


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# THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

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VOL. IV—NUMBER 4

## ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF UKRAINE



LOWER BOUNDARY: PREWAR TERRITORY IN 1939      UPPER BOUNDARY: DEMARCATION OF UKRAINE AFTER THE WORLD WAR

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## OUR TALKS WITH STALIN

*(Editorial)*

**W**E have recently heard again voices in the United States about a possible new meeting between President Truman, the premiers of Britain and France, and Stalin. The purpose of this new, that is, fourth, meeting would be a general review and solution of all the controversial questions between the democratic countries of the West and the representative of the bloc of communized countries. The idea of such a peace settlement between the East and the West was used as propoganda, during the presidential election campaign, by Henry Wallace, the leader of the American appeasers.

Yet nobody in the United States, at first, gave any serious thought to Wallace's slogan, for they knew that his policy was directed by communists who were working not for the good of the United States, but for the benefit of Soviet Russia. It was evident to everybody that the plan for the new meeting of the Big Four could benefit only Soviet Russia.

The possible meeting of the Big Four became more serious when, a few days before the election, a news item said that President Truman intended to send Chief Justice Vinson of the Supreme Court of the United States, to Moscow to reach some kind of an understanding with Stalin on the controversial matters. This news item was a bombshell; it created a great sensation in the world of politics and threatened the position of the Secretary of State, as the presidential move was made without the knowledge of the Secretary. Soon, however, the rumor about the President's intention of a mission to Moscow died down; everybody regarding it as a mere election step by means of which President Truman tried to create confusion among the non-communist followers of Henry Wallace and win part of their votes for himself.

However, news items about a possible talk of President Truman with Stalin keep on appearing in the newspapers again and again. The idea of a direct meeting between the heads of the great nations has found support among some spiritual leaders of the world. Even the *Osservatore Romano*, a paper connected with the Vatican, has raised its voice, in accordance with the role of the Pope as a peacemaker among nations, in favour of such a meeting. The idea of a new meeting of the Big Four is propounded also by the American pacifists, who believe that they are thus serving a good cause. Not to mention the

fact that the same idea is propagandized, with sinister plans, in the United States by the communists and their fellow travelers.

Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin of Britain has declared his definite opposition to a new meeting with Stalin. President Truman has stated that a meeting with Stalin was possible only in Washington after the lifting of the Berlin blockade.

No matter what stand will be taken by the United States official quarters, in the future let us remind ourselves of our former talks with Stalin and of their results. Basically no one could have anything against new talks with Stalin, if there were any hope that they might help to solve the present world crisis.

However, all the peace discussions so far do not give any hope whatever that it would be possible to settle the differences between the democratic West and the communist East at a new meeting of the Big Four. The main reason why all the talks are futile is the fact that there are no common ethical principles between the democratic Christian West and the communist, atheistic East which could serve as a basis for any discussions, agreements, or treaties.

Moscow regards all talks and meetings only as a means to gain new possibilities and fields for the expansion of its Russian communist imperialism. Its immediate plan is to communize Germany. The Kremlin never has had any intention of binding itself in any manner through agreements with the non-communists, even if such agreements were concluded in the most solemn spirit. On the other hand, the democratic nations regard their agreements as inviolate, and to be carried out in a loyal and gentlemanly way.

The three last meetings of the Big Four gave enough evidence that as soon as the participants of the meetings went home the Kremlin began to infringe upon the terms of the agreements and to misinterpret them in such a way, through the "Stalinist dialectics," that the talks at the meetings lost all their meaning. Usually it was the part of the agreements that was beneficial to the Soviets that was put into effect, and the other part of the agreement, which was beneficial to the other partners of the treaty, was treated as just a scrap of paper.

It was through the agreement at Yalta, carried into effect solely by the Kremlin, that communism was planted in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, in northern Korea, and later on, outside of the terms of the agreement, also in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Such was the deliberate misinterpretation of that part of the pact where it said that the nations delivered from the Nazi tyranny should get "really democratic governments through the will of the people." All the

countries under Russian occupation in time got, in accord with the Kremlin interpretation, so-called "democratic" governments, based on the small communist minority, with the real representatives of the will of the people in general regarded as the enemies of the people and sentenced by the Red courts to the gallows.

The Yalta agreement stipulated that the liberated Manchuria would be handed over to legal Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek. Yet Manchuria soon found itself in the hands of the rebellious Chinese communists, who later plunged China into a terrible civil war which menaces now peace in the whole world.

No one who was acquainted with the perfidious ways of the bolshevist policy in Eastern Europe, and especially remembering their treacherous actions during the Red occupation of Ukraine, had any doubts about the results of the American-Soviet meetings even at the time when they took place. However, anything that was adverse to such meetings, also all that was said to this effect in our Quarterly, found no favorable response, for it was regarded simply as Ukrainian propaganda, aimed at creating discord among the allies of the Second World War, and favorable to the interests of the "Ukrainian Nationalists."

The Bolshevik methods of action have been so standardized by now that who have been under communist rule can easily predict how the communists are going to act in every case when they meet with the Capitalist world of the western democracy.

So let us understand that our talks with Stalin will not solve the present American-Russian crisis. Even if we make any agreements with him, our agreements will be thrown into the wastebasket the very same day. What is promised by Stalin will not be carried out in Berlin by Sokolovsky, of course, in accord with his own secret instructions. In order to understand this one has to study the double game of the Soviet perfidy for years. However, it can always be traced to the following Lenin-Stalin ethical formula: that "the communists are not bound by any obligations in their dealings with the Capitalist world."

Our talks with Stalin will have no effect; the only thing that can save us from war is our continuance of a strong policy in our dealings with the Kremlin in the rebuilding program of Western Europe and its military and political organization. Effective aid to the legal government of China (in order to stop the advance of the Chinese Reds and to turn them back from where they came, into the Red centres

of the Russian Asia) will eventually lead to a successful solution of the differences between the United States and Russia.

No doubt, this is a very heavy task for the United States. It requires great material sacrifices. It expects the present generation to give up its daily comforts of life for the sake of a happier future for the next generations and in order to save the present Christian civilization. The democratic nations should fully realize the sinister meaning of the following words of the communist anthem, the International: "This will be the last and decisive battle." We are now facing this battle, and we must not run away from it.

We do not say that a strong policy of the democratic nations will inevitably lead to a crisis and end up with a new world war. On the contrary, only when the Kremlin realizes its isolation within the strong ring of its well-organized neighbors will it be ready to talks of peace with other nations and to make concessions to peoples within the borders of the Soviet Union.

One can talk with the Kremlin only with the words of a strong fist and with such words as the world used in its talks with Hitler, demanding from him "Unconditional Surrender." If the Kremlin grows strong, it will force a war on us when the conditions will be most adverse to us, at the time of our moral and material disarmament. But if the Kremlin realizes that we are stronger, it will be ready to make real concessions and will not risk war, as communists are realists.





## THE WEST-EAST PROBLEM IN THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA

By BORYS KRUPNITSKY

**R**USSIA has always been in the past and will certainly continue to be vitally interested in the question of its orientation. Its destiny hangs upon its solution of the dilemma whether to follow the West or to remain with the East. Was Muscovy of the times preceding Tsar Peter the First, with its policy of isolation, following the right path, or the Empire of St. Petersburg, ushered in by Tsar Peter, with its approach toward the West? This has always been the subject of impassioned discussion among the Russian historians and people, and it will remain of vital interest so long as the very fate of Europe, of Russia, and of the whole world is not finally settled.

### The Spirit of Ancient Muscovy

The ancient Muscovy had no such problem, for it deliberately kept itself aloof from the West. Furthermore it persistently destroyed everything that was tinged with the spirit of the West. Due to such a policy Muscovy acquired very little, indeed, from that spiritual awakening of which Kiev was the very center in the Middle Ages. The Tatar invasion made a lasting rift between Muscovy and the South (Ukraine) that was in direct contact with the West. The century-long domination of the Tatars transformed Muscovy into a country that was definitely isolated and detached from western Europe.

On the other hand, the same Tatar invasion pushed Ukraine nearer to the West. In fact, Muscovy had never been an heir to the cultural ideas and forms that took shape in the Kievan State. In the colonial districts of the North there was evolved a different kind of a prince, society, and social and political conditions. The ruling prince evolved into a self-willed autocrat, the tsar of the future. The common people lost their rights. The political and social conditions degenerated into a way of life that found its best expression in the "iron fist" policy of the State. Tsar Ivan III, after marrying Princess Sophia Palaeolog, to some degree took over the haughty spirit of the autocratic Byzantine emperors, but he definitely put their sanctified royal approval to the already existing Tatar form of government in Muscovy.

The Muscovite spirit of life was already stamped to a greater

degree with superficial formalities and ceremony than with the richness of ideas and spirituality. The present day dialectics of "form" is not only a specific mark of the contemporary Russian expression of the teachings of Marx and Lenin. It definitely contains something transmitted from the ancient Russian character which has been expressing itself in the same way for ages. This special characteristic of the Russians is clearly evident in their religion in which the ceremonial aspect dominates its spiritual content.

The abiding attachment of the Russians to the external, technical, ritualistic and formal attributes of life is closely connected with their belief in their own righteousness, and with the spirit of intolerance which, as time went on, was more and more changed into sheer fanaticism. An educated Muscovite of the sixteenth century was not only a scribe, believing in his own infallibility, but also a person who haughtily and with contempt looked at the outside world, and believed that there was nothing in that poor outside world which could compare favorably with "holy" Moscow.

### The Muscovite Expansion

Thus the "gathering up of the lands," the main feature of Muscovite history in the period preceding Tsar Peter I, acquired the stamp of the Muscovite character. Muscovy knew no other way of life than the way of life of a nomadic Horde: to conquer, to subdue, and to oppress. It was but natural for the Muscovites to regard their form of government, of religious thought, and of social conditions as the only righteous form of life and to believe that it should be transplanted to the conquered or annexed countries. Thus the entire history of Muscovy is bound up with its policy of centralism and unification, and, in consequence, with the policy of "Russification," by force and violence.

In this process of the "gathering up of the lands," which was actually a policy of violent subjugation by the autocratic tsars, Muscovy ruthlessly combatted everything that could be, so to say, called of the West in the East. The battle between the West and the East took place in Muscovy itself.

It is evident that during this period of violent conquest Muscovy lost its best opportunities. From the days of old there were, the so-called, "windows into Europe" for Muscovy, through such western Russian republics as Novgorod and Pskov, which had close economic contact with the West. But there was no understanding among the Muscovites

of what they might gain if the two democratic republics were left alone, freely to develop their cultural, political, and economic phases of life.

At first the Muscovite tsars were satisfied, after taking supremacy in Novgorod and Pskov away from the Lithuanian-Ruthenian State, with the right of appointing candidates for the position of dukes in the Novgorod and Pskov republics. But by the end of the fifteenth century they not only destroyed the last vestiges of independence of the republics, but they also ruthlessly eradicated all the intellectuals of Novgorod and Pskov, who were representatives of the democratic and freedom-loving ideas. It was Tsar Ivan III who wrecked Novgorod's self-government (in 1478). Later Tsar Ivan the Terrible stamped out what remained of its freedom. In a barbarous manner he ruined the defenseless city, killed in cold blood a few thousands of its inhabitants, and transplanted fifteen thousand of its remaining citizens to Muscovy, filling their places with Muscovites. He thus destroyed everything that could remind the people of liberty. The "window into Europe" was closed. His own efforts to reach the Baltic Sea failed.

Not only Novgorod and Pskov, but even Smolensk (partly also Ryazan and Tver), which formerly belonged to the federated State of Poland, Lithuania and Ruthenia, could have acted as a cultural center through which the central part of Russia could have had contact with the Western world. The despotic and ignorant Muscovy put to an end all its opportunities, by stamping out all efforts for freedom and cultural development in its lands where it noticed any kind of rivalry or difference from its own ways of life.

### Muscovy Meets Ukraine

In like manner Muscovy also failed to understand the significance of the Ukrainian situation. Its fear of every freedom-loving movement was stronger than all the attractive political possibilities which were presented to it by the great Ukrainian revolution of 1648. This fear prevented Muscovy from assuming leadership in the opposition to Poland. The partition of Poland could have taken place in the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. That it failed to take place was the responsibility of the Muscovite politicians who, instead of co-operating with Ukraine in the wide open spaces of Eastern Europe, began to oppose it.

The problem of the Black Sea and of Turkey would have acquired also a different significance, if Muscovy had decided then to co-operate with Ukraine. In the name of the unity of the centralized Muscovite

State every freedom-loving movement and every freedom-loving nation was regarded as a disruptive element, undermining the very national basis of Muscovy. On account of this attitude Muscovy reached some of its political objectives only centuries later, and simply failed to reach others. Besides, even for its most necessary objectives Russia had to pay with rivers of blood and with such over-exertion that, because of its exhaustion, it was bound to remain inactive afterwards for long periods of time.

It was Ukraine, not the Russian lands of Novgorod and Pskov or Smolensk, that became in the seventeenth century a cultural bridge between Muscovy and the West. This was possible because up to that time Ukraine had been excluded from the sphere of Muscovite influences, and because it had been part of the federated Polish and Lithuanian State, which had developed under the cultural and educational ideals of Western Europe. Otherwise Ukraine would have succumbed to the same fate as Novgorod and Pskov.

The transition to modern times forcefully emphasized to Muscovy the urgency of it catching up with the progress of Europe. The dangers in the fact that Muscovy was lagging far behind the general and constantly increasing current of European civilization became ominously real.

Muscovy was forced to subject itself to a process of Europeanization, with the first phase of such a process coming in the seventeenth century from Ukraine. But, simultaneously, on the one hand, Muscovy took advantage of the Ukrainian culture and of the educated Ukrainians who acted on its territories as cultural missionaries, and, on the other hand, it continued to combat all those ideas which were the very foundation of life in Ukraine. As in the preceding age, Muscovy's aim was to grasp rapaciously, to subdue, to annex and to Russify this source of its own cultural rejuvenation.

Russians eyed suspiciously the western cultural values that were brought to them from Ukraine. With but a few exceptions, the majority of Russians were hostile to the Western European scientific ideas brought to them by the Ukrainians. Even Tsar Peter's reforms had to be forcefully imposed on Russia from above through imperial ukazes (decrees). The torchbearers of European civilization in Russia, foreigners and Ukrainians, as late as the eighteenth century, still encountered hostility to their work even among the Russian intellectuals.

### Tsar Peter I and the West

In fact, the process of the dissemination of the Western European culture was imposed on Russia by the iron fist of Tsar Peter I, by violent methods, overwhelming the tardy Russian traditions. This was possible because of the fact that the Russians had been used from time immemorial to decisions made by the iron fist. The Europeanization of Russia, with the exception of the church reforms, had one special feature. Tsar Peter had a special aptitude for understanding technical progress, and this understanding became the leading feature of his application of European ideas in Russia. Spiritual values were, in fact, strange and meaningless to him. In a primitive, East-European fashion Tsar Peter himself was a *homo technicus*. That was the reason why the process of Europeanization in Russia was superficial, and did not affect the inner ways of life of the Russian people. (Hence, we cannot speak here of the European spirit, but only of the Europeanization, since Russia always kept itself aloof from Europe, as a world apart.)

The process of Europeanization in Russia failed to acquire spirituality even by the time when Russia began its policy of continually widening its borders. The Russian expansion to the East, we could say, was along the traditional lines, and was in harmony with the Russian spirit of colonization. On the other hand, Russian expansion to the west was somewhat superficial, it was an invasion of police and officials into the densely populated European countries, without the complementary following of the Russian masses. Russian expansion into Europe was very much like the expansion of the Ottoman Turks, a bare imperialistic move, without any special mission which would appeal to the people of western Europe. It was not a mission, but simply a conquest.

The annexation of Finland, of the Baltic countries, and of Poland (mostly at the end of the 18th and at the beginning of the 19th centuries), had no effect whatever on the political or cultural structure of Russia. The annexed countries had even less cultural effect on Russia than Ukraine which united its destiny with Russia in the middle of the seventeenth century. In the annexed territories Russia applied its traditional policy of centralization and Russification, and gradually absorbed the worst elements of the conquered countries—those people who were eager to adapt themselves to the Russian wishes and ready to strengthen and expand the power of the tsar's autocracy and of the Russian Orthodox Church. Especially the Baltic barons adapted themselves with much ingenuity to the reactionary tsarist policy, and many

of them became high tsarist officials. As foreigners, living among the Estonians and Latvians, the barons were sympathetic with the aims of the Russian Empire which, as they, was going far beyond its ethnic borders.

As we have said before, the process of Europeanization in Russia touched only the externals of life, and did not have any spiritual effects. In general the continual policy of conquest and expansion obstructed any inner, spiritual growth. So much energy was expended by the Empire on its expansion that it failed in its effort to catch up with the progress of Western Europe. This was the reason why for such peoples as the Finns, the Balts, the Poles, and the Ukrainians, etc., who belong to the Western type of civilization, Russian annexation meant not progress, but retrogression. In addition, they were subjected to the Russian policy of unification and centralization.

Russia did not help the annexed Western nations in their progress, but rather pulled them down. It simply meant that they began to lose some of their Western cultural values, after the breaking of their well-established contact with Western Europe. They were switched from their normal pathway of progress to small local by-paths.

### The Russian Slavophiles and Westerners of the 19th Century

In the nineteenth century the question of the Western European orientation in Russia became of prime significance. Russia was divided into the partisans of the two orientations—the Westerners and the Slavophiles. The Westerners desired to live in harmony with the intellectual life of Western Europe, and the Slavophiles preferred the life of isolation, and believed that Russia should keep to its own pathway. For the Slavophiles Slavic unification around Russia was not of secondary importance. They thought that it was Russia's destiny to include in its isolated existence all the Slavic nations. As Pushkin wrote, Russia should see to it that "All the Slavic rivers flow into the Russian Sea."

In reality it was not Moscow or St. Petersburg that was representative of the freedom-loving Slavs, but Kiev. It was in Kiev that the Society of SS Cyril and Methodius was organized in the forties of the last century with the aim of uniting into a fraternal federation all the Slavic nations on the basis of equality, Christianity and democracy. Such ideas never came from Moscow. It was Kiev that produced the Western type of Slavophiles, who desired the fusion of the Slavic idea of fraternity with the progressive ideas of Western Europe.

The Russian Westerners were quite weak. They lived on European

materialistic ideas, but were unable to infuse into them any original spirit, to embody them into the Russian character. The contact of Russia with the West had accustomed the Russians to regard the ideas of Western Europe as a sort of modern fad which could be as easily changed, as Vladimir Solovyov bitterly remarks, as a pair of gloves. Even some of the foremost Russian Westerners finally landed in the Slavophile camp.

Both the Russian Slavophiles and the Westerners were of the same opinion that Tsar Peter I had stopped by force the native Russian way of development. There was the slight difference, that the Westerners regarded Tsar Peter's action as a necessity and thought that Russia's destiny was closely bound with the West, while the Slavophiles viewed Tsar Peter's action as a mistake which had placed Russia on the wrong path.

In fact, both the Russian Slavophiles and the Westerners based their ideas on the philosophy of such representatives of the German Romantic Period as Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling. The difference was in the reaction of the two camps. The Slavophiles used the ideas borrowed from the West to oppose the West. They preached against the "rotten" West, as bad company for Russia. They asserted that it was Russia's destiny to reveal its own intrinsic character, to evolve its own national type, and finally that it was its destiny to develop entirely by itself and through its own powers. Yet, if one asked all those Kireyevskys, Aksakovs, Khomyakovs, etc., from the camp of the Slavophiles, what basic creative ideas Russia could present in place of the ideas from the "rotten" West, they certainly could name nothing else but Russian Orthodoxy, the Nation, and the communal land ownership—"obshchina" (commune). The official Russia could add its spirit of Autocracy. It was, indeed, a very narrow and vague pathway over which the Russian Slavophiles intended to lead their "holy" and messianic" Russia—that Russia which was expected to utter the greatest word of its "Messianic wisdom," not only to the West, but also to the whole world.

### Muscovy versus Ukraine

It is very interesting to note that in Ukraine the West-East Problem simply never existed. Ukraine was conscious of being an integral part of Europe, and, it was only natural for the Ukrainians to think that their progress was part of the framework of the Western European civilization.

Finally, the Russian Slavophiles wanted to be and were repre-

sentative of the ancient Muscovy, that is, of its violent annexations, of its policy of centralization, and of its policy of Russification. There is no doubt, that their hostility to the West was also directed against the Westerners who existed side by side with them in the Russian Empire. This hostility was directed against everything which could not be included in one formula or one definite national activity. The Slavophiles believed that the Russian Empire, with its many peoples, some of which, such as the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians, representing Western culture—should in time transform itself into a homogeneous, uniform Russified nation. In this respect the Slavophiles were at one with the Russian official politicians. Russia was ready to continue its policy of destruction of everything that could not be included in its all-inclusive national organism.

