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June, 1959

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“CULTURAL EXCHANGE” WITH THE ENEMY

Editorial

For some time the United States has been subjected to “cultural exchange” invasions of various musical and dance ensembles, scientific groups, government officials and athletes from the Soviet Union. To some these visitations of select and trained personnel of the dedicated enemy, who publicly and on many occasions has stated that his aim is our total destruction, are synonymous with the easing of international tensions and the growth of “friendship and good will” among all the nations.

In signing an agreement on the cultural exchange program with the USSR, the United States undoubtedly has just such objectives in mind. Under the terms of the “Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Exchange in the Cultural, Technical and Educational Fields” (January 27, 1958), the two states in 1958 and 1959 proceeded to exchange radio and television programs on science, industry, agriculture, education, public health, sports, and judiciously selected international political subjects.

American press and radio analysts greeted the signing of the agreement with an almost enthusiastic and unanimous acclaim, without considering who is going to gain and who is going to lose by the cultural exchange accord.

In the “joint” statement on the American-Soviet agreement the purpose of the exchange was naively put as follows:

The agreement is regarded as a significant first step in the improvement of mutual understanding *between the peoples* of the USA and the USSR and it is sincerely hoped that it will be carried out in such a way as to contribute substantially to the betterment of relations *between the two countries*, thereby also contributing to a lessening of international tension.

The very premise of the agreement is utterly erroneous and misleading, unfortunately, for the American side and the free world at large. The accord strongly implies that the present international tensions are due to “misunderstandings between the peoples,” which could be removed merely by dancing and singing together. Another blatantly false implication is that the “people” in the Soviet Union have the power or ways to influence the policy of the Soviet government. While this is true of the United States, it is entirely unfounded in the case of the USSR.

MOSCOW'S TARGET OF "CULTURAL EXCHANGE"

Let us at this point examine the aims and goals which Moscow had in mind in signing the accord.

For almost the entire period of the existence of the USSR, Moscow took extreme care to keep its subjugated population hermetically sealed. This isolation from the rest of the world was rigidly imposed especially after the end of World War II, and Stalin had a good reason for it. During World War II millions of inhabitants of the USSR had seen the West, heightening their consciousness of freedom and their rebelliousness.

After Stalin's death Khrushchev instituted a series of "reforms," including the downgrading of Stalin, all aiming at the preservation of his power and of the communist system as a whole. Beginning with 1954, however, the USSR launched a well-planned psychological offensive for the purpose of disarming the West and winning over the neutral and non-committed nations to its side. One of the vital instrumentalities of this overall campaign is cultural exchange, through which Khrushchev is endeavoring to gain respectability for himself and his regime and acceptance of the political *status quo* by the West on his own terms and conditions.

Moscow now is claiming vociferously that it took a long time before it succeeded in breaking down the "American Iron Curtain" and compelling Washington to admit cultural teams from the USSR and the satellite countries. The process of cultural exchange itself thus becomes an issue in the cold war. The peoples of the world hear that it is Moscow, not Washington, which is promoting international amity and friendship.

The United States, regrettably, cannot gain by any cultural exchange agreement, as is generally supposed. First of all, the United States has provided the Communist Party of the USSR with a field day in America for propagating communism and its alleged fruits. Mikoyan and Kozlov are cases in point. They were provided with the full facilities of the American press and television. Their distortions, deceit and outright lies reached audiences numbering in the millions. As many an advertising man can point out, considerable inroads were made in American public opinion.

The argument which we hear too often: "We have nothing to hide nor are we afraid of people looking at us" is complacent and naive. Assuredly, we are proud of everything we cherish and what we have accomplished as a nation. But we should not delude ourselves into thinking that our cultural, economic and industrial attainments will influence the Communist visitors. Those who are ai-

lowed to come here are immune to the call of freedom as we know it. The Soviet "exchange" personnel—be they artists, dancers, professors, students or scientists—are well trained in the communist teachings. Brainwashed, there are no defectors to freedom among them.

On the other hand, they do create a favorable impression of the Soviet system among us, despite our professions to the contrary. Our daily press is replete with write-ups of Soviet ballets, Soviet music and dance ensembles and Soviet trade exhibitions. On the heels of the *sputnik*, individuals who heretofore heard only negative reports of communism are beginning to exhibit awe at the gigantic "progress" made in the USSR. This naturally creates a favorable climate for all other Soviet political tricks and manipulations: a drive for a new Summit conference, a favorable trade agreement or large loans from the United States and a "workable" compromise in the matter of Berlin or some other international sore spot.

The Soviet press, on the other hand, is systematically berating the United States for its internal conditions. One constantly reads about "hunger" and "unemployment" in the United States. It would appear from the pages of *Pravda* and *Izvestia* that the only joy and relaxation for the American people are precisely the Soviet music and dance ensembles. The Americans avidly thirst for "Soviet culture." Even more, Americans are dying to learn the Russian language inasmuch as "eventually the Russian language will become the principal language of science" (*Pravda*, June 14, 1959).

WHAT THE U.S. GAINS BY "CULTURAL EXCHANGE"

Because of the nature of the Soviet Russian communist society the impact of the American cultural visitations in the USSR is of a minimal order. First of all, unlike in the United States, American exchange teams are guided and closely directed by both visible and invisible Soviet officials. Our teams do not have direct contact with the masses of the population; they do not appear at Soviet press conferences or on TV panels. The display of American ideas is limited to small and selected groups of Soviet officials, well indoctrinated in anti-American propaganda and ever aware of their own positions to preserve. Moreover, American visitors by their very nature as Americans are politically tolerant people, and thus occasionally succumb to the blandishments of Communist propaganda. If they return home with the conviction that "all differences between the two countries can be resolved by further friendly visits and better understanding between the peoples," that is exactly the result the Russians are striving to achieve. A case in point is

the visit to a Soviet concentration camp outside Moscow by two prominent New Yorkers, who wrote fantastic reports about the benign treatment of inmates, their leisurely "chess playing," visits by their "girl friends," and the like. These two visitors uncritically reported their "findings" in the American press, thereby achieving an impact far greater than any direct Soviet propaganda treatment of the same topic.

But what is most devastating from the viewpoint of Western interest, specifically that of the United States, is the fact that the increased mingling of highly-placed American personalities with all types of Soviet Communist officials adds considerably to the prestige and respectability of the Soviet regime, which in turn convinces the captive nations that their Communist oppressors are definitely and irrevocably accepted by the United States as honorable and legitimate representatives of the captive nations. The enslaved nations accordingly tend to feel that their fate is sealed.

The aim of Moscow through cultural exchange is a political one; ours is primarily cultural. Where a Stevenson voluntarily sallies forth in the lion's den and, to his own surprise, returns unscathed and reports a "stability" of the regime, every Soviet visitor has a definite task to fulfill, knowing that upon his return to the USSR, he will be called upon to produce a full account of the mission. In any event, what will be reported is not what a particular member says but what the Communist Party wants the world to hear.

The disadvantage for the American side is a double one. Our visiting personnel is not controlled by the government, on the one hand, and on the other the American visitors are prone to accept whatever they are told as *bona fide* expressions of "sincerity and good will" ("I am convinced Khrushchev spoke the truth" or "There is no doubt that he meant business," and the like).

WE MUST AIM AT THE ENSLAVED PEOPLES, NOT THEIR CAPTORS

One of the greatest dangers inherent in a cultural exchange with the Soviet Union is that the United States is being trapped into a tacit approval of the enslavement of the non-Russian nations of the USSR and the satellite countries. By sending over our cultural experts and teams, we are in effect endorsing the Kremlin line, which puts a preponderant emphasis upon the *Russian* people, rather than the peoples of the USSR as a whole. For instance, the principal targets of American tourists in the USSR are Moscow and Leningrad, but not Kiev, Minsk or the Baltic capitals or the Caucasian countries. In fact, Western Ukraine and some areas of the

Baltic Sea are still off limits to foreigners; the non-Russian inhabitants of these areas are not allowed to see a single American tourist or any American delegation.

Conversely, the Soviet visitors to the United States are in the overwhelming majority Russian; one is hard put to find a Ukrainian or other non-Russian visitor. The same can be said of the Soviet Exhibition at the Coliseum. The non-Russian nations are not represented at the exhibition. Everything which is attained or produced in the USSR is ascribed to the "great and glorious Russian people." The non-Russian peoples who constitute the majority of the USSR population are simply non-existent at the fair.

If our government really thought that by agreeing to cultural exchange with Moscow it would accomplish something, then certain precautions and safeguards should have been taken. Above all, the United States government should have insisted that delegations from the USSR should truly be representative of the USSR. It should insist even now that since the Soviet visitors have unlimited access to the American people, so should the American visitors have freedom of movement throughout the whole Soviet Union, including Western Ukrainian territories, where the Russian domination would disclose some interesting facets.

Such considerations have not been advanced as bargaining points of cultural exchange. But since it has apparently been wholly in the hands of the United States Information Agency, one can hardly be surprised at such a turn of events. Only a few months ago the USIA reduced the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian broadcasts of the "Voice of America" to half of their original time, and completely eliminated the Uzbek language in the evident belief that the non-Russian nations of the USSR are not important in our relations with Moscow.

CONCLUSION

Finally, let us assume that both the United States and the Soviet Union will be equally successful in attaining the common objective: dissipation of "misunderstandings" and creation of the desired climate of mutual respect, trust and friendship between the USSR and the United States.

Would this psychological atmosphere alter the ultimate objective of Moscow which is the conquest of the entire world for communism? Would it affect the basic sources of the tension, unrest and atomic warfare hysteria which are prevailing in the world today?

Nothing of the kind will happen. The Russian communist leaders could easily eliminate the root causes of international tension without resorting to cultural exchange programs. But they will not do so, and, in fact, they cannot. Dedicated to the ultimate conquest of the world, they are prisoners of their own insane ideology and mentality. They either will conquer or will perish according to their inviolable goal of world conquest.

It is our earnest hope that the United States will survive the consequences of the hastily-concluded exchange agreement, although it has already lost tremendously in prestige among the enslaved nations.

One encouraging development that may yet restore our damaged prestige is the recent resolution passed unanimously by both houses of the Congress calling for the President to designate the third week of July as "Captive Nations Week," in support of the many nations which have lost their independence to Moscow. The resolution says that "the imperialistic policies of Communist Russia have led, through direct or indirect aggression, to the subjugation of the national independence of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, White Ruthenia, Rumania, East Germany, Bulgaria, mainland China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Cossackia, Turkestan and North Vietman."

This step is far more important from the point of view of our own security and political leadership than all cultural exchanges. It is positive rather than negative. It gives hope and promise to the millions of enslaved nations that the United States has not after all accepted their enslavement and that they may hope, in the future, for a helping hand when the hour of their liberation finally arrives.

A MEASURE OF REALISM IN THE COLD WAR

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

How to cope with the cold war thrusts and maneuvers of Moscow has been a fundamental and vexing problem for some time. By no means has the problem in any real sense been resolved. In fact, our Government has not faced up squarely to all the demands and issues involved in the problem. As a consequence, no clear-cut decision has been made on how to meet it, no apparatus or coordinating body exists at present to adequately deal with it, and our dearth of operation could only accommodate a defensive reaction, based on military might, to the successive challenges posed by Moscow. In each instance, some gain of a psycho-political nature accrues to the enemy. This could not be otherwise since our defensive posture can only serve to minimize, not prevent entirely, his inroads into the broad field of operation offered by the Free World.

The problem is not one that can be competently and satisfactorily handled by any existing executive agency. Moscow's cold war activity embraces military factors, to be sure, but much of the bluster, bluff, and blackmail built about USSR's military prowess plainly indicate that in this context the military is essentially a tool for the furtherance of broader political and psychological objectives. This dimension does not fall as an object of primary study, not to mention operation, in our military establishment. As another example, Moscow's unleashing of economic warfare against the Free World creates a similar dimension in its cold war activity. Now the economic tool is utilized to achieve the same psycho-political objectives. Our Departments of Commerce and State are properly concerned with these economic penetrations into the Free World. But the most that one can hope for in either department is a subsidiary study of this phase of the problem. The same may be said for the propaganda and information phase, cultural exchange, education, science and other fields of enterprise in the cold war. Studies will continue to be piecemeal, interest in one aspect or another will fluctuate in response to the tune played by Moscow, and much of the effort and capital invested in these lines will yield less than maximally productive results for want of central purpose and efficient coordination.

If, somewhat inaccurately, one dates the beginning of the cold war period as 1947, the picture depicted above is not a pretty one. The picture is scarcely exaggerated; if anything, it is incomplete. After over a decade of experience with cold war activity, we find ourselves still stripped of the necessary means to engage intelligently and competently in it. Recently, some legislators on the House Appropriations Committee were amazed to receive a State Department request for funds to establish a section for the purpose of studying Communist tactics and techniques. As one of them pointed out, he was under the natural impression all these years that appropriations made along these lines were being continuously applied to this primary and necessary end. The obvious moral here is that in these matters one should not be guided by natural impressions and, in effect, take things for granted. As a matter of fact, if the Department had actually conducted such continuous studies, there is little likelihood that they would have assumed any concrete operational significance and the problems of coordination and forming a composite picture of Russian cold war operation would still remain unsolved.

There are numerous reasons accounting for this present state of affairs. For one, the nature and scope of cold war activity continue to elude the understanding of many Americans. Some, pitiful in their grasp of Russia's historical background, view it as part of a "strange new force" that has entered our world—"the strangest and most enigmatic in all history."¹ When, for instance, Khrushchev makes a warm actor's plea for "the lessening of international tensions, they find it difficult to understand that this gesture is only another purposeful maneuver in Moscow's cold war operation. The zag—after the zig—is nothing new in Russian (not just in the so-called Soviet) history, and the end has both political and psychological import. Americans naturally crave for real peace. When it suits the calculations of their next operational move, the Russians are prepared to soothe this popular craving. The process misleads, confuses, softens, and gains time and advantage for a concurrent or subsequent move. Moscow's controlled cultural exchange program and recourse to economic aid and competition play on additional American instincts, with much the same results. Even the conduct of diplomatic negotiation is for Moscow a traditional cold war instrument. But many of our leaders, steeped in Western traditions, continue to believe that a high level conference with the Russians

¹ E. g. *What We Must Know About Communism*, by Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, 1958, p. 9.

is an appropriate occasion for settling differences of view on particular issues.

Another reason for our lack of a cold war apparatus is the expressed distaste Americans have for Russian methods and techniques. It is frequently argued that we could not succumb to the use of such methods. The filth of lies, distortions, callous murders, and general immoral behavior is beyond our political upbringing. Thus we must depend upon our standard ways. In reply one could say that in a hot war we don't hesitate to employ any ruse or means of killing where it serves the end of our survival and self-preservation. Why should we be so discriminating under conditions of "neither peace nor war," however, that to overwhelm the Russian cold war threat a condescension to such methods is not necessary. We possess powers of truth and knowledge that are not being fully used for want of organization and implemental zeal and imagination. In short, we haven't as yet developed an efficient apparatus for the utilization of these powers in the most effective ways possible.

Differing views as to the administration of a full-fledged cold war undertaking constitute a third reason for the absence of such a vital program. Those having these views are in complete agreement that such a project is a must. To a greater or lesser extent they do disagree with regard to its content. For example, this writer sees nothing really new in the cold war techniques and methods of the Russian Communists. There is nothing peculiarly "Communist" about them. Except for accidental variations of refinement and intensity, the substantive content of these techniques was provided by Russian totalitarianism politics as far back as the XVIth century. These tools are the key to an understanding of Moscow's phenomenal creation of a vast empire long before Lenin and the Bolsheviks appeared on the scene. However, this perspective awaits expression and treatment once our facilities are adequately established. The "newness" of these techniques rests in the fact that Americans never encountered them before. For East Europeans of the traditionally subjugated nations, these are historically old methods.

Many recent voicings that something creative and different must be done clearly indicate a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction with existing agencies on this score. Senator Jackson of Washington soundly declared at the recent Military Government Association meeting in Washington that "We have never been outmaneuvered politically in one vital area after another." He is right when he avers that "We have never been in the same league with the Russians in the psychological war of wits and words." The writer, David Lawrence, began his illuminating column recently with these

words: "What a spectacle the Western governments are making of themselves these days as they flounder indecisively, in the midst of Soviet threats and ultimatums, seemingly afraid to meet squarely the challenging issues of the hour!" Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson gives further expression to this growing restlessness as concerns our operational inadequacies when he urges the calling of a summit of the heads of state of the Free World.

These and many more evidences simply show that the requirements and demands of the current situation are not and cannot be met by our existing agencies. They are functionally fitted for other respective ends. This does not mean, of course, that with a new agency, created for the specific purpose of dealing with the realities of cold war operation, the fringe efforts of the existing departments would not be embraced. On the contrary, for policy-making reasons, a close coordination would be mandatory.

THE FREEDOM COMMISSION MEASURE

The measure of realism in the cold war is the measure now before Congress, known as the Freedom Commission Act. This measure is sponsored in the House by Congressmen Herlong of Florida and Judd of Minnesota. In the Senate its sponsors are Senators Mundt of South Dakota and Douglas of Illinois. The measure calls for the creation of a Freedom Commission, the establishment of a Freedom Academy, and the formation of a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee. Its basic idea was first advanced several years ago by the Select House Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression which was led by the Honorable Charles J. Kersten of Wisconsin. Two years ago Senator Douglas sponsored a bill seeking this very Freedom Commission. The immediate stimulus given to the present measure was provided by a Florida group called the Orlando Committee for the Freedom Academy.

The bill is designed to provide much-needed facilities for the strengthening of our cold war position. As its objectives imply, it would correct the glaring inadequacy that exists in our executive realm. The Freedom Commission it seeks to create would be an independent agency composed of six members and a chairman. The members and chairman would be appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate. One of the prime authorized functions of the Commission would be the establishment and supervision of the Freedom Academy. Training at the Academy would concentrate on knowledge of Russian Communist techniques and ways and means of counteracting them. Students would be carefully drawn from

governmental, private, and even foreign areas. Other functions of the Commission include the establishment of an information center to aid all groups in an understanding of the Russian Communist conspiracy, the conduct of research and surveys, and a host of additional tasks aimed to realize the objectives of the Act. The Joint Congressional Freedom Committee, consisting of seven Senators and seven Congressmen, would oversee the work and development of the Commission.

There is no question that this measure realistically fills in some serious gaps in our Government when it comes to this subject of cold war preparation. The bill should definitely and overwhelmingly be passed. Its passage would be one of the crowning achievements of this Congress. Beyond a question of doubt there is no educational institution in our Government or in the private area that can be compared with the contemplated Freedom Academy. Second, no existing executive agency is equipped by administrative bent or facility to undertake the functions prescribed for the Freedom Commission. And third, since cold war progress is just as important and vital—if in the long run not more so—as atomic progress, the need for a Joint Congressional Freedom Committee is well satisfied by this bill.

THE BROADER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEASURE

This measure of realism in the cold war has a broader significance than an actual reading of it would suggest. First, it should be borne in mind that it isn't impossible for this country, and with it the Free World, to suffer disastrous defeat at the hands of the present Russian Empire. The possibility of such defeat is not necessarily grounded in any precondition of a hot global war. As a matter of historical fact, the great advances in the expansion of the Russian Empire, both past and present, were achieved primarily through diplomatic duplicity and conspiracy rather than military means. Thus, if the defeat of the United States should come to pass, the increasing chances are that this tragic eventuation would not be the result of lapsed missile production, any technologic lags, deficiency in conventional arms, retarded space exploration, domestic economic difficulties, or a fictitious economic victory by Moscow. As one speculates with balanced weighting of each of these he cannot but conclude that this possible defeat would be the consequence of a stubborn misunderstanding of the traditional nature of the enemy, how he grew to be what he is, and the trained cunning of his diplomatic, political, economic, and conspiratorial ways and

techniques. With the well grounded projection that our deterrent power in military means will be of declining importance over the long run, the soundness of the preceding observation becomes even more striking.

If the estimate arrived at above is correct, then the significance and indispensable value of the Freedom Commission come into full view for the precarious period ahead. To live up to its expectations, the Commission would have to probe into one of the strangest phenomena characterizing America's role in international politics. In this country, strangely enough, with all its rich traditions of freedom, national independence, and principled opposition to colonialism and imperialism, the real chasm that exists between imperialist Russian totalitarianism and freedom-aspiring non-Russian nationalism seems to escape the minds of many, including many on the highest levels of Government. In these cases, which perhaps are far too numerous than the present critical situation can tolerate, it appears that their deficiency of knowledge concerning Russia *qua* Russia is exceeded only by their lack of insight into the traditional spirituality and living revolution of our own nation. Well exemplifying this was the Mikoyan exhibition in this country at the beginning of this year. Fortunately, however, this inexcusable condition is being steadily, though slowly, overcome by various contributions made in this field at our universities and in group action. The basic force of Russian totalitarian imperialism and colonialism would necessarily be a high priority item for the Commission.

UNUSED POWERS OF KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

As mentioned earlier, the argument of submission to the filth of Russian totalitarian behavior is grossly untenable. With honorable means and techniques the Commission can begin to utilize some of our unused powers of knowledge and truth to inflict severe damage upon Moscow's cold war campaigns. In this respect its first area would be domestic. There is an intricate labyrinth of false preconceptions and disinformation concerning Russia and the USSR and their relations to the United States. Doubtlessly, this cannot be dissolved in short order. Time, patience, and persistent effort are required. Not only an educational but a historical process is involved. This field of knowledge seems to excel all others in this country in confusion, misunderstanding, and even unpardonable ignorance. In its pursuit of objective studies the Commission would inevitably have to consider whether communism or imperialist Russian totalitarianism is a reality, whether the USSR can be identified

as any other state, whether—all sentimentalism aside—Russians can in any decisive manner be attracted to the responsibilities of freedom while the empire of their capital is maintained. These and other basic issues would have to be sufficiently clarified by the Commission if we are to adopt those approaches to techniques, via understanding, that would incisively penetrate and weaken the present Russian empire.

This first step would be the heaviest and at the same time most constructive responsibility of the Commission. In the order of first things first, unless we begin to rectify our own inbred misconceptions, we can't help but perpetuate old errors. For example, in this field of knowledge the failure of many scholars and writers to comprehend the empire character of the Soviet Union has led to all sorts of distorted and slanted observations. In the military sciences, for instance, the armed forces of the Soviet Union are erroneously viewed as nationally integrated units similar to those of Japan, Germany and other true nations. Nothing could be further from the truth. In science and the arts, because of demographic ignorance contributions emanating from the Soviet Union are flip-pantly and uncritically characterized as Russian products. In the field of economics, marked by ill-adapted symbols of GNP and the like, treatises are developed on the fallacious assumption that the Soviet Union is a national parallel to the United States. In many other fields the same basic errors of concept and interpretation crop up. In short, the actual is scarcely penetrated to grasp the real: the superficial is accepted in preference to the essential. For purposes of meaningful interpretation and action, the Commission, if it is to achieve a balanced coverage of the enemy and his techniques of deception, would necessarily have to consider alternative frameworks of analytic reference than that presently used.

