

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SOVIET REALITY IN NEW YORK

(Editorial)

NEW YORK CITY was recently the stage for a drama which might aptly be entitled "Soviet Reality." The lead was played by the Soviet Consul General Jacob M. Lomakin. In the supporting cast were the Soviet Ambassador Alexander Paniushkin and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov. The tragedians were two ordinary former Soviet citizens, teachers by profession, Michael Ivanovich Samarin, a Russian from Moscow, and a Ukrainian woman from Slovianske, Oksana Stepanivna Kosenkina.¹ The plot dealt with the manhunt for these two citizens who refused to return to that prison house of nations commonly known as the U.S.S.R.

Samarin, a man of prudence, followed the example of Kravchenko and Barmine and eluded the grasp of Lomakin and his henchmen. Kosenkina, less prudent, allowed herself to be kidnapped by them. True, she had managed to escape at first. For awhile she stayed at the Reed Farm at Valley Cottage, not far from New York. There she had the protection of Countess Tolstoy, head of the Tolstoy Foundation. But her sentimental Ukrainian nature made it hard for her to believe that even in the worst of men there is no spark of human kindness. So she allowed herself to be enmeshed and brought back to the Soviet consulate. She probably thought, in any event, that she had nothing to lose, for her entire life had already been ruined by the Soviet system. Her main preoccupation was with her husband and son, to whom she had devoted her life.

As early as the 10th century Arab travelers wrote that Ukrainian women were the most faithful of all womankind. Once she becomes married the Ukrainian woman devotes her entire attention to rearing a family. The same applies to Kosenkina. "She spent her entire life on her son and husband."² Her husband, a Ukrainian schoolmaster, had been "liquidated" during the 1937 purge, known also as the "Period of Yezhov-Terror." He was but one of the about four thousand Ukrainian teachers to disappear then in that manner.

¹ Oksana Stepanivna Kosenkina is her correct name. In American press reports her name is Russianized: Kosenkina. There is no Oksana in the Russian language. Obviously she not only comes from Ukraine but is Ukrainian by birth.

² From an interview with her. *The New York Times*, Aug. 26, 1948.

Kosenkina was left with but one priceless possession, her beloved son. She did her best to protect him from the effects of the barbaric Soviet system, keeping him from joining the Komsomol, and, when he reached the proper age, sending him, as in the case of many Ukrainian parents, to Moscow to study at the university there. There existence was less dangerous, for the NKVD did not keep such strict watch as it did in Ukraine.³

Normally young Kosenkin would have finished his studies and become a professional with no Party connections. War intervened however. As is well known, non-Party members were discriminated at every step during the war. Without much training they were turned out as shock troops, to bear the brunt of battle. Among them was young Kosenkin. He was killed on the Leningrad front January 12, 1942.

His mother, however, clung to the hope that he had not perished but had been captured by the Germans, and that as a non-Party member had preferred to remain prisoner in the hope that after the war he would be released and allowed to go to some other country. Buoyed by this hope Kosenkina searched for an early opportunity to leave the country herself and somewhere abroad rejoin her son.

Such an opportunity finally arrived. She was sent to this country to teach chemistry at a school attended by children of Soviet citizens here. From the very outset she planned not to return to the Soviet Union. When the school was closed by Soviet authorities, she found herself at the Reed Farm. At no time had she any intention of making political capital of her position. For that matter, even if she had any such intention, she lacked the boldness of Samarin to do that. She was content in the belief that if she spoke with her superiors they would sympathize with her and grant her request to remain in this country as permanent resident. As a sentimentally inclined Ukrainian, she "thought that these people have some semblance of human mercy left in them and would converse with her . . . She wanted to speak with them as human beings in order to see that proper arrangements could be made."⁴

So Kosenkina wrote a letter to Lomakin, related to him the details of her broken-up life, and threw herself upon his mercy. Little

³ Many Ukrainians scholars saved their lives leaving Ukraine and moving to Russia. Prof. Volodymir Vernadsky, First President of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, moved to Moscow; Ukrainian mathematician Mikhaylo Krewchuk moved to Leningrad.

⁴ Interview, *New York Times*, Aug 26, 1948.

did she surmise that Lomakin, like other Red officials of his ilk, was a "brutal terrorist".⁵

He immediately forced her to return to the Soviet consulate in New York, from where she was to be deported to Russia.

Sensitive as to the reaction of the American press to this kidnaping, Lomakin arranged a conference for members of the press, where with very serious mien he charged that Kosenkina had been "kidnapped by White Russian bandits" and kept at the Farm with the aid of local American police authorities.

Kidnaping is a very serious offence in this country. Federal law prescribes the death penalty for it, if it is a matter of interstate jurisdiction. Lomakin's act therefore was regarded not at all lightly by the American authorities. What saved him for the while, however, was his diplomatic immunity, plus a certain expediency on the part of the American officialdom whose relations with the Soviets were already at a straining point. Nonetheless public opinion here compelled the summoning of Lomakin with his prisoner to court. To his defense came the Soviet Ambassador Paniushkin and Foreign Minister Molotov. It was quite an imposing "defense counsel." In notes sharply worded they demanded that Lomakin be left alone and that any errant Soviet citizens here be turned over to the proper Red authorities for deportation to Russia.

Hearing this over the radio and realizing the inevitable consequences of it, Kosenkina decided to make a break for it. Since the egress from her third-story room was stoutly barred, she made a terror-ridden jump out the window—to freedom or death. New York police and an ambulance got her safely away from Lomakin.

A diplomatic scandal ensued. Ordinarily such an affair is settled by the recall of the foreign diplomatic representative involved. The Soviet government acted differently. It not only supported the patently false charges of its Consul General here, but it demanded the repatriation of wanted Soviet nationals in this country with the aid of our police.

Naturally our State Department immediately requested the recall of Lomakin. He was, in the eyes of the American law, guilty of a criminal act. It went even further than that. It reasserted the traditional American right to give asylum to political refugees.

The finale to this American drama provided the spectacle of the

⁵ *The New York Sun*, September 8, 1948. Report of how Lomakin took part in the savage beating of a Russian seaman in San Francisco who jumped his ship to gain his freedom but was recaptured.

Soviets closing down all their consulates in their country and at the same time demanding the closing of the American consulate in Vladivostok. All this to the accompaniment of a stepped-up barrage of Red propaganda against America, in the press and at international conferences.

The first blast was loosed at the World Congress of Intellectuals, held at Breslau, Poland, beginning August 25 last, and attended by Communists, their fellow travelers and some innocent souls from various parts of the eastern and western hemispheres. Mr. Fadayev, president of the Soviet Writers Association, trumpeted at the gathering that America is a "country whose facade by irony of fate is decorated by the Statue of Liberty," and in which there exists a "cold terror" for the intellectuals. Anyone who disagrees with American governmental policies, he maintained, is liable to a prison sentence of ten years in prison and a \$10,000 fine. Those American writers who in their works hail the American way of life were dubbed by him as hyenas and jackals. ". . .if hyenas and jackals could use fountain pens, they could write such things, as the men produced," he added.

Moreover, he wrote, American imperialists together with imperialists of Great Britain, France and Italy, "want to handcuff all mankind and turn the whole planet into a police station under American supervision." On the other hand, Mr. Fadayev "hailed Premier Stalin and Eastern socialism as the salvation of mankind."⁶

At about the same time two philosophies emanating from New York and the town of Breslau collided. They were the philosophy "of the ant heap and a free person in free society." The average person of the West naturally finds it difficult to differentiate between the two systems, especially when he reads the note of Molotov to our government and the note of the latter to Molotov, and looks upon both in the light of the cynical speech made by Fadayev at the Congress of "Intellectuals." According to his example the Soviet intellectuals still follow Lenin's principle "to use any ruse, cunning, unlawful methods, evasion and concealment of the truth." Anything goes, as long as it conforms with and is to the advantage of the Soviet regime. Such mendacity, brutal disregard of individual rights, concealment of truth, or the complete distortion of it, are not at all peculiar alone to the MVD (formerly NKVD). Such qualities characterize also the typical Soviet diplomat, scholar, writer, provided, of course, he is a true disciple of the Marx-Lenin-Stalin school. If he is not, than it

⁶ *N. Y. Times*, Aug. 26, 1948.

is a matter of perforce. On the whole these qualities are essential in the attempt of foisting Soviet hegemony over the world.

Such is the time-tried Soviet system. It is especially applied to the non-conformists within the Party, as well as those outside the Soviet boundaries. The chief victim of this policy, of course, has been Ukraine, which for the past thirty years has endured under the Soviet rule and system a martyrdom unequalled in world history. The Ukrainians, however, have not been duped by Soviet mendacity. Bitter experience has taught them to know better. Unfortunately, certain sections of American public opinion have been duped by it.

Recall, for example, the myths of not so long ago about "Soviet heroism and nobility." Recall, too, the fate of thousands of Ukrainian displaced persons, of the caliber of Samarin and Kosenkina, who were forcibly thrust back by American, British, and French military authorities under Soviet domination. Accusations of a patently false nature that he collaborated with the enemy, was sufficient to deny that person the right of asylum and to send him on a death journey to the U.S.S.R.

Recall, also, the calumny poured by the Reds upon the Ukrainian Division which was activated before the fall of Germany for the sole purpose of defending Ukraine against the onrush of Soviet Russian barbarism and communism.

And consider also how little understanding there is today in the governmental circles of the western democracies concerning the valiant battle being waged by the revolutionary-underground Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) against the Russian and Polish Red rulers of Ukraine.

Today when we see the Bolsheviks in their true colors, when we recognize them as conspirators planning the overthrow of world order and peace, there are still a great many people in this country who do not realize how much heroism, patriotism, self-sacrifice, and devotion to the cause of liberty is required to successfully wage a struggle, already in its third year since the end of the war, against the barbarism for which Soviet Russia stands.

Recent press dispatches report that in the County of Pidhaytsi, Western Ukraine's youths sympathizing with the UPA were strung up on the telegraph poles bordering the highways, and that the civilian population was forcibly driven to witness their hanging. Some day the heroic deeds and patriotism of these young Ukrainian fighters for liberty

will be emblazoned on the pages of history. Today, however, American public opinion still fails to recognize them for what they are.

Only recently such reputable newspapers as the N.Y. Times and N.Y. Herald Tribune were still publishing Soviet inspired reports that the UPA-ites were bandits, fascists, collaborationists, when as a matter of fact they were just the opposite. The fact that thousands of them perished in German prison camps, the fact that they fought during the war against the Germans as well as the Russians, has been largely ignored by our press.

Just a few months ago (June 13, 1948) the New York Times correspondent Sydney Gruson wrote from Warsaw that the anti-Soviet underground movement "reaches even into Byelorussian, Ukrainian and Baltic republics of the Soviet Union. However, the Communist charges that it is based on pro-German and Fascist elements which sided with the Nazis, seem to be true and it cannot be doubted that this prevents it from having a general appeal."

If an American press correspondent ⁷ allows himself to be hoodwinked in this manner, imagine then the gullibility of our average citizen when exposed in this connection to the propaganda of the Reds and their fellow travelers in our midst, including those who have been and in some cases still are highly placed in our government.

It required Soviet man-hunts in this country, the terror-ridden leap from a third story of Kosenkina, the diplomatic scandal rising from it, climaxed by the shutting down of the consulates, to prompt our American press to speak in a different language. The following editorial captions speak for themselves: "The House of Fear," "Farewell to Mr. Lomakin," "Russian Retaliation," (N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 21, 26, 1948) and "Soviet System" (N.Y. Herald Tribune, Aug. 15).

The Times editorial (Aug. 15) was well in step with the new trend to recognize the Soviets for what they are. "This incident of a desperate woman comes home to us because it occurs in a house of one of our streets, in a city where there are police whose duty it is to protect the innocent and courts to see that the rights of the individual are preserved. It may startle some readers more than suicide or murder of a Czech patriot. . . more than the countless slaves in Russia itself, more than the countless dead whose offense was a belief in something like the Bill of Rights or perhaps merely in some variant of the

⁷ Mr. Gruson was denied admittance to the World Congress of Intellectuals in Breslau.

official Communist creed. It is human nature to find a tragedy under our windows more shocking than a multitude of tragedies far away."

Such is human nature indeed. Yet despite the opinion of the Times editorial writer that "we have no power or wish to force this kind of freedom upon Russia or any other country other than our own," we still cannot deny the right to the millions of enslaved peoples under the Soviet Russian regime to expect from the American people at least some understanding of their terrible plight and of their heroic struggle for their human rights as well as national liberation.



THE MAZEPPISTS

THE UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT OF THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY

By BORYS KRUPNITSKY

UKRAINIAN political thought of the latter half of the seventeenth and of the first half of the eighteenth century was under the powerful influence of the great personality of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky who liberated Eastern Ukraine from Polish rule and became the founder of the second Ukrainian State (1648).

All Ukrainian patriots considered as their foremost duty toward their fatherland the necessity of preserving the Ukrainian statehood, that precious heritage of Hetman Khmelnytsky; but on the other hand, Muscovy, which in 1654 assumed protection over Ukraine as over a vassal state, continually attempted to restrict the state rights of Ukraine. This led to endless conflicts and clashes between Moscow and Kiev, and almost every Ukrainian hetman following Bohdan Khmelnytsky was forcibly ousted by the tsarist government as a result of this struggle.

Hetman Mazepa and His Followers

The revolution of Hetman Ivan Mazepa against Tsar Peter I at the time of the Northern War (1708-1709) became not only a breaking point in the relations between Ukraine and Russia, but also a turning point in the political ideology of the Ukrainian Independence Movement. On the one side, it stressed the mortal danger for Ukrainian autonomy from Moscow, and, on the other hand, it impressed upon the consciousness of the Ukrainians the fact that there were no prospects whatever for an understanding between Kiev and Moscow, and that the destruction of the Russian power alone could bring about the liberation of Ukraine.

This ideology was in the first place shown in Hetman Ivan Mazepa himself, a man of great intellectual attainments and of no mean diplomatic ability. The same conviction was shared by his associates, especially those who were graduated from the political school of the old hetman. The break with Moscow became the political program of all the idealistically-inclined commanders of the Kozak host as well as of the autonomous Zaporozhian Sich which remained the foundation of the Ukrainian Kozak liberties.

An occasion for a break with Moscow was offered by the Northern War which in the first years brought victory after victory to the young Swedish King Charles XII, that "Eagle of the North." To be sure, an alliance with Sweden was not a novelty for the Ukrainians; on the contrary, Bohdan Khmel'nitsky himself had indicated the advisability of Ukraine's orientation towards the then powerful Sweden. It is a matter of common knowledge that on the eve of his death the hetman-liberator, disillusioned by Moscow, had formed a plan of breaking away from it with the assistance of Charles Gustav X of Sweden (1657).

The defeat of the Ukrainians and Swedes at Poltava (1709) decided the fate of eastern Europe to Moscow's advantage, but it did not end the struggle for the liberation of the Ukrainian people. On the contrary, it marked the beginning of an active Ukrainian independence movement under the banner of which there assembled all the finer sons of Ukraine of the eighteenth century. History has nicknamed them Mazeppists ("Mazepintsi"), i. e., followers of Mazeppa, the man who was hated bitterly by Peter I and his successors to the present time, with the red tsar Stalin included.

The old hetman, however, did not survive the tragedy of the dire diacomfiture at Poltava and died that very year in Bendery in Turkish territory, whither he had fled, anathematized by the Russian Orthodox Church as on an equal level with the heretics of the early Christian centuries and glorified by the Ukrainian patriots as a symbol of the struggle for the freedom of the Ukrainian nation.

Those who took an active part in the revolution of Hetman Mazeppa against Russia numbered several thousand. After its failure they emigrated together with the entire government of the Hetman, and thus formed the first large scale political Ukrainian emigration. This became known during the first half of the eighteenth century in every corner of Europe. The Mazeppists represented outside the borders of Russia the idea of an independent Ukrainian nation and had behind them thousands of sympathizers who had remained in Ukraine.

Hetman Philip Orlyk, the New Leader of the Ukrainian Independents

The Mazeppists continued their struggle against Russia under the leadership of the Ukrainian government in exile which was headed by Ivan Mazeppa's successor, Hetman Philip Orlyk. He was a person

of high intelligence, well educated, strong-willed, and capable of the utmost sacrifices for the good of his fatherland.

Philip Orlyk, the former chancellor of Hetman Ivan Mazepa and the most intimate confidant of the latter's secret plans for regarding the severance of Ukraine from the protectorate of Moscow, was unanimously elected Hetman of Ukraine at the General Council of the Kozaks, gathered at Varnitsa on April 15, 1710. Upon taking the leadership of the Ukrainian Independents, he outlined for them the ideal of the future liberated Ukraine as well as the manner of struggle to be waged in order to achieve that ideal. The aim of the Mazepists was an independent Ukraine which was to include not only the Ukrainian territories under the Muscovite protectorate, but also that part of Ukraine which up to that time had been under the Polish rule. Philip Orlyk planned to include in the independent Ukrainian state also the so-called Slobodian Ukraine, i. e., the territory of the present region of Kharkiv, which belonged to Muscovy but had been during the seventeenth century colonized by a Ukrainian population. To be brief, Philip Orlyk's ideal was an independent Ukraine on the territory settled and inhabited by the Ukrainians. That was the very ideal which had been fostered in the heart of Hetman Ivan Mazepa, Orlyk's great political master.

At the Kozak Council, which elected Philip Orlyk hetman, there was formed and accepted a *Constitution of Ukraine*, perhaps the first constitution of its kind on the European continent. The Constitution of Ukraine foresaw the establishment of permanent legislative and controlling bodies in a Kozak parliament to which the hetman and his government were to be responsible. In proclaiming the independence of Ukraine from Russia and Poland, the Ukrainian Constitution defined the boundaries of Ukraine as containing that territory which formerly, during the period of the rebellion, i. e., during the rule of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, had formed the second Ukrainian state.

At this Kozak Council steps were taken to renew the Ukrainian-Swedish-Alliance established by the late Hetman Mazepa. The Swedish king once more bound himself not to lay down arms or to conclude a peace treaty with Russia until Ukraine should be freed from the Muscovite oppression.

Philip Orlyk, as true pupil of the diplomatic school of Ivan Mazepa, selected, under the circumstances, the means whereby the Ukrainian people might best realize the ideal of an independent na-

tion. In the first years of his direction of the political inheritance of Mazeppa, Hetman Orlyk saw to it that Ukraine was protected by a system of alliances and pacts with all the powers interested in checking Russian expansion. In the first place he supported with all his energy the plans of the Swedish King Charles XII to continue the war with Russia. The Swedish king, like the Ukrainian Kozak troops, found himself isolated on Turkish territory. The town of Bendery, which was not far from the delta of the Danube, became for a short time the capital of the Ukrainian and Swedish forces. Hetman Orlyk was likewise successful in developing friendly relations with the eastern neighbors of Ukraine.

In January 1711 the Kozak delegation concluded an alliance between Ukraine and the Crimean Khanate, a thing in which neither the Swedes nor the Poles of the Swedish orientation (i. e., the supporters of King Stanislas Leszczynski) had been successful. The alliance with Crimea, which had been formerly the most turbulent neighbor of Ukraine, recognized the right of Ukraine to complete independence, and bound Crimea not to conclude a peace treaty with Russia without the agreement of the hetman and the Zaporozhian Sich. During the war, the Crimean Khan guaranteed peace and safety to the population of Ukraine proper and to the Slobodian Ukraine which was to be separated from Russia.

The diplomatic work conducted in the southeast, on the hetman's instructions, by the general adjutant ("Osaul") Hrihor Hertsik, one of the most colorful figures in the camp of the Ukrainian independents, is especially interesting. Hertsik was probably of Jewish origin, one of those Jews who had settled in Ukraine and bound themselves firmly to the Ukrainian fatherland. Hrihor Hertsik, Orlyk's son-in-law, finally gained a very responsible position in the Kozak hierarchy, that of the General *Osaul* or Adjutant to the hetman. He became the right hand of the hetman in exile and a very talented executor in his political charges and recommendations. Several years later he was seized in Hamburg by tsarist agents and was taken to Russia. At the time of which we are now speaking, however, Hrihor Hertsik, acting as an emissary of the Ukrainian hetman and the Swedish king, went to the territory of the Kuban Horde, where dwelled the Don Cossacks and the supporters of Bulavin who was the leader of those Cossacks in the rebellion against Russia. With them he concluded an understanding as to the further struggle with Russia. With the assistance of the Kuban sultan he succeeded in making connections

with the Kazan Tatars and Bashkirs. His diplomatic achievements and knowledge had a great influence on the further political plans of the Swedish king Charles XII.