Nor did the Russian Westerners have any intention of lending a helping hand to the peoples with Western culture within the Russian Empire. The problem of the non-Russian peoples within the Empire was of no interest to them. Though they were interested in the ideas of Western Europe, they looked for no friends with similar interests within the Empire, in the lands that were annexed by Russia in the West. Of course, there were exceptions like Herzen. Yet even Herzen was sorry in his old age for having been too "liberal" in his attitude towards the Polish question.

### Eurasianism and Communism

Our modern times have given birth to two new ideological currents—to Eurasianism and to the Soviet Communist doctrine. The followers of Eurasianism as a school first appeared in Western Europe, among the Russian emigrés. They propound the idea that Europe and Asia can be united through a process of synthesis. In reality they are people who have deliberately turned their backs on Europe, and are trying to discover in the ancient Muscovy ideals which they have failed to find in Western Europe. They have been brought up on the ideas of the Slavophiles, and on the Slavophile hostility to the "rotten West," but they have given a special form to these ideas.

The Eurasians are definitely of the opinion that the Tatar domination was beneficial to the ancient Muscovy and they emphasize the Tatar influence on the development of the Muscovite form of government and thought. They regard the Mongolian tribes which have been or still are settled in the eastern districts of Russia as the people with equal rights with the rest of the members of the big Russian family,



but when they speak of the Western ethnic elements they either are very vague or they keep silent on the question of equality, though they give hints that many of the Western ethnic elements should be included in Eurasia, especially all those that are to the east of the Polish ethnic border. As can be seen, the Eurasians have shown themselves more logical than the Slavophiles in their conclusions, for the Slavophile ideals were quite often only very vaguely expressed.

Soviet Russia has perfunctorily entered on the pathway of the Russian Westerners. It has acquired from the West the teachings of Marx, one of the basic social currents of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. But the fact that Russia took over Marxism from the West as its prevailing philosophy did not mean at all that Russia had finally turned its face towards Europe. The Marxist teachings in Russia took a special form, and the international Marxist ideas received a special Russian version. The Russian way of thinking has expressed itself with great force in the Soviet combination of Marx, Lenin, and has shown there all its love of dry formalism, literal interpretation, and its peculiar form of dialectics.

In reality Russia has chosen for itself not the West, but the East. Soviet Russia has put into effect what was propounded in earlier times by the Slavophiles and later by the Eurasians. It is but a concrete expression of the idea about the "rotten" West (in the Soviet language, it is now "the rotten capitalism" of Western Europe). It is basically the same idea of Russian self-sufficiency (now of the national Communist kind), the same kind of belief in the unification and resurgence of the Soviet continent of Europe and Asia, and the same policy of Russia towards the world, of the Russians as the "Chosen People," the leaders and the standard-bearers of the world revolution.

Soviet Russia has adopted only the technical inventions of the West, and now claims them as its own. After adopting the Russified form of Marxism Soviet Russia believes that there is nothing else worthy of adaptation from the West. We can notice, after a close examination, that as time goes on there is more and more tendency in Soviet Russia to move away from the West than in the other direction.

Present day Russia regards itself as strong enough to stand on its own cultural basis. Furthermore, it refuses to regard itself as a tributary of the main cultural current, that is, of Western Europe. It is not only the idea of self-sufficiency (which is but an old idea and not far-reaching enough to satisfy the Eurasians, the successors of the Slavophiles)

that is steadily sinking a deeper and firmer root in Soviet Russia, but also the idea of the existence of two cultural currents, one in Western Europe and the other of more importance in the Soviet Russia. We find a typical expression of these ideas in an article which appeared in the Soviet magazine "Neue Welt" in Berlin (No. 2, 1946), under the caption "Leninism and the Progressive Russian Culture of the Nineteenth Century," by M. Yovchuk, which makes this unequivocal statement: "The creators of the progressive Russian culture impregnated the thoughts of the Russian people with the belief that a great future was awaiting Russia and that the Russian nation was capable of creating as great, if not a greater, culture and civilization as that created by the nations of Western Europe."

Furthermore, Soviet Russia has started to express its claims to world leadership, not only in matters of politics, but also in matters of civilization, culture, and spiritual life. We find hints to this effect in the aforesaid article,—for instance: "...Lenin and Stalin... have expanded the Marxian teaching, and thus created Leninism, which is the highest achievement, not only of Russian culture, but also of world culture, the highest peak of the contemporary scientific and philosophical thought." The article hints that the main current of life is moving to the East. The Soviet ideologists have started to see the very center of the world in their own country. They believe that if it is the destiny of Communism to spread all over the world, then it is fitting for the "Chosen Nation" (meaning, Russia), which has made so many blood sacrifices in its Communization of the world, to assume world leadership. Behind this kind of ideology, we find the face of the nationalist Russia, the ancient Muscovy, which has invented but a new method for imposing its own will upon the world.

The new nationalist Russia is going, in its policy toward the other nations that are included in the Soviet Empire, down the same old well-tried pathways, ruthlessly against all those in whom the spirit of freedom is still alive or in whom it could be easily brought to life again. The whole weight of its ruthlessness is applied especially to the countries and nations which lie between the present day Russia and Western Europe. Under the shadow of a federative constitution, Moscow is in reality subjecting its non-Russian peoples to a ruthless policy of denationalization, using every kind of excuse to destroy those non-Russian peoples which are still conscious of their own national identity. The spirit of intolerance and of violence is even more evident now in Soviet Russia than it was in ancient Muscovy. Its policy of centraliza-

tion and of Russification is more and more evident. Soviet Russia methodically uproots everything that has even incipient features of possible opposition. It is afraid especially of any opposition on national grounds from the non-Russian peoples.

The basic principles of the development of Russian culture have become more conspicuous since Russia went Communist. One can notice there a definite retreat from the Western World, through a deliberate, systematic and methodical policy of estrangement from the West, both of the intellectuals and of the masses of the common people. Russia also in the same direction is pulling the other countries and nations which have found themselves within the scope of the Soviet influences. Soviet Russia has evolved its own way of life, its own world, hostile to the West.



## UKRAINE, THE OPPRESSED PEOPLES, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

*By* CLARENCE A. MANNING

**I**N SEPTEMBER, 1917, there was held in Kiev on the eve of Lenin's seizure of power in Petrograd a Congress attended by the leaders of the non-Russian nationalities to formulate plans to compel the Russian Provisional Government to give recognition to the many separate peoples who had been conquered and doomed to Russification by the imperial regime. Despite all their protestations of democracy, Kerensky and his followers saw no reason why the voice of the subject peoples should be heard in the Russian capital, even though his methods were rapidly driving them to declare their complete independence of the Russian colossus.

In November, 1943, under the protection of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army there was held somewhere west of the Dnieper River the First Conference of the Enslaved Peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia. Here in addition to the Ukrainians were representatives of Azerbaijan, the Bashkirs, the White Ruthenians, the Armenians, the Georgians, the Kabardinians, the Kozakhs, the Ossetes, the Tatars, the Uzbeks, the Circassians and the Chuvash. Many of these names mean little to the American public but they represent some of the major groups that have been swallowed up in the onward march of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. They are peoples living from the western borders of the Soviet Union through the area of the Black Sea and the Caucasus almost to the borders of China. Many of these groups are larger numerically than are some of the independent states already represented in the United Nations and in a world that is devoted to the achievement of the winning of the Four Freedoms, they have a right to be heard.

The significant fact is that the representatives of these peoples should have gone together under the leadership and the inspiration of the Ukrainian struggle for liberty and under the protection of armed men fighting for the cause of Ukraine. In a very real sense the Ukrainian struggle for independence has become the model and the centre for all the efforts that are being made by the nations oppressed by the Kremlin. The Ukrainian Revolutionary Army has established contacts with their neighbors to the north, especially the White Ru-

thenians and Lithuanians and through them they have relations with the peoples of the Baltic who are fighting for their liberty and through their eastern lines, they are in touch with similar movements which exist in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In a word, all around the Russian Soviet Republic from the Arctic Ocean on the north to the Black Sea and from the Black Sea into Central Asia there is a steady and persistent resistance to the standardization that is being enforced by the Kremlin on the Great Russian pattern.

It is natural that Ukraine should be the keystone to this great arc. The Ukrainians next to the Great Russians are the most numerous of all of the oppressed nations. They have the largest population, more than triple any of the other groups, and larger by far than most of the peoples of Western Europe. By every standard that can be advanced, Ukraine has the population, the area, the wealth to become a powerful nation and their subjugation was the main factor in the rise to power and to world menace of the Great Russians, whether imperial or Soviet. In every century Ukraine has been in close touch with the countries of Europe. It has always had a distinctively European orientation and without interference of Moscow, it would have developed further and faster along this line.

At the same time the appeal which was issued by this Conference is striking in its clarity. "The new order in Eastern Europe and Asia will exclude all imperialism and will guarantee full freedom of development to every people. This order will be founded on a system of independent countries of each nation on its own ethnographical territory. For the victory of the national revolution there is needed the rising of the millions of the masses."

It will be at once seen that the general goal of these movements follows very largely the ideals which have served in the development of Europe during the last centuries. There the old conception of the Holy Roman Empire which had aimed to be a Christian empire without regard for race, language, or nationality, broke down before the development of a series of national states which have become stabilized in their own ethnographical boundaries. With few exceptions as Alsace-Lorraine and a few small areas, the general boundaries of Western Europe have remained fixed since the beginning of the nineteenth century and to-day as never before the trend toward the former formation of larger entities and groups of nations which have joint interest is growing stronger. We can speak now of the Benelux combination of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg, but even so these

countries are acting together without losing their own particular values and traditions. Thus the democratic states of Western Europe are working toward cooperation but with the preservation of their fundamental liberties and with the respect for the rights of the individual.

The goal of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union is diametrically different. In both cases there is still the predominant urge to fashion the life of all the subjugated people on the Great Russian model. Its object is to break down all smaller entities and to welcome the individual not as the member of a specific group but as an applicant for membership in the Great Russian race. Moscow is now the sacred fatherland for all Communists, the word of Stalin is an imperious command, and it is the duty of all progressive people to obey him and build up the new colossus until it becomes the master of the universe.

This conception was inherent in all of the teachings of Lenin despite his playing around with nationalism as a means of disintegrating the old regime. It was realized clearly by the Ukrainians at their Congress of the Kiev Soviet in 1917, when they resolved that they had not thrown off the imperial yoke to accept the yoke of the Russian commissars. It was perhaps concealed during the period of the twenties when the Kremlin was allowing some cultural liberty to the various Soviet republics with the idea of identifying the leaders who would be dangerous to its policy of standardization but it has now been some 20 years that Stalin has revealed the truth in all of its original bareness and harshness. It was the underlying conception of the White Russian armies during the civil war. It has been the underlying conception of all the schools of thought among the anti-Bolshevik Russians, and it is the one conception that any of the Russian opponents of Bolshevism has to offer for the future.

To achieve this, the masters of the Kremlin have falsified history and have rewritten the story of the past. They have mutilated and annotated and edited the writings of the poets and thinkers of Ukraine and of all the other Soviet republics. They have twisted the careers of individuals like Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko and Lesya Ukrainka to make them appear as the devout lackeys of the masters of the Kremlin and their predecessors in the Russian intelligentsia.

They have not been content with this but they have embarked upon the most far-reaching plans for leaving no people on their ethnographic territory but of scattering them at any cost of human life

in order to eliminate from the body politic anything that does not fit with their ideas. Their goal is a "natural steady progress toward a general blood union" carried on with all the powers of a steadily increasing police state and they are working towards it by destruction as well as breeding.

Under such a policy the slightest sign of nationalism, of attachment to any local tradition or ideas becomes dangerous treason to be wiped out at all costs. It explains the use that the Soviet authorities have made of any opposition to deport and uproot millions of the population and to send any undesirable elements to areas where they will soon perish. It explains the transfer of millions of Ukrainians to Siberia and the frozen north. It explains the deportation of nearly all the intellectual leaders of the occupied Baltic republics to unknown destinations. It explains too the Soviet choice of peoples from the Far East to take the place in the Baltic and in Ukraine and the newly acquired Western Ukraine of those people whom they have arbitrarily removed and doomed to disappear. It explains too why so many of the people of the eastern Soviet Republics are willing to join the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army in their struggle against the Moscow imperialism.

To-day there are few people who do not realize that a new wave of nationalism is sweeping over Asia. It has created the new states of India and Pakistan, the revival of Korea, the disturbances in Indonesia, the movements among the Mongols, and countless other changes that are filtering into the American and European press. In all these cases Communism is encouraging these movements because it sees their value as disintegrating weapons against the powers of the West which had first brought to the East many of these ideas, but it has no intention of allowing these new states to develop their own cultures. Once the balance of power has been upset, the Moscow-trained Russian-speaking Communists hope to take over and turn these states into replicas of their own Soviet Republics which are called happy because they are silent. At the same time, any sign of nationalism in their own territory is sternly suppressed and punished with death or deportation.

The ostensible admission of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian Soviet Republics to the United Nations was but a blind to render more palatable to the Poles and the Czechs, the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians, Romanians and Hungarians their degradation in the name of Pan-Slavism from free countries to obedient tools of Moscow imperialism.

It is only necessary to read the accounts of the steady voting in the United Nations of the Soviet block to realize that they are succeeding even better than they had dreamed.

They have had one piece of good fortune which never came to the lot of Hitler or of any other European despot—the ignorance of the educated public opinion of the West as to the material with which they were working. A Hitler invading the Netherlands or Norway at once provoked the hostility of the civilized world. A Stalin or a Lenin seizing Ukraine or Georgia or a Kirghiz Republic could get away with the excuse that Russia was merely recovering territory that the country had lost at the end of World War I and could compare it with the French claims to Alsace-Lorraine. For the general public it was more a matter of ignorance than of even indifference that Russia had not reached the Baltic Sea until the early part of the eighteenth century, that Russia had not wiped out the independence of Ukraine and her local institutions until the latter part of that century, that it was the middle of the nineteenth century before Russia had become secure in her control of the peoples of the Caucasias and that it was the latter part of the nineteenth century before she had begun to introduce her own institutions and language among the peoples of Central Asia. It would still be within the realm of possibility for a very aged patriarch in any one of several Soviet Republics to remember distinctly the day when the first Russian imperial troops put in an appearance even as he could remember when the Red Army and the secret police returned to reassert the rule of Moscow.

It is against that history that we have to face the statements of the Western diplomats that in their dealing with the Soviet Union and their efforts to check the advance of Communism they have no desire to take from Moscow anything that rightly belongs to it. They have not yet come to take the stand that the various Soviet Republics which appear in the lists of the Soviet Union and which are changed at the will of the rulers arose from the struggle of the population of Eastern Europe and Asia against Russian domination. At the time when men are questioning the significance of democracy and are anxious to carry out its ideals, they are still willing to try to conciliate the ever greedy Moscow by accepting its hand-picked delegates to represent other peoples in the United Nations. At the time when the world is trying to punish the Nazi leaders for their acts of genocide and of oppression, they are still willing to hope for peace by treating Moscow's persecution of its "independent" republics as the acts of a legitimate government and not those of a usurper and conqueror.



The events of the past decade have drawn a striking parallel between the German seizure of Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France and the states of the east with their quislings and their deportations, their concentration camps and murder gangs and the Soviet policy in the Baltic states, in Ukraine, in the Caucasus, and in Central Asia, yes and their treatment of the Siberian Eskimos on the Russian islands off the Alaska coast or the people in northern Korea. They are all part of that imperialistic trend which has led the Russian Empire and now the Soviet Union to substitute for democratic cooperation the forced assimilation of whatever people come within their clutches.

It is this fact and this alone that has turned the United Nations and the Security Council into a caricature of world organization and a sounding board for a world-wide transmission of Soviet insults, threats, and abuse. That is now becoming obvious to all except the fellow-travelers and dupes, and sooner or later there can be but one answer, if democracy and freedom are to survive. The nations must come to grips with the problem and admit to the United Nations not the mouthpieces and parrots of the Kremlin but the representatives of the people of Eastern Europe and of Asia selected by themselves to express the thoughts and feelings, the hopes and aspirations of the great masses of the population and not of a small Communist group taking their orders blindly from Moscow.

That means the recognition of the Soviet rule as an imperialistic device and a menace to the peace of the world in Kiev and Tiflis as well as in Berlin, Warsaw, and Prague. It means that the Great Russian thirst for a messianic or a Communist mission must be recognized as what it is, a nightmare and not a salvation of the world.

"But that means the Balkanization of still another part of the world." The phrase was not used some centuries ago when the Low Countries first recovered their liberty from Spain and began their career. It was not used when Norway and Sweden separated peacefully and continued their accord within the general feelings of Scandinavian friendship. It will not bring any other evil and disruptive consequences now, if the democratic countries will lend a helping hand to the new regimes and protect them from that sort of infiltration and attack that destroyed the governments set up in 1917 and 1918 on the ruins of the old Russian empire.

It is easy to see how many of the Soviet Republics and other states could form friendly groups within the United Nations, once the power

of Moscow were removed and they were allowed to work for their own good and the welfare of humanity.

Let us take for example the whole problem of the Black Sea. The area around its shores have a common interest in trade and commerce and in self-defence. It is only natural that the rich grain fields of Ukraine which have been for thousands of years the natural granary of Europe would export through the Dardanelles. So it was in the past, in the days of Greece and Rome. So it was even after the Russian imperial occupation but there was one striking difference. Russian statistics and those of the Soviet Union emphasize the fact that the Black Sea ports have been used only for the export of grain. Any imports have been transferred to the Baltic so that the Great Russians could profit at the expense of their victims. The ports of the Black Sea would once again begin to function on a two way traffic with mutual advantage to the world and to Ukraine.

And the neighbors? We only have to look back into Ukrainian history and see the close connections that prevailed between Ukraine and Kiev and the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, the modern Romania. We see the same thing in the east in the long series of contacts between the Khan of the Crimea and the Kozak hetmans. We see it in the relations between Ukraine and Georgia and the peoples of the Caucasus. We see it in the trade with Istanbul and the old Constantinople.

Yes, the Black Sea powers form a group which have every reason in the world to maintain friendly relations through a revitalized United Nations and in a peaceful order. There never has been the need for a Russian-Soviet garrison in the Dardanelles to maintain open navigation but it has always been the dream of Moscow to show its supremacy and its claim to be the centre of the world by placing its armed forces in the city on the Bosphorus and making it pay homage to the Third Rome. To Russians of every school of political thought, Constantinople was destined to be theirs but they only discovered this manifest destiny, after they had secured control of Ukraine. Before that, back in the Middle Ages, when there was a Christian emperor in the city, Moscow turned aside in disdain. It was absorbed in the east and its eastern interests. It had no desire to be corrupted by contact with the Greeks and the Byzantines. On the other hand Kiev and Constantinople worked together from the days of St. Volodymyr right down to the time when Kiev finally fell to Moscow. Scholars from Constantinople were welcome in Kiev and in cities as Wilno but they

were not wanted in the northeastern capital which was ever proud of its old superiority. All through the Middle Ages the Armenians had their settlements around the Black Sea. They had one in Lviv as well as in other Ukrainian towns, for their merchants realized the kinship of commercial interests throughout the area.

On the other hand, Kiev had its connections with the north and the Baltic Sea. They were less direct but they were real and vital. All through the centuries there was a constant interchange of envoys between Sweden, north Germany, the Baltic and Kiev. They had the same interests, the need to hold back the insatiable greed of the Grand Khan Moscow and the alliance between Mazepa and Charles XII of Sweden was but a late reflection of the friendly and mutually profitable trade that went on in the great days of the Kiev state. To-day the contacts between the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army and the Baltic countries, the extension of its activity into the areas that have been seized by Poland and used for the breaking up of still more Ukrainian homes are but following in the traditional paths of the old friendships between the Lithuanians, the White Russians, and the Ukrainians which existed for centuries.

In a real sense Ukraine in its position of the Black Sea and on the great rivers of southern and eastern Europe is really the cornerstone of a new system of security and prosperity that could be easily built under the United Nations if the curse of Russian Soviet domination could be removed and a democratic system substituted. On the one hand its interests would lead it to the north. On the other, it stands as an important centre for trade between the east and the west. These are old routes. They brought Kiev into being in early prehistoric times and eastern Europe and western Asia have flourished as Kiev was prosperous.

To-day as never before human beings are conscious of the fact that time and space are being eliminated from human life and that mankind must unite or perish. After centuries of struggle and of combat, of war and of destruction, Europe is beginning to learn that lesson. Moscow neither now nor in the past has wished even to notice it. So at the end of most destructive war in history the world is forced to devote more and more of its energies and its resources not to repair the damage of the past struggles but to protect itself against the determination of Moscow to rule the world or perish itself.

The world has the answer, the building up of a new series of free and independent nations in eastern Europe and in Asia on their own ethnographical territory. In 1917 and in 1918 those nations

existed but Western Europe fascinated and dazzled by two centuries of the St. Petersburg court thought only of the monolithic character of Russia and stood idly by while Russian imperialists and Russian Soviet universalists tore to pieces what had been gained by the triumphs of democracy in Europe. That was the heritage of World War I. The heritage of World War II is the iron curtain, the displaced persons, and the widening threat of Russian Communism.

