

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***Editor-in-chief* NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY**

***Associate Editor* LEV E. DOBRIANSKY**

***Artistic Adviser* SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY**

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***Managing Office: THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY*
*50 Church Street, S 252, New York 7, N. Y.***

***Editorial Address: DR. NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY*
*250 Franklin Turnpike, Mahwah, New Jersey***

Tel: CRagmere 8-3767-M

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, Ph. D., Professor of Economics at Georgetown University. President of The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.

CLARENCE A. MANNING, Professor of Russian and Ukrainian Languages and Literatures at Columbia University. Author of *The Story of Ukraine, Ukrainian Literature* and others.

PETRO PEKIV (pseudo), a Soviet Lawyer and specialist in Soviet Labor Law. Legal Adviser to the Soviet Labor Unions in several cities of the USSR. Now in USA.

MUSTAD AYTUGAN, a former major of the Red Army and lecturer in several Soviet military institutions. In Finland War he was taken prisoner. He is at present leader of the Idel-Ural national movement and President of the Turc-Moslem Kurultay. Now working as a journalist in Western Europe.

IVAN NIMCHUK, Ukrainian journalist, former editor of the most prominent daily of Western Ukraine "*Dilo.*" Now living in Canada.

STEPHEN PROTSIUK, Ukrainian economist, former member of the teaching staff at the Lviv Politechnical Institute; now in Australia.

NICHOLAS CHUBATY, Ukrainian historian and author. Chairman of the Ukrainian Shevchenko Society in America. Editor of this publication.

MYKOLA VELYCHKIVSKY, former Professor of the Economic-Agricultural Institute in Kharkiv. After World War II migrated to the West; at present in the USA.

ALEXANDER DOMBROVSKY, Ph. D., Ukrainian prehistorian. Now in USA.

A UNITED ANTI-COMMUNIST FRONT

Editorial

President Watson Kirkconnell of Acadia University in Canada is perhaps the most determined opponent of Communism in the Anglo-Saxon world. Even when during the last war, sovietophile sympathies swept over the entire democratic world like a flood, he constantly with the fervor of an apostle called attention to the harmfulness and danger to the democratic world of the brotherly bonds between it and the Kremlin. In the last number of the Canadian journal *Public Affairs*, he has published an article *Policy Post-Mortem*.

The author, a humanitarian with a great soul, reviews the countless mistakes of America and the British Commonwealth, including Canada, in regard to the Bolsheviks and points out their terrible consequences, not only the domination of 1/3 of the human race by Red Moscow but the penetration of Bolshevism into the rest of the world. Prof. Kirkconnell concludes his article with a quotation from a letter of Count Axel Oxenstjerne, a Chancellor of Sweden in the seventeenth century: "*You would be surprised, my son, with how little wisdom the world is ruled*" (*quam parva sapientia mundus regitur*). These same words can be repeated today when we look at the setup of a worldwide anti-Communist front with a single goal and especially the front of the anti-Communist nations enslaved by Moscow.

NATO WITHOUT A SPIRITUAL FRONT

The recent conference in Lisbon ended with a success. The nations of the Atlantic Pact succeeded in strengthening their military front and extended this by the inclusion of Greece and Turkey, but they did not even make an attempt to create an ideological anti-Bolshevik front to be a basis for the military alliance of the democratic world. Yet such a spiritual anti-Communist front is necessary and must proclaim full liberation of all enslaved peoples and involve the cooperation of the great religions of the world, especially the Christians and Mohammedans, for both of these religions are widespread in the area of the broadened Atlantic Pact and its possible extension to take in the Arab world. Yet such a cooperation is not even considered among the peoples of a shattered Christianity.

The attempt of President Truman to connect America through diplomacy with the Vatican, the spiritual leader of approximately 400,000,000 Catholics of the world, aroused so many protests from certain religious circles that the President was compelled to drop the idea for a while. At the same time Pastor Niemoeller, the well-known German pacifist, arrived in America. He came here after his "successful" conference with the Patriarch of Moscow with whom, according to the press, he agreed that cooperation was possible.

