complex." Solidity, uniformity and

abundance characterize his art, which is tied to the soil and its cultivation. His figures express the sadness of life, together with an ardent and yearning love of it.

ANTIN PAVLOS is the creator of several monuments, which, however, have never left the phase of projects, as finished works, for the above mentioned reasons. He is particularly interested in one of the most popular subjects in sculpture: the horse and the rider. He loves to depict animals and has a keen, observing eye for dynamics and movement. Pavlos is a very versatile artist. He has made many works with a social meaning as, for instance a "Working Woman," "Hunger" and others.

But he shows his mastery best in the nude female and infant figures. The warm rose-brown of the terra-cotta he uses is especially suited for these figures.



ANTIN PAVLOS:

ROMAN THE GREAT—Clay

where the center of the bulk of three horses with their riders rests on a very small support, and gives the whole group the air of a fantastic flying dragon. He works mostly in

The work of BOHDAN MUKHIN is alive with dynamic power and original force, to the exclusion of all that is static. He is wholly a romanticist and delights in subjects from the heroic eras of Ukrainian history. His art has eastern features, with a marked pre-historic tendency. For parallels one must go back to the animal ornament of Pontic art from 700-400 B. C. in Kuban and later Scythian art. Mukhin is one of the greatest masters of the horse in contemporary sculpture. He knows it like a true man of the steppe. One of his striking compositions is "Glory,"



BOHDAN MUKHIN: GLORY—Wax

wax, and then casts his statues in bronze, but his familiarity with marble is well proved in one of his recent sculptures "Night."



ALEXANDER ARCHIPENKO: ILLUMINATED (1947)

*Carved Plaster*

However Ukrainian sculpture is not limited to only more or less realistic works. The experimental creativeness of ALEXANDER ARCHIPENKO, which is the artistic wealth of Americans, as well as Ukrainians, shows with what a wide diapason of styles and trends Ukrainian sculpture disposes. In writing about the younger Ukrainian artists, one can not but mention a master so entirely different in his creative expression, whose art has been known for the past forty years. His recent exposition

in the New York galleries of the Associated American Artists, which displayed a row of Archipenko's works created during his forty years of inventive sculpture, is a good occasion to write a few words about him. We know the importance of experimenting in modern art. It is the unquestioned right of modernism. In his search for something new Archipenko, perhaps more than any other sculptor in the history of art, touched almost all the great styles of the past. And Juillaume Apollinaire was right when, as early as 1913, he wrote, that Archipenko subjected his arts to tradition and took from the old all he could.

In the span of his creativeness the artist had periods of archaic-primitivism, going through the scale of Egyptian, classic, Baroque and many other styles. He united sculpture with painting and movement, and named it *Archipentura*. He modelled not only space but concave, and brought transparency into his sculptured works. Now he is experimenting in modeling light effected by electricity. But his importance does not lie as much in his technical inventiveness, as in the fact that he is the creator of works of art.

Rhythm is the fundament of his art. To create harmonies and rhythms is the basic rule of all art in all times. He who does not agree with this is a speculator, and has against him thousand years of experience, so much wiser than all the capriciousness of the moderns. Archipenko has an inborn feeling for rhythm, and it never, or hardly ever betrays him. That is why his sculptures, even the remotest and most abstract, those which do not represent any objects, express at the same time very much: a certain rhythmic harmony, an accord, hence the primeval substance of art.

But above all the works of Archipenko are the creation of our technicalized era, that unites man with the machine and foretells a still more technicalized time. And if we have to place Archipenko side by side with Picasso, and if esthetics, so outmoded today in modern art, have still retained at least an ounce of value, let us agree, that Archipenko's abstract figures are far more esthetic and artistic than the clinical imbeciles of Picasso.



## THE 300th ANNIVERSARY OF THE SECOND UKRAINIAN STATE

(1648—1948)

By NICHOLAS CHUBATY

**I**N the course of their historical existence the Ukrainian people have known three distinct periods of sovereign and independent statehood. The first period dates back to the early days of their history when Kiev was the capitol of all of Eastern Europe. Ukraine, under the name of *Rus*, emerged as an independent nation in the middle of the IXth century and lasted as a great and influential Eastern European power until the second half of the XIth century; at the end of that century the decline of the empire precipitated the establishment of two new nations. Out of the territories inhabited by non-Ukrainians there emerged White Ruthenia and Muscovy. Ukraine itself existed as an independent nation until the middle of the XIVth century (1349).

After three hundred years Ukraine again regained its political independence, when one of its most outstanding and colorful leaders, *Hetman* Bohdan Khmel'nitsky, threw off Polish rule through a national revolution and created a democratic independent state in 1648 on the greater part of the Ukrainian territory. The third period of Ukrainian statehood began in 1917 when, with the fall of the Russian Empire, the Ukrainians proclaimed a sovereign and democratic republic which was overrun by the Soviet armies at the end of 1919.

Of the three periods of Ukrainian independence, the most widely known among the Anglo-Saxons is the second period, or the era of Khmel'nitsky, probably because it paralleled the English Revolution of Oliver Cromwell. Ukraine's *Hetman*, after inflicting crushing defeats upon the Polish armies, established friendly relations with the government of Cromwell and was even called "the Cromwell of Eastern Europe."

Yet the revolution in Ukraine and the separation of the country from Poland in 1648 had far-reaching repercussions, for it completely overturned the political structure of Eastern Europe. As a result, Poland lost her position of leadership and the supremacy shifted gradually toward Moscow.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century Poland was such a formidable power that it could have conquered Muscovy and imposed



its King Wladyslaw on the Muscovite throne. But after the loss of a great part of Ukrainian territory which passed under the protectorate of Muscovy in 1654, the shift of the centre of gravity from Warsaw to Moscow was already underway. Thus the source of Polish power was the possession of Ukrainian lands, and after their loss Poland declined while Muscovy grew in importance and power.

### **Poland Was Unable to Solve the Ukrainian Problem**

The three-hundred years of Ukrainian-Polish relationship demonstrated once and for all that Poland did not know how to use this relationship for the good of the two peoples. Instead of uniting with the old Ukrainian nation and forming a triple union of Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania, the Poles began a cultural and economic offensive against Ukraine. This cultural drive of Poland aimed to Polonize the Ukrainians who were of a different Eastern (Byzantine) Christian civilization. Regrettably enough, this eastward march of Poland was conducted under the guise of a Catholic crusade in Eastern Europe.

In reality, this crusade was quite unnecessary because the Ukrainians, although of Eastern Christian background, had always leaned toward Western Europe, and until the arrival of the Poles in 1340, had considered themselves part of the Western European *Communitas Christiana*. Poland, on the other hand, had to find a purpose for the purported crusade in order to obtain the assistance of the Western Catholics. In fact, the crusade consisted in forcing the assimilation of the Ukrainian people and the colonization of their lands. While the Latinized Polish culture was proclaimed a pure Catholic culture, that of the Eastern Christian Ukrainians was scornfully called "schismatic" and pushed into a secondary place.

Ukraine, before the arrival of the Poles in 1340, was never anti-Catholic, and if it became so later it was solely because of the Polish policy of assimilation and economic exploitation of Ukraine which was carried out in the name of Catholicism. As a result, such a Polish "Catholic mission" in Ukraine brought perilous consequences not only for Catholicism but for Poland itself as well. For the Ukrainians, being part of the Western European *Communitas Christiana* before Poland's occupation of the country, were unwillingly pushed into the arms of Moscow, the Orthodox "Third Rome." As for Poland itself, it was unable to assimilate the Ukrainians and to exploit economically the natural resources of Ukraine and by the middle of the XVIIth century it entered upon its own decline.

The Ukrainian Revolution and the rebirth of the Second Ukrainian State in 1648 was a turning point in the alignment of political forces in Eastern Europe. For a few years Ukraine was the pivot in the struggle between Poland and Muscovy, but eventually Ukraine was unable to maintain its political independence, and it was neither Poland nor Ukraine, but Muscovy that acquired political hegemony in Eastern Europe.

### Poland's Domination and the Rebirth of Ukraine

Nevertheless, the revolution of Bohdan Khmelnytsky in 1648 and the rebirth of the Ukrainian independent nation even for a short period, had some relation with Polish domination over the Ukrainian people. It was through Poland that the influences of humanism came to Ukraine from Western Europe. As in the countries of Western Europe, so in Ukraine, humanism was a stimulus to the Ukrainians to study their own history, literature and language which had been gradually suppressed during the Polish rule.

It was the very definite aim of Poland to eradicate all traces of Ukrainian national entity as well as all bases for its political independence. The old Ukrainian law was abolished in the first half of the XVth century in the Western Ukrainian lands. During the XVIth century this was accomplished in the remaining provinces, and after the liquidation of the autonomous charters of the Ukrainian territories at the close of the century, there was no difference in political status between the provinces of Poland and the newly conquered Ukrainian lands.

The agrarian reform of Queen Bona resulted in the establishment of servitude and the imposition of Polish squires and great property owners on the Ukrainian peasant masses. Simultaneously, the assimilation of the Ukrainian nobility and their integration within the Polish nation was proceeding with accelerated speed. The former Ukrainian gentry and *boyars* became, thus, a special class of Polish citizens of Ukrainian origin, called *gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus*.

But in carrying out this policy of assimilating the Ukrainian nobility, Poland proved to be too weak to Polonize the Ukrainian masses. As a result, the desertions of the Ukrainian gentry to the Polish camp only strengthened the Ukrainian democratic traditions. The common people, in their struggle against their social and economic exploitation by the Poles, joined in a revolutionary movement, which aimed at the re-establishment of a Ukrainian independent state.

By occupying the vast territories of the rich Ukraine far beyond the Dnieper River, Poland did not have sufficient strength to defend these lands against the constant raids of the Crimean Tartars who not infrequently reached even the provinces of Western Ukraine. Consequently, these territories, although under Polish suzerainty, lay waste. Therefore the pioneering in this devastated land fell to the Ukrainian people themselves, since the Polish government was incapable of carrying it on. In addition, the Ukrainians, despite the existence of Polish authority, were compelled to organize their own army in order to provide military protection against the ever-increasing incursion of the Tartars. It was nothing unusual for the Ukrainian settler to be at the same time both a soldier and a pioneer in the economic reconstruction of his country.

Thus the Ukrainian military strength came into being about 1540 when a few thousands Kozaks united to build a stronghold, the Zaporozhian Sich, on the cataracts of the Lower Dnieper. Later the Kozaks pushed their pioneering work southward toward the Black Sea on the peripheries of the old Kievan State, which had been completely deserted and ruined during the XIIIth, XIVth and XVth centuries.

The remarkable characteristic of these Ukrainian settlers was the fact that they were recruited from among the peasants, especially those who were oppressed by the conditions of servitude practiced by Poland in the northern and western parts of Ukraine. As peasants they could not but bring with them the idea of democratic order, inherent in the Ukrainian common people, and a strong opposition against Polish rule over their country. Consequently, at the end of the XVIth century the Kozaks were already organized into a regular military force. It was capable not only of defending them against the Crimean Tartars, but against the Polish landlords who were following them with the aim of expanding their system of servitude to the new territories. In a short time, the Kozaks controlled practically all of Eastern Ukraine and much territory west of the Dnieper. Representing the conscious elements of the Ukrainian people, they soon became a decisive political factor in Eastern Europe, and were able to influence the attitude toward Ukraine of such powerful states as Poland, Turkey and the growing Muscovy.

Together with the rebirth of Ukrainian military strength was the cultural development of the Ukrainian people. Under the influence of humanism and the Reformation that had swept Western Europe,

the new ideas penetrated into Ukraine and awakened the Ukrainian people from their political lethargy and inaction. Soon a strong movement began in favor of a Ukrainian independent state, based on the old traditions of Kieven Rus.—the first Ukrainian nation. The Kozak army was to become the armed force of the reborn Ukrainian nation.