But the days of the great empires are finished, unless the tide of history is to be completely reversed and Moscow is to push its career of genocide and autocracy to a successful conclusion and take over the entire Eurasian continent and then the world. It is hardly likely to happen for mankind is not so utterly dispirited and so utterly blind that it will yield peacefully all that makes life worth living.

The reports that come from Ukraine, the constant struggle of the satellite governments against the Ukrainian Revolutionary Army, the growing signs that all is not well within the Soviet Union, the developing determination that Communism must be stopped, all are portents of the future. The danger now is that the world will once again be led astray and refuse to see that the new era of cooperation and of friendship needs the assistance and the support of the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia who, once liberated, can be brought into a free association of free and democratic peoples in the United Nations and that their spokesmen, once and for all liberated from the Moscow yoke, will be able to do their part in making available to the world the material products and the intellectual accomplishment of an important part of humanity. Moscow can control what is its own but once it is forced back to its own boundaries, it will be a negligible factor in the councils of the world and no longer a barrier to the friendly development and cooperation of the democratic countries among which a free Ukraine will play an important role.



## WHY DID YOU NOT WANT TO SEE, MR. STEINBECK?

*An open letter of a Ukrainian writer to his American colleague*

By YURIY SHEREKH

DEAR SIR:

I have always had an interest in and a liking for your writing. I admire the fearlessness with which you see and name things that are usually avoided (*The Grapes of Wrath*). The "hot taste of life", about which you write in "Cannery Row", is dear to me. Not long ago I read your *Russian Journal* in a German translation—I am sorry to say—I did not recognize you. Until 1944 I lived in Ukraine, I know the facts and some of the people, whom you mentioned. I do not doubt that you saw and heard all that you describe. But why did you not want to delve deeper into what you saw, in order to understand it, as it really is? Why were you betrayed by your ability not only to call a thing by its name, but to sense its meaning, as well?

You yourself admit that you were not able to see everything and lack a broader background. I understand: you were the guest of the regime, and you were shown only those things, which the regime wished you to see. It was impossible for you to visit the prisons and the slave labor camps, beyond the Arctic Circle. You could not enter the house of any ordinary citizen. All that is so. But there is enough material for conclusions in what you have seen. You did not want to draw these conclusions. Why? You state that you were not interested in the political system, but in the human being. Such a statement is entirely correct in the lips of a writer. But is not the life of an individual bound up with the political system? Is the political system not created by men? Does not the political system interfere in the life of the individual all the more, when it is such a powerful and omnipotent system, as in the USSR? You come to the conclusion that the Russian nation (you must have in mind the nations of Russia)—is the same as other nations, that it has both good and bad elements in it, but the good ones are in the majority. Yet one should not forget that an evil political system, tends to spoil the individual, and the longer it rules, the more people it demoralizes. Why did you not want to see the degradation of men in Russia?

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regime in USSR. Your host in Kiev assures you that in the next war, the populace will defend itself as it did against the Germans. You describe the cult of Stalin, you mention that his statues and portraits are seen everywhere,—that his word excludes every discussion, (*Roma locuta, causa finita*). Of course you could have been told nothing else: you were surrounded by a net of the most cunning vigilance, and *everyone* with whom you spoke was obliged to give a detailed account of all that you and your interlocutors said. All that was shown to you was *organized*, as it always is in the USSR. No one was allowed to talk frankly with you, because a person who has any connections with aliens in the USSR, outside the official rules and norms, disappears. The citizen of the USSR trembles with fear on receiving a letter from abroad. The Soviet press, radio and theater (remember Simonov's "Russian Question") systematically develops in the citizens of the Union, a hatred for aliens—in particular Americans. There is nothing strange in the fact mentioned by you, of the Ukrainian boy, who exclaimed in surprise on seeing you, on finding out to his wonder, that the Americans are human beings, too. You noticed that in Kiev the people turn aside from German War Prisoners. They do it not because they hate the Germans, but because they are afraid of the slightest suspicion of any connection with an alien. But the system did not succeed in developing a hatred for aliens. Six hundred years ago Russia repudiated aliens, (the Ukrainians even then did not do it). Now they are not afraid of the alien but of the punishment the regime will impose upon them for connections with aliens. The present feeling of the populace toward aliens is—fear, combined with deep interest.

You mention that in the Ukrainian village you did not sense hostility, but interest. People observed you, asking themselves: can these Americans help us free ourselves from Bolshevism, or are they, too, the same as the Germans? The words of your host in Kiev, about the defense in the new war, were but a half truth. In 1941 the nation did not fight against the Germans. On the contrary, tens of thousands voluntarily gave themselves up to the Germans as war prisoners. They hoped that the Germans would help them save themselves from the Soviets. Only when they saw that the Germans were no better, did they begin to fight. This was in 1942-43. Dissatisfied in the Germans, knowing hardly anything about other foreign nations, except what is continually fed to them by the Soviet propaganda, which always insists that the Anglo-Saxons are no better than the Nazis (the propaganda knows well why it is doing this)—and calls Churchill and



Truman openly a couple of Hitlers—the people of the USSR observed you with the secret desire to find out what the Americans might bring them. You did not want to see this, nor to understand why you were under such scrutiny.

You often came in contact with pressure of propaganda and censorship on the citizen of the USSR. When your photographs of the German war prisoners and the homeless vagabond from Stalingrad were confiscated,—do you really believe that the excuse of war safety had anything to do with it? You tell how interviewing you stopped, after you took the control of the text into your own hands. You tell how all discussion on the subject of Simonov's "Russian Question" was avoided, when it became obvious that you condemned the book. Yes, the Soviet citizens dares take no part in discussions. You were under the impression that a discussion took place during the dinner given in your honor by the Soviet writers. This, however, was no discussion—it was a public denunciation, a thing widely practiced in the Soviet Union. The first speaker, who demanded of you to write that which would help the Soviet-American friendship, unmeaningly disclosed that in the USSR the propaganda dictates to the writers. The more cunning Ehrenburg and Simonov, hastened to soften any unpleasant impression that you might have formed, and at the same time publicly announced that the first speaker had spoken words that could harm the reputation of the USSR. There can be no doubt that the unfortunate first speaker had great difficulties later. Such public denunciations are common in the USSR. To term this a discussion would be the same as calling exile to Siberia—which often is the result of such a discussion—an official commission.

The cult of Stalin . . . The names of Stalin is mentioned in whispers and with great respect . . . Yes, that is true. But how is this attitude developed? Do you know that for a printer's mistake in the name of Stalin, many editors and correctors have been executed by the firing squad? Do you know, that the person who dared to wrap anything in a newspaper with the portrait of Stalin, is arrested? That the person who does not have the portrait of Stalin in his room is under suspicion? Do you know that during the war people prayed that Hitler and Stalin might die together? It is true Stalin does have authority, but Mussolini had the same authority, until the Italians hung him up by his feet. This authority is created by propaganda and fear. This respect is the result of power and it is not far separated from hatred. Yes, it is respect, but to you, a writer, who knows the human soul, such an illogical (irrational) feeling should be comprehensible. At the first

change of the situation, the respect will disappear, and the hatred will be all the greater.

Your surmised correctly that the nations of the USSR, more than any others live on hope. What else remains to those people, if not hope? Think of the last scene in "the Adding Machine" of E. Rice; reduced to the last stage of animality and despair, Mr. Null, in spite of everything still pursues the delusion of hope. But this, so to say, is not one hope, but two. The continual propaganda lack of all contact with the rest of the world, the system of terror, the victory over the Germans, that seemingly confirmed the power of the USSR,—all this tends to confirm in spite of himself, the fears of the Soviet citizen, that perhaps after all the USSR is really unconquerable. This conviction is unstable, it waivers at the slightest defeat, but it is revived with almost hypnotic power by the propaganda, every day, every hour, at work and at home, in the theater and in the street. (On the whole the Soviet propaganda is not as naive as it appeared to you, but its purpose is to convince the masses and not the individual—in it the individual, as in the whole of the USSR, has no importance). Try to imagine the mental state of *enthusiastic insanity* (*desperate enthusiasm*), add to this the system of terror and the system of rewards—and you will understand why the people of the USSR work so feverishly, in the unbearable conditions of hungry and homeless existence.

You saw these conditions. Barefoot peasants (Barefoot not only at work, as you at first wrote, but even at the dance, in their peasant club). The city-dwellers are living in mud huts; the endless standing in lines (the episode of the fight over the place in the line, which you describe,—is by far not sporadic, it is daily event). The whole time is given to work, for which the people have nothing,—the peasant may build his house only during bad weather. The lack of freedom of speech, and at every step the nauseating propaganda. You yourself tell the contents of the idiotic propaganda piece, in which the amateur actors of the village were compelled to play,—and you very correctly noticed that the village girls were extremely annoyed, when they had to stop dancing to attend the play, that not the text of the play was applauded by them, but the flare of your bulbs, while you made snapshots,—and if you had chosen to draw your own conclusions you could have very easily concluded how abominable to the Soviet individual is the Soviet propaganda . . . That is all—picture of conditions in which the citizens of the USSR lives, which you yourself saw and described. But think more deeply, about them, and you will

understand to what an extent the desperate hope grows in the soul of the Soviet man, the hope that perhaps with his unrelenting labor and through his poverty, he will achieve a better future.

But there lives still another hope. It is not spoken about. Nevertheless it is there. The years go by, and the life of the Soviet citizen does not become any better. Hunger, lack of living quarters, labor beyond strength and always the abominable propaganda,—there is nothing more in the life of these people. And at the bottom of their souls grows the conviction, that the root of all this evil is in the system itself. In secret, even before himself, the Soviet man knew it long ago,—particularly after the tragic famine in 1933. His eyes turn to liberation, to the liberator and the ally, whom he expects from the Western World. Of course, no one spoke to you of this hope. But did you not sense a weak ray of it in the glance directed toward you, in the questions asked you?

It is understood that the poverty and the strenuous labor were explained by the people assigned to you as the result of the last war and German devastation. But do believe, that before the war the peasants were barefoot and starving, too; the laborers often lived in mud huts, and the living space allowed to one person was enough only for a grave. The propaganda ate its way into the soul then, as now, and the hope of liberation burned in the soul, as it does now.

I knew personally one of the people assigned to you. It is the "Ukraine writer Poltoratsky." A writer, who does not even know the language he is supposed to write in, and speaks only Russian. A writer about whom the general opinion was—of course it is difficult to prove this, as the archives of the NKVD are not open to anyone,—that he has on his conscience many a death and exile of the true Ukrainian writers,—because for this very reason he was made a "Ukrainian writer", in order to give him the opportunity to spy on the literary circles, with special instructions. This man, hated by all, was secretly called not Poltoratsky, but Poltovratsky (from the Russian word "vrat'"—which means—to lie—tell a falsehood) . . .

From this man you heard about the partisans. But he did not tell you, that there were two types of partisans in Ukraine during the war: a great number of those, who fought both against the Germans and the Russian Communists, and a small number of those who were sent or descended in parachutes from Russia, as the Communist partisans. He did not tell you that from the first Ukrainian group, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was formed in the war years it is the

same army which is still fighting the Soviet Communists and their satellites, and of which many representatives have fought their way to the American Zone in Germany.

From him you heard, that the Germans ruined Kiev, which is not true. *Kiev was ruined by the Russians.* They began to ruin it in 1930, and the war only afforded them the opportunity to increase this destruction tenfold. Here are a few facts: before the war the Soviet destroyed by explosion the St. Michael's Cloister from the XI century, the churches of the Three Saints and the Desiatynna, built in the XI-XII centuries, they destroyed more than ten churches, built in the XVII century—which were the most valued architectural monuments of the Ukrainian Baroque period. The Germans did not bomb the city, with the exception of its suburbs, during the siege, which lasted several weeks. The whole center of the city was ruined by mines, planted by the Soviets. The explosion began some five days after the German occupation of the city, and as a result many German officers and soldiers were killed. The barbarism of the Germans is a well known fact, and it was particularly savage in Ukraine, but Kiev was ruined by the Soviets.\*)

You will no doubt ask why the Soviets should ruin their own city, and the Germans should wish to spare it? The Germans spared it not for the love of the Ukrainians, but because they planned to populate it with German colonists, and make it the center of German expansion in all Ukraine. As for the Russians, they ruined Kiev, because they are the same kind of occupants in Ukraine, as were the Germans, Poltoratsky told you how often Kiev was ruined by foreigners. He forgot to tell you that in 1169 Kiev was ruined for the first time by the Russians' ancestors—the Suzdalites and the destruction was far more terrible than that caused by the Tatars. When in the middle of the XVII century the Russians finally became the master of Kiev, they had only one desire and have had it ever since: to annihilate the Ukrainian character of the city. That is why the Soviets left the Tsars' palace untouched in Kiev, but systematically ruined all Ukrainian

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\*) The photographs of the demolished church in the Lavra, and the ruins of the Kreshchatyk, which Mr. Steinbeck reproduced in his original edition, and which, as he states, were destroyed in 1943, were already reproduced in the same state of ruin in the Ukrainian press in the winter of 1941. Therefore the author was as shamelessly deceived on this point, as any foreign visitor could be expected to be in the USSR. One of the chief principles of Soviet dialectics is to deny obvious and perfectly well known facts, even their own previous statements. So for example The Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow in 1943, published a book by D. Chekanyuk under the title "The Folk Army in the Heroic Defense of Kiev and Odessa", where the author describes specifically the planning of mines by the Soviets in Kiev on September 18, 1941.—EDITH.

buildings. That is why you saw so many old churches in the Moscow Kremlin,—and only one surviving to-day in old Kiev.

But just as you did not notice the utter weariness and despair of the Soviet man, so you did not notice the national repression in the USSR. You did not see the struggle of the Ukrainian and the Georgian nations for their liberation. You did not find out that even the Soviet press in Ukraine is full of articles against "Ukrainian nationalism",—and, in its conception, Ukrainian nationalism is the struggle against the all-devouring Russian imperialism. You write that in Kiev live Ukrainians who belong to an entirely different branch of the Slavs than the Russians, and have their own separate language. But that does not stop you from calling Kiev the oldest Russian city. It would sound the same, had you said that Benares is one of the oldest British cities! It is all the more strange, that you yourself call attention to the richness of the Ukrainian land, which fascinated so many invaders, particularly the Russians. You yourself allude to the colonial condition of Ukraine, when you state that although ruined and starving, she has to feed Russia. Yes, there is war within the boundaries of the USSR, a secret and masked war, a war not for life, but unto death. You did not notice it however, although it can be clearly seen from the very facts that you give.

But, why, you might ask, why had no one told me of it? Why, when we talked about the destruction of Kiev, every one insisted that it was the work of the Germans? Hundreds of thousands of the city's citizens lived there during the German occupation, they lived in a ruined city and its center burned down before their very eyes.

That is, because in the USSR, there are many things, which are not mentioned. Because the people of the USSR are thought to keep their silence. Because every second individual might be a spy. Because in every establishment, school, institution, there is a "spetsotdiel" (special department),—a branch of the MVD, which openly spies on every worker, every pupil, every employee. (You visited a tractor plant in Stalingrad—why did you not ask to be shown through this "Special department", do not doubt—it is there). Because, beside the "special department" there are hundreds of thousands "secsots" (secret spies), bought with money or forced by fear, to report each of your conversations to the MVD. Because one word in the USSR costs your life and the lives of all your dear ones.

But, you might say, as no one there talks of what he is thinking, how could I have found out the true state of things, not knowing any

of the languages? You could have surmised many things from the facts that you had gathered. And now, at last there are thousands of former Soviet citizens abroad, who are not afraid to talk. They are those who have been fortunate enough to escape from the Soviet serfdom and now vegetate in the DP camps in Germany and Austria. They are peasants, laborers and the Intelligentsia. Here they may tell the truth. Why do you not come here to talk with them, to check up on your impressions from the USSR, and compare them with their words? There are many things that they would show you in a different and true light. Or did Comrade Poltoratsky tell you that they are Fascists? But you are a writer, and you would be able to discover for yourself where the truth is, and who is nearer to Fascism: the DPs or the charming Mr. Poltoratsky.

You wished to know the individual of the USSR, and not the regime. But the conditions of the USSR are such that they do not allow any one to find out the true character of the individual. You had no desire to see that. Come and visit the DP camps. You will be assigned no guide here from the VOKS. You will be allowed to talk freely with all, and they will at last answer your questions without fear. Here you will learn to know the soul of the average individual of the USSR, and the souls of the different nations, held by force in the prison, that is the USSR. I assure you that such a visit will give you much as a writer, a lover of life and a humanist.

Germany, U. S. Zone.



## SOVIET GENOCIDE OF THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE

By PROF. T. S.

*"The most precious of all the treasures of the world is the human being."*—STALIN.

**D**URING the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the existence of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" special praise was given to the gigantic "achievements" of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in all branches of the social, national and cultural program, and to the "happy" and "joyful" life of the Ukrainian people.

We shall discuss the Soviet "achievements" only in regard to the changes that have taken place in the population of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic and show what has become there of "the most precious treasure," that is, of the human being. The government policy in regard to the treatment of its people is important under all conditions, because it is of direct concern to man, and especially in the Soviet Union where it is integrally connected with its national policy. This policy entirely based upon the requirements of the building up of "socialism," that is, the requirements for safeguarding and extending the Communist regime. In other words, all the affairs of the Ukrainians as a national, cultural and religious entity are entirely subservient to the affairs of the totalitarian State.

Under the Soviet rule all the quantitative and qualitative processes that take place within the population are foreseen in the planning program. The destruction of people by famine or by killing, by legal procedure or without it, by immigration or emigration, by Russification and denationalization—all these methods are included in the plans of the Soviet policy on the population problem, since this is an integral part of the Soviet national policy.

Our knowledge of the quantitative and qualitative changes in the population of Ukraine is based on the census reports of 1897, 1926, and 1939, and similar other official Soviet sources. Only in some special instances do we make use of our own computations.<sup>1</sup>

The general change in the population of the USSR and Ukraine for the period 1897-1939 can be seen in the following table (numbers denoting millions of people):

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<sup>1</sup> This article discusses matters relative to the Ukraine included within the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR of 1939, that is excluding Western Ukraine and Carpatho-Ukraine, which were finally incorporated within the Ukrainian SSR in 1945.

Countries	Year			
	1897	1913	1926	1939
USRR .....	106.4	139.3	147.0	170.5
Ukraine .....	20.5	27.0	29.0	31.0
Ukraine's %	19.3	19.4	19.7	18.2

During the sixteen years, from 1897 to 1913, the population of Ukraine increased from 20 million, 500 hundred thousand to 27 million, that is, by 6 million, 500 thousand, and during the next twenty-six years, from 1913 to 1939, it increased only by 4 million. During the period from 1926 to 1939, when the population of the entire USSR increased by 23 million, 500 thousand, the population of Ukraine increased only by 2 million. Accordingly the percentage of the population of Ukraine also fell in 1939, in comparison with 1926, from 19.7% to 18.2%, that is, by 1.5%. Why? What happened to the population of Ukraine between 1913 and 1939? How can we explain such a failure to increase proportionally?

We can see much better what kind of numerical change took place in the population of Ukraine for the period of the three census listings from the following table:

Periods	Total increase of population in millions	Annual increase in thousands	Annual increase of population in %	
			USSR	Ukraine
1897-1913	6.5	433	1.93%	1.98%
1913-1926	2.0	154	0.59%	0.57%
1926-1939	2.0	166	1.23%	0.53%

That is, the total annual increase of the population in Ukraine fell from 433,000 (for the period of 1897-1913) to 166,000 during the period of 1926-1939. Accordingly the annual increase of population in percentage fell from 1.98% to 0.53%, that is, the rate decreased by 3.6 times.

At first glance the above statement seems hard to understand, especially when we take into consideration the fact that Ukraine occupied the foremost place in regard to its natural increase of population just before the First World War, not only in Europe, but in the whole world. Its yearly increase in population varied between 1.8% and 2.0%. After the First World War and the civil war the natural increase of population became even greater. During the period 1924-1927 its yearly average was 2.36%. In other words, this kind of natural increase insures the doubling of the population within the space of one



generation. Such a high tempo in the increase of the population shows that the Ukrainians are still living a highly moral life, and are healthy and full of vitality.

The low annual increase in population in 1913-1926, both in Ukraine and the USSR, which varied between 0.57% and 0.59%, was due to war and the revolutionary conditions. From 1914 to 1921 there was war, at first the First World War, later the civil war. The latter especially deeply touched Ukraine, not only because the civil war was mainly waged on Ukrainian territory, but also because the great famine of 1921-1922 raged with its worst fury in Ukraine, where it killed off two million people. In fact, during the period of war and the revolution (from 1914 to 1921) the natural increase of population in Ukraine almost ceased. At the end of 1920 the population of Ukraine, in comparison with 1913, showed no change. It was still about 27,000,000.