This first step could not be constructively undertaken without the simultaneous development of the whole area of the non-Russian nations in the USSR. This area of study would have to be developed economically, politically, historically, and culturally. The cultivation of such study, which is virtually nil in this country, will undoubtedly produce many interesting results for perspective and policy alike. One important result is that both out of ignorance as to the nature of the non-Russian revolution in the crumbling Russian Empire and out of half-hearted determination, the United States failed to support the ideas and principles of our own tradition in concrete application to independent Georgia, Armenia, White Ruthenia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkestan and other non-Russian nations which determined themselves at the end of World War I. These nations were

soon again individually subverted and subjugated by the imperialist successors to the White Czar. But the manifest significance of this period rests in the fact that the Russian Communists built upon this failure and our mistakes of forty years ago and now threaten the very life of our own nation. What should have been a second or third rate power is today, largely on the basis of accumulated captive resources, a contender for the world. More ironical still is the fact that the sole real imperialist power in the world today has actually stolen the American banner of the idea of national self-determination and freedom and successfully parades it in Asia and Africa. Plainly, then, the Freedom Commission in its positive concern for freedom everywhere would be morally obligated to launch systematic studies of this long neglected and yet vitally strategic non-Russian area of the Soviet Union.

THE PROSPECT OF REDRESSING A SAD RECORD

In addition to its broader significance and suggested opportunities, the Freedom Commission, should it come to pass, would have the tremendous prospect of working to redress somewhat the sad record of American relations with Russia. Whether one appreciates it or not, the successess of contemporary totalitarian Russian imperialism have been imposing and sweeping. These successes from 1918 to the present provide a concrete measure of fault and incompetence on our side. In the 1920's, soon after our contribution by indifference to the establishment of the now Russian Empire, we inadvertently saved the Russian Bolshevik regime by our charities through the American Relief Administration. In the 30's we furnished industrial know-how and capital to the empire, and soon thereafter cloaked the new imperial regime with the respectable bonds of diplomatic concourse. In the 40's we spent billions to save Stalin and overlooked our own determining power in virtually allowing the Russians to expand their empire to the Danube and the China Sea. Our naive faith in Russian word and intention accommodated the leakage of the most vital atomic and missile secrets, and in this decade we witnessed the evaporation of our monopoly power. Finally, our ill-advised participation in the Geneva Summit Conference built up the international prestige of Stalin's criminal successors who are today strengthened by the *sputnik*, *lunik*, and intercontinental missiles. Regardless of the rationalization offered for each of these developments, the record is a sad and almost incredible one.

A mid-western professional friend of the writer has suggested as a title for the past decade of these relations, as concerns the

United States: "From Atomic Monopoly and Supreme Air Power to Surrender Research." The pessimistic overtones of the title are not to be accepted, although the elements are factually valid. Yet it cannot be argued that we as a nation did not lose much in the shortest period of time for any leading power. The reasons for this have in part been given above. There are others. But had there existed all this while an administrative entity comparable to the planned-for Freedom Commission, the results would have been immeasurably different. The nature of the enemy revealed itself decades ago. Nevertheless, to win the cold war means in some notable measure to redress our sad record. And the Freedom Commission is purposed to realize such victory.

RUSSIAN EMIGRATION AND THE ANTI-COMMUNIST STRUGGLE

By GREGORY D. GOURJIAN

Forty-two years after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution of 1917 the Russian emigration in the free world still argues as to who was responsible for precipitating the fall of the Czarist Empire. It would seem that the deposed Russian aristocracy, especially its rightist wing, tends as a rule to shift the blame on "foreigners," Catholics, Jews, Socialists and Masons and everyone but the Russians themselves. Yet long before 1917—at the time of the "Decembrist" uprisings of 1825—it was the Russians, especially representatives of the Russian nobility and officers of the Czarist Guards, who rebelled against the monarchy. Among them were such well-known aristocratic figures of Russia as Prince Troubetskoy, Prince Volkonsky, Prince Obolensky, Muraviev-Apostol, Bestuzev-Rumin, and Kakhovsky. All were Russian and Orthodox.

Nevertheless there are people who would like to rewrite history and unearth a culprit on whom they could put the blame for the fall of Czardom. N. Ulianov (cf. No. 8 of *Opyty* for 1957) espoused a similar approach with respect to P. Chaadaev, one of the most brilliant minds of Russian thought and a staunch friend of the "Decembrists." He was one from whom the younger generation received inspiration for freedom and hatred of the despotic power in Russia. Russian apologists of despotism tend to ascribe the anti-Czarist sentiments of Chaadaev to the fact that he was a Catholic—a charge which is wholly new to all historians. It would seem that because Chaadaev was a Catholic he was against absolutism and criticized the Orthodox Church, and it would further seem that his Catholicism was the cause of all misfortunes which befell Russia a hundred years or so ago. Yet we know another Russian of international fame, L. N. Tolstoy, who was an Orthodox and not a Catholic, and who was excluded from the Orthodox Church for his critical stand with respect to some dogmas of the Orthodox Church. On the other hand, the history of Russia also knows Catholics and other religions' communicants who loyally served Russia. For instance, Count Czartoryski who was a Catholic and a close adviser of Czar Alexander I; or Count Loris-Melikov, a right-hand man of

Emperor Alexander II who was of Armenian origin and not Orthodox.

But the same argument continues. For example, a certain Mesnaev has leveled a heavy barrage against Catholicism, blaming it for all the misfortunes of Russia and praising Ulianov for his anti-Catholic stand (cf. *Rossia*, March 27, 1959). What these writers have in mind is obvious: to throw off the responsibility for the Russian debacle onto somebody else and thus exonerate the Russian people. It would be advisable for Mr. Mesnaev to read an article by M. N. Spasovsky, entitled, "The Day of Abdication of the Emperor" (*Rossia*, March 12, 1959), in which he ascribes the fall of the empire to "our own mistakes, indifference and cowardice in the days of February and October. Instead of seeking real and imaginary enemies of Russia around us, we ought to admit the blame for everything—because it is we, the Russians, who induced and even compelled the Emperor to abdicate. In this folly of ours we laid the groundwork of our imperial ruin."

THORNY AGRARIAN PROBLEM

One of the most important causes of popular discontent in Russia from times immemorial has been the land question. After the abolition of serfdom in 1861 this problem remained unsolved. The peasant upheavals and the unrest after the unsuccessful Russian-Japanese war compelled the Czarist government to tackle this important matter. Disregarding the opposition of the reactionary circles of the Court the government came up with a solution. A grandiose project of land reform was elaborated by Minister P. Stolypin and it was accepted. But the opposition went to work as well: Minister Stolypin was assassinated in Kiev in the presence of Emperor Nicholas II and the Empress. The assassin was revealed to be an agent of the Russian secret police, Socialist D. Bagrov, but his secret—whether he had acted for the Rightists or the Leftists—never was disclosed. Some contended that Bagrov killed Minister Stolypin in order to prevent his land reforms from going into effect, inasmuch as its full realization would have kept the revolution from erupting in Russia, a goal fiercely pursued by the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries. Still others maintain that Bagrov committed the act on the order of the rightist groups, which were unwilling to part with their huge land estates. Whoever it was that was responsible for the assassination of Stolypin achieved his goal: Stolypin's land reform plans were buried in the archives.

This development was one of the basic reasons for increased peasant discontent and open rebellions on the part of millions of

landless and illiterate peasants. By dropping the Stolypin land reform plan the Czarist government delivered a powerful argument into the hands of its opponents—the Socialists and Russian intelligentsia, which stood in opposition to the Czarist autocracy. The labor problem was equally neglected and unsolved, and the wages of workers were extremely low; social legislation was unknown.

In entering the war against Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, Russia was totally unprepared to wage a long and victorious struggle. The Russian army lacked armaments and ammunition, as well as other supplies. As the Russian armies were compelled to retreat from Poland, the intrigues among the various factions of the Court, as well as such sinister forces as typified by the monk Rasputin, went into open contest for the favors of the Czar, although his rule grew less popular day by day. The war became extremely unpopular, and discontent among the population swelled, especially when it became known that the Empress, who was under the spell of Rasputin, had a strong hand in the affairs of state. Under her influence ministers and generals were dismissed at random, while her favorites, although incompetent, were given responsible posts in the government and in the armed forces. All these developments were reported in the memoirs of such Russian leaders as P. Milukov, S. Melgunov, Prince Yusopov and Purishkevich, member of the *Duma*.

FALL OF CZARDOM

The Russian industry, although geared to war production, could not cope with the demands of the vast front, and consumer goods were almost non-existent. The Allies, especially the United States, had to supply Russia through Vladivostok, Murmansk and Archangelsk. But the inferior Russian railroad system proved to be incapable of supplying the front and the hinterland at one and the same time. Soon such cities as Moscow and Petrograd were the scenes of street disturbances, largely instigated by hungry housewives, upon whom both the police force and the troops not only refused to fire when ordered, but in many cases went over to the striking or protesting civilian mobs. A special Committee of State *Duma* was organized which assumed the reins of government. The country as a whole received the change of government with enthusiasm, as did the army and all classes of the population, including the peasants and the laboring class. Even the Grand Duke Kiril Vladimirovich, father of the living Russian pretender to the throne, Vladimir Kirilovich, appeared in the *Duma* wearing a *red* kerchief

—symbol of the revolution—although Russian Monarchists living in America may be unwilling to acknowledge this fact. The “women’s rebellion,” because of the shortage of bread, was given political consideration by the various parties which sought the abdication of the Czar.

When a delegation from the *Duma* visited Czar Nicholas II at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander and requested that he abdicate the throne, Nicholas signed the act of abdication almost immediately, and wishing to have his son with him, he signed the act of abdication in the name of his son as well. In his diary, under the date of March 3, 1917, Nicholas wrote: “All around us is treason, cowardice and betrayal.”

Much has been written about the Bolshevik *coup d’etat* (John Reed, L. Trotsky, General Krasnov and General A. I. Denikin) in October of 1917. In the Russian monarchist newspaper *Rossia* of November 14, 1958, appears an article by A. Stupenkov, “At the Gates of the Winter Palace.” Apparently one of the defenders of the palace on November 7, 1917, the writer depicts the apathetic disorganization of the Provisional Government of A. Kerensky and the complete lack of will on the part of the population to defend this government. At the decisive moment Kerensky, as head of the Provisional Government, proved to be utterly incompetent. The Winter Palace was defended by a battalion of women-soldiers under the command of Bochkareva and a few detachments from the officer schools at Petrograd. At the conclusion of his article, Stupenkov writes:

Forty years have elapsed. I am not trying to solve the problem whether it was necessary to defend the Provisional Government or not; I personally believe that at that time there was no middle road and could not have been. Either you support those who rule Russia or you are against them. If in February as well as October 60,000 officers who were available in Petrograd had seized rifles in their hands, then both revolutions would have been crushed completely . . .

CZARIST OFFICERS BUILT RED ARMY

These officers, whom the writer treats with scorn, subsequently helped Lenin and Trotsky to build up the Red Army, which thoroughly destroyed the White Armies of Generals Denikin and Wrangel and Admiral Kolchak, as well as others. We saw a Colonel Kamenev of the Czarist General Staff become commander-in-chief of the Red Army; and General Kluev become chief of operations of the First Red Cavalry Army. Later on thousands of Czarist officers, not because of fear, but in full conscience, served the Red Army and

built communism. Among them were later giants of the Red Army: Tukhachevsky, Marshal of the Red Army, and Generals Kork, Shaposhnikov, Yegorov, Shuvaev, Lazerevich, Solohub, Sergiev and others (cf. journal *Pereklychka*, No. 90, April, 1959).

In the November 6, 1958 issue of the Russian monarchist newspaper, *Nasha Strana (Our Country)*, which appears in Argentina, appeared an article by Monarchist N. Pototsky, "On the New Russian Man," in which we read:

Eighty percent of the officers of the General Staff went to serve the Bolsheviks, and in the Volunteer Army of General Kornilov out of 30,000 officers only some 2,000 remained loyal.

The role of the famous General Brusilov is also well known. He not only joined the Bolsheviks himself, but also prepared a special appeal to Czarist officers in which he called on them to join the Red Army, which "continues to preserve the Russian national ideals." Needless to say, the overwhelming majority of the Czarist officers were liquidated during the perennial purges of the Red Army.

In another book, *Kazachia Tragedia (The Cossack Tragedy)*, author Admiralov writes on page 55:

Distinguished colonels and generals proved to be venal people; they enrolled in the Communist Party, went to serve in the NKVD, commanded punitive units and executed thousands of innocent people.

Why did the White Armies suffer defeat? Military specialists have written many expert analyses. The writer of this article is not a military expert, but he lived in Georgia during the crucial period. Georgia was then occupied by the "Volunteer Army" of General Denikin, and the writer plainly saw the situation and the causes of its defeat, the same causes which contributed to the defeat of Admiral Kolchak and the other White Russian commanders.

The principal question remains: Could the White Armies have defeated Bolshevism at that time? The answer is yes. The so-called "Volunteer Army" had every opportunity to defeat the Red armies; if it failed to do so, the fault lies squarely with itself. Moreover, the High Command and those reactionary forces which surrounded General Denikin were culpable. His "Personnel Section" was a sort of "government within a government," in which all the officials were former Czarist ministers and counselors and from the upper strata of the Russian society, that is, all those who contributed to the outbreak of the revolution.

The land question, of course, was the basic reason for the defeat of the White Armies. The reactionary elements of the White Army were always against land reform, and they prevailed upon Gen. Denikin to reject any land reform proposals, thus turning the

peasantry against the White movement and directing them into the arms of communism.

In the spring of 1919 Gen. Denikin, after attending a solemn mass in Ekaterinodar, issued his famous order "To Take Moscow," in which he promised to call a special Land Congress to solve the ever-important land question (cf. *Priazovsky Krai*, May, 1919, Rostov on the Don). He said that landless peasantry and small-holders would be free to cultivate a free land, which implied that they would be given land. This promise encouraged greatly the peasantry in their support of the White Armies, and contributed to the military successes of the latter. But behind the White Army the great land-owners continued their former policy of exploitation and oppression of the peasantry, punishing them with harsh penalties or putting them to death. This played into the hands of the Bolsheviks, who launched deceitful slogans: "All land to the peasants, and factories to the workers."

This temporary success of the White Armies turned the heads of the officers' corps, especially its "Personnel Section," and the old Czarist practices resumed. Debauchery, drinking and orgies were common among the elite officer corps of the White Armies, especially in the headquarters of the Central Front under the command of General Mai-Mayevsky. His *aide-de-camp*, Capt. Orlov, was notorious as one of the principal organizers of the debauchery. It subsequently came to light that Capt. Orlov was a Bolshevik agent, especially charged with demoralizing the White Russian officers' corps (a book by Capt. Orlov was published by the Soviet government in the 20's in Moscow).

OPPOSED LIBERATION OF NON-RUSSIAN NATIONS

Undermining the White Russian army as well was its negative attitude toward the newly-established national republics. General Denikin refused to recognize the independence of Ukraine and dispatched large contingents of his army against the Ukrainian troops of the Ukrainian National Republic. In like fashion he waged aggressive war against the non-Russian republics of the Caucasus, and he was soon compelled to keep his regiments on the Georgian border instead of using them against the Bolsheviks. What General Denikin and his government wanted was the restoration of a "one Great and Indivisible Russia."

Some of the White Russian military leaders understood well that such a policy would end in utter defeat. Among them was Gen. Wrangel, who believed in a speedy solution of the land problem

and a democratization of the regime. While in the Crimea as commander-in-chief of the "Volunteer Army," General Wrangel began implementing a land reform, but the process was tardy and doomed to failure.

The total negation of the nationality problem by the White Russian military leaders was skillfully capitalized upon by the Bolsheviks, who propagated slogans of "national self-determination" and complete "separation" from Russia.

What is tragic and regrettable is the fact that all these White Russian generals, admirals, princes and high financiers, finding themselves in the emigration, have continued the same policies with respect to the non-Russian nations. They have refused to recognize these peoples' right to freedom and national independence, but instead have maintained old Czarist attitudes and prejudices. It may seem somewhat paradoxical, yet the overwhelming majority of these Russian aristocrats today are not waging any struggle against communism, but are exerting all their efforts against the aspirations of the non-Russian nations to freedom.

INFLUENCE AMERICAN THINKING

These Russian aristocratic relics, possessing knowledge of foreign languages and social contacts among the American financial and social strata, have succeeded in penetrating important American organizations in which they continue to propagate their Russian Czarist ideology and campaigns of hatred and vituperation against the non-Russian nations of the USSR. All those non-Russian leaders who fight for restoration of the freedom and independence of their enslaved countries are usually denounced by these aristocrats as "Soviet tools" and the like. Ignored is the fact that most of the non-Russian leaders from the USSR suffered persecution and oppression at the hands of the Soviet government at one time or another. All those who do not subscribe to Russian imperialism and chauvinism are labelled "tools and agents" of communism.

As a rule one cannot find any non-Russian nationals in the Russian emigre organizations in the United States, because the members of these organizations do not recognize political principles other than those supporting the cause of Czarist Russia.

Therefore, we cannot find any constructive program or work against communism in the ranks of the Russian emigres in this country. In the rightist Russian organizations rules a political ideology of the Russian upper class of the XVIth century, where a principle of family pedigree or rank prevails. As a result Russian

organizations based on such archaic principles cannot enlist large memberships. If there are some Russian organizations that have a more substantial following they are strife-ridden. Struggle and intrigues attending an intra-chamber fight for leadership are characteristic. For example, the organization of the followers of former Soviet General Andrei A. Vlassov is divided into three different groups waging an implacable struggle among themselves.

UNITED IN CHAUVINISM

What unites the Russian emigres is their common hatred of the non-Russian nations, first place being given to the Ukrainians

CARTOON OF SHAME AND INFAMY



This cartoon, representing a "cemetery of exile governments," could easily be reprinted in *Krokodil*, *Pravda* or *Izvestia* in Moscow. But it appeared in the April-May, 1959 issue of *Russian Independence*, a Russian-language journal published in Brooklyn, N. Y. The Russian caption says: "Efforts of a 'Magician,' Who Wants to Resurrect Those Who Cannot Rise." The coffins are marked with the following identifications: "Taiwan China, the Independent [Ukrainian patriot—ED.], the Dynasty of Regent Horthy, the Baltic Pretenders, Cossackia of Glazkov." One wonders on whose side the editors of *Russian Independence* are: ours or Khrushchev's? Certainly, their cartoon is worthy of a Stalin prize.

who are scornfully dubbed "separatists" by the Russians. They are followed by the Georgians, Armenians, Tartars and so on. In this aspect the Russian emigration of all hues and colors, including the "progressive," pro-Soviet and communist elements, is unanimous: they speak in the language of Russian imperialist chauvinism under the slogan: "One and Indivisible Russia." They accept no compromises which might provide for the establishment of national states on the territory of the former Czarist empire.

It would seem absurd at first sight, yet the old anti-Bolshevik emigration is keeping in close step with its alleged enemy, communism. For propaganda purposes the Soviet Union established a "Union of Soviet Republics;" Moscow bestowed certain national "liberties" upon some of these, but it actually holds them with an iron fist. None of these "independent" republics is allowed to deviate from the general line of the party, i. e., the Russian imperialist interests and the territorial integrity of the USSR. In all the national republics the people well remember what happened to those non-Russian Communists who advocated the secession of their republics from the USSR. Today, as in the times of Stalin, the Russians occupy key positions in all the non-Russian republics, whether in the party, the administration or the organs of the MGB.

In combatting the aspirations of the Ukrainian people for freedom and independence, the Russians advance the following argument: the Ukrainians belong to the same Slavic family as the Russians and are of the same religion, and hence should be together with them; besides, Ukraine joined Russia "voluntarily" in 1654, and so forth.

Of course, these Russian chauvinists are forgetting the times in which we now live. Since all the nations of Asia and Africa are receiving their national freedom and independence, why not then the ancient Ukrainian people, with a thousand-year-old tradition? As for the matter of religion, not all Ukrainians are Orthodox; several millions of them are Catholic. But let us look at Latin America, where all the inhabitants are Catholics and descendants of the Spanish and Portuguese, mixed with the local indigenous population. The same situation prevails in the Arab countries, where all the Moslem profess the Islamic religion, yet were able to establish separate independent states: Morocco, Tunis, Libya, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Egypt. These arguments are inadmissible to Russian emigre chauvinists who, by following this old Czarist imperialistic line with respect to the non-Russian nations, always remain a docile instrument in the hands of communism.

SOVIET INFILTRATION AND REDEFLECTION

Both the old and the new Russian emigrations are heavily infiltrated by Soviet agents, as was the case in the past. We recall such agents as Generals Skoblin and Slavshchev, actress Plevitskaya and others, who were luminaries among the White Russian emigres, and who then returned to the Soviet Union to be revealed as Bolshevik agents. Many other "Soviet patriots" also returned to the USSR, among them monarchist Shulgin, Lubimov, Kolenishchev and Kutuzov. The new post-war Russian emigration has provided an impressive array of Russian "returnees" who were received in the West as "anti-communist heroes" only to scuttle back to the USSR. It is obvious that they had been sent by Moscow as special agents and spies. Among those who returned were Kolosov, Zalesky, Vinogradov and his wife, Olshansky, Levchenko, Major Ronzhin, Alexandrov and Ovchinnikov. It can be safely stated that in the United States there are presently a great number of well-trained Soviet agents and spies who are operating upon the orders of Moscow.

It is dismaying how effectively these Soviet agents established themselves in various American propaganda agencies and in posts of importance, and upon fulfilling their assignments how easily they skipped back to the USSR to report. It is incomprehensible that this type of Soviet "refugee" should have enjoyed the special sympathy and protection of the American Committee for Liberation. *For the fact remains that all these returnees—Zalesky, Vinogradov, Olshansky, Major Ronzhin, Lieutenant Ovchinnikov—were employed by the American Committee.* Outrageously enough, American taxpayers thus subsidize Russian Communist agents. (cf. *Rossia*, December 20, 1957 and *The Information Bulletin*, No. 8, of the Russian Representation in America).

Another specialty of Russian emigres in the United States is that of fabricating spurious organizations from among alleged non-Russian nationalities which "support" the principle of a "One and Indivisible Russia." One such Russian-firster front is the so-called "Union of Ukrainian Federalists" and another the "Bloc of the Peoples of Russia." Neither of them has any following, and more often than not the same people are members in both "organizations." The latter group put out a pictorial history of Russia, a brochure depicting all the "invaders" of Russia: Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon, the Teutons, the Poles and Hitler. At the end there is a picture of Uncle Sam eyeing the USSR, by which, of course, is implied that the United States is about to commit the crime of invading the USSR. A warning is served that the United

States would meet the fate of Charles XII and Hitler. The brochure makes no mention of the aggressive and bloody conquests of Moscow, of the threats to Berlin, the Middle East or Formosa or of any other international crisis which has been engineered by Moscow in order to create dissension and unrest so that it could the more easily extend its conquests and aggressions.

The post-war Russian emigration on the whole is trying to become integrated into the American way of life and is happy to have left its former "glorious life" under communism. But among the new Russian emigres there is an impressive number of pro-Soviet elements which, although they sustained persecution under Bolshevism, nonetheless are "proud" of the might and power which the USSR offers today. These elements are no less dangerous than the Communists themselves.

The new Soviet Russian emigres provide the principal membership for two Russian organizations: the NTS (the Russian Solidarists) and the Central Association of Post-War Refugees, both with headquarters in Western Germany. The NTS publishes a weekly, *Posev*, and a monthly magazine, *Grani*; they also have a radio station over which they broadcast allegedly anti-Soviet propaganda to the USSR. It is commonly assumed that the NTS is receiving financial and political support from the United States, as does the Central Association, which publishes a monthly, *Svoboda*. Both organizations recruit their membership from recent Soviet escapees. Many of those who recently returned to the USSR were in key positions in the NTS and the Central Association. Thus they knew all the "secrets" of Russian political emigres and their relations with the United States organizations.