The Ukrainian intelligentsia educated in humanistic schools provided the national ideology. In a most convincing manner this was expressed in the famous *Proclamation of the Ukrainian Orthodox bishops* (1621) to the Kozaks. "This is a clan of the seed of Japheth"—wrote the Ukrainian Hierarchy to those Ukrainian warriors—"who battled the Greek Empire on sea and land. This is the army of these people, which under the leadership of Oleh, Sovereign of Rus, crossed on their boats over sea and land and stormed Constantinople. They also in the time of Saint Volodymir, Sovereign of Rus, fought Greece, Macedonia and Illyria." The Ukrainian Orthodox Episcopate saw clearly that the Kozak army would bring about the rebirth of Ukrainian independence and that this would be only a continuation of the first Ukrainian state, Kievan Rus.

Thus in the middle of the XVIIth century two nations faced each other in Eastern Europe; they differed in their religious ideologies, and their cultural and economic systems: Latin-Christian and aristocratic Poland and democratic Byzantine-Christian Ukraine. A few unsuccessful Kozak uprisings against Poland between 1625 and 1637 were only the forerunners of the all-national Ukrainian revolution under Bohdan Khmelnitsky in 1648, which put an end to Polish domination over a great part of Ukraine and gave a rebirth to the Ukrainian nation.

### The Revolution of Bohdan Khmelnitsky in 1648

After the suppression of the Kozak uprising in 1637 peace was restored again in Ukraine and during the ensuing ten years there was little change in the political situation. The Poles succeeded in imposing their domination on the bulk of the Ukrainian people. It seemed as if the trouble had finally been settled and that it would not rise again, but this was only the calm before the storm.

There soon appeared a new leader, who was to take a long step forward in coordinating all the movements and also in outlining a definite political program for the Ukrainian people.

Bohdan Khmelnitsky, the new leader of the Ukrainian Revolution, was able to unite around him all classes, societies, schools and

the intelligentsia as well against the Polish rulers. He soon gathered over 150,000 first-rate fighters and in a series of crushing defeats inflicted upon the Polish armies, he freed Ukraine from Polish domination. With the debacle of the Polish armies, which were driven out of Ukraine, the landlords and squires who kept the Ukrainian people in social and political bondage, also were forced to leave. As a result, Ukraine in 1649, was already a nation in which all inhabitants were equal before the law, a development not known anywhere in Europe until the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789.

But the sudden successes of Khmel'nitsky confronted him with new problems which were totally unexpected and which were beyond his capacity for solving them. He had to re-organize the nation on a completely new social and economic basis, a nation without a master or serf. Toward that task he needed new cadres of experienced leaders, administrators, social and economic thinkers who could completely rebuild the state organism and thus make Ukraine capable of its own political existence and of defending itself against the still powerful and menacing Poland.

Soon after his victories over Poland, Khmel'nitsky was forced to seek the political protection of Muscovy in order to safeguard Ukrainian independence. He died too soon to realize that his step was a disastrous calamity for the Ukrainian state and for the Ukrainian people in the years that followed.

### Muscovy Against Ukraine

The protectorate of Muscovy over Ukraine, which Khmel'nitsky accepted in 1654, proved to be far more dangerous for the Ukrainians than had been the domination of the Polish kings. From the XIVth century on, Muscovy had never concealed its desire to acquire the Ukrainian lands, on the ground that it and not Ukraine, was the legal successor of Kievan Rus.

That the move made by Khmel'nitsky was extremely unpopular in Ukraine is attested by the numerous protests of Ukrainian enlightened circles and above all, of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Notably opposed to the protectorate of Muscovy were many Kozak officers who rightly saw the beginning of the end of Ukrainian independence once the Muscovite Tsar had the right of protector over it. They favored rather an alliance with Sweden, Turkey and its satellites Transylvania and Moldavia.

The later *hetmans* of Ukraine ceaselessly tried to abrogate the

Treaty of Pereyaslav (1654) by which Muscovy gained control over Ukraine. The Ukrainian-Swedish alliance between *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa of Ukraine and King Charles XII of Sweden, was one of the most striking efforts of the Ukrainians to be rid of Russian domination. Unfortunately, the defeat of both of them at Poltava in 1709 precipitated the fall of Ukraine and the consolidation of the Russian Empire.

Yet, despite the fact that the Ukrainian Revolution against Poland in 1648 had not permanently restored Ukrainian statehood, it became, nevertheless, a perpetual inspiration for the Ukrainian people to be free and independent again. The Kozak period of Ukrainian history renewed the old Ukrainian tradition and their national ambitions.

As for Khmelnsky, his work was not in vain, for he created an idea, even if only in theory, that would assure thinking Ukrainians a permanency and a place in the world. He himself was the real founder of the Ukrainian national movement, an incarnation of the Ukrainian effort for freedom and political independence. It is for these ideals that the new generation of Ukrainians is paying untold sacrifices in blood and suffering on its road toward freedom and independence.



## TRENDS IN UKRAINIAN LITERATURE UNDER THE SOVIETS

By YURIY SHEREKH

### I

THE Ukrainian revolution against Russia broke out in Kiev in 1917, and soon spread through the entire country, beginning with the large cities and ending in the smallest villages. The same love of independence which had caused the Kozak rebellions and the Great Revolution of 1648, came to life again, although it had apparently subsided in the XIX Century.—“The black soil arose once more, and looked the world in the eyes”—wrote Tychyna. As often happens in times of such great upheavals, literature did not keep pace with the political events. The energies of the whole population were drawn into the political reconstruction, and there was little time left for the immediate creation of a new literature.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the years of the hard national struggle for liberation from 1917-20, did not produce many important literary works. The experiences and emotions of the period were pictured chiefly in poetry. The ruling style in literature was *symbolism*. The older masters of the word, such as Alexander Oles, Mykola Vorony, and Hrytzko Chuprynka, were leading exponents—but many of the younger generation as Yakiv Savchenko, Oleksa Slisarenko and last but not least Pavlo Tychyna worked in the same direction.

Ukrainian symbolism on the whole is a peculiar phenomenon. It is unlike that of Western Europe which was an attempt to escape from gross materialistic reality, to soar into other worlds, beyond the reach of the fine human senses.

In Ukrainian symbolism vague mystical and spiritual elements played a very small part, for it was not the result of spiritual fatigue nor a reaction against materialism. It represented a literary trend toward “Europeanization,” and was something of a reaction against the narrow ethnographical current which dominated the literature of the XIX century. This in view of the attitude of the Russian government emphasized those aspects of Ukrainian life which reflected the special cultural tradition of the Ukrainians and especially the peasants. The folk song, music, art and language were so different and nationally individual, that they served best to confirm the fact that the Ukrainians are a separate people, and have nothing in common with Russia.

Toward the end of the last century, the ethnographical sphere became too narrow for Ukrainian literature. The liberation movement spread into all social spheres, the intelligentsia increased in number and the Ukrainian movement ceased to be solely cultural and became a political movement for independence.

A new, bold stream was introduced into symbolism by *Paulo Ty-chyna*. It is marked by three features: philosophic depth, a fundamental musical character and new principles of unity with the folk song. These three innovations changed the entire course of Ukrainian symbolism and made Ty-chyna not only its leading exponent, but the most prominent Ukrainian poet of the twenties.

Ty-chyna came into literature with the profound philosophical point of view of an idealistic pantheist, to whom life has a harmonic depth. The soul of his world is music, and the world itself is "not Zeus, not Pan, not the dove of the Spirit, but clarinets of sunshine." This sublime musical harmony enfolds the cosmos and nature; the aim of man is to let himself be engulfed in this music of the spheres. The national Ukrainian revolution of 1917 to him was an awakening of the inner music of the world, which till that time had slumbered in the Ukrainian nation. He glorified it in the image of the "Golden Harmony" ("Zoloty Homin") that rings from the churches of St. Sophia and the Lavra in Kiev, and echoes in the soul of every Ukrainian. This inner musicality can not be produced through the play of words, with which Chuprynka struggled so long. Ty-chyna sought it in unusual groupings of words, and in images full of unusual meaning. In his poetry the Ukrainian word acquired for the first time a manifold meaning, as in the poems of the western European symbolists.

He created a new Ukrainian poetry that was deeply philosophic and at the same time deeply subjective, not the poetry of journalism or the salons, but profoundly human, in the full meaning of the word. In the XIX century, with the exception of Shevchenko, the folk song had been merely imitated or reconstructed. Ty-chyna showed that European thoughts, problems and poetic forms could be synthesized with the images, forms and universal problems in the Ukrainian folk songs. In his volumes "Clarinet of Sunshine" (1918), "The Plow" (1919), "Instead of Sonnets and Octaves" (1920), and "Wind from Ukraine" (1924) he gave examples of such a synthesis.<sup>1</sup> However this aspect of

<sup>1</sup> In the latest editions of his works, his poems on national or religious subjects have been either omitted or modified. It is therefore necessary to study his early writings only from the older, uncensored texts.



Tychyna's literary significance was only fully realized later. During those turbulent years he was to his contemporaries the deepest Ukrainian poet of the national revolution and the peak of Ukrainian symbolism. The Europeanizing of Ukrainian poetry was not yet completed. Its actual exponents were the futurists and the neoclassicists.

*Ukrainian futurism* in literature came into existence before the First World War. As in other countries, it was a movement of the city intelligentsia, that was characterized by contempt for the old cultural traditions, the destruction of poetic forms, and the praise of modern technical civilization to an extreme degree.

In Ukraine it was marked by its emphatic derision of that peasant life, which had been exalted and idealized in the XIX century,—and its particular emphasis was on the great metropolis. The leader of the Ukrainian futurists, Mychaylo Semenko, began by writing poems about the city cafes, and then went to an intentionally contentless series of meaningless sounds and ended with a hymn to modern technical civilization. His poetic forms are marked by their accumulation of foreign expressions, the wide use of "impoetical" words, the denial of the accepted poetic metre and rhythm—in a word futuristic poetry took on many of the characteristics of prose.

As the futurists, and to some extent the symbolists, in their attempts to Europeanize Ukrainian literature, turned to the modern aspects of European literatures, a group of intellectuals, connected with Mykola Zerov, professor of Ukrainian literature in Kiev, propounded the idea of going back to the sources of European culture, and above all the ancient classics: Ad Fontes, Zerov and his comrades (Pavlo Filipovych, Mychaylo Dray-Khmara, Yury Klen, Maksym Rylsky) demanded as a counterbalance to the futuristic poetic chaos, severely disciplined verses of perfect form and cultured refinement. This group, led by Zerov, came to be called the *Neoclassicists*. The name however is incidental and can be explained only by the love that its leader, M. Zerov, had for classical literature. The poets of this group were in no way strict masters of the classic style, either in the Greco-Roman sense or in that of the French classics of the XVII century or the French Parnassians of the XIX century. Zerov alone attained the perfection of the Parnassians in his masterful sonnets, which were his favorite verses, and in which he pictured the tranquility of childhood or ancient eras, and especially the calmness and equanimity of the antique world. The rest of the new classic poets, were nearer to symbolism (Dray-Khmara) or to romantism (Y. Klen).


The group of neo-classics crystalized later, in the mild twenties, after the downfall of the struggle for independence. It was the climax and, at the same time, the end of the Europeanizing movement. The merits of this literary trend were high, especially in the perfecting of the form of the new Ukrainian verse. But at that time the leading role in literature had passed already to other groups and other trends.

## II

The struggle between Ukraine and Russia lasted three years, 1918-1920. Russia refused to accept the loss of such a rich colony. Twice the Communist forces flooded Ukraine in the winters of 1918 and of 1919—and both times they were repelled. Therefore for the third attack the Russians turned to cunning. At first Communism had come to Ukraine as an unmasked foe—as a real Russian conqueror. After two defeats Russia finally came to the conclusion that she would have to compromise. She had to agree to accept Ukraine as an independent republic in the Soviet Union, with its own cultural life, but demanded only, that the administrative body was to be communistic. The Communists knew what they were doing. They directed the Ukrainian creative forces into the channel of cultural activity. In this way they attained two results: they centralized political and economic power in their own hands, and at the same time they gave prominent Ukrainians the opportunity to reveal themselves, in order to be destroyed by the Communists whenever they deemed it proper.