But how can we explain the slowness in the increase of the population in Ukraine in 1926-1939? In comparison with the annual increase of population in the whole USSR, it was 2.3 times smaller. In place of the 1.23% increase in the whole USSR there was only 0.53% increase in Ukraine. We should point out that this annual increase in population in the USSR is really its natural increase, as there are no migrational movements between the USSR and the rest of the world, if we leave out those Soviet diplomats and officials who refuse to return home, and in effect migrates thus from the USSR. The situation is different in this respect in Ukraine. In Ukraine, as we shall see further on, the increase in population from 1926 to 1939 can be accounted for not by the natural increase, but by the inflow of foreign elements.

The special feature of the population policy of the Soviets is the fact, in order to achieve its ends, in the interest of the dominant nation, that is, of the Russians, it does not hesitate even to eradicate some peoples altogether. We have witnessed this ruthless policy applied to the German Republics of the Volga, and to the republics of the Crimean Tatars, of the Chechen-Ingush people, and of the Kabardin-Balkarians, etc., the population of which was deported either to Siberia or to the North to face certain death. The Soviets are applying the same kind of policy to Ukraine.

### **The Extermination of Ukrainians by Famine**

The ominously low increase of the population in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic for the period of 1926-1939, amounting only

to 0.53%, can be adequately explained primarily by the deliberately planned mass famine. As we know, the Ukrainian peasants had no desire to join the collective farms, for they refused to have the fruits of their labor looted by the State. They actively opposed the process of collectivization. The Soviets decided then to break their opposition and to force the peasants to join the collective farms, even if they had to use the most brutal means. By such means a terrible famine was created in Ukraine in 1932-1933.

It is necessary to bear clearly in mind that there was nothing ominous in the weather conditions in 1932. True, the harvest of that year amounted only to 14,400,000 tons of grain, in comparison with the average annual crop of 17,700,000 tons of grain in the previous years. That crop was sufficient to feed the people and the livestock of Ukraine, without causing any lack of food at all. But it was necessary for the Soviets to have a famine. So they caused it deliberately, by making the peasants yield unusually heavy tax allotments in grain to the State.

Even before the last tax allotments in grain had been delivered, the famine of 1932-1933 already began its grim work in Ukraine. Its extent and the huge number of deaths due to actual starvation were without any precedent. In many villages the people were entirely wiped out by the famine. Crowds of starved peasants burst into cities, in search of food, and dropped dead along the streets in thousands. The country roads, deprived of the usual traffic, were overgrown with weeds. It was dangerous for anyone to walk alone or in twos, as there were frequent cases of robbery and even of cannibalism... It is recorded that in some cases the local authorities would keep the corpses unburied until they started to decompose in order to prevent the hungry people from digging up them from the graves and eating them...

This is what Malcolm Magridge, an Englishman, wrote in the May, 1933, issue, of *The Fortnightly Revue*. "During my recent visit to Ukraine I had a glimpse of the fight that is waged by the Soviet government against the peasants. The battleground is all littered up with ruin, as in a real war. The work of destruction goes on. On one side of it there are millions of peasants with hunger pangs in their bodies, and on the other side, soldiers, members of the GPU, who carry out the orders that are coming from the proletarian dictatorship. They have attacked the country like a huge cloud of hungry locusts and have plundered it of all its food. They have shot down or deported thousands of peasants, thus destroying some villages altogether. They have transformed the most fertile country of the world (Ukraine) into a desert." Ukraine be-

came the land of bitterly crying, starved children and of women weeping in despair, seeing their exhausted and hunger-stricken children dropping dead ... The pangs of hunger drove the people mad. In their madness some of them tried to quench their gnawing hunger with human flesh, attacking each other. In 1936 there were still 325 deported persons on the Solovkian Islands among whom there were 75 men and 250 women who had turned into cannibals during the great famine of 1932-1933.

In all the villages, along all the roads and all over the fields of Ukraine the corpses of those who had died of famine were lying ... The whole country was littered with corpses... There were special brigades in villages whose duty was to bury the dead. Quite often they were unable to cope with their duties. The corpses were pounced upon by dogs who had turned wild. No doubt, many men and women who were very weak were buried along with the dead... Here are some facts contributed by eye-witnesses.

A trucker from the village of Fursa in the district of Kiev was paid in grain for carting away corpses, five grams of grain per corpse. One day this carter brought a big wagon load of corpses to the cemetery and began to dump it off. One of the "corpses" got up and was about to start home. The carter grabbed him by the scruff of his neck and wanted to throw him down again with the rest of the corpses, fearing that he would lose five grams of grain. The unwilling "corpse" began to plead and finally came to an understanding with the carter. The carter brought him back home. This "corpse" lived till 1941.

Here is another similar case. "In the village of Parkhomovtsi, in the district of Kharkiv, the brigade that was picking up the corpses stopped at the house of Pylyp Koval. The men entered the house. The owner of the house was not yet dead... With great difficulty he pleaded: 'Don't drag me... Give me something to eat... I am not dead yet...' But the corpse-collectors answered: 'You will die anyway... We have no intention of coming here again to get you.' Soon Pylyp Koval found himself in a big communal grave. At night he scrambled up from among the dead bodies and crawled from the cemetery to the nearest house. There he was given to eat a piece of cooked meat from some dead animal. He recovered. He was still alive in 1942. But he was not known anymore by the people of the village as Pylyp Koval, but as the Immortal Deadbones."

It is not enough to say that the Soviets caused the famine deliberately in order to break down the opposition of the peasants who

refused to join the collective farms. They also took all the possible steps to make their gigantic terrorist action against the Ukrainian peasantry really effective.

It was prohibited to write and talk about the famine. Officially the existence of the famine was denied. It was officially said that there had not been even any undernourishment. All the offers from the charitable organizations from abroad to help the starving people were declined with sarcastic remarks to give aid to their own unemployed. Besides, nothing at all was done in the USSR itself to help the starving people, though the grain elevators were filled with grain.

How many people actually died of starvation during the famine in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic in 1932-1933? The Soviets used all possible means to keep their crime secret. The physicians were forbidden even to say that anyone had died from undernourishment. Computations show that, in accordance with the natural increase of population for the period of 1924-1927, there should have been at the beginning of 1939 in Ukraine 38,500,000 people. But there were actually at the date of the census, on January 17, 1939, only thirty one million people (to be exact, 30,960,200).

As we see, the deficiency in the numbers of population in Ukraine, on account of the famine of 1932-1933, comes to 7,500,000 people. This number consists of two parts: the number of those who actually died of starvation in 1932-1933 is 4,800,000, and the decrease of births, due to the famine, comes to 2,700,000.

It is interesting to note that the Soviet sources give the number of the population of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic at the beginning of 1932 as 32,680,700 people, and only 31,901,500 people at the beginning of 1933. In other words, even the Soviet statistics show that at the beginning of 1933 the population of Ukraine was 779,200 less than at the beginning of 1932. If we take into consideration also the natural annual growth in the population for 1932 we shall have to add to the total population at least 700,000 more. Besides, the famine was only started at the end of 1932. The figures we have given include only the Ukrainian population within the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR, but it is well known that the famine of 1932-1933 was deliberately caused also in such other Ukrainian ethnic territories as Kuban and the region of Don (included in the Russian SFSR) where the population also put up a stiff opposition to collectivization.

Here is the most important reason why there was such a small increase in the population of the Ukrainian SSR from 1926 to 1939.

But the numerical changes within the population of the Ukrainian SSR were not due entirely to famine, for this was only one cause of these changes.

### The Extermination of Ukrainians in the Compulsory Labor Camps

As is well known, the collectivization that was introduced in 1929 went on side by side with the policy of the so-called "liquidation of the kurkuls (the well-to-do peasants) as a class," that is, the liquidation of the richest and the most nationally conscious class of the Ukrainian peasantry. In accordance with the decision of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars of February, 1930, the local Soviets were authorized "to take all necessary steps in the fight with the kurkuls, including the confiscation of their property and their deportation from the region or district." Actually this decision gave freedom of action to the local authorities. From then on they could apply it to all classes of peasants who refused to join the collective farms. The local Soviets really did apply their extended authority with such vigor that the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1930 added in its report: "It has been noted that some groups of the "dekurkulized" peasants include also peasants of middle means and even some without any means."

We can imagine the tragic and brutal method of the "dekurkulization" of the Ukrainian peasants and its extent from the following account of a peasant Sh. from the district of Kharkiv:

"On May 22, 1929, all that I possessed, farm implements, cattle, buildings, and even our clothes were confiscated. Being left without any means to live, I and my family (my wife, mother, and six small children) were forced to beg for food in the village and lived on what the kind people gave us. And what the people gave they gave it to us in secret, as it was forbidden by the authorities to give food to anyone who went around begging . . . On November 27 we were evicted from our own home, in spite of the fact that the whole family had hardly any clothing and the temperature was 15 degrees Centigrade below the freezing point. We lived until February, 1930, in an abandoned, half-ruined house. On February 28th I and my family (my wife and six of our children now without my mother who had disappeared somewhere) were arrested and taken with other 'dekurkulized' peasants, to a railway station. There we were driven by force into freight cars. (We had as little space there as canned sardines.) We travelled like this by train for eleven days, not knowing our destination. Food was given to us only once every two days. Many people died during that trip from starvation and cold. Thus they finally brought us to the railway station of Makarykha, which is near Kotlas, in the district of Archangel. With the

temperature 40 below, we were simply 'unloaded' in the woods, directly into the snow.

"Immediately all those people who could work were taken into the woods 300 kilometers from Kotlas. They made us march in the bitter cold, though we were only partly dressed. Daily each one of us was given 300 grams of bread (about two-thirds of a pound), 5 grams of grits and 3 grams of salt. Many persons simply dropped down dead during that march. Those who dropped but were still alive were put out of their misery by the bullets of the guards on the spot. When we arrived finally at our destination, we were made to cut down the woods. They gave us very bad food. The amount of work that each of us had to do was usually heavy. We lived in little earthen huts—dugouts that we made for ourselves. Out of the many thousands of people who came there, more than half died of sheer exhaustion, starvation, and cold.

"More than half of these who were left behind near the station of Makaryka, near Kotlas, froze to death. Two of our sons, Ivan and Fedir, froze to death, and the third, Hryhori, died of sheer exhaustion. Later all the children under fourteen, including three of ours, were taken back to Ukraine. But I do not know what become of them later. At the beginning of 1932 both of us, first my wife, and later I, succeeded in escaping from there in the freight cars that were loaded with lumber. We found work in the Donbas region. In 1937 my wife was arrested again and shot to death in the prison cell in the Donbas town of Artemivske. What saved me was the fact that I was living under an assumed name. At present I am a DP living in Germany, in an IRO camp."

The brutal process of "dekurkulization" went on throughout the years of the first Five Year Plan in some sixty thousand villages and individual farms of the Ukrainian SSR. Long columns of trains kept taking "kurkuls" with their families to the far north. Many peasants, having no wish to join the local collective farms, and knowing that they were going to be "dekurkulized" for such a refusal, left their own homes and possessions and ran away, most frequently beyond the borders of Ukraine, to the newly built cities and settlements and thus avoided the Soviet concentration camps.

The history of the Ukrainians living under the Soviets is but one endless story of a people that is continually being terrorized, "purged." The Ukrainians are continually being destroyed, as a cultural and national entity, in a systematic, progressive way, according to a plan. The extermination of the Ukrainians is done at periodic intervals. One such period was during the stormy and tragic years at the beginning of collectivization. The attack was launched simultaneously both against the Ukrainian peasants and the Ukrainian intelligentsia—the educated and leading class. The court proceedings at the

beginning of 1930 against the ULU (The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine) gave the Soviets a formal excuse for making mass arrests among all those classes of Ukrainians who were conscious of their separate national identity. A whole series of court proceedings took place then against, for instance, groups of Ukrainian agricultural experts, forest experts, etc.

We can imagine to what extent the leading class of Ukrainians was exterminated from a statement in *The Communist*, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, of May 19, 1931, which said that "twenty thousand schools in Ukraine were then without teachers" . . .

The Yezhov terror in 1937-1938 was but a continuation of the wave of extermination. That bloody wave rolled across Ukraine and left behind it many hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian families with someone missing...

It has been calculated that between the years of the last two censuses (1926 and 1939), at least 10% of the Ukrainian peasant households (that is, about 500,000) were abandoned either because of "dekurkulization" or because many people simply left their homes and ran away. This means that some 2,300,000 Ukrainians were forcefully uprooted from their homes. As a matter of fact we should add to this number at least half a million Ukrainian workers and professional experts who were either killed off or deported to the Soviet concentration camps.

There are reasons to believe that the figures we quote are rather understatements than otherwise. We should bear in mind that in the city of Vinnitsya alone were found twenty thousand bodies of Ukrainians who had been shot to death between 1937 and 1939. We have also evidence that many Ukrainians escaped beyond the borders of Ukraine. *The Economic Geography of the USSR*, published in 1940, points out that "during the last twelve years (1926-1939) there was a considerable migration of people from the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR into the industrial centers of the Russian SFSR, especially into the new manufacturing centers." Due to such migration "the population of the Ural region, of Siberia, and of the Far East increased by 5,900,000," and in addition, "3 million people came there from other regions." The same book underlines the fact that "the population of the Archangelsk region increased by 25% and the population of the Murmansk region was multiplied by nine."

### The Change in the Racial Aspect of Ukraine by Forced Measures

The direct extermination of the Ukrainians and their deportation beyond the borders of Ukraine is only one phase of the fight that is being waged by the totalitarian Bolshevik State against the Ukrainians.

The natural aspirations of the Ukrainians to national independence have not ceased even for a moment during the whole period of the Soviet occupation of Ukraine, and all the time such aspirations have encountered the fierce opposition of the Soviets. It is easy to understand this opposition. The main purpose of the Soviets is to decrease the number of Ukrainians in one way or another. *This main purpose of Moscow makes it employ all possible methods for liquidation of the Ukrainians as a national entity in the shortest possible periods, through extermination and by denationalization and Russification.*

Officially there is a pretended Soviet recognition of the rights of the Ukrainian language and Ukrainian culture, but actually the Soviets wage a continual, stubborn and systematic struggle against all phases of Ukrainian life. This struggle is the outcome of the ever active Soviet policy of denationalization and of Russification.

Here are some proofs of the above statement.

The census of 1926 shows that there were about eight million Ukrainians living mostly in compact groups in the USSR outside of Ukraine. The cultural, educational and national needs of such Ukrainians have never been adequately satisfied. When collectivization began, the policy of Russification in the regions inhabited by the Ukrainians was intensified. Then, finally, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) telegraphed a decree on December 15, 1932, ordering the local authorities to Russify all the Ukrainian institutions, serving Ukrainians, which existed within the USSR but outside of the Ukrainian SSR. In addition, many scores of thousands of Ukrainian leaders and educators were relieved of their offices in the territories outside of the Ukrainian SSR. In the regions that actually border on the Ukrainian ethnic territory there were the following numbers of Ukrainians in 1926:

		% of the entire population	
		Ukrainians	Russians
In the districts of Kursk and Voronezh	1,412,000	64.2%	35.4%
In the Don region	597,000	76.8%	20.6%
In the Sub-Caucasus	1,348,000	63.8%	28.4%



Yet in spite of the fact that these regions directly border on Ukraine and in spite of the fact that the majority of their population is Ukrainian they have been incorporated within the Russian SFSR. This was done deliberately in order to accelerate the process of Russification of the Ukrainian population in those regions.

Finally, great numbers of foreigners, mainly of Russians, are migrating to Ukraine, in place of the Ukrainians who have been either deported or exterminated. A considerable number of such newcomers settle on the land or work in the factories. A great number of them also occupy political, administrative, economic, and educational positions. This helps greatly in speeding up the process of denationalization and of Russification of the Ukrainian population.

Of course, it was not the Soviets that began this policy of Russification in Ukraine. They are simply continuing the policy of the tsars, which was scoring quite a success. We can appreciate this when we remember that 23.4% of the population living on the Ukrainian ethnic territory in 1947 was non-Ukrainian. There is no other country in the world that has such a big national minority. Of course, every nation that loses its independence can expect this same lot.

The long Russian rule in Ukraine, with its endeavor to Russify its population, was the cause of a continual influx of all kinds of officials from Russia, predominantly of Russians. We have to bear in mind that even after the Revolution in 1917, under Kerensky's rule, the Russian officials in Ukraine, west of the Dnieper, received a bonus of 10% of their salary for their help in the work of Russification.

Under the Soviets all efforts at Russification were intensified. They acquired a new vigor, especially with the beginning of collectivization. The Reds concentrated their Russification policy especially in the big Ukrainian cities and in the industrial centers.

It is possible to reach some definite conclusions on the basis of the material in the last three census reports. We can see from the following table the changes that were shown by the vital statistics of Ukraine during the period from 1897 to 1939:

	1897		1926		1939	
Population of Ukraine	20,500,000	100%	29,000,000	100%	31,000,000	100%
Ukrainians	15,700,000	76.6%	23,200,000	80%	19,600,000	63.2%
Others	4,800,000	23.4%	5,800,000	20%	11,400,000	36.8%

By 1926, in comparison with 1897, the population of Ukraine

increased by 7,500,000, or by 48%. The number of Ukrainians, in proportion to the others, increased from 76.6% to 80% in 1926. But for the period of 1926-1939 the number of Ukrainians dropped by 3,600,000 (from 23 million, 200 thousand to 19 million, 600 thousand), or by 15.5%. Their percentage fell from 80% in 1926 to 63.2% in 1939.

During the same period the number of non-Ukrainians in the population of Ukraine increased by 5,600,000 (from 5 million, 800 thousand to 11 million, 400 thousand) that is, by 96.6%. The percentage of non-Ukrainians rose from 20% in 1926 to 36.8% in 1939, i. e. almost doubled itself. Among the non-Ukrainians numerically Russians are leading.

It is necessary to emphasize here the fact that out of the 5,600,000 increase in the non-Ukrainian population between 1926 and 1939 the natural increase could amount at most to 1,200,000. In other words, the other 4,400,000 persons migrated to the Ukrainian USSR, mainly from the Russian SFSR. Without the people who migrated to Ukraine, there would have been in 1939 in the Ukrainian SSR, not 31,000,000, but only 26,600,000, that is, 2 million, 400 thousand less than in 1926.<sup>2</sup>

### Colonial Exploitation of Ukraine by Russians

Ukraine under the Soviets has all the features of a colony whose population is subjected to economic exploitation and to the crime of genocide. This can be seen in the following table of occupations of the main racial groups in Ukraine:

The main racial groups in the Ukrainian SSR	Ukrainians	Russians	Jews	Others
Whole population	80.0%	9.2%	5.4%	5.4%
Workers	54.6%	29.2%	8.4%	7.8%
Civil servants	51.6%	25.0%	14.9%	8.5%
Persons of liberal professions	47.9%	15.2%	30.4%	6.5%
Farmers who work only with their own families	88.4%	4.9%	1.3%	5.2%
Farm establishments with business officials	33.8%	19.4%	40.8%	6.0%

Most of the Ukrainians are found doing hard manual work:

<sup>2</sup> In the publication that was printed in 1947 to commemorate "The Eighth Hundred Anniversary of Moscow" we find the following statement in Chapter IX: "Moscow continues to send to various republics and regions trained workers and engineers, experienced organizers and chiefs of industry. The engineers and technicians, teachers and physicians, who have been educated in Moscow, are building up Communism wherever they go . . . "Thus Moscow renders its brotherly help from the great Russian people to others." The above statement needs no comments from us.

88.6% of the Ukrainians are engaged in farming. Proportionally the smallest number of Ukrainians is found in the occupations that require little physical exertion (in the farm establishments with business officials, among the members of the liberal professions and among the civil servants). Such occupations belong predominantly to the non-Ukrainians mostly imported from the Russian SFSR. Such was social and economic situation of Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians in Ukraine in 1926. Today after bloody extermination of Ukrainian intelligentsia (1931-1937) the position of Ukrainians in their native country worsened considerably.

Let us now come to some definite conclusions in regard to the population policy of the Soviets in Ukraine. The quantitative and qualitative changes that have already taken place can be summed up in this manner:

There should have been in the Ukrainian SSR in 1939 .....		But actually the population of the USSR in 1939 was .....	
38,500,000		31,000,000	
people, divided thus:		divided into	
a) Ukrainians .....	29,900,000	a) Ukrainians .....	19,600,000
b) Others .....	8,600,000	b) Others .....	11,400,000

As can be seen, there is missing for the period of 1926-1939 on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR some 10,300,000 Ukrainians. Instead of the possible and expected 29 million, 900 thousand Ukrainians we have only 19 million, 600 thousand. Where did the 10 million, 300 thousand Ukrainians disappear? Let us remind ourselves of their fate: some died during the famine of 1932-1933 of starvation, to the number of 4,800,00, others numbering some 2,800,000, either ran away or were deported; besides, there was a decrease in the number of births, due to the famine, of 2,700,000.