Another important group among the Russian emigres is the Marxist-Socialist group or the Mensheviks, who left Russia after the ascension to power of the Bolsheviks. Some of them, however, remained and collaborated for a number of years with the Communists.

This group is extremely active and influential. It has succeeded in occupying key positions in American organizations and the press, and it provides the bulk of the so-called "experts" on communism and United States-Soviet relations. The group includes a few Russian literary figures who, being dependent financially on the Marxist Mensheviks, have to toe a political line which more often than not is not in tune with their consciences. It is self-evident that these "experts" cannot contribute anything to the anti-communist struggle, inasmuch as a number of them were and still are sympathizers of Leon Trotsky, and their "anti-communism" springs from

a fanatical desire to avenge the death of their leader Trotsky, rather than from a wish to see communism as such destroyed.

The free world needs genuine Russian anti-communists, but not former Chekists and former communist spies and informers, who actually are sent here to constitute a Trojan horse, directed against the free world.

These observations might serve as food for thought for those American policy-makers who believe that these Russian "experts" who are so generous in giving advice as to how to conduct U.S. foreign policy with respect to the USSR, are trustworthy and reliable. If the history of recent years proves anything, it is that they are not, and never are to be relied upon.

UKRAINE, POLAND AND SWEDEN AT THE TIME OF IVAN MAZEPA

By OSCAR HALECKI

The 250th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava and the subsequent death of *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa is sad to commemorate not only for the Ukrainians. The great Polish historian Wladyslaw Konopczynski, who knew that whole period so well, rightly pointed out that the defeat of 1709 ended at the same time the chances for Ukrainian independence, the prospects for Stanislaw Leszczynski's rule in Poland, and Sweden's role as a great power. It is, therefore, important and instructive for all three nations to study why that happened in spite of an unusually promising situation in which these countries, in the persons of their most prominent representatives, had created an apparently powerful coalition against the threatening advance of Russian imperialism.

It is, of course, obvious that one of the reasons for such a turn of events was the extraordinary energy and ability of Czar Peter I who from the Russian point of view is correctly called the Great. But it seems equally true that even he, with all his ruthlessness and versatility, would hardly have succeeded in meeting the challenge which he had provoked himself, if not for the tragic mistakes made by his opponents.

Most fateful indeed were the surprising mistakes of Sweden's famous hero, Charles XII. It is utterly unfair to blame him, as is sometimes done by those who consider Russia a frequent victim of Western aggression, for having attacked and invaded that country. On the contrary, the war, known in history as the Great Northern War had started nine years before Poltava with an anti-Swedish coalition set up by the Czar who had carefully planned an entirely unprovoked aggression against one of his western neighbors. And if immediately after his victory at Narva, in 1700, the King of Sweden had marched against Moscow, he would have been not only well justified in doing so, but would have seized an excellent opportunity for rapidly and completely defeating his main enemy. He turned instead against the least dangerous one: the Saxon King of Poland, Augustus II, who personally was indeed involved in the plot against Charles XII but without any knowledge and responsibility of the Poles and without any interest of Saxony. Yet it was

precisely these two countries which were punished by a Swedish invasion, absorbing for about eight years the best forces of Sweden, while to Peter I ample time was left to recover from his initial defeat and to organize Russia's forces of resistance. During these long years, practically wasted by his opponent, the Czar put an end to his internal troubles, achieved his almost revolutionary military and financial reforms, and even succeeded in occupying a substantial part of those Baltic provinces which were his foremost war aim.

But Charles XII, in addition to this strategic error, made another and equally disastrous mistake. He treated Poland as a conquered country, recalling to the Poles who in 1660 had effected a reconciliation with the Swedes, the hardships of another Swedish invasion before that date. Although the candidate whom he wanted to replace Augustus II on the Polish throne was rather well chosen, that first election of Leszczyński, dictated by Charles XII, was obviously illegal and necessarily divided the Poles into two camps fighting each other and conducting different policies. It is true that the election of the Saxon, in 1697, had also been illegal, enforced as it was by the future partitioning powers against the decision of the majority of the Poles; but it had been at least formally legalized two years later, and therefore it was understandable that many Poles resented another, this time Swedish, interference with their constitutional rights and that all of them were confused when suddenly they had two different Kings.

Nevertheless it was a great mistake that the Polish nation did not unite in those critical years. After all, Augustus II had first violated their constitution and drawn them against the vital interests of the country into a senseless war which could benefit only their more dangerous Russian enemy; and then, when defeated and threatened by Charles XII in his Saxon homeland, he had himself, in one of the conditions of the Treaty of Altranstadt, resigned all his claims to the Polish crown. It was, therefore, unfortunate that in spite of these facts the Elector of Saxony continued to have supporters in both the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania partly occupied by Russian forces, and that some of them would rather turn to these eastern invaders and consider them allies against the Swedish. Unfortunately King Stanisław I did not have the whole nation behind him when his Swedish protector at last decided to turn against Peter I and when a Polish-Swedish alliance against the common Russian enemy, which had seemed so desirable already at the time of the Jagellonians, could at last materialize.

Leszczynski also realized how desirable it was to include in such a cooperation the Ukrainian Kozaks. However, this would seem rather difficult to achieve. Ukrainian-Swedish cooperation, never easy if only for geographic reasons, had been tried before but against Poland, when in the days of Bohdan Khmelnytsky any chance of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation seemed hopeless. In general the whole preceding century had left behind a painful tradition of Polish-Ukrainian conflicts, obscuring the memories of bygone common struggles against Muscovites, Turks, and Tartars. And particularly vivid was Ukrainian resentment raised by the partition of Ukraine between Poland and Muscovy, in 1667. But it was precisely that partition for which the Kozaks and their internal divisions were not irresponsible, that had made them aware that Moscow's rule, extended even to Kiev, was the worst of all, destroying all hopes of independence and respecting not even the promised autonomy. The failure of the conception of the Pereyaslav agreement of 1654 with the autocratic Czardom, a failure which by now had become obvious, was a serious argument in favor of a return to the conception of the Hadyach agreement of 1658-59 with the Commonwealth, suggested by Leszczynski.

Both the unique chance of support of the Ukrainian independence movement by a victorious King of Sweden who was on his way to Moscow and could be persuaded to choose a way through Ukraine, and the futility of re-uniting Ukraine by bringing the western part also under the rule of Peter I, were well recognized by *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa. Much more than the equally famous Khmelnytsky he deserves to be considered the most prominent leader the Kozaks ever had after Konashevych and Vyhovsky. Sharing their Western orientation, fully in agreement with the genuine heritage of old Kievan Rus, he was equally prominent in promoting the political and the cultural development of a Kozak State based upon that heritage, and therefore well qualified to seize the historic opportunity of 1708-09.

However, while joining wholeheartedly in the tribute which is paid to Mazepa on the anniversary of these events, the historian is obliged to admit that he, too, just as Charles XII and so many Poles, made mistakes which contributed to the disappointing fact that the great opportunity was missed. His policy before Poltava has been rightly called Machiavellian and had indeed the same justifications and the same shortcomings which are typical of the ideas of the great Florentine patriot. The game which the *Hetman* played for several years hoping to prove smarter than the Czar, could mislead for some time even a man as shrewd and suspicious

as was Peter I. But it misled at the same time most of the Kozaks also, who could hardly find out what Mazepa really planned and wanted, and therefore were not ready to join the fight for freedom when its outbreak could no longer be delayed.

All this explains to a large extent the tragedy of Poltava where the exhausted Swedish army, cut off from its natural bases, had to fight practically alone. But that Russian victory, important as it was, was after all only one battle in the course of a war which was to last twelve more years before the Treaty of Nystad, in 1721, made Peter's victory final. That he was very near to defeat in 1711, when Polish and Ukrainian exiles had persuaded Turkey to enter the war against Russia, is very well known; but it is equally clear that the declining Ottoman Empire, still hoping to gain Ukraine for itself, could not be of any real help neither for her or for Poland and faraway Sweden. It is only thanks to recent historical research that we are now aware of another, more promising opportunity to check Russian imperialism, which appeared in the last phase of the Northern War when several years after Mazepa's death Pylyp Orlyk tried to continue his policy as *Hetman* in exile.

In 1719, in Vienna, a treaty was concluded between Emperor Charles VI, George I, King of England and Elector of Hanover, and last but not least, Augustus II, but only as Elector of Saxony, in order to put an end to the Czar's aggressive policy. The Western powers were particularly alarmed because Russian forces had already appeared, for the first time in history, on German soil, but all depended, of course, on the cooperation of Russia's directly threatened neighbors. And since Charles XII was already dead and Sweden anxious to get out of the war, decisive was the attitude of the Poles which in turn would strongly influence that of the Kozaks. Yet the Polish Diet of the following year refused to adhere to the Treaty of Vienna and the whole project of anti-Russian action was given up.

Was this another mistake, this time exclusively Polish, which confirmed the results of Poltava? It could seem so, but for two reasons the opposition of the Diet is understandable. First, Poland needed peace even more than Sweden and could rightly doubt whether Austria and English forces were ready to help her effectively on the distant eastern front, especially as both powers had hardly recovered from the War of the Spanish Succession, and Austria from an additional Turkish war. Furthermore, it was difficult to expect from the Poles any confidence in the policy of their Saxon King who from a long alliance with Peter I suddenly turned to a coalition against him and who always was prepared to sacrifice the interests of the country to his personal ambitions.

There remains, however, a most instructive lesson to be drawn from the experiences before and after Poltava. There was no longer any possible defense against Russia's rising power and her interference with the fate of her western neighbors, since these neighbors had not decided to cooperate closely. Even more than for Sweden which in view of her geographical position eventually escaped Russian conquest and only lost Finland one hundred years later, that lesson was inescapable for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and for the Kozak Ukraine. For these peoples both a defensive alliance and internal unity were already in the days of Mazepa a question of life and death. Therefore they join today in commemorating the great leader and in recognizing the basic soundness of his policy which could have favorably decided that question, if not for a complex series of circumstances largely beyond his control.

MAZEPA IN ENGLISH LITERATURE

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

Ivan Mazepa was one of the greatest of the *Hetmans* of the Ukrainian Kozak state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Zaporozhian Kozaks under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky had developed through independence from Poland into a power of the first rank in Eastern Europe but Khmelnytsky's alliance with Czar Alexis of Moscow had led to the interference of the Muscovite bureaucracy into all aspects of Ukrainian life. It was against this interference that Mazepa was obliged to struggle throughout his entire career as *Hetman* and it was to escape this that he formed an alliance with King Charles XII of Sweden against Moscow. The defeat of the Swedes and the Kozaks at Poltava in 1709 not only doomed Sweden and stripped her of her holdings east of the Baltic Sea but it laid Ukraine helpless before the advancing forces of Czar Peter I. It was under these conditions that the aged Mazepa in one of his most brilliant feats succeeded in carrying Charles to safety in Turkey but the effort exhausted the seventy-year old leader and he died in exile soon after but carried to his grave his honors as *Hetman* and he received a funeral worthy of his rank. It was the fitting climax to a career that was filled with service to his people as he conceived it.

Mazepa had an attractive and striking personality. All the Western Europeans who came in contact with him either in his capital of Baturyn or on his many visits to Moscow stressed his graciousness, his deep knowledge of political and economic affairs, his high culture and his more than liberal donations to various Ukrainian and Orthodox institutions not only in Ukraine but throughout the entire Orthodox world. Mazepa was in a real sense the very culmination of all those cultural currents that flowed into the *Hetman* state from the West and were from there transmitted in a dilute form into Moscow and the East. We should expect the Western literatures to reflect in some degree these aspects of his career and yet, if we do, we will be extremely disappointed, for the figure of Mazepa as it appears in English literature, is inseparably connected not with the greatness of the *Hetman* but with a romantic canard that became early associated with his name.

In a sense there is a reason for this. The interests of Western Europe were almost entirely involved in the struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism and in the first half of the seventeenth century these doctrinal disputes flared up into the ferocious Thirty Years War which left the German states a mere shambles and a pale picture of their former selves. The English succeeded in remaining almost entirely aloof from this conflict but at the same time they were busied with the no less furious conflicts between the Kings and Parliament which in a somewhat different form reflected various aspects of the same struggle. It was only natural that Khmelnytsky with his allies in Protestant Sweden should correspond with Oliver Cromwell but the restoration of the Stuarts put an abrupt end to negotiations between the English authorities and the Zaporozhian Kozaks. At the same time the Thirty Years War freed the hands of the Eastern European peoples to settle their own affairs without interference from the great powers of Central and Western Europe. Poland had a priceless opportunity to settle her own domestic problems and to work out a satisfactory solution of her relationships with the Lithuanians and the Ukrainians. Yet that opportunity was recklessly wasted. Poland took no effective steps to rearrange its internal affairs and merely brought about a situation where the embattled Kozaks, wedged in between the Republic of Poland, the aspirations of the Turks and the infiltrating processes of Moscow, lost their own power of independent movement and failed in their effort to make a new settlement based upon a Kozak regime in Kiev which could hold the balance of power between all of its neighbors. The situation was further complicated by the efforts of the Kings of Sweden to assert their claims to the Polish throne, to secure this for the Swedish line of the Vasa family and to make of the Baltic Sea a Swedish lake with the Swedes in control of all the Baltic sea-coast. There were thus three centers of conflict—Western and Central Europe, Ukraine and its neighbors, and Sweden. It was only the first of these that had ready access to English public opinion which was not ready to take sides in the others and was thoroughly indoctrinated with the Muscovite point of view thanks to the visit of Peter to England and the services of such men as Patrick Gordon in the Czar's army and entourage.

As the century drew to a close, Louis XIV of France tried to assert his authority over the whole of Western Europe and this led to another long and continued series of wars not only in Europe but also in America and in India. It led to continuous clashes between the French and English colonies in America and for a

century both the British and the Americans saw the whole field of European and international relations through the prism of this struggle between England and France on three continents.

The Northern War which opened with King Charles XII of Sweden embroiled with Peter of Moscow, Poland and Denmark went on simultaneously with the War of the Spanish Succession in which Great Britain, Holland, Austria, Denmark, Portugal and some of the German states were allied against France, Bavaria, Cologne and Spain. France and Moscow did their best to secure the intermingling of the two wars or perhaps we might say the liquidation of the one in which it was not involved, for France was constantly making efforts to induce Charles XII to give up his struggle against Moscow and take his place in the anti-British combination and Peter was trying to induce Marlborough to throw his talents and energy into the war against Sweden, even at the price of peace between Great Britain and France. The resulting complications produced a bedlam in which the cause of Ukraine and the Kozaks was hopelessly concealed from the minds of Western Europe and the position of Mazepa was thoroughly misinterpreted just as the cause of Ukraine later under the exiled *Hetman* Orlyk was involved in the fate of Sweden and France.

By this period too England as a maritime state was far more interested in exploration and expansion overseas. Moscow had not yet secured a firm hold on the Black Sea and the Dardanelles were still more or less closed to commerce. As a result English travellers and diplomats who reached Constantinople rarely penetrated into the interior. They knew the future Russia from access by St. Petersburg and Archangel. Ukraine and Kiev were not on the route of the Grand Tour taken by all young men of fashion and of wealth during the eighteenth century and there were few English travellers and diplomats who made the long and tedious journey overland to visit the Ukrainian centers. For a knowledge of Ukrainian affairs, they were dependent upon sources hostile to the Kozaks and these wasted no opportunities to stress Mazepa as a traitor in those lurid colors with which Peter had painted him.

Furthermore with all of his great qualities Mazepa was a favorable subject for criticism. A member of a Ukrainian noble family, he had been reared at the Polish court and had a definite position there even before the rise of Khmelnytsky and the independence of the Zaporozhians. His passage from the service of the King of Poland to the Kozaks aroused criticism among the Poles and they in their turn did not spare any efforts to blacken

his character, especially when they realized that he was no longer going to do their bidding.

It was just at this period that the young Mazepa made a bitter enemy, Jan Chrysostom Passek. Passek was a swashbuckling Pole, a brawler and a general disturber of the peace but unfortunately for Mazepa's reputation he possessed the fatal gift of not spoiling a good story. After several personal encounters with the young Ukrainian, Passek in his memoirs told the unforgettable tale of Mazepa's ride. According to this, Mazepa was caught by the irate husband of a lady with whom he was having an affair and to take vengeance the husband had him bound naked on a wild horse which was then turned loose. Passek covered himself in case of controversy by not giving either the time or place or even the precise name of the insulted husband, so that it was impossible to pin down the actual episode, if there was one, that served as the basis of the story. Yet that story, as Passek told it, sounded convincing. In the original form, the horse carried Mazepa back to his own estates after a wild ride, but later gossips embroidered it even more. They told how the young man was so scratched up that the peasants believed that he was some supernatural monster from hell and secured the village priest to exorcise the demon. Each one added some new twist to the tale without regarding the fact that Mazepa could not have survived, if he had had to go through all the details with which they burdened him. It was a jolly example of a story, highly improbable at first, but becoming more and more fantastic with each individual new accretion. Thus at the moment when Peter let loose a torrent of denunciation and the vilest possible language on the defeated *Hetman*, there was already in existence a mass of scandalous stories connected with Mazepa and only waiting to be incorporated in a pseudo-historical account.

The next step in this collection of misrepresentations was to link the stories in some way with Mazepa's withdrawal from the Polish service and his entrance into the Zaporozhian Host. There was no need for this to excite wonder, for Polish and Ukrainian families were largely intermingled especially in the western part of Ukraine and there were many cases when as a result of some deliberate insult a Ukrainian gave up his hopes for serving with the King and yielded to the cause of his own people. But Mazepa's choice could not be made to seem so simple and entirely regardless of the geographical truth of the setting, some one discovered that it was the wild horse that had carried Mazepa to the Ukrainian camp. That was enough and when Voltaire set himself to write a history of Charles XII, he perpetuated the story and included it in

his celebrated history. The stage was set for poets and literary men to complete the immortalizing of Mazepa's ride.

This step was taken by Lord Byron who in 1818 published his poem *Mazeppa* and prefaced it with the appropriate passages from Voltaire. It was only natural that the story of the *Hetman* with all of its fantastic additions should appeal to the Scotch bard, for he was the very heart and soul of that Romanticism which sought everywhere to find examples of extravagant passion and of superhuman manifestations of the human will. The story as told by Voltaire fitted perfectly into his formula, for no ordinary mortal could have stood all the trials and tribulations which the mythical Mazepa had had to undergo.

Yet Byron did not lose touch with reality, for he represented the aged Mazepa in his own historical form and he gave vent to his anti-monarchical feelings in his description of Charles XII, who had sacrificed so many thousands of his people to satisfy his ambition:

For thousands fell that flight to aid:
And not a voice was heard t'upbraid
Ambition in his humbled hour,
When truth had nought to dread from power.

Yet even then he pays a tribute to Charles' endurance:

But yet through all,
Kinglike the monarch bore his fall,
And made, in this extreme of ill,
His pangs the vassal of his will:
All silent and subdued were they,
As once the nations round him lay.

Then the poet pictures Mazepa as he was during the retreat from Poltava:

Among the rest, Mazeppa made
His pillow in an old oak's shade —
Himself as rough, and scarce less old
The Ukraine's *hetman*, calm and bold,
But first, outspent with this long course,
The Cossack prince rubbed down his horse,
And made for him a leafy bed,
And smoothed his fetlocks and his mane,
And slacked his girth, and stripped his rein,
And joyed to see how well he fed;

His horse attended to, Mazeppa next looked to his arms and then he offered the King and his men what food he had available. Charles appreciated the old man and his tribute:

Of all our band,
Though firm of heart and strong of hand,
In skirmish, march, or forage, none
Can have less said or more have done
Than thee, Mazeppa! On the earth
So fit a pair had never birth,
Since Alexander's days till now,
As thy Bucephalus and thou:
All Scythia's fame to thine should yield
For prickling on o'er flood and field.

And at the end:

The *Hetman* threw
His length beneath the oak-tree shade,
With leafy couch already made,
A bed nor comfortless nor new
To him who took his rest whene'er
The hour arrived, no matter where:
His eyes the hastening slumbers steep.

Here we have the essence of the real Mazepa, the old courtier and campaigner who despite almost superhuman obstacles carried the wounded Charles XII to safety in Turkey practically out of the middle of the followers of Peter. Mazepa in this last ride called into play all the knowledge of the steppes and of the Russian enemy that he had stored up during the many years when he had ridden with the Kozaks hither and yon across the steppes. It would have been well, had the readers of Byron's poem taken as their evaluation of Mazepa that tribute to the aged man that Byron pays so handsomely in his account of the night when Mazepa and his Kozaks were on guard to protect the helpless Swedish King and his surviving followers.

Then to console the King and to put him to sleep by setting his mind at rest Mazepa tells how he came to join the Kozaks. He describes the luxurious and cultured life at the court of Jan Casimir and the poetic sports that were used to pass away the time instead of war and battles. It was here that he fell in love with the beautiful Theresa, the wife of a Count Palatine,

A count of fair and high descent,
Rich as a salt or silver mine;
And he was proud, ye may divine.

His wife was thirty years younger than he and so she and the youthful Mazepa fell madly in love. That was the one love of Mazepa's life:

I'd give
The Ukraine back again to live
It o'er once more — and be a page,
The happy page, who was the lord
Of one soft heart, and his own sword,
And had no other gem nor wealth
Save nature's gift of youth and health.

With this Mazepa goes through all the passions that inspire the Romantic poet as he describes how he and his beloved are caught by the irate husband and how in vengeance the Count has him bound to a wild horse and turns the horse loose. After more than a day of running, the horse drops dead and Mazepa, scarcely alive and unconscious, suddenly finds himself brought back to life by a Kozak girl. Her father has found him in the steppes and has brought him to his home and she nurses him back to life. Yet as befits the Romantic hero, he passes over the devotion that she shows him in relative silence and merely says that from there he has gone to be the *Hetman* of Ukraine.

It is the account of the ride on which Byron expends all of his undoubted talents and it is that picture of the mad rush of the crazed horse over hill and dale that remains in the memory and has completely confused and overshadowed that historic role of Mazepa which the poet elsewhere pictures so fully and accurately. Passek has had his revenge for he, thanks to Byron, has impressed upon the English-speaking reader the picture of Mazepa, not as the intrepid leader but as the love-sick swain who was forced by overweening jealousy to take a hurricane ride and whose endurance won him an undying place in literature.

The effect which this conception of Mazepa had upon the mind of the Americans of the period is well illustrated in an unexpected manner by the history of the Mazepa Engine Company in New York. At the time fire protection was offered to the city by the Volunteer Fire Companies which fostered a great deal of inter-company rivalry. Many of these companies adopted badges and other symbols which signified the speed with which the volunteer members gathered and took their apparatus to the scene of the blaze and to the fortitude and bravery of the members in remaining at their posts, even at times of the greatest conflagrations. In the eighteen twenties, only a few years after the first copies of Byron's *Mazeppa* reached New York, we find that some of the volunteer

firemen were organized into a Mazepa Engine Company in an allusion to the speed of Mazepa's ride and the endurance of the hero during his mad flight across the steppes. The badge of the company represented the naked Mazepa bound to the wild horse. The company continued its existence with its ups and downs until it was replaced during the Civil War by a paid Fire Department. The badges of this company have been preserved and when it was finally disbanded, these badges were given to an offshoot company in the town of Nyack, New York. We could probably find still other examples of groups of the same character in some of the other American cities of the day. Yet we can cite this one example to see how thoroughly the character of Mazepa was detached from that of the Ukrainian *Hetman* and acquired an independent appeal with no thought of the source from which the story was taken, for there is no evidence that the founders of this Company had any other Ukrainian connection than their desire to appropriate the tradition which had been so well set in motion by Lord Byron.