Whatever were the ultimate aims of the Communists for a time there opened up for the Ukrainians wide possibilities in the fields of literature, art and science. The result was that sudden and rapid growth of Ukrainian culture, marked the twenties. The creative forces of the nation found an outlet in cultural activity, and dedicated themselves to this work with fervent devotion and enthusiastic zeal. In the literature of that time we find writers, who agreed or disagreed with the Communist Revolution. Some of them very discreetly, as *Hryhory Koshynka*, who showed the *conflict of the Ukrainian village with Communism*. He detested Communism and the city; to him the only positive and constructive element was the peasant class. But he accepted the revolution, in as much as it gave the land to the peasant, and he did not wish the return of the large landowners.

Others accepted the *Communist Revolution with sincere enthusiasm*. To them it seemed that it was bringing a new and just order to all mankind and that Ukrainian nation would at last find its indepen-



LITERARY GROUP VAPLITE—Free Academy of Proletarian Literature. 1926. (Explanation see footnote 3)

dent place among the other free nations. It is for this reason that Communism was glorified by the young poet Volodymyr Sosyura, not so long before a soldier in the army of the Ukrainian Republic, and likewise by Mykola Khvylovy, the author of two volumes of short stories: "Blue Etudes" (1923) and "Autumn" (1927), a novel "Woodsnipes" (1927) and other works. Khvylovy had an unusually great influence and was in fact the organizer of the new Ukrainian literature. First he founded the literary organization "Hart"<sup>1</sup> (1923), and later "Vaplite"<sup>2</sup> (The Academy of Proletarian Literature), which played a decisive role in the development of the new Ukrainian literature, although it existed for only one year (1927).

*Khvylovy* was captivated by the elemental power and the impetus of the Communist Revolution. He believed that in the fire of revolution the backward and exploited Ukraine would be renewed, and would begin to travel a new and wide road. He was lost in the Communist-propagated dream of achieving happiness for mankind by destroying the ruling classes. In his early poems and short stories Khvylovy wrote about the power of the revolution, the Red terror and the proletariat, that was to redeem mankind, about factories and mills.

However he was not long an active Communist for he underwent a grave crisis. He began to see that Communism did not bring Ukraine the desired happiness. On the contrary, a new ruling class emerged, drafted from Communist Party circles. The new system demanded of him and his like the sacrifice of all that was Ukrainian in the service of a foreign master, Moscow. This problem he developed with tragic force in the story "I," the hero of which might well be the author himself. This man fascinated by the strength of the Communist Revolution, sincerely wants to serve it—even unto the most terrible deeds: he went to work for the "Cheka," that silenced all protest against Communism with vicious terror. But he found that his comrades, in the "Cheka," were foreigners (Russians), degenerates, men without feeling and humanity, sadists and villains. Terror to them was not a means, but an

<sup>2</sup> Ukrainian word related to the tempering of metal.

<sup>3</sup> Picture of the literary group VAPLITE (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature) in 1926. Seated from left to right: the poet Pavlo Tychna, the novelist Mykola Khvylovy (shot himself in 1933), the dramatist Mykola Kulish (disappeared in exile), the poet and novelist Oleksa Slisarenko (disappeared in the Solovki slave labor camp), the novelist Mikha Yohansen (shot by the Soviets), the novelist Hordiy Kotziuba (disappeared), the novelist Petro Panch (now attacked for "nationalism"), the novelist Arkadiy Lubchenko, Secretary of the Academy (died from ill treatment during his arrest, by the German Gestapo). Standing from left to right: M. Maykovsky (disappeared), the novelist Hryhory Epic (sentenced to life imprisonment), Oleksa Kopylenko, Ivan Senchenko (now attacked for "nationalism"), P. Ivanow (disappeared), Yuriy Smolych, Oles Dosvitny (shot), Ivan Dniprovsky (disappeared). Photo from the collection of S. Hordynsky.

end in itself. He was torn with doubt: whether it was possible to make the world happy, and build a new harmonious order, on outrage and violence. Was it possible to bring happiness to mankind from without? Were not the noble slogans of the Communist Revolution changing into their opposite?

The story reaches its climax, when among the victims, that were to be put to death by the hero, he saw his own mother. He shot her with the others, but with her death his own life ended. Now he could not but see, that all his endeavors had served only foreign and hostile powers, that they were turned against him and all that was dear to him, ultimately all that was Ukrainian. The mother in this story is not merely a human individual, but Ukraine herself. The author understood already, that under the false humane slogans of Communism there were concealed the imperialistic interests of Moscow, and the man who thought that he was serving universal Communism was actually serving merely the occupants, who had come to Ukraine to subdue her, and had instituted terror in order to destroy all her best sons.

The problem treated in the story "I" has a vital and universal meaning for our time. The very problem now looms menacingly in all the countries, which are at present in the power of Soviet imperialism. Russia made the first round of aggression in 1920. Her first victims were Ukraine, White Ruthenia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbeyjan. Now the second round of this aggressive policy is taking place. Russia has occupied Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldavia, and is endeavoring to digest Roumania, Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia etc. In these countries there are still people, who wish to serve the Communist idea in all truth and sincerity. But the conqueror bids them to execute their own mothers.

In Khvylovy's other stories we follow the degeneration of the revolution. Old oppressors are overthrown, but in their place new ones have sprung up; the new administrative class uncivilized, filthy and cruel (the "Swine"), a new bureaucracy foreign to the nation ("Ivan Ivanovych," "Revisor").

Disappointment in the revolution compelled the author to think more profoundly about the road that would lead to the full development of Ukraine? What was to be done? The return to the old order of things was not the answer. The old was irrevocably dead, both in its good and evil aspects. History knows no return. New ways and means had to be found. New trails had to be cleared. In a series of articles and pamphlets the author treated the philosophy of the history of Ukraine.

These articles and pamphlets caused a wide and extremely animated discussion during the years 1925-27, and proved themselves so dangerous to Communism, that Stalin himself saw fit to interfere, by instigating a new wave of ruthless terror. But Khvylovy's ideas, under the name of Khvylovism, became the gospel of young Ukraine.

Khvylovy made it clear that the expectation aroused by the revolution had not been fulfilled. Moscow, under the guise of the world liberator, was really the parasitic center of the Soviet bourgeoisie, that exploited Ukraine economically, suppressed her politically, and culturally strove to make her a provincial nation of the second rank. Ukraine and Russia could not travel the same road. In her cultural traditions the former was a part of Europe, the youngest part. When Europe was weary and pessimistic, Ukraine was budding with new strength, zeal and the will to fight. The Asiatic nations, that were her nearest neighbors in the east, were in the same position. An "Asiatic Renaissance" was at hand, and Ukraine had every chance to become its leader. All the more so, because willingly or not, she found herself in the process of revolution and possessed the desire and will to fulfill the great ideas of freedom and democracy.

These views, announced with an extraordinary power, pathos and sarcasm, caused a veritable furore. In its essence this was a *Ukrainian Messianism*. The Ukrainian nation was to liberate itself, and by its example bring about the liberation of other nations. This Messianism was neither fanatical nor limited. The liberation was to be brought about not by force, but by the example of an equal among equals.

These ideals found a powerful echo throughout the nation. The official Soviet criticism made a great hue and cry, and labeled the author a traitor and a bourgeois nationalist. However all the people that were progressive and intelligent enough to grasp the meaning of his ideas were on his side. So there sprung up around Khvylovy a group of writers under the name of *Vaplite*. Vaplite found sympathizers in the theater *Berezil*, with its superb regisseur Les Kurbas, and in the artistic circles of the *Armou* (Association of Revolutionary Artists of Ukraine, with the school of Boychuk at the head). This triple constellation of *Vaplite*, *Armou* and *Berezil* brought about for a short time a common thought: to go back to the foundations of ancient Ukrainian art, not to copy it blindly, but to use its elements creatively, in order to achieve a new and modern Ukrainian style. The members and sympathizers of *Vaplite* felt, that they were citizens of the universe. But most of all they loved their own country with a passionate devotion and tenderness,

because they felt and believed Ukraine to be the first in Europe, if not in the world, to accept the bloody ordeal of Communism and find the courageous possibility of conquering it spiritually.

In literature Mykola Khvylovy preached an *active romanticism*. By this he understood all literary styles that took an active part in life, not merely aping it, with lack of imagination, but interfering with it, trying to change it, improve and reconstruct it. This interference could be of several kinds; sharp satirical ridicule, deep philosophic meditation, passionate poetic glorification... This appeal for active romanticism became the motto of a combative, vital literature, which was at the same time critical and optimistic.

It was at this time that Khvylovy wrote his novel *Valdshnepy* ("Wood-snipes"). It is economic in style and unimpassioned, without unnecessary detail, and with a minimum of description. It is evident that the most important part for the author were the dialogues, in which the characters of the story discuss the series of problems, that occupied him and his readers. These problems dealt mainly with the development of a new type of Ukrainian. Through the words of his heroine Ahlaya the author seeks the reason for Ukraine's enslavement in the XVIII-XIX centuries and the defeat following the revolution of 1917. He sees these reasons not so much in outside circumstances as in the psychology of the Ukrainian. Ahlaya reproves her partner, Karamazov, for lack of will and discipline, an inclination to meditation instead of action. She finds these same faults in the historical figures of Ukraine.

These passionate, and often sarcastic, dialogues form the greater part of the novel as it is known to exist. Another part the author was forced to destroy.

The task of Khvylovy and his comrades was to close the accounts with the past and to tear out from its root the provincial complacency, that had developed in Ukraine in the XIX century. The most dangerous outside enemies were the representatives of the new occupation and the Soviet regime.

At this time too *Satiré* began to develop. Hryhory Epic venomously ridiculed the creatures of the new Communist order, in *Nepiy* Ivan Senchenko crushed the inert and stagnant small town (Portraits of Chervonohrad). A tribute to satire was paid likewise by the greatest Ukrainian dramatists, *Mykola Kulish*. He began as a genre playwright. His first works lacked depth, they were merely scenes from peasant life, and were often used as propaganda. His friendship with Khvylovy and

Kurbas compelled him to look deeper into the present reality and to make a different attitude in his dramas. This resulted in his writing of *Narodny Malakhy* (The People's Malakhy), the tragic story of a man, who had read the works of Lenin and his followers, and believes that the Communists really have created a new paradise in Ukraine,—only to find that in the capitol of Ukraine, this new regime has found the triumph of bureaucracy and the scum of the city, the triumph of all that was low and vile. The "azure dreams" of the village mailman, Malakhy, found a tragic end in their impact with reality. Kulish proved that the revolution had destroyed the pre-revolutionary order, together with its good and evil, but had put in its place nothing better or higher. Instead of the promised communism and socialism it brought a new system of repression of one human being by another, a system far more complete, heartless and dreadful, than the old pre-revolutionary system. Malakhy passed through three stages: the Soviet bureaucratic institution, the insane asylum and the brothel,—they all serve to illustrate the hellish inhumanity of the Soviet regime. The drama ends with the tragic question, if the dream has been destroyed—what next? The author offers no answer to this question in his play.

The drama is written in tones of a tragic grotesque. It is like a new variation of *Don Quixote*. The figure of the knight in his hopeless struggle with evil—is Malakhy. The traits of faithful Sancho Panza are reproduced in Malakhy's uninspired companion—Kum. In the comedy *Myna Mazaylo* Kulish ridicules the Soviet Ukrainization." The power of this play lies in the characters, and although it became classic example of the national comedy, it has no positive hero for the author apparently regards only the man of action as such.

Such a character appears in the tragedy *Sonate Pathetique*. In vivid, clear and almost allegorical figures the play reviews the Ukrainian revolution of 1917. Some of the characters symbolize the Communists, others the sympathizers with pre-war Russia, still others represent the various trends among the Ukrainians. But above all other figures rises the person of Maryna—a proud, strongwilled woman, who does not hesitate to give her own life and the life of others in order to bring about the final victory of Ukraine. She is a person dominated not by emotions, but by a purposeful will, unbending in her decisiveness and self discipline. The figure of Maryna is idealized and glorified with the author's love. If the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 was to him a powerful and utterly fascinating *Sonate Pathetique*—then Maryna was it superb virtuoso.