Such was the population of the USSR on the eve of the Second World War. What changes in it were brought about by war? Out of the total number of soldiers of the USSR, amounting to 7,500,000, who were killed during the war more than one fifth were from the Ukrainian SSR, that is, some, 1,500,000. As is well-known, a special mobilization "method" was used in Ukraine, in order to increase the number of recruits. Besides, Ukrainian divisions were thrown into some of the bitterest battle of the war: at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, and Leningrad. In consequence, the casualties of the Ukrainians were unduly higher than among the Russians.

At the start of the war, during the Soviet retreat, a great number of Ukrainians were exterminated by the retreating troops, as some of them were suspected of being unreliable.

Ukraine was a continual battle-ground during the recent war. Twice the armies of Hitler and of Stalin rolled through it. Both the Germans and the Soviets used the policy of the "scorched earth." Such a policy caused terrible losses, both in property and people. Many hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians died in Germany as slave laborers. Many hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were persecuted and destroyed by the Germans for their fight to liberate Ukraine.

Finally war came to an end, but there was no end to the genocide policy of the Soviets in Ukraine. The Ukrainians are still being exterminated... The fact that all the Ukrainian ethnic lands are now within the Soviet fold simplifies Moscow's policy. Now the people of the western Ukraine are continually being deported to Siberia. At the same time with Moscow's tacit agreement, the Ukrainians are being subjected to a systematic extermination in the Ukrainian territories that are included within the new boundaries of Poland and Czechoslovakia.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, the Ukrainian SSR is continually being subjected to "purges" at the hands of such "experts" in Ukrainian affairs as Postishev, L. Kaganovich, Khrushchov, and others.

It is hard to state the exact number of Ukrainian war casualties. But we do know that the Ukrainians, caught between the anvil and the hammer, between the brown and red types of imperialism, between Hitler and Stalin, have suffered the heaviest casualties of the war. Nor is there any end to their casualties. The struggle in Ukraine goes on. Right now, as in the past, Ukrainian blood is still being shed daily, as the Ukrainians fight on for their social and national liberation. This fact is corroborated by the continual heroic struggle against the oppressors by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army—the well-known UPA.

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<sup>3</sup> Dushnyck: *Dead and Devastation on the Curzon Line*, 1948.



## UKRAINIAN ARCHITECTURE

*By SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY*

**T**HE LARGELY steppe character of Ukraine is associated in the imagination with horizontal planes. Ukrainian architecture grows out of this level soil, and as if for the purposes of contrast creates powerful vertical forms.



THE CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA IN KIEV—XI Century

Not many regions of the earth have been subjected to such numerous and different influences as the territory of Ukraine. Geographically belonging to the East, Ukraine forms the final boundary of a Western culture. The French historian Leroy-Beaulieu writes that Kiev was more European than Russia ever was before Peter I. One of the most important facts of Ukrainian culture is that it has the same Classical base as the cultures of the Romance of Germanic

nations: it possesses the Graeco-Roman heritage. The territory of Ukraine was in this sphere of influence by the VIII century B. C., when the first Greek colonies were founded on the territory of Southern



THE SAVIOR IN CHERNIHIV—1024

Ukraine. Especially rich in architectural remains are the territories of former Olbia, Chersonese and Kerch, (the ancient Panticapeum). For example, in Olbia, at the delta of the Dnieper and the Boh rivers, which was founded in 645 B. C., archaeologists have so far discovered seven cultural stages corresponding to the different periods of cultural development. Whole streets have been unearthed in Kerch and Chersonese, and in Sevastopol, Crimea, that is located on the bay opposite the ancient Chersonese, the Tsarist administration built whole suburbs from the stones of the ruins of Chersonese. The Greek colonies later came under the rule of Rome, and in southern Ukraine in the IV century of our era many Christian structures were erected. In Chersonese alone the foundations of thirty churches dating from the IV-IX centuries have so far been unearthed. The oldest types were the cross-formed and the basilica; later the three-naved church with three apses developed, and this became the predominating type in Ukraine, in the X-XII centuries.

Even before the official acceptance of the Christian faith in Ukraine by the Great Prince Volodymyr in 988, there were Christian buildings in Kiev. But the real architectural development of Ukraine began with the acceptance of Christianity. The magnificent twenty-five dome church of the Tithe (Desyatynna), built by Prince Volodymyr the Great, has not survived, but the Church of St. Sophia, built by Prince Yaroslav the Wise (1017-1054), can give us a good idea of how the Desyatynna might have looked. The Church of St. Sophia has five naves of the basilican type, with the central dome held up by four supports. At first there were only nine domes (today there are nineteen). The characteristic trait is the disappearance of the columns



ST. BASIL IN OVRUCH—XII Century

many stone churches were ruined during the Mongolian raids. However a proportionately large number withstood these raids and were still in existence in our era, although the exteriors of some have been partly rebuilt in different styles. To these belong the Goldenroofed Cloister of St. Michael, (originally the Church of St. Dimitry), built in 1054, and demolished by the Soviets in 1934\*), the Church of the Ascension in the Lavra Monastery of Kiev, built in 1073, and ruined during the war, the Church of the Savior (Spas na Beresti)

and the almost exclusive use of pillars, which serve better to uphold the great arches. In this fashion miles could be covered with vaults, (H. Pavlutsky). In architectural grandeur St. Sophia in Kiev, even in its present rebuilt state belongs to the most beautiful Byzantine structures in the East, and the mosaics that decorate it are superb.

The German Bishop Thietmar of Merseburg counted as many as 400 churches in Kiev in the beginning of the XI century. It is possible that many of them were wooden structures, that could not have survived to our time, but



THE FORTIFIED CHURCH IN SUTKIVTSI—1476

\*) See article "The Stones Cry Out" in *Ukrainian Quarterly*, I, 1948, by the same author.

from the XI century, the Church of St. Cyril, 1140, the Church of the Three Saints, from 1184 (but demolished by the Soviets in 1934). Chernihiv was second to Kiev in its love for building; the Cathedral of the Savior, built in 1024, which was one of the most beautiful structures from the era of the Princes in Ukraine, survived to our time, but like other buildings in that city it was badly damaged by the war. It was a



THE CHURCH OF THE ASSUMPTION IN LVIV  
(Ukrainian Renaissance)

three nave structure with five domes. In Chernihiv was also built and still exists the church of the Assumption of the Yeltsky Monastery, 1060, the Church of Borys and Hlib, 1120, and others. Whereas the architecture of Kiev is closer to Byzantine and Caucasian types, the buildings of Chernihiv show a marked Romanesque influence. This style also predominates in the architecture of West Ukraine, although not much of this period remains. For instance in the ancient capital city of Halych (Galicia), thirty foundations of churches have been discovered, among them the cathedral of the Virgin, which was not much smaller than the Church of St. Sophia in Kiev. Only the Church of St. Pan-teyemon survives in a fairly good state. The city of Volodymyr in Volhynia, which had one of the oldest Ukrainian cathedrals, built in 992, now has only one rebuilt church dating from 1160. From the rich architecture of Kholm, described in the ancient chronicles, only fragments of the old fortifications remain.

After the fall of Kiev during the Mongol raids, the cultural life of the country moved to West Ukraine. The Byzantine-Romanesque style still predominates in architecture: the Church of St. Nicholas,



and the Armenian Cathedral, built in 1363, are both in Lviv, Galicia. But the permanent state of war with the Tatars placed the emphasis rather on military architecture: defense walls and castles. These structures are particularly numerous in Podillya and Volhynia (Ostrih, Lutsk). The fortified churches in Rohatyn (Galicia) and in Sutkivtsi



THE CATHEDRAL OF ST. NICHOLAS IN KIEV—1690  
(Ukrainian Baroque—Demolished by Soviets)

(Podillya) 1476, show Gothic influence. In the church in Sutkivtsi the four defense towers of the structure form four apses, the altar is in the eastern. The Gothic style did not represent an organic part of Ukrainian architecture, but was more characteristic of the Roman-Catholic churches (the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Lviv). However one of the favorite styles, widely accepted and deeply rooted in Ukraine was that of the Renaissance. It was brought to Ukraine directly by Italian architects, mainly to Lviv, where they joined the local guilds and very often took Ukrainian names. Following the great fire in

Lviv in 1520, the city developed a wide architectural activity, and the center of the city took on an almost Italian character, but at the same time the Italian builders accepted many features of Ukrainian architecture. Thus one of the finest Renaissance buildings in Eastern Europe was erected, the church of the Assumption in Lviv, begun in 1564, with its graceful tower, the work of Petro Krasovsky, Pietro di Barbona and Paolo Romano. The Renaissance radiated strongly from Lviv to the province.



WOODEN CHURCH IN BUSOVYSKO  
(Western Ukraine)

The second great period of architectural development, after the early Kievan period, comes with the Kozak era in the XV-I - XVIII centuries. The Renaissance found fertile soil in Ukraine, undoubtedly because it had also a Classical foundation. The center of architectural development returns once more to the heart of Ukraine, Kiev, and results there in structures, worthy of the capital of the Kozak state. Architecture now takes two directions; the first is restoration of the old buildings, which now received their Baroque exterior, and original building. Such his-

torical figures as the Archbishop Petro Mohyla and the Hetmans Ivan Mazepa and Samoylovykh have rendered priceless services in the architectural revival of the country. The Ukrainian Baroque is even termed the "Mazepinian Baroque" in memory of the great builder. The warlike character of that turbulent period left its mark on the Ukrainian architecture: it is dynamic, exuberant, often flamboyant, and with a wealth of ornamentation, which occasionally resembles the sumptuous Oriental styles, but it is always in good taste. The finest specimens of this style, excluding the reconstructed buildings, are the church of St. Nicholas, built in 1690 by Ivan Mazepa, and torn-down by the Soviets in 1934, the church of the Holy Trinity in Chernihiv, the Cathedral of Kharkiv built in 1689, a number of churches in the Lavra

of Kiev, the bell tower of St. Cyril (demolished by the Soviets in 1934), the church of Sts. Peter and Paul (demolished by the Soviets), the Brothers' Monastery from the XVII century (demolished by the Soviets in 1935) and many other highly artistic structures, mostly blown up by the Soviets between the years 1930-36. The best architects of that time were Stepan Kovnir, Fedir Starchenko, Ivan Barsky, and D. Zarudny.



ST. GEORGE CATHEDRAL IN LVIV,  
by *Meretini*, Middle of 18th Cent.  
Ukrainian Rococo

The Baroque harmoniously develops into the Rococo, but here the style becomes more international, because foreign architects take over more and more the planning of the buildings. So the Church of St. Andrew in Kiev was built by the Italian architect Bartholomeo Rastrelli, the Academy of Kiev and the tower of the Lavra by the German I. Schedel, and the Cathedral of St. George (Yury) in Lviv was built in 1744 after the plans of Merderer-Meretini.\* These western influences become more pronounced in the pseudo-classical period of the XVIII Century, when the aristocracy of Ukraine, wishing to equal that of Peters-

burg, invited the leading architects from the West, such as de La Motte, Charles Cameron, Giacomo Quarenghi, who built a number of splendid palaces and churches in the time of the last Hetman of Ukraine, Cyril Rozumovsky.

But simultaneously with this architecture, which developed parallel to western European style, grows the folk architecture which is one of the most interesting and original phenomena of European architecture. The oldest wooden churches have survived mostly in Galicia. (Potylych, Busovysko). They date from the 16-17 centuries. The church divided into three parts or cross type is the form most frequently used in these churches, and accordingly the church has one, three or five domes. This same form in East Ukraine develops into the nine-dome church. In the Carpathian region (Galicia, Carpathian Ukraine, Bukovina) the most characteristic feature is the wide overhanging roofs, that form, as it were, a low gallery around the church. These roofs grow higher, in the form of a helmet, often with seven to eight stories. The beams of the walls here are arranged horizontally,

\*) Meretini's work is the CITY HALL IN BUCHACH, Western Ukraine, 1730. (See Cover.)

whereas in East Ukraine they are placed vertically and form a smooth and high wall that is crowned on the very top with a wreath of Baroque domes. Such is the Kozak church in Samara, built in 1773 by the architect Pohrebniak.



THE OPERA HOUSE IN LVIV—End of 19th Century

The development of Ukrainian architecture met with a serious setback in the XIX century, as the result of the ban issued by the Tsarist administration, forbidding the building of structures in the Ukrainian styles. In the place of Ukrainian style the official Russian pseudo Byzantine style was introduced in Ukraine. On the whole the architecture in Ukraine in the XIX century is eclectic as in the rest of Europe. At this time the architects in Ukraine imitated the trends coming from Petersburg and Vienna, and in this academic style many public buildings were erected in Kiev, Odessa and Lviv, such as universities, theaters, private residences. Ivan Levynsky is regarded as the first representative of modern Ukrainian architecture. He was the designer of the main terminal in Lviv. In the beginning of our century the architects became interested in Ukrainian wooden architecture, and the result of this interest is the attempt to prolong the artistic traditions of the country. One of the first pioneers in this trend is Vasyl Krychevsky, who blended harmoniously the elements of Ukrainian wooden architecture with the modern style in his building of

the Poltava County House, 1910. The study of the Byzantine style also had a great influence on modern Ukrainian building. Today the Ukrainian architects may be divided into two groups: those that seek a national character in connection with former Ukrainian traditions;



THE BUILDING OF SUPREME SOVIET IN KIEV, by V. Zabolotny—Soviet period

Oleksa Lushpynsky, E. Nahirny, D. Diachenko, S. Tymoshenko, V. Sichynsky, M. Ivanchenko and J. K. Jastremsky (the last in the United States). The other group represents the architecture of the modern engineering type, but artistic; in this group American influence is very pronounced: the "skyscrapers" of Kharkiv, the construction of the Dniprelstan (Dniprostroy). Among the large modern structures of Kiev are the administrative building of the Supreme Soviet by V. Zabolotny, Verbytsky's terminal in Kiev, and the buildings of E. Nakonechny, M. Hrechyna etc. But unfortunately this "socialistic reconstruction" of Kiev has been carried out at the cost of ruthless demolitions of the priceless architectural monuments of the XI-XVIII centuries. The damages done by the Soviets in the single year of 1934, was far greater than resulted from several Mongolian raids.

# THE BASIC FEATURES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF FARMING IN UKRAINE UNDER THE SOVIETS

By WASYL MARCHENKO

## Introduction

**T**HE genial climate of Ukraine, which lies mainly in the black soil belt of eastern Europe, contributes a great deal to the many-sided development of Ukrainian agriculture. From time immemorial the riches of Ukraine have consisted of its golden wheatlands, its abundant orchards, the long-horned grey (Cherkassian) breed of cattle, the smaller domestic animals and poultry; and the land has supplied Europe with pork, leather, wool, eggs, and feathers. Ukrainian village industry has also developed considerably, especially in transforming the raw materials into sugar, spirits, flour, canned goods, and oils. In short, Ukraine is the natural granary and the source of food for Western Europe.

In spite of the speeded-up development of heavy industry in Ukraine since the beginning of the twentieth century, especially in the Donets basin and at Krivey Rih, where coal and iron ore are found, and in the big cities, Ukraine has remained mainly an agricultural country. However, during the last few decades, that is, since the Communist Revolution, there has been no progress in the development of Ukrainian agriculture, but rather stagnation has set in.

## 1. Agriculture

The utilization of the arable lands of Ukraine for farming purposes has already reached almost its maximum extent. This explains why the tilled area of Ukraine is now increasing so slowly. In 1928 the seeded area of Ukraine consisted of 24.9 million hectares; in 1937 it increased to 25.1 million hectares. The statement that, according to the new five-year plan, the arable area of Ukraine will reach by 1950 as much as 30.5 million hectares can be explained by the fact that the new figure includes the annexed Western Ukrainian territories.<sup>1</sup>

In fact, the tilled area of Ukraine has considerably decreased in the last few decades. Just before the First World War, in 1913, 90.4% of

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<sup>1</sup> All the figures given here were taken from official Soviet sources, such as the collection of statistics under the heading "The Socialist Structure of the USSR" (1933-1938), "The Publication of the State Planning Commission", M. L., 1939, and figures from the new Five Year Plan.

the tilled area of Ukraine was seeded with grain crops. By 1928 this percentage had decreased to 78.8%, and by 1937 to 72.5%. According to the new plan it will be only 64.2% by 1950, seeded on 19.6 million hectares. The tendency of the Soviet mechanized farming policy in Ukraine is to reduce grain sowing in order to have more tilled land for crops used for industrial purposes and as fodder. Among the crops for industrial purposes the first place is held by the sugar beet. Then come the oil-producing plants (such as sunflowers) and cotton. The industrial use of potatoes has increased considerably in comparison with the pre-revolutionary period. The potato area has more than doubled. In 1950 the area of fodder crops (5.4 million hectares) should exceed the area with the crops for industrial purposes (2.6 million hectares) and also the area with vegetables and potatoes (2.8 million hectares).

In spite of the decreased area sown with grain crops, they yield the the grains, according to the Soviet plans, should continually increase due to the increased fertility of the field. The official Soviet statistical publications, with very meagre data, generally point out the continual increase of fertility of the fields and the general yield of the grain crops. But the conclusions, reached on the basis of other data, also given by official publications, indicate a very confused picture of fertility and grain yields, without any definite explanations how the fertility and the yields are to be increased.

There is considerable doubt whether there has been actually any increase in the fertility and crop yields in Ukraine during the last few decades. In regard to the total crop yields and the increase of fertility, the Soviet statistics are very unreliable, and contradict the well-known observations of the Soviet reality. A thorough investigation, partly also in such publications which are not available, is necessary in order to arrive at correct figures. The usual Soviet method is to put side by side a few figures of crop yields from the worst pre-revolutionary years and the figures for the best year or two from the Soviet period. Such a presentation of a few arbitrarily chosen figures gives a false impression, that the yield of the grain crops and the land fertility were steadily increasing in the USSR. Besides, the official Soviet statistics make use of secondary references (such as, for instance, the state of seeding or of harvesting at a certain date), and give only the factors most favorable for the Soviet policy, in excerpts from the complete statement which remains unknown to outsiders.

In reality the people of the Soviet Union have periodically ex-

perienced a scarcity of bread, even in years of peace. The peasants have been forced to augment their slender supplies of food by buying baked loaves of bread in the nearby towns or cities. This also proves that the grain supplies in the villages are not left untouched by the authorities. In addition, the Soviet export statistics confirm the fact that the export of grain is two or three times less than it was in the pre-revolutionary period. When the war broke out in 1941, it was soon evident that the Soviet government had no adequate supplies of grain on hand. It had to ask for aid in food from abroad. Hence we know that the data on the grain consumption in the Soviet Union does not harmonize with the official Soviet statistics on the state of the grain crops.

We have the following data on the production of grain:<sup>2</sup>

*Grain Crops in Ukraine*  
(Official figures)

Period	1913	1928	1932	1937	1940	1950 (plan)
Total yield (in millions of metric centners)	204.8	138.9	146.6	227.7	(226.0)	(254.8)
Area seeds to grain (in millions of hectares)	20.7	19.7	18.1	18.2	(19.5)	(19.6)
Yield (in metric centners from one hectare)	9.9	7.1	8.5	12.5	(11.6)	(30.0)

As we see from the above table, it was from fifteen to twenty years after the Communist Revolution before the figures for grain yield reached their pre-revolutionary standard. It is necessary to point out that 1937 was an exceptionally good crop year. That is why the figures for 1937 cannot be taken as a standard measure for normal crops. The grain yield for 1940 is almost as high as for 1937 (according to our computations on the basis of the official data given for the whole USSR), but this includes also the yield on the territory of Western Ukraine. As a result that the grain yield in 1940 was really somewhat smaller. According to the new Five Year Plan the grain yield in 1950 should increase to 255 million metric centners, assuming that the yield amounts to 13 centners to a hectare.

This is the picture of the grain crops in the USSR on the basis of the Soviet statistics.

However, present conditions do not conform either to the latest

<sup>2</sup> Figure in brackets represent computations based on the official data for the whole USSR.



published data or the presumed conclusions of the plans for the future, as is evident indirectly from other official reports. We can see this from the reports of the central committees of the Communist Party of the USSR and of Ukraine for the months of February and March, 1947, which state that the grain yield in the drought year of 1946 was considerably less than in the previous year. The reports add that even in 1947 it would be foolish to hope to reach the pre-war yield. Taking into account the percentage figures which were reported at the plenary session of these central committees,<sup>3</sup> we arrive at the conclusion that in 1945 the grain yield was only half of the pre-war time (119 million tons of grain in 1940 this is 66.5 million tons in 1945). In 1946 the grain yield decreased to the level of the famine—in spite of the fact that there was an increase in the territory of the USSR. For the whole USSR (as Ukraine cannot be excepted here) the grain yield in 1945 and 1946 decreased to the level of 1932, and even to less (to 5.7-6 centners from a hectare). In fact, as is well-known from the newspaper reports, the USSR had in the years 1946 and 1947 serious food difficulties.