Yet we have still not completed the history of the dissociation of Mazepa in English literature from his people and from his historical career. Byron had aided in the process but Byron had travelled extensively in the Ottoman Empire. He had lived among the Greeks, the Albanians and in Constantinople and though he was an ardent Hellenist and preferred to call the Dnieper the Borysthenes, its ancient Greek name, and to speak of Scythia, he had enough opportunity in Constantinople to meet or at least to hear about those Kozak groups which had chosen exile in Turkey to absorption by the steamroller of Russian Muscovite standardization.

The confusion was further intensified because of the widespread misunderstanding of the name of the people of Ukraine. There were in common use for Ukraine in the eighteenth and earlier centuries such old names as Sarmatia, Roxolania, etc. and there were also stories that the Kozaks (Cossacks as they were labelled) were not Slavs but Tartar tribes wandering around on the pathless steppes. As a result more than once Mazepa emerges on the literary scene not as a Slavic individual but he turns also into a Tartar and as such he can become the hero of works written in the full Romantic and melodramatic manner which brings together in one category Kozaks and Tartars. In this stage of development there can be no question of any contact between the literary figure of Mazepa and the real historical personage. Everything is permitted and a drama with Mazepa as the main figure has only one obligatory feature—the hero must be bound for a wild ride on the back of a wild horse.

All this is well shown in the drama by H. M. Milner, *Mazepa* which was produced at the Theatre Royal in London in the eighteen thirties. The author may have read some Polish book to secure the titles and the names of his Polish protagonists and he also had read the *Arabian Nights* to good purpose.

In this *Mazepa*, a young Tartar, falls in love with Olinska, the daughter of a Castellan. She is sought in marriage by Premislas, a Count Palatine and a fabulously rich man. Despite the difference in their ages and wealth, *Mazepa* defies the Palatine and slightly wounds him. In a rage the Palatine has him bound to a horse which is turned loose. When the horse falls dead, *Mazepa* is so exhausted and disfigured that the Tartars who find him imagine that he is a supernatural figure, a Volpas, but he is saved and brought back to health by the Tartar Khan, the aged Abder Khan, who recognizes the unconscious young man as his long lost son. Abder Khan is old and since he has no direct heir, his position is sought by an ambitious lord, Thama, who decides to aid his prospects by murdering the old man, his lord, and for good measure he decides to slay the newly arrived *Mazepa*. Despite his exhaustion *Mazepa* proves his valor by saving both his father and himself and then as the duly recognized heir to the throne, he returns to Poland accompanied by his father and the latter's army. Once again he confronts the Count Palatine who is on the verge of forcing Olinska to marry him. The Count again tries to take vengeance but this time he is dealing not with a helpless page but with a proud and powerful Tartar chieftain. *Mazepa's* troops seize the castle and forbid the marriage and the play ends happily with the lovers united amid the blazing ruins and the Palatine finally and hopelessly thwarted. Romance and misconception have here won out entirely and have corrected not only history but even the romantic hero as drawn by Byron.

There is little need to pursue the study of the appearances in literature of this fantastic figure labelled *Mazepa* but it may be sufficient to mention as a curiosity the satirical vulgarization of it found in *Mazepa, An Equestrian Burlesque* published in 1856 as No. III of *Brady's Ethiopian Drama*, for it gives a good picture of some aspects of the American publishing business just before the Civil War. Brady pirated Dickens' *Household Words* and then in this series, he has obviously satirized the play of Milner. *Mazepa*, here renamed *Satinette*, is in love with Olinska, the daughter of Castiron of Hoboken, a shady character who is willing to sell his daughter to Count Coleslau, some punk, and a swindler in his own right. When *Mazepa* tries to reveal the scheme, he is tied to the

horse which carries him back to his father Abder Khan, Cream of Tartar and the boss white-washer of Jamaica, Long Island. Then Mazepa recovers, turns up as the minister who is to marry Olinska, and Count Coleslau is finally shown up, and again all ends well. It may well be doubted whether the author of this monstrosity had ever heard of the history of Mazepa or of the existence of countries in Eastern Europe.

It is a sad fact that the one idea that appeared in English and American literature about Mazepa and penetrated into the consciousness of the reading public was the utterly fantastic story of Mazepa's wild ride. Yet this was a canard that found respectable backing not only in the semi-literate and artistic circles but even in works of reference.

The 1881 edition of the *American Encyclopaedia* gives credence to this story and calls Mazepa a Pole. Then it alludes to the two versions extant of Mazepa's ride, the one according to which the horse carried him into a Kozak camp and the other [preferred by Passek] where the horse takes him back to his own estate and leaves Mazepa there so mortified that he refuses to continue to move in Polish circles and so makes his way to the Zaporozhians. The ride dies hard and even the 1951 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, while it has learned that Mazepa was a member of an Orthodox family, still finds it necessary to mention that the story is that he was thus treated by the irate husband of a Polish lady with whom he was in love.

Yet we must not blame too harshly the individuals who spread throughout the English-speaking world this grotesque picture of the great *Hetman*. Mazepa himself was well aware of the way in which in his own lifetime he was the object of hostile propaganda. He was in his youth too outstanding a representative of the Ukrainian noblemen in Poland to escape unscathed when he threw his lot in with the Zaporozhians after repeated insults to him by the Polish magnates with whom he was forced to associate. A trusted representative of King Jan Casimir, he could not be ignorant of the fact he would never be accepted by the Poles or given such posts as he might aspire to but that his life would be spent in futile missions to try to persuade the Host not to insist upon its rights in the face of Polish hostility and contempt. When he entered the service of Doroshenko and then of Samiylovych he was rewarded by a flood of scandals which emanated from Polish sources, even though they had little effect on Polish lords with whom he was compelled to treat in his new capacity.

He was the trusted friend of Peter, so long as the latter thought that he could use Mazepa by playing upon his personal ambitions to agree with the Czar's plans for taking from Ukraine those rights which had been guaranteed in the Treaty of Pereyaslav. When the Czar believed that the hour for that had come during the Northern War, Mazepa slipped away from his clutches and joined Charles XII so that Ukraine could maintain its traditional usages and freedoms. The full anger of Peter was directed against the Kozaks when he captured and burned Baturyn and massacred without discrimination all of the inhabitants of that city, men, women and children. For Mazepa himself he saved his choicest words of abuse and would have reserved the choicest tortures, if the *Hetman* had not escaped after Poltava. When he did that and carried off Charles XII to boot, there was nothing more for the Czar to add. Mazepa was roundly cursed in the churches, he was damned and compared to the worst criminals and traitors of history and the victorious Peter saw to it that the career of Mazepa was written up in appropriate terms. It made no difference for the evaluation of Mazepa and his work that he had left behind him the high regard of all with whom he came into contact, that Peter had praised him to the skies when he thought he could use him, and that Charles XII was his admirer and his friend in his last hours.

The agents of a declining Poland and a vindictive and advancing Russia grasped every opportunity, every breath of scandal to issue scurrilous propaganda against the man who in defense of his country had succeeded in thwarting their schemes to crush the Ukrainian Kozaks. Nothing was too fantastic for them to utter and to write and they succeeded in catching the ear of Europe, when Ukraine had no defender of equal note. English and American scholars and writers were only too ready to accept one or the other of these hostile sources as the truth and in default of serious study of the real history of Ukraine, they repeated whatever charges were the best accredited by the propaganda which they followed.

In the course of this process, public attention was centered on the story of Mazepa's ride, for it was an episode that true or false, fitted into the general conception of the Romantic poet and his dreams of life on the open steppe. So the story of Mazepa's ride passed into history and literature and there it has remained for the masses of the people who know Ukraine only vaguely as a part of Russia, whatever that may mean.

Today it is two centuries and a half since the Battle of Poltava. We can see now the consequences of that battle and the way in which it barred any normal spreading of free institutions in the

area. We can see what the defeat of Charles and Mazepa really meant to the world and why military historians rank Poltava as one of the decisive battles of the world. We can see that despite that, the spirit of Ukraine has not perished but is still alive even under the adverse conditions of the present.

Now on the anniversary of the battle, the problem is to correct the impressions that the world has of Ivan Mazepa and to try to restore to him that place in history which he fairly earned through his long years of service to his people. It is not only a question of producing new and more accurate histories but it is also the work of tearing down that strange phantom which for more than a century has wandered here and there through the pages of English literature wearing the name of the great *Hetman* but totally apart from him in his vices, his virtues and his accomplishments. It is the task of the present to give to the world a knowledge of the real Mazepa, that courtly and heroic figure who at the very end of his life was still able to conduct one of the great flights of history. It was the *Hetman* of an independent Ukraine that was buried with high honors in Jassy in 1709. It is as such a *Hetman* that English literature and the English and American people must learn to regard him and think of him, of his career, and of his people. To do this will be to erect the best monument to the memory of Ivan Mazepa.

FICTIONS VS. FACTS OF LIFE IN THE POLICIES TOWARD THE NON-RUSSIAN PEOPLES IN THE USSR

By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

On November 15, 1917 (one week after the Communists' accession to power), the Council of the People's Commissars proclaimed in the Declaration of the Peoples of Russia, the equality and sovereignty of all peoples living in the former Russian Empire, their right of self-determination (including the right of secession), the abolition of all national and religious privileges and restrictions, and the right of free development of national minorities and ethnic groups as well.¹

In the subsequent declarations of Soviet officials, it was repeated time and again that an era of liberation had come for the "oppressed brothers," that opportunities had been granted for use of the national languages in administrative bodies and in the republics with heterogeneous populations, and that the national minorities had been authorized to use their native language. During 1921-1922, laws were promulgated in all Soviet republics guaranteeing the use of national tongues in all state bodies which served the needs of the local national populations and the national minorities; for instance, in Byelorussia, officials in some governmental departments were obliged to know Byelorussian, Russian, Polish and Yiddish. The Constitution of the USSR of 1936 provided for instruction in the native languages; alphabets were introduced for those backward tribes which had none. Elementary and secondary schools, colleges and universities were founded in the various Republics, with the local tongue as the language of instruction.

ILLUSIONS ABOUT SOLUTIONS OF NATIONALITY PROBLEMS

These legal steps were enthusiastically received by numerous American intellectuals and fellow-travelers.² Thus we read:

¹ For handy survey of this policy, see: Anatole Goldstein, *The Soviet Attitude toward Territorial Minorities and the Jews* (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1953).

² Corliss Lamont, *The Peoples of the Soviet Union* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944); National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, *A Family of*

Few observers will now take exception to the judgment of the Webbs made in 1938 that the Soviet Union can claim with a high degree of accuracy that it has solved the difficult problem presented by the existence of national minorities in a strongly centralized state...³

Or the Soviet spokesmen proclaimed:⁴

The Soviet Union is a multinational State inhabited by scores of nations and nationalities, each of which has its own national language, its own customs and its own culture, national in form and socialist in content... The Communist Party gradually prepared the amalgamation of the Soviet national republics into a single union state. This amalgamation was historically logical, for it stemmed from the nature of the Soviet system and was at the same time dictated by the external conditions of the development of the land of Socialism... The Communist Party of the Soviet Union accomplished its work of creating a single multinational State in the course of bitter struggle with bourgeois nationalists of all shades, and with proponents of national deviations in its own ranks...

Yet the historical evidence shows that the nationality problem has not been solved. In the first place, the October Revolution (1917) was really a Russian revolution, taking place not only in Russia but also carried out in the main by Russians.⁵ In order to establish the Kremlin-controlled state, the Soviet regime tried to stamp out "Federalist nationalism" in the Baltic, Transcaucasia, northern Caucasus and the Central Asiatic regions, as well as local nationalism in the economic sphere (as shown in the greater resistance mustered in the non-Russian areas than among the Great Russians against the collectivization of agriculture), tainted nationalism (especially in the non-Russian countries of the Russian empire) and linguistic nationalism (cropping up in all nationalistic and dialectic divisions). In fact, many of these diverse national groups were hostile to one another, and the heritage of bitterness has been evident in Soviet history to this day. But by their legal pretensions the Soviet leaders hoped that they could secure more political loyalty. They granted more cultural freedom to all nationalities, especially through a policy of promoting cultures and by granting the right of national language.

Nations: The Soviet Union (New York 16, 1956); Bernhard J. Stern, "Soviet Policy on National Minorities," *American Sociological Review*, IX (June, 1944), reprinted in: B. J. Stern & Samuel Smith, Eds., *Understanding the Russians: A Study of Soviet Life and Culture* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1947), 19-24, etc.

³ Stern, *op. cit.*, 19.

⁴ N. Matiushkin & N. Georgiev, "Successful Solution of the National Problem in the USSR, *Voks*, LXX (1951), 7-14; or see: N. Georgiev, "On Socialist Nations in the USSR, *ibid.*, IV (87), (July-August, 1954), 5-15.

⁵ Walter Kolarz, *Russia and Her Colonies* (London: George Philip, 1952).

Nevertheless, in spite of such legal steps, the introduction of a Soviet regime was often bitterly opposed. For instance, the Kalmuks (of Southeastern Russia) actively supported Denikin's and the Don Cossacks' anti-Soviet armies. Similar difficulties arose in Turkestan, Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.

At any rate, roughly speaking, the Russians followed a policy of fostering "minority" cultures (paralleling the same phase of concessions accompanying the New Economic Policy). In some respects the results for a while were satisfactory, as they pleased some of the peasantry, workers and intelligentsia, and helped, in some places, the national, political and cultural consciousness (although bitterly opposed in Ukraine). Eventually Stalin originated the well-known formula: "national in form and socialist in content."⁶ During the first two decades of his regime, the development of national languages and national cultures was greatly encouraged. The nationalities which formed federated national or autonomous Republics, as well as the "minorities" living within these national Republics, were allowed, in most cases, to use their own languages.

But around the 1930's, the policy of forced assimilation started to shape up. A first step was the discarding of the Arabic alphabet for the Latin, which in turn was replaced by the Cyrillic (Russian), although these two languages have certain sounds which cannot be conveyed by the Cyrillic. This was a definite blow against the Moslem peoples because the Koran is written in that alphabet; by 1939, 69 new alphabets, based on the Latin, had been created.⁷

⁶ Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2nd ed., 1936), 196-7.

⁷ Kolarz, *op. cit.*, 37-38; among the more important works treating the problem of Soviet nationality groups, see: Anatole Goldstein, *The Soviet Attitude toward Territorial Minorities and the Jews* (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1953), and bibliographical references, I-VII; Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire* (London: The Macmillan Co., 1953); M. Chekalin, *The National Question in the Soviet Union* (New York, pamphlet, 1941); David J. Dallin, *The New Soviet Empire* (London: Hollis & Carter, 1951); T. W. Fernau, *Moslems on the March* (New York: Knopf, 1954); W. Jochelson, *Peoples of Asiatic Russia* (New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1928); Firuz Kazemzadeh, *The Struggle for Transcaucasia 1917-1921* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951); Hans Kohn, *Nationalism in the Soviet Union* (London: Routledge, 1933); Richard E. Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1954); S. M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (Syracuse University Press, 1951); Roman Smal-Stocki, *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1943); Mustafa Chokhaev, "Fifteen Years of Bolshevik Rule in Turkestan," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XX, 3 (1933), 351-359; Xenia J. Eudin, "Soviet National Minority Policies 1918-1921," *The Slavonic & East European Review*, XXI, 2 (November, 1943), 31-55; Erich Hula, "The Nationalities

RUSSIFICATION

In 1938 the Russian language was introduced as a required subject in all Soviet schools, from the first grade up; the language was proclaimed to be dominant inasmuch as "Lenin and Stalin wrote their incomparable works in Russian" and since it was necessary to "esteem the powerful Russian nation and be acquainted with its language in order to share its civilization."⁸

It was at this point that the Communist policy of fusing all cultures and languages into a common one was replaced by the policy of superimposing Russian over the native tongues.

In theory, Lenin believed that it was undemocratic to establish one official language—in this case Russian—in a multi-national country like the USSR; but he was convinced that the economic factor could always be expected to bring about the use of one common language.⁹ Stalin developed further Lenin's idea of the one-world language of communism: "The dying of national languages and their fusion into a single common language is not an internal state question, but a question of the victory of socialism in one country, an international question, a question of victory on an international scale."¹⁰ Soviet jurists and writers started giving more and more praise to the Russian language as a language which "enjoys vast affection among all peoples of the USSR, as the general property of the Soviets,"¹¹ and which "attracts not only the peoples of the

Policy of the Soviet Union," *Social Research*, II (May, 1944); Ivan Kurganov, "The Problem of Nationality in Soviet Russia," *Russian Review*, (October, 1951), 253-267; S. W. Page, "Social and National Currents in Latvia," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, VIII (1949), 25-36, "Lenin, the National Question and the Baltic States," *ibid.*, VII (1948), 15-31; Richard E. Pipes, "The First Experiment in Soviet National Policy: The Bashkir Republic (1917-1920)," *Russian Review*, IX, 4 (October, 1950), 303-319 and "Bolshevik National Theory Before 1917," *Problems of Communism*, II, 5 (1953), 222-227 and "Muslims of Central Asia," *The Middle East Journal*, (Summer, 1955); S. M. Schwarz, "Self-Determination under the Communist Regime," *Problems of Communism*, II, 5 (1953), 28-34; "The Soviet Concept and Conquest of National Cultures," *ibid.*, II, 6 (1953), 41-46; A. D. Wolfe, "The Influence of Early Military Decisions upon the National Structure of the Soviet Union," *The American and East European Review*, IX (1948), 169-179.

⁸ *Izvestia*, April 14, 1938.

⁹ Lenin, *Sochineniya (Works)*, (Moscow: Gosizf, 3rd ed., 1935), XVI, 595-97. For an extensive treatment of this whole problem, see: C. C. Cecys, "Present Russian Nationalism," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, IX, 2 (Spring, 1953), 141-155.

¹⁰ Stalin, *Marksiizm i natsionalno-kolonialny vopros (Marxism and the National and Colonial Question)*, (Moscow: Parizd., 1935), 256-257, 264-266.

¹¹ A. Vyshinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State* (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1948), 603.

USSR, but all the workers of the world."¹² The famous directive of Stalin on the question of language in the 50's made clear that the "international language" of communism was the Russian tongue. David Zaslavsky wrote:

The Russian language is the first world language of international significance, which sharply rejects the destruction of the national character by cosmopolitanism... Nobody can regard himself educated in the full and true sense of the word if he does not understand Russian and cannot read the creations of the Russian mind in the original language.¹³

As the Soviet regime became more and more Russianized, Great Russian chauvinism inevitably emerged. Russians were endlessly proclaimed to be the "elder" brothers of the non-Russians (an epithet uncomfortably akin to the "big brother of George Orwell's 1984"). The homage which non-Russians had to pay to Russian culture was almost incredible in its servility. History was rewritten to paint Czarist oppression as "progressive Russian rule" which had liberated the benighted non-Russian peoples.¹⁴ Shamil, the national hero of the Moslem peoples of the Caucasus, was erased from the pages of history because he had fought the armed forces of the Russian empire. Kazakh historians were reprimanded for having portrayed Czarist Russia as the principal enemy of the Kazakh people.

This situation of dominance developed from the rigid political centralism which is fundamental to the communist system. There were a number of instances in which Russians were sent by Moscow to rule the various non-Russian republics. Old-time national communists (such as Christian Rakovsky and Mykola Skrypnyk, early rulers of Ukraine, lost the fight against federalism in the early 1920's. (They argued instead for a looser confederation). Federalism became only nominal. Moscow employed the divide-and-rule principle, establishing a large number of small republics under its direct control and preventing any alliance or amalgamation of ethnic groups which might constitute a potential threat. Thus was abolished the Transcaucasian Soviet Federation—it could have served as a mean of strengthening the position of the Armenians, Azerbaijanians and Georgians vis-a-vis Moscow. Moscow abolished the

¹² B. Volin, *Veliky Russky Narod (The Great Russian Nation)*, (Moscow: Ogiz, 1938), 18.

¹³ David Zaslavsky, "The Great Language of Our Epoch," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (January 1, 1950), cited in *The New York Times*, February 2, 1950.

¹⁴ Scattered references to this trend can be found in: C. E. Black, Ed., *Rewriting Russian History: Soviet Interpretations of Russia's Past* (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1956).

Turkestanian Republic and forbade the establishment of any kind of Central Asian Federation, since the latter would threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. Similarly, the regime separated the Volga Moslems from those of Central Asia and weakened the former by dividing them into two republics—the Volga Tatar and the Bashkir.

Another feature endemic to Soviet nationality policy is the purge. Periodic overhauls have occurred in the national republics and districts as a result of what the Russians call "national deviation." Even a numerically unimportant people like the Nentsy (who live within the Arctic Circle) have been accused of this offense. In large part, "national deviations" occur as a reaction to the presence of considerable numbers of Russians who are colonists or who represent the interests of Moscow in the various republics. In the Far North the regime's reliance upon forced labor and its use of the exile system have led to large influxes of Ukrainian and Russian deportees. In the Kazakh Republic, the natives are actually in a minority; the Kazakh SSR had a population of 6,146,000 in 1939—while the number of Kazakhs throughout the USSR was 3,098,000. The Baltic states are treated as nothing more than Russian provinces. Similarly, Russian settlers have replaced the Germans in the Koenigsberg province. In the case of the Caucasus, three peoples were forcibly dispersed. At the same time, Moscow has never hesitated to create new "nations" if such were profitable—for example, the Moldavian Autonomous SSR was established as the prelude to the Soviet seizure of Bessarabia.

There is one important ramification which is noted by Barghoorn:¹⁵ the regime, although stressing heavily the traditional Russian sentiment, "has always carefully refrained from committing itself to a wholehearted identification with these sentiments. Even when it has exploited them most intensively, it has been highly selective and it has always reminded Party members, in particular, and to a lesser degree the non-Party population, that only such Russian sentiments and traditions as are in accord with its interpretations of Soviet Marxism can be considered respectable."

NATIONALITY POLICIES AFTER STALIN

Since 1957 there has been a reversal process in the Russification of the educational system. Schools in the national republics are

¹⁵ F. C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

being de-Russified. In Ukraine, most of the institutions of higher learning have been subordinated to the Ukrainian Ministry of Higher Learning. But it is interesting to note that all institutions of this type in other Soviet republics continue to remain under the control of the All-Union Ministry in Moscow.