The dramas of Mykola Kulish developed out of the expressionistic dramas of G. Reiser; we can find analogies with the work of Elmer Rice and Eugene O'Neil. But the plays of Kulish are so characteristic and tense, that all these parallels are very remote. In the literatures of America and Western Europe nothing similar is to be found. Such dramas as *Narodny Malakhy* and *Sonate Pathetique* could easily mark a new epoch in the theatrical life of the world. But after a few performances the *Narodny Malakhy* was stopped, and the *Sonate Pathetique* was forbidden even before its appearance. The manuscript was saved, however, and it was printed for the first time in Lviv in 1943.

Among the philosophic and historiosophic works the *Vertep* or Puppet Show of Arkady Lubchenko was the most important. It was made after the traditional Christmas puppet show. The stage usually consists of three stories: heaven (paradise), earth and hell. In the conception of time it is the past, the present and the future. Lubchenko developed many philosophical problems in the separate chapters of this book, such as: life and death, time and man's attitude toward it, man's attitude toward nature and his fellow beings, Ukrainian Messianism, realism and idealism, the individual and the community. The *Vertep* is an abstract philosophical work, rather than a work of literature. All the problems are presented in original and vivid images of an allegorical type; the epilogue of the book is a hymn to man, active and creative, who subdues nature, builds up the future of his nation and mankind, and moves honestly, nobly and firmly toward his goal.

In the stories of Senchenko, the dramas of Kulish and the *Vertep* of Lubchenko we observe the return to the old traditions of Ukrainian literature, as their main source. They stem from the folklore, the dumas, the old Ukrainian theater, the chronicles and the old novels, and thus they initiate a new phase in the development of Ukrainian literature. The Europeanizing of Ukrainian literature, preached by such literary groups as the symbolists, the futurists and neo-classicists has born fruit. Ukrainian literature has freed itself from the limitations, so obvious in the works of the XIX century. Now there is the work of synthesizing the results of this movement with the old Ukrainian traditions. Toward the end of the twenties there began this task. The problem involved crystalizing the national character of Ukrainian literature, not only in its contents, but in its style. In this field direction Yury Yanovsky has special merits.

In these years Yanovsky wrote a volume of poems, and three novels: *Bayhorod*, *The Master of the Ship* (1928), and *Four Sabers* (1930)

Among his later works the most important was *Vershnyky* (1934). Yanovsky at the time was a passionate romanticist, fascinated by the sea and the steppe, both vast and infinite. The sea and particularly the steppe cherish the spirit of freedom of reckless courage, the ability to live on a tremendous scale, scorning the petty rules of the city and the rural provincials. In his prose there is a certain rhythm, a fluency of phrases, that perpetually reminds the reader of the sweeping quality of a folk song of the steppe. Yanovsky loves the strong, primeval type of men, who is perhaps somewhat crude in conduct, but always deep in emotions and powerful in action. His heroes are seamen, vagabonds, and the partizans of the steppe, who with heroic humor disturbed the steppe by their raids during the Ukrainian-Russian struggle of 1918-1920. They have no political program or military system, their reactions are elemental, but essentially typical of the undying Ukrainian spirit. They are like the old Zaporozhian Kozaks of the XVI-XVII centuries, who ranged in the same manner over the steppe, fighting foreign intruders, Tartars, Turks, Poles and Russians alike. These men have much in common with the American Pioneers in the Wild West. And if the American writers were fascinated by the powerful vitality of the pioneers, the prototypes of Yanovsky's heroes had the same fascination for him. At the time when Khvylovy and Kulish were attempting to show what the intelligent Ukrainian should be, Yanovsky showed what the Ukrainian *Stepovyyk* (Man of the Steppe) was. Both these types have many similar traits.

Toward the end of the twenties the *realistic novel* was developed as in the *City of Valerian Pidmohylny*, *Death of Borys Antonenko-Davidovych*, and the *Black Lake of Gzhytzky*. *Pidmohylny* was perhaps the best novelist of the day. He translated into Ukrainian many of the French realists, especially Maupassant, and this phase of his apprenticeship, so to speak, to the French masters is evidently his later works. From the French he learned to give a broad picture of the surroundings of his character. He gave them a wide social and local background, he analyzed their emotions and feelings deeply and finely. His novel *The City* written in an unusually calm and objective manner, is a profound and convincing story of a village youth, who comes to the city, experiences its temptations, finally conquers it. The action takes place in Kiev, and the author grasped the very soul of this city, which in the distant past strove against Byzantium, withstood one by one Tartar, Polish and Russian attacks and amid all these trials retained its Ukra-

inian soul. The conquest of the Metropolis by the village—is the idea of Pidmohylny's novel.

*Borys Antonenko-Davydovych* in the novel *Death* treated the same subject, that Mykola Khvylovy had used in his story *I*, but the style is different. He employed lyrical and ornamental prose, to develop his subject on a broad realistic foundation. Here a Ukrainian lets himself be carried away by the international ideas of Communist Moscow, but soon learns, that these bombastic ideas are only another mask for Russian imperialism.

In the "*Black Lake*" *V. Gzhytzky* likewise reveals the imperialistic appetites of the pseudo-international Communist politics toward the various nations of the Soviet Union. His background, however, is not that of Ukraine, but of the Oyrotes in the heart of the exotic Aetay.

Another trend in the literature of this period is represented by a few authors, who developed the tense short story and the adventurous novel. Leading among them were Oleksa Slisarenko, Mike Yohansen and Yury Smolych.

The great development of Ukrainian culture, and the ideas of Mykola Khvylovy, in particular, found many enthusiastic sympathizers, not only within the borders of Soviet Ukraine, but beyond them, as well. The ideas of Khvylovy were akin to those set forth in the Scientific Literary Review called *Naukovo Literaturny Visnyk*, published by D. Dontsov in Lwiw. The group of writers and publicists, working in this review, also dreamed of a new and strong Ukrainian type and the rebirth of the nation. They had the same messianic ideas, and believed that a reborn Ukraine would have a message for the world. The leading prose writer of this group, Ulas Samchuk, wrote in his large three volume epos *Volyn* (published also in French, German, Polish and Croatian translations): "We are not only a patch of land, an undefined spot on the map. We are an idea, a dream, a vision. We have begun the Book of Exodus and are now wandering through the desert, for long years, in search of the Promised Land."

The sudden progress of creative Ukrainian culture, the enthusiasm of the masses, the increase of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which in spite of all the obstacles began to conquer the cities—frightened and disturbed the Russian occupants, Russia came to the conclusion that, unless she interfered with this powerful cultural progress and stopped it, it would overflow the banks and then it would be impossible to limit the movement purely to questions of culture. *Following a direct order from Moscow the administration began the attack, especially on the*

literary nucleus of opposition—the *Vaplite*. The Party press indignantly denounced Khvylovy and his comrades. The dramas of Kulish were forbidden performance on the stage. Khvylovy was forced to burn the manuscript of *Valdshnepy*. The sixth issue of the literary review of *Vaplite* was confiscated, and the organization itself closed.

As a counteraction a new literary group was organized, the *Vuspp* (The Ukrainian Alliance of Proletarian Writers). It did not possess any competent authors, but it was showered with favors by the Communist Party and was an obedient tool in its hands. *Vuspp* was planned as the Trojan horse, and played its role to perfection. Its goal was to cultivate a new literature, in the Ukrainian language, to be sure, but hostile in its essence to all that was Ukrainian. Its purpose was to translate mechanically into Ukrainian the slogans and programs of Moscow, to the exclusion of all independent thought. In practice the *Vuspp* carried out the slogan of Socialistic realism, as dictated by Moscow. (This name arose later, in the mid-thirties). *Socialist realism* implied the copying of the phenomena of life as selected according to the Soviet program and appointed by the administration. It is practically the same realism as that demanded by Hitler, and in an identical manner, he repudiated all other styles as “degenerate art.”

These measures, however, did not stop the struggle. Due to the fact that all direct speech was strictly forbidden, a new language was created—the language of Esop—of allusions, vague and undefined implications, two edged quips. It was the language of Shakespeare’s court fools—who knew how to mask by it the most venomous and bitter criticism of their masters. From that time on the literature of Soviet Ukraine could appear only under a mask, which concealed its revolutionary content in conciliatory phrases. Some of the authors achieved perfection in this new style (1928-1930). Their sallies were hailed with great interest, especially as they stung the occupant secretly, but the more acutely.

Khvylovy was likewise compelled to use this form. When *Vaplite* and its organs were liquidated, Khvylovy organized a new journal of a peculiar type—*The Literary Market*. As anyone may come to a market to sell his merchandise, so said Khvylovy, every writer may send his manuscript to *The Literary Market*, and it will be printed. This made the Journal open not only to the former members of *Vaplite*, but to all others, including the members of *Vuspp*. But the editorial staff added to these works their humorous notices and suggestions, which they called “intermedia.” This was supposed to be done in order to amuse

the reader, but in reality the "intermedia," written by the highly competent member of *Vaplite*, became *Vaplite's* secret platform. It is no wonder, therefore, that *The Literary Market*, after existing only one year, was closed.

The attack of the Communist Party, and its agencies on Ukrainian literature grew to tremendous dimensions. But before silencing the Ukrainian, authors, the occupational administration had to subdue those that supported them—the readers, that is the masses of Ukrainian laborers, peasants and intelligentsia. In 1930-31, under the pretext of collectivization a famine was organized in Ukraine. The peasants deprived of their produce died of starvation by the millions, while at the same time Moscow was overflowing with Ukrainian bread. This action of exterminating the Ukrainian peasants can be compared, in its colossal proportions, only to the Nazi system of annihilating the Jews, with the difference that death from a bullet or a gas chamber was much easier and more merciful, than death from starvation.

Under such circumstances all thoughts of literature were abandoned. The time was ripe for the destruction of the creators of the new literature. With the special assignment of *extinguishing Ukrainian culture* Moscow sent her party emissary, Postyshev, to Ukraine. This name will forever be written on the darkest pages of the history of Ukrainian culture. Carrying out the will of his masters, this man caused a flood of misery.

Postyshev's first victims were Mykola Skrypnyk, the commissar (minister) of national education in Ukraine and Mykola Khvylovy. Both ended their lives with a pistol shot in Kharkiv, in order not to fall into the hands of the hangman. The shot fired by Khvylovy in May 13, 1933, was a signal. It meant, that the agreement between the Russian occupants and Ukraine had come to an end. Moscow then began the attack, aimed at the total annihilation of Ukrainian culture.

A ruthless terror followed immediately. Among seventy-nine authors and scientists, executed by Soviet firing squad in December 1934, were such talents as Hryhory Kosynka, Kost Buroviy and Oleksa Vlysko. Mykola Kulish, Les Kurbas, Mychaylo Boychuk, Oleksa Slisarenko, Valerian Pidmohylny, Mike Yohansen, Ostap Vyshnia, Borys Auntonenko-Davydovych, Hryhory Epik, Mykola Zirov, Pavlo Filipovych, Evhen Pluynyk, Mychaylo Sochenko, Volodymyr Gzhytzky, and hundreds of others were exiled. Only the person who has experienced it can know what Soviet exile means. No Nazi Buchenwald or Auschwitz can be compared with it. It is no wonder, therefore, that from

among all the condemned, only one, Ostap Vyshnya, the humorist, survived. The verdict of exile was a sentence of slow and agonizing death.

After 1933 there came the *complete collapse of Ukrainian literature*, along with a violent and wholesale Russification of the country. Since then not one important work has appeared. It is characteristic, that the members of *Vuspp* shared the same fate as those of *Vaplite*. After having carried out their destructive mission, they were not needed any longer and fell victims of the general liquidation (Ivan Mykytenko, Ivan Kurylenko, Yulian Kulyk and others). Exile to the depths of Russia implicated not only the death of the individual, but the death of his name as well. The works of the exiled were immediately removed from all libraries and destroyed (not publicly as Goebbels did, but secretly), and it was strictly forbidden even to mention the name of the condemned—as if they had never existed.