It is not strange then that Latin America is beginning to withdraw from its natural ally and neighbor America, and President Peron is beginning to set up his own South American front. The liberation movement of the Arab world brings us much trouble. The position of a spiritual anti-Communist front is bad and there is no hope of forming it, for the Western world is facing a world of Communism without any idealistic slogans. It is relying only upon military power. Yet in reality we need these great and moving slogans if we are to fight a world led by Moscow. We must speak in the name of universal, pan-human ideals to our allies on both sides of the iron curtain.

OUR ALLIES BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

The Bolsheviks of course have their fifth columns in the democratic world but we have also behind the Iron Curtain millions of potential allies in the USSR, China and the satellite states of Moscow. We only need to know these allies, to understand their aspirations and to learn how to appeal to them and organize them for the struggle with red Moscow, when the hour of crisis arrives.

We have to reckon with the fact that our potential allies are living under a most terrible terror, while the Communist fifth columns in the democratic world are protected by the rights of democratic citizenship. If we take this into consideration, we must frame a policy that will not waste our allies behind the Iron Curtain and a propaganda that will not give the Communist tyranny the opportunity to destroy them before the final act of the drama.

In regards to the recent conference in Lisbon, C. L. Sulzberger reported in a dispatch to the *New York Times* (February 22, 1952) that for the use of the members of the conference there was distributed a report on the aims of Bolshevik policy and the strength and weakness of Moscow. "It was carefully worked out by Western political experts on the basis of long study, and comprises a truly comprehensive analysis of Soviet philosophy, aspirations and intentions. The document is perhaps

the best available summary of Western views on Soviet intentions." But in discussing the objectives of Soviet policy, the same document says: "The Western nations are advised to recognize the fact that *the Soviet regime today is more stable than any time since 1917*; that the Communist Party and its security forces can preserve this monolithic power. Party discipline is so rigid that even when Premier Stalin dies . . . it is unlikely that either a Communist schism or a change in system will be brought about."

"*There are zones of discontent within the Soviet Union, such as, (geographically speaking) in the newly acquired areas of the Western Ukraine and the Baltic States or the Ukraine itself, the Caucasus, and Central Asia*". This is stated in an official document prepared by experts of the highest type.

It is not only this official document that affirms the fact of the existence of our allies behind the Iron Curtain, but it is constantly stressed by the Bolshevik press, especially *Pravda*, the central organ of the All-Union Communist Party. Quiet reigns on the territory of the Russian people. There lies the strength and the power of the Kremlin and of the Communist Party. But there is no quiet on the territory of the non-Russian peoples, who in time of peace are helpless, because the power of the Kremlin is great. News of these disorders appear in the American press. We are not talking now about the purges in the apparatus of the Communist Party, of the scholars, writers, and artists in Ukraine, for these have been repeated every year almost as a permanent Soviet routine and we can only marvel how despite the deportation of millions of the population from Ukraine this same "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" rises phoenix-like and continues to trouble Moscow. The *New York Times* on January 6, 1952, reported again that in Ukraine there were being arranged countless meetings at which well-known Ukrainian writers were compelled to repent and recant from their "bourgeois nationalism." Apparently the dynamics of this struggle which has been going on for 34 years for the liberation of their own country must be based on elemental causes. We have concrete data through Ukrainian underground channels on the existence of an active Ukrainian resistance even in 1951.

The Soviet press reports the existence of this "bourgeois nationalism" also beyond Ukraine in other non-Russian regions of the USSR. The Soviet *Pravda*, and the American press following it up, inform us of its appearance in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Everywhere as in Ukraine the local scholars and writers are being attacked for their "bourgeois nationalism" and for the "perversion of the history" of their

countries and their failure to evaluate properly the "progressive work" of Russia in the Asiatic lands. They are blamed for their silence on the fact that the annexation of these lands to Russia was by a "voluntary union." The local Communist Parties are attacked for not being sufficiently alert in the "unmasking of these bourgeois nationalists."