Furthermore, we know from the reports of the Soviet Planning Committee, published in the Soviet newspapers on October 15, 1947, that the total grain yield in 1947 increased 58% in comparison with the grain yield in 1946. This means that, according to trustworthy computations, the total grain yield in 1947 in the USSR was about 95 million tons. This would give for Ukraine's share, based on proportional calculations, 19 million tons of grain, that is, still less than in the pre-revolutionary period.

Such is the picture of the grain yield in Ukraine in the period of 1945-1947, based on the data taken from the exceptionally meagre Soviet statistics.

The exceptionally fertile land of Ukraine, during the period of the collective Soviet farming, has not been able in general to yield as much grain as it was able to produce in the pre-revolutionary period. There were only a few years during the Soviet period when the grain yield was 10% above the grain crop of 1913.

There were many innovations introduced into the post-revolutionary farming in Ukraine, such as the growing of cotton, rice, and large plantings of tomatoes for canning, and also an extended cultivation of oil-producing and fodder plants. However, the new agricultural and

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<sup>3</sup> The resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow as it was reported in the Soviet newspapers on February 28, 1947. The report given by the well-known communist A. A. Andreyev was published in the press on March 7, 1947. It was Andreyev who announced the percentage figures among the data for 1945 and in the Plan for 1950.

technical progressive undertakings are not based on the rational social organization of farming, but lead to the unnatural state in which the member of the collective farm is more absorbed in his own little garden and orchard near his house, which gives him the means of living, than in the work on the collective farm, where he works under compulsion and regards his work as serfdom, hardly of any benefit.

One would think that the extended cultivation of fodder plants had led to intensified cattle-raising in Ukraine. Such is not the fact. As we shall see further on, cattle-raising has considerably declined in comparison with the pre-revolutionary period. The cultivation of fodder plants occupies a definite place in the system of the rotation of crops and points to the increase of summer-fallowing.

The documents relative to the agricultural policy of the Soviet regime for the last year (such as the above-mentioned resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of February, 1947, and the so-called self-imposed duty of Ukraine towards the thirtieth anniversary of Communist October Revolution) pay much attention to the increase of the areas seeded to spring wheat. Evidently the plans for the introduction of new kinds of plants at the expense of the grain crops do not bring the desired results. In reality it is the cultivation of spring wheat that is on the decline. That is the very reason why the Soviets have started intensified methods for protecting the cultivation of spring wheat, even at the price of return to the extensive farming.

The main feature of the technical progress in Ukrainian farming is the use of farm machinery, such as tractors and combines (the latter used for reaping and threshing at the same time). At the beginning of collectivization there were 8,600 tractors. These increased to 51,300 in 1932, and to 83,900 in 1937, and had 1,495,000 horse-power. There were 6,000 combines in Ukraine in 1932, and these increased to 26,700 by 1937. All these machines were kept at the government machine and tractor stations (MTS), in spite of the fact that the collective farms are also in reality the property of the government, although they are regarded nominally as cooperative organizations. Before the beginning of the recent war 99% of the collective farms were run by modern machinery. In the cultivation of the fields such new methods were used as winter ploughing, barriers for snow conservation, mineral fertilizers, complicated crop rotations, frequent weeding, etc. It is easy to imagine what great aid the modern machines and the new agricultural methods would be to farming, if they were used in combination with the

voluntary work of the peasants who would be really interested in the results of their labors.

The recent war destroyed almost completely the farm machines in Ukraine. We do not know how many machines Ukraine has now. The aforesaid report of the Soviet Planning Committee shows that the factories made in the third quarter of 1947 twice as many tractors and 2.4 as many combines as in the third quarter of 1946. But since the Soviet industry was very slow in 1946 in returning to the manufacture of peace-time machines, and still kept its war factories basically unchanged, it is impossible to come to any definite conclusion, with only these relative figures at hand. In addition, there was also a general decline in the number of horses employed in Ukrainian farming during the war. This factor contributed also to the general scarcity of power and, without doubt, lowered the quality of the cultivation of the soil and the amount of the crop yield.

## 2. Cattle Raising

We have no statistics about the present state of cattle raising in Ukraine, but we do know that Ukraine suffered terrible losses in livestock during the war. The same report of the Soviet Planning Committee for the third quarter of 1947 passes over in almost complete silence the question of the cattle raising. We may regard this as evidence that the level of cattle raising is still very unsatisfactory.

In the first place, we shall use the data for the whole of the USSR, in order to secure a general picture of the state of cattle raising in Ukraine. The new Soviet Five Year Plan indicates in percentages to what extent the different kinds of domestic animals should be increased in the USSR by 1950 in comparison with 1945: these are horses by 46%, cattle by 39%, sheep and goats by 75%, swine by 200% (that is, tripled). In other parts of the Plan the expected number of animals by 1950 is given in figures, separately for each of the federated republics. When we add these figures for each republic together we get the following amounts for the whole of the USSR: 15 million, 300 thousand horses; 65 million, 300 thousand cattle; 121 million sheep and goats, and 31 million 300 thousand pigs. By applying to these figures the published percentages, we find that there were in 1945 in the USSR: 10 million, 500 thousand horses; 47 million cattle; 69 million, 100 thousand sheep and goats; 10 million, 400 thousand pigs. Now let us summarize the above figures in the following table:

*Number of heads of Domestic Animals in the USSR in millions*  
(according to the official statistics)

Kind of domestic animal	Year 1916	Year 1933	Year 1938	Year 1945
Horses	35.8	16.6	17.5	10.5
Cattles	60.6	38.4	63.2	47.0
Sheeps and Goats	121.2	50.2	102.5	69.1
Pigs	20.9	12.1	30.6	10.4

As we see, there were fewer cattle in the USSR in 1945 than there were three years before the war (in 1938) and relatively fewer than in the famine year 1933. During the last thirty years the Soviet raising of domestic animals has been relatively stationary, and even has not yet reached the figure of 1916, that is, the considerably reduced number of cattle in Tsarist Russia in its third year of the First World War. Besides, we have to take into account also the fact that the territory of the USSR has been increased by the taking of the Western Ukrainian and White Ruthenian territories and through annexation of the Baltic and other republics.

It is easy to imagine that the relative decline in the number of cattle in the USSR has been even greater in Ukraine, which become one huge battlefield.

Even since the recent war, in 1946, the state of cattle raising in Ukraine has not improved, contrary to the Soviet plans. On March 10, 1947, premier Khrushchov made a report, at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, on the rebirth of farming in Ukraine in the post-war period. "In connection with the crop failure last year," said Khrushchov, "in general the number of pigs in Ukraine has declined. Horse raising in Ukraine is very badly retarded. In spite of the fact that we received a considerable number of horses from the State in 1946 the number of horses on the collective farms has decreased by .9%. The number of the cattle on the collective farms has reached 69% of the pre-war figure, the breeding female pigs 25%, sheep and goats 33%, and poultry 24%.

In accordance with the Soviet traditional policy, Khrushchov blamed for the unsatisfactory state of animal raising in 1946 only the peasants and the petty officials of the administration. He reported that "in a number of districts (of Ukraine) the process of domestic animal raising is altogether unsatisfactory".<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Khrushchov's report at the plenary session of the Communist Party of Ukraine on March 10, 1947, in Kiev published in the newspaper "Pravda Ukrainy" of March 23, 1947.

As we see, cattle raising in Ukraine in 1946 declined, contrary to the fact that cattle raising was at the time steadily increasing in all the great countries which came out of the war as victors. Having no data on Ukraine of the pre-war period (1940 is regarded in the Soviet statistics as the outstanding year), we cannot compute how many domestic animals there are in Ukraine. At all events, even the percentages quoted by Khrushchov point out to us that cattle raising in Ukraine in 1946 was in a disastrous state. In reality the state of cattle raising is, perhaps, even worse than could be imagined on the basis of the above figures, as the decrease in the number of animals was progressing with the worsening of the productive use of cattle. To this category belong the decline in milk production, the decline in the amount of fattening of cattle, etc. (For instance, it is indicated in the already mentioned report of Andreyev that due to the decline in the average live weight of cattle by 2 puds (33 kilograms), in comparison with 1940, the collective farms had to give up to the State from one and a half to two times as many cattle as they would have done if the cattle had been of normal weight.)

The thirty years of almost continual depression in the Ukrainian farming is a good evidence of the way in which the Red forces of occupation have deliberately shackled down the productive capacities of a naturally rich country.



## UKRAINE: RUSSIA'S MOST VIOLENT HEADACHE

By WASYL HALICH

**E**ACH of the great empires of history has been faced with many complicated problems which demanded solution. Among the modern empires, the British, and American stand out in a class by themselves. Though in each case the subject races were not asked whether they wished a foreign rule or not, both have displayed great administrative ability. England, after blundering with her thirteen colonies and losing them, learned an administrative flexibility and a better solution for her colonial problems. As a result, today we have out of that Empire an Independent India, the State of Israel in the making, and the British Commonwealth of Nations. From these examples it is apparent that Britain has given her colonies freedom to develop, and as soon as they have become sufficiently advanced to demand self-government or independence, she has granted it to them. The United States ranks with England as an able colonial administrator. After taking over the very backward Filipino people, it transformed them in a short period. This speaks highly of both the Filipinos as pupils and of America as teacher. Finally, an unselfish America gave the Philippines self-government; and when they lost it to Japan, regained it for them. She did more for the Filipinos in thirty years than Spain in 300 years. Other obvious examples of this type are the self-government of Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico.

Russia, however, though huge in area and ruling over more than a hundred nationalities, has never been blessed with a sense of justice in ruling either her own Muscovite people or her conquered races. She does not compare with the better empires; but her system is rather a combat to them. Her energies have been concentrated in grabbing more land and still more rather than in making an intelligent use of what she has. The present administration has continued the old Russian imperial pattern. It is backward, cruel, selfish, consistently treacherous, but very vigorous and aggressive. The closest approach to fair play by Russia has been for a short time in two cases. Empress Elizabeth restored self-government in Ukraine, but her successor Catherine II abolished it again; Alexander I proclaimed Poland a kingdom, but Nicholas I transformed it to a province. Stalin's constitution of today, however, is like all the Russian laws, a paper display and a teaser for the subject nations. *It is not a living thing.*

Those who are not familiar with the internal problems of the Russian empire, or are nourished on propaganda, may think that everything is harmonious and uniform there under Stalin's constitution. Such have been the censored impressions that Russia has tried to disseminate. There are people in America who say that the various Soviet "republics" are as loyal to Moscow as either Texas or Vermont is to our national government. Such is not the case in reality: numerous purges, the MVD (gestapo) system, the arrests, the wholesale exile to slave camps, and the "iron curtain" are only partial evidences of the internal conflict with the subjects and the subject nationalities. The Promethean League, composed of the enslaved nations, has existed since 1925, and its chief purpose has been the liberation of its members from Russian rule.

Some of the current Russian imperial problems have been inherited from the Tsarist regime; others are of Soviet creation. The Ukrainian problem falls in both categories. It dates back to 1654, when the two Slavic countries, Muscovy and Ukraine, made an agreement of friendship and cooperation, under which Ukraine was to have complete autonomy. The Ukrainians carried out their part of the agreement until they became convinced of the treachery of Tsar Alexis and his advisers. Their experience in dealing with Moscow then is almost the carbon copy of the Czech or Romanian experience with Moscow in our time (1947-48), or of that of the United States with her in Berlin, Austria, and Korea. The Tsar acted toward the Ukrainians as Stalin does toward them, the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks, and the other peoples whom he has "liberated" from their freedom. No Russian government since then (1654) has ever left the Ukrainians alone. The year of 1654 was just the beginning; at that time it saw only that part of Ukraine east of the Dnieper included in the Muscovite orbit. But from such a beginning, Moscow expanded into Ukraine, until by 1945 she had added even the most remote southwestern province, Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) in the Carpathian Mountains, when Stalin detached this from his ally, Czechoslovakia. Since 1654, Muscovy has taken everything that the Ukrainians have had and has claimed that it has always belonged to her, including the name of the country—for she gave up her own name, Muscovy, in the eighteenth century and replaced it with the old Ukrainian name Rus; in Greek pronunciation, Russia. She has claimed everything belonging to the Ukrainians just in the same way that he Bolsheviks of 1948 claimed the scientific inventions of the world to be theirs.

The high-handed Russian policy imposed upon the very democratic Ukrainians quite naturally produced opposition against the oppressor. To be sure, there have been some black sheep among the Ukrainians, who have permitted themselves to be bribed by the Tsars, Lenin, Stalin, and their henchmen, but the Ukrainian people as a whole have remained loyal to their national principles and have paid a very high price in blood for their idealism.

Yet no terror, fraud, torture, or exile in the past or present has gained for the Muscovites that security in Ukraine which they have desired. The oppressors have likewise paid for their sins, for some of the leading revolutionaries of the last century were Ukrainians. Thus Peter I had his Mazeppa, Orlyk, and Voinarovsky, who joined Sweden during the Swedish-Muscovite War, in the hope of thus freeing their country; Tsar Alexander I was constantly in fear of a Ukrainian revolution during the Napoleonic War; his brother, Nicholas I, was more uneasy about the poems of Taras Shevchenko than he was about the Turkish army. Kerensky's regime, when it refused to "play ball" with Ukraine, met opposition from Hrushevsky and the Declaration of the Independent Ukrainian Republic of 1918. When dictator Lenin of Russia tried to destroy this Ukrainian independence, he had to fight General Petlura and his forces. Now the sanguine Stalin has his UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), his Kravchenko, Guzenko, and many others. No amount of terror has strengthened Russia's position there. Oddly enough, when everything was in chaos in the Soviet empire in 1921 and Lenin instituted the New Economic Policy by restoring a small measure of freedom, he got good cooperation in Ukraine. The Stakhanov movement also started at Krivey Rih (Krivoi Rog), Ukraine. But when the Bolshevik government began the collectivization of farms, it met with the sternest opposition in the Ukrainian farmer: in many cases it had to kill him or exile him, his family, village and district before it could dispossess him. The enforced famine in Ukraine in 1932-33, perpetrated by the Soviet government, in which at least three million died of starvation, is surely ample evidence of the resistance to collectivization by the Ukrainians.

Russian rule over Ukraine has had one notable characteristic; namely, the use of force—force in its primitive and savage form. The methods of torture have been expanded but the idea has continued for nearly 300 years. Russia's basic policy may be divided into two parts: the first phase of it has been the destruction of Ukrainian rights;



the second has aimed to prevent the Ukrainian people from regaining them. A person not familiar with this issue may wonder what is behind it all. The answer is rather simple: Russia, like Prussia, has had a national policy of territorial expansion by seizing land from her neighbors and trying to hold it. In addition to this, Muscovy itself is primitive and poor agriculturally, while Ukraine has had the reputation of being the granary of Europe. The better climate and the geographic location of Ukraine, the more enterprising character of her people, as well as the mineral resources and water power, make it a prize colony of Russia.

If the Bolshevik politicians are failing in their "brother Slav" policy in the Ukraine, they have the consolation of knowing that the Tsars likewise failed in the application of it, and the Tsars worked at it a much longer time. Some one may ask, then why not change methods; aren't the Stalinists supposed to be clever realists? No, they are not so clever when it comes to their imperial policy. They may have some plans on paper, as Catherine II had for public display; for example, Stalin's constitution. But in reality, they all aim at a ruthless policy of destruction of all the subject peoples, intending to make Muscovites out of them as fast as possible, or even faster by the use of force. It does not matter whether one examines the old regime, Kerensky's democracy, or Red rule,—the imperial policy is the same: hold everything you have and grab more territory.

Closer examination reveals that Russia's fight against Ukrainian nationalism has often taken her even beyond her territorial border. She has fought it wherever she found Ukrainian settlements, even in such distant places as Manchuria and the United States. Here are several illustrations. Since she did not occupy all the Ukrainian territories until 1945, she often used her diplomatic power to influence such countries as the old Austrian empire, as well as new Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia not to give too many rights to the Ukrainian provinces they ruled, because such a policy would have adverse effects upon her own Ukrainian subjects. And she had a measure of success: for example, neither old Austria nor new Poland permitted their large Ukrainian population to have their own university. Simultaneously, for over a hundred years she has attempted to demoralize those Ukrainians outside her domain by the propaganda that they would be better off under her rule—just as the Russians try to "sell" their Communism to the world today. Not only the Russian government, but also many of its imperialistically-minded

citizens, the by-products of her schools, have learned to discredit the other nationalities and their culture and to impede their development. Thus when the Ukrainian National Chorus traveled in Europe in 1920-21, Russian (white) emigrants did everything in their power to prevent its appearance. They brought various false accusations against the chorus before several governments, and when these proved useless after investigation was made, they used other tactics. Those were the "whites" of the old regime. Their "red" successors used a less civilized method in Chicago in 1931, when the Ukrainians staged a street parade in demonstration against the Stalin-made starvation in the Ukraine. A large portion of the Chicago underworld was mobilized to attack the peaceful marchers with clubs, stones, and even chemicals. In Paris, the Ukrainian Gen. Petlura was murdered by a Red agent. Other Red agents have tried to hinder the cultural work of the Ukrainian refugees in Harbin, China.

Today Ukraine is a republic; i. e., on paper. But what kind of "independence" or self-government it has under the Stalin constitution may be partially seen from this incident. In 1939 the American Ukrainians took steps to have their pavillion and cultural exhibits at the New York World's Fair, as they did in Chicago in 1933, but the Soviet Government threatened its withdrawal from the Fair if the Ukrainians received such permission. The reason underlying such action was that the Russian government did not want the world to see an example of Ukrainian culture as such; it must be labeled "Russian," and be under Soviet authority. The Fair authorities weakened; and the Russians got away with their bluff. And so, instead of Ukrainian culture, Stalin himself was on display at this Fair, as anyone who visited the Russian Building could testify.

During World War II, Ukraine suffered the most of all the countries, according to impartial American observers. Her farms, villages, cities, and institutions were ruined. The destruction was carried out by the retreating Russian armies and the NKVD (the older name for the present MVD), as well as by the retreating Germans. Neither wanted the other to get anything of material value. Now the Russians blame it all on the Germans, and in their self-righteousness admit no part in the destruction. As a matter of fact, some of the medieval Ukrainian churches and monasteries were demolished by order of the Moscow government as early as 1934, and those cultural workers like Prof. Makarenko, who pleaded with Stalin to save the historical monuments, were sent to slave camps. Yet, recently, a Rus-

sian government agent in Kiev told an American writer, John Steinbeck, that all the destruction there had been wrought by the Germans. No doubt the government had ordered the dissemination of such information.

While the war was still going on, Stalin hinted to the Ukrainian people that they might expect better things after it was over. It was the First, Second, and Third Ukrainian Armies that bore the burden of war against Hitler. They were led by such able Ukrainian generals as Timoshenko, Rokosovsky, and others. Meanwhile the Ukrainian underground forces, often equipped with American armament and fed by lend-lease, did their job well. By 1945, Germany was vanquished; Stalin became the dictator not only of the old Russian empire but of "liberated" central Europe also. Since then he has been knocking at the door of Italy, France, and Finland, and bidding them to become Russian colonies. And his iron hand is as heavy on Ukraine as before the war and there is no projected plan for any amelioration.

Since Russia dominates so much of Europe, she has ignored her allies of the recent war and has been making unilateral arrangements to shift the territories to her own satisfaction. Thus she first of all detached the Ukrainian provinces of Bukovina from Romania, Carpatho-Ukraine from Czechoslovakia, and annexed the most part of pre-war Polish Ukraine, thus "uniting" them with the "Ukrainian Republic." Now she could boast to the Ukrainian subjects that the great "vozhd" (fuehrer), Stalin, had at last united Ukraine: they were all his people. Many Ukrainians in the above provinces tasted Russian rule for the first time in 1939, in connection with the Hitler-Stalin partition of Poland, and never wanted to experience it again. As the Soviet armies advanced again to their communities in the final stage of the war, these persons left their homes, businesses, and even families, and fled ahead of the Reds until they became the largest group of war refugees among the Displaced Persons.

What happened to those left behind and "liberated" by Russia? The "iron curtain" is the answer. As late as 1948, no food, garden seed, or mail may be sent there, although Stalin permits such favors to his other new subjects. Yet the Russian consul will tell you: "Da" —yes, you can send it all, but just try it. However, by adding nearly 10,000,000 new Ukrainian subjects, Russia has added the liveliest and most advanced branch of their race. These have never known Russian rule and have had much self-government under other foreign

rule. One month of Russian rule sufficed to convince even the most pro-Russian Czechs that they did not want it. For the Ukrainians even one week of it was too much, because they are noted individualists and democrats, two types of people for which Russia has no time. She deals with the millions, recognizes the masses. When the Russians came to this new Ukrainian territory, they found a few thousand cooperative stores, highly developed small businesses, newspapers, magazines, thousands of libraries and reading rooms, as well as Ukrainian schools and churches. This all pointed to a higher standard of living. Within a few days Moscow "liberated" the new subjects of it all and placed a yoke on their necks. In fact, according to the refugees, the very first day the NKVD arrived in any village they seized the able-bodied men and shipped them to Siberia, just as in the days of the Tartars in the thirteenth century—slavery started in earnest. Mass murder, starvation, and terror became the order of the day.