In fact, for a short time after Stalin's death, the de-nationalizing policy was softened, but the fight against "all-national" tendencies (such as Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism) has continued. Stressing once more that the Communist Party has fought against national oppression, national dissensions, chauvinism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism, *Pravda* (May 1, 1953) declared that proletarian internationalism is indissolubly linked with the patriotism of the working masses. While expressing the respect of the party for the "progressive national traditions of every nation," the newspaper admitted that the Party's goal is the promotion not of the national but of the international education of all people of the USSR.¹⁶

During the 1954 celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Union of Ukraine and Russia, the party line glorified the Great Russian part of the Soviet population once again as well as historic Russian dominance in what is now the Soviet Union. The clearest evidence of this return to Stalin's policy was given in the "Theses" on the history of Ukrainian-Russian relations, issued in January, 1954, by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR; they put official *imprimatur* upon the Russian interpretation of this history, while rejecting the traditional Ukrainian view. Among the doctrines receiving official approval was that the Great Russians, not the Ukrainians, were the people who inhabited Kievan Rus in the 11th and 12th centuries and who later gave rise to the three major Slav peoples of the Soviet Union today, the Great Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians. The Ukrainian decision, ratified on January 18, 1654, to unite with Russia was made voluntarily to escape annihilation at the hands of the Polish and Turkish invaders. Those Ukrainian leaders who from time to time revolted against the Russian Czars, such as *Hetman* Ivan Mazepa in the early 18th century, were traitors to the Ukrainian people. The leading

¹⁶ For more details, see: Helene and Pierre Lazareff, *The Soviet Union After Stalin* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956); D. Solovey, "Fresh Light on the Nationality Policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government," *Ukrainian Review*, IV (1957), 67-123; H. Koch, "The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party and the Nationality Problem in the USSR," *Caucasian Review*, IV (1957), 57-66; Scottish League for European Freedom, *Russian Colonialism. Its Consequences: Slavery and Annihilation* (Edinburgh, 1956).

historical force making for progress in Russian and Ukrainian history has resided directly and indirectly in the Great Russian proletariat.

In the 30,000 words of Khrushchev's seven-hour speech, which was devoted to the general problem facing the USSR (*Izvestia*, March 1, 1956), 1,500 words (about 5 per cent) dealt with the nationality problem. Analysis shows that "Khrushchev's speech brought nothing but disappointment to the nationalities who had hoped for a slackening of internal political pressure."¹⁷

EDUCATIONAL IMPERIALISM

Behind the theoretical facade of "equality" and tolerance of cultures of non-Russians, imperialistic pressure is being exerted on non-Russian education. It is true that many scores of languages are used today in education and in publishing which were not allowed by the Czarist regime. But some languages have been banned for all practical purposes: Arabic, Hebrew, Chechen, Ingush, Kalmyk, German, and Yiddish. Efforts are made to alter the vocabulary of the native language through the insertion of Russian words in their pure Russian form. The imposition of stiff Russian language prerequisites for attendance at institutions of higher learning or for career positions in the republics is being practised, together with the active fostering of Russian literature, art, and history. The process is a relentless one, carried out with all the resources at the disposal of a totalitarian regime—and assisted by the resettlement of the Russian population in strategic areas.¹⁸

¹⁷ H. Koch, *op. cit.*, 57-66.

¹⁸ We must also notice the continuation by the communist regime of the rich traditions of anti-Semitism.

RUSSIAN EMIGRE SCHOLARS ON GENOCIDE

By R. S. S.

Under the editorship of two Russian scholars, Nikolai K. Deker and Andrei Lebed, the Institute for the Study of the USSR has published a volume, entitled, *Genocide in the USSR*, dedicated to the study of group destruction. These aims and methods are discussed in Chapter I and include: the meaning of genocide, genocide as a means of creating a unified socialist nation, destruction of national groups through compulsory migration and resettlement, genocide through destruction of national culture and sense of nationality, and genocide as the inevitable concomitant of Russian Communism. Chapter II presents the complete destruction of national groups as groups: the Crimean Tartars, the Kalmuks, the peoples of the North Caucasus, the Volga Germans and other German groups, and other national groups. Chapter III is dedicated to the partial destruction of national groups as groups: the Armenians, the Azerbaijanis, the Byelorussians, the Georgians, the Jews, the Russians, the Turkestanis, the [Eastern] Ukrainians, and the Western Ukrainians. Discussed in Chapter IV is the destruction of national religious groups: the Armenian Gregorian Church, the Byelorussian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, the Georgian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church, and the Western Ukrainian Greek Catholic [Uniate] Church. Chapter V continues with the persecution of religion by presenting the attempted destruction of other religious groups: the Buddhists, the Kalmuk Buddhists, the Moslems, the Russian Orthodox and the Roman Catholics. Chapter VI includes the attempted destruction of political and social groups and the Cossacks as a group. Added is a bibliography, an appendix and an index.

Generally speaking, all students of Russian Communism and Soviet Union history will welcome this publication. The majority of the articles, documented by footnotes and statistics, are written by such competent scholars as Mizra Bala, Edige Kirimal, Sarkis Torosian, Solomon Goldelman, Alexander Yurchenko and Eugene Glowinsky. Unfolded before the reader is the terrible tragedy of mass murder unequalled in history and the systematic cruelty and bestiality which has filled the 40-year existence of the Soviet Union. That all these atrocities could take place and that a free world,

especially the Anglo-Saxon world, could remain silent and even tolerate the Soviet Union's membership in the League of Nations, and now in the United Nations, is appalling proof of the moral apathy and indifference of the free and democratic nations. The contents of this volume cast also an unfavorable light on the Library of Congress, which thirteen years ago completely misinformed the U.S. Congress about the status and rights of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. This misinformation was contained in House Document No. 754 *Communism in Action*, (1946), a study for which Dr. Sergius Jacobson is responsible, [cf. Roman Smal-Stocki, *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union and Russian Communist Imperialism*, pp. 361-363]. It is hoped that some Congressional committees will investigate this fact, especially in view of recent action by the Library of Congress, which revoked its previous information in its *Study in Genocide, Discrimination, and Abuse of Power*, prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee under the chairmanship of Senator James O. Eastland, Document No. 122 titled: *The Soviet Empire: Prison of Nations and Races* (Government Printing Office, 1958). We must also welcome the fact that some Russian scholars have become interested in the plight of the victims of Russian imperialism.

While underscoring the positive values of this book we must nevertheless also voice some strong objections against some political implications and "conceptions," elaborated in the political laboratory of the organization which sponsors the Munich Institute and which, in our opinion, abuses the name and stature of the distinguished and respected American scholar, Professor Oliver J. Frederiksen, (who is regarded by his colleagues as co-responsible for sponsoring such "movements" as "non-predetermination," "federalists," etc.).

Thus the Baltic States were omitted with the explanation "that the extensive materials on genocide in these areas have been published elsewhere." This explanation is eyewash. The truth is that they were not included, first, because "professional liberators" included them in another well-known organization, which has a "monopoly" on the Baltic victims of Soviet Moscow, and secondly, because the truth about the Baltic States would knock out the article about the Russians as victims of genocide. These omissions constitute a great disservice to the identification of the perpetrators of genocide in the Soviet Union. For the same purpose, apparently, the Ukrainians were divided into two articles, one dedicated to the Western Ukrainians and the other to the [East] Ukrainians. The forcible Russification of the Western Ukrainian cities and their cultural life is not even mentioned.

The article on "The Russians" introduces the "conceptions" that (a) the Russian nation is equally persecuted and is as fully a victim of genocide as the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union; (b) therefore, Russians were not and are not committing the crimes of genocide against the non-Russian nations but, instead, the "international Communists" are; (c) and, consequently, the ruling Russian Communism is not contemporary Russian imperialism but "international Communism;" moreover the Russians, consequently, are "victims" of European Socialism and Marxism. For the genocide in the Soviet Union, therefore, the Russians apparently blame St. Simon, Owen, Fourier, Engels, Mazzini, LaSalle, etc. but especially Marx-Mardochai, with a delicate twinkle and hint regarding his descent. Thus the article modestly states that "the government in 1918 included three Russians, one of them of Ukrainian origin, out of 12 members on the Party's Central Committee, three Russians out of 22 members of the Council of People's Commissars, and six Russians, one of whom was of Ukrainian origin, out of the 62-member Central Executive Committee. There were only two Russians among the 32 members of the All-Union *Cheka* in Moscow" (p. 113). Now, who were these non-Russians? Why are the authors diplomatically silent? Thus intentionally is omitted the problem of "national renegadism" and the existence of Russian *Janissaries*, from this remarkable "institution of making [ideological] soldiers and administrators out of slaves [renegades]," which A. S. Toynbee traced as a specialty of the Ottoman Caliphs (cf. Smal-Stocki, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-78). These Communists of delicately unmentioned national origin were the products of the previous Russian Czarist imperialism and its Russification; they were, in fact, not only Russians, but worse than all Russian nationalists because they continuously had to justify claims for the desired Russian national membership before the native Russians. Consequently, by acts of personal self-determination, they joined the Russian nation, and it is amazing that Russian emigre scholars now discriminate against them. It is advisable for these politicians-scholars to use some logic and if they regard persons of non-or-half-Russian origin as full-fledged Russians (such men as Derzhavin, Karamzin, Kheraskov, Fonvizin, Pushkin, Fet, Griboyedov, Lermontov, Gerbel, Vostokov, Dal, Kantemir, Bortnyansky, Grot, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Nadson, Nekrasov, Dostoyevsky, Glinka, Rosen, Rubinstein, and many others) then they dare not also discriminate against the Russian Communists of non-Russian descent. They are an integral part of the history of the Russian nation. This thesis of the authors, that the early Communist government and Communist leadership was not made up of Russians, collapses.

Also collapsing in view of the convincing opinion of the late great Russian Christian philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev is the second thesis, that international Communism and not *Russian* Communist imperialism perpetrated and is perpetrating the acts of genocide against the non-Russian nations. It was Berdyaev who identified Russian Communism as "the third appearance of Russian autocratic imperialism, its first being the Muscovite Czarism and its second the Petrine Empire" (*The Origin of Russian Communism*, p. 120). Also, the real fathers of Russian Bolshevism are not in the West, but, in reality, are such Russian natives as Bakunin and Tkachev. Consequently, the first thesis that the Russian nation was and is equally persecuted and is an equal victim of genocide along with the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union also collapses.

We, the non-Russian students, clearly see all the problems of our Russian colleagues involved in the interpretation and evaluation of the genocide and revolutionary mass murder which has taken place and is still occurring in the Soviet Union, the new Red Russian empire. It can be said that the same thing that happened in the early period of the revolution in Russia-Muscovy also occurred in France during the revolution but no one classifies it as genocide; it also happened in England and to some extent in the United States, but, again, no one accuses the English of Cromwell's time or the Americans led by Washington, of genocide. Quite to the contrary as a matter of fact, for, according to Jefferson: "Rebellion to tyranny is obedience to God" and "the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants . . . it is its natural manure!" Therefore, all the losses (yes, amongst them were real losses for the Russian nation also) cannot be termed "genocide." The Russian divine right monarchy, based on Russian nationalist imperialism, a degenerated official church (which never thought of freedom, justice and mercy), militarism and a police force, collapsed in a bloody struggle for power with Russians who believed that only the mass murder of the human pillars of Russian Czarism, of the nobility, army and police officers, the old reactionary priests and the establishment of a Russian dictatorship from the bottom, could save the integrity of their "beloved Russia . . ." What kind of internationalist was Lenin, this man who dominated the revolution? The following facts provide an answer to this question. In the memoirs of his wife Krupskaya there is a real mine of material for evaluating the real Lenin: "Exile in Cracow was only semi-exile . . . Ilyich liked Cracow so much, it reminded him of Russia . . . Each of us secretly thought about Russia, each had a strong desire to go . . . We avoided speaking about it but all of us

secretly thought about it . . . " Krupskaya wrote to Lenin's mother that he was "starved for Russian novels," had "learned by heart the works of Nadson and Nekrasov," had "read and re-read a hundred times until it was in pieces, *Anna Karenina*." Then Krupskaya actually writes: "Volodya is a terrible nationalist.¹ He would not go to see the works of Polish painters for anything; but one day he got hold of a catalogue of the Tretyakov Galleries . . . and he frequently becomes absorbed in it . . .² Lenin's nationalism merged later with the old Russian messianism, which only deepened his national emotions, putting his nation on the very top of mankind, as a kind of "chosen people by the grace of Marx":

Is the feeling of national pride strange to us, the Russian [Great-Russian] proletarians? Of course it is not strange. We love our language and our native country and we work, most of all, to raise her working masses [nine-tenths of the population] to the life of conscious democrats and socialists. We feel, most painfully, the oppression and torture of our country by the Czarist myrmidons and capitalists. . . . We are overflowing with national pride that the Russian [Great Russian] nation has also created her revolutionary class and proved her ability to give to mankind great examples of her struggles for freedom and socialism. . . .³

These quotations may suffice to prove the assertion that Lenin was an ardent Russian nationalist, impatiently waiting for the bourgeois Russian inheritance in the firm conviction that he could advance the Russian nationalist interest far better than the bourgeoisie. Consequently, to accuse Russian Communists of genocide against the Russian nation is nonsense.

A completely different situation arises when a foreign power occupies a nation and uses the mass murder technique against the occupied nation. Therefore, we are entitled to accuse the England of Oliver Cromwell of the genocide of the Irish civilian population in Ireland, that is, on a foreign non-English ethnographic territory. Thus, in this writer's opinion, the non-Russian nations are fully justified in accusing the ruling Russian Communists, as the new Red Czars of the Russian nation, of genocidal acts committed against the civilian population and the intellectual elite of their countries. All these acts of genocide, committed by the Russians against the non-Russian nations, were aimed at the physical weakening, even destruction, and full Russification of the non-Russian nations, their digest by the Russians and their integration into the Russian nation, its language and culture. And that was executed and is being executed by all means. It is therefore the height of illogicalness to propagate the "conception" that all that was and is done in the

¹ In Russian Socialist terminology, nationalist means chauvinist.

² Cf. B. D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution*, pp. 566-567.

³ N. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Moscow, 1925, Vol. XIX, p. 144.

Soviet Union, was and is done not in the interest of the political and economic growth and might of the Russian nation, its imperialism and its further colonial expansion, but that all that is being done is for the oppression of the Russian nation and its intelligentsia. It is also rather fantastic to write that the very word "Russian" was forbidden in the early period of the revolution (p. 112) when it was used in the official term of the "Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic." The authors are also silent about the famous "Lebed" two-cultures theory and proudly write, "This nationality policy [respect for non-Russian cultures] of the Party remained unchanged until 1934" (p. 113). That is simply a falsification of facts; a general Russian pogrom of Ukrainians in Ukraine, of their culture and language, was started in 1930, and even earlier (cf. R. Smal-Stocki, *The Ukrainian Language in Soviet Ukraine*, Warsaw: 1936, pp. 46-51). Yes, in the first years of the revolution, Russian scholars, professors, academicians and writers suffered as the pillars of the old regime, of the old ineffective Russian imperialism, because the Russian Communists were convinced they could promote Russification and colonial exploitation better and more effectively. Only they, representing the ruling Russian nation, could deprive the populations of the non-Russian nations of the right to property, the basis of freedom, and impose upon them, in fact, a new serfdom for the ruling Russian nation, using the profit from this archcolonialism for the beautification of Moscow and for armaments, backing the new Russian imperialism and proclaiming the Russian language as the world language of the international proletariat.

Soon the Bolsheviks, by their aggressive Russian nationalism and imperialism, attracted the leading Russian elite inside and outside. In the emigration were Bunin, Gorky, Kuprin, Andreyev, Remizov, Zaitsev, Amfiteatrov, Merezhkovsky, Gippius, Khodasievich, Viacheslav Ivanov, Averchenko, Teffy, Aleksey Tolstoy, Shmelev, Igor Severianin, Chirikov, Yushkevich, Surguchev, Sasha Cherny, Aldanov, Ehrenburg—they all returned. Why—to become victims of international Communism's genocide or to work for the Russian nation—"the avant-garde of humanity?"

Extremely instructive for an elucidation of the mentioned conception and a good picture of the present ideological plight of the overwhelming part of the Russian emigres is an editorial from the Russian paper *Nasha Strana* (Argentina), No. 48, 1950:

The genuinely Russian national emigration has honestly to recognize the present tragic situation: nobody in the world has sufficient reason for having confidence in us. Around 80 per cent of the Russian emigration in the U.S.A. is embraced by Soviet patriotism. Nearly one half of the Russian generals,

even "White" generals, went over to the Soviets. Nearly the whole great emigre literature, the journalistic publications and philosophy in one way or another, is merged with Sovietism: here are Bunin, Kuprin, Miliukov, and Kuskov and a whole list of professors, who for 30 years have preached about the evolution of the Cheka, GPU, NKVD, MVD,—the professors Ustrialov, Tatischev, Savitsky, Miliukov, Prokopovich—we could enumerate two dozen more. Against all that, the genuinely national camp puts forward almost nothing or even absolutely nothing. As a matter of fact, for all our tragedies we have to thank our leadership,—from Markov to Lenin, from Alekseiev to Kerensky, from Gorky to Bunin, and from the Monarchist Kozembek to the Solidarist Boldyrev. "As we sowed, we shall reap."

The term "Sovietism" from the non-Russian point of view is equivalent to Russian imperialism and it was and is the perpetrator of all the acts of genocide directed against the non-Russian nations, nationalities and peoples in the Soviet Union. This writer agrees with the thesis of Andrei Lebed that "genocide is a means of creating a unified socialist nation," but he must add: a *Russian* Socialist nation, speaking Russian and which completely assimilated the non-Russian nations like the Jews, into Russian culture. Who among the Russian leaders in or outside the Soviet Union has condemned this planned genocide?

The authors of the article on "The Russians" often simply write in the pathetic style of Purishkevich and proudly state: "In pre-revolutionary Russia the dominant people were the Russian people, the dominant culture was the Russian culture . . ." (p. 111). Where? In Poland? Lithuania? Finland? Amongst the Caucasian nations or the masses of the Ukrainians? These same authors further write that during the early years of the revolution "Russian history was taught in a distorted and caricatured form, filled with denunciations of the Russian Czars and other historical figures who had been responsible for the former greatness and glory of the Russian Empire." That is simply nauseating. This writer confesses that he evaluates greatness and glory of nations and states from the point of view of the ideals set forth by the American Declaration of Independence. As a result he regards imperialism, colonialism, oppression, *pogroms* and the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* as the complete opposite of true glory and greatness. As a matter of fact, Ivan the Terrible, Peter I and Catherine II were reestablished long ago in the USSR to their old "greatness and glory," as was Suvorov, in order to impress the Caucasian nations. The authors besides simply "annex" into "Russian" history the Kievan Grand Duke Yaroslav the Wise (p. 120); the paintings of the Ukrainian painters Borovikovsky and Levitsky are proclaimed "monuments of Russian national art" (p. 124); and in the absence of any true genocide against the Russians they complain that Russian Communists "began to export and sell abroad such items as furniture,

pictures, china, bronze and crystal, mainly Russian in origin, at auctions in Berlin and London." (p. 124); and apparently regarded as the climax of "genocide" is the report that the Communists sold "about 80 valuable Easter eggs by Faberge to American collectors" (p. 125), and the sale of the crown of [the originally German Princess] Catherine II—the infamous Messalina was a virgin by comparison with her—to a film actress. What have all these nonsensical complaints to do with genocide? Do the Poles regard as genocide the fact that Catherine II removed the throne of Polish kings from the Warsaw castle to her palace in Petersburg and adapted it as a chamber pot?

Thus the old former "greatness and glory" of the Russian empire is worshiped in the article; the sale of furniture, pictures, china, crystal, etc. from the palaces of Grand Prince Vladimir, Grand Princess Maria Pavlovna and the Russian aristocracy (p. 124) is lamented as "genocide" of the same dynasty and aristocracy which has a bloody record of real genocide against the non-Russian nations, including the massacres of the Novgorodians, the Tartars in Kazan, the Ukrainians in Baturyn, the freedom-loving Don Cossacks, the massacres of the Poles, Lithuanians and Byelo-Ruthenians by Muraviev, the pogroms of the Jews and the massacres of the Asiatic peoples [(cf. *Encyclopedia Americana*, p. 291, Vol. 27, 1947, regarding the Kazakhs, the Russian administration applied the principle: "There is no other way to manage the Kazakhs except through massacres"; or W. Kirchner, *An Outline of the History of Russia* (p. 49) regarding the Russian conquest of Siberia: "The further the conquerors were away from Europe, the greater their lawlessness. Torture, abduction, murder and cannibalism were among their crimes . . .")] These facts of Russian genocide are written in blood and now the Russian sentimental eggheads in the free world waste their time by mourning the bejeweled Easter eggs and the possessions of the previous ruling class as "genocide." But we compliment the authors as pious Russian Orthodox Christians who are deeply distressed in their Russian hearts, especially by the sale of *ikons* into private hands in the United States and France. Regarding their final conclusion, that "the Russian nation as a cultural entity has suffered an irreparable loss, a partial destruction of the nation as a specific group with specific national characteristic," this writer takes the liberty to basically disagree.

Also found in the volume is a special "policy" regarding the status of the Cossacks as a nation. But whether the Russians and the Ukrainians like it or not, the Cossacks regard themselves as a special national entity and as such they must be treated.

Finally, the book's terminology describing the Catholic Rites is not current. The Catholics of the Byzantine Slavic Rite are also "Roman Catholics," (p. 211), and should not be referred to in such political terms as "the Western Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church." In addition, the article "Roman Catholics" should be titled "Roman Catholics of the Latin Rite." Even more, some of the volume's transcriptions are false: Chikalenko — Tsikalenko.

We also regret to report that the volume's bibliography is neither current nor complete. Books and articles are disregarded and especially noticeable in its absence is the voluminous material of the Kersten Commission of the American Congress.

In spite of these shortcomings, however, we congratulate the emigre scholars on their fine contribution while at the same time expressing the hope that the second edition of this book will appear supplemented and corrected.

GERMAN-UKRAINIAN OPERATIONS DURING WORLD WAR I

By JULIUS EPSTEIN

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The article of Mr. J. Epstein, based on an official German document, is published here because of its historical value. The contents of the German memorandum clearly show that the Germans appreciated the fertile area of national independence which existed in Ukraine at that time. Their action was a pragmatic response to already existing opportunities which only had to be seized and utilized. As a result, the German-Austrian alliance succeeded in defeating both Czarist Russia and the democratic regime of Kerensky by supporting not only the aspirations of the Ukrainian people to freedom, but also those of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the peoples of the Caucasus, such as the Georgians and the Armenians. The German interest in Ukraine in no way minimizes or qualifies the basic and indisputable fact that the Ukrainians wanted to free themselves from Russia, seeking allies wherever they were to be found. Thus in publishing this material we by no means believe that we might be giving support to those fabrications of Moscow which hold that the Ukrainian aspirations to freedom and independence were a "German intrigue." But what is surprising is that the Nazi government should have failed to study, much less act, upon these recommendations which were made forty-odd years ago by the German Imperial Staff. A Ukrainian point of view by Prof. R. Smal-Stocki of Marquette University, explaining the position of the Ukrainians during World War I, appears on Page 169 of this issue of THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY.*

An enormous amount of Top Secret documents of the Imperial German Government fell into the hands of the British after World War II. Among them were hundreds of thousands of documents belonging to the German Foreign Ministry. Without exaggeration, it can be said that those historians interested in the subject will not run out of source material for the next twenty-five years, if not longer.