The question of the independence of Ukraine was strongly emphasized in direct negotiations between the Ukrainian emigrants and Turkey. On the invitation of the Turkish government, Hetman Orlyk sent to Turkey a delegation whose purpose was to conclude a pact of friendship. The treaty of alliance between Turkey and Ukraine stipulated that Ukraine to the east and to the west of the Dnieper was to be freed from Russian occupation and forever henceforth to be recognized as an independent state. Furthermore, Ukraine's boundaries, liberties, and its internal order were to be guaranteed, together with the right of all the Kozaks to choose their hetman by means of a free election. Ukrainian merchants were to be given the right of free enterprise in the entire state.

At the same time, however, Hetman Orlyk carried on in all of Europe a widespread movement in favor of an independent Ukraine. An exhaustive and historically sound Latin memorial under the heading: "Deductio Iurium Ucrainae" (A Deduction of the Rights of Ukraine), compiled perhaps in March, 1712 was to be the basic document revealing to the governments of the European nations the historical and natural right of Ukraine to lead a free and independent life. The document also exposed the lawlessness of the Russian oppression and of the intervention of Moscow in the affairs of Ukraine.¹ *The Deduction of the Laws of Ukraine* showed as far back as the second decade of the eighteenth century how an independent Ukraine would stop the territorial expansion of Russia, would put an end to her aggression at the cost of her neighbors, and would establish a balance of power in the political relations of Europe.

The hetman himself issued a Manifesto to the European governments dated April 5, 1712, in which he attempted to raise the problem of Ukraine as a question of the first magnitude in European politics, and one upon which the peace of Europe strictly depended. A war between Turkey and Russia actually did result. In the decisive battle on the Pruth River the Russians were defeated, but the Turks, in spite of their pact with Ukraine, concluded a peace treaty with Russia, and left the question of the freedom of Ukraine completely outside of their deliberations with the Russians. As a salve for Ukraine's

¹ The two documents, *The Deduction of the Rights of Ukraine* and the Manifesto were discovered in the French Archives (1925), and were published by the Ukrainian historian Ilya Borochak in *Stara Ukraina*, Lviv, 1925/I-II.

wound, Orlyk was granted a part of Ukraine to the west of the Dnieper.

That part of Ukraine, which was to be taken away from Poland, was to have Orlyk as its head and was to come under the protectorate of Turkey. All the rights of the Ukrainian people were to remain inviolate. In actual fact, the Kozaks gained nothing, because that part of Ukraine which was under Poland was utterly ruined and economically dead. In addition, it was yet to be taken from the Poles who were backed by Russia.

This first period of the political activity of the Mazeppists outside the borders of Ukraine thus ended in a negative manner. Masses of the emigrants were seized by despair. The hope of gaining independence for Ukraine seemed therefore to be removed by tens of years into the future, until such time as the international situation might again become more favorable.

The Mazeppists at the Crossroads

A critical time ensued for the Ukrainian emigration, a time in which their staunch spirit was to undergo a severe test. Tsar Peter I proclaimed amnesty for those taking part in the Revolution of Ivan Mazeppa, and some of the emigrants did take advantage of the tsar's grace and returned to Ukraine, but only a few of them were allowed to settle in Ukraine.

The forces of the Zaporozhian Sich, enraged at Turkey for her failure to abide by the promises given to the Ukrainians in the pact, left the Turkish territory and moved to the territory of the Crimean khan, to the district of Aleshki (1714). That same year Hetman Philip Orlyk moved with his family, and with a large group of his close collaborators, to Sweden, where he passed several years in Christianstad, until the death of his ally, Charles XII (1718). There, however, he had no opportunity to do anything for the liberation of Ukraine.

It is true that after the death of Charles XII new hopes seemed to appear for the Ukrainian independents, because the Swedish government, having made its peace with all its other enemies, began to gather its forces against Russia for a final stand. In this it was encouraged by the Court of Vienna, and by King George I of England, who was also the Elector of Hanover. It thus appeared that a new anti-Russian coalition, consisting of Austria, England and Poland, was becoming consolidated.

The Ukrainian hetman then left Sweden and moved to the conti-

ment, where he settled in Breslau in Silesia, in order to be active in the formation of an anti-Russian bloc, into which he expected to draw Turkey, Crimea, the Don 'Cossacks, the Volga and the Astrakhan Tatars, and, of course, those Kozaks who had remained in Aleshki on the territory of Crimea.²

Unfortunately, the planned anti-Russian coalition fell apart and Sweden herself was forced to conclude a peace treaty with Russia, which finally put an end to the Swedish domination of the Baltic Sea. The downfall of the Swedish power was a terrible blow to the movement for Ukrainian independence, because she in fact lost an inestimable ally who was not directly interested in dominating Ukraine, but was much more concerned in vitally weakening Russia.

The Russian government, encouraged by its successes, began to persecute the Mazepists throughout the whole of Europe. Hrihor Hertsik, one of the closest collaborators of the hetman, fell into a Russian trap in Hamburg, while the Austrian government was pressed by Russia to deport from its territory the staunch enemy of Russian imperialism, the leader of the Ukrainian independents, Philip Orlyk.³

As a result he was forced to leave Breslau and to go to Poland. But there too he was followed by Russian spies, so that his life was in constant danger. For that reason Orlyk and with him the headquarters of the Ukrainian independence movement moved to Salonika in Turkish territory, because Turkey had continually been Ukraine's most promising ally, not only as far as her own power was concerned, but likewise on account of her vital interest in checking by all means the growth of the Russian power.

Salonica, the Headquarters of the Ukrainian Independents (1822-1834)

The Independence of Ukraine was in direct line with the vital political interests of Turkey, even as it is to-day. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries France was closely connected with Turkey, and for that reason Ukrainian diplomacy paid chief attention to Turkey, France, and to those powers which collaborated with the Franco-Turkish coalition. Thus the port city of Salonika, where the Turkish and French interests met, became for twelve years the headquarters of the Ukrainian independence movement. From this city Orlyk and his closest collaborators attempted to take advantage of all

² A. Jensen, *Orlik in Sweden*, Transactions of Shevchenko Sc. Soc., Vol. 92.

³ The Trial of Hrihor Hertsik, *Kievskaya Starina*, 1883/III (in Russian).

the anti-Russian movements in Europe in order to force the discussion of the question of Ukraine in all international or regional political conferences, as the important unsolved problem of Europe then.

Such an opportunity again presented itself. Europe had again become divided into two sharply opposing camps, into the so-called Vienna and Hanover coalitions (1725). The first consisted of Austria, Spain and Russia, and the second of France, England, Holland, Denmark and other smaller nations. It appeared that a war was inevitable and imminent, but Europe, exhausted by the Northern War, as well as by the war of the Spanish Succession, was seeking peaceful means of settling its conflicts.

In the summer of 1728 an international conference was opened at Soissons thanks to the ability of the director of the French foreign policy, Cardinal Fleury. Hetman Philip Orlyk showed great energy in attempting to place the Ukrainian problem on the agenda of that Conference. He was greatly assisted in this task by his young son Hrihor Orlyk. Hetman Orlyk probably applied directly to the Conference by means of a special note, requesting the Conference to place Ukraine under international control because of Russia's failure to fulfill its obligations to the vassal Ukrainian State.

According to some reports, England, Sweden and France promised to give Ukraine their diplomatic assistance. But the Ukrainian problem was not placed on the agenda. Ilya Borschak, a Ukrainian researcher working in the French Archives concerning this particular period, states that the conversations on the problem of Ukraine were being conducted apart from the official meetings of the Conference at Soissons. Cardinal Fleury, and the English, Dutch and Spanish delegates spoke in favor of Ukraine; but they could not persuade the Russian delegation to consent to a general discussion of the Ukrainian problem within the framework of the Conference. Still this question caused Russia no end of worry.

It is difficult to say whether the action of Philip Orlyk had any influence on the internal policy of Russia; but the fact that at that time there followed some changes in the policy of Petersburg toward Ukraine would indicate that political action of the Mazeppists had quite a pressure on Russia. A Russian delegate stated that his government could not consent to a discussion of the Ukrainian Kozaks because such a discussion was not at all necessary. The friendship of the Russian government to the "Kozak nation" is quite clear—he said—and is revealed in the fact that at that very time, and against the dic-

tate of the late Tsar Peter I, the Ukrainian Kozaks were again allowed to elect their hetman. And to be sure, one had been elected in 1727 in the person of Colonel Danilo Apostol. Orlyk—the Russian delegate proceeded to say—was a rebel and a collaborator of Mazeppa, but in spite of it all the Petersburg government was ready to grant him amnesty if he promised to conduct himself loyally toward the tsarist government. The words of Golovkin convinced even those who favored the Ukrainian problem, and Cardinal Fleury simply advised Orlyk to take advantage of the proposed amnesty.

But Orlyk did not follow the Cardinal's advice, for he was seeking only a solution of the grievous conditions in Ukraine, and not an amnesty for himself. Orlyk next approached the Jesuit Order which at that time had great influence in the French Court, sought the mediation of the Pope⁴ and continued his efforts to develop connections even with the Austrian and Russian governments, which were hostile to him, in order to sound out their attitudes towards Ukraine.

In the following year (1729), however, the hetman bade farewell to his illusions as to the possible understanding with hostile Moscow, and till his death continued a policy clearly directed against Russia. He understood that the only firm basis for the Ukrainian independence policy lay in an orientation toward Turkey and France. In addition, he came to the conclusion that the decisive part in the liberation of Ukraine must be played by the strong Ukrainian elements outside and inside the borders of Ukraine, as well as by those whose interests were similar to those of Ukraine, i. e., by the Don Cossacks and the small Tatar hordes already subjugated or dangerously threatened by Russia. For that reason the formation of an anti-Russian coalition was the basic political conception of the policy of the Ukrainian headquarters in Salonika.

In his notes to the states friendly to Ukraine he called their attention to the danger threatening Western Europe from Russia on the one hand, and on the other—he compared the Russian invasion of the west with the advance of the barbarians against the European civilisation. In his estimation, no country in Europe was safe from the Russian invasion from the east. After Ukraine, the next victims of this invasion would be Russia's neighbors, Sweden, Poland, and

⁴ Professor Ivan Ohienko (now Metropolitan Ilarion) discovered in the Warsaw Archives a document which testifies that Orlyk at this time was converted to Catholicism of the Eastern Rite. Probably he felt so inclined, perhaps because of the favorable attitude taken by Catholic circles towards the liberation of Ukraine, and also because he was embittered against the Orthodox Church in Ukraine for allowing itself to be used as a political instrument of Russia and for placing hetman Ivan Mazepa on the list of those heretics whom the church had excommunicated.—*Editor*.

Turkey. In these memorials drawn by Orlyk there is much political foresight and vision, and his fears in the present day are becoming a ghastly reality for all of Europe. Again to-day Ukraine is still the most important unsolved problem of eastern Europe.

In contemplating the European situation so broadly, the hetman of Ukraine foresaw in his vision the tragic part to be played by his beloved Ukraine. He foresaw that the autonomy of Ukraine would soon end, and that his nation would be the first victim of Russian imperialism. Orlyk considered Ukraine of that time as a defensive rampart of Europe, but he knew that that rampart had been badly breached by the centralizing policy of Petersburg and needed immediate help from western Europe.

Another Russian-Turkish War (1735-1739) again aroused the energy of the hetman in spite of his bitter experiences and age. Turkey was forced to wage war on two fronts—against Russia and Austria, and for that reason Orlyk tried to persuade Turkey and France to liquidate the war against Austria and to concentrate all their strength against Russian expansion.

Orlyk emphasized that Ukraine and Poland would join Turkey because those countries were at that very time bled white by military exactions, for the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops, Field Marshall Minikh, had made Ukraine his base against Turkey and was driving the Ukrainian population to despair. But the anti-Austrian policy of France won the day at the Turkish Court, and Orlyk's basic idea of forming an Eastern-European coalition against Moscow found no understanding in Istanbul or in Paris in spite of his energetic efforts in that direction through the mediation of his son Hrihor at the Court of Versailles⁵.

In order to be closer to the theater of war as well as to Ukraine, Orlyk left Salonika and moved to the territory of Moldavia which was then a dependency of Turkey. There he issued a fiery manifesto to the Zaporozhian Kozaks, exhorting them to a renewed struggle with Russia, while his son Hrihor secretly made a very dangerous journey to Ukraine in order to resume connections with the Ukrainian independents there and to instigate a rebellion against Russia.

But this international turmoil did not bring any profit to Ukraine. Hetman Philip Orlyk did not return to Salonika, because he pre-

⁵ E. Borchak, *Hetman Philip Orlik and France*. Transactions of Shevchenko Scientific Soc., vol. 124/35 (in Ukrainian).

ferred to be nearer to Ukraine, and there, on the borders of his beloved Ukraine, he soon breathed his last in the seventieth year of his life.

The verdict of history was written for him by his son Hrihor in a letter to the French King Louis XV in which he informed him of the death of his father: "The obstinacy and patience with which my father, until the end of his days, suffered the cruelest misfortunes, the greatest disillusionings, and the whims of the inexorable fortune, which resulted from his loyalty to our mutual interests, won for him respect not only in the countries interested in his plans and legitimate measures, but also in those countries against which he worked in order to maintain the interests of his fatherland and his nation."

With Philip Orlyk the first generation of the older Mazeppists became extinct. Their work in Europe for the liberation of Ukraine was, however, continued by their followers under the leadership of that extremely interesting figure in Ukrainian and French history—Hrihor Orlyk, the son of the hetman, an ardent Ukrainian patriot, and a Lieutenant-General in the Royal French Army.

The Mazeppists continued to fetter the hands of the Russian diplomacy in Europe, as in Ukraine, and for that reason were hated by the Russians. The word "mazinginets" to a Russian was tantamount to "traitor," but to a Ukrainian it meant "patriot," one devoted to the welfare of Ukraine.

In the person of Philip Orlyk there seemed to be concentrated all the ideal passions of the first generation of the Ukrainian political emigration of the eighteenth century. As its leader, he propagated, and struggled for, the ideal of a free Ukrainian nation, and continually stressed the right of his people to decide their own destiny.

If one analyzes his political beliefs from the present point of view, from the ideology of the American President, Woodrow Wilson as to the right of self-determination of every people, one reaches the conclusion that Philip Orlyk was the precursor of that modern political point of view. He recognized neither the then prevailing dynastic rights, nor the right of force, nor the historical rights of the existing states. He rejected political traditionalism, and for that reason the views of the leader of the Ukrainian independents regarding a nation's right to an independent existence, were in those times considered really revolutionary⁶.

⁶ B. Krupnitsky; *Hetman Philip Orlik (1672-1742)*. The Works of Ukrainian Research Institute in Warsaw, V. 42, 1938.

INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COMMUNISM

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

THE quarrel between Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party on the one hand and the Cominform and the Soviet Union on the other has attracted the attention of the world to the relations existing among the world Communist parties. There can be no doubt as to the significance of this open airing of the questions at issue but the chance that out of this may come any fundamental easing of the relations between Communism and the democratic world are very slight. It is rather an opportunity for that same kind of wishful thinking which has led the idealists of the democratic world on so many occasions to believe that the conflict is on the verge of solution and has resulted each time in the strengthening of Communism. The adoption of the New Economic Policy during the time of Lenin, the entrance of the Soviet Union to the League of Nations, the fanfare with which the cooperation of the Soviet Union and the democratic powers during World II was welcomed, the joining of the Soviet Union in the United Nations, all have been merely steps in the deepening of the conflict and not approaches to peace.

So long as the Western world persists in thinking of the Soviet Union in terms of the monolithic Russian Empire as the country of the Russian people, it cannot evaluate the meaning of these clashes or appreciate the Soviet attacks on nationalism. It is only as we grasp the fact that the Russian Empire under the tsars and the provisional government included a number of peoples who had formerly enjoyed their independence and ardently desired to break away from Russian control, that we can get some idea of the nature of the Soviet Union and its basing of Communism on the Great Russian interests centering in Moscow.

One of the favorite arguments for the Soviets by many even non-Communist supporters has been their recovery by force and intrigue of the non-Great Russian republics as Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, etc. which declared their independence during the troubled days of the Revolution, for it was only thus that the satisfaction and self-esteem of the Great Russians could be restored. Such people have looked askance at the continued independence of the states on the western boundary, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which maintained their in-

dependence for various reasons and reached between the wars a far higher level of personal liberty and economic stability than did the countries brought under Soviet domination. Yet these small states have shown clearly what could be achieved by their own peoples, when they were able to chart their own development and work in harmony with the world community. There is no reason to believe that the states which were overwhelmed would have fared any worse. Had they been given the same opportunities and without a desire for domination, the Great Russian state could have fitted in by itself in the same way but the resources, human and material of the last has been continuously drained by the ideological needs of the Soviet masters.

It is conveniently forgotten that the worldwide movement of Communism did not at first look to Moscow as its centre. When Lenin met in various European conferences with the leaders of similar movements in other countries, it was still an open question where the revolution would first triumph. Lenin was one of a group of men who had an idea which they strove to carry out on a worldwide basis. With him there were leaders from France, from Germany, from Austria-Hungary and elsewhere. When he succeeded in seizing power in Petrograd in October, 1917, the entire group looked forward to the almost momentary victory of the Communists in the entire world and the establishment of a real Communist International.

It was not to be. Communist uprisings in Germany and in Hungary failed. In other countries they hardly took place or were on a scale that rendered them inconspicuous and negligible. Even Poland which was invaded by the Red Army in 1920 stood firm and the Red tide was forced to retreat. It was only in those countries as Ukraine where the victorious Allies treated them as a part of Russia and where the White Armies calling for a unified Russia invaded and opposed the populations that the Reds were able to make headway and overthrow the newly established regimes. Yet even here as an unconscious tribute to the power of self-determination, the Moscow Communists thought it advantageous to set up independent Soviet Republics which they could dominate indirectly through the power of the local Communist Party.

This circumstance changed almost overnight the meaning of the Communist International. It was not to be a gathering of equal minds in which Lenin as the representative of the home Communist state would be the host and the leader of a group of equals. It was to be a gathering in which the representative of Moscow was giving aid and advice to a collection of more or less discredited leaders who had failed

where Lenin had succeeded. The Moscow Communists could not fail to grasp the situation and to profit by it.

In the beginning the Russian Soviet Republic went through the motions of treating the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the others which it dominated as real states. It encouraged the growth of the local cultures, for it hoped in this way to spread its influence. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences took in members from Western Ukraine which was under Polish control and it tried to become a centre for Ukrainian cultural activities. But all this merely revealed to the dominant groups the ideas and aspirations of the outstanding non-Communist individuals and left them exposed, when the Communist Party changed its mind.

Then Stalin took the next step. The organization of the Soviet Union to include all the Soviet Republics meant the foundation of a higher unity. The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences became rather a section of the All-Union Academy of Sciences; but there was no reason why the head of that section should have risen through it. Why not make the post available to any one in the All-Union Academy? It was a logical development which was applied in all forms and aspects of life. Rapidly and deliberately the administration of the Soviet Republics became merely a shadow of the All-Union policy which was formulated at Moscow by the leaders of the Russian Soviet Republic who dominated the All-Union policy. When finally the mask of a difference between the Soviet Union and the Communist Party was discarded, the truth stood out in all its nakedness. The will of Moscow was supreme; the system adopted at Moscow was to be followed to the last paragraph; the ideas of Moscow were correct, and the independent Soviet Republics which had "voluntarily" entered the Union were but mere administrative conveniences.

This was a hard blow to the bona fide Ukrainian Communists who had dreamed of adapting the Ukrainian traditional culture to Communism and of cooperation with their Russian brothers. They had no chance even to repent, for they were marked men. Execution, deportation, or suicide awaited them. Skrypnik and Khvilovy met the same fate as did the older Ukrainian nationalists who had headed the short-lived independent Republic. One and all were guilty of nationalism, of a denial of the self-evident truth that Moscow knows best.

The fate of Ukraine was no different from that of all the other Soviet Republics. Their life and thought were to be standardized. They were to be plunged once for all in the great sea of the Moscow Com-

munist world. The new Communist man was to be uniform throughout the Union. The Ukrainian traditions were to be rewritten or to be regarded as a sign of opposition and treason. Even imperial Russia in forbidding the printing of Ukrainian books and the denial of the Ukrainian language had never gone so far.