The New York Times on Jan. 6, 1952 reported that in Kazakhstan there were removed for nationalism two members of the central Executive Committee of the Union of Communist Youth. For similar reason the president of the Kazakhstan branch of the Union of Soviet Writers was removed.

The same paper reported a similar purge in Turkmenistan, where the head of the local Union of Writers was removed for "bourgeois nationalism" too. In Turkmenistan it has been forbidden to read the old national epic of the 11th century, *Korkut Ada* and in Azerbaijan the Azerbaijani version of the old epic *Dede Kurkut* has been banned because it aroused Mohammedan religious pathos and patriotism.

In Uzbekistan several poets of the local Union of Soviet Writers have been condemned for writing patriotic verses and for the efforts to "disfigure the Uzbek language with Arabic and Turkish words." It is obvious that in Ukraine orders have been issued three times to re-edit the Academic Dictionary of the Ukrainian language because it contained too many Ukrainian words, which segregated Ukrainian from Russian.

The New York Times again on January 30, 1952, reported from the Soviet press of the growth of nationalist currents among the Moslems of Soviet Asia probably in connection with the growth of the nationalistic currents in the Arab world. Again Moscow had troubles with nationalism in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In the first instance the head of the local Komsomol was removed, and in the latter the head of the Academy of Sciences and of the Branch of the Union of Soviet Writers. For reason of "bourgeois nationalism" — two secretaries of the Turkmen Communist Party, S. I. Kruglov and I. O. Omarov were also removed. It is obvious that these nationalist and Mohammedan currents are connected with the nationalism of the Mohammedan nations on the borders of the Soviets and so the Soviet press attacks the Pan-Iranian, Pan-Turkic and Pan-Moslem tendencies in these movements.

On February 18, 1952 the *New York Times* again reported from the Soviet press of the new troubles of Moscow with "bourgeois nationalism" in Uzbekistan, especially among the scholars. The historians became a special object of the attack of the Communist Party through the words of the first secretary Amin Irmatovich Niyazov. An Uzbek Communist

loyal to Moscow reproached the historians his fellow-countrymen because they "erroneously" explained the history of Uzbekistan and passed over "the progressive mission of Russia in Uzbekistan." They should have spoken of the progressive character of the Russian administration even under the tsars, for already then Russia possessed in itself the germs of the Bolshevik Revolution.

From Munich the *New York Times* on February 21, 1952, reported the statement of a Siberian deserter from the Red Army that Siberia was now the weak spot in the Soviet Union, for millions of the inmates of the concentration camps were turning the whole of Siberia into one prison. Even during the early stages of the Revolution Siberia had shown centrifugal tendencies from Moscow. A well-known Caucasian deserter, Colonel Tokayev, not only emphasized the definitely independence movements in the entire Caucasus, but the "ripening of political maturity" of all small nations of the Soviet Union (*The Caucasus*, 1951, No. 5, *Lessons and Prospects*, by Gr. Tokayev).

These are the facts which during the last two months have leaked out from the Iron Curtain. Any one who knows even superficially the history of the last decades since 1917, understands what a potential army of allies the democratic world could secure in the Soviet Union itself, not mentioning the newly enslaved satellite states.

There is quiet naturally only on the territory of the Russian people. Why should there be on the territory of the Russian people movements against the Kremlin, when the Russians, despite the fact that they form a minority of 46% of the population of the Soviet Union in fact control the entire Union. Or when Russians sent from Moscow or the Russianized local officials control the local Communist parties and the professional associations and administer all component republics from Ukraine to Yakutia? Why should the Russians be dissatisfied with the government of the Kremlin, when the Russian language is more wide-spread throughout the entire territory of the Soviet Union than it ever was in the days of the tsars, when the Russian people have been officially given a higher position among the peoples of the USSR, the place of the "elder brother" of the non-Russian peoples? Why should the Russian people be dissatisfied with the Kremlin, when in the Moscow centre there are gathered the material goods of all the colonially exploited non-Russian republics as Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and the Caucasus which have lost millions of their population from hunger? The Russian people are constantly better cared for and have never known hunger. Finally why should the Russian people be dissatisfied with the Kremlin, when it has