Among the documents of the Berlin *Auswaertiges Amt* (Foreign Ministry, abbreviated as AA, are a host of papers, most of them classified "Top Secret," dealing with the support the Imperial German Government gave Russian, Baltic and Ukrainian refugees, who in the main were then residing in Switzerland. There were the Bolsheviki with Lenin in Zurich and Geneva, where also most of the Mensheviki lived. Besides them there were the Balts—including the Finns—most active of whom was the Estonian Keskuela, and the Ukrainians with Volodymyr Stepankovsky, who is now living in the United States and the Lithuanians, like Garlava (Gabrys). All these groups desired the downfall of hated Czarism. The Balts, Finns, Ukrainians

and the Caucasians, especially Georgians, were also interested in the re-establishment of the independence of their oppressed countries.

Naturally, the Imperial German Government was likewise very much interested in lending a well-disguised support to these groups, hoping to weaken the Czar's Government by fomenting revolutionary troubles within the Russian Empire. The German Kaiser, his Government and the General Staff (General Ludendorff) used the people who pursued this same aim, although for different reasons. While these revolutionaries and national patriots, exiled in Switzerland and other countries, acted from the German point of view as foreign agents in the employ of the Kaiser's Government whose money they took, they were from their point of view Socialist and Bolshevik revolutionaries or Baltic, Finnish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Caucasian patriots and therefore "separatists." This goes for all of them, including Lenin, who did not care where the money for his revolution came from. Nor did the Keskuelas and Stepankovskys.

Nevertheless, they were well aware of the notoriety attendant upon dealing with the German Government, which can be deduced from their anxiety to hide the identity of the source of their funds and the lengths to which they went to explain away their funds to their questioning comrades. Indeed, in perusing the Wilhelmstrasse documents one is sometimes quite amused by the kinds of evasions resorted to by the recipients of the German funds.¹

It would be beyond the scope of this article to picture the German-Russian secret relations as they emerge from the Wilhelmstrasse documents. We cannot even depict the activities of those Ukrainians whom the Wilhelmstrasse considered to be its agents.

It is the explicit purpose of this article to produce for the first time a single document from the files of the Imperial German Foreign Ministry which gives us the background of the German Government's thinking about Ukraine and the reasons for that Government's support of the cause of Ukrainian liberation among the prisoners of war.

The document is a Top Secret memorandum written for the exclusive use of some high officials in the German General Staff as well as in the Foreign Ministry. As such, it is a policy paper of

¹ According to former members who are now in the United States, only the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" openly informed all concerned that it was receiving financial support from the Central Powers, which support it regarded as a state loan to be later reimbursed by the government of a free Ukraine—EDITOR.

great importance. It obviously found the complete approval of all concerned.

This memorandum originated within the German army. Its authors are a Colonel Friedrich and a Captain von Luebbers, whose identities await further clarification.² Since it was found among the Foreign Office documents, its authenticity cannot be doubted. The fact that it was printed rather than typewritten or mimeographed allows the conclusion to be drawn that it was distributed among a fairly large number of members of the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff, and probably as well among officials concerned with the administration of the POW camps in which Ukrainian prisoners were held.

The complete text of the document, translated from the German, follows:

Berlin, 1 December 1915

Colonel Friedrich
Capt. v. Luebbers

S E C R E T !

M e m o r a n d u m
concerning the Ukrainian Prisoner of War Camps in Germany
and
the Formation of an Independent Ukraine

I.

PURPOSE OF THE UKRAINIAN CAMPS
AND THE NATURE OF OUR
PROPAGANDA

Soon after the start of the war, representatives of the Russian Ukraine approached the governments of the Central Powers with a request to help the Ukrainian people to regain their independence.

At the same time they suggested that the prisoners of war of Ukrainian origin be kept in special camps apart from the Great-Russians and the revival of the idea of independence be allowed. This would be brought about by special instruction.

In accordance with the directives of the Foreign Office, the Ministry of War started to execute this idea; it reserved the camp at Rastatt for Ukrainian prisoners of war.

The number of POWs who registered soon grew to such proportions that a single camp was not enough. The Ministry of War was forced to make available two more camps (Wetzlar and Salzwedel) for mainly propagandistic purposes.

² Both Colonel Friedrich and Captain von Luebbers were known to the members of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" as specialists and experts of the German General Staff in Ukrainian matters—EDITOR.

The Organization for the Liberation of Ukraine (a Russian organization),³ was charged by the Ministry of War to carry out the propaganda under the supervision, of course, of specially trained German officers. At the present time, there are about 40,000 Ukrainians in these camps. It is said, however, that there are many more thousands of Ukrainians who are working in the various corps-districts and who will be transferred to the propaganda camps in the very near future.

The funds necessary for the appointment of propagandists, Ukrainian priests, professors, school teachers from Galicia and the Russian Ukraine, as well as for the purchase of means of instruction, will be provided by the *Auswaertiges Amt* (Foreign Office).

Buildings which are absolutely necessary for the instruction courses, e. g. lecture halls, schoolrooms, and workshops, have already been erected in the camps by the army administration.

The foundation of an effective propaganda, intelligible to every Ukrainian, offers itself in the history of Ukrainian independence as compared to the present situation. Russia's policy of oppression of all non-Russian peoples within her borders has been especially harsh with regard to the strongest of these peoples, the thirty-two million people of Ukraine. (Thirty-two millions as part of a total population of one hundred and seventy million people.)

The very special characteristics of the Ukrainian, who is deeply attached to old traditions, made the pressure exerted by the Great-Russians doubly felt—with the result that the desire to regain independence grew from year to year and ultimately embraced even the lowest ranks of the populace.

Therefore, the instruction started with the teaching of Ukrainian history. Daily lectures, accompanied by the projection of suitable slides, were introduced. They are always attended by 3,000 prisoners, proving that there is an excellent response.

Ukrainian music, arts and crafts are being practiced. The overcrowded classes where analphabets learn to read and to write as well as to use arithmetic illustrate more than words can do the thirst to learn, while the fast progress demonstrates the intelligence of the Ukrainian and his deep attachment to his own national language, so long suppressed by Russia.

There are even some Ukrainian pupils who are eager to learn German. The instruction about Middle Europe and its superior culture has the aim of developing a desire for unification with it.

The carefully demonstrated difference between the Central Powers and Russia has already transformed many Ukrainians into friends of Germany and Austria-Hungary and has created a desire for the separation of Ukraine and for a close contact with these states.

The pattern of behavior shown by the Ukrainians illustrates the great difference between the Ukrainian and the Muscovite. Where the Muscovite is soft and indolent—it's always difficult to induce him to do some work—the Ukrainian shows more independence, methodicalness and resourcefulness. Those who know Ukraine and her people like to compare the Ukrainian with the Bulgar. The Ukrainian POWs show great interest in agricultural instruction.

³ The "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" was not a "Russian," but a Ukrainian organization. The classification in the German memorandum stems obviously from the confusion existing then regarding the Ukrainians and Russians.—EDITOR.

an interest clearly based upon the desire to make use of their newly acquired knowledge on their own soil.

Two camp newspapers, written, mimeographed and distributed by the Ukrainian prisoners, constantly show the increasing influence of the instruction courses and the growing importance of the liberation idea.

It is wholly satisfactory that the often heard assertion that the Ukrainians lack the necessary "intelligence" can be countered by the fact that there are not only many Ukrainian officers—among them a General—who have volunteered their services as instructors, but that there are also in the camps, mentioned above, many persons among the rank and file who are equipped to serve as teachers at the schools, and who have already been successfully so employed.

It also speaks well for the intelligence of the Ukrainians in general that the camp commanders are constantly picking Ukrainians as the most intelligent people among the "Russians." It took a special decree to make these elements available for the Ukrainian camps.

On November 3rd a conference took place with the commanders of the three Ukrainian camps. Under the chairmanship of the UD directors, it was also attended by Austrian Colonel Longard, commander of the Austrian POW camp for Ukrainians at Freistatt, near Linz.

At that conference, new directives were issued for the future work in propaganda. The conference confirmed the fact that the propaganda instruction has already proved to be a great success.

II.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT AN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE

The urgency in going ahead with the Ukrainian propaganda derives from the plain fact that the separation of the Ukrainian territory from Russia and putting her under the influence of the Central Powers is of the utmost importance.

The war's center of gravity has now been shifted to the East. The goal, of course, was the opening up of a suitable road to the Orient for our future commerce. The first step, the destruction of the Serbian bloc, placed by Russia upon the rail connections which are so important to the Central Powers, has been achieved.

The road is clear. Whether this will be so for all future times appears to be doubtful. Russia will certainly do everything in her power after the war to regain her lost influence upon the states along this route, with a special eye on the Dardanelles.

Her aim will be to use them (the Dardanelles) again as a hindrance to her troublesome competitors. If she succeeds, the future economic influence of the Central Powers in the Orient will be seriously threatened. Russia will always find in England a willing helper in her pursuit of doing away with Germany and her allies as dangerous economic competitors in Asia.

The possibility of any exertion of such pressure upon our now freed road to the East compels us to vanquish Russia by every means in the shortest possible time.

How can we eliminate such future pressure and how can we make secure the newly opened way?

The answer is: Separation of Ukraine from Russia and the closest attachment of that area to the Central Powers.

Everybody who really knows and understands the geographic and economic situation in which Russia finds herself, is aware of the fact that Greater-Russia is able to exist only because of her possession of the rich Ukraine. If we succeed in transforming Ukraine into an independent state and in keeping an independent Ukraine alive, we shall certainly administer a deadly blow to Greater Russia which will completely paralyze her development for many years to come.

Therefore, Ukraine must be considered as the heart of Greater Russia. In the opinion of all the experts it is the possession of Ukraine which makes Russia a great European power. Ukraine possesses tremendous resources. Russia gets her wheat from Ukraine. Russia's income and her creditability are largely founded upon the export of Ukrainian agricultural surplus. In Ukraine are Russia's sources of coal and iron ore (Donetz Basin). Together with Siberia, the thirty-two million Ukrainians provide Russia with her best soldiers.

Ukraine—separated from Russia—will form a wall between Russia proper and the Central Powers and the Balkans, closing Russia's access to the Black Sea.

Separated from the Black Sea and from the export routes through the Dardanelles, Russia will be compelled to expand in direction to the East, thus freeing Germany, Austria-Hungary and their allies from Slavonic pressure. These facts surely illustrate the tremendous importance of an independent Ukraine.

Such independence would mean for the Central Powers a complete independence of grain imports from foreign countries (America, etc.). As a country, suitable for settlement, Ukraine offers vast stretches of fertile black earth.

The control of the Dnieper line would not only embrace Kiev and Nikolayev as well as the great industrial districts of the South with their sugar industry, iron and coal districts, railroad workshops and shipbuilding yards where the big Russian battleships are being built; it would also mean the control of Odessa. As is well known here, the great industrial and trading concerns of the Central Powers are very much interested in the Ukrainian problem, hoping for a realization of Ukrainian independence. Granted that independence, it certainly would not be difficult for the Central Powers and their allies to gain the leading economic position in the rich coal and iron works.

These statements by no means exhaust the possible results of our successful progress.

The Rumanians are not yet able to overcome their fear of Russia in spite of our latest victories in Poland and Serbia. They rightly realize that only a decisive weakening of Russia could insure them against the possibility of later becoming the victim of their neighbor's vengeance, a neighbor who could rally and be able to punish the little state which stabbed her in the back in the very moment of distress. At that moment Rumania would be our natural helper and ally; the prospective independent Ukraine would certainly destroy her worries on that score.

Today, not only every Rumanian frontier district but the whole kingdom lies open to Russian invasion. It is understandable if the Rumanians do not want to risk a repetition of those times when Russian Governors resided in Bucharest and when the principalities on the Danube were nothing but a Satrapy of the White Czar.

In the very moment, however, that we can give Rumania those guarantees which her statesmen must rightfully ask in order to be able to send the Rumanian army into Bessarabia; in the very moment that Rumania, which today would not dare to accept a single Bessarabian hamlet from the hands of the Central Powers, will occupy the right wing of our Dnieper position, the Rumanians cannot help but close the chain.

That will mean that the Balkan problem, including that of the Straits, will finally have been solved, and in our favor. Greater Russia will have been cut off from the Black Sea, deprived of the roots of her economic forces, the only sources which could have provided the opportunity for an economic, financial, political and military rebirth.

Therefore, the progress of the allies in the East will ultimately have a worthwhile goal, a goal which we can reach without too great a sacrifice in blood. A goal whose attainment will not only give us a tremendous and permanent advantage over our enemies, but which will also solve at one stroke the most urgent and bothersome problems of the Near East.

However, should the political and economic situation of the Central Powers during the present war not permit the ultimate realization of an independent Ukraine, we can at the very least assume that our propaganda instruction, given to the Ukrainians in the interest of the Central Powers, will not have been in vain and that many of those Ukrainians who will return after the war will strive to realize their ideal of an independent Ukraine.

FRIEDRICH

ACTIONS OF "UNION FOR THE LIBERATION OF UKRAINE" DURING WORLD WAR I

By ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI

To understand the political actions during World War I, not only of the Ukrainians, but also of the Poles, Lithuanians, Finns, Turko-Tatars, Turkestanians and of the Caucasian nations, one must take into consideration (a) their plight in the Russian Empire, and (b) the whole background of World War I.

Europe entered this century divided into two alliances. Following Prussia's defeat of France in 1870-71 came the unification of Germany into the Second *Reich* at Versailles in 1871. Bismarck then formed the *Dreibund* or Triple Alliance, the chief members being Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. Using French gold indemnities, Germany experienced a terrific industrial expansion and prosperity in the following decade and was forced to look for markets for her production. Before World War I German leaders elaborated the concept of *Mittel Europa* and the so-called Berlin-Baghdad plan in order to secure a proper market for Germany's capital, industry and trade. Germany had to be connected from Berlin by a railway system to Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia, Constantinople, Baghdad—and finally with Basra on the Persian Gulf. From there the way was free to India, China, Japan and Australia. German export by sea was, in the German opinion, endangered by the British Navy in the North Sea, and controlled by Gibraltar and Suez. To eliminate these British controls, the great German designs were conceived which alarmed defeated but still rich France and imperial Russia.

Russia, which regarded itself as the "heir" of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, and the "protector" of the Balkan Slavs, was enraged by the German reorganization of the Turkish Empire and its army and gladly concluded the Russian-French Alliance, getting from France gold bullion for her armaments. But the German designs were also a threat to the British interests in Asia, and thus—after the British-Russian antagonism in Persia-Iran ended with a partition of this country into two spheres of interest—Great Britain joined France and Russia and by the Triple *Entente* opposed the Triple Alliance. The murder of the Austrian heir, Archduke Francis

Ferdinand, instigated by the Russian intelligence service, provoked a chain reaction inside the two treaty systems and soon war declarations were raining down on all sides—World War I was in full swing.

The nations of Central-Eastern Europe, which in the previous centuries had become victims of the imperialism of Prussia-Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, amongst them, the Finns, the Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians, in the first line, were confronted with the crucial question: the victory of which camp is in the general interest of their nations? As a matter of fact, the Lithuanians and Poles in Germany were far better off than in Russia; the Poles and Ukrainians in Austria enjoyed parliamentary rule based on universal suffrage, whereas in Russia they were deprived of all fundamental human rights. Consequently even Socialists like Josef Pilsudski, in fact a Russian subject, regarded Russian Czarism as enemy number one, and joined the Austrian armies with the Polish Legion.

The Ukrainian Socialists and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who, after the revolutionary events of 1905-1906 in Russia, had to look for refuge in the Western Ukrainian provinces (East Galicia and Bukovina), then under liberal Austrian rule, sympathized even more strongly with the Austrian and German cause.

Immediately after the outbreak of the war, these groups formed the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine" (ULU) consisting of democratic Socialists like Andriy Zhuk, who headed the Union's work in Vienna; Alexander Skoropys-Yoltukhovsky, who worked in Berlin, and Volodymyr Doroshenko, Volodymyr Kozlovsky, Peter Bendzia, Basok-Melenevsky, Alexander Semeniv and others. It is to be noted that Dmytro Dontsov did not join it, while Volodymyr Stepankovsky and Mykola Zalizniak (the leader of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries) were in open hostile relations with the ULU, conducting their own activities, as they believed, for the Ukrainian cause.

What was the ideology of the ULU? In short, it was a practical application of the ideology of the national poet of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) who commanded the Ukrainians to "rise and to break the Russian chains" (*Testament*) and who advocated a "Ukrainian George Washington with a new and just law." The ULU predicted (1) that Russian Czarism would collapse during the war; (2) another phase of the revolution of 1905-06 would occur and would end with the disintegration of the Russian Empire into free republics of the non-Russian nations; (3) it demanded from the Triple Alliance—joined by Turkey—to proclaim as its war aims, the liberation of Ukraine; (4) to grant the ULU the right to assemble

all the war prisoners of the Russian army of Ukrainian descent in special camps where delegates of the ULU would take care of them and conduct cultural and political education; (5) for permission to organize the prisoners into military legions, which would join the Ukrainian Legion already in existence in the front under the Austrian command; (6) to grant material subsidies for these actions which the future Ukrainian state would repay as a state loan.

Soon this ideology was transformed into facts. A volunteer Ukrainian Legion of Austrian Ukrainians joined the Austrian Army on the Austrian front and fought against the Russians, as did the Polish Legion under Pilsudski. In addition, a Finnish Battalion joined the German Army on the Eastern front and Berlin and Vienna became centers of Lithuanian, Georgian and Turkestanian revolutionary organizations. As a matter of fact, these activities immediately put the whole nationality problem of the Russian empire which before World War I had a non-Russian majority of 58 per cent of the population on the agenda of world politics.

Backed by the sympathy and active patriotism of the whole Ukrainian intelligentsia of Western Ukraine, the ULU developed extensive activities in many fields.

It organized its diplomatic missions by sending emissaries to Switzerland and Turkey (Basok-Melenevsky and Peter Bendzia), to Bulgaria (leader of Western Ukrainian Socialists, Lev Hankevych), to Bavaria and Germany (Roman Smal-Stocki). Melenevsky was received by the Turkish Minister, Talaat Pasha, as early as the beginning of 1915, who, in a public statement, declared that a free and independent Ukraine was Turkey's war aim. He also secured from one of the leaders of the Jewish Socialists, Parvus-Helphand, a special foreword to the Ukrainian translation of the pamphlet: *In Defense of Democracy—Against Czarism* (Vienna 1914) in which the Jewish-Russian Socialists proclaimed that the independence of all nationalities oppressed by Moscow is the future aim of the revolution in the Russian empire.

But the greatest achievement of the ULU for the Ukrainian cause was the consent of the Austrian and German high commands to segregate all war prisoners of the Russian army of Ukrainian descent into special Ukrainian Camps under the auspices of the ULU. Such camps were established in Freistadt (*Oberoesterreich*) and Wetzlar, Rastatt, Salzwedel and Hannoverisch Muenden (for officers) in Germany. The ULU sent into these camps groups of university and *gymnasium* professors, teachers, professors, attorneys, journalists and prominent Ukrainian writers and poets like Bohdan

Lepky, Vasyl Pachovsky, Petro Karmansky and others. This writer received the assignment to organize a camp in Wetzlar, and is writing this account as an eye-witness of this work.

It was a unique opportunity for the Ukrainians. From 1876 to 1905 the Ukrainian language was forbidden in Russia by *ukase* of the Czar; printing of Ukrainian books and teaching were also forbidden and the Ukrainian language was banned from public life, schools, universities and the Church. Ukrainian culture found refuge in Western Ukraine under Austria in Chernivtsi, the capital of Bukovina, and especially in Lviv (Lemberg), the capital of Galicia, where the Shevchenko Scientific Society became its center.

The Union availed itself of the opportunity to realize the following program in the camps: (a) organization of a school system of elementary, high and professional schools and university studies by enrollment of all volunteers who wished to use the time of their internment for education and study; (b) organization of theaters, choirs, of camp newspapers and printing presses; (c) every camp had the task of educating free Ukrainians, coming from a country, in which "divine-right" absolutism still existed, as to how a free society governs itself. The prisoners were taught how to organize societies, political parties, cooperative societies, how to conduct meetings and general assemblies—a great experiment in political education with a practical seminary of political science was soon in full swing.

After a year, the camps were ready to organize their substitute political parties (usually a workers' party and a peasant party, which accepted the party programs of the Ukrainian Socialist Democrats and of the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries), and elections to the camp constituent assemblies, which elaborated camp constitutions with a free elected camp president and a board responsible to a free elected camp parliament for a half year or whole year term. Thus after one year, every camp was a miniature Ukrainian republic.

As the camps finally received self-government, the blue-yellow national flag was hoisted and the German rule was limited to outside business, supervision and general guard. A delegate of the Union was the liaison between the German camp commander and the Ukrainian camp community. Special representatives from the camps visited all the work groups operating outside the camps. Finally the camps organized their congress, integrated themselves into the work of the ULU, and approved the organization of a Ukrainian National Army by forming the "Gray" and "Blue" Divisions in Austria and Germany.

In the course of this work many of the Ukrainian prisoners of war joined this action in the camps. In the meantime the ULU established, through Sweden and Finland, contact with the Ukrainian underground center in Kiev, and its delegate, the Socialist leader V. Holitsynsky, twice visited the camps, bringing greetings and encouragement from oppressed Ukraine and returning to Kiev with information about the ULU activities.

The work of the ULU in the publication sphere was also a great success. It published in Vienna *Visnyk Soyuzu Vyzvolennia Ukrainy (The Herald of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine)*; in all camps there were camp newspapers and textbooks and special political literature printed, amongst them a pamphlet, *How the Irish Fight for Liberty*. Besides, the Union financed a whole series of scientific books and political pamphlets in German, Bulgarian, Turkish and other languages, in order to popularize the Ukrainian problem.

Finally, the actions of the ULU penetrated into the hinterland of the Russian front. The activities of the ULU became a very important part of the "war of ideas" during World War I. The Russian official press reacted violently by publishing slanderous articles, thereby making the activities of the ULU known to the whole Russian Empire and the army. The ULU therefore decided to strengthen the revolutionary Ukrainian nationalist movement in Ukraine by returning selected groups of Ukrainian patriotic war prisoners who under the guise of "incurable" tuberculosis cases were handed over to the Red Cross exchange service and who through Sweden and Finland reached their homeland, where they began Ukrainian propaganda work among the army and the population.

When the fateful year of 1917 came, it was not an accidental result of the work of the ULU that a Ukrainian regiment of the Volhynian Guards started the revolution in Petrograd on March 12, 1917, which finally led to the proclamation of the independence of Ukraine and the Brest Litovsk Peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers on February 9, 1918. Thus the ULU, using this opportunity of World War I against the oppressor of Ukraine, Russian Czarism, skillfully utilized the power of the Triple Alliance for putting the name of Ukraine and her national state back on the political map of Europe and securing *de jure* recognition.

Thus it was in the Ukrainian national interest to join the Central Powers. But why did the Germans support the ULU? There were several reasons. First of all, the Germans supported not only the ULU, but also the Lithuanians, Georgians, Finns, Estonians, Azerbaijanians and Turkestanians. They also supported the Irish

(Sir Roger Casement) and the Indians. The German leadership had grasped that nationalism of the oppressed colonial peoples of the Russian and British empires was their ally and the most effective ideological weapon. Secondly, the Germans remembered the writings of Herder on Ukraine and Engel's *History of the Ukrainian Cossacks*, the old geographic atlases like that of Homan, which had special maps of Ukraine, and above all, a great role played by the Bismarck tradition. It is not a well known fact that the architect of the Second *Reich* did well appreciate the deadly weapon of nationalism of oppressed nations against an oppressor. During the war against Austria (1866) he used it in a proclamation to the Czechs and "Moravians," stimulating their hope for the realization of their national ideas. Besides, Bismarck had ready a revolutionary Hungarian Legion under the command of General Klapka in Prussia. The most important fact for the Ukrainian cause was that Bismarck had for a time played with the idea of the re-establishment of the "Kievan Realm," in order to save Central and South-Eastern Europe from the aggressive pressure of the Russian colossus.