Stalin's constitution appears to be very innocently fair on the religious issue. And yet, on the Russian arrival in Western Ukraine all the Ukrainian Catholic bishops were arrested and shipped to the land of "unknown address." One was murdered by the NKVD near Uzhorod in 1947. No news is available about the others. All this because they did not want to become Russian Orthodox and communists. Such is Stalin's zeal in behalf of the Orthodox Church, which formerly he persecuted, but which now he utilizes as one of his agencies. In addition to the bishops, several thousands of priests, intellectuals, monks, and nuns were also carried away. The "iron curtain" is supposed to shade this terror from the eye of the civilized world. Occasionally a letter or a refugee breaks through with news which is not very encouraging. It makes one blush with shame that such things can take place in the twentieth century, A.D.

Those Czech communists who are now purging their own fellow country—men will get a surprise two or three years hence, or sooner, when the Muscovites liquidate them. Such has been the unhappy experience of the Ukrainian and other "idealistic" communists. Even those who preached Stalinism among the Ukrainians in Canada, upon their arrival in the Ukraine to test Soviet "Utopia", were dispatched to the slave labor camps in no time. Liquidations, endless liquidations. First included were the non-communists, churchmen, kulaks, professors, businessmen, and literary men; later purges included the highest Ukrainian communists. It is getting to the point that whoever speaks

the Ukrainian language in public is considered a nationalist, hence a separatist, tantamount to being a traitor. Although Stalin's constitution "guarantees" Ukraine self-government to the point of independence, and although it is a member of the United Nations, it is subjected to Moscow and Muscovites rule the country. The Russian government cannot understand, however, that the use of force has failed to attain its object; that the Ukrainians have never learned to be obedient slaves. They are rebelling.

The U.P.A. is one of the means the young Ukrainians have of fighting the Russian terror with force of their own. The rebellion is spreading widely over the country, and has been going on for over three years. The masses are in sympathy with the insurrectionists, against whom Moscow has tried bribery and terror, but unsuccessfully. How serious this problem is may be seen from the fact that Russia made treaties with her satellites, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, to aid her in crushing the Ukrainian forces. She has assigned no lesser a personality than Gen. Zhukov to the Odessa region to fight Ukrainian nationalism; and yet, according to a refugee report, there were three days of rioting in Odessa last April by disabled war veterans and sailors. The M.V.D.—gestapo—has been working hard; several times it has declared everything under control only to find sporadic insurrections in the districts. Terror holds no more horror to the younger generation that grew up in it and went through the war. Therefore, a bigger dose of it does not give Russia the expected results, just a temporary satisfaction. No one knows how large the Ukrainian insurgent armies are. Various Western European papers estimated them as between 50,000 and 200,00 men. What Stalin and his agents fear the most is guerilla warfare in the occupied countries, which may eventually spread even to Russia proper.

An American reader, accustomed to fair play, may wonder why Russia does not really put her constitution into operation for a while: give the Ukrainians the kind of self-government that they are entitled to as a member of the United Nations, or at least what they are entitled to according to Stalin's constitution. Though this approach appears fair to the Anglo-Saxon mind, one must remember that Russia never has been in the habit in the past of solving her problems humanly. It has been force, terror, bribery, torture, Siberia, and death that have been practiced by the Moscow politicians for over 400 years. Furthermore, Russia did not destroy Ukraine just to have it restored later. The Ukrainians feel that they have had more

than enough of this Russian political model. That is why Ukraine is Russia's most perplexing problem.

This movement will become more serious some day for Moscow when the other oppressed nations likewise start fighting against the Big Oppressor. Serbia already is defiant as a satellite and does not want to be Moscow's colony. As long as the Muscovite empire has no mentality to learn from its own and the experience of other empires, it may be doomed to a very unhappy future, for the hand of justice will catch up with the unjust. In the meantime, the Ukrainians no doubt will continue to struggle for their freedom. The recent examples of freedom in Ireland, India, and Israel will serve as an inspiration to them to strive hard toward their goal, for they are the largest nation in Europe—over 40,000,000—that does not have its independence. They are Slavs but not Russians. Russians have a leaning toward communism and autocracy, while the Ukrainians in their entire history have been noted for their individualism and democratic inclinations. The difference in make-up of these two peoples and their past and present relationship make political continuation under Moscow's regime suffocating and impossible for the Ukrainians. They have a hard struggle ahead of them, but their determination is equally strong.

The only salvation for "Matushka Russia" (Mother Russia) as an empire may be in starting to solve the problems of 1948 with the methods of 1948, instead of continuing to employ those of the Moscow of the 15th century. Unless she decides to treat her colonies more humanly and starts to do so without delay, she will be doomed just as other despotic empires of the past. But meanwhile, oblivious to the urgent problems at home, Russia is advocating world revolution and world conquest, and causing trouble to all her neighbors, near and far; while Ukraine continues to be not only the most valuable and most populous colony of the Russian empire but also the most nationalist-minded and the chief enemy of the "big Slav brother."



# THE CASE FOR A UKRAINIAN IMMIGRATION QUOTA

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

**T**HIS past summer the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America was cordially invited by the United States Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization to send delegates to its extensive hearings held for the purpose of submitting recommendations for the possible modification and revision of our present immigration laws. It was my happy fortune to have been selected as one of delegates before this subcommittee.

The following testimony advances the reasons for a fair establishment of a Ukrainian quota in our immigration laws. I took the position in the preparation of this statement that in discussing such matters as immigration, food relief, currency plans etc., it is patently naive to consider any of them apart from political objectives. It is about time that many of our legislators began to realize the significance of this essential fact. With this in view, the following statement was presented, and is published here as it will appear in the *Congressional Record*.

## Statement for the Senate

Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization  
October 9, 1948

I am testifying on behalf of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America which, representative of approximately one million Americans of Ukrainian birth or descent, is the central organ of Ukrainian American organizations in the United States. Its primary objectives are the progressive advancement of American democratic ideals, here and abroad, and the establishment of a free democratic government in Ukraine, liberated from the yoke of Russian communist tyranny.

The Ukrainian Congress Committee is profoundly grateful for this opportunity to present its particular views before this body, and this for two notable reasons. First, that it confidently feels it can contribute to the realization of the specific purpose of this committee by directing it considered attention to certain defects and inconsistencies in our present system of immigration. Secondly, that, as implied by this extended opportunity, it is encouraged to note the constructive progress achieved by our fellow Americans in the evolution

of their thought concerning the multi-national composition of Eastern Europe, with particular reference, of course, to the Soviet Union. Just a few years ago the very mention of Ukraine was cause for puzzled wonderment among our unoriented people, and the vestigial appellation of "Russian" is even still misapplied by our uninformed to the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union.

The vital importance of a healthy and liberally regulated stream of immigration into the United States has doubtlessly been treated at length by others appearing before this committee. As an economist, I simply wish in a general way to re-affirm their testimonies on this point. From the economic, anthropological and cultural viewpoints the necessity for liberal immigration into this country cannot be too strongly emphasized. Objective, systematic studies on this problem demonstrate too clearly and conclusively that, *economically, immigration into our country has contributed immensely to our sciences and our inventiveness*, that it has precipitated expansion of job opportunities and not contraction, that its labor supply is competitively limited and often noncompetitive, that it has presented no special problem of dependency, and, finally, that it has actually led to a standard of living among our population and to a creation of wealth and not an impoverishing division of it. Unfortunately, some of us are still beclouded by the depressive "nature economy" thesis advanced so glibly and without factual evidence in the past decade. On the contrary, our material resources and technologic possibilities are still great and plentiful, and as, in our assumption of world leadership and in the interests of world peace, we are beginning to realize the utter indispensability of a free exchange of goods and services for a rising prosperity at home and for a more stable and balanced international economy, let us not forget the simple economic principle that a freer mobility of labor is a necessary counterpart of this enhanced trade in goods and services. To seek the one and ignore the other is a patent contradiction.

*Inseparably related to this economic consideration are the anthropological and the cultural.* Sociological studies are unanimous in their account of the high social desirability of heterogeneous elements in the body of a population, from every viewpoint, including the biological, but of greater import, today, are their disclosures of the prospective decline in the rate of population growth in the United States during the next half century. The materialization of such an extrapolation will certainly conduce to social and economic stagna-



tion unless certain measures, such as that of augmented young immigration, are liberally adopted. It is of special significance that England, for example, confronted by this exigency, has taken to admit within the acutely limited framework of its economy productive elements from Eastern Europe. It is in our long-range interest to avert any such exigency here by effectuating far-sighted measures, of which an expanded immigration is one, while we still can. Also, the countless cultural advantages and benefits that the immigration of peoples, both the educated and less educated, from diverse quarters of the globe endows the receiving country with, need hardly be recounted here.

In the light of these few, but fundamental generalizations, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America advances the following specific points and recommendations for fair consideration by this committee in its review of our present system of immigration:

### 1. A Correct and Proper Classification of Ukrainian Immigrants to the United States

Recognizing fully well the reason why, before the first World War and in certain respects even after, the people migrating from the ethnic territory of Ukraine were classified here as Austrians or Russians, and later as Poles, Czechs or Roumanians, we bid our legislators, in the happy event of the much needed revision of our present immigration system, to take special cognizance of the transformed political conditions in Eastern Europe. As it rightfully should have been before, the *ethnic territory* of Ukraine finds its cohesive expression today in the political state of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist "Republic" and is no longer obfuscated by the *multiple existence* of overlying alien governments. This ethnico-political identity predicates, therefore, a correct and proper classification of the present and past inhabitants of this region as Ukrainians, historically distinct from the Russians, Poles, Czechs and others. If the classification set-up in our immigration laws is to be rationally formulated and true to fact, this revision must necessarily take effect.

### 2. The Establishment of a Ukrainian Quota in the Immigration Law of the United States

a. The proximate justification for a correct and popular classification of Ukrainian immigrants to the United States should be based on the establishment of a Ukrainian quota in our immigration

law, which in itself is justified by the political existence of the Ukrainian state. The *formal reality* of the Ukrainian state cannot be denied nor overshadowed by the ignorant utterances of some untutored Americans for whom everything and anything east of Poland is Russian. Taken at its literal value, Mr. Molotov's recent statement, in a speech entitled "30 Years of the Soviet Ukraine—A Tribute", that the Ukrainian people have "at last achieved the realization of their age-old dream by creating a national Ukrainian State of their own," is absolutely true. (USSR Information Bulletin, Feb. 11, 1948). Of course, what Mr. Molotov cautiously avoided telling his otherwise hostile Ukrainian audience was that this Ukrainian state, created in 1918, was the first non-Russian state to be raped by Russian Communism, commencing, thereby, in 1920, the program of communist aggression that was only opportunely resumed in Finland and the Baltic countries in 1939-40 and extended down to Czechoslovakia in this year. In effect, then, the formal reality of the Ukrainian state is essentially no different from that of any of the various political states east of the Iron Curtain, save possibly Yugoslavia.

More important is the official recognition of this political Ukrainian state by our own government. The Ukrainian state has its own representative at the United Nations in the form of Mr. Manuilsky who has presided over the Security Council this past month (July). His position there is substantially the same as those of the other puppets of Soviet Russia, but the chief point still remains that our government by honoring him is at the same time recognizing the political entity which he is formally given to represent. Briefly, then, if our government officially recognizes representatives of certain states, such as Soviet Ukraine, sheer consistency demands that it recognize the people of such states in its immigration law.

b. The establishment of a Ukrainian quota in our immigration law might well be accomplished in the circumstances surrounding that of the Czechoslovakian quota after the first war. In the next census, for which we are presently preparing, the determination of Americans of Ukrainian birth or descent should be statistically allowed for in order to arrive at some reasonable basis for a Ukrainian quota. Our own estimate is approximately one million. Although, quite realistically, under present conditions one cannot hope for any substantial migration from the countries east of the Iron Curtain, yet the presence of quotas and the appearance of a Ukrainian quota in our immigration law can still serve to accommodate in the short run those nationals who have originated in the areas of their respective present states, but

are not living there now, and in the long run those who will eventually be free to migrate from these slave states in which they are now existing. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians, Balts, Poles and others, who are not classified as political refugees and who will not be admitted to the United States under the recently passed D. P. legislation, can be beneficially accommodated by such quotas. The Ukrainians, especially, like so many non-entities, are compelled by the discriminatory classification system of our present immigration law to vie at a disadvantage with Russians, Poles and others in order to squeeze themselves into the respective quotas of the latter. With the establishment of a Ukrainian quota such injustice can be eliminated.

### 3. The Upward Revision of Quotas with a Fairer Distribution to Eastern Europeans—and Adjustment to Population Changes

The long-range populational requirements of the United States necessitate scaled increases in our present quotas, most especially in view of the little net gain in populaton estimated for the United States in the past twenty years. The extent of such increases is, of course, subject to periodic determination based upon general economic conditions in this country and our responsibilities abroad. In the immediate future, however, there can be no rational doubt as to the wholesome desirability of increased quotas. Moreover, the discriminatory character of our existing laws against Eastern Europeans, as evidenced concretely by the far greater allocation of quotas made to the countries of North and West Europe, should be thoroughly obliterated. Any un-American prejudice that has motivated such discrimination, in itself tantamount to a brash imputation of inferiority to these peoples, is certainly born of blind ignorance as to the history, talents, achievements and promise of the numerous Eastern European peoples. No better argument in the vicious racist propaganda of pan-Slavism rests at the disposal of the dominant Eastern European communists than this. And lastly, a realistic population policy should provide for a definite adjustment of quotas to the populational changes in the various countries. In this connection it seems somewhat ludicrous that the Ukrainian population, consisting of 46 million people, constituting the second largest Slavic nation in Europe, does not even enjoy a quota status in our immigration system, less mention its relative quantitative superiority or equality to the other national populates of Europe that have such status.

#### 4. The Liberalization of Sections in Our Immigration Law Admitting Political Refugees

The macabre reign of totalitarianism in Eastern and Central Europe has magnified the need for democratic asylum of political refugees whose ideals of life conform with ours. Such asylum, which has always monumentalized the American spirit of humanity, decency and Christian charity, should be more readily afforded to those courageous opponents or innocent victims of this barbarous twentieth century version of human slavery. But the sanctity of such compassionate asylum ought not to be blemished by any businesslike mortgaging of future quotas. As we come to know more and more of the insidious savagery of Russian communism, which, incidentally, among the non-Russian peoples the Ukrainians know best by sheer length of time and brutal experience with it, our practical sympathies for those who are presently waging deathly battle with it, such as the underground Balts, Poles, Ukrainians, etc., should certainly express themselves in the provision of open asylum. We are learning rapidly that their battle is in essence our battle.

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As was pointed out earlier, the necessarily intensified interest of Americans in the history, culture, affairs and peoples of Eastern Europe is one of the most significant developments in our country today. Its most notable effect in the increasing dissipation of certain parochial misconceptions that some of us have too long entertained, as, for example, the nation of helpless, unassimilable, uncultured and barely literate people migrating to our shores only to join our financially cumbersome relief rolls. Permit me, in concluding this testimony, which obviously has been motivated by the desire to seek your fair consideration of certain defects in our immigration laws, as concerns particularly the Ukrainian immigrant, to cite some salient facts pertaining to the general type of being we have been considering here.

The recent reportorial activities of such Americans as John Fischer and Steinbeck in the Soviet Union are revealing to our public by the notice each has taken of the conspicuous differences between the people of Ukraine and those of Russia. Fischer, for example, although still misemploying the term "Russia" in its vestigial sense, likens these Ukrainians to our Texans, and rightly so. Anyone who has carefully studied the characteristics of the Ukrainian people knows of their treasured individualism, their keen industry and thrift, their whole happy and optimistic orientation toward a hopeful life, and most

significant, as can be easily seen even across our border into western Canada, their generally intense love for the soil. The last is historically explicable in that Ukraine has for centuries been "the granary of Europe" and its people have largely tended to its soil.

The history of the Ukrainian people has already been beautifully epitomized by Voltaire himself, when in specific reference to them, he declared: "They always aspire to Freedom, though they are still dragging the chains of subjugation." The history of this people has for centuries been a democratic history of tenacious and unyielding struggle for national freedom and free government. In the successive stages of its independent statehood and government—1. Kievian Ukraine, from the 9th to the 14th century, 2. the Ukrainian Kozak Republic, from 1648 to 1764, and 3. the Ukrainian National Republic in 1918 until its rape by Russian communism in 1920—, the Ukrainian nation has been at one with many of our Western nations in its stern adherence to the ideals of individual liberty, government by popular consent, and reasonable economic freedom. This history, as the record well shows, was the natural product of the substantial bonds between Ukraine and the Western European nations in the development of Western culture.

The struggle continues into the present. Just peruse the testimonies in Dr. Dallin's superb work, "Forced Labor In Soviet Russia" and you will find who makes up the largest proportion of political prisoners in the Soviet labor camps. Investigate the pages of Kravchenko's "I Chose Freedom" and you will find where the barbaric man-made famine of the early thirties took place. Read the resolution of our own 73rd Congress (2nd Session, House Resolution 399, 1934) and you will find the earliest horrible meaning of genocide as practiced by the Kremlin in its purposeful starvation, mass execution and Siberian exile of countless Ukrainian families and persons. These and many more ghastly events are simply the resultant manifestations of the invincible resistance of the Ukrainian population against the tyranny of Russian communism. Nor has this resistance subsided. Today, as is well known to our State Department but still, unfortunately, not adequately covered by our press, this opposition continues in the overt form of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which, formed in 1942 to resist the similar barbarities of the German dictatorship, has redirected its indefatigable military force against the Russian dictatorship. Thus, in view of these stubborn general facts, and especially for what they portend in the morrow, could one honestly regard the large Ukrainian

population as undeserving of our best consideration—even that of a fitting recognition in our immigration laws?

But of equal importance are the performances of Ukrainian immigrants and their descendants in the United States. As a "young" immigration to this country, these present Americans and their children have had, in the light of the characteristics of their heritage, little difficulty in assimilating themselves to our modes of living and in their modest or outstanding ways, along with increasing promise, have been making their contributions to our expanding culture. The heavy number of Ukrainian Americans in our coal mines, in the steel mills, in the automotive plants and on our farms attests to their economic productiveness. The thousands who operate their individual enterprises, some, such as the Switlik Parachute Company in Trenton, N. J., or the Dzus Screw Company in Babylon, L. I., N. Y., not by far of meager resources, reflect further the individual initiative of this people. Also the innumerable farm establishments maintained by Ukrainian Americans in such states as Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota and many others certify to the sturdy peasant stock of their heritage. The wheat seeds and those of other farm products brought by many of them from Ukraine's famous "Black Earth" belt are in current use by our farmers throughout the Middle West.

More toward the so-called cultural occupations we find many prominent Americans of Ukrainian birth or descent rendering their respective contributions to our rich culture. To cite a few examples, there are in our universities the well-known chemist, Prof. George Kistiakowsky of Harvard University and recipient of the William H. Nichols medal, presented in 1946 by the American Chemical Society for his "fundamental contribution in the field of explosives and as head of the explosives division at the Los Alamos Atomic Laboratories, he contributed vitally to the success of the atom bomb", Prof. George Vernadsky of Yale University, author of numerous historical works and one of America's foremost authorities on Eastern European history; Prof. Stephan Timoshenko of Stanford University, member of the American Academy of Sciences and also honored, along with a member of the Ford family, for his talented work in mechanics; his able brother, Prof. Volodomir Timoshenko, also of the same institution, economist in food research and last year adviser on German food conservation with the American Military Government; Dr. Arnold Margolin, author of the work, "From a Political Diary, Russia, Ukraine and America",

and presently engaged with the American Army College in Germany, and countless others deserving to mention. Further random enumeration would include the names of Alexander Archipenko in sculpture, Igor Yuskevitch in the ballet, young John Taras in choreography, John Hodiak in the cinema, Alexander Koshetz in music and in the world of sports, certainly Bronco Nagurski and Steve Halaiko and Peter Fick, in 1940 the "swimming ambassador" of the U. S. Olympic team, are known to all. These are just a meager few of those Ukrainian Americans contributing to the growth, power and richness of our country. As one studies this matter in greater detail, unavoidably will he understand the conclusion reached by Allen H. Eaton, who writes in his book, "Immigrant Gifts to American Life":

"In our search for immigrant gifts sometimes the most interesting and colorful are found among the late arrivals. To me, one of the most picturesque of our rather recent immigrant groups is from Ukraine. Their entertainments are full of vivid action and beauty, and not the least charming thing about them is the way in which the entire family takes part . . . But fascinating as are those scenes and as impressed as one may be with the thought that their power and beauty will ultimately find their way into the stream of our culture, I did not realize until a few days ago . . ." etc.