raised the power of Russia to the highest degree known in Russian history and is satisfying the mystical aspirations of the Russian writers and philosophers, that Moscow must be the head of the entire world and religiously the "Third Rome" of Christianity? Russian people traditionally were deprived of "civil liberties." At the same time the Russian emigres like Gogol's "Inspector from Petersburg" have been able to convince many Americans that they alone are able to overthrow the Kremlin, provided that America — God forbid! — will not attempt to liberate the enslaved non-Russian peoples. On the contrary America has to be helpful to Russians in the preservation of the Russian Empire and in the continuous enslavement of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR.

FOR ONE ANTI-COMMUNIST FRONT

There is no doubt that it is in the interests of America to form not only a world-wide front against Communism but also a front of the peoples of the USSR against the Kremlin. Yet the American ignorance in this latter field, thanks to the ill will of the Russian imperialists, makes this work almost hopeless. For a year the efforts of the *American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia* under the American journalist Eugene Lyons and now of Admiral Alan G. Kirk, former Ambassador to Moscow, with E. Lyons still the executive director are a case at point.

The very name of the Committee shows that it is undertaking the labor of a Sisyphus. By its methods it is unable to bring any advantage to America and the democratic world. If any one like its former head attacks secretary Acheson and accepts the conception of Russia as a historical state that must not be divided and considers that all who wish to divide it and make independent the nations enslaved by Moscow are enemies of democracy, its task is so much harder and hopeless.¹ The basic mistake of many Americans is the acknowledgement that the Russians have the predominant role in the crushing of the Moscow tyranny which is entirely false.

In fact the leading role in the overthrowing of the Moscow tyranny will be that of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR who are vitally interested in securing their independence and who have for 34 years been struggling for it. Yet the Committee headed by Lyons takes the position against their liberation and assigns them a subordinate role in the struggle

¹ *Acheson's Gift to Stalin*, by Eugene Lyons. *The Freeman*, August 27, 1951.

against Kremlin. It threatens even those gains which they have won from the unwilling Bolsheviks.

The leading nations of the USSR in 1918-1919 declared their right of self-determination, they defended it in torrents of blood, they still have their governments in exile and Ukraine and Byelorussia have preserved even under the Soviet system the form of a state and the membership of the United Nations. There is little profit to be gained by the Committee when it rejects all this and provokes the ill-will of the peoples by declaring that there must be a plebiscite held by the favor of a Russian Constituent Assembly before Ukraine can maintain even its present position.

The non-Russian peoples are not political children. They realize definitely that all Russian parties are hostile to their liberation, for all Russian parties and groups stand for the indivisibility of the Russian Empire.

Similarly there can be no profit to the United States from such recent actions of Congressman Armstrong who allowed his conference in Washington to be controlled by the Pro-Fascist element of the Russian emigration who excluded every idea of a liberation of the non-Russian people enslaved by Moscow. As an American, Congressman Armstrong should be aware of what America would face, if the Communists in the Kremlin were replaced by Russian fascists. The situation not only of the nations oppressed by Russia but of America and the whole democratic world too would scarcely change. Why should we arm ourselves again in a few years to check Russian Fascists permeated with the idea of a Russia called by destiny to dominate the world and be the master of the entire planet?

Is not the calling to the platform by Congressman Armstrong of some unknown Russian Ershov to speak in the name of Ukraine and to falsify the will of the Ukrainian people not a provocation of our most powerful potential ally, the Ukrainian people? Is it not a similar provocation when favored by some Americans the group of Boldyrev assumes the Trident, the badge of the independent democratic Ukraine under which the Ukrainian Underground is now fighting and asserts that they are Russian partisans fighting against the Bolsheviks in Ukraine and Russia? In any event, despite the 500 Russian Studies in America, the Americans know little of the USSR and in the best of faith they are making mistakes which will harm America and the entire democratic world and only Russia, be it white or red, will reap the profits.