The democratic world paid no attention. It was still obsessed with the idea that all those peoples who had formed part of Russia should be in the Soviet Union as the successor of Russia. It still held firmly to the idea that they all wished to be Russian and again it found excuses for the suppression of that negligible minority that regarded itself as distinct. It made no difference as to whether that minority was numbered by dozens or by millions. It was all the same, even when in 1940 Stalin showed that the same policy was to be applied to the conquered states of the Baltic where the population was similarly decimated, exterminated, or deported.

For twenty years of prosperity and of depression, the Soviet Union was never able to win over enough adherents to jeopardize the existence of an outside state. It could win apologists in the great countries; it could gain by its preposterous claims a certain number of adherents among the intellectuals and parts of the laboring classes. That was all. Not one of the states along its borders, whether they were Slavic or not, were inclined to come within its bear-like hug. They valued too much their own liberty, their own traditions, and their own homes. Even under the pressure of advancing Nazism, they shuddered at welcoming Soviet protection and absorption.

The war changed all this. The Nazi attack upon the Soviet Union created a wave of sympathy and for a while the Soviets capitalized upon this by preaching the Slav brotherhood, by holding Pan-Slav congresses and by an ostensible willingness to get along with the rest of the world. Yet along with this attitude there came the organization of a Soviet-inspired Committee of Free Germans, who were taught the blessings of a non-Slav Communism. There came the ostensible ending of the Communist International which no longer was needed to bolster up the purely fictitious idea that there could be a Communism apart from the Moscow dictate abroad as well as in the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, as the Nazis retreated and the Soviets were confronted with the patriotic activities of the partisans, groups and armies which had fought both the Nazis and the Communists, they planned a new subterfuge. The Soviet armies were reorganized into those of Ukraine and White Ruthenia. Stress was laid upon these

republics and to give color to the new emphasis, the Soviet Republics were allowed to have their own foreign ministers and Moscow demanded that they join the United Nations. It was the height of bad form to ask what power these foreign ministers had or as to whether they were even real citizens of the countries that they claimed to represent. Any of these questions might reveal the Soviet plans and upset the newly developed friendship with the democracies.

The democratic world fell into the trap and there came the list of betrayals with which we are so sadly familiar. The Red Army for the sake of prestige liberated Warsaw, Belgrade, Budapest, Prague, even when the other Allies were nearer. The patriotic leaders of the Slav states, men like Drazha Mihailovich who had fought throughout the war for democracy and national liberty, were liquidated. Millions of men and women who had escaped from the Soviet Union were handed back for punishment. The Communists were allowed to dominate the liberated governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, while the spokesmen of these countries became more and more subservient to the will of Moscow and a larger and larger proportion of the population was rated as unreliable, and fascist or Western in sympathies. When Czechoslovakia, the last of the governments to pretend to an independent opinion, was transformed, it was time for the next step.

That step involved the final regimentation of the satellite states on the tried and true principles of Moscow. The Soviet Union had already succeeded in providing for a standardization of army equipment and of foreign policy so completely that even Czechoslovakia before its definite submission to a Communist government had withdrawn its adherence to the European Recovery Plan and consented to violate its ancient and modern tradition of affiliation with the West. Already the Soviets had learned from their experience in Ukraine that the aspiration of the cultural leaders to learn from the West was a sign of opposition to the Moscow totalitarianism and it was regarded by the Kremlin as a dangerous experiment in nationalism.

It is as true to-day as it was in the time of Pushkin that the Great Russian attitude toward their neighbors was one of absorption. The great poet of the early nineteenth century had declared that the Slav rivers must run into the Russian sea or it will dry up. Taras Shevchenko had answered this emphatic statement but his words had no effect on Moscow or St. Petersburg. Imperial Russia in its own way had tried to carry out this policy in the Balkans and it had had much to do with

the failure of the tsars to dominate the Slav states there despite their sympathy and regard for Holy Russia.

To-day the task has to be carried out and executed in such a way that it would not arouse too open opposition. As a result there was formed the Cominform, the Communist Information Bureau, which was to coordinate the activities, ideas, and thinking of all the Slav states and the others within the iron curtain on the Moscow pattern. It meant the elimination of any special particularities in political form or activity in any of the states which the Soviets had in their orbit. Founded by one of the most important men in the Soviet Union, the late Zhdanow, member of Politbureau, the Cominform was to be the true and inflexible mouthpiece of Kremlin and its decisions were to be accepted as absolute.

They were, except in Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party were aware of their opposition and preferred to work more slowly in the task of breaking all those Yugoslav habits of living that separated the more independent Balkan peoples from the Russian sense of obedience. More than that, they hoped to create a Balkan Federation out of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, a Federation which would be purely Communist, as they understood it, and would willingly obey the desires of Moscow. This was rank rebellion and could not be tolerated. It was too easy for it to degenerate into nationalism or to grow into a powerful bloc which might not be so amenable to the hint of the Kremlin.

Hence came the denunciation and it was timed to appear on Vidovdan, June 28, the anniversary of the battle of Kosovo in 1389, when the Serbs were definitely overwhelmed by the Ottoman Empire. This was indeed adding insult to injury, even if we take into account the fact that Tito was from Croatia, where the celebration of this anniversary had never been as important as it was among the Serbs.

The actual charges against the Yugoslav Communist Party are no surprise to any one who has even superficially followed events in Soviet Ukraine. The charges of nationalism and of favoring the kulaks, the peasant owners of the land, the willingness to copy from the West, were all brought against the Communists of Ukraine when they were trying to preserve some of the national traditions and adapt them to the methods of Moscow.

Yet even these form but a slight part of the process of standardization. There is the same attack on the autonomy of the Orthodox Churches insofar as they are tolerated by the demand that they must

recognize the Patriarch of Moscow as their official head instead to be autocephalic. There is already evident the rewriting of the cultural history of the land so as to prove that all valuable ideas came from Russia or the Soviets. Writers and thinkers who do not fit into this pattern are being systematically discredited or overlooked or are filed away until their works can be properly edited and excerpted to make them fit for Communist reading.

The novel factor in the situation is the refusal of the Yugoslav Communist Party to submit at once to the new orders. Instead of this, a considerable portion made a direct appeal to Stalin for a reversal of the policy. As far as there has been a publication of the details of the controversy, there seems to be little more in it than an assertion of independence not as to the goal to be achieved but the methods, and this should serve to warn the rest of the world not to build any hopes on a possible democratizing of the Yugoslav regime.

It is idle at this stage of the controversy to speculate upon the course of action that the Soviet Union and its obedient tool, the Cominform, will take. That is the old Communist International now reorganized on the new basis of the absolute supremacy of Moscow and the Moscow policy. The tactics of the Communists are as flexible as their course is rigid. There may be a temporary truce, while Moscow attempts to build up a more loyal and obedient Communist Party within Yugoslavia. There may develop, with discreet Moscow urging, movements to divide the country into its component areas and create a series of loyal states, none of which will have great potential power. There will probably not be an attempt to use force, unless some of the other members of the Cominform as Albania appeal for protection to the great Soviet Union against the heretical Yugoslavs.

Of course there is a risk in this policy but on the part of Moscow it is calculated and necessary for the next step and that is to extend the power of the Moscow Communists over the non-Slavic lands to the West. Greece rebelled against the openly Slavic Communist domination and with the aid of the United States and Great Britain is winning its fight. The Italian Communists have not been able to make palatable to their people the loss of Trieste. What then of the Germans who have already been mulcted of a large portion of their eastern lands for the benefit of the Communist Poles?

Ukraine and the other Soviet Republics have seen on many occasions how easily their boundaries have been changed to suit the temporary needs of the Kremlin. The Armenian Soviet Republic has seen

the Soviet Union demand from Turkey the return of some of the Armenian traditional lands to be added to the Georgian Soviet Republic. To extend its power, Moscow must be in a position to propitiate new victims by offering to them territories that it has already assigned elsewhere. It has long been a settled Soviet policy to move the borders of the Soviet Republics at its own whim, to make and break leaders, to change conditions of living, until it believes that it has annihilated or rendered powerless any opposition. To advance further, it must have the same power over its satellites or formally include them as Soviet Republics with their automata of foreign ministers and their willing subservience to the latest order from the Kremlin.

There is an old saying that when thieves fall out, honest men get their rights. Let us hope that this may happen in Yugoslavia and that the clash between Tito and Stalin may benefit the democratic elements in the country. But this can only happen, if it is well understood that Tito and his associates will have no place in a future democratic country. There will be a great temptation to many people to try to persuade Tito that he can find a reward by doing those things of which he is accused,—by turning to the West and receiving sympathy and assistance.

Ukraine as the first state to be subjugated by Soviet Russia and after thirty years of experience has realized the hopelessness of such an action. The campaign of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is now supported by all the democratic elements still existing. It can find and is finding sympathy among the democratic elements of the other nations within the iron curtain. There are many elements in Yugoslavia which have the same love of freedom, and while they are at present crushed by the iron hand and the massacres of Tito, we can be sure that they will do their part when the moment comes to wipe out once and for all the present regime.

Communism with a national flavor was the dream of many of the old Bolsheviks and they paid for it with their lives. At its best, it was not democracy. At its worst, it was an unconscious or conscious means of betraying the sound elements of the population. The clash between Tito and Stalin should be handled by the democratic powers for the benefit of democracy and not of either party. It calls for a careful study of the opponents of both factions and the determination of the world not to be lulled into security but to press every opportunity to break the power of all forms of Communism and use each sectarian rift as a means of pressing the attack of freedom and liberty, until the rights of mankind are secured to all the nations within the iron curtain and

those that have been forced into the Soviet Union itself. We can only hope that this unexpected revelation of differences between the various Communist parties may show the latent desire for liberty and freedom hidden in the Union itself and behind the iron curtain and that it may be a prelude to the appearance of representatives at the United Nations who will speak not the voice of Moscow but the words of their own people, whether they were conquered in 1945 or in 1918. Then we will realize the real cause of the dissolution of the Russian Empire in 1917 and the real love for independence that has marked the history of the Ukrainian people and the other oppressed nations just as it has been a characteristic of the Yugoslavs and the other victims of totalitarian aggression. Such a time will mark the end of the ridiculous Slav bloc which has nullified all the efforts of the United Nations at the whim of Moscow and we will have true representatives of Ukraine and the other states sitting in on the meeting of the world.



UKRAINIAN GRAPHIC ART

By SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY

IN the interval between the two World Wars, Ukrainian graphic art gained a good name for itself in Europe. Works of Ukrainian graphic artists were shown in a number of exhibitions, such as those in Brussels, Belgium in 1925, Berlin in 1933, Prague in 1934, Rome in 1938, at



MYKOLA BUTOVYCH: A FIGURE
FROM UKRAINIAN MYTHOLOGY



OKSANA SAKHNOVSKA:
WITCH—Woodcut

the "Salon International du Livre d'Art" in Paris, and others. It is not so well known, however, in America, where Ukrainian graphic art has been met only occasionally at expositions: as the Chicago World Fair in 1933, and mostly at the annual international expositions of book marks in Los Angeles, beginning with 1931. At these expositions Ukrainian artists won a series of prizes and awards of merit.

In Ukraine special attention has been given to the graphic arts, perhaps because the graphic field has more possibilities in decorative

expression, which is the most important characteristic of Ukrainian folk art. The traditions of Ukrainian graphic art are a thousand years old, and its beginning is closely related to the first appearance of



Гетман Петро Сагайдачний з "Вісника на українській поштовій гетьмані". 1627 р.

HETMAN PETRO SAHAYDACHNY
Woodcut, 17th Century



S. N. BOYCHUK:
TARAS SHEVCHENKO—Woodcut

ancient Ukrainian literature. Already in the XI century miniatures and book illumination stood at the height of their development. Here the Byzantine style was artistically combined with the Romanic ornament and the local traditions of folk art. Such are the earliest miniatures of the so-called Ostromyr Bible of 1057 and the Almanac of Svyatoslav of 1073. A series of illuminated books follows in the later centuries. The love for hand illuminated books persisted long after the introduction of printing.

The woodcut became known in Ukraine in the first half of the XVI century. The fundamental style is still Byzantine, but now it is influenced by Gothic and later Renaissance elements. The printing centers of Ukraine at that time were: Ostrih, Kiev and Lviv. The highest development of the art of engraving comes in the XVII-XVIII centuries, and reaches its climax in Kiev in the era of Hetman Mazepa. At this time Ukrainian graphic art is at its best. Its influence is felt in other countries of East Europe, beginning with Romania and ending with Russia. The leading Ukrainian engravers of that time are: Antin Tarasevich, Ivan Myhura and Hryhōr Levytsky. The order of Peter I,

issued in 1720, forbidding the publication of books in the Ukrainian language, was a painful blow to Ukrainian printers and engravers, who now were limited solely to religious publications. However Kiev was



PAVLO KOVZHUN: BOOK COVER YURY NARBUT: MAGAZINE COVER

still in the lead, and counted more than fifty engravers at the time.

With the beginning of the XIX century new techniques were introduced into Ukraine; one of them was the lithographic method, known in Odesa and Lviv already in 1820. In the middle of that century a new school of xylogravers was founded by the Lavra Monastery in Kiev. But the central figure of Ukrainian engravers in the XIX century is TARAS SHEVCHENKO (1814-61), who made a series of brilliant engravings, and had a great influence on the development of this art, not only in Ukraine, but in Russia as well.

In our century one of the most important Ukrainian arts is book art. The return to Ukrainian artistic traditions became the turning point in this field. The pioneer here was VASYL KRYCHEWSKY. But

modern Ukrainian graphic art reaches its highest stage of development under the masterful hand of YURY NARBUT (1883-1920). At first he played the leading role in the artistic life of Petersburg, but with the outbreak of the revolution and the formation of independent Ukraine in 1917, he returned there and developed a spectacular artistic activity, as an artist and director of the Academy of Fine Arts in Kiev, of which he was one of the founders. It was he, who found the artistic form for all state documents and papers. He designed money, postage stamps, diplomas, even playing cards, which were a state monopoly. All these are works of high artistic value, and they are often referred to in France as fine examples of this branch of art. Narbut fully utilized the graphic traditions of the Ukrainian past, particularly the Baroque Era of Mazeppa, not imitating it mechanically, but giving it his own modern

and creative interpretation. He is recognized as the greatest Ukrainian graphic artist, and at the same time is the most deeply despised Ukrainian artist by the Soviets, for his successful attempt to create a modern Ukrainian national style in art. When in 1932 a large book about the artist and his art was completed in Kiev, it was destroyed by the Soviets, before it was released, and the authors and critics, who contributed to this book, were arrested as nationalists and exiled to the Russian sub-arctic regions. Not one copy of the book was saved.

There was formed around Narbut a group of artists and pupils, among them ROBERT LISOVSKY,



JURY NARBUT: Book Cover

The best proof that the traditions of Narbut are still alive are the works of such artists as *A. Strakhov*, *A. Sereda*, *P. Kholodny Junior*, *M. Olshanska-Stefanovych*, *M. Dmytrenko*. In spite of all Soviet repressions Narbut's influence seeped even into Russian graphic art.

The works of PAVLO KOVZHUN (1896-1939) have a separate place in Ukrainian art. His starting point was also Narbut, but he went further in the development of modernistic trends: futurism, cubism, con-

structivism: Among his young followers there are several decided talents as Volodymyr Balas, Yakiv Hnizdovsky and others.

The woodcut has developed widely in the last years. Its masters are *Olena Kulchyzka*, *Vasyl Kassian*, who chooses his subjects mostly from the proletariat, *Oksana Sakhnouska*, *Sophia Nalepinska Boychuk*, the sculptor *Vasyl Masiutyn*, who was also a virtuoso in the engraver's technique, *Mykola Butovych*, fascinated in both his paintings and engravings by the strange world of Ukrainian folk demonology, *Yury Kulchizky* and the prominent maker of book marks, who disappeared during the war, *Nil Khasevych*.

One of the best artists of woodcuts in Russia, beside Favorsky, is the Ukrainian *Oleksa Kravchenko*, but his art created in foreign surroundings shows only a few typical Ukrainian elements, with the exception perhaps, of his illustrations of Gogol's works.

The best known among the illustrators are: *H. Pustoviyt*, *Vasyl Sedlar*, the eminent caricaturist *E. Kozak*, *Borys Kriukov*, *Halyna Mazepa*, *Victor Cymbal*, *Petro Andrusiv* and *Myron Levitzky*.

In Soviet Ukraine graphic arts were and still are, more than any other art, a means of propaganda, in keeping with the slogan, that art has to serve the party. It is not strange, therefor that under such conditions, more than half of the above mentioned living artists are now emigrants, in search of that, which to an artist is most precious—the freedom of creation.



THE NATIONALITIES POLICY OF BOLSHEVIKS

By P. RADCHENKO

[The emigrants who have come to Western Europe from the Soviet Union, after remaining for almost thirty years under the rule of the Russian Communists, are quite divided politically. They include monarchists, national-democrats, and social-democrats. But there is also a group whose political program consists "in preserving the achievements of the Social Revolution" in the future independent democratic Ukraine. This group is practically the direct heir of the ideological Ukrainian Communists, represented in the twenties in Ukraine by the Commissar of National Education O. Shumsky, the writer M. Khvylovy, the economist M. Volobuyev, as well as hundreds of Ukrainian Communists, completely exterminated by the Soviets in 1930-1937. In the organ of this group *Our Struggle* (Nasha Borotba 1947/4) published in mimeograph form there appeared an article of one of their leaders, P. Radchenko, under the title *The Nationalities Policy of the Bolsheviki*. The article published in 1947 before Tito's revolt is interesting not only because of its thorough understanding of the Soviet Nationalities Policy, but also because of its original approach to the problem of the liberation of Ukraine, as well of other Kremlin subjugated nations.—EDITOR.]

THE Nationalities policy of Bolshevism shows perhaps better than anything else its complete anti-revolutionist degeneration. In the evolution of the Bolshevik Nationalities policy we can distinguish three periods: 1. The pre-revolutionary period of theoretical research; 2. The application of the theoretical principles of Bolshevism in revolutionary practice; 3. The Nationalities policy of the degenerate Bolshevism.

Bolshevism as one of the sectors of the European Social Democracy continued the analysis of the Marxist theoretical heritage in the sphere of the nationalities problem, as in every other theoretical question. The heritage of Marx however in the sphere of nationalism was negligible. Marx, patently, underestimated the problem of nationalities. Working on the thesis that the proletariat had no mother country, Marx regarded the problem of nationalism only as one of the imminent questions of the bourgeois class. Consequently his approach to the nationalist-liberational movements of the oppressed peoples was not from the angle of principle but of tactics: he either supported or ignored those movements only in so far as they favored or hindered the struggle of the proletariat for social liberation.

I. Bolshevik Conceptions in the Nationalities Problem

It was Lenin who was the theoretician of the nationalities problem. Lenin worked on this at the time when it had already outgrown the narrow framework of the European area and had developed into a cardinal European problem, and when it had become not only a national but also a colonial question. In his theoretical lectures Lenin integrated the liberational struggle of the proletariat with the liberational struggle of the submerged nations. He summed up the attitude of Bolshevism regarding the question of nationalities in the two fundamental principles: "The support by the proletariat of the revolutionary-nationalist movements of colonial and submerged nations" and "the right of nations to self-determination even as far as separation." Lenin emphasized two trends in the contemporary evolution of nationalities: the tendency to mutual co-operation and the tendency to antagonism and separation. But Lenin gave no exact definition of those two tendencies and, what is more important, he expressed equal sympathy for both of these tendencies, while those tendencies are approximately related to each other as night and day—or as good and evil.

The tendency of nations to come together results from the modern economic development of the world. Modern industrialism, with its standardization, naturally destroys the particularism of nations first in the technical and cultural sphere. The archaic English coach and the Ukrainian cart are vanishing in all countries of the world, before the modern auto. The uniformity of factory production all over the world and the more or less uniform system of farming, replace the nationally original artisans and peasants. This perfectly normal and sound convergence of peoples is going on spontaneously, and requires neither advertising nor propaganda.

Nevertheless this normal convergence of peoples in the sphere of technology and culture is taking place in the modern world under the influence of such abnormal forces as the political and economic subordination of the backward or even up-to-date peoples to nations more advanced or simply more powerful. Such subordination is followed inevitably by a forcible de-nationalization of the submerged people, and, in general the cramping of its normal development, and the adaptation of it to the requirements of the ruling nation. It is this fact that causes the other tendency in the modern development of nations, the tendency to resistance and alienation. In order to save its own existence a submerged nation generates within itself a movement of "opposition."

Consequently, in the fusion of nations, the only progressive factor is that natural tendency to the technical and economic standardization of life and the consequent cultural approach, but not forcible assimilation. Quite on the contrary, forcible assimilation generates in the submerged people a violent reaction, which opposes the oppressor in every sphere of life, notably political and cultural.