Terror and rewards were used to break the spirit of Ukrainian writers. In some cases, as for instance that of Tychyna, the aim was attained. In all world literature no one has ever written so many odes, as those dedicated to Stalin in the last decade. The universally despised dictator has been honored with praises, that even a God would blush to accept. However both the authors and the readers are fully aware of the value of these praises. Writers who have been decorated with orders continually feel, that they are not trusted and are spied upon by the secret police. This lack of trust became especially evident in the first days of the Russian-German war. The first to be removed from Kiev were not the museums, galleries and economic wealth, but the writers and cultural workers. No excuses for not complying with the order for this "voluntary" evacuation were accepted. The administration saw its greatest danger in the possibility, that some of these doomed men, in escaping, might reveal the truth about the Soviet regime in Ukraine. Although all knew that the Germans had come to Ukraine as hostile occupants, they hoped to escape through Germany to Europe, and eventually reach the democratic world. However from the literary elite only Arkadiy Lubchenko succeeded. He had boarded an evacuation train, but he saved himself and his little son by springing from it. (Let us add in parenthesis, that his later death in Germany was caused by the cruel treatment of the German Gestapo, during his imprisonment, brought about by the secret agents of the Russian NKVD, then in the service of the Nazis!)

After the war a new wave of terror flooded the country, bringing

with its new persecutions of writers and artists. We need not wonder at the continual terror against Ukrainian authors and Ukrainians in general, but it is amazing how Ukrainian literature perpetually regenerates itself. At times when all seems to be lost and extinguished—new names appear, new works are born, only to disappear again in a few years. In contemporary Ukrainian literature, on the other side of the iron curtain, there can be no word about styles, trends or prominent works. But through the very existence of Ukrainian literature, in spite of all the cruel and ruthless persecutions, the Ukrainian nation proves that it never was and never will be reconciled with the Russian occupants.

Although Ukrainian literature in the Soviet Union dares not express the thoughts, dreams and desires of its nation,—nevertheless, it exists—and the bare fact of its existence is a miracle and a proof of the unbending spirit of the people in the struggle for independence.

The real thoughts, dreams and desires of the nation are proclaimed by the writers outside the boundaries of the USSR. Their mission is as serious as the mission of German emigré literature during the years when the Brown Pestilence raged in Europe. The representatives of Ukrainian literature in the emigration are quite numerous, and among them are to be found some of the best names. They never forget the fact that, although they are territorially separated from their country, they can never be spiritually parted, and when the center of the Red Pestilence falls apart in decay, their reunion with their nation will be joyous and fruitful.

But Ukrainian emigré literature is a theme that calls for a separate treatment.



## THE THIEF

By MARKO CHEREMSHYNA

(Translated by C. H. Andrusyshen)

**A**FTER the feast of Epiphany his father died; his mother did not tarry very much longer; and finally, whatever he inherited was taken away from him to pay off the debts. For weeks on end small Yura, Priymak's son, wanders about all alone, and no one ever asks him if he ate, slept, or if he has a shirt on. Nobody at all!

His pale little face became as yellow as wax, and on both its sides the bones protruded sharply, while his eyes sank into his head and became bleary. Only his thick, uncombed hair grew even more profusely and covered his forehead and neck, but was not covered itself. His front teeth also grew bigger to take the place of those which he had lost during his father's lifetime. But what's the use! His upper lip is too short to cover them, and for that reason the children out on the street mock him and call him buck-toothed.

When his father was still alive, Yura used to tend a goat and take it out to graze along the edges of fields and on the banks of brooks, until the goat was taken away for debt. Then he led a wonderful life indeed: he was a shepherd. And even now he went about with a little whip. The handle he had cut out of a hazel-wood, and a rope, which some fettered horse had lost on the village common, he twisted into a lash. From the same rope he also made himself a belt to hold up his trousers.

And so he walks down the street, making a cracking sound with his whip. And when some farmer observes him doing that and scornfully ridicules the boy, saying: "What do you think you're doing, boy, taking dogs to pasture?"—Yura lowers his head, hides the whip behind his back, greets the farmer politely, and passes him by very quickly. And then again the same cracking sound of the whip is heard.

So eager indeed is he to be a shepherd.

But nobody wants to hire him as a shepherd. An aunt of his came from the neighboring village, where she serves in the priest's household, and took him to the rich Krechun to see if he would hire the boy to herd cattle.

"I don't need a tramp like him. He's liable to steal something from my house and run away, and then try to find him. You could sooner catch the wind in the field than him. I am capable of looking after my own property without his help. He is a bad lubber."



So did Krechun thunder out in reply to Yura's aunt; while Yura became so terrified that he fled from the yard before the rich man had time to finish what he had to say.

And when the aunt was saying good-bye to Yura, before returning to her village where she worked, she said: "Out of my sight, you wretch. Shame is all I get from you."

And Yura continues to pace up and down the village streets.

If he ever finds a vegetable or a berry of any kind in the forest, he simply throws it into his mouth and in one swallow it is gone. And if someone takes pity on him and gives him a slice of bread, he does not take it immediately. And if he does, it seems to him the entire world is falling upon him.

"Thank you, uncle, auntie, I am not hungry," he says; while his eyes appear to devour it most greedily. So bashful he is.

If one walks along the meadow of the rich Krechun, following the brook and the hedge, one arrives at Fenchuk's meadow land, and finally finds himself ascending Klotichka hill. On the Klotichka berries grow in such abundance that one cannot but sit down and eat them. Yura had been going there for some time for his noonday meals, but their season is now over. Now he is going there to see whether they have appeared under the top leaves.

The sun has just had its lunch period and again started out on its journey. It is beating down so hard on the Lord's earth that perspiration rolls thickly down one's face. In the meadow Krechun's old wife let the calf go to suck the cow so that the cow would release some of her milk. She herself is crouching on the other side and slowly, one after another, takes the teats out of the calf's mouth. While the calf sucks and sucks, from time to time it nudges the udder and continues sucking. While Yura looks at it all through the reed enclosure. As soon as the calf sticks its head under the cow's udder, he too pushes his head through the reed fence; and as soon as Krechun's woman strikes the calf on the mouth and it moves its head to the side, he likewise draws his head back from among the reeds.

When at last Krechun's wife seized the calf by its tail and ears and dragged it to the stall, Yura rose and continued on his way.

He walks slowly and does not make his whip crack at all. At times he even stumbles over insignificant obstructions, as if he did not see where he was going in broad daylight. By the rope which fell from his belly to his hips one might easily judge that it was hunger that was blinding his eyes.

While in the brook the water is gurgling and rushing from one stone to the other. And he recalled how his father once had brought fish from Bessarabia. It was so salty and so tasty. His mother had boiled it with onions and given him a piece the thickness of two fingers. It was then that he had taken the goat out to graze along the brook. He ate the fish and time and time again drank water from the brook, so that the rich woman Krechun was jealous of him when she came to the brook with the buckets.

"And where have you been that you're gulping down so much water? At a feast?" she asked angrily.

This sweet memory was interrupted by the rope which finally determined to fall from his hips to the ground. He tied it shorter and, step by step, reached Fenchuk's meadow. And in the meadow the cow was mooing and slowly walking towards him. It may have appeared to the cow that Fenchuk's wife was coming to milk her and bringing some fodder, because it was exactly milking time, and a cow certainly knows those things.

Yura stopped and leaned against the reed enclosure. At first he lowered his head as if he were thinking of something, and then he stuck his fingers into his mouth and began to masticate them and look at the cow very, very sorrowfully.

The cow drew closer and closer to him. When she reached him, she stuck out her head and put her mouth to his hand as if to sniff him, and then began to lick his hands, face and hair.

The sensation Yura felt was much sweeter than at the times when his mother used to delouse him in the sun. It is the first time since her death that he experiences such a pleasurable feeling, such warmth. Being an orphan, he has met only coldness and mockery. For the third day now he has had nothing in his mouth. If it continues much longer, the skin of his belly will get stuck to his back. Out of gratitude he began to pat the cow's forehead and say: "My Mitzka, my dear little one!" Then he climbed over the reed fence, plucked a handful of grass and gave it to the cow. The cow began to eat it. As he looked at her eating it, he suddenly recalled his hunger. And he also recalled Krechun's calf which had been sucking its mother with so much relish; and he again remembered all the sweetness he had experienced while his father and mother were alive. And he forgot where he was, and went down on his knees at the cow's udder, drew the teats to his parched lips and sucked them, one after another, unconscious of what he was doing. While the

cow stands still, chewing her cud. She is glad that she will get rid of her milk in time and that her udder will become lighter.

But old woman Fenchuk does not forget her household chores, because it is not for nothing that she has been a housewife for twenty-one years. In one hand she carries a bundle of fodder and in the other a milk bucket, and goes to her cow out in the meadow. She walks in that direction and considers if she should leave to-day's milk for cream or if she should take it to Jew Berko's wife and sell it raw and for that money buy a candle to burn as an offering to the Mother of God. She is a member of the church sorority, you know. She comes up to the cow, stops, looks, looks again, and cannot believe her eyes. So angry did she become that she let both the fodder and the milk bucket fall to the ground.

"I wish you sucked blood, I wish you did!" she shouted at him at first, just as a cow growls at a young steer when the latter draws near to its mother's teats without her permission. Following that she pounced on Yura who continued to kneel and suck, insensible to all else, seized him by the hair and turned him head upwards.

"So that's the kind of a thief you are! So you're now set on stealing my cow's milk, are you, robber? My cow's milk?"

She was lamenting at the top of her voice and striking Yura indiscriminately over the face, legs, belly. Then she grasped him by the hair, raised him in the air and dashed him to the ground. In the meantime the cow moved away from the spot, walked up to the abandoned fodder and began to eat it peacefully. That sight increased the anger of Fenchuk's woman. She again seized Yura by the shock of his hair and raised him again. It was only then that Yura seemed as if he had awakened from sleep. Up to that time he was not aware of what had been happening to him. Fenchuk's woman beat him, but he did not say anything; he did not even stir. It was only at that point that he recognized old woman Fenchuk's face, which was bespattered with saliva; and he began to cry and beg to be forgiven, as he would beg to be spared if someone had begun suddenly and without cause to shower him with blows.

"I won't do it again, auntie, I promise I won't, auntie darling, I wo-o-o-on't."

Fenchuk's wife did not listen to him. She abandoned the cow and the bucket and led Yura by the hair to the house (cursing him continually: "You wretch, you fiend, are you trying to rob me, rob me, you thief!")

Inside the house old Fenchuk heard his wife's vociferation and

rushed out to the gate, calling out: "What's the matter there, Nastya?"

"Just think, we are in the house, and this thief is robbing us of our very substance," replied his wife shrilly.

"Impossible! Where did you find him?"

"Why, just imagine, he glued himself to the cow like a leech and sucked out all the milk."

At this explanation of his wife, Fenchuk spat into the palms of his hands, opened the gate and ran up to his wife as lightly as if he were a boy. He seized Yura by the hand and whacked him on the face, right and left. In a moment Yura began to scream even louder and beg to be forgiven: "Uncle, I won't, I won't do it again, as long as I live, never."

So loudly did he shout that all the neighbors began to hasten to the place as if to witness a curious spectacle.

Fenchuk shook Yura once more, gnashed his teeth and yelled again: "Say! I'll teach you once and for all! Nastya, just go in and get me the scissors."

Nastya was still relating in fragments to the neighbors how she had caught the thief, and only when she had finished her account did she go for the scissors, moaning and cursing on the way.

"Shear the thief, shear him!" shouted the neighbors who finally understood why Fenchuk told his wife to fetch him the scissors.

Tears streamed down Yura's face. He screamed in an unnatural voice. He knew that it was the custom to cut the hair off the heads of the principal thieves in the village, and he also knew that it was a great shame. And for that reason he could not contain his tears.

Fenchuk's woman brought out the scissors and gave them to the old man. The neighbors at once seized the boy by hands and held him fast; while Fenchuk cut Yura's thick growth of hair close to the skin, even closer than one shears the sheep in spring.

Such a clamor rose when he was being sheared as if the sound were coming out of a seething cauldron. Those who are holding him heap all the curses upon him, as one usually curses thieves. Nastya curses him even louder than do the others. Yura now moans only from time to time with his hoarse, tearful voice. And those who have nothing else to do, go up and down the street and inform the vagabonds from the highlands about this event. They apply both their palms to their mouths and shout:

"We've caught a thief!"