For the support of the ULU during World War I it was decisive that the planned Berlin-Baghdad-Basra highway could obtain full security only by a zone of buffer states from the Baltic Sea over Poland to the Caucasus, whose basis had to be an independent Ukraine covering the most sensitive point of this highway—the Dardanelles. Another factor for the support of the ULU was the revolutionary propaganda conducted from American territory by U.S. citizens in newspapers, pamphlets and books in the Russian prisoners-of-war camps in Japan during the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905). The whole action was financed by the great Jewish-American philanthropist, Jacob Henry Schiff (1847-1920), partner, and later head of Kuhn, Loeb and Company, and implemented in the camps (at least fifty per cent of whose inmates were of Ukrainian descent) by Dr. Nicholas Russell and George Kennan (1845-1924). This action was motivated by the terrible plight of the Jews, persecuted by Russian absolutism.

The events after Brest Litovsk are well known. The Western historians came to blame unjustly both sides, the German and the Ukrainian, for the treaty. Soon a new decisive factor appeared in European politics: that of the United States with the self-determination program of Woodrow Wilson, which was applied only to Finland, Poland and, at the beginning, to Armenia, but not to Ukraine and other non-Russian nations under the domination of Moscow.

BOOK REVIEWS

WHAT WE MUST KNOW ABOUT COMMUNISM. By Harry and Bonaro Overstreet. W. W. Norton and Co., New York, 1958, pp. 348.

This is the book that received nation-wide publicity from an opportune newspaper photo showing President Eisenhower thumbing through it in his car. The President was returning from a visit with the ailing Secretary of State Dulles. It was reported that the late Secretary recommended that the President read it. Soon thereafter, several thousands of copies were ordered by certain governmental agencies and sources. The work made the best sellers' list and many private organizations have been sponsoring its distribution.

Marketwise, the book undoubtedly made a hit. In two respects this success is all to the good. First, the authors restate much that requires constant repetition about the mortal threat confronting this nation. There are many among us who have allowed the intensity of such knowledge to lapse in the past two years. There are far more who have never even attained to such knowledge. For both groups this book can perform a useful service. Moreover, its publication came at a very appropriate moment. Its sobering influence should be felt in the midst of Moscow's cold war barrage on "peace," "trade," and a host of other things close to the warm American heart. Its popular reception should abate somewhat the feelings of resurging appeasement which is really Moscow's prime goal.

Second, despite the large amount of rehashed material in this work, the two enterprising authors provide many new insights and some fresh perspectives which cannot but profit the reader. "Conspiracy was indigenous in Czarist Russia," say the Overstreets (p. 59). They show the environment in which Lenin and other Russians thrived and rightly relate this conspiratorial bent to the present Kremlin manipulators. However, as in numerous other instances, they fail to furnish the full significance of this insight because of their own acutely limited background in Russian history and politics. Their chapter on "Khrushchev's Party" is most rewarding. It shows how terrorism can be and is employed by the smiling Russian in other forms, such as jail sentences, cutting means of livelihood, and other less conspicuous but more effective methods. Their characterization of Moscow's current economic warfare is very apt. "It is, in essence, a new kind of trade imperialism; an effort to pry backward countries loose from their trade relations with the Western powers and bind them to itself."

Part II of the work, which is devoted to "The Party In Our Midst," covers much trodden ground. Most, if not all, of the data was provided by the FBI. How much more of similar data was given by this agency is difficult to determine. But here again, as necessary reminders, the data point to the present united front operations of Moscow on the soil of this country.

As concerns the basic issues of this subject, the book falls far short of a commendable mark. The foreword indicates that for the Overstreets a "strange new force has entered our world, the strangest and most magnetic in all history" (p. 4). Actually there is nothing strange or magnetic about Russian

Communist imperialism. But after carefully reading this book a reader might well think that there is. Many critical points are inadequately developed and sufficient guidelines for successful action against the threat are virtually non-existent. The reader is taken back, for example, to the 1905 Revolution, but anyone at all familiar with that event cannot but view the treatment offered here as being superficial. On this score and many others it is evident that the authors possess no comprehension of the fundamental problem of the non-Russian nations in the past and present empire of Russia.

The authors make much of the point that Moscow today has a body of theory which attracts the minds of millions in the world. "Most strangely of all," they say, "it is—as Czarism never was or could have been—a form of absolutism which has, like a magnet, drawn to itself millions of people who have sought to set men free" (p. 21). The source of this ideology is supposedly, of course, Marxism. For them, in addition, it is this that distinguishes the present Moscow from the past. This dictatorship is totalitarian to an extent not conceived by anyone prior to the twentieth century and, also, it is international in scope and impact. This view represents the core of their thesis—nothing new, just stated differently perhaps.

In point of fact, it is a waste of time and effort to rehash Marxism for the purpose of attempting to understand what motivates Moscow. Russian history serves this purpose best. The authors' interpretations of Marx are subject to much criticism and are actually forced to fit the thesis. To say that for Marx "Either capitalism or communism would prevail" is well nigh nonsensical (p. 35). Marx's economic determinism is what made Marxism, and the socialist outcome was logically held to be inevitable. Furthermore, to emphasize some of Marx's eccentricities and then to relate them to the Russian Communists is rather superficial to say the least. The authors apparently don't know enough of the past Petrine doctrine and Pan-Slavism to be able to assess Communist doctrine in terms of an instrument of deception. It is only the fact that the last rests on economic materialist grounds that its spotty influence has been global. The previous doctrines of imperialist Russia also had totalitarian and international effects, despite certain limitations of appeal and technologic means of implementation. In addition, surely the captive millions in the Russian Communist Empire were not magnetized by Marxist-Leninist doctrine. One would think that at least the Hungarian Revolution demonstrated the bankruptcy of the alleged doctrinal force, but this work doesn't show it.

The inability of the authors to distinguish between substance and accidents in history is revealed clearly toward the close of the book. They agree that the objective of world domination and tactics of conspiracy and the like also characterized the Czarist Russian Empire. Speaking of past and present Russia, they assert: "They are not actually identical, of course. But on two counts they are fatefully similar" (p. 259)—the two being world domination and methods. The difference, then, is in "the area of theory." In the same way that accidental types of methods are different under the Russian Communists as against the Russian Czars, though the substance of these methods are identical, so in the area of theory the types differ but the substantial use of Marxism is no different from that of the Third Rome idea or Pan-Slavism under the Czars. All three are fallacious, deceptive, instrumental, and nominally justifying. The Overstreets fail to grasp this. All their arguments designed to prove some new element of substantial difference between past

Russian totalitarianism and the present one fall on this score. For example, using the conquest of the Baltic states, they observe that "The brand of terrorism employed in these countries, however, had a totalitarian, not a Czarist, efficiency" (p. 262). Making necessary allowances for technology in time, it is clear that the authors are unaware of some of the equally totalitarian and genocidal acts of Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and other Czars.

The work represents, on the whole, some progress in our understanding of the nature of the enemy. But the progress is inadequate for our swift-moving times. Basically, this book shows the marked lag in our understanding of Russian totalitarian imperialism. If this work is representative of current intellectual thinking on the subject of Communism, then our most serious lag is not in missiles, space, science, education, or languages. It is in our study of imperial Russian history, down to the present date.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

HUNGARIAN PREMIER. A Personal Account of a Nation's Struggle in the Second World War. By Nicholas Kallay. Published by Columbia University Press. New York, 1954, p. 518.

The author divides his book into 21 chapters, in which he analyzes political events in Hungary before and after World War II, with special emphasis on the era in which he, as Premier of Hungary, took an active part.

On the basis of the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary after World War I was deprived of those parts of its territories inhabited by the non-Hungarian population. These lands were given to the neighboring states of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, thereby giving rise to a sense of injury in the Hungarians. As a consequence, the policy of Hungary after World War I was focused on the revisionism of frontiers and the abolition of the Treaty of Trianon. In this respect Hungary found the ready support of Germany, which also aspired to revision if not outright abolition, of the Treaty of Versailles.

Author Kallay, after giving introductory information, becomes wholly preoccupied with the policy and its developments in this era during which he served as Premier, namely 1942-1944. The author provides a good deal of new material, which of course is slanted as it is based on his subjective observation. One regrets that the author was compelled to destroy his archives, which entailed the loss of many original documents. This is a serious drawback of the book.

His tenure as Premier coincided with the time of the emergence of Germany as a great military power. From the accounts of the author it would appear that everything Hungary did for Germany was done so under duress and compulsion. But apparently, the author has forgotten that numerous documents of World War II, especially those published by the Department of State in Washington, have already been made known; these cast an entirely different light on the developments. It is known, for instance, that such Hungarian statesmen as Gombos (Goemboes), Daranyi, Bardossy, Csaki and Horthy without coercion accepted the domination of Hitler, according to the proverb that "He who wants to sit at the table, must also help in the kitchen." So they truly helped and in return received compensation in the form of Carpatho-Ukraine and Transylvania.

According to the constitution of Hungary, Regent Horthy, who was considered to be an "uncrowned" monarch, had the right to appoint his own

ministers. Thus of dubious value is the author's statement to the effect that Horthy did not trust such ministers as Gombos, Daranyi, Bardossy and Csaki, all of whom conducted a pro-Germany and pro-Hitler policy. Mr. Kallay writes:

" . . . None of whom Horthy ever entirely trusted, and none of whom, he told me, he would ever have appointed of his free will: he had been forced by circumstances to do so."

But on the same page the author continues to contend that the authority and popularity of Horthy among the people was so great "that the nation would not even have accepted as premier anyone other than the man designated by Horthy."

The book is replete with a series of similar statements which weaken rather than support the author in his deductions.

The author depicts himself as a "conservative liberal," from which it would appear that he and his government should have taken into consideration the rights of the different nationalities living in Hungary. This was not the case. We think it would have been more politically advisable had the author related the problems of the non-Hungarian nationalities, which Hungary acquired before and during World War II. We specifically refer to Carpatho-Ukraine.

The question of autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine within the framework of Czechoslovakia and its proclamation of independence in 1939 had wide and favorable international repercussions. Therefore, the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary created an international problem. Surprisingly, the author limits himself to a few statements with respect to Carpatho-Ukraine. Yet during Mr. Kallay's Premiership in Hungary, Carpatho-Ukraine was ruled by a "legalized" terror and violence. It would be interesting to know: (a) how much of the local population were in Hungarian prisons at that time; (b) the findings of a special commission of the Hungarian government sent to Carpatho-Ukraine to investigate the acts of terror and violence; (c) why General Francisz Szambathelyi, chief of staff, was dispatched to Uzhorod in 1942 in connection with the activities of military tribunals and tortures in the prisons.

Two additional statements of the author on the Vienna Arbitration and the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine are contrast with known facts. In the first instance, the author writes:

"The Hungarian government accepted with hesitation, but the Hungarian people with enthusiasm, the two Vienna awards of November 2, 1938 and August 30, 1940, which partly rectified the errors of the Treaty of Trianon. In each case we had to thank Italy for what we got, since Joachim von Ribbentrop, as always, worked against us."

In the other case, the author states that "it is important to emphasize, however, that Hungary's occupation of Carpatho-Ruthenia was done at the urging of Poland, in the face of German disapproval, and only after Czechoslovakia had disintegrated."

One has to admire the courage of an author who defies existing facts and writes such statements. Let us recall what Regent Horthy wrote to Hitler on March 13, 1939, in connection with the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine:

"Your Excellency! Heartfelt thanks! I cannot express how happy I am, for this headwater region (*Quellgebiet*) is, in fact for Hungary—I dislike using big words—a vital question.

"Notwithstanding our recruits of but 5 weeks, we are tackling the matter with enthusiasm. The plans are already laid. On Thursday the 16th of this

month a frontier incident will take place, to be followed on Saturday by the big thrust.

"I shall never forget this proof of friendship and Your Excellency can at all times ever rely steadfastly on my gratitude.

HORTHY."

In gratitude, the Hungarian government named one of the most beautiful streets of Budapest "Hitler Street."

In Chapter VI the author deals with the question of the Jews in Hungary. In presenting a short outline of the participation of Jews in the economic, cultural and political life in Hungary, the author suggests that the matter of the "solving of the Jewish question" came about as a result of the intervention of Germany. There is no doubt that the Nazi government at that time was pressuring all its puppets toward a "radical solution" of the Jewish problem. The same pressure was exerted against Rumania and Slovakia and elsewhere. The author, however, suggests a false thesis to the effect that everything that happened to the Jews in Hungary came about wholly as a result of the pressure of Germany, (although he accuses himself, Rumania and Slovakia of anti-Semitic policies).

For instance, the author fails to mention a proposed anti-Semitic law by a member of his cabinet, Minister of the Interior Keresztes-Fischer, which bill was discussed in the parliament. He also fails to elucidate sufficiently the matter of the deportation of Jews from Hungary, which was conducted in accordance with a decree of the government. Therefore, his information on this point bears the character of an alibi rather than an objective analysis on the part of a responsible statesman.

In other chapters of his book, as for instance, on the way Hungary declared war against the United States and England; on the part of the Hungarian army in the German campaign in the East; on the action of Hungary against Yugoslavia in 1941, with which Hungary had signed a treaty of "eternal friendship"—the author seeks to put the blame always on somebody else in order to establish the "innocence" of Hungary. We think that the truth should be told not only when it is bitter for somebody else, but also when it is unpleasant for one's own people.

In summing up, the book is not a true reflection of what had happened in Hungary during the Premiership of Mr. Kallay; it is rather an apologia of the Hungarian government for its part in the Nazi alliance during World War II.

Hungary still has to find a proper and just place in cooperation with the peoples of Central Europe; it will not find it until it rejects for all time aggressive designs upon its own neighbors, until it foregoes the dream of a "Great Hungary" inspired by a "crown of St. Stephen," and until it ceases to be an instrument of Germany in its policy toward the Slavic peoples in that area.

VIS

I FOUND GOD IN SOVIET RUSSIA. By John Noble and Glenn D. Everett. With an Introduction by Rev. Billy Graham. St. Martin's Press, New York. P. 192. 1959. \$2.95.

The present book by John Noble is more or less a sequel to his first book, *I Was a Slave in Russia*, written after spending ten years in Soviet prison camps in Dresden and Buchenwald and Soviet slave labor camps in Vorkuta.

The author is an American of German Lutheran background who left his native Detroit with his father and went to Dresden, Germany, in the late thirties. Caught by the war, both he and his father remained there until the final collapse of Germany. Subsequently, they witnessed the savage and inhuman treatment of the German civilian population by the Soviet troops. Eventually, they both were arrested in 1945 on the suspicion of being "American spies." The first half of the book is devoted to his description of life in the Soviet prisons in Germany. His father was released in 1952, while the author was sentenced to 15 years at hard labor and shipped with other prisoners to the Soviet Union's Arctic slave labor camp in Vorkuta.

And again, here as in his first book, Mr. Noble relates his first encounters with Ukrainian prisoners, who were religious, devoutly believing in God. He found them altogether friendly people who selflessly tried to help every newcomer to the camp. He also met Catholic nuns who were brought to the camp in 1950, hailing apparently from Western Ukraine or Carpatho-Ukraine. Subsequently, the author came across a number of priests: Roman Catholic priests from Lithuania, Orthodox and Catholic priests from Ukraine, Lutheran pastors from Latvia and Estonia, a Jewish rabbi, a Mennonite bishop from the Volga basin, Seventh-Day Adventist missionaries and Jehovah's Witnesses—all suffered persecution because of their beliefs. All these religious groups, including Baptists as well, met regularly for religious services. The author remarks that although many Ukrainian prisoners had been brought up in their youths as members of various communist-controlled organizations from which religion was banned, they fervently espoused religion in the camps, and conducted their own service in the Ukrainian language.

One of the moving moments in the narrative is the author's description of a funeral for those prisoners who were killed in the rebellion in the Vorkuta camp. It was held for two strike leaders, one a Lithuanian named Machnevicius and the other a Ukrainian, whom the author did not know personally. For all the other thousands who had previously been killed no rites were permitted, but for the fallen two heroes the prison administration relented and gave permission to hold funeral services according to church customs. Some 1,000 men knelt in prayer while a Ukrainian priest solemnly intoned the office of the dead. According to Mr. Noble, it was the first public Christian service ever conducted in this bleak area of the world.

In 1954, with the advent of the new "liberalization" policies of Khrushchev & Co., the author was released along with two other American prisoners, William Marchuk and William Verdine, young American GIs who had been arrested after allegedly crossing the Soviet zone border in Germany and sentenced to long years at hard labor as "spies."

Incidentally, Rep. Alvin M. Bentley of Michigan, who prior to his election to the Congress in 1952 was a U.S. State Department officer in Hungary and knew well the communist tricks and inhumanities, had taken the case of Mr. Noble to President Eisenhower. Charles E. Bohlen, then U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, intervened with the Soviet government and thus brought about Mr. Noble's release.

The book is a human story of thousands upon thousands of lay men and women who remained loyal to Jesus Christ, and by their example, gained converts in the very place where Christianity had long been outlawed and its adherents bitterly persecuted and oppressed.

It is this story, and not the pretentious Soviet technical "progress" which the Russians are trying to display at the New York Coliseum, that can convince us that the enslaved peoples of the USSR have not lost their faith in God and that it is with them that we have to come to an understanding and agreement, rather than with their atheistic jailers. Mr. Noble's book provides an epic tale of courage and faith. Under the most trying conditions is shown the individual human spirit, determined to be free and to worship God; and in this wise the book is inspirational reading for every American who has any doubts at all as to where we should stand with Communist Russia today.

W. D.

LENIN AND THE REVOLUTION. By Stanley W. Page, New York University Press. New York, 1959.

The volume under review here should, in all justice, carry a subtitle which, in the opinion of this reviewer, is to be chosen from among the following: "A Manual for Distorting History," "Lenin the Idealist in His Lone Combat Against Imperialism," or "Perish the World, Live Holy Russia." The book is a prime example of "Russia Firsters" at work, a case of smuggling Marxist-Leninist propaganda under the guise of an allegedly objective research concerning events which now can be considered the recent historical past. Samples of what the author claims to be historical facts and what actually are propagandistic distortions will be quoted below. For now the reviewer wishes to ask one simple question: what did the author wish to accomplish? According to the author himself, the purpose was: "The author of this book, by exposing Lenin's theories as rationalizations designed to mask his personal strivings, hopes to remove Leninism from the realm of the scientific and indisputable and to open upon it the floodgates of free critical evaluation" (p. XVIII). In this task, he has most certainly failed, unless it was the author's objective as a historian to subject Lenin and Leninism to an emotional evaluation. In spite of the hundreds of volumes that have been written within the last two decades exposing communism as Russian imperialism and proving beyond any doubt that the only forces capable of wrecking the Soviet colonial empire are the unreconstructed non-Russians of the USSR, such as the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Cossacks, Armenians, etc., the author refuses to budge from his position of regarding Russia as being "one and indivisible." Hence his treatment of Ukrainian national independence during the 1917-1921 period as a *German intrigue* and his distortion or outright fabrication of facts to prove his point. Discussing events of the period between February 18 and March 3, 1918, leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest with the Russian SSR, the author deliberately omits any mention of the fact that a treaty between the Central Powers and the Ukrainian *Rada* was signed on February 9. On pages 98 through 107 the author speaks of the grave danger to Russia of losing the Baltic countries, Finland and Ukraine, and finally comes up with the following pure fabrication: "The treaty of peace was signed on March 3. Shortly thereafter the Germans set up a puppet *Rada* in the Ukraine and then proceeded to harry the defenseless Soviet government with a series of demands, one being that Soviet Russia make peace with the 'independent' Ukraine, that is, abandon all claims to Ukrainian territory." To justify the use of the term "fabrication," this reviewer need only cite such an impartial source as the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and an author like George F. Kennan. The *En-*

Encyclopaedia Britannica (Vol. IV, p. 95, edition of 1959) notes the conclusion of a separate peace treaty between the Central Powers and Ukraine on February 9, 1918, and gives the fact that the Ukrainian *Rada* was dissolved when the Germans occupied Ukraine. And George F. Kennan, in his *Russia Leaves the War*, Princeton University Press, 1956, speaks unequivocally of the Ukrainian Central *Rada* as a "Ukrainian Government" and of its members as *Ministers* (p. 184), and even quotes a private American observer (Mr. E. T. Heald, representative of the YMCA) reporting on the *Rada* from Kiev, that it "was . . . weak, compromised by its relations with the Bolsheviki" (p. 185).

Mr. Kennan also states that on January 9, 1918, the French Ambassador in Washington informed the United States Government that his Government had recognized the Ukrainian Central *Rada de facto* and asked whether the U.S. Government would do the same.

How can anyone reconcile Mr. Page's assertion that the *Rada* was set up by the Germans after March 3, 1918, with Mr. Kennan's designation of the same body as a Ukrainian *government* in December of 1917 and January of 1918, and with its being pro-Bolshevik? The answer to this query plainly is: either Mr. Page is ignorant of the method of historical research or, faced with contrary facts in sources which he must have seen with his own eyes, he has deliberately ignored them in order to make out a case favorable to the unity and indivisibility of Russia as an empire.

Again, on p. 138, the author states that: "Soon thereafter (March 22, 1919) the Germans hastily withdrew their troops from Ukraine, leaving it open to easy Soviet conquest." This is obviously an attempt on the part of the author to extend the German occupation of Ukraine several months beyond its actual duration. One does not have to be a scholar of history to recall that Germany collapsed on November 11, 1918, and that German soldiers started for home from wherever they were at the time, including Ukraine. And the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* states (Vol. 22, p. 667) that: "After the collapse of the Central Powers, a directorate of five, with Vinnichenko as chairman, and Petlyura as commander in chief, assumed power in Kiev" (December 14, 1918). It is a mystery to this reviewer whence the author recruited his German troops that withdrew hastily from Ukraine in March 1919 when Ukraine was already free of them in the early part of December, 1918.

It is extremely regrettable that the prestige of the New York University Press should be so misused as to appear a sponsor of distortions, half-truths and ignorance, as represented by the volume here reviewed.

ROMAN OLESNICKI

THE COMMUNIST WORLD AND OURS. By Walter Lippmann. Boston, Little Brown and Co., Toronto 1958, pp. 56.

It is very difficult to classify this volume for it contains much valuable information on the Communist world which should interest the American reader and it also contains, in its few pages a series of unsupported and purely hypothetical suggestions as to Communist policy which are nowhere justified. In short there is a wide gap between the material that is presented and the hopes that the author expresses for the future.

The most important part of the volume is the account of Mr. Lippmann's interview with Khrushchev and as a trained reporter he has given us perhaps the most penetrating and intelligible account of Khrushchev's position that any

American who has interviewed him has done. According to him, Mr. Khrushchev is calling for the end of suspicion and for peaceful coexistence on the basis of the *status quo*—but the *status quo* involves the recognition of the development of the Soviet and Red Chinese revolutions and any action of the West that interferes with any developments that may hereafter come into being is a violation of the *status quo*, since Communism is the wave of the future. Khrushchev believes in the reunification of Germany but not by free negotiations which would cast doubt on East Germany's ability to remain Communist or leave Germany able to carry on war, although with his confidence in Soviet missiles, he believes that Germany in one way or another can be swung into the military orbit of the Russians, if the United States and its allies do not make peace on his own terms.