Therefore, Lenin needed to emphasize only the one politically important tendency—the trend of opposition or self-help of the nation. It is the only tendency that the revolutionary movement ought to support. Mutual convergence of nations can take place according to need without agitation. At the same time Bolshevism was putting its main emphasis upon the tendency to convergence. Hence the origin of the formula: "The right to self-determination 'as far as' separation."

The Bolshevik formula, recognizing the right to everything, "as far as" separation—up to—viz. even including separation, takes it for granted that a nation may be found, which voluntarily would consent to remain self-determined "as far as," namely in slavery, and that the Bolsheviks are not going to summon that nation to throw off the yoke, oh no, because there exists a progressive tendency to the convergence of nations. Thus a nation may realize self-determination without "as-far-as," remaining in a semi-submerged stage and this is not supposed to contradict that complete emancipation of man, which is so vociferously proclaimed by the Bolshevik program. From this Bolshevik indifference to the theory of national slavery arises its counter-revolutionary tactics in the nationalist problem.

Stalin's "Supplement" to Marxism-Leninism

On his death-bed, Stalin, following Nero's example, will be sure to exclaim pathetically: "Behold, what a great theoretician is dying." In the formula: Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, it was Stalin himself who put his name in the fourth place. The true Bolshevik theoretician Bukharin, at the funeral of the historian Pokrovsky, gave a very fitting characteristic of Stalin: "There are people"—said Bukharin—"who swear by Marx at every step they take and constantly take Marx's name in vain, while they are barren themselves as the fig tree of the Gospels."

As far as theoretical knowledge is concerned Stalin is a theorist is a complete zero, a scholastic automaton, unable to apply even a ready formula to concrete reality. Totalitarian regimes have been as a rule led by intellectually dull but ambitious and reckless cut-throats of the type of Ivan the Terrible. It was not by accident that in our days, the

contemporary totalitarian regimes have been headed by such characters as Hitler and Stalin. Italian Fascism was somewhat less totalitarian as Mussolini, compared with Hitler and Stalin, was more intelligent.

Nevertheless Stalin's formula in the nationalist problem became the basis of the contemporary Bolshevik policy. In commenting upon and popularizing Marx and Lenin, Stalin with his modest ability delivered himself of the following dictum: *The Nationalities problem in the USSR is a question of the relations between the Russian proletariat and the peasantry of the national republics.* At that time hardly anyone paid any attention to that Stalinic aphorism. In general Stalin's "intellectual production" received scanty attention. Yet this dictum was destined to become fatal. No one had recognized that in that Stalinic phrase the proletariat of the national republics went out of existence. Just obliterated. "It never was, does not exist and never could be." That was the way the Russian Tsars used to decide and now such was the wish of Stalin. In so far as the proletariat became the fundamental source of Bolshevism, where the Russian imperial capitalism finds the human material for indoctrination, it is a long step toward that collectivization which Stalin, in the days of the NEP had ordered, by providing that *the proletariat of the non-Russian Republics was to be considered once and forever, as Russian.* There should not be any other proletariat in the national republics. In the perspective of future centuries history will undoubtedly appreciate that principle as a great and bold step of Russian Imperialism.

Naturally it will be sufficient to send into Bulgarian cities hundreds of thousands of Russian immigrants, to be able to annex Bulgaria to the USSR and to declare: "The nationalist problem in Bulgaria is a problem of relations between her Russian proletariat and the Bulgarian peasantry." And so on. We shall see later what practical consequences were caused by the above dictum in the nationalities question.

II. Bolshevik Theory in Practical Application

Up to the debacle of the leftist and rightist opposition in the VKP/b, viz. up to the early thirties, the nationalist policy of Bolshevism was found in the attempt to introduce Lenin's theoretical principles into actual life.* From the very first months of the existence of the Soviet regime in Russia, Bolshevism was compelled to solve the nationalist problem by armed forces. It conquered Ukraine and Georgia. It

* VKP/b—First letters of "All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" in Russian.

attempted to win for the RSFSR by armed force, Poland and the Baltic countries as well. Thus it did not wait until the proletarian revolution ripened in every nation, as its internal inevitable necessity. It imposed the dictatorship of the Russian proletariat on other nations by force, for it feared that as soon as the bourgeois regimes were consolidated, it would be too late. Consequently, although, subjectively, Bolshevism was not nationalistic, although it sincerely ignored and ridiculed the Russian imperialistic past, by taunting it with the Romanoff dynasty, with the peasant revolts of Razin, Pugacheff, the Decembrist Revolution and the nationalist liberatory struggle of oppressed peoples,—by imposing on other nations by force, the rule of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, it was compelled to rely not upon the local revolutionary masses, but upon the Russian colonizing element amongst the enslaved peoples.

Under such conditions, justice, democracy and the real liberational character of the October Revolution disappeared, and was replaced by the seeds of a new nationalist oppression. During the Polish Soviet War of 1920, even those elements in Ukraine, that actually gravitated towards the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and World Revolution, were deserting the VKP/b, after reading the proclamations of general Brusiloff, who called upon the "genuinely Russian people to join the ranks of the Red Army, forgetting the internal 'dissensions,' to defend the Russian country" (not the Revolution), from the "ancient enemy of the Russian country"—the Poles. Honest Ukrainian Bolshevists were ashamed to be on the same side as General Brusiloff. It is true that Bolshevism attempted to hush up this episode as a tactical maneuver, by representing the type of General Brusiloff type as that of the technical experts. Nevertheless this kind of policy brought about one indisputable fact: the genuinely revolutionary element in Ukraine as well as amongst the other enslaved peoples, was put into a position of dissent or even active opposition, met with extermination or repression, or simply was debarred from any political activity, while at the same time, the imperialistic elements summoned to join the Bolshevik party in order to crush the Ukrainian and other separatism, were the "heroes of the civil war." Thus, even at that time, the counter-revolutionary elements were reinforced at the expense of the true Revolution. The first treacherous blows received by the Revolution were dealt by Bolshevism.

Bolshevism explained its centralizing policy in the years of Civil War, by the need of concentrating all the forces necessary to defend

the Revolution. "Let us finish the war first, then you will receive all the freedoms"—Bolshevist agitators used to say.

But people were forgetting the old truth that freedom is never given but has to be won by struggle. For about three years after the Civil War until the twelfth Congress of the VKP/b, Bolshevism maintained the old centralizing policy, which proved so detrimental to the reconstruction of the country ruined by the Civil War. Since Lenin was at that time already near death, the nationalities policy of the party was under the control of the "specialist" of the nationalist problem—Dzugashvili-Stalin. Then at the twelfth Congress of the VKP/b, he reaffirmed his statement that the nationalities problem of the USSR is "the problem of the relationship between the Russian proletariat and the nationalist peasantry." In other words, after the conclusion of the Civil War Stalin declared, that the Tsarist Russian policy of Russification of the enslaved nations, which actually had accomplished the Russification of a part of the urban population, was correct and that the Soviet government considered its own policy a continuation of the same, as a problem of the understanding between the completely Russified town and the still un-Russified village. Hence came the Stalinic policy of Ukrainization, viz. not assimilation of the Ukrainian city with the village, as Skrypnik and all Ukrainian Communists imagined, but the acquisition by the Russian city of the peasant language spoken by the nationalist majority, for ulterior motives. The problem appeared therefore not as a matter of principle but of expediency. Against this background arose the silly "theory" of the struggle between two cultures, which recommended the free competition, in a Ukraine subordinated to Muscovy—of the Ukrainian culture with the Russian, an idea which amounted to a formal campaign against the Ukrainian culture.

Lenin's Nationalist Utopia

A short while before his death, towards the end of 1923, the sick Lenin wrote to the Central Committee of the Party a letter concerning the Georgian nationalist opposition, which had been treated by Stalin with such brutality that it induced Lenin to call him the "Imperialistic Trap Muzzler." In this letter Lenin pleaded with the Central Committee, that relations between the nationalist Republics should be built on the principle of equity; that to the Federated Government should be left only Diplomacy and the command of the National armies, and that in all respects the Republics should remain independent, having even their own currency. But it is here that Lenin revealed himself, as the

Russian prof. Ustrialoff describes him, a "great Utopist." He forgot that Ukraine was a conquered country, unable to determine herself the nature of her relations with Moscow and that she had no power to regulate those relations. Ukraine could even be granted "independence," but only as a gift from Russia, a donation which could be any moment withdrawn. A really independent nation wins independence for herself regardless of whether her neighbors find it convenient. As the basic plans of Lenin were inconvenient to Moscow, the nationalist Republics not only were denied those gifts of independence, but even Lenin's letter was never published in the press, being regarded as detrimental to the state created by himself. That is the outcome of making a Revolution with the hand of Muravieff.

III. The Nationalities Policy of the Autocrat Stalin

The fact of rejection by Bolsheviks of Lenin's Utopian project to put Soviet Republics on the same political footing signified that although Bolshevism was created by the Revolution, it had succeeded in entrenching itself as a power independent from the Revolution. Thus began the era of the Dictatorship not of the Proletariat, but of the Party itself, which later on developed into the Dictatorship of the Boss. Further changes in the Bolshevik nationalist policy developed alongside with the evolution of Bolshevism from a Party of the Proletarian Dictatorship into a Party of Capitalistic State Bureaucracy.

The shattering of the Trotskyists and Bukharinists (leftists and rightists) and the swing over to Social Collectivization, signified the final breach of Bolshevism with the masses. Similarly came the nationalist evolution of Bolshevism. The resistance displayed by the peasantry of the National Republic against the compulsory collectivization and by the workmen against Stakhanistic exploitation, reinforced the separatist movement against Russia. The revolutionary genius abandoned Russia and joined the nationalistic liberatory movement against Russia. In reply to separatism Muscovy increased Terror. But so long as Terror was directed against the representatives of the old nationalist-democratic movement, it was difficult to convince the masses that it was the struggle against the restoration of the bourgeois regime. As soon as Terror began to be turned against the masses as such, then the old Marxist armaments gradually became detrimental, while the Russian Nationalism grew more profitable. After all, that nationalism still commanded a certain amount of inert obedience from the nations

enslaved by Muscovy, while Marxism incited to revolt against such obedience and every kind of compulsion. It was for that reason that the Bolsheviks replaced the idea of the equality of nations, and began to promote the new slogan of gathering the nations around Muscovy, the idea of Russian sovereignty. The cycle of the degeneration of Bolshevism had been completed.

In the years of the *NEP* the idea of some co-operation of honest Ukrainian nationalists with Bolshevism became thinkable. For that reason such indubitable patriots as the academician Hrushevsky and other refugees found their return to Soviet Ukraine possible. They were not expected to abandon the idea of Ukraine's independence. They only had to admit silently that the UkSSR was such an independent Ukraine. Actually they accomplished in Ukraine more important political work, than if they had remained in emigration, although they paid for that work with their lives. They assisted in forming in the UkSSR cadres of new champions of the Ukrainian cause, which could not be exterminated even by Yezhov's policy. Life required such sacrifices from the emigration. If they all had returned home, the damage to the national cause would have been as irreparable, as if not one had returned. After the liquidation of all the constructive elements in Bolshevism, a liquidation which was tantamount to the annihilation of all the attempts to build socialism, co-operation with Bolshevism by the honest people in the national Republics became impossible, because every kind of participation with Muscovy from now on had begun to bear the character of which was shown by abject servility, such individuals writers as Korneychuk, Tichina, Bazhan and others, while those who tried to escape from it, committed suicide or were liquidated by the NKVD, as Skrypnik, Khvylovy, Volobuyev and others.

Having forfeited its ties with the masses, and having degenerated into a bureaucratic tool of the Muscovite State Capitalism, Bolshevism is building its own nationalist policy not in harmony with the needs of the Revolution and the interests of at least a fraction of the common masses, but according to the expediency of retaining and extending its power. In the interior of Russia that policy is indistinguishable from the nationalist policy of the German Fascism. In the same manner as in the interests of the domination of the German nation that could thoroughly exterminate whole nations, so Bolshevism, in the interest of the dominant Russian nation deported to Siberia or the cold North, which meant total extinction, the German Republic of the Volga, the

Crimean Tartars, Checheno-Ingusian and Kabardino-Balkar, and Republics of the Northern Caucasus. Gradually it is exterminating Ukraine, Romania, the Baltic States, and so on. While this extermination might still have some political object, then the purposeless killing of millions of German and especially Japanese prisoners of War (Japan had not even declared war on Russia) and of millions of workmen and peasants is typical of Fascist zoological nationalism. Enemies of Revolution are inclined to regard this as the rough side of Revolution and the popular masses. But there is no similarity. The people cannot be cruel to itself. The fact is that Bolshevism became the same enemy of the Revolution as were its old foes. Actually worse. By the man-made famine in Ukraine in 1933 and the Terror of 1937, Bolshevism apparently made an attempt to demonstrate its exceptional ability for crushing the Revolution.

This phenomenon is not new. We know that the worst Terror in the days of the Great French Revolution coincided not with the period when the common masses were on the rampage, as the revolutionists themselves bear witness, but occurred in 1793, namely in the period of self-isolation of the degenerated Jacobin clique, which having liquidated both the left and the right wings of its own Party, began to send batches of common people to the guillotine. It is proved statistically that at the time of this Terror the guillotine cut off most heads of the common people, not of the Royalists. In Ukraine the poor people were the first to go, by being starved to death. Fouché was burning and terrorizing Lyon in the name of the Revolution, in order to become a minister of the oppressors of the people. The liquidation of the Ukrainian nationalist-revolutionists—Skrypnik; Khvylovy, Shumsky, Richetsky, and thousands of others; the liquidation of the fanatical Communists Zinoviev, Kameneff, Bukharin, and thousands of others, was carried out, as it is revealed now, and as Stalin himself did not perhaps expect, with the object of repatriating thousands of White-Guard generals and officers, and in order to enable "the Leader of the Revolution" Stalin to receive from the Russian Kremlin-dominated patriarchal Church the title of the "Divinely appointed Leader."

*The Nationalities Policy of the Degenerated Bolshevism
Outside of the USSR*

By tearing the proletariat of the nation enslaved by Russia from its national background, and by making that proletariat an enemy of its own nation, Bolshevism committed its first theoretical and practical

treachery against Revolution as a liberating factor. By the same act it established its first ties with the Russian counter-Revolution: it saved Russia's unity.

We are examining the present foreign policy of Bolshevism neither as nationally Russian nor as internationally Communistic. We live exactly in the era of the nationalistic regeneration of Bolshevism and that process is not yet finished. There is nothing solid now about Bolshevism. The liquidation of the *NEP* the Kremlin regarded as the transition to socialism, but actually it turned out to be a liquidation of the socialist experiment and the introduction of State Capitalism. That became evident about the middle of the thirties, when in the Yezhov state upheaval all the genuinely constructive Communist elements were exterminated, and the power in the country was seized by unscrupulous elements, unashamed to carry out any instructions acceptable to the centre. To that bureaucracy the Marxist ideas were unacceptable, as Marxist theory was hardly helpful in the introduction of the Stakhanist sweat-system, since it was opposed to every kind of exploitation and promoted the ownership of the means of production by the workers.

Stalin and his entourage think differently. Stalin understands perfectly that the days of revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses for the USSR have passed long ago—but more precisely, the masses are craving a revolution—but one—against the Bolsheviks. Nevertheless Stalin cannot stop, and on the position of his politically dull bureaucracy, he cannot reject all programs and become an ordinary Russian Tsar. It was in the name of Communism that he had done all his murderous deeds. Willy-nilly he must remain a Communist. Therefore, although Stalin is for Communism, he has no one to rely on "for Communism." Hence the system of terror, the repression of every live thought and the compulsion to obey his orders. But can he command? He is bound to lead the USSR against capital for Communism, while the USSR wants to get rid of Bolshevism and to split into separate States. So Stalin decides to rely on the "foremost" (most numerous) Russian people. He intimidates it with the nationalist separatism of the enslaved peoples, he galvanizes Russian patriotism, cultivates the idea of the Russian Messianism. The Russian nation is exhorted to save the world from rotten Capitalism. Of course, for that the world ought to submit to the chosen nation, support its demand for the Dardanelles, Azerbaijan, Spitzbergen as well as the chain of satellite states for "own protection of Kremlin." The history of the USSR is being built up as the history of the chosen nation. The Bolshevik bureaucracy is being

supplied with an ideological base for the war propaganda. Only slackers can refuse to prepare for war. "For the country! For Stalin!" In this way the imperialistic policy inside of the USSR receives its motivation.

And outside? On the outside that policy has to depend on the support of the huge mass of the discontented. Colonial and enslaved peoples exhausted by war are forced to believe that the colossal arming of the USSR is nothing but the sacrifice of the Soviet nation for the salvation of the world. In this way the whole wisdom of the Kremlin is directed towards the purpose of creating in Russia the impression of advantages and convenience from the foreign policy of Bolshevism (the unification of all the Slav nations, of East Prussia and possibly more), while abroad this conciliation must appear to the masses as salvation from the capitalistic yoke. In other words Stalin wants to prove that it is possible to make the wolf satisfied and the goat alive.

To be frank we do not believe in such a possibility. We know Suvoroff well and it is our belief that when his name emblazons the standards of the USSR, he in the other world is not being fooled. As little as we like him we consider him seriously. Suvoroff demanded firmly that not only East Prussia should be annexed to the USSR, but that Koenigsberg should be renamed Kalinin but a Russian city; that German factories should be dismantled and transferred to Russia. And here we see that as soon as the wolves are fed, Stalin's goats disappear.

It is the wish of Bolshevism that the Communist parties of the West should convince the world that the French homeland is not France but Russia and the same rule is to apply to every other citizen of the globe. If that fails then an instruction comes from Moscow: Greek Communists have to fight in order to annex Thrace to Greece and Bulgarians to annex it to Bulgaria. French Communists are told to fight for the annexation of the Saar region to France (it is called the education of the proletariat in the spirit of international solidarity); German Communists are to fight for the Ruhr to remain part of Germany. It is impossible to deny that there is some logic in it: Communists of all countries must reinforce the home of Communism—the USSR, in every possible manner and perhaps that would sound like the supreme sacrifice if it were not for one "but": what if by subordinating the policy of one's mother country to the interests of Muscovy and by handing over to Bolshevism one country after another, the Communists should strengthen the control of the Kremlin over the whole world to such an extent, that its power under no circumstances would consider any compromise and the Muscovite brethren would prefer to remain

masters of the whole world as the Manchurian Mandarins had ruled China for centuries, even if Stalin and his entourage did not wish it.

Policy of "Whip and Candy"

This is the weakest spot in the national policy of Bolshevism. Consequently it is building this policy on the principle of whip and candy, viz. it begins with a "spontaneous" assimilation of nations and finishes with "compulsion." So, the more Bolshevism gets into contact with the concrete reality of any country, the less there is of candy and the more of the whip. During the War the attitude of the Poles, the Czechs, the Yugoslavs and all the Slav nations towards the Soviet army was most friendly, but now if there is no revolt against it (as in Yugoslavia Tito's revolt—Ed.), there is desperate opposition. In the Soviet occupied zone of Germany after the War, Communist organizations were growing like mushrooms, but now there is social sabotage, requiring the well-tried method of terror. Nevertheless, although weakening where it has been tried, Bolshevism does not cease to be a lure in those countries that have never seen it.

We are living in the critical period of the Bolshevist imperialistic conception. The outcome of the experiment does not depend so much upon the strength of Bolshevism, as upon the vitality of the old world, the helplessness of which encourages the Bolshevist Imperialism. For this reason the remedy against Bolshevism consists not in armed conflict with it, but in the reconstruction of the world on principles of social justice and nationalist equality. If that reconstruction is not carried out soon by means of reforms, Bolshevism will win. But only if Europe demonstrates to Moscow her genuinely humanistic and democratic socialism, will Bolshevism veer around from aggression to defence; which means that Russia will cease to be a symbol of Revolution and Liberation and will become again what she has always been, a gendarme of Europe. Then Ukraine's struggle for liberation from Muscovy will become part of the single front of socialist Europe against the Muscovite Asiatic State Despotism.



DECLINE OF POPULATION IN SOVIET UKRAINE

By HALYNA SELEHYN

AMONG all the problems that face the administrations of those countries, which take an active part in war, perhaps the gravest and most interesting, in connection with the social and political stabilization of the normal increase of population, is the roll and position of the woman in postwar society.

It is well known, that the communists have paid special and very serious attention to this problem. Pompously and loudly they have proclaimed the Soviet woman to be free from the family hearth, from the duties of the wife and mother.