"Priymak's Yura!"

"Yes, yes, the one with buck teeth!"

## BOOK REVIEWS

**RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIANS**, by Edward Crankshaw. The Viking Press, New York, 1948, 223 pp.

For some time now the government of the Soviet Union, so obviously envious of the technological prowess and ingenuity of the West to which it itself is desperately seeking to attain, has been engaged, to put it mildly, in some unabashed revisions of the history of world invention. In a real sense it has been inventing history by claiming Russian origin for the steam engine, electric lighting, the flashlight, electric welding, radio, radar, the jet engine and penicillin. As the list of human inventions is long, we can expect further spectacular announcements from Moscow in the future. But those who are even casually acquainted with the specific historical origins of these several inventions cannot but be overpolitely amused by this infantile behavior of the Soviet revisionists, at least insofar as the matter of historical truth is of sole consideration. On the other hand, those who are not familiar with these specific origins but have some knowledge of Russian history up to the present time and some conception of the historical factors typically present in the unfolding of the inventive process can share in the joke even by simple logical inference.

However, this irresponsible recourse to distortion of fact for evident purposes of political self-glorification and the inflation of a starved national ego is not by any means peculiar to the contemporary Russian political caste, but rather finds extensive precedent in the similarly autocratic regime of the Tsars. The grounds for such manipulation was of course not that of technologic emulation as characterizes the present regime but instead that of territorial aggrandizement. The current regime continues to operate in both fields. The simple fact underlying both cases is the existence of autocratic government which through the control of the press and publications has precluded in the course of Russian history any substantial measure of objective research, unhampered and unhindered by governmental policy.

This crucial fact which has been carelessly ignored or innocently unrecognized by the countless English and American writers who have recently canalized their energies toward the understanding of the Russian people, their traits, institutions and history, accounts basically for the inevitable confusion that persistently permeates their writings. Mr.

Crankshaw's work is no exception to this. Having been in the Soviet Union during the past war, this English author with explicit distaste for our wartime hero-worship of Russia seeks to promote some understanding of the Russian people largely through a depiction of his feelings during his stay there. Rightly recognizing that world peace depends essentially on the USSR and the United States—although he sees fit to include also Great Britain—the author sees only two ways to the achievement of such a peace—conquest or love.

The book is purposely superficial in factual content. The advantages of this are seen in the light and entertaining reading that it provides and in the fresh, imaginative observations and insights expressed on the everyday-living, attitudes and common behavior of the people that fall within the scope of the author's experiences. But these are seriously outweighed by the disadvantages arising from a vague outline of facts. First and most important is that one throughout does not know whether the author is writing about the Russians or the Ruthenians or Ukrainians or the other peoples that make up the Soviet Union. He recognizes that these non-Russian "Nationalities" exist; yet in obvious confusion, when discussing the anthropological character of the Russians, he asserts that they are not of the pure Slav strain as the inhabitants of "Little Russia" who for him, nevertheless, also appear to be Russian.

Underlying this bungling confusion is the myth of the origin of Russia in Kievan Rus perpetuated by many Western writers who in turn acquired it from controlled Russian sources. Mr. Crankshaw's treatment of this historical background is simply pathetic. He quite accurately commences with Muscovy in the thirteenth century in his outline of Russian history, but then, characteristically without any historical data, appends the Kievan period of Ukrainian history to the Muscovite. The many contrasts between the two histories of which he is aware, such as "the egalitarianism among the Kievans" and the absence of it in the north, or the Ukrainian "Ruska Pravda," a code of laws, as against the "Sudebnik" of Ivan the Great, or the European orientation of the Kievans as opposed to the Oriental in the north, are naively explained away on the basis of the Tartar invasions and the topography of the region, the plain (as though the Ukrainians were not exposed to the same influences and yet persisted in their liberal political and cultural tendencies).

Given more to sentimental generalizing than to analytic interpretation solidly founded on facts, this work hardly achieves its modest

aim of forming some preliminary understanding of the Soviet Union. To explain the necessity for autocracy in Russia on the basis of the anarchic and centrifugal forces engendered by its wide plains is to strain one's credulity to the breaking point. Moreover, his numerous parallels between Marxist and Catholic dogma and discipline, which are not unique and have been semi-fallaciously drawn before, demonstrate little knowledge of the latter. Also, outright errors of fact as, for example, his contention that the Provisional Russian government in 1917 had no intention of distributing land to the peasants or that Michael was the son, rather than the brother, of Nicholas II, suggest in themselves the real value of this work.

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

**HISTORY OF THE LITHUANIAN NATION**, by Constantine R. Jurgela. New York, Lithuanian Cultural Institute Historical Research Section, 1948, 544 pp.

**THE STORY OF LITHUANIA**, by Thomas G. Chase. New York, Stratford House, Inc., 1946, 392 pp., chronological table, bibliography, maps, index. \$3.50.

C. Jurgela's *History of the Lithuanian Nation* is a comprehensive annotated volume, which could, with the addition of an index and some collateral material, well serve as a school text. It traces the course of history of the Lithuanian people from the earliest time to the present unhappy state of affairs under Russia. The chief accent is on political events. The book is well illustrated.

Those who cannot find any satisfactory answer in histories in English and even in leading encyclopaedias about the ancient Prussians would do well to examine the introductory chapter of this volume. The account of the early Lithuanian tribes is quite extensive. Also, a very fine feature of the work is that the nobles, princes, and grand dukes alone do not monopolize all the space; the masses of the people, too, often receive consideration. In fact, Mr. Jurgela pays considerable attention to the social aspects of Lithuanian history.

Chapter II, on the religious issue, throws much light on the reason why the Lithuanians so long resisted the German Catholic missionaries, the Teutonic Knights. It is apparent that the fault was not necessarily so much with the heathen population as with the methods used by the Knights in dealing with the Baltic people. It took even such a noted "missionary" as Charlemagne several decades to

"convert" the Saxons by force; therefore it is no wonder that the Lithuanians and Latvians, even in the 15th century, resisted the Teutonic Knights who came more to conquer and enslave them than to bring the message of Christian love expressed in the words, "Love thy neighbor as thyself." A very singular thing about the medieval Lithuanians was their tolerance of the religions of other people. After Lithuania spread her domain by conquest to include the Orthodox believers in White Ruthenia (Byelo Rus) and Rus-Ukraine, the conquerors were very sympathetic towards the religion of the conquered. There was mutual accord and harmony, something not much practiced at any time or place in European history. When one realizes how intolerant the Poles and Muscovites have been to the peoples under their rule, the merit of the Lithuanian character, whether heathen or Christian, is apparent. Imagine heathen Lithuanians aiding Orthodox Ukrainians in their religious problems; also the illiterate Jagiello funding the University of Krakow.

The author is impartial and gives credit to various racial groups for the work done by them. He mentions the fact that in the Battle of Tannenberg, in 1410, all the subject nationalities of the Polish-Lithuanian empire participated, including the Tartars and the Ukrainians (pp. 154, 157-59). His accounts of the Lithuanian efforts for self-government after 1385 (Polish-Lithuanian royal marriage) and Polish designs for making Lithuania part of Poland could have been more thorough; also the White Ruthenian question merited more attention because that territory constituted a large part of Lithuania.

The account dealing with the struggle for the right to print in Lithuanian (pp. 487-91), though brief, is quite revealing to an American reader. It must be quite hard for one not versed in Russian methods to comprehend the fact that the mania for Russification went as far as even prohibiting prayer books in native Lithuanian until 1904. The part played by the Lithuanian priests in the movement for the freedom of the press was very important. It resembles the similar role in cultural work played by the clerical families in West Ukraine during the last century. Lithuanian-American letters and newspapers, no doubt, served as a great stimulus in this aspiration toward eventual victory.

The chapter dealing with the origin and development of the Muscovite kingdom, though historically correct, will probably be denounced by the Russian nationalist writers, both Red and "White",



who are about ready to promulgate a theory that all the Slavic peoples descended from the Russians. Catherine's II order to Governor-General Ryepin to produce "thanksgiving delegations" from Lithuania (p. 352), because she had "liberated" them by annexing their country, may suggest the source of Stalin's inspiration for countless "thanksgiving delegation" from the countries Russia now occupies.

In his "Closing Remarks" the author idealizes the fact that the Poles and Lithuanians are now "little people" in the hands of Russia and that the underground units cooperate against the common enemy. "Gone are the old dreams of 'greatness' and expansion fostered by the students of statecraft and scions of the princely families of old. The freedom fighters are fighting for their common liberation and opportunity to restore the function of democratic ways of life" (p. 527). Such may be the aim of the Lithuanian leaders. Unfortunately, a great bulk of the Poles in London, New York, and other places have not yet been cured of the medieval concept of "greatness" and designs on neighboring territory. They still talk and write of Vilna and of Lwiw, the capital of Western Ukraine, as "Polish." Under such condition it is not easy for other oppressed peoples to cooperate fully with the Poles against the Muscovities.

The author must understand several languages, if one judges by his extensive footnotes. The volume will nicely supplement the other books of Lithuania that are available in English. It is a scholarly work of which any radical group could be proud and an example worth emulating. The style lends itself to easy reading. Mr. Jurgela has done his work well; now it is up to the American Lithuanians to see to it that the book finds itself in the hands of many readers. More books of this type are needed in English about the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.

\* \* \*

*The Story of Lithuania* by T. Chase like many of its sister-books on other countries, is a brief, popular edition to acquaint the American Lithuanians as well as the English-speaking world with the subject. In it the Rev. Fr. Chase traces briefly the history of Lithuanian from the earliest time to the present. It is a story of a people who had its share of struggle against such "good" neighbors as Poland, Prussia, and Muscovy or Russia. Like many other small national groups, the Lithuanians formed a state in the middle ages and reached their peak of power and expansion at the close of the 14th century, when Lithuania controlled a large share of non-Lithuanian territory, includ-

ing White Ruthenia (White Russia) and a major part of Ukraine (known then as Rus or Ruthenia). The Lithuanian decline really dates from the personal union or marriage in 1385 between the Lithuanian Prince Jagiello and the Polish Jadwiga. That gave the Polish nobles a chance for expansion eastward, and started Lithuanian troubles that culminated in the partitions of Poland. By that time (1772-95), the Polish influence upon Lithuania had become so denationalizing that the "cream" of the native gentry considered themselves Poles: changed their names to Polish, spoke Polish, acquired Polish habits, enslaved their serfs more harshly according to Polish modes and were leading their race to complete disappearance. The masses, however, remained steadfast Lithuanians; and it was the masses, with the aid of a few devoted and daring leaders, that preserved the nationality.

As an empire, Lithuania seemed to exercise more moderation toward the occupied countries than did any of her neighbors. She did not upset or overthrow the Ukrainian customs, religion, laws, or traditions. Lithuania, whether pagan (as at first) or Catholic, did not disturb the Orthodox faith in Ukraine and White Ruthenia until her "marriage" to Poland and her gentry degenerated to the low Polish level of religious oppression.

The chapter (XII) on the Protestant Revolt in Lithuania is a useful contribution. Not only general histories of the Reformation Period but even special books and college texts rarely mention the spread of Protestantism in Lithuania. This brief chapter is quite concise in mentioning the causes of religious unrest, the reformers, the different sects, the extent of penetration, and finally the causes of the almost complete disappearance of Protestantism.

The relationship of Lithuania and Russia, taken in chronological order, portrays the unhappy picture of one of the small peoples that fell into the hands of the Muscovite tyrant, the tyrant of 1795 and the tyrant of now. The story here is a sad one, but it is identically the same as that of all the nationalities whose misfortune placed them in the embraces of the "Russian bear." One thing is identical for nearly all of the nations under the Russian rule: she ruled them all with an iron hand and kept them behind the iron curtain for centuries; she played no favorites for any length of time, but tried to destroy them by means of Russification, a policy which is not abating.