One anti-Communist front of the peoples of the USSR and the satellites will be possible only when its organizers accept a freedom-loving

and progressive approach to the entire problem. The present formal gains of the peoples of the USSR are already facts upon which there can be no discussion. The united anti-Communist front must accept as its basis the right of every people to build into its existing state form that content which fits its national mode of life with the right to leave the USSR or to remain in it as the Soviet Constitution provides. That Constitution has been hitherto because of the Bolshevik tyranny a dead letter but on the fall of Bolshevism it must be brought to life by democratic victors.

The ideological bases of the anti-Bolshevik front of the peoples of the USSR and the satellites must be part of a universal ideological program which America must write on its banners in the struggle with Bolshevism. *In answer to the slogans of red Moscow which promises to the people social and material equality, the free democratic world must proclaim a universal program of the liberation of all peoples, small and large, who desire liberation.*

The democratic world and America cannot convince either the peoples of the USSR or the satellites or the colonial or semi-colonial peoples with slogans of the democratic freedoms of the individual. The enslaved peoples do not want freedom of the individual brought in by strangers; the Communists also say that they are bringing freedom. *The enslaved peoples of Russia want only to be the masters in their own house, to control their own fate, to govern themselves in their own land, even if it is poor. They will decide for themselves the meaning of freedom according to their own understanding of it and in line with their national traditions.* Only a universal program of the democratic world, which brings national liberation to all peoples can cement a mighty front of mankind against the Bolsheviks. Such a program all the satellites of Moscow will accept at once. So will all the nations of the USSR and so will the Moslem world. So will the colonial peoples. Only those nations who can see their way to national independence will form such an effective front and will overthrow the tyranny of Moscow over a third of the human race. Any other course will accomplish nothing.

AMERICA'S DEVELOPING REALISM TOWARD RUSSIA

by LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

From all reliable indications the most salutary development in current American political thinking about Russia is its powerfully emerging realism. As certainly never before, the predominant historical forces that have moulded Eastern Europe into its present menacing form are being intelligently understood along a broad front of American scholarship and politics. The political realities that underlie the minutely calculated Soviet Russian maneuvers and operations from the Danube to the Pacific are now beginning to receive sober consideration and rational appraisal in the analyses of responsible and disinterested students of this problem in America. And for those to whom the prodigious tasks of formulating effective plans for psychological warfare have been assigned, a more secure foundation of valid knowledge and ripe judgment is being constructively laid. Beyond question of any doubt this unfolding realism constitutes the healthiest and most hopeful sign in recent American thought on Russia. It certainly signalizes the long-awaited obliteration of the many iron curtains of thought which have only served to perpetuate dangerous illusions about Russia in certain high official quarters as well as in our numerous private institutions of higher learning.

THE MOTIVE FORCE OF TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

For some time alert and historically trained European observers have grasped the motive force of traditional Russian imperialism in the Trojan horse of world communism. In the 20's and 30's at a time when countless so-called American liberals naively viewed the ruthless politico-economic activities of Soviet Russia as momentous features of "the Great Experiment," vastly more informed European students perceived the aggressive and predatory nature of Russian Communism in a sound perspective of historical and institutional continuity. The unpardonable error of arbitrarily positing an unreal hiatus in the historical development of Russia was reduced to a harmless minimum. With necessary allowances made for guarded diplomatic discourse, perhaps the finest expression of this realistic outlook was given by Dr. Joseph Motta who, as the head of the Swiss delegation in the League of Nations, justified his country's

dissent on the admission of the Soviet Union to that concert of nations in the following words: "From the point of view of sound international relations and the indispensable principles of life that govern those relations, the essential and outstanding feature of Russian Communism is its invincible, inevitable, irrepressible tendency to secure universal domination." Significantly this was uttered five years before overt Soviet Russian aggressions caused many an American liberal to revamp his baseless attitude toward the seat of "the Great Experiment."