It is not strange, that they should have taken this attitude. The woman, as the guide of her children, and the comrade of her husband, has always had and will have a great influence in social life. Therefore the communists have found it necessary to destroy this influence, to deprive her of the right of bringing up her own children, and thus sway the moral foundations of family life. The Soviet propaganda does not spare any means to convince the woman, that the family hearth is an aspect of serfdom, that the woman's true vocation lies in wide social and industrial activities, and the rearing of children should be left to the State.

But more eloquent than words, more convincing than Soviet propaganda, were the material circumstances of postwar reality. As an aftermath of World War I a large number of women found themselves widowed, very often with children to bring up, care and provide for. But the same necessity of providing means of livelihood faced not only the widowed mother.

The exceedingly low standard of living of the average urban family after the revolution, compelled the married woman, as well, to seek paying labor outside the home, because the wages of the head of the family—the father and husband—were too small to meet the needs of the entire family.

The average earnings of the intellectual or office worker rarely exceeded 300-350 karbowantzi per month. This was the average minimum of the needs of one consumer at the price rate of that time:

Meat	15 krb. per 1 kilogram
Butter	15-20 krb. per 1 kilogram
Sugar	3.50 krb. per 1 kilogram
Bread	1.50 krb. per 1 kilogram
Milk	2.00 krb. per 1 litre

The problem of clothing was still worst. A coat cost 400-500 krb., a pair of shoes 200-250 krb., a suit 400-450 krb.

It is clear that with such a disproportion between wages and prices the woman had to seek work, as only the combined earnings of two or more members of the family gave it the possibility of existence, even on a very low level.

The drafting of women into labor in the USSR took place gradually, and achieved its height only in the last few years before World War II. This is easily explainable.

In this preparation for war the Soviets developed an extensive war industry, which demanded more and more laborers and managers for its production. The men of the Union did not suffice: thus the process of recruiting women as laborers became more organized and compulsory, to meet the demand.

The average number of women employed in the various branches of agricultural production and intellectual work in the nineteen-twenties was about 20%. But in the last prewar years, 45-50% of all, so-called independent laborers were women. Usually, however, they were employed in lighter work and in consequence received lower wages.

In the latest prewar times, 80% of all office workers, and 60-70% of the industrial laborers were women. There was also a large number of women in the sanitary service and popular education.

In the years immediately preceding the war and during it, women replaced men in every possible field of labor, including even those which had previously been thought suited only for men, such, as for example, smelting, mining, etc.

The question arises, whether this really brought about the liberation of woman, as was so loudly proclaimed by the Soviets, and whether it made the woman happy.

It is true that the woman now worked beside the man. She even had the sad privilege of sharing equally with him the responsibility for sins and faults of which too often no one was guilty. But through the will of her destiny, she remained as a rule, in lower positions, although she often held a responsible and complicated job. Her wages

were always lower, even according to the official wage schedule. In life, however, the difference was still greater, because the men had more possibilities of earning money on the side, than did the women.

The working day of the woman, although officially equal to that of the man, was always longer. She did not possess the means of circumventing the existing order, that the man did. Her work in the office, shop or factory, freed her in some way from the duties of a housewife, and all her leisure hours were spent in preparing them. Returning home, after a heavy day's work, this newly liberated "slave of freedom", cooked, baked, sewed, washed and mended, cleaned house, helped the children with their homework, late into the night, and performed countless other tasks, that no woman with a family and a house to take care of, can avoid.

With a very few exceptions, this was the lot of all Soviet women. It was a life of veritable serfdom, and in such conditions, children were a misfortune, which had to be avoided at all cost.

According to official statistics, the number of abortions increased from year to year, until it reached the sum of 900,000 to a million per year. As a consequence hundreds and thousands of women crowded the offices of gynecologists, seeking cures from the numerous feminine ailments and sterility, which resulted from the frequent abortions. The Ukrainian nation paid a high price for the "liberation" of its women, from the bonds of family life.

The communist policy left its ruinous traces on the Ukrainian population and its increase. Ukraine belonged to the so-called intensively progenic type of population, which is characterized by a comparatively not high birth rate: 25-30% per thousand individuals (Russia 40-45% per thousand), and at the same time by a low death rate, especially among children. Before the revolution the child mortality in Ukraine was 180-190 per thousand, whereas in Russia, it was 250 per thousand.

In the last years before World War II the child mortality in Ukraine almost equalled that of western Europe, being 120-125 per thousand. But all attempts to lower the death rate were totally destroyed by the artificial hunger in Ukraine, impairing the birthrate, as well. The number of births, which should have been 1200-1500 thousand per year, fell constantly and reached the dangerous level of 240-400 thousand, and this combined with the increase in the death-rate in the last decade, amounts to a negative balance of population, and its absolute decrease.

In general, beginning with the census of 1926 and ending in 1939, the absolute decrease in the Ukrainian population, caused by the higher death-rate and the deliberate birth control, amounted to 6,000,000.

Thus a nation, that in the span of thirteen prewar years lost 6,000,000 in the total increase of populace existed in the constant danger of an absolute reduction in quantity. These facts, however, caused no loss of sleep in the Kremlin, which was concerned with Ukraine only as an immediate source of supply of urgently needed manpower.

World War II brought new devastation and caused still greater losses in the Ukrainian population. It destroyed a large part of the male population, a part which consisted mostly of young men at the peak of their vitality and reproductive power.

Statistics prove the losses of population in all countries, which took an active part in the recent war, and the effect that these losses have on the normal proportion between men and women.

In Ukraine instead of the usual and not very high surplus of women, overwed in time of peace (1080-1100 women to every thousand men), the latest statistics show an average of 1,300-1,400 women to every thousand men. The surplus is still greater in the working age: 1,500 women to a thousand men. In some age groups, such as 18-20 years, only 25-30% are men.

It is true, that the difference might diminish to a certain extent, with the return of men drafted to the fronts. However, a large number of women, in the reproductive age, will remain without the possibility of normal family life, and will not be able to add to the increase of the population.

Accepting the average birth rate of the last two decades of three children in every peasant family, and two or only one in the city families, such a condition becomes one of the gravest menaces to the increase of the nation's population, as at this rate the nation will not even be able to keep up its present numbers.

The second element in the natural increase of population, the death rate, in particular child deaths, is in no better state. The large numbers of families, deprived of their natural head, the father, and the necessity of the single woman to earn a living for herself and her family, will have an undesirable influence on the children. As a consequence of the necessity of earning a living for herself and her family, the mother will not be able to give her children the necessary physical

care and moral guidance. This fact is certain to have a bad influence on the child's health and morals, and in the prevailing circumstances, it will become a cause of a higher child mortality. Thus this second grave element in the natural increase of population is also due to the harmful influence of the war.

Touching on these grave perils to the demographic structure of Ukraine, it is necessary to state that they are the outcome of observations, made over a long span of time. Such a decrease becomes evident only with the passing of years; improvement is very gradual and can take place only within the lifetime of the new generation.

The reconstruction of the normal demographic structure of Ukraine will require a long time, if the process is left only to its natural development. A conscious intervention of the state and society can undoubtedly stimulate the demographic development, however, not in the sense of Communist "planning," which attempted to improve the increase of population by a strict program of reproduction.

In this case besides the organized influence of the administration, in the improvement of the living standard of families and the state of health of women and children, then is needed also the combined and organized effort of society as a whole (politicians, moralists, writers, artists) to create a healthy moral code and a clear point of view on these problems.

The nation's progress in the future is perhaps more dependent on the attitude of the administration and society, on their ability to employ the most effective means and methods in this direction, than on an artificially stimulated tempo of the nation's increase. The birth rate, the living standard and the care for the health and welfare of women and children will have a greater influence on the progress and development of the war devastated nation, than the number of rebuilt factories and reconstructed mines, no matter how great it may be.

But the revival of the human power of Ukraine can take place only under a free national administration, which will work solely for the future and the good of its own nation.



RED RUSSIA AND THE CATHOLIC WORLD

By NICHOLAS CHUBATY

AN EAST EUROPEAN journalist once dubbed Russia an empire of the impoverished, for though Russia conquers one land after another, enslaves more and more people, garners vast riches, more than sufficient to provide for its inhabitants a high standard of living, still the Russian dominated masses live in poverty. Such was the case during Tsarist times, and such has been the case under Communist rule. Although the Soviet-ruled peoples are today in a worse economic condition than ever, the Kremlin continues on its mad march of territorial expansion, and ruthlessly sends literally millions to death in its forced labor camps. Patently it is the conception of the Kremlin that although the Russian people are duty-bound to be builders of an empire still they must content themselves with their poverty-stricken lot.

This observation, however, is not limited to the politico-social life under Soviet rule, but includes also the religious and church field. The undeniable fact is that the Russian church and its hierarchy have placed themselves completely under the control of the most immoral governmental authority the world has ever known. Not only are the Reds anti-Christian in practice and theory, but they are also militantly atheistic, opposed to any form of religion whatsoever, including the one headed by the Moscow Patriarch himself. Despite this, however, the latter has not only given his open approval of the anti-religious policies of Kremlin, but has given them his blessings.

The Religious Imperialism of the Russian Orthodox

He has done so because the Soviet atheistic regime is a convenient instrument for broadening the Russian Church imperialism, bringing under its sway the entire Orthodox Church throughout Russia and its satellite countries, destroying Catholicism of the Eastern Rite in Western and Carpatho Ukraine and Romania, and finally making the Russian Church supreme in the entire Orthodox world, be it within or outside of the Russian spheres of influence. With this aim in mind the Moscow Patriarch is going ahead without the slightest qualms of conscience and it is immaterial to him that anti-Christian methods are being used in the process, or that the notorious MVD secret police

is aiding him. The Russian Church imperialism is really on a par with the Russian State imperialism in its lack of moral principles. The Russian Orthodoxy enlarges its multitude on territory but morally is entirely poor.

All this, however, does not deter the Russian hierarchy headed by the Patriarch from proclaiming to the world that they alone are the apostles of the teachings of Christ. Despite their moral degradation they continually prate that true Christianity revolves around them and that Catholicism and Protestantism have degenerated and departed from their original Apostolic mission.

The Messianism of the Russian Orthodox Church— the Third Rome

The slogan of The Third Rome is the challenge to world Christianity made recently by a spokesman for the Patriarch, Bishop Hermogen, rector of the revived Theological Academy in Moscow. The Protestants, he charged, lack Christian dogma. They attempt to create "Christianity without Christ," he claimed. On the other hand the Catholic Church, according to him, has lost its ecumenical value because it has become a worldly institution, devoted to worldly pursuits. The last two Popes, Bishop Hermogen claims, Pius XI and XII have "utilized the Catholic Church to defend Fascism and attack democratic parties." Considering that in Russian communist terminology democracy is synonymous with atheistic communism, it is easy to understand why in the eyes of Bishop Hermogen the Catholic Church has lost its Christian mission by its fight against atheistic communism. Ergo, according to him, the world should regard the Russian Orthodox Church as the only course of the true Christianity, for within it lies true Orthodoxy "in all its depth and clarity as well as the infallibility of the Church founded by Jesus Christ."

This strange attempt at Messianism coupled with the religious decadence of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy is not without precedent. Its origin lies in the 15th century when the Russian Church broke away from Rome and the Patriarch of Constantinople and re-established itself on an independent basis. It proclaimed itself then a Third Rome. As for a possible "Fourth Rome,"—perish the thought, wrote Philotey, a Muscovian monk. Russian messianism really started when following the reforms of Peter I a Tsarist appointee served as head of the Holy Synod. From then on it continued on its course,

with deviations here and there, although at no time was it inspired by the true Christian spirit.

In proclaiming itself as the Third Rome, Moscow naturally claimed to replace the old Rome. The second Rome, Constantinople, was at that time unable to react in any positive manner, as it was then under the domination of the Turks. Today the Moscow Patriarch proclaims more loudly than any of his predecessors that Moscow is The Third Rome, the only leader of the Church of Christ.

This year, which marks the 500 anniversary of the rise of the independent Russian Church, has been seized upon as an opportunity to bring back into life the Ecumenical Council (Sobor) of the Orthodox World which had gone out of existence several centuries ago. It was summoned under the auspices of "the God-blessed Stalin.." The Sobor met July 18. Some of its participating, high clergy apparently appeared voluntarily; most of them, it is reported, had no other choice as MVD agents compelled them to do so. They came from all parts of the Soviet Union, including Ukraine, as well as its satellite countries. Some came in the role of observers from countries outside the Red sphere of influence, evidently to protect themselves in the event that eventually the Reds would swallow up their respective countries too.

Apparently because the Sobor was so unrepresentative in character and so sadly lacking in canonical reason for summoning it, nothing came of it. It did not even have a formal opening. There were just festivities.

Moscow Against Rome

Today in the Christian world we find two irreconcilable opponents, Catholic Rome and Orthodox Moscow. The first is headed by the Pope and the second by the Russian Patriarch. Conscious of his moral inferiority the latter hates Catholicism, just as the Stalin regime hates and yet at the same time fears the Western World. This fear is not only of Western material superiority but also of its moral superiority.

Realizing the moral power of Catholicism, Moscow fears that if the Russian empire were to collapse, thereby depriving the Moscow Patriarch of a defender, the Catholic Church would quickly extend its sway over the formerly Russian dominated lands, especially those which traditionally have gravitated toward the West, Ukraine and White Ruthenia. That accounts for the feverish attempts by the

Patriarch to strengthen his authority wherever Soviet influences predominate. This is the basic reason underlying the destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite in Western and Carpatho-Ukraine and of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in Eastern Ukraine, also the Autocephalous Church in Rumania and the Balkans.

Of course, Moscow has no such plans for the Catholic Church beyond its sphere of influence, as it well knows that it is powerless to do anything there. Its principal ambition is to consolidate its strength in the zones of eastern Christianity. It well knows that Latin Catholicism offers no real danger to it by penetrating into Ukraine or White Ruthenia. On the other hand, the Catholicism of the Eastern Rite is a definite threat to the supremacy of Russian Orthodoxy in these regions. The present Russian policies toward the Latin and Greek (Eastern-Catholic) Churches well illustrate the last point.

Eastern Catholic Church a Dangerous Foe of Russian Orthodox Church

When in 1705, during the Northern War, Peter I at the head of his army entered Polotsk, White Ruthenia, and there met Catholics of the Eastern Rite, he immediately took a hostile stand against them. His visit to the Uniat cathedral there ended with the murder of six Basilian Fathers. But in the very same border city he conducted himself very circumspectly toward the Latin Catholics. In attempting to find an answer to this rather puzzling behavior on his part some historians have come to the erroneous assumption that in general the Russian Tsar was favorably inclined toward Catholicism, and that the incident in the Cathedral was due to the conduct of the Basilians themselves.

This assumption can readily be dispelled by the fact that it was really Peter I who laid down the blueprint for his successors of the Russian policy toward the Catholic Church. This plan called for the merciless destruction of the Eastern Rite Catholicism and the cultivation of friendly relations with the Latin Catholics. When in the course of the Northern War the Russian forces entered upon Ukrainian and White Ruthenian territories, the Eastern Rite or Uniate Catholics were especially subjected to persecution, whereas the Roman Catholic priests and bishops were left unmolested. The Uniat Bishop Zhabokritsky of Lutsk was exiled by the Russians to Siberia from which he never returned, while the Metropolitan of the Church himself

had to escape beyond the borders of Poland. The clergy had to seek safety in the forests and hills.

Peter's successors, especially Catherine II, faithfully followed his church policy. Following the Partitions of Poland, when practically all of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian lands came under Russian rule, the Russian Government instituted a systematic and ruthless persecution of the Uniat Catholics. Yet it left the Roman Catholics unmolested; in fact it even granted them various concessions. It is a historic fact that during the reign of Catherine II, some ten million Ukrainian Catholics were forced to enter the Russian Orthodox Church. On the other hand, the Tsaritsa by special decrees allowed the Jesuits to ride out the storm which enveloped their order during the second half of the 18th century when their own order went out of existence in Catholic countries.

Throughout the vast length and breadth of Ukraine, White Ruthenia and Russia proper there is such a sharp cleavage between the religious culture of the West and that of the East that it would be utterly impossible for Catholicism of the Latin Rite to establish itself widely there. The peoples there are too closely attached to their Eastern religious culture, an integral part of their national cultures permit that. The Latin Rite for them is a foreign element. That is why Russian Orthodoxy feels itself safe behind the wall of the Eastern religious culture and rite against any possible danger of invasion by Latin Catholicism. On the contrary a real danger for the Russian Orthodoxy is the potential expansion of Catholicism in its eastern rite, familiar to the population of Eastern Europe.

In one particular respect, however, Russian Orthodoxy fears Catholicism, and that is the latter's strong antagonism to any kind of state's superiority over the Church. The whole philosophy of the Russian Orthodox Church is against this principle, necessarily so because its power and development are dependent upon the Russian Government, including the atheistic and all-powerful Politburo.

The idea of the separation of the Church and the State is particularly strong in Ukraine and White Ruthenia, both of which down through the centuries have readily responded to Western influences. This fact worries considerably those who guide the destinies of the Russian Orthodox Church is against this principle, necessarily so because to pick up strength it may eventually wreck their church structure. Hence the relentless drive to force Eastern Catholicism out of the Russian lands and hinterlands.

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For this purpose Moscow harnessed the services of its historians. The very Union itself was interpreted by them as foreign intrigue (usually of the Poles and the Jesuits), aimed at the destruction of the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians, whose nationality, ironically enough, the Russian historians refused then to recognize as such. By all means possible Russia attempted to smear the Union.

That is why for the past 180 years, down to the present, Russia has fought Eastern Catholicism in Ukraine and White Ruthenia. In four separate drives against it following the fall of Poland, it managed to force about 12 million Ukrainians and White Ruthenian Catholics to forsake their faith and enter the Russian Orthodox Church. Within the last couple of years it has with the aid of its MDV secret police managed to do the same to 4 million more. Each such drive has been hailed at its close by Russian propagandists as the joyful return of the Ukrainians and White Ruthenians to their Mother Church—the Russian Orthodox Church. Meanwhile, however, there has been relatively less furious attempt to eliminate the Catholics of the Latin Rite who found themselves under Russian domination.

Although the Soviet regime cannot be compared with the former Tsarist regime, especially since the former is notorious for its anti-religious character, still it is worth observing that even the Soviet regime tolerates the Latin Rite of the Catholic Church. For example, today in Western Ukraine, where the vast majority of people are Uniat Catholics (Ukrainian by nationality), and which has been occupied not so long ago by the Soviets, there is officially not even one Eastern Rite Church in active existence, whereas at the same time the Latin Rite Churches are allowed to exist and be active in some dimensions. A similar situation exists in Transylvania, where the Romanians are Catholics of the Eastern Rite and the Hungarians of the Latin Rite.

All this continual persecution, both in the past and now, has been of such a character as to clearly reveal that Russian Orthodoxy regards Eastern Catholicism as a grave danger to itself.


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That Stalin would dare to liquidate the Catholic Church of the Latin Rite in the Soviet satellite countries is hardly probable. More probable will be the advance in those countries of outright atheism rather than Russian Orthodoxy.

In a word, Soviet Russia is continuing the policy of Tsarist Russia in attempting the total extermination of Catholicism of the Eastern Rite by the most brutal methods possible, and of treating the Latin Rite Catholics somewhat with kid gloves although they too have known repression at the hands of the Russians.



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1. The Necessary Postulates

The theme of this argument, namely the proper attitude of our government toward Eastern Europe and its many national units, rests of necessity upon certain propositions that have been discussed at length in many issues of this journal and elsewhere and that now, with the support of much experience, are almost axiomatic in our thinking. First, it is impossible for the world to persist in endless tension and mounting discord. Secondly, the two paramount forces in the world today, namely the Soviet Union and the United States, are irreconcilable in interests, divergent in conduct, and tenacious in objective. Thirdly, there is no reasonable or ethical ground for the making of a lasting and mutually respected contract between a democracy based spiritually on the peaceable reconciliation of conflicting views and an absolute dictatorship dedicated ideologically to a grandiose scheme of world power by forcible conquest. Fourthly, there is no reasonable possibility for a miraculous conversion of the character or will, intention or purpose, of those few who hold the dictatorial reins over the lives of the hapless millions in their domain, nor is there the likely probability of a world-saving collapse in the stratic structure of the Soviet state. And fifthly, there exists the real possibility of a clash-producing incident in the ebb and flow of the increasing tension.