Though the volume is carefully written, one can not help noticing certain omissions. One of these is the transition from paganism to Catholicism. Of all the people of Europe, the Lithuanians put up the

staunchest fight in defense of their pagan religion. A chapter on the Lithuanian pre-Christian era, explaining various religious beliefs and practices, would have clarified the point why the people defended their religion so long and would have added to the merit of the book. Another omission is the definite mention of the part played by White Ruthenia (White Russia) in Lithuanian history. Though there are frequent references to different cities in White Ruthenia under Lithuanian rule, and references to the fact that the Lithuanian catechism was written in White Ruthenian (Ukrainian) (p. 104) and that there were court decisions in that language, no clear-cut statement is given that Lithuania ruled over that country which constituted about a htrid of her kingdom. Another topic omitted and too important to be overlooked is the exodus of the Lithuanians to America.

A more complete index would have improved the volume, and perhaps the same consistency could have been employed in the spelling of Ukrainian names as was observed in that of Lithuanian. Throughout the book the author spells the latter in their original forms—i.e., the way the local people spell and pronounce them; but in the case of the Ukrainian, he gives for the most part the Polish or Russian spelling. This procedure may have resulted from the author's reliance on Polish and Russian material.

The book concludes with the most recent unhappy events—namely, the destruction of Lithuania by Hitler and Stalin. The treatment accorded the people there by these twentieth century despots is but a carbon copy of the same in other countries. The resistance to the foreign force is likewise identical. Theoretically Lithuania is still independent; in reality she lost her freedom nearly a decade ago. Her people, however, are not losing hope of outliving the present hardship, as their forefathers did in the past, and are dreaming of brighter days ahead. In the last chapter the author has compiled some most recent facts pertaining to the German and Russian occupation of Lithuania, the promises or evasion of them. Deportation by the Germans to forced labor was identical with the Russian deportation to the slave camps. The German *gestapo* left and the Russian NKVD (now MVD) took its place. Some rough data is also listed as a testimony to the price the leaders for freedom had to pay.

Because there is so little about Lithuania in English, the author of this book has rendered the Lithuanian cause a distinct service. For decades the American schools and libraries have been in need of works

of this character; and this volume, quite scholarly and yet written in clear, simple English, should partially help meet the demand.

WASYL HALICH

**I SAW POLAND BETRAYED: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People.** By Arthur Bliss Lane, Bobbs-Merrill, 344 pp., \$3.50.

Mr. Arthur Bliss Lane, one of America's ablest career diplomats, has been a friend of long standing of Poland. As long ago as 1919 he acquainted himself with that country for, as a young man, he was attached to the U. S. Embassy staff in Warsaw. This was one of the reasons that compelled the late President Roosevelt to appoint him U. S. Ambassador in September 1944, at a time when Poland was still under the domination of the Nazis. And since he could not proceed to Warsaw, he planned to report to the Polish Government-in-exile in London under Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. Somehow, however, he never left the United States until the summer of 1945.

After a year and a half in Warsaw, Mr. Lane resigned from his post on March 31, 1947 and decided to write a book on his experiences in this unhappy, Soviet-dominated Poland. It was his intention, he says, to tell the American people the bitter and unpleasant facts of the dishonesty, duplicity and brutality of the Soviet and Warsaw Governments. He does that excellently in his best-seller, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*.

What he describes in his book is not altogether unknown or even unfamiliar to any conscientious reader of daily newspapers. But his personal accounts as an Ambassador of the United States, his helplessness and his anger over all tragic things that happened in Eastern Europe, have great value in their own right.

The major part of Mr. Lane's book centers around the epoch-making international conferences of Teheran, and Yalta. It was in Yalta, asserts the author, that the betrayal of Poland took place. There three major powers, unscrupulous Russia with the United States and Great Britain naively giving support, sealed the fate of Poland and brought about the enslavement of the Polish people. Mr. Lane has some bitter words to say about the late President Roosevelt's unbounded optimism regarding Soviet Russia's peaceful intentions.

Still more indignant is he with regard to some high State Department officials because of their pro-Soviet pro-Stalin policies. Among

them are former U. S. Ambassador Joseph E. Davies and the late Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt's special adviser. On the other hand, Mr. Lane is full of deserved praise for other State Department officials, such as Charles E. Bohlen, now special Assistant to the Secretary of State Marshall, for their realistic appraisal of Soviet designs and policies.

The strongest portion of Mr. Lane's *I Saw Poland Betrayed* is his description of Soviet Russia's system of terror set up in what was to be a "strong and independent Poland," as expressed by Stalin during the war years. Warsaw was a seat not of a genuine Polish government, but a puppet communist clique, ruled by men brought in by the Soviet armies. He cites several instances of Russia all-out terror against the Polish opposition elements. Besides the sinister apparatus of the NKVD and UB, several other para-military groups and organizations participated in the mass terrorization and persecution of the Polish people, such as the MO and ORMO or "citizens militia" and its reserves. These are the armed brigands commanded by the Soviet commissars used by the Warsaw puppets to terrorize the populace, kidnap prominent leaders of the opposition and so forth.

The book sounds time and again one specific theme—to warn the American people that the Soviet totalitarian expansion, its inhuman and anti-Christian methods, are a serious threat to this country and to the entire world.

But in one instance, we think, Mr. Lane's generally objective approach to the Polish question should be challenged and criticised. The author accepts without reservation the Polish viewpoint insofar as the territory east of the so-called Curzon Line is concerned. These territories, as every one by now knows, are not Polish ethnic lands as the Polish nationalist propaganda would have us believe.

It is true that the territory known as "Eastern Poland" was in the possession of the Poles from 1919 to 1939. Yet the Poles comprised a minority as compared with the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians, who had been conquered militarily by the Poles at the close of World War I. Although the League of Nations gave formal approval to the conquest, it put in the provision that some six to seven million Ukrainians obtain an autonomous status, particularly in the fields of local administration and education. These pledges were not honored by the pre-war Polish government; very often the Ukrainian minority had had to seek the protection of the League of Nations. The question of the Polish "pacification" of Eastern Galicia aroused world-wide repercussions in 1930, ending with censure of the Polish government by

international public opinion and by the League of Nations itself.

In 1939, when Hitler and Stalin decided to divide Europe, the Ukrainian lands under Poland were assigned to the Soviet Union arbitrarily and against the will of the Ukrainian people. Four years later in 1943 the Soviets put forth the claim for these territories on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. To placate Soviet Russia, the Americans were repeatedly told that these lands were not Polish, but Ukrainian, and should, therefore, be part of Soviet Ukraine. Now Mr. Lane, who is one of our ablest career diplomats, tells us that these lands are Polish, without going to the trouble to point out that the Ukrainians themselves should be asked whether they want to belong to Poland, Soviet Russia or live as an independent nation in their own sovereign state.

There is no intention here to defend the Soviet grab of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian territories from Poland. We think, nonetheless, that the American public should be told the truth, which Mr. Lane failed to stress, namely, that neither Russia nor Poland has any right to retain Western Ukraine. On the contrary, for the sake of international peace and security, it should be restored to the Ukrainians, who for centuries comprised a majority on these lands.

UCRAINICUS

**EASTERN EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS, 1918-1941**, by Hugh Seton-Watson.—Second Edition. Cambridge University Press, 1946, xv+445 pp.

Anyone who is interested in the modern English literature on Eastern European problems will welcome this unique study. The author discusses the region between Germany and Russia, which he calls Eastern Europe, and particularly the pre-1939 States of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria.

The main reasons for the publishing of this work are explained by the author himself:

"Between Germany and Russia live a hundred million people. A few hundred miles separate them from the shores of Britain, but to the British people, which is aware of the existence of Zulus and Malays, Maoris and Afriidis, they are unknown. . . . It is true that two World Wars have started in Eastern Europe, and that both have taken a heavy toll of British lives (p. xiii). . . . Peace and stability in Europe as a whole will be impossible as long as Eastern Europe remains a centre of social unrest, political tyranny and international disputes" (p. 429).

By merely looking at the headlines of the ten chapters of the book (Geographical Background, Early History, Modern Times, The Peasantry, The Political System, Political Experience 1918-39, Minorities and Mixed Populations, Small Power Imperialism, International Experience 1918-41, Eastern Europe and the Great Powers) we are convinced of the profoundness and solidity with which the author approaches the problem, the more so as we find the author's promise "to avoid partisanship for any one national group at the expense of another" (p. x).

During the period between the wars, Western Ukraine was divided and occupied by three of the above mentioned States i.e. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Roumania, and the author was therefore compelled to discuss the Ukrainian problem as well.

Yet, we are very sorry to say that such an able and competent student has still a very hazy notion of the Ukrainian nation in the modern sense of the term. His picture of Eastern Europe contains only Poland and Russia and leaves the impression that on the vast territories between these two States there are no other nations striving for freedom.

In order to illustrate the author's confused view of the Ukrainian problem, we quote some of his most striking thoughts, and stress the most interesting expressions.

"Between the regions unmistakably Polish and those unmistakably Russian remained a long and broad belt, inhabited by people still speaking *undetermined dialects*, whose religion might be Catholic, Uniate or Orthodox" (p. 321).

In the southern region of this belt there "lived a turbulent population of highly *independent-minded peasants*... whose language was substantially *different* from Polish or Great Russian, and who were the descendants of the people of the ancient Principality of Kiev" (p. 32).

The people of Eastern Galicia "spoke a language *distinct* from Polish or Russian, which is now known as Ukrainian language. Throughout their history they had shown a *spirit of independence* with regard to all their neighbors" (p. 48).

"The Ukrainians of Galicia undoubtedly developed a *strong national consciousness* in the modern sense of the word" (p. 330).

In Carpathian Ukraine (called by the author "Ruthenia") "the *Ukrainian nationalist current* was the *strongest*" (p. 181).

"The events of 1938-39 would seem to show *fairly conclusively* that they too (i.e. the Ukrainians of Carpathian Ukraine;—our remark.) were unwilling to become Hungarian citizens again" (p. 343).

If a federal State, including Poland and the whole of Ukraine (as it was conceived by Petlura and Pilsudski), came into being "the Ukrainians, numbering over 40 millions in contrast to some 25 millions Poles, would eventually play a *dominant part*" (p. 332).

Finally:

"During the last decades of the Tsardom the Ukrainian movement acquired some political *importance*... A Ukrainian Council (Rada) was formed by the nationalists in 1917, and, assuming the right to speak for the Ukrainian people, came to terms with the Central Powers... In November a Western Ukrainian Republic was proclaimed by Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia" (p. 331).

Yet these statements of the author do not convince him of the existence of the Ukrainian nation in the modern sense of the term, as we see in the following lines:

"In Russia the Ukrainians were less feared... They might be dangerous to the St. Petersburg Government as discontented peasants, Liberal intellectuals or revolutionaries, but *hardly* as an Ukrainian nation" (p. 49).

"It is *doubtful* whether the aims of the Ukrainian movement were of interest to any but a small group of intellectuals, but social conditions in Russia were such that these... might in favourable circumstances create a powerful movement in Ukraine" (p. 331).

In speaking of the Old Ukrainian State he calls it "a semi-civilised State" (p. 14), and labels its Duke Volodymyr the Great or the Saint, who accepted Christianity and made it the national faith as "a prince of irregular sexual morals and the murderer of his own brother" (p. 16).

The Ukrainian Governments after the first World War were only "Governments" (in inverted commas) (p. 322) and the aspirations of the Ukrainian nation to independence are "romantic" (p. 334), as they were "encouraged by Austria" (pp. 48, 49, 321, 330) or by "German agents" (p. 333). We look in vain for the Ukrainians in the chapter on "Minorities." Even the very name "Ukrainian" is carefully avoided by the author and replaced by other confusing terms (Russian, Little Russian, Ruthene, and even, according to Polish statistics, — *tutejszi*, — "people from here" (p. 322), till the author is inevitably forced by the real existence of some nationally conscious Ukrainians to-day to use this dangerous word.

We cannot quote all his errors but against them we must place the facts that the old Ukrainian state was highly civilized for the times, that Kiev was the Eastern European Byzantium, and that the state not only produced art and literature (Book of Laws, The Word of Ihor's Campaign), but had dynastic connections with the whole of



Europe (France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Poland, Hungary). And why emphasize the worse sides of Volodymyr the Great? Can we not quote any members of Western European dynasties with the same characteristics? The author himself says:

"The peoples of Eastern Europe formed a buffer between the West and Asia, allowing the Western nations to develop in comparative security their own civilisation, while the fury of the Asiatic whirlwinds spent itself on their backs. And throughout centuries their powerful neighbours in the west exploited their weakness to encroach on their territory and ruin their economic life. Impoverished by constant wars, the Eastern European peoples had little opportunity of cultural and economic development" (pp. 21-22).