The further contributions of Ukrainian Americans in both World Wars are well known to our authorities. One of the first American casualties of World War II was a Ukrainian American, Anthony Curovsky, an expert in the Japanese language. It goes without saying that they are prepared to ardently defend their America again in the event of another emergency.

When all these facts and more are taken full cognizance of, the conclusion as to the desirability of such people to migrate to and live in America appears inevitable. Again, we express our gratitude to you for this opportunity to vent our views on certain necessary modifications in our immigration laws, and we do not hesitate to say that the effectuation of the revision proposed here would be deemed as a noble American gesture to the Ukrainian people abroad, whose resources, efforts, democratic faith, and unyielding resistance to world communism we may well need in the not too distant future.



## CURRENT UKRAINIAN CHRONICLE

### *The Stockholm Tidningen on the Fighting of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army*

"Ukrainian Armies of Liberation in Action — Regular Battles in the Carpathians." Such is the heading of an article in the number of August 30, 1948.

We read there the following:

"In the event of a new world conflict Stalin will be forced to overcome unusual difficulties in the rear of the fronts, and the Red Army will be exposed to a dangerous stab from the back. The very existence of the armed partisan detachments, their continual regular fighting and their extermination of the Communist Party leaders is the best evidence that there is still an illegal opposition to the communist rule in the extensive region between the Vistula and the Danube.

"The Ukrainian movement of liberation, which is directed by General Taras Chuprinka, already glorified in heroic legends, is spreading like fire. The opposition of Marshall Tito makes the situation more complicated. *General Chuprinka takes advantage of the complicated situation in order to coordinate all the movements of liberation in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. ...*

*The "UPA — the Ukrainian Insurgent Army — is the backbone of the anti-bolshevist armed forces. Lately its activity has increased. The main base of this army is in the impassible marshes of Pinsk — a terrain that provides an excellent opportunity for partisan military operations.*

"The enforced colonization of East Prussia, mainly with Ukrainians (in 1945-1947), provided the UPA with an opportunity to extend its order to keep the movement of liberation alive in the Baltic countries. military actions also to that region. It is making raids into Lithuania in order to keep the movement of liberation alive in the Baltic countries.

"The activity of the UHVR, that is, of the Ukrainian Supreme Council of Liberation, causes much worry among the Russians, as in the past. The opposition of the population against the Soviet rule increases daily. That is the reason why the influence of the UPA is increasing. The initiative of the "permanent struggle" is on all occasions in its hands.

"General Chuprinka will endeavor to extend his sphere of influence also to Hungary and Yugoslavia. He will certainly increase his



activity in order to coordinate the great fight that is being waged between the Baltic sea and the Black sea."

*Soviet General Moskalenko Dies in Fight Against the UPA*

The Ukrainian Press Service has a dispatch from the first days of September which says that at the railway station of Tiaziv, near Stanislaviv, was killed, in the fight against the UPA, the Soviet General Moskalenko who was in command of the MVD troops. The general and three Soviet officers of high rank were surprised in an ambush set by a detachment of the UPA. The death of the Soviet general at the hands of the Ukrainian partisans is being kept secret from the local population.

*Death of a Ukrainian Traitor-Clergyman*

The Kiev newspaper *Ukraine Pravda*, (Kiev, Sept. 26, 1948) reported that Havriil Kostelnik, Russian Orthodox Bishop of Lwow, had been murdered.

It quoted the All-Russian Patriarch Alexius as saying that the alleged murderer was "a Ukrainian Nationalist bourgeois underground agent of the Roman Pope."

In Ukrainian circles there is a belief that Rev. Kostelnik was not killed by Ukrainian nationalists, but by an agent of the MVD for whom Kostelnik had become of no more use.

Father Kostelnik was generally known in Western Ukraine as a writer and poet on religious topics. When after the death (on November 1, 1944) of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptitsky, the spiritual leader of the Western Ukrainians, the bolshevists began to liquidate by force the Greek-Catholic Church, which had in Western Ukraine all the characteristics of a national Church, Father Kostelnik offered his services to the Russian communist authorities. After the arrest of the new metropolitan, Josef Slipiy, with all of his five bishops, Father Kostelnik formed a Committee for the purpose of putting the Ukrainian Catholic Church under the jurisdiction of the Russian Patriarch. Only a small minority of the clergy passed over to the side of Father Kostelnik, the majority of the clergy remained faithful to the Vatican, though exposed to all kinds of persecution, such as deportation, death by shooting, or deprived of office. Amid such persecutions Father Kostelnik might have become just an obstacle for the Russian authorities of occupation.

*75th Anniversary of the Shevchenko Scientific Society*

The oldest and most important Ukrainian Scientific institution, the Scientific Shevchenko Society, which formerly had its headquarters at Lviv, is now celebrating its 75th anniversary abroad. It is in fact a Ukrainian Academy of Art and Sciences. It was formed in 1873 at Lviv, during the period of the most obstinate struggle of the Russian tsarist regime against the Ukrainian language and the development of Ukrainian scientific research. The Society was founded by the Ukrainian men of science, from Austrian and Russian Ukraine at Lviv and was financially supported by donations from all Ukrainians. During its 75 years of existence it developed into the most important institution of scientific research among Ukrainians.

Being under the free and constitutional regime of Austria, the SSS became very active in its scientific researches, especially in the department of Slavics studies and ethnography, and published about six hundred volumes of scientific value. The most productive period of the Society was during the time when Michael Hrushevsky, the greatest Ukrainian historian, was president (1897-1914)—he who later on, at Kiev, became the first president of the Ukrainian National Republic. Scientific Shevchenko Society had, at Lviv, a very valuable library, three museums and several laboratories.

When the Reds occupied Lviv (in 1939) they dissolved the Scientific Shevchenko Society. When later the city was occupied by the Nazis, the new oppressors also put a clamp on the Society's activity. Before the city was re-occupied (in 1944) by the Reds, the majority of the Society's active members and almost all its research staff migrated to the western countries and renewed in Munich the Society's activity. At present the Scientific Shevchenko Society has become the very centre of the scientific activity of Ukrainians outside of the USSR. The Society has three departments: Philology, Philosophy and History, and Mathematics and Science. The Society has started to publish its publications again at Munich. There is also a branch of the Shevchenko Society in the United States, with its headquarters in New York. Among its elected members are such renowned scientists as Max Planck, Albert Einstein, Stephen Timoshenko, Clarence A. Manning and others. The anniversary celebrations of the Society, as indicated in the program, are to take place in March, 1949, both in Europe and the United States.

*The World Congress of Ukrainian Women*

Ukrainian women, scattered throughout the Western World by the Soviet subjugation of their homeland, met at Philadelphia, Pa., November 12 and 13, 1948, in a conference that evolved into the Second World Congress of Ukrainian Women.

The outbreak of World War II and the Nazi and Soviet occupation of all Ukraine caused the mass emigration of the most active Ukrainian women to Western Europe. The necessity of building close organizational bonds among these displaced women led to the Philadelphia convention and the Second Congress of Ukrainian Women. The Ukrainian Women's League of America headed by Mrs. H. Lotocky, acted as hostess. Over two hundred delegates from Western Europe, Canada, and the United States were present. The European delegation was headed by Mrs. I. Pawlikowsky. Those addressing the convention were Mrs. E. Paine, president of Common Cause, Inc., and David Martin, secretary of the Refugee Defense Committee. The Congress paid tribute to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army for its struggle against Red Russia and appealed to the conscience of the world on behalf of the oppressed Ukrainian nation. Emphasis was placed on the necessity for the liberation of Ukraine and the rebirth of the Ukrainian Independent Democratic Republic.

The World Federation of Ukrainian Women was re-created and officers elected. Mrs. Olena Kysilevsky, formerly a Senator of the Polish Diet representing Western Ukraine and now living in Canada was named president.



## BOOK REVIEW

**THREE WHO MADE A REVOLUTION.** A biographical history.  
Bertram D. Wolfe, New York, The Dial Press, 1948, pp. x+661.

In this large volume, the author carries the careers of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin down to the opening of World War I with especial emphasis upon the development of their theoretical ideas and their relations with one another and with the other revolutionary leaders both of the Russian Empire and of the various European socialist parties. The result will be bewildering to the average reader who is unaware of the intricacies of Marxian dialectics, especially if he is one of those persons who believe the modern popular version of the Russian revolution, i. e. the rising of the Russian people under the leadership of popular leaders, as Lenin, to overthrow a hated tsarism and establish some form of democracy in the country.

No point of view could be further from the truth, for as the author shows by reference to the original documents, these leaders had only a very subordinate part in the abortive revolution of 1905 and they spent their time quarreling with one another over the pure interpretation of the writing of Marx and Engels. The story is an elaborate narration of double-crossing, heated arguments, and hair-splitting debates entangled with police spies, wealthy idealistic fellow-travelers, and even ordinary bandits and criminals. We have finally a picture of a well-intentioned but hopelessly weak tsar, a bureaucracy more stupid and tolerant than evil and strong, and a group of revolutionary leaders thirsty for a more absolute power than the Autocrat of the Russians had ever wanted to possess. The only man to appear in the pages who apparently was trying to benefit the Russian people was the Prime Minister Stolypin. For his efforts to satisfy the land hunger of the peasants he won the undying hatred of the official circles as well as the revolutionists and was murdered under conditions that made it impossible to decide which one of his opponents was really responsible or whether the two were not working together.

Yet the book is instructive, for it points out how closely Stalin is following out the implications of the ideas that Lenin advocated even in the early days of his career. Lenin was always deliberately vague on the subject of democracy or of individual rights in any form. At times he defended them but fundamentally he was interested in the seizure of power by a well-trained and well-organized professional re-

volutionary group that was obedient to his will. Trotsky as early as 1903 predicted a state of affairs in which: "The organization of the Party takes the place of the Party itself; the Central Committee takes the place of the organization; and finally the dictator takes the place of the Central Committee" (p 253) but criticisms of Trotsky support the inference that it would take but a small development for the party to take the place of the state, and then we find the policy of Stalin today.

Likewise when the Duma was elected in 1906, Lenin insisted upon not boycotting the meeting, not because he believed that the Duma was anything but a parliamentary comedy but because he realized its potentialities as a sounding board for his ideas. To him a revolution was only *The* revolution if it was carried on by his friends and he was not prepared to work seriously in the Duma for any ends, however helpful to the people. Apply the principles of Lenin to the United Nations and the policy of Stalin and his agents is clear. They are there to make trouble and not to facilitate peace and cooperation.

In the same way the policy of Lenin as regards the unity of Russia is thoroughly ambiguous. To him nationalism was an evil thing but he appreciated how it could be used for disintegrating purposes. Also unlike most of his associates and the other revolutionary leaders, he understood the full meaning of the oppressed nationalities of Russia. Again and again he emphasized the role of the Ukrainian nationalists even when they hardly realized their own power and significance. But he did it not with the idea of dividing up Russia except momentarily but so as to find support against any and all fractions of the government and the government itself.

The opponents of Stalin and the friends of Trotsky, Zinovyev and the other purged leaders have endeavored to draw contrasts between the policies of Lenin and Stalin, and the latter has given them the opportunity because of his policies of rewriting the history of the past for the purpose of creating a Stalin legend. Yet even under Lenin's principles, the policy of Ukrainization was only a temporary one. He might have chosen a different moment to liquidate it and he might have been less ruthless in his actions but Lenin was alive and active when the Red Armies attacked and overthrew the Ukrainian National Republic and replaced it with a Russian-dominated Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It was Lenin who used Manuilsky in this connection and made it clear that Moscow was in theory to be the standard of Communist thought and action. Hence it comes about that not one of the

opponents of Stalin have had a good word to say for the national republics that were overthrown in the years succeeding the war. Both Stalin and his opponents have accepted the monolithic character of Russia-USSR and practically the entire group of anti-Stalinist Marxists are as hostile to the aspiration of the Ukrainians as are the most incorrigible supporters of the old regime. It is this fact that adds to the tragedy of Khvylovy and the other Ukrainian Communists who somehow believed that they could develop a Communism with a spirit other than that of Moscow.

One of the great virtues of this book is the recognition by the author of the fact that while Lenin was deeply imbued with the spirit and ideas of Marx and Engels, he looked at the world through the eyes of a Great Russian. It is no chance happening that Stalin is an admirer of Peter the Great who himself turned to the West but who maintained intact the old Moscow spirit of autocracy and tyranny. Lenin perhaps had a better appreciation of Europe and of European culture but his point of view was that of a Great Russian of Volga region and Stalin is but an Asiatic pupil of the anti-European tendency.

This book makes clear how closely the machinery of the Soviet state follows the traditional spirit of the Great Russian machine from the time of the rise of Moscow. That was a combination of messianism, tyranny, and oppression and the determination to absorb or eliminate all nations which stood in their way. In the nineteenth century among the intelligentsia it was often veiled in pan-human garb and in high sounding ideals but the experiences of Taras Shevchenko with the intelligentsia were no more sympathetic than those with the imperial police. Walking in the paths of the intelligentsia Lenin and Stalin only accentuated this feeling and woe to Ukraine and the nations that attracted the attention of Moscow, white or red.

To the casual reader this volume may seem detailed and almost pedantic but it opens a vista into the inner workings of the Bolshevik and Communist mind and of the real value of the meaning of Holy Russia throughout the ages. It draws more deeply the significance of the iron curtain and stresses by its story the need of a serious consideration of the cause of Ukraine and of the other oppressed nations which are striving to free themselves from the Russian Soviet yoke to take part in a free world.

CLARENCE A. MANNING.

## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN PERIODICALS

"Polish Foreign Policy," by Oscar Lange. *Poland of Today*, October, 1948, New York.

This superficial statement of current Polish foreign policy by a former American citizen but now a Polish delegate to the United Nations Economic and Social Council bears all the earmarks of an imprisoned intellect. The halls of intellectual freedom at the University of Chicago doubtlessly appear now as the portals of human paradise to this idealist who renounced his American citizenship in order to play his avowed role in constructing that mythical bridge of understanding between the Soviet Union and the West. For it is transparently clear from the stereotyped text that it is not Mr. Lange's thoughts that are being expressed, but those of his Kremlin masters. When with hollow joy he dwells upon the long-awaited solution under the "new people's democracy" of the territorial and populational differences between the White Ruthenians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians and the Poles, he must know within the recesses of his own mind the ugly untruth of this fabrication. Surely as a high official in the present satellite Polish government, he is not unaware of the military conflict that is now being waged over these very problems between the underground forces of the former and the Soviet-led contingents of the latter.

"In Defense of the Russian People," by Alexander Bermine. *The Saturday Evening Post*, September 4, 1948, New York.

The dominant motive that has inspired this former Soviet General and diplomat to write this interesting article is beyond reproach. As Russian born, he pleads for a sense of fairness on the part of his fellow American citizens toward the Russian people. The surging anti-Russian feeling abroad in this country is that measure of unfairness which he sees based on the failure of Americans to distinguish between the Russian people and the Soviet government, for whose many nefarious acts the former can hardly be held culpable. The author presents much convincing evidence from the time of the minority Bolshevik coup d'état in 1917 to the present to support his largely correct contention of the need for such a distinction. However, one is prone to ask the crucial question as to how far the Red Army would have

advanced in its imperialist annexation of the independent states of Ukraine, Georgia and the others in the early days of the Soviet regime had there not been the traditional sentiment in the Russian people for "the Great Russia." The subsequent sequence of events might have been entirely different for the Russian people, the non-Russian peoples, indeed, for the world at large. Full sympathy should be expressed for the enslaved Russian people and all peoples spiritually and materially decimated by communist tyranny, but from a cold, rational point of view, full exoneration of the Russians from responsibility for the course of events these past thirty-one years in Eastern Europe is hardly justified.

It is of particular note that the author, unlike most of the intellectual Russian emigres in this country, is fair and honest in recognizing the reality and importance of the many nationalities in the Union. In this connection it is singularly significant that many times he uses the Ukrainians as examples of his main points of argument. When he declares that "The mighty Ukrainian peasant rebellion is entering its fourth year" and elaborates further on the Ukrainian underground movement, Mr. Barmine demonstrates an honest familiarity with current events behind the Iron Curtain that is suspiciously rare among such men as Kerensky, Dallin and the kind who still nurture the "Great Russian" myth and persist in distorting the true perspective that Americans are desirous of acquiring.

"The Story of One Russian Underground Attempting to Overthrow Stalin," by Constantine W. Boldyreff. *Look* magazine, October 26, 1948, New York.

Highly pertinent to the general remarks made above concerning the propaganda appeal currently undertaken by many of our Russian emigres is this article which has been uncritically accepted by one of America's popular magazines. As indicated by its title, this account pretends to relate to the activities of a Russian underground movement which, if it were in actual existence, would be welcomed by every anti-communist. The fact is that there is no concrete evidence of any active Russian underground resistance against the Stalin regime, and this is negatively supported by the author's silence on this point. The narrative concerns itself, therefore, with the alleged past of this group which adorns itself with the impressive name of the "Solidarist Movement."

As with most Russian emigres, those who have aligned them-



selves with this group have apparently been waging their "underground resistance" thousands of miles away from the ostensible scene of battle. According to the author, this group originated in Yugoslavia in the early 30's but in contrast, let us say, to the Ukrainian underground which operated within the Soviet Union and resulted in the famous Kharkov trials in 1930, this group has nothing to show as evidence of its resistance other than the spurious claim that it was responsible for the assassination of Sergei M. Kirov.

Moreover, his assertions regarding the Vlassov army and the program of the Solidarist movement are subject to many devastating criticisms that cannot be enumerated here, but it can be pointed out that the collaborationist aspects, the anti-Semitic leanings, and the totalitarian implications of these two features should be exposed in print so that the American readers of such literary products might be spared the embarrassment of being "taken in" by these emigres who, capitalizing on the relative ignorance of their readers, continue to peddle nationalist Russian imperialism under the cloak of such high-sounding terms as "solidarism," "democratic Russia" and the like.

"The Secret Papers of Harry L. Hopkins," by Robert E. Sherwood. *Collier's*, June 19, 1948, New York.

A patient reading of this extensive series of articles on the intimate relations between President Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins and their war activities, notably in connection with American support of the Soviet military machine, serves only to deepen one's impressions of some official American naivete on matters of Eastern European affairs. Assuming the plausible situation of America's fear of a sudden Soviet turnabout toward reconciliation with Nazi Germany, in the event of which the Western military position would have seemed impossible, there was no necessity for the almost endless manifestations of American gullibility, childish diplomatic display, and adolescent trust in the Kremlin's intentions such as these papers reveal.

"Death of an apostate," an editorial. *America*, A Catholic Review of the Week, October 9, 1948, New York.

A prudent comment is made by the editors of this Jesuit periodical on the assassination of Gabriel Kostelnyk, a Ukrainian priest of Western Ukraine who opportunistically sold out to the Soviets when the Kremlin through its ecclesiastical tool, the Russian Orthodox Church,

began its program of destroying the powerful Ukrainian Greek-Uniat Church in that region. While thousands upon thousands of Ukrainian Catholics were, and are, being subjected to cruel persecution for their conscientious refusal to embrace Orthodoxy, Kostelnik threw in his lot with the Soviets, agitated among his people for Orthodoxy and therefore the Kremlin, was elevated by his new masters to the Orthodox bishopric of Lviv, and is now no more. As the editors accurately surmise, his usefulness to the Kremlin was at an obvious end, but the blame for the murder will continue to be placed upon some mythical "Ukrainian nationalist bourgeois, underground agent of the Roman Pope"—as explained by the sacerdotal puppet, the All-Russian Patriarch Alexei.

"The Peasant—Key to the Balkans," by M. Phillips Price. *The New York Times* magazine section, August 29, 1948, New York.

It is really unfortunate that many Western writers, such as this British Labor M. P., that take to writing about their experiences in Eastern Europe produce some instructive and fascinating accounts that considerably enhance the general reader's understanding of conditions there, but by far not in full nor devoid of certain serious defects, the absence of which would strengthen the coherency and validity of the pattern of thought conveyed by the authors. This author is quite convincing in his thesis that the more highly individualistic Balkan peasants, notably the Yugoslavs whom he uses constantly as his example, are radically different from the more collective-minded Russian Slavs, and thus such communist measures as collective farming cannot be as easily imposed upon the "Southern Slavs" as was done in Russia. However, although he mentions Ukraine twice, for him this identical difference does not appear between the Russian peasant and the Ukrainian. Yet significantly it is one of the keys to the understanding of what Mr. Barmine above refers to as "the mighty Ukrainian peasant rebellion" and of the horrible man-made famine in Ukraine in the early 30's when collectivization was first initiated in Ukraine under the initial Five Year Plan. All this leads us to think how much more convincing and valid Mr. Price's account would have been had he known this and effectively incorporated it as a precedent of what one might expect in such areas as Yugoslavia.