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Each of these assumptions may on the surface be subject to off-hand questioning, but after a careful examination of the history of the past forty years, the documentary evidence establishing the consistent Soviet chicanery and purposeful prevarication, the wretched experiences of the mass victims of Soviet terror and legalized murder, the maniacal adherence of variously motivated minds to a logically constructed body of half-truths and appealing shibboleths, and the sincere and earnest desires and efforts of the Western representatives to find an agreeable *modus vivendi* with the insular Soviet force in the field of general international relations, their underlying validity becomes perfectly clear.

2. The Link Between Western and Eastern Europe in American Foreign Policy

A policy of foreign affairs or in any undertaking implies a general course of endeavor determined by certain definite conditions. When the various American actions in the nineteenth century were based upon the tenets of the Monroe Doctrine, a policy can be said to have existed. When, on the other hand, following the first World War, the United States became a dominant world power and sanctioned even contradictory measures as, for example, in Europe, and eventually lapsed into a naive isolationism despite its responsibilities in the world at large, certainly no definite or adequate policy was in existence. During the past war and up to last year, the same unfortunate condition persisted. At last with the Marshall Plan, necessarily supplemented by the Truman Doctrine, it is again possible to discern some elements of a policy.

This implies certain broad objectives that positively and negatively serve to coordinate the various activities of a given agency. Thus, it has explicitly become part of American foreign policy to confine the insidious spread of world communism and to combat in whatever way practicable and necessary all the different methods employed by the Soviet Union in producing discord, confusion, division, and sabotage in the various non-Soviet nations of the world. Toward these ends, material and moral aid is extended to these nations, closer political ties are made, military exchanges are carried on, etc. In a few words, the overall objectives of Soviet foreign policy dynamically provide a plan of political organization in Europe and throughout the world, whereas our restricted objective causes us to continue to grope for some basis for a stable international organization. For example,

to piously affirm the sovereignty and independence of the individual states in Western Europe is patently not enough, and no better proof of this can be provided than the current demand on the part of many leading Europeans for the practical beginning of a working plan for a federated Europe.

Judging, however, by some of the statements made by our leaders concerning America's favorable attitude toward European federative efforts, it may readily be inferred that for reasons of diplomatic expediency, no explicit inclusion of such an objective in our foreign policy is accepted and demonstrated by active, and open participation in them. But one of these real possibilities is suggested by the realistic question that must dominate our deliberations of the present—"What to do with Eastern Europe tomorrow?"

3. The Political Reconstruction of Eastern Europe

(a) *The Dismemberment of the U.S.S.R.*

The American Eastern European policy is, of course, chiefly concerned with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. One can hardly deny that the future of this organization must be serious considered by our policy-makers. Now, it is contended here that whether by internal revolution and collapse, which we hold to be a very dim and remote possibility, or by a world conflict, toward which the general international developments appear to be rushing (allowing even for intermittent conciliatory gestures by the deliberately zig-zagging Soviet diplomacy), the artificial political structure of the Russian Empire, now in the form of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, must be decisively eliminated. It needs to be replaced by a political reconstruction of Eastern Europe along lines of ethnographic validity, with the reasonable self-determination of peoples, the institution of democratic processes of government, and the persuasive incorporation of these peoples in a federated Europe. It must at last be recognized that the political system resulting from Russian military dominance in Eastern Europe has always been and continues to be founded upon force, fraud and fear.

It is becoming increasingly evident in the United States that many objective minds studying this subject ridding themselves of the myth of the homo-geneity of the inhabitants in the European section of the Soviet Russian Empire, an idea which is still irresponsibly propagated by numerous Russian emigre writers, despite the nominal recognition

given to the distinct nationalities by the Soviet government itself. The unspeakable disservice done by these writers to the interests of the United States and of democratic principle in the West might well eventuate in a repetition of the fatal mistake made by the democratic powers at the end of World War I, when they supported all the anti-democratic, non-communist Russian forces to the fatal detriment of the one solely genuine democratic force, that of Ukrainian liberation². The inevitable outcome was, as we know, the perpetuation of the Russian autocracy as a red regime rather than white.

On the other hand, it is not as yet clearly understood that the propaganda disseminated by these same peddlers of Russian imperialism on behalf of a democratic Russia, significantly conceived in terms of the retention of its imperial holdings, i.e. Ukraine, White Ruthenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and others, is a dangerous illusion. If Mr. Kerensky, Dr. Dallin and others were genuinely true to the principles of democracy and popular consent which they so glibly espouse, they would not insist upon the retention of the imperialist acquisitions. Their protests against an obnoxious "separatism" does not excuse them from the basic test of their sincerity in democracy, namely their willingness to allow these various nations the opportunity to determine for themselves whether they desire to remain as subordinate parts of the Empire or not. Moreover, the entire history of Russia since its origin in Moscow in the 13th century is a record of aggressive conquest and hardly justifies the optimism implicit in their contention. Following the conquest of Ukraine in 1709, Muscovy, which assumed for obviously shrewd political reasons the name Russia in 1721 (an adaptation of Rus, used interchangeably with Ukraine during the past centuries), embarked upon a series of annexations that brought the Crimea (1786), White Ruthenia (1793), Poland (1795), the Caucasus (1799), Turkestan (1876), Manchuria and Port Arthur (1901) within her orbit of power and thus carried it close to the cherished control of the Balkans and the Dardanelles, India and the Asiatic coast. Without the forcible opposition of Germany and Austro-Hungary, Britain and Japan it would have won this control.

Another myth, but in this case Soviet-sponsored, that has seized the minds of our intellectual concerns the vaunted solution of the nationalities problem in the Union. If by solution one means the rigid suppression of the national wills of the subjugated peoples, then this claim is substantially correct, subject only to the qualification of

² See Arnold D. Margolin, *From a Political Diary, Russia, the Ukraine, and America.*

intermittent resistance on the part of these peoples. The basis of Soviet Russia's nationalities policy was sounded by one of its political mentors in 1927, when he declared "As far as we Bolsheviks are concerned, Ukrainization never was and is not an end in itself. . . it is only a method of establishing a closer contact with the Ukrainian masses." This quotation is vitally important in its significance indication of the Ukraine as the testing-ground for the development of that technique of "intensive revolution" which the Soviets are applying throughout Eastern Europe today.

In the trucelike interlude between the two wars, naive Westerners lauded the Soviet government for its "tolerance" of the cultural usages of its politically submerged peoples. As concerned Ukraine, for example, in the period of cultural concessions from 1922 to 1928, the Ukrainian language was rendered permissible in the schools and universities, the Ukrainian Academy of Science was manned with competent personnel of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and Ukrainian art and music was provided fair latitude for national expression. But these proved merely to be points of "contact with the masses," as they are today in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and elsewhere. The pattern of "intensive revolution" is the same.

When one honestly speaks of a solution, there is implied a harmonious settlement. How any rationally objective mind can apply such a conception to the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union is beyond rationality itself. One need just recount the following known facts to recognize this myth of the Soviet authorities and their friendly cohorts. After 1928, all the concessions mentioned above were severely modified or completely eradicated, once the reign of centralized government from Moscow was securely tightened, and the supposed Ukrainian independence became only a shell without even a semblance of autonomy. The current phenomenon of Tito's opposition to the monolithic Soviet control has its clear precedent in Mykola Skrypnyk and the Ukrainian communists in the early 30's, for the differences are largely those of geographical distance from the seat of such control and the entrenched party organization. The significant fact that Ukraine was the first genuinely independent nation to be subverted by Russian Soviet military force in 1920 also enters into the general pattern. The duplicity of the Soviet word was early experienced by Ukraine, for Lenin piously taught that "any Russian socialist who refuses to recognize the freedom of Finland and Ukraine is bound to degenerate into a chauvinist. . . And no sophistries, no references to

this 'method' will ever justify him." The Soviet practice of genocide also has left its appalling imprint upon Ukraine, as witnessed by the man-made famine of the thirties with its ruthless decimation of millions of innocent peasants, the uprooting of countless families for transport into Siberia and death, and by the endless purges of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Read some of the authentic testimonies in Dr. Dallin's latest work and the largest national group of the "political prisoners" in the Soviet concentration camps will be readily found as Ukrainian⁸. Moreover, it is not without special significance that the leadership of the so-called Ukrainian Soviet Republic is denied to any Ukrainian communist.

Once we have dispelled these myths that becloud an objective understanding of the situation in the Soviet Union, the way becomes clear for a consideration of a policy that can utilize the political realities of the past and present for the benefit of the future. It requires little imagination to perceive the fundamental fact that the success of communist ambitions for world rule rests upon the basic solidity of the Soviet Eurasian fortress of which Ukraine is significantly an indispensable segment. Geopolitically the Soviet power is concentrated in this area and radiates from it into the Baltic and Northern Europe, into the Danubian Valley and the Mediterranean, into the Persian Gulf and the Near East, and into Manchuria and the Yellow Sea. Yet, as the strength of a chain depends on its weakest link, Ukraine may well determine the fate of the world communist destiny and serve in the future as the bulwark against the centuries-long Russian expansionism, pitched sequentially to the themes of "the Third Rome," "Pan-Slavism," and now the "Socialist Fatherland." Without Ukraine, and the other non-Russian entities, the Russian colossus would be deprived of the essential requisites for its expansionary projects and securely confined to its proper region in the Volga basin. The critical importance of Ukraine especially cannot with reason, therefore, be neglected in the foreign and military policies of the United States.

(b) *Restriction of Imperialist Polish Designs*

The sordid possibility of a revived Polish imperialistic aggression against Lithuania and Ukraine, in the event of the political reorganization of Eastern Europe, is the second major object of consideration in American East European policy. The wanton Polish aggression against the Western Ukrainian Republic in 1918, for example, stands as

⁸ David J. Dallin and Boris L. Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*.

an unforgettable event in the annals of contemporary history. Later the brazen Polish disregard for the peace proposals of the Supreme Allied Council, including that of the "Curzon Line," its reactionary aspirations for the re-establishment of the 17th century Polish hegemony, its ungrateful disposition of armed Ukrainian assistance in the frustration of Trotzky's advancing Red Army, and its denial of Ukrainian autonomy, emphasized by a reign of terror in the 20's and 30's, convey a lesson not only of Polish political immaturity, of which Mr. Churchill has recently taken account in his war memoirs, but also a mockery of its professions of democratic ideals and the right of reasonable national self-determination.

The frank statement of the Polish minister Grabski in 1924—"Within twenty-five years there will not remain a sign of the Ukrainians—all of them will have been converted into Poles"—is no less infamous than those of his Soviet counterparts. The mass imprisonments and by torture deaths of Ukrainian nationals, the severely enforced policies of cultural repression, the Polish "colonization" of Ukrainian districts, and the countless acts of religious persecution of Ukrainian Orthodox elements were likewise, but on a smaller scale, the Polish counterpart of the Soviet atrocities during the period. Any occasion for the repetition of these vile stupidities must obviously be circumvented.

The issue of the basic right for reasonable self-determination on the part of the Ukrainian population in Western Ukraine is beyond comprehensible dispute. On the basis of history, language, culture and sentiment this in fact is no real issue at all. The Soviet government has itself resolved this alleged issue by the incorporation of this area within the Union, joining it with Eastern Ukraine, although the possibility of future territorial concessions to the dependent Polish state for the attainment of higher Soviet aims cannot be ruled out. But to the extent that the unsuppressed Polish representatives in the West and in the United States persist in their irresponsible advocacy of a future free Poland to include the Western Ukrainian territories, to that extent their unbridled chauvinism must be vigilantly attacked by all genuinely democratic forces sincerely seeking the solid foundations of European and, therefore, world peace. The recent spectacle of the indifference of the Polish Americans attending their convention in Philadelphia toward the frank question put to them by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, as to affording the Ukrainian populace in Western Ukraine the right to determine them-

selves, should cause every true American to wonder how genuinely democratic in mind these people are.

(c) *Liberation—Independence—Integral Federation*

In the happy event of the final dissolution of the unnaturally-founded Russian Empire into its natural national components and the judicious containment of imperialistic and reactionary Polish aggressiveness, no dangerous political vacuum need be feared in Eastern Europe by the just and rightful establishment of sovereign and independent states, such as Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, Estonia and others. Each of these nations possesses the determination, qualifications and the necessary powers to achieve and maintain democratic statehood in a community of reasonably independent states. These elemental facts, it must always be recalled, the Germans ignored in their reckless thrust into Eastern Europe, and, among other things, the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in 1942 to combat German imperialism, as it is presently engaging the Soviet, was the natural result. If war should be the tragic means of eventually accomplishing world stability and peace, then the objective of the liberation of the now subjugated peoples of Eastern Europe looms as the ace card in the American hand.

But liberation, no matter how achieved, without a constructive plan of political arrangement in Eastern Europe would prove as hollow as the German adventure. The prospect and realization of independent statehood must follow this first step in the various countries. And this, if properly executed, would not be without incalculable advantages to Europe and the world at large. For example, again let us take Ukraine, primarily cited because it is the second numerically largest nation in Eastern Europe. Ukraine, by virtue of its strategic territorial nature, assumes vital geopolitical importance. Consisting of approximately 60 million people, 45 million of which are Ukrainian. Ukraine stretches ethnographically over 330,000 square miles, from the foothills of the Carpathian mountains to the Caucasus and from the Pripet Marshes to the Black Sea. The erection of an independent Ukrainian state in this rich area would strategically limit Russia to her natural geographical and ethnical boundaries, separate her by about one thousand miles away from the threshold of Central Europe, as well as from the Black Sea, and create against any of her traditional imperialist drives a protective wall for Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Balkan states and the Turkish Straits.

Her perennial pressure upon Central Europe and the Mediterranean will be permanently dissipated and the first constructive step toward a peaceful Europe will have been achieved. Her potential material in Ukraine for large-scale imperialist aggression will thus have been eliminated. Ethnically confined to her own territories in the north, containing vast resources now being feverishly developed and occupied by about 100 million people, Russia would still remain economically rich, politically important, but necessarily checked in its means of carrying out its imperialist designs. Moreover, if a democratic Russia should emerge, as many of the emigres hope, then liberal trade, possibly even within the ideal framework of a European Customs Union, could serve to remedy any economic insufficiencies hampering its peaceful industry.

But even liberation combined with independence is inadequate for the advanced needs of Europe as a single community. The extension of the federative idea is essential. Current embryonic plans for the federation of Europe, as, for example, the project of Mr. Churchill, are deficient in one essential respect. Despite off-record assertions to the contrary, they are postulated upon a dichotomy between Eastern and Western Europe. At present, of course, in actuality this is unavoidable. But looking to the future, none of them has stipulated concretely the area to be covered by the federation, the contemplated composition of the federal body, and its practical significance for all the people that have historically made up Europe.

The hoped-for realization of a federated Europe in any genuine sense is impossible on the political dualism presupposed by these plans, even in their theoretic stature. The natural line for democratisation for a federated Europe is approximately that which existed for almost 2000 years, from the time of Herodotus who placed the boundary of Europe on the River Don and which was confirmed by the independent state of Kievan Ukraine, the Polish hegemony, and the two Republics of Ukraine in 1648 and 1917. On the basis of its past history with its special Western orientation, a self-determining Ukraine, for example, would inevitably veer toward an intimate association with the nations of Western and Central Europe, a natural gravitation into the orbit of democratic Western culture. Only in such an association, founded upon democratic ideals and the economic utilization of the resources of Europe as a whole, toward which her rich wheat fields, coal mines, minerals etc. can serve immensely, can a free Ukraine, along with the

other subjugated nations of Eastern Europe, make its contributions to European peace.

4. The East-West European Link Again

In what is tantamount to a complete circuit of thought, it should be apparent that by sponsoring the positive objective of a federated Europe in an explicit way and by considering the real possibility for the reconstitution of Eastern Europe, clean of any befogging myths, in the manner pursued here, our foreign policy makers could render the world democracy fundamentally sincere against oppression in whatever form. They would furnish a constructive counterbalance to the political plans of world communism. They would lay the actual foundation now for an effective East European policy tomorrow. They would avert the blunders of their predecessors by facing squarely the political realities of Eastern Europe and infusing great hope in the hearts of the Ukrainians, Georgians, Latvians and others who are one with us in this struggle for freedom against totalitarian oppression. In effect, the objective of limited federation in Western Europe, which, significantly enough, the Soviet Union dreads so much, stands as the logical basis for a sane reconstitution of Eastern Europe. The exigencies of the future must be prepared for by a sober accounting of the real possibilities in the present. There is no other course for rational policy-making.



WESTERN TENDENCIES IN UKRAINIAN CULTURE

By IVAN MIRCHUK

THE entire public and private life of the Ukrainian, and above all, his cultural achievements throughout his entire history, reveal certain unmistakable characteristics. They not only elucidate various phenomena and events in the past of this people, but they also permit us to make certain prophecies as to its role in the future. Moreover, the peculiar and definite mentality evolved by the Ukrainian people is a significant factor in the proper evaluation of the complicated conditions in Eastern Europe; it is a flat contradiction of the commonly accepted view of uniformity and, at the same time, indicates the dangers which threaten the study of Eastern Europe when it is based on a false assumption of homogeneity. Here we are not interested in the economic role reserved for this people in the reconstruction of the Eastern hemisphere, nor in the political significance of the country's geographical position, but first and foremost in the message of its cultural history and its share in the intellectual life of the eastern Slavonic world.

Studying the basic traits of the Ukrainian we see that his definite, and sometimes overemphasised *individualism*, the practical trends of his idealism mark him as definitely western in outlook. These have included his country from the very beginning in the sphere of influence of Central and Western Europe and have determined him to be an instrument in handing western culture on to the nations of the East. In the entire history of the Ukrainians, from their first appearance on the stage of European history up to modern times, we find clear traces of this tendency towards the West. In spite of the position of this territory on the frontier of the European world this tendency has never allowed its living contact with the West to weaken, but has helped it to remain accessible to new western ideas and to assimilate them.

The very first historical mention of the Kiev empire, which arose on the Ukraine territory of today and expanded in all directions, shows it in contact with a western European power. In the Annals of Bertinius we read of an audience given at Ingelheim by Emperor Ludwig on May 18th, 839 to a Grecian delegation, which included in addition to the ambassadors of the Greek emperor Theophilus men "qui se, id est gentem suam Rhos vocari dicebant." One can assume with a fair degree of certainty, that these men had been sent first from their native country

to Constantinople and had accompanied the Greek delegation on its long journey from Byzantium to the Rhine and that the name "Rhos" is identical with the later Rus. The Grand Princess Olga, who embraced the Christian faith, sent a delegation in 960 to the German Emperor Otto I with the request to send priests to her almost unknown country. The request of the Grand Princess was granted and a mission under Adalbert set out on the long journey, which, however, did not have any practical result.

The fact that the Kiev Princes accepted Christianity from Byzantium can be explained by geography, politics and economics. In spite of this, however, and despite the following dependence of the church on Constantinople, they showed their desire to cooperate in the *general* European cultural life through political and marital alliances with the western powers as early as the reign of Volodimir the Great and his son Yaroslav the Wise (10th-11th century).

Pursuing this western policy, Yaroslav appointed Hilarion, a native monk of some standing, to be Metropolitan of Kiev, a position hitherto always held by a Greek; he sought in this way to strengthen his position with regard to Byzantium in the ecclesiastical, as well as in the political world. Izyaslav, Yaroslav's eldest son, first negotiated with King Henry IV, whose wife Praxedis was a daughter of Vsevolod, the Grand Prince of Kiev, and later with his adversary Pope Gregory VII in order to establish contact with Rome. These and similar facts point out clearly that, in spite of their geographical position and distance from Western Europe, in spite of the vicinity and influence of the Byzantine empire Kiev and its leaders pursued a policy that was definitely western.

After the final break between Rome and Constantinople, the Ukraine was pre-eminently suited to assimilate influences from eastern and western Europe and to transform them into a new and unique whole. In the early years of the history of the Kiev empire, the Grand Princes made definite efforts not only to include Kiev in the sphere of interest of Byzantine culture but also to make it a centre of native culture. This aim was to be achieved by means of the natural affinity with the East as well as by the maintenance of intimate bonds of contact with the West.

After the Tatar invasion of the Ukrainian steppe, the reins of government in Ukraine fell into the hands of the Galician-Volhynian Realm which, as an advanced outpost on the route to the West, became a channel of communication between the "world" of those days and the East. The Galician prince Daniel received the crown at the hands

of Pope Innocent IV and planned to carry out a great campaign against the Asiatic barbarians with the help of Christian Europe. As was natural, the western influences became stronger; the Roman style dominated architecture and Latin became the language of public life. But the waves sent out by the West did not stop merely at the country that was nearest in space; they spread further east, where, from the outset, they counteracted the one sided influence of Byzantium.