The Ukrainian nation is the most eastern European nation on the crossroads between Europe and Asia, and occupies a country devoid of natural boundaries. Yet despite the innumerable hardships caused by the Asiatic whirlwinds and Western encroachers the Ukrainian Government after the First World War was, not by any means worse off than the other governments in Eastern Europe which had to accomplish their hard task alone without aid from abroad. It had from the outset to defend the vast Ukrainian National Republic against several enemies (Russians—Red and White,—Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Roumanians—most of whom were supported by the Allies) amidst the all-European chaos.

But the climax of the author's opinion is:

"Ukrainian intellectuals *tried* to show that the medieval Principality of Kiev had been a Ukrainian National State, that the shifting of the centre of gravity of *Russia* from Kiev to Moscow after the Tatar Conquest was an act of nationalist oppression of Ukrainians by Muscovites, that both Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Mazepa were conscious Ukrainian nationalists, and that everything of cultural value in the history and art of 'Russia' is of Ukrainian origin—*hypotheses which no impartial historian can regard very seriously*" (pp. 331-332).

And yet the Ukrainians are the descendants of the population of Kiev as he admits. In a word: there are some nationally conscious Ukrainians and perhaps a Ukrainian nation to-day, but it has no history.

The existence of the Ukrainian nation the author really doubts in spite of the undeniable fact of the retention of the Ukrainian State, as a distinct State, by the Bolsheviks themselves, who had seen, of course, the necessity of doing it, on national, and not on geographical, principle.

The fight of the Ukrainian people for independence (waged mainly by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army) against any invader of Ukraine, Germans and Russians alike (since the author must have heard of the

fight of these "guerilla bands"), appears to the author only as a fight for . . . the life on the Kolhoz! . . .

We are very sorry to state that the author has failed to draw the logical consequences even from his own statements. But it would be unfair to leave the impression that this book contains only untrue ideas of the Ukrainian life and history. On the contrary, there are a great many facts shrewdly perceived by the author, some of which are unpleasant to Ukrainians, still—we are sorry to say—corresponding with reality.

It is very regrettable that such a student in Eastern European problems has no unified view of the Ukrainian problem which is of so great an importance to Europe and peace.

CORNELIUS YAVORIVSKY.



## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"How Stalin Can Be Stopped," by Eugene Lyons. *The American Mercury*, May, 1948, New York, N. Y.

One of the first far-sighted American political thinkers to appreciate the fatal menace of the Soviet dictatorship to world peace and culture, Mr. Lyons sets forth in this compact article some of the essential steps of "tough action" which he feels the United States must take in order to "stop the Soviet Union in its tracks." Among these that range from our material support of nationalist China to heavy armament expenditures at home he lists the necessity for the formation of a "Foreign Legion" to consist of D.P.'s who are "fugitives from Communism in their homelands—Russians, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Czechs, Yugoslavs, etc." and "are eager to enter military formations under the flags of free nations." Among the Ukrainians, who make up one of the largest D.P. units, this eagerness is undeniable and powerful and they are prepared to serve the interests of universal democracy in the same way that their brethren are presently furthering them in the current military struggle against Red fascism behind the Iron Curtain.

"The Problem of International Understanding," by Gottfried Salomon Delatour. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January, 1948, Philadelphia, Pa.

Dr. Delatour is at present a visiting professor at Columbia University in New York City and formerly lectured at the universities of Frankfurt and Paris. In this well-reasoned essay the author reflects a meticulous European training by his intimate familiarity with Eastern European problems. His discussion of the Russification policies of the past and present Russian political autocrats, now more insidious than previously in view of the technique of intensive revolution sponsored by the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which presumably includes the Russian Republic as only one among many "equal" republics, reveals a sound understanding of contemporary Russian imperialism by which many an American can profit. The so-called Ukrainian Republic which, significantly enough, has never had a Ukrainian at its head but rather Russian political agents can serve as exhibit A.

"Stalin's World Slavic Army," by Stephen Naft. *Plain Talk*, April, 1948, New York, N. Y.

The enforcement of a Pan-Slavic policy by the Kremlin to promote under cover of Marxist terminology the interests of traditional Russian imperialism in substantially the same manner of racial appeal as the former tsars but with considerably more power and cunning receives detailed factual treatment in this vitally interesting article. The author bears especially upon the activities of the American Slav Congress formed by Russian agents to ensnare unthinking Americans of Slav extraction into the communist network. The enrollment is, as one would expect, quantitatively meager and of singular importance is the fact that those of Ukrainian birth or descent, or like the Poles, are scarcely represented in this foreign agency. Why the *Narodne Slovo*, a weekly paper in Pittsburgh with a minor circulation, is the only Ukrainian unit mentioned by the author, is hard to say, because this paper is strongly anti-communist.

"The Norman Theory of the Origin of the Russian State," by N. Riasanovsky. *The Russian Review*, Autumn, 1947, New York.

Depicting the development and range of theory formulated to account for the origin of the Russian state, this Rhodes Scholar at Oxford attempts with the pretension of objectivity to eliminate the discrepancy that exists between the opinions of modern scholars on the matter and the traditional version. In effect he feels that it is high time for us to eject from our history textbooks the Normanist theory which in its extreme form presents the ancient Kievan state of Rus as of Scandinavian creation. That this step would constitute an advance in our learning cannot be denied. But as the proponents of the Norman theory are still thinking in terms of an eighteenth century formulation, the thoughts of this bright young student are still moulded by the expedient formulation of nineteenth century Russian scholars which fitted conveniently into the political requirements of imperialist Russia. The author in advancing his thesis that Kiev was of predominant Slavic origin indiscriminately employs the terms "Rus" and "Russia" as interchangeables—this despite the stubborn fact that the latter term is not a correct translation of the term Rus into English, French or into other European languages. Further, he pretends to give a general perspective on this whole problem of the origin of the Russian state by furnishing the opinions of modern scholars in the field; yet nowhere

is mention made of Hrushevsky and other prominent Eastern European historians who on the basis of anthropology, archaeology, linguistics and cultural and political realities consider the Russians or descendants of Muscovy and the Ukrainians, or the descendants of Kiev, as two distinct peoples, much like the French and Italian peoples. Facts, both present and past, and not conjectural theory inspired by sentimental or political reasons should be the criteria of resolution. The author would do well to concentrate on the unbridgeable discrepancy that exists between the facts pertaining to the culture, institutions, anthropology and the like of the early Muscovites and those revealed by the Ukrainians in ancient Kiev. They stubbornly resist artificial compression into a theory that is intended to trace arbitrarily the origin of the Russian state to the Kievan environment.

"The Strength and Weakness of Russia," by J. V. Davidson-Houston. *The Contemporary Review*, February, 1948, London.

The author of this essay is an English colonel who assesses the strong and weak points of Russia for warfare. As is the unfortunate habit with most Anglo-American writers who apparently are little given to precise exposition when they treat of such topics, the writer uses the terms "Russia" and the "Soviet Union" interchangeably, despite his full awareness of the multi-national composition of the Soviet political organism. Adequately supporting his contention that the Soviet Union is in no general position to undertake a successful military campaign against the West, he mentions the highly important fact of "disturbances caused by national minorities," but because of an evident unfamiliarity with the details of Russo-Ukrainian conflicts, the full significance of this weakest link in the Union escapes him completely.

"God's Underground in Russia," by Father George as told to Gretta Palmer. *Collier's*, May 29, 1928, New York City.

This fascinating disclosure of a Roman Catholic priest and Croat who aided the Partisans in Yugoslavia and then as a Partisan officer entered the Soviet Union to undertake a religious mission reveals the existence of an extensive religious underground in the fortress of Marxism. The sterility, indeed in large measure the fatuous nonsense, of Marxist doctrine can be perceived by some on the level of intellectual cognition, but evidently by the many in the proletarian paradise it is being understood through the disillusion bred by the concrete

policies of the dictatorship. Father George recounts how at least a third of the young Red soldiers in the First Ukrainian Army to which his Partisan unit was attached expressed their Christian faith. Many of them were undoubtedly Ukrainian and as in the case of the simple hardworking Russian folk, they, too, cannot escape the religious dictates of their live consciences, despite puerile Marxist babble, state persecution and the operations of the militant atheist league.

"A Centenary of Marxism," edited by Samuel Bernstein and others. *Science and Society*, Winter, 1948, New York.

This Stalinist publication dedicates its first issue of this year to the celebration of the issuing by Marx and Engels of the Communist Manifesto in 1848. In reading some of the essays of these communist "intellectuals" one can form a clear picture of the pollutions of thought of which twisted or undeveloped minds are capable. The usual splurge of undefined terms carrying only emotional appeal, the tortuous logical reconstructions engaged in to equip an arbitrarily constructed product of nineteenth century thought with a perennial new look, and the purposeful misconstruction of established scholarly refutations of self-contradictory Marxian theories resound again and again in what are unconscionably passed off as creditable intellectual productions. One cannot help but begin to appreciate Bergsonian philosophy and its anti-intellectualism when he is confronted by such manifestations of the intellect. Tragedy results, however, when such doctrinaires begin to exercise public administrative power—as the peoples of the Soviet Union well know by sad experience.

"Getting on with Russia," by Harold J. Laski. *The Nation*, January 10, 1948, New York, N. Y.

This English political philosopher continues in his apologetic way to "explain" Russia to the Western reading public. The stock arguments concerning Russia's fear of "capitalist encirclement," Russia's memories of Western aid to the counter-revolutionaries, Russia's immense sacrifices in the past war and so forth are advanced as an antidote for the growing indignation in the West against Soviet political intentions and behavior. "More than this: I know of no sufficient evidence to prove that Russia is bent upon imperialist expansion," writes the supposedly learned professor. If Mr. Laski, whose capitalizing of his past intellectual prestige is fast running low, were

more acquainted with the facts—that Russia as such suffered little during the war, most of it being sustained by Ukraine, that the United States and other western nations practically broke their backs to appease this totalitarian state and that the contemporary histories of Ukraine, the Baltic states, Poland, the Balkan states, and Czechoslovakia constitute “sufficient evidence” to prove Russian imperialist expansion—he might perhaps again begin to restore his past prestige. Of course the moral will motivates reasoning as much as the naked energies of the intellect.

“30 Years of the Soviet Ukraine—A Tribute,” by V. M. Molotov. *USSSR Information Bulletin*, February 11, 1948, Washington, D. C.

Apropos of Laski's article noticed above is this speech by Molotov on the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet Ukraine. This manifestation of political chauvinism is equal to the intellectual sham of the former. “We all remember that the Ukraine is that part of the Soviet Union which suffered most and made the heaviest sacrifices in the years of German fascist invasion,” declares Molotov, who then devotes the rest of the speech mainly to the final reality of the “formation of a Soviet for all Ukrainians, the Ukrainian's dream of national reunion came true.” So often does he stress this point that a feeling of insecurity concerning the genuine national aspirations of the Ukrainian people can be noticed in this high member of the Politburo. Again the characteristic tantalizing and meaningless verbiage, such as “capitalistic slavery,” “bourgeois influences” and similar nonsense, appears in this typical harrangue. What Mr. Molotov could have done to overcome the paucity of thought streaming through his demagogic oration was to recite how the independent Ukrainian National Republic was raped by Trotsky's imperialist Russian Red army in 1920, how Stalin annihilated millions of Ukrainian peasants in the 30's in the man-made famine, how Hrushevsky and other Ukrainian socialist scholars were humiliatingly banished from the Academy in Kiev for attempting to show what Russian history is and what the Ukrainian is, and why the Ukrainian people who “at last achieved the realization of their age-old dream by creating a national Ukrainian State of their own, and so ushering in a new epoch in their “republic.” But then if he had done this, Mr. Molotov would not be Mr. Molotov.