Then from his own observations Mr. Lippmann stresses the fact that the Communists are gaining in Asia "because they are demonstrating a way, at present the only obviously effective way, of raising quickly the power and the standard of living of a backward people" (p. 42), even though Khrushchev had refused to answer whether Russia in 1918 was backward in the sense of the countries in Asia and Africa (pp. 24f). He therefore advises the United States to make India an example of a country made prosperous rapidly by democratic processes.

"The failure to recognize that there are many worlds, not merely one, is, I believe, the deepest source of confusion between us, and the most stubborn obstacle to that mutual toleration which is the very best that is conceivable between our two societies" (p. 51). On the other hand despite his remarks on East Germany, he believes that the time will come when Communism, unable to win the hearts of the satellite states, will seek ways of withdrawing and he blames Secretary Dulles and to a lesser degree President Eisenhower, for treating the conflict not as one of "empires and great states but as a religious war in which the contending positions are absolute" (p. 38).

Where does this leave us? We must reconcile ourselves to Communist despotism in Asia unless we can turn the tide by a complete redevelopment of India. We must not try to defend the sparks of freedom in Asia by military means or any other than by example. We must withdraw from Europe sufficiently to let European nationalism make it expedient for Moscow to withdraw (after the Hungarian example?). We must be prepared to allow the *status quo* as seen in the progress of Communism to develop without interference from the West and keep our defenses up in the hope that somehow that *status quo* will not trend in our direction.

There can be no doubt that the United States needs a thorough reassessment of its positions and its obligations. It must take a new attitude toward that growing nationalism in the underdeveloped countries which Moscow is inflaming against the West and the free world but it can never lose sight of the fact that with the world as it is, it cannot tamely agree to the Soviet blandishments and threats. It must give up its hope of friendly coexistence and be prepared to strike hard when the occasion calls, so that Moscow will not rivet the chains of slavery upon the new countries. Plain speaking and straight thinking will do more to postpone World War III than chimeric longings for peace and gestures of sympathy toward the Kremlin and there is no better place to begin than to make clear to Khrushchev and company that the world does not accept his claims to be the wave of the future and demands the same right to protect our *status quo*, the constant discontent of

all men with slavery and their efforts for freedom on both sides of the Iron Curtain, that is, in the USSR. A dynamic program for peace and freedom will strike the Kremlin in its sore spot and that is what American policy demands today.

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THE THIRD WORLD WAR. Trade and Industry—The New Battleground. By Harry Welton. New York, Philosophical Library, 1959, pp. 330.

This book is a sober and alarming picture of the real nature of the conflict between the free world and the Russian Communist despotism which is aiming at world mastery. It deals primarily with the struggle as it affects the British Isles, but there is much in it that is fully applicable to the situation in the United States.

It is the thesis of this volume that there are two ways by which Khrushchev is hoping to surpass the free world in production. One is the commonly recognized system of raising production within the Iron Curtain through the unprecedented subjugation of the working class and its iteration of the principle (quoted on p. 45) "Damage to a worker's health is not as serious as damage to production." As a result Moscow does not need to pay as much attention to the conditions of work and of the mode of living of the masses of its slaves as the West. It is content with keeping them cowed and working and it can therefore adopt automation or any other device without paying more than the minimum regard for their feelings.

The second method which has proved effective again and again is the simple one of disrupting industry and production abroad and advancing in a palatable form arguments and demands that will unreasonably hold back production, whether through wildcat or other strikes, the preservation of antique and outmoded methods of work or any other method that occurs and seems profitable to the Communist supporters of Moscow. This is the more easy because many of the factories in the free world are long established and somewhat outmoded; labor has already secured vested rights and agitators can work to their hearts' content to prevent changes, even though ultimately they would be for the workers' own good.

This is appreciated by many of the thoughtful and forward-looking leaders in both the United States and Great Britain but they have not been able yet fully to impart their knowledge to the rank and file of labor. They have not been able in all cases to prevent Communist firebrands from infiltrating the lower levels of labor and by overheated oratory and political chicanery sweeping the masses temporarily from their adherence to their chosen and tested leaders.

These tactics have been even less understood by many of the intellectuals, the economists, the political idealists and even the big capitalists who have viewed the "peaceful coexistence" of Khrushchev and Co. merely in terms of a rate of an annual increase of production. In this connection it is significant that the recent visits of Mikoyan and Kozlov have been largely devoted to flattering precisely these classes and holding out to them prospects of increased trade and of general good will. Both Soviet travellers have given scant amounts of time to studying labor conditions but much to flattering the employers, encouraging them and seeking for weak points in their armor.

The same is true of distribution. The author gives many figures to prove his point. Thus a Czechoslovak Skoda car costs £1,372 in Prague and there are

abundant restrictions on its sale. In Cairo and Egypt it costs under £400. The difference is taken out of the skins of the workmen within the Iron Curtain. It is difficult for the West to match the foreign prices of Soviet goods which are priced with small regard for the costs of manufacture but Moscow sees to it by propaganda that the truth of this is hidden from those peoples who are most afraid of being exploited or of being placed in a disadvantageous position in the world. What they do not see is that Moscow is offering these terms to defeat the West and to tie up their economies so badly that they will be forced to become Soviet client states on the road to complete satellites, all for the Russian masters of the Kremlin.

We must give Khrushchev the credit for distilling out of the teachings of Lenin and Stalin this new method of attack which stultifies any talk of "peaceful coexistence" and this in common with his use of the modern fear of war serves to furnish arguments that the West is using in its ignorance against itself. Yet it is apparent that far too many persons interested in world progress have fallen for his arguments rather than study seriously the methods necessary to thwart them.

The volume emphasizes the fact that the West from top to bottom has not yet fully comprehended the real meaning of the phrase "cold war." Perhaps there are few as fond of understatement as Aneurin Bevan when he declares that the utterances of the Soviet leaders were mere "ritualistic exercises" on the road to peace. Yet there are many who understood the need for total mobilization in World War II but who do not realize the necessity for clear thinking and close cooperation in this phase of the struggle which is being carried on not only among the undeveloped and neutral countries but within the nations of the free world themselves.

This book should drive home to every thinking person the realization that the West is engaged in a battle for life and existence and that it is no time to rest on past achievements. The free world must find new methods of carrying out its task not only of protecting itself and the uncommitted world but of smashing Russian Communist hopes for world domination at all cost and creating a new system which will fulfill the ideals of mankind and produce a truly free world where every man will be entitled to the fruit of his labors and to live in harmonious and peaceful cooperation.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

L'UKRAINE DANS LE CADRE DE L'EST EUROPEEN (Ukraine in the Context of the European East). Par I. Mirtchouk, J. Leclercq, A. Choulguine, R. Yakemtchouk, P. de Visscher, L. Leskovytch, L. Dupriez, M. Wasyliw, F. Gregoire, A. Koultychyskyl. Recueil de l'Universite Ukrainienne Libre de Munich. Louvain-Paris. Editions Nauwelaerts—Beatrice—Nauwelaerts. P. 204. 1957.

This is a fine collection of ten major essays on Ukraine and the Ukrainian position in the world today written by a team of ten scholars, among whom are four Belgians and the remainder Ukrainians. A short introduction to the collection was penned by Archbishop Ivan Buchko of Rome, Apostolic Visitor of Ukrainians in Western Europe.

There is no doubt that the pressing need for such a collection dealing with the many facets of the Ukrainian problem today was a compelling reason for the Free Ukrainian University of Munich to sponsor such a work. The product of astute men, it is a major contribution to the literature on Ukraine.

Prof. Ivan Mirtchouk, Rector and Professor of the Free Ukrainian University in Munich, deals with "Ukraine, the Intermediary Between the East and the West." He assesses Ukraine's significance as a cultural unit in the contest between the East and West. Prof. J. Leclercq of the University of Louvain, who is a noted Belgian scholar, discusses "The Value of Nationalities," with special emphasis on Ukraine as one of the largest "stateless" nationalities today.

Prof. Alexander Choulguine, former Foreign Minister of Ukraine and presently a professor at the Free Ukrainian University in Munich, gives a concise historical survey of "Ukraine Throughout the Centuries," underscoring the great and significant role Ukraine played in the past as a balancing force between East and West.

Another author, Dr. R. Yakemitchouk, who recently won a Ph. D. degree at the University of Louvain, deals with "Ukraine on the Plane of Diplomatic Relations." He provides a detailed picture of the diplomatic relations maintained by Ukraine from the proclamation of Ukrainian independence on January 22, 1918, until the present membership of Soviet Ukraine in the United Nations.

Prof. P. de Visscher of the Law Faculty of the Catholic University of Louvain discusses "The Juridical Personality of Ukraine" from the viewpoint of international law. He contends that Ukraine had been recognized as an independent state and thus acquired a juridical personality. He further claims that Ukraine has been recognized as an independent state not only by its membership in the United Nations, but also by its participation in certain international diplomatic conferences. He admits, though, that from the viewpoint of internal sovereignty (Soviet) Ukraine is not a fully sovereign state. But the author assails those adversaries of the present regime in Ukraine who would deprive Ukraine of its membership in the United Nations. His remarks refer to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, who some time ago while discussing a revision of the U.N. Charter expressed the opinion that Ukraine and Byelorussia should be ousted from the international body, inasmuch as they do not possess the full attributes of sovereign states.

"The Religious Situation in Ukraine" is expertly described by Rev. I. Leskovytsch. The author supports his arguments by countless authoritative sources, including ecclesiastical statistics, and presents a vivid and alarming picture of the brutal suppression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church by Moscow. He also discusses at length the policies of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine today, a church which is a tool of the Russian communist government and which serves as an instrument of Russification of the Ukrainians and other non-Russian nations in the USSR.

Two economists, Prof. L. Dupriez of the Catholic University of Louvain, and Dr. M. Wasyliw of the Free Ukrainian University, discuss economic problems. Dr. Dupriez analyzes "Welfare and Economic Progress" as they relate to the general economic conditions of Eastern Europe, while Prof. Wasyliw discourses on the "Economic Forces of Ukraine." His analysis encompasses the industrial and agricultural production of Ukraine and the general economic policy as directed by Moscow, a policy which aims at the general pauperization of rich Ukraine rather than at an increase in the economic welfare of the Ukrainian people.

Finally, two authors, Belgian Prof. F. Gregoire and Ukrainian A. Koulchytyski of the Catholic University of Louvain and the Free Ukrainian

University of Munich, respectively, discuss ideological problems as they relate to the enslaved nations. Prof. Gregoire, in his article, "The Sources of the Atheism of Marx," describes the origin of communist atheism and analyzes its sinister influence in modern society, which is based upon the order of God.

Prof. Koulchytskyi, on the other hand, treats of "The Marxist Concept of Man and Ukrainian Psychism," and draws the logical conclusion that the Ukrainians, who, prior to the revolution of 1917, were largely a peasant people, could never accept Marxism as an ideological doctrine, inasmuch as it is directed against the basic roots and the very soul of their national entity.

Summing up, the collection of articles on the various aspects of the Ukrainian problem constitutes a rounded and scholarly addition to the much-demanded knowledge on Ukraine and other non-Russian nations of the USSR. It is without question a valuable contribution to the French-language literature dealing with the European East in general and the problems of Ukraine specifically.

It is hoped that a similar symposium or collection of articles written by like authors of note and authority will be published in the United States or Canada in the English language, where this field, with its deplorable over-emphasis on the Russian problems, is lamentably unbalanced.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

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UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"THE ANATOMY OF SOVIET COMMUNISM," program No. 10. Mutual Broadcasting System, in cooperation with The Institute for the Study of the USSR, New York, N. Y., 1958.

The transcripts of this series of radio programs over the Mutual Broadcasting System make for worthwhile informative reading. The series was prepared by the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, Germany. The institute is maintained by the American Committee for Liberation in New York. It houses scholars, writers and other intellectuals who fled the Soviet Union. The work of the institute these past few years has been productive and salutary. This series well reflects it.

The thirteen programs cover every essential sphere of the Soviet Union. Conducted over a number of months, they include education, sports, culture, and arts, science and technology, the secret police, foreign policy, economics and other pertinent subjects. One rather well done program is number ten which deals with the "Nationalities in the USSR." It shows along with others the high calibre of the thought provided by the institute. Its basic content can be extracted from the periodic publications issued by the Munich institution. Here much of this is favorably and effectively popularized for public consumption.

Staged so to voice the favorite deceptive theses of Moscow on this most vital subject, the program quotes, for example, Ekaterina Furtseva who declares that the USSR is "voluntary union of nations." The narrator, Robert C. Cody, then replies: "The republics in question are neither voluntary, nor united. They were taken over by armed intervention or set up by arbitrary force." Handled in the same manner with as much truth and fact that could be compressed in radio time are other basic points, such as the 1944 amendment to the USSR constitution, providing for diplomatic relations by the republics, economic colonialism, national self-determination, Russification, and genocide. Justice William Douglas' book on *Russian Journey* is appropriately quoted: "all political leadership, no matter how it is window-dressed, is Russian."

The re-writing by Moscow of the histories of the non-Russian nations is stressed. The narrator states: "They have been called upon to rewrite the history of the republics in such a way that Russian conquests will be seen as 'voluntary subordination' of the conquered peoples." The description of genocide in Ukraine by an eye-witness, Mykola Herus, is vividly presented. Aside from a few politically inaccurate usages, such as "minorities" and the like, the program capsules all the fundamental points which any student of the captive non-Russian nations in the USSR would emphasize.

"THE UKRAINE BUILDS FOR THE GOOD OF MAN," by Lyubomir Dmiterko. USSR, Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in USA. Washington, D. C., May, 1959.

Needless to say, this magazine is always one with pictures of smiling faces and well fed and clothed people. It is the product of the reciprocal

agreement entered into by us whereby the magazine *Amerika* can be published and distributed in the Soviet Union. A major part of this particular issue is devoted to the Seven Year Plan of the Soviet Republics. An article appears for each republic to show its role in the hoped-for fulfillment of this exaggerated plan. The first is devoted, of course, to "The Russian Federation—First Among Equals." The supposedly equal non-Russian republics follow.

In going through these articles an alert reader cannot but ask himself, "How powerful would Russia be without the captive resources of the non-Russian nations in the USSR?" It must be said that the articles bring out the important resources of each republic. A measure of political astuteness by the reader can well supply the correct and very fundamental answer to this question.

In this particular article on Ukraine the rough percentages of contribution to the Union product are indicated for agriculture and industry. About a half of sugar beet production, quarter of milk and meat products, third of coal, two-fifth of steel, two-thirds of iron ore come from the Ukrainian republic. It is alleged that new substantial amounts of natural gas have been found in the Carpathian foothills and that important discoveries of oil have been tapped about Poltava.

As in the other articles, the exalted theme is the 1965 goals. In essence this is an old theme which attended many previous plans, including the ill-fated Sixth Five Year Plan. For example, the writer emphasizes the role of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station at Zaporozhe and then claims that more hydroelectric stations and thermal power plants will be built in Ukraine in the course of the next seven years. This obviously is mere propaganda. In fact, Khrushchev himself admitted the miscalculated over-investments of capital in such enterprises. With the prospect of increasingly strained investible resources, much of the prognostication given here can be reasonably discounted now. Not so easily discounted, however, is the cold war effect of this so-called economic competition proffered by Moscow.

"TASHKENT, UZBEKISTAN," a commentary, *Abroad. National Review Bulletin*, New York, N. Y., November 1, 1958.

This commentary points out the strange and highly questionable operations of the United States Information Agency regarding the Soviet Union. It first enumerates systematically the steps taken by Moscow for the penetration of the Free Moslem World. Tashkent in the so-called Uzbek republic is the focal point of these operations. It is being developed as the political center from which Moscow hopes to control the entire Moslem area from East Pakistan to Egypt. The revolutionary institute there is being expanded, training Moslem agents. Powerful new radio facilities are being established, and numerous other projects have been undertaken in this capital in Central Asia.

These facts are sufficient to indicate the range and depth of Moscow's activities in this strategic area. Now, what are we doing to offset this? Mr. George Allen, the director of USIA, testified not so long ago that "In the interests of economy" and "to avoid moves that might lead toward a 'splinterizing' of the Soviet Union, the 'Voice of America' has ceased its broadcasts in the Uzbek language." Amazing, isn't it? It would seem that we are intent upon aiding Moscow in its own plans. The action taken by USIA was severely protested, and as a result of Congressional hearings on the subject, the Agency has retreated somewhat.

"THE BALTIC QUESTION IN WORLD POLITICS," an editorial. *Latvian Information Bulletin*, Washington, D. C., April, 1959.

The position of the subjugated Baltic nations is a rather suspended one. These nations continue to be recognized diplomatically by the United States. Yet, because of their *de facto* status, they are frequently overlooked as nations that have been recently annexed to Moscow's empire hidden behind the facade of the USSR. Like Ukraine and others, they are viewed by many as integral parts of some sort of Soviet monolith.

This editorial recites what has been done over the years to avoid the mentioned position. It cites how at the beginning of each year, in January and February, the Independence Days of Ukraine, Lithuania, and Estonia are observed in Congress. Then it accurately states that though "most such statements (by the legislators) are usually devoted only to Ukraine, Lithuania, or Estonia . . . there are also speakers who include in their remarks all three Baltic countries, or the captive nations of East-Central Europe, as a group which shares a similar fate under Soviet domination, and harbors equal hopes of eventual liberation."

The importance of these anniversaries observed in Congress should be obvious. Most statements made by our legislators embrace all of the captive nations. What is singularly important in this editorial is the fact that each captive nation, whether in the Soviet Union or outside of it, "shares a similar fate under Soviet domination, and harbors equal hopes of eventual liberation." The idea of standing together for liberation or hanging separately in permanent captivity is quite implicit. Doing the former will keep the Baltic question on the *terra firma* of world politics.

"HOW TO LIVE WITH THE RUSSIANS," by the Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd. *The Reader's Digest*, New York, April 1959.

After carefully reading this article a perceptive reader will probably ask, "Well, how can we live with the Russians?" The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs offers a sound treatment of many aspects surrounding the prime problem, but he really offers no concrete solution to it. His simple answer is more contacts with the Russians. "In all this, I believe," he says, "that one of the most helpful means of reaching a better understanding is through the technologists, the scientists, the experts in every field." The presumption is that with this, the softening processes of evolution will take care of all else and peace, with or without justice, will prevail.

This type of unimaginative and uncreative thinking is not restricted to London alone. It serves to explain also the low level of our competence to meet the incessant challenges of Russian cold war activity. Its wishful thinking leads to nothing more than a blank wall. One need only point out that prior to World War II there was far more access to German, Japanese, and Italian intellectuals and experts than now exists, or in the future can possibly exist, in regard to those in the Soviet Union. Yet war did come to pass. The possible argument that with time we could succeed through these means with the Soviet Union contains its own dose of naivete. For no matter how hard we press for a broadening of contacts, Moscow must necessarily keep it in bounds. There is propaganda value in generating these pressures, but it won't show us how to live with the Russians. Basically, what Mr. Lloyd fails

to understand is that the cultural exchange operation, initially pushed by the Russians themselves, is from Moscow's viewpoint another cold war technique.

"UKRAINIAN EMIGRES AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE," an article. *Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press*, Prolog, New York, N. Y., April 1959.

It cannot be said that the sensitivity of Moscow puppets to some measure of critical thought is at a low ebb today. Prolog, with its invaluable digest of material flowing out of Ukraine, furnishes in this issue a concrete example of highly disturbed sensitivities. Extracted from the *Ukrainsky Istorychny Zhurnal* is an article written by L. O. Leshchenko, titled "Prologue or Epilogue."

The major excerpts from the puppet's article contain vehemently worded objections to an instructive pamphlet published by Prolog on the "Problems of Independence and Amity of Nations." From an intellectual viewpoint, the communist article is of nil worth. The writer revels in calumniations against "dirty bourgeois nationalists" who are ostensibly operating in the pay of Washington. What is significant, however, is the fact that unquestionably several sore spots were tapped. This is justification enough for more published material along these lines. Those with the armor of truth and authentic fact contend with arguments headlong.

"MR. KHRUSHCHEV AND POST-STALIN RUSSIA," by Reinhold Niebuhr. *Christianity and Crisis*, New York, March 2, 1959.

Dr. Niebuhr's observations on the USSR have frequently been short of accuracy in the past. In this editorial the liberal theologian advances certain views on the current struggle which one can accept only with cautious reservation. His main thesis is that the next few decades will be dominated by competition between the USSR and USA over the task of raising technical competence in Asia and Africa. His last sentence contains the usual trite remark about American concern for "the annual new automobile model." On the basis of this we presumably are not meeting up to the challenge he visualizes.

Many of the facts used by the writer are important. He points out, for example, the gamble taken by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress in exposing Stalin's crimes, "though he was Stalin's hatchet man in the Ukraine." But this and other factual elements are assembled in a context of interpretation that is most vulnerable to criticism. First, the absorptive powers of Asiatic and African nations will take a long time in becoming to accommodate new capital techniques. Second, the writer assumes that the Communist Empire itself will be all this time in steady equilibrium. And third, although this freak competition will undoubtedly be an important factor, it is only a subsidiary means of a broader cold war activity staged by Moscow. In short, competition about elevating technical competence is grossly exaggerated in this editorial. It is scarcely a force to dominate the next few decades.

"FEDERATIVE TENDENCIES OF SLOVAK NATIONALISM," by E. S. Buc. *Slovakia*, Middletown, Pa., December 1958.

Those who flippantly outrule the force of nationalism because of a growing interdependence of nations may profit immensely from this article. It is

certain that in the first instance they would be amazed to find strong federative tendencies associated with the development of Slovak nationalism. For discrediting reasons this nationalism has been fallaciously portrayed as extremist.

In a section on "The Slovaks and the Ukrainians," the writer dwells favorably on relations between Carpatho-Ukraine and Slovakia. He quotes the sentiments expressed by Carpatho-Ukrainian representatives toward their Slovakian neighbors at a meeting in Zilina in October, 1938. Both peoples have a common background in the struggle for national independence. Both see this as a logical step for federations of a free choice.

"WHY NOT BITE THE BITER?," a commentary. Manion Forum Network, South Bend, Indiana, March 29, 1959.

A call for putting the Kremlin on the defensive is sounded in this commentary. The major vulnerable spots are cited. Russian colonialism is one. Moscow, it points out, has "ruthlessly gobbled up such highly advanced and formerly independent countries as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Rumania, Ukraine, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Albania and Czechoslovakia." The commentator also shows that in "East Berlin, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine and Tibet, the record of popular rebellion against this alien Red tyranny has been and is now being written in the blood of the oppressed people."

"CACEED ANNUAL MEETING CALLS FOR DYNAMIC U.S. FOREIGN POLICY," a report. *ACEN News*, New York, March, 1959.

This monthly review of the Assembly of Captive European Nations carries a report of the political statement drawn up by the Conference of Americans of Central and Eastern European Descent. The Conference consists of organizations representing over fifteen million Americans. Issued at its annual meeting in February, the statement called on our Government "to reject the dangerous policy of expediency and to stand upon principle." It cited also two major causes of tensions in Europe: "the division of Germany and the subjugation of the East-Central European countries and the Ukraine."

L. E. D.

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