The Lithuanian dominion over the Ukraine in the 14th century had a fundamentally peaceful character; Lithuania had the upper hand in politics but Ukraine was superior to her partner in culture, an advantage which persisted after the union with Poland. But this latter historical fact brought the Ukrainian state into still closer contact with the movements of Western European culture; this was much facilitated by the already existing Western type of principles in Ukraine, and aided western culture in making headway even further East.

The Magdeburg statute, which had been known earlier in Western Ukraine as a privilege of the towns (Volodimir 1324 and Sianik 1339) became the basis of the organization of further settlements in newly acquired areas; it extended farther and farther east, reached Kiev, and even the Ukrainian towns East of the Dnieper, where it was preserved until the 19th century. Western artisans and artists were welcomed to these areas and the youth of Ukraine were fired with the enthusiasm to attend German and Italian universities, in order to acquire learning and subsequently to enrich the life at home.

Thus western cultural movements, like Humanism, the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation finally penetrated the wide-flung steppe. It is true that these innovations at times were to have consequences different from those produced in other countries, consequences which could have been neither foreseen nor expected.

Because of its western interests public opinion placed no obstacles in the way of the spread of the Reformation in Ukraine; for intelligible national reasons, however, Ukraine endeavored to shield its church from the coming attacks that might not only have occasioned a shifting of the cultural creative forces, but might even have endangered the very existence of the entire nation, the old church being the bulwark of Ukrainian national life.

The same trends and sympathy for the West gave rise to the movement for the union of the churches whose leaders did not think only of their personal interest, but were also inspired by lofty ideals.

When, after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow, the Third Rome, as it was called, tried to succeed to the position of capital of the Eastern Church, the Ukrainian bishops were faced with a choice between a Moscow that they regarded as still uncivilized and Rome, the centre of Western culture. They decided in favor of the latter.

From the point of view of the national interests, the dignitaries who joined the Union represented definitely progressive tendencies, in contrast to their conservative colleagues who preferred a connection with Moscow that was also Orthodox. In support of this contention we may mention that Metropolitan Hipatius Potij, a Ukrainian Catholic and one of the most energetic champions of the Union, displayed particular zeal for the rights of the Ukrainian language, in which tongue he recited his creed and took his oath to the Pope, although he was completely at home in Latin. By accepting the protection of the mighty church of Rome as the supreme head of their Church, the champions of the Union and of the cultural independence of the Ukraine wished to throw off the cultural yoke of Poland, for they thought that they would acquire equal rights with the Poles, when the churches would once be united. The events have shown how greatly they were mistaken; for the Poles merely exploited this rapprochement to completely absorb the Ukrainian nation.

Western influences can also be detected in the guildlike brotherhood organizations of the Ukrainian middle-classes in towns like Lwiw, Kiev, Lutsk, etc., organizations which in addition to promoting the interests of a particular class or trade, also concerned themselves with church affairs. One of their main aims was to spread knowledge among the people by modern instruction organized on Western lines; they therefore founded schools *which taught Latin* as well as Church Slavonic and Greek, and where students were trained in the new methods of rhetoric. These pioneers were well aware that they could only successfully oppose the Jesuits by using the mental weapons of clever propaganda.

The most important of these so-called brotherhood schools was undoubtedly the Kiev Academy, which owed its supremacy as an intellectual centre, not only of Ukraine, but of the whole of Eastern Europe, to the activities of that eminent personality, the Metropolitan Peter Mohyla.

Mohyla, the son of the governor of the Moldavia province, was educated in Jesuit schools, but he remained a *life-long advocate of Western culture* and the Catholic Church institutions, the organization

of which served him as a model when planning the reform of the Orthodox Church. We are scarcely able to-day to imagine what an enormous revolution and what great boldness of spirit was implied in the idea of introducing Catholic ideas into the organization of the Orthodox Church, which had been hostile to Rome for centuries. Yet this unique plan succeeded and could have succeed *only* in Ukraine, for it was here alone that history had prepared the way for the adoption of these plans for realising western ideas. The spirit which inspired Mohyla's activities was wholly directed *towards the west*, as was clearly expressed in his reforms of the administration; in dogma, however, he remained a disciple of the "faith of his fathers." He is thus a concrete symbol of the synthesis of two worlds, of the harmonious and complete union of two cultures, of the meeting of East and West and of the fertilising of Ukrainian Orthodoxy by the Latin spirit of the Roman Catholic Church.

He is, at the same time, the herald of the historical mission of the Ukraine, signs of which were clear at the very beginning; these signs became more apparent in the course of the 17th century when it became decisive for the spiritual renewal of the whole of Eastern Europe.

The seed scattered by Mohyla bore rich fruit. Hundreds of scholars, writers, politicians and organizers graduated in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries from this unique "alma mater" of the Kiev Academy. These men were equipped with the modern weapons of western learning, they could fight—first of all—for the independence and for the honor, of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. After completing their studies in Kiev, the Ukrainian patriots of that time went to Western Europe to study and then apply the arguments used by the Reformation against Catholicism. They journeyed as far as Rome and did not shrink from joining the Roman Church for a season only so as to become better acquainted with their opponents in the very heart of the hostile camp. On their return home they started an energetic campaign in teaching and writing to prepare and train wide circles of less well-educated priests for this ideological warfare. In order to furnish their followers with all kinds of information on the results of their studies they sat to work to publish facts; series of polemic pamphlets against the enemy and a great number of apologiae in defence of their own cause, utilizing the knowledge they had gathered in the West and that were now published. This led to an enormous output of polemical writing, and to quite some intellectual activity throughout the country,

which did not fail to attract even foreigners. But the efforts of these champions of Ukrainian culture who had been trained in the West did not stop at this; they became the civilizers of Moscow.

Thus we see a strange drama in Eastern Europe. Ukraine, politically impotent and without worldly experience, and split up by its over-emphasised individualism falls politically under the thumb of a strongly centralized Russia, while Ukrainian culture spreads north, where there is almost a cultural vacuum and at the same time contributes a lot to strengthen and modernize this great country.

This mutual penetration of the physical power of the north with the intellectual strength of the South, initiated by Peter the Great's reforms, did not bring lasting blessing to either partner. It was natural that Ukraine, politically crushed and intellectually exploited to the full by Moscow during the 19th century, should have been obliged to lead the shadow of an existence. Tsarist Russia however did not profit from all this in a real sense.

For she was not capable of maintaining the supremacy achieved as a result of the imposition of European ways of thought and of life; it could be seen that the products of western culture which had been transplanted from the south as the foundation of public life, proved to be too weak to sustain the edifice of that gigantic empire in times of crises. Even before the catastrophe numerous intellectuals in the 2nd half of the 19th century turned from a Europe which they alleged to be disintegrating and looked to the East, their spiritual home (ex oriente lux). The leaders of the new Russia have therefore found the right way out of the dilemma when they recognize that the West has nothing to offer this empire; the Eurasian solution confirms the hypothesis that the powers permitting of assimilation were rather to be found in Asia. (Pokrovsky's *Outline of Russian History*.)

But this natural process brought that part of Ukraine still incorporated in Russia into an extremely difficult position, as the trend of its development and its sympathies are entirely opposed to such a course. It is only natural that serious clashes resulted from all this conflicts that disturbed the country's economy and its cultural life, since these were at loggerheads. I should like to mention the fate of the contemporary Ukrainian poet Mykola Khvylovy which, in its form and consequences, was practically caused by a definite political program. Although he was a convinced Bolshevik, he had grown up in the cultural traditions of his native Ukraine; but he wished literature to follow the influences of the West and not to become Muscovite. Under

pressure from those in power in Moscow to-day, he had to abandon his point of view, publicly admit his "delinquencies" as regards official policy, in short commit cultural suicide, which soon was followed by physical suicide.

The role of Ukraine in the cultural history of Eastern Europe may be briefly summarized as follows. This fertile and rich country unfortunately was the corridor through which the hordes of Asiatic nomads had rushed like a whirlwind westwards from time immemorial, ruining whatever was in their way. As a consequence of her geographical position, Ukraine, a paradise for a farming population known for some centuries before the birth of Christ as the "granary" of the Europe of those days, had constantly to provide new armies so as not to be crushed by the hooves of the plundering horsemen. These two circumstances, the wealth of the country and the necessity of fighting constantly against Asia for this frontier territory of Europe, essentially determined the subsequent fate of the people who had always to keep their eyes and swords directed towards the East. At its back was the western world, on which it leaned for support, in which its roots were imbedded and where it forged its weapons. Robbed for long of its political independence Ukrainians have been permitted to express their peculiar aims in the domain of culture alone: those aims culminated in the idea of the historical mission of this people.

Fate had thus decided it: the Ukrainians had been given the thankless mission from the very beginning of being an intermediary between East and West; in fact of being a faithful and staunch champion of enlightened ideas as well as in propagating nearly all the cultural currents that have arisen in Europe.



UKRAINIAN CURRENT CHRONICLE

DECLARATION OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL IN EXILE.

Delegates of eight Ukrainian political parties active in all Ukrainian territories before Red Russian occupation of Ukraine and representing new Ukrainians living outside of the Soviet Union except communists, met during July 16-20, 1948 in one of the cities of Western Europe for the first their official sessions and created the Ukrainian National Council of the Liberation. This act of Ukrainian national unity marks a new phase in the struggle of Ukrainian people for independence.

The parliamentary session of the Ukrainian National Council was opened by Andriy Livitsky, head of the Directorium of the erstwhile Ukrainian National Republic (1917-1920), by virtue of which, the assembled body assumed a legal status of a successor of the legislative body of Ukraine elected thirty years ago by the free will of the Ukrainian people.

The executive branch of former Ukrainian government in exile was reorganized and its members were presented to the Ukrainian National Council. Both the legislative as well as executive bodies took an oath of loyalty to Ukrainian independent nation. By this step an unified center of Ukrainian liberation movement outside of the Soviet Union was created; its ideology is clearly exposed in the following

Declaration of The Ukrainian National Council.

Ukrainian People!

In the time of great disaster for our people, on the eve of historical events in international life, the responsible representatives of Ukrainian political organizations have united and created the Ukrainian National Council as a representation of the Ukrainian people in its struggle for an independent state,

The Ukrainian people have fought from ancient times for its liberty. In the revolution of 1917 the Ukrainian people showed its political will through the act of the Ukrainian Central Rada in Kiev on January 22nd, 1918, declaring the restoration of Ukrainian state under the name of Ukrainian People Republic, through the creation of the Western Ukrainian Democratic Republic on November 1st,

1918, in Lviv, as well as through the Act of the All-Ukrainian People Congress of Union of all Ukrainian territories into one united state from January 22nd, 1919.

The renewed Ukrainian state did not claim foreign territories and wished to live in peace with its neighbors. To its citizens, regardless of their nationality, status and religion, the Ukrainian Democratic Republic secured by its laws full equality and freedom. However, its neighbors waged war against the free Ukrainian Nation.

The Ukrainian people were forced to fight on several fronts. Besides the struggle against the Russian Communists in the north and Poland in the west, Ukraine had on the southeastern front to ward off the attack of the armies of Tsarist generals. The army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, surrounded from all sides, without connections with the outside world, being destroyed by disease, without supplies, had to leave in November 1920, together with its government headed by the President of the Directory, Simon Petlura, the territory of Ukraine. The Ukrainian territory was divided between Soviet Russia and the western neighbors of Ukraine.

The Russian Communist government began at once with the ruthless oppression and extirpation of the Ukrainian people. By mass arrests, deportations into concentration camps, executions and deliberately organized famine, millions of Ukrainian peasants, workers and professionals have been annihilated.

Russian communists began simultaneously a ruthless struggle against Ukrainian culture; thousands of Ukrainians, who worked for its development, paid for this by their lives. The Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalic Church has been destroyed. The bishops, the clergy and thousands of faithful perished in prisons and exile.

The so-called Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, established by the Russian Communists, as one of the republics of the Soviet Union, became an instrument of Russian imperialism for the economic exploitation and political oppression of Ukraine. On the Western Ukrainian territories Poland and Rumania accomplished on the Ukrainian territories occupied by them a policy of denationalization and economic exploitation. In spite of such a difficult situation the Ukrainian people did not abandon their struggle for their national liberation and fought against all occupants in various forms and by various means.

World War II brought for the Ukrainian people new disasters. The Nazi occupation transformed Ukraine into a ruin.

Against this invasion the Ukrainian people arose in organized armed revolts that hastened to a great degree the defeat of the German armies in Eastern Europe.

After the retreat of the Germans, a new wave of red terror swept over all Ukrainian territories. Its victims were hundreds of thousands killed, tortured to death in prisons and exile. A manifestation of this terror was also the violent liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church on the western Ukrainian territories in 1945; the metropolitan, all bishops and thousands of clergymen and faithful were arrested and deported.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian people did not succumb to violence and terror. Ukrainian partisan forces, known under the name of Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which had fought during the war against German and Communist invaders, keep on fighting today under the slogans of liberation of the Ukrainian people and the restoration of the Ukrainian state.

The communist terror has forced hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to leave their native country. Under such circumstances, when the Ukrainian people on their own soil cannot show openly their political will, the organized Ukrainian emigration has the right and duty to be the spokesman of their struggle for freedom before the world.

Ukrainian People!

Clinging to the act of restoration of the Ukrainian national state the Ukrainian National Council has decided to reorganize the State Centre of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic to create a renewed Executive Body responsible before the National Council.

The Ukrainian National Council announces before the whole civilized world its unanimous protest against the foreign rule of Russian Communists in Ukraine and states that this government has no right to speak in the name of the Ukrainian people.

The Ukrainian National Council declares that the so-called government of Soviet Ukraine is only a puppet of the Russian Communist government, which rules the Ukrainian people only by the force of arms and means of terror.

Until the time when the Ukrainian people will be able to express their will freely on their soil, the State Centre of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic represents the interests of the Ukrainian nation before the world, which in due time has got mandate for it from free

elected Ukrainian legislative institutions of the independent democratic Ukraine.

The Ukraine National Council calls under the banner of the Independent United Ukrainian State all for whom this banner is dear. At this time, when our people live in the chains of Russian Communist dictatorship and when the basis of their life is endangered, only Ukrainian unity and full selfdenying struggle for the people's cause can save Ukraine.

Ukrainian People!

We bow before the strength of Thy spirit, before the greatness of Thy sufferings and the heroism of Thy struggle. Unconceivably grave are the conditions of Thy life in Communist slavery! But we do not lose confidence in our victory. We promise Thee to consecrate all our forces in order to finish all horrors of Thy endless sufferings and to make the citizens of Ukraine free of fear for their lives, their health, the fate of their kin, to free them of hunger and violation of their thoughts and religion. We remember all those who gave their lives for their people, we greet all who suffer under Communist terror wherever they may stay, we unite in spirit with all our brethren and sisters dwelling in Ukraine and outside its borders.

The Ukrainian National Council will fight for the realization of all democratic civil liberties in an independent Ukrainian Nation, for a healthy Ukrainian family, for the transition of all lands into the ownership of peasants who work on them, for free labor and its legal protection, for abolition of exploitation and the highest well being of workers, for state management of big industries, for free individual enterprise, for the organization of free co-operative societies and the manifold development of Ukrainian intellectual culture.

The Ukrainian Council will oppose every kind of totalitarian and dictatorial aspirations and will stand for the equal status of all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their nationality, race or creed.

Only by struggle will the Ukrainian people gain their rights. But the liberation of Ukraine as well as other subjugated people is simultaneously an affair of international peace and democratic development of the world. Russian Communist imperialism is a danger to the whole world and therefore the defense against it needs a uniform moral and political front of all forces ready to fight for the highest national and human ideals proclaimed during World War II in the Atlantic Charter. The organization of the struggle against Communist total-

itarianism and imperialism must include all peoples enslaved and endangered by Russian Communism. Not only the physical victory but the victory of ideas, particularly the full realization of the great principles of basic rights of nation and man, can avert the danger equal for all, can create a new system of international relations and secure lasting peace in the world.

Standing on the principles of independence and unity of Ukraine the Ukrainian National Council regards the policy of close relations and narrow collaboration above all with all peoples subjugated by Moscow as indispensable.

Only by the efforts of all constructive forces, by inner concord and by union around its national political centre can the cause of Ukrainian liberation succeed and find corresponding understanding and support in the world.

In brotherly love, in uniform ranks, with faith in the victory of truth and justice we begin our holy task.

Long live the Ukainian People!

Long live the Independent United Ukrainian Nation!

Long live the common fighting front of peoples subjugated by the Soviet Union!

THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL

In exile, 21st July, 1948.

UKRAINIAN PARTISANS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

For the last three months the Czech Red Army has had to fight heavily with number of units of UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) which have made another raid on Czechoslovakia with the object of establishing contact with the liberation movements in the Balkan countries.

Two soldiers of the UPA who fought their way to the American zone of Germany in July of this year, have stated to our correspondent:

"The activities of UHWR (Ukrainian Liberation Council) and UPA are seriously worrying the Russian occupational forces: not only because they are detrimental to Moscow's prestige and an encouragement to the Ukrainian people to resist the usurpers but, above all, because UPA is beginning to develop into the co-ordinator of the liberation movements in all the Soviet-occupied countries from the Pripet marshes to the new Russian and Polish regions of East Prussia. As will be remembered, a considerable number of Ukrainians and

Russians were forcibly settled in this region. In June of this year a regular battle between UPA men and a unit of the Polish Red Army took place near Allenstein. The Poles retreated in disorder leaving their dead on the field. This UPA raid was undertaken to keep in contact with the Baltic liberation movements while the raid through Czechoslovakia is a link in the realization of a plan of General Taras Chuprynka (Commander in chief of the UPA) to strengthen the liberation movements in the Danube countries."

This information is corroborated by official reports of the Prague government. The Czechoslovakian ministries for war and for interior affairs had published a joint communiqué which says: "Czech army and police troops are fighting heavily against UPA units who hold positions and fortifications of World War II in Slovakia." It goes on to say that after several days' fighting police troops had taken a bunker whose defenders (three UPA soldiers and a Red Cross nurse) had fought to their last breath with daggers and bayonets after they had exhausted all their ammunition.

On June 22, 23, 24, TWORBA, the organ of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia, wrote that "small but exceedingly well-equipped and well-disciplined UPA units have again broken into Czechoslovakia", and that it is "most alarming that numerous Czech and Slovakian rebels have joined them and begun to liquidate Communists and People's Democrats."

Other Czech papers confirm that the fighting in Slovakia is heavy and the number of Czech and Slovakian recruits to UPA alarmingly large. "It is therefore imperative," says the papers, "to take firm and ruthless steps against UPA as well as their partisans among the Czech and Slovakian population who supply these Ukrainian rebels with food and information on the movements of the Government troops."

A number of Czech troops which have become "demoralized" in the course of their struggle with UPA, have been transferred to the West of the country and their place in Slovakia is taken by the "Communist vanguard", volunteers and former Red partisans.

TWORBA sharply reproaches the Soviet-Polish-Czech high command in Slovakia for its failure to liquidate UPA which, by its activities, is said to have turned the military forces of the above mentioned three powers into a laughing stock. The very existence of UPA is encouraging the anti-Communist elements in all the East-European countries. TWORBA blames the united high command for failing to issue constructive slogans to counteract the ideas of UPA and com-

mand the sympathies of the Czechs and Slovaks. The paper proposes that propaganda against UPA should proceed from the aspect that the Ukrainians would like to annex part of Slovakia and to turn Czechoslovakia into a dependency of independent Ukraine for which UPA is fighting. TWORBA says, moreover, that insufficient stress is laid on "the fact that all the Ukrainians are in the service of American and British imperialists."

On June 28 it was reported from Bratislava, that at that date heavy fighting was going on between Czech, Polish and Soviet troops on one side and UPA units on the other. The arrival of Polish troops at Moravska Ostrava, Opava and other places in Moravia is connected with these battles. UPA in Slovakia is reinforced by Czech and Slovakian insurgents. A brisk hunt for Ukrainians is carried on in the whole country. Constant control of travellers' identity papers is effected on trains and roads and not only a Ukrainian word but even a Ukrainian accent elicits the cry of "Hands up!"

Lately the press has desisted from publishing too frequent reports on UPA activities but they, nevertheless, keep circulating by word of mouth. The truth is spread mainly by wounded Czech soldiers in the hospitals and by the population of the regions where the fighting is going on.

[*Newsletter from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Vol. II, 79-80), Stockholm, Sweden.]



BOOK REVIEWS

STALIN AND GERMAN COMMUNISM, Ruth Fischer. A Study in the Origins of the State Party. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948, pp. xxiii+687.

This is an important book, for it traces out with infinite detail the rise of the German Communist Party out of the chaos and defeatism and pacifism which marked the last stages of imperial Germany on the eve of defeat in World War II. It also shows how this growing Communist movement was influenced at every turn by the events in Russia and by the organization of the Communist International which was supposed to standardize and aid the revolutionary movement in all countries. Then with a wealth of detail the author traces the rise of Joseph Stalin to power in the Soviet Union and the steps by which he cemented his authority and turned the Comintern into a mere mouthpiece of Russian Soviet Communism and thereby reduced the Communist parties of other countries to absolute dependence upon the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and even to imitate it in both its elements of strength and weakness. A similar book could be written on the history of each of the Communist parties that were formed after 1917 and whatever the variations in the beginning, the later histories would repeat with startling exactness the last stages of the crushing of all independent thought and the triumph of Moscow.

This book with its wealth of facts may well be taken as almost a definitive work on this phase of the last thirty years. Yet it is necessary to see this book against a still broader setting for as Gorky remarked, "The wisdom of life is always deeper and broader than the wisdom of people." The communist movement, the work of a trained body of theorists and practical men upon the upheaval of the ruin of empires, was itself only part of the life of the day but its ideas and the ideas of the individuals who were its predecessors have exercised a remarkable influence on the thought of the world and explains many of the difficulties which such peoples as the Ukrainians have met in their struggle for liberty, independence and recognition.

The Communists claimed to speak for the international proletariat and they often kept themselves ostentatiously apart from all of those democratic struggles for liberty carried on by the oppressed

peoples of Europe. In Germany a surprising number of the early leaders came from the East as Rosa Luxemburg and received their early training in the struggle against the Polish nationalists. (p. 49). She regarded the Ukrainian movement as more intangible than a fantasy (p. 9) and could not understand the ideas of Lenin who was willing to use the latent and open movements for independence of the various peoples, insofar as it could advance his cause. Thus from the beginning a large part of the European Communist and non-Communist Left and of the Russian Communists declined to think at all of the problems of nationalism and of national independence which was the dream of the oppressed peoples very definitely and openly after the beginning of the nineteenth century. In Russia the imperialists and the intelligentsia alike scorned this movement for independence on the part of the subject peoples and both parties united in persuading the thinkers of the West that the final solution of the problem of Eastern Europe had to be carried out with regard for the aspirations of the Russians and the Russians alone.

Lenin was the only leader to recognize this new force and endeavor to use it for his purposes but his vision did not extend to the well-being of the people but of the Communists. He therefore at the same time laid the foundation for the attempted disintegration of these movements. The experience and activities of Manuilsky in a diplomatic post at Kiev during the period of Hetman Skoropadsky and until 1923 gave him the training in embarrassing Ukrainian Communism that he was to employ so successfully later as a representative of the Communist International in Germany from 1924 on, when he crushed all independent thought in the Germany party. Thus the relations between the Russian Communists and Ukraine set the pattern for all further Communist developments under whatever leader and policy existed.

In the same way the author emphasizes the fact that the centre of the Communist International should not have been in Moscow but that after 1923 it should have been transferred to a European capital. "Comintern life and Comintern policy should have been divorced from the Russian Party" (p. 547). This was already impossible, for as the author notes, by 1920 the Russian propaganda methods had been transferred to Germany. It was a foregone conclusion that since Communism had triumphed only in Russia, sooner or later the other Communist parties would be drawn to accept the Russian methods and the decrees of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, even though

questioned by Lenin, were a proof that Communism was to be carried to the world in the Russian spirit.

The iron party discipline demanded by Lenin and the train of events put the Russian Communist Party at the centre of world Communism. The ability of Stalin standardized and regulated the process and doomed the last vestiges of independence both at home and abroad. He carried out to the full the implications of the program which had been worked out successfully during the first stage of Communist expansion at the expense of the Ukrainian National Republic, the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijan Republics and the others. Even before the death of Lenin, the Ukrainian opposition was already in evidence as it had been from the beginning.

From the earliest days also, as the author points out, the Soviet government had maintained relations with the German Republic without regard for the well-being of the German Communists. It should have warned the idealists among them but they refused to see it. An international Communist movement under the control of a single government was a paradox in terms and it led inevitably to the Hitler-Stalin agreement of 1939 with all that meant for the world and its afterthought is the relations between the Soviet Government and the Free German Committee and the German Army in the Soviet Union.

It would be possible to continue almost indefinitely an analysis of this book but its lesson is clear. The method of Communism is disintegration, infiltration, occupation, deportation, until happiness is achieved by silence as Shevchenko wrote a century ago in regard to the policy of imperial Russia. Ukraine was the testing ground for the development of those methods which the author so laments in Germany. Ukraine was the first victim of the transition of international Communism of the Kremlin variety. The liberty of Ukraine will be the sign of the ending of the Kremlin tyranny and the sooner that this is recognized, the better for Europe, for the world and for the United Nations. If the reader of this book will see the struggle in the Kremlin and in Germany not only as an isolated struggle but as one section of a worldwide situation, the book will have served its purpose, for here we have a good picture of one aspect of the world conspiracy aided and abetted by idealists who reject the traditional forms of democracy and national culture and temperament in their quest for a universal culture and a universal mode of living.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

KIEVAN RUSSIA, by George Vernadsky. New Haven, Yale University Press. 1948, 412 pp., annotation, bibliography, index, map. \$5.00.

This is the second volume of a series of projected books on Russia by Prof. Vernadsky and Prof. Karporich, to be published by the Yale University Press. Like its predecessor—*Ancient Russia*—it deals chiefly with the medieval Ukrainian People. The author has compiled a great mass of material on this period of Ukrainian history. Though this book is not so thorough as Hrushevsky's volumes II and III for the same period, the author has included a considerable amount of material that has been made available in printed form since the appearance of Hrushevsky's first volume.

The volume covers roughly the period from the ninth to the middle of the thirteenth century. There are eleven chapters of fairly equal length; some are much more heavily annotated than the others. The better chapters are those dealing with the economic field (V), social system (VI), civilization (IX), and foreign relations (XI). The author shows a special aptitude and a great amount of study in his treatment of the social problems. Though he does justice to the royal houses he also recognizes other social classes, but could have given more recognition to the masses of the people and their work. It is interesting that in dealing with a quasi-political question—the formation of the Muscovite kingdom—he has discarded the fantastic theory of Prof. Klyuchevsky that the latter kingdom was founded by a mass migration from Rus—Ukraine—in the eleventh to fifteenth centuries. He also dares to disagree with Klyuchevsky on some other topics.

Another interesting feature of the book is that the author, unlike most Russian historians, has utilized some Ukrainian and Polish books in the preparation of his volume. This was undoubtedly because the chief focal points of action were in and around the cities of Kiev, Chernihov, Pereyaslav, Vladimir Volinsky, i. e. in the Ukrainian principalities. He has explored extensively the material in Greek, German, and Jewish, but less thoroughly in the Scandinavian, Finnish, and Baltic languages. This still await a future scholar. Prof. Vernadsky differs from the average Russian historian in not following the old pattern of cleverly concealing facts to bury the Ukrainian history and people. Probably his Ukrainian parentage is responsible for it, and again it may be the free American air he breathes. . . He recognizes the early existence and creative power of this race.

The technical weakness of the book is apparent in several instances. In a good many cases the author wanders too far away from the subject, especially when he deals with the other Slavic groups. He has a hard time restraining himself from writing their history. On the other hand, he badly neglects elaborating on the Finnish and Mongolian elements in the Great Russian population in its formative stage as a Russian nation. He claims (p. 159) that they were the largest minority group. Probably his next volume will cover this. In chapters III and IV, especially the latter, there seems to be too many references to Cross (pp. 71-98) and not enough to Hrushevsky.

In dealing with the Ukrainian books the author often makes an error in transliterating the titles correctly that he does not make in Polish or Czech or other languages. For example: In Doroshenko's book *Ohlad Ukrainskoi istoriografi*, the first word is spelled "Ogliad"; in Lashchenko's *Lektsii po istorii Ukrainskoho prava*, the word Ukrainskoho is spelled in Russian "Ukrainskogo." And all through the book he shows a similar tendency toward the Russian transliteration of Ukrainian words. Likewise the linguistic comparison the author tries to make of the language of Metropolitan Ilarion of the eleventh century with that of Turgenev and Lomonosov is out of place (p. 243), for Ilarion spoke medieval Ukrainian mixed with Church Slavonic, while Turgenev wrote in modern Russian.

The chief and cardinal fault of the book—which here follows the orthodox Russian imperial pattern—is the misnomer. The title says Kievan Russia. Medieval Rus—Ukraine—and modern Muscovy—Russia—are not the same thing. Of course, the Russians of today annex Ukrainian history and explain in by various theories; and when it is exploded, they invent new ones. The Bolsheviks, in particular, have been great masters in claiming things belonging to other nations. Because some of the Kievan princes collected tribute in the Middle Ages from the self-governing city-states of Novgorod, Pskov, or Suzdal, the modern Russian politician has tried to take over the entire Ukrainian history of that period. Yet this has been the Ukrainian experience with the Muscovites. It is a fact that the Ukrainian people settled very long ago in a compact mass in the territories they now occupy, just as other Slavic groups settled in their present domains. Most likely, even before the Slavic migration in ancient times, there was the fundamental differentiation of the modern Slavic tongues. Yet the Russian government in its zeal for Ukrainian territory tried to annex its language and entire civilization and then deny its existence. It

will be interesting to see how soon Russia will claim the history of the other Slavic nations, since she has seized their territory. Mr. Vernadsky, in some of his writings, following the imperial pattern, calls every Ukrainian a "Russian"; but in the present volume, he is more factual and considerate of the Ukrainians. He still shows much inconsistency.

Notwithstanding its faults, the book has many merits. In the hands of a careful scholar, acquainted with the geography of the region, it can be very useful.

Superior, Wisconsin.—State Teachers College.

WASYL HALICH

STARY HALYCH (ANCIENT HALYCH), by Yaroslav Pasternak. Ukrainian Publishing Co., Cracow-Lviv, 1944, 1-238, 16 tab.

Halych (Halich) the ancient capital of the Western Ukrainian kingdom of the XII and XIII cent., one of the largest cities of Eastern Europe before the Tatar invasion (1249), now a small town on the Dniester river in Galicia, has been the subject of the historical and archaeological researches of several scholars during the last 100 years. Many books have been written, on this topic, several excavations undertaken but until 1930 we were unable to locate the locale of the City and the most important edifices like the Cathedral of St. Mary with the sarcophagus of the powerful Halych ruler Yaroslav Osmomysl, the princely palace, the powerful walls of the strongly fortified capital, etc.

All these buildings and fortifications so often mentioned in the Halich Volhynian Chronicle were covered under a heavy stratum of ruins almost without any visible traces of their former glory. It was not until the author of this book, Dr. Yaroslav Pasternak, a former member of the staff of the excavations of the Hradchany in Prague, started to make regular excavations that these were discovered for the world one of the medieval cities of Ukraine closely connected with Western Europe.

Halych probably was the most eastern seat of the Romanesque style which was used in the cathedral as well as in the other churches as that of St. Pantalemon in its fundamental structure existing until today near the village of Zalukwa.

The excavations directed by Dr. Pasternak discovered the most precious object for any western Ukrainian—the sarcophagus of Prince Yaroslav Osmomysl, mentioned so proudly in the chronicle as well as in the brilliant work of old Ukrainian literature *The Tale of Ihor's*

Campaign. The author of this epos praises Prince Yaroslav as the most powerful prince in old Rus-Ukraine who alone is able to check the barbarians from Asia invading Ukraine "because his iron regiments are supporting the Carpathian mountains, they closed the mouth of the Danube river." The prince is seated on a golden throne ruling his kingdom.

This archaeological discovery by Dr. Pasternak aroused the national sentiment of the western Ukrainians ten years ago and showed how even archaeology can become a political factor in the history of Europe.

This basis book of Y. Pasternak on Ancient Halich is a result not only of the author's historico-archaeological studies but also a result of his discoveries in the territory of old capital, which gave its name to the entire Ukrainian province of Galicia (Halych in medieval Latin was pronounced Galich). It is the best work yet written on this subject.

NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY



UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"Eastern Europe in the Light of World History," by H. F. Schmid. *Eastern Review*, April, 1948, Klagenfurt, Austria.

The virility of European scholarship is amply reflected in this first issue of an extremely important publication undertaken by apparently highly competent Austrian scholars on East European affairs. Issued in English, German and French editions, this journal offers great promise of successfully accomplishing its prime purpose, namely a balanced enlightenment in the West on East European history, religion, politics and the like. In this article, as in the others, a strict objectivity is aimed at in dealing with the historical facts of this area. Driving home the paramount points that Eastern European history is much more than simply Russian history and that many basic cultural relations have existed historically between the former and Western history as such, the author takes occasion to criticize the English historian Toynbee for his neglect of "those most powerful figures" in Cossack history, on the one hand the Ukrainian Cossacks in the Hetman State of Bohdan Khmelnitsky (1648-1657), and on the other hand the Don Cossacks . . . led by Hetman Stenka Rasin . . ." Also in Toynbee's treatment of the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom, it is pointed out that "Here the Ukrainian Cossacks deserve special mention as an outstanding example" of "the enhancing effect of a social and particularly religious discrimination on the flowering of a culture." The author and his associates seem well grounded in Ukrainian history, and it is to be hoped that they will see fit to concentrate some on this history, especially for the edification of the Anglo-American world.

"Is Atlantic Union Inevitable?," by Charles A. Jayne, Jr. *Freedom and Union*, June, 1948, Washington, D. C.

The author of this fascinating essay is a member of the Foundation for the Study of Cycles, and the sub-caption of his article is significantly of this description—"Author's study of 800-year cycles in the history of world civilizations shows Western Democracies are due to 'integrate' and Soviet Russia to 'disintegrate'." This summary account of the author's studies is essentially offered as a scientific sup-

port for the favorite thesis on "Union Now" of Clarence K. Streit who is President of the organization publishing this "Journal of the World Republic." The author maintains that empirical evidence shows that all human societies pass "through a long cycle during which they are alternately integrated and disintegrated," the length of the cycle itself being approximately 800 years. What he calls "the Russian society" is seen in a state of disintegration which began in 1917.

Now, although this conclusion is most attractive for democratically-minded persons, yet such a statistical use of individual historical facts, marked by their character of contingency, is most doubtful. In economics, for example, where it has been extensively applied to business cycles, the element of extreme caution in inference is always insisted upon. In history, it would seem to be still more necessary. Moreover, it is not clear to an informed reader whether the author includes the Kievan Ukrainian period in his category of "Russian society" or not. If he does, then his definition is fallacious and his statistics are unfounded. In any case, theoretic analysis is still the final test and despite a neat statistical arrangement of past empirical date, especially in an area of pervasive contingency and liberty, the rational possibility of totalitarian triumph and its enforced existence cannot be so easily brushed aside.

"Death and Devastation on the Curzon Line," by Walter Dushnyck. Committee Against Mass Expulsion, in cooperation with The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1948, New York.

Mention is made here of this extremely important pamphlet because, aside from its valuable data and generalizations concerning Soviet barbarism, it is one of a periodic series of writings sponsored by this committee which, consisting of such prominent names as William H. Chamberlin, Prof. George S. Counts, Rev. John H. Holmes, Dr. Sidney Hook, Norman Thomas, Dorothy Thompson and other notables, is dedicated to the proper dissemination of undiluted information on the present genocidal activities of the Soviet regime. The author, who is an expert on contemporary East European affairs, assembles many authentic testimonies, much documentary evidence, and a rich fund of concrete factual date showing the mass expulsion and extermination of Ukrainians by the Soviet authorities from the area west of the Curzon Line. For those intimately familiar with the history of Soviet tyranny, this well-organized pamphlet provides new material falling into an old pattern, but for those who are still unacquainted

with this blood-ridden story, the contents of this short work can prove to be of profitable instruction in one lesson.

"Soviet Strategy and Tactics," in *Comment on the Week. America, a Catholic Review of the Week*, June 6, 1948, New York.

In evaluating the Italian election this year, almost all correspondents and commentators admitted that aside from powerful American influence, if any single cause for the decisive defeat of the communists is to be cited, it is that of the network of Catholic "cells," established to combat the poisonous propaganda and threats of violence of the communists. Catholics everywhere, it seems, can be relied upon for their full understanding of the communist menace, and this comment reflects it well. It warns that we should not naively lapse into any sense of security when any temporary lull occurs in the "cold war." It rightly emphasizes that such lulls are part of the tactics, and there is certainly a wealth of evidence to substantiate this observation.

One special point that it makes applies in its fullest measure to the Ukrainians, who more than any other non-Russian group has suffered the pangs of Soviet deceit and brutality. That is that the "Soviet agents succeed even in depriving victims of communist tyranny of the sympathy of free men outside the Russian empire." When it goes further to quote Sydney Gruson's reports from Warsaw (*New York Times*, 13, 1948) to the effect that communist charges against the underground in this Empire as being in its elements pro-German and fascist "seem to be true, and it cannot be doubted that this prevents it from having a general appeal," one is almost led to despair of the competence of some of our correspondents. For, as the comment accurately states in part, the underground, of which the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is the largest, was originally formed to resist the Nazis. More background and less on-the-spot superficial reporting may even tually elevate some of our correspondents to the known European standards of journalism.

"The Permanent Mission," by Hans Kohn. *The Review of Politics*, July, 1948, Notre Dame, Indiana.

The priceless virtue of patience produces some wonderful results, one being that of restrained comment in the presence of professorial authority. Imagine a person describing another in minute detail, telling of his background, his achievements, aspirations, talents, relations, experience and mission in life, but then when it is time to iden-

tify the subject, the narrator partially misidentifies him. Some obvious judgment would then be formed concerning the narrator's power of essential observation. By such an analogy, one can succinctly judge this otherwise instructive "Essay on Russia," written by this eminent Professor of History at Smith College. In developing his theme on the spirit of mission in the Russian soul, as manifested historically in the forms of fanatical Orthodoxy, pan-Slavism, and now communism in combination with the second, the author affords many valuable insights, but the article is marred by his historical inaccuracies when he speaks of Russia as centering in the capital of Kiev whose dynasty, according to the textbook fable, was supposed to have come from Scandinavia. This mistake identity runs through the essay, so that apparently everything east of Poland is Russian for the learned professor. Moreover, it is surprising that within the admittedly erudite scope of his treatment of pan-Slavism, no iota of mention is given to the Society of Sts. Cyril and Methodius.

"The Geographical Bases of Contemporary Poland," by Stanislaw Leszczynski. *Journal of Central European Affairs*, January, 1948, Boulder, Colorado.

With the chief aim of impressing upon the reader the liaison character of the new Poland between the East and the West, the author appears to bend over backwards to have facts or their omission fit his particular thesis, which seeks to afford a groundwork for a revived international importance of this satellite country. For example, he declares that "In consequence of the change of frontiers, the problem of national minorities has ceased to exist." This is a gross untruth. Following the Yalta Conference, where the Polish-Soviet frontier was agreed upon, about 1,200,000 Ukrainians were still inhabiting the area west of the boundary, mainly in the provinces of Peremyshyl, Sianik, Kholm, Polesia and Pidliasia. The simple change of frontiers brought about no cessation of this problem, but rather aggravated it when the Soviet, aided by the puppet Polish regime, resorted to mass expulsion in order to have these unwilling people depart from their ancestral land for "the happiest country in the world." The matter, as seen in the invincible resistance of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, is not by far a closed case. Moreover, the author's emphasis upon the "Role of Poland as liaison between Latin and Byzantine culture" is a bit overextended in point of uniqueness, for the same and more can be made of Ukraine.

"300 Million Forgotten Allies of the West," an editorial. *The Baltic Review*, 1948, New York.

The writer of this pointed editorial, Arvo Horm, reveals a keen knowledge of the present circumstances surrounding the subjugated national units in the Soviet Union as well as an intimate understanding of the naivete of many leading representatives, of the West concerning the type of menace which they will undoubtedly encounter. His attempt to translate the meaning of the seemingly unbelievable experiences borne by the Balts since their forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union is exceeded only by those of the Ukrainians for the past thirty years. He places his finger squarely on the pulse of the feelings of all the submerged peoples in that region when he asserts: "As regards the 120 million of other nationalities subjected by the Tsars and the Bolsheviks, such as the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, the tribes of Turkestan and Azerbeidzhan, the Don and other Cossacks . . . all of those who have any cultural traditions of their own . . . are only waiting for the moment to cast off the yoke of Moscow tyranny." Once the 300 million allies of the West are not forgotten, as irresistible truth will eventually have its way, this yoke will be cast off in everlasting triumph.