Fortunately the entire problem is now receiving careful attention from American students and observers. It is not possible here to recount all the recent expressions that show this growing appreciation of the situation, but a few important examples can be offered to prove the general point. In the field of scholarship, one of the few genuine experts on Russia, Rev. Edmund A. Walsh of Georgetown University, states in his latest remarkable work on "Total Empire, The Roots and Progress of World Communism" that the "second circumstance which strengthens Mr. Stalin's hand in his bid for total power is the adroit combination of Russian nationalism and Russian imperialism."¹ The results of calm and objective scholarship find easy confirmation in the personal experiences of sagacious observers who, as General Walter Bedell Smith, have quickly come to learn that "communism today is great Russianism." Temperate and cautious American statesmen, such as the Honorable Herbert Hoover, mince few words when they declare bluntly that "Since Peter the Great they steadily have expanded their reach of empire over the largest land mass in the world. Their method was that of a burglar going down a hall." For the constructive use of legislators, Senate Document No. 41, prepared last year at the request of Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, refers to an illuminating pamphlet written in Moscow in 1929 by the Russian analyst, Alexandrov, and entitled "The Marked Class Enemy," wherein it is forthrightly stated that "Great Russian chauvinism has remained alive even to the present day. Among Soviet officials, and even party members . . . even among certain sections of the Russian working population."² A still more marked growth of this since World War II is accurately discerned by the skilled authors of this valuable document.

Undoubtedly, the recent statement of Secretary of State, Hon. Dean Acheson, stands unsurpassed for its intellectual integrity, historical objectivity, and theoretical precision. It is not feasible to reproduce here the

¹ p. 138.

² *Tensions Within The Soviet Union*, p. 33.

full historic statement made by Mr. Acheson on June 26, 1951 before the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, but several portions may be quoted to demonstrate the depth of his superlative observations. "Historically, the Russian state has had three great drives—to the west into Europe, to the south into the Middle East, and to the east into Asia . . . Historically also the Russian state has displayed considerable caution in carrying out those drives . . . The Politburo has acted in this same way. It has carried on and built on the imperialist tradition. What it has added consists mainly of new weapons and new tactics—the weapons of conspiracy . . . the ruling power in Moscow has long been an imperial power and now rules a greatly extended empire. This is the challenge our foreign policy is required to meet. It is clear that this process of encroachment and consolidation by which Russia has grown in the last 500 years from the duchy of Muscovy to a vast empire has got to be stopped."³ For the editors of the renowned *New York Times* this unprecedented declaration on the part of an American Secretary of State signaled a new "Realism About Russia."⁴ It is manifestly significant that the only source of opposition to the declaration and the *New York Times* editorial was a small group of unrepresentative Russian emigres who have advertised themselves as the incorrigible defenders on American soil of the Russian imperialist ideal.

Anyone sufficiently familiar with contemporary East European history is well aware that the series of Soviet imperialist aggressions did not commence after World War II, nor at the start of the last war, but at the very origin of Bolshevik Russia thirty-four years ago. As the above observations clearly imply, Soviet Russia was indeed born in the womb of traditional Russian imperialism. The wanton destruction of the independent states of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Turkestan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and several other non-Russian nations by the marauding hordes of Trotsky's Red Army made mockery of the principle of national self-determination advanced in the councils of the West at the time. Marxism, or so-called international communism, was already doomed to become the mere ideological trappings of traditional Russian imperialism. In less than a decade sincere and devoted Georgian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and other national communist leaders witnessed the rapid perversion of the ideals of the Revolution, as twenty years later untutored "Titos" in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were to realize in similar vein.

³ *The Mutual Security Program*, hearings, pp. 11-12.

⁴ June 28, 1951.

The outstanding fact is that only power-drunk communist quislings remain in the non-Russian countries of Central and East Europe with their model in the traitorous conduct of the hated renegade of the great and historic Georgian people. The magnificent traditions and priceless cultural treasures of their respective countries, which are being liquidated by the imposed process of Russification, have the same value to them as those of America to the treasonable communist elements in our midst. History is replete with aggrandizing lackeys serving foreign interests, and it should prove no strain on the imagination to envision many more of these in the service of the Russian state. A detailed socio-economic analysis of the institutional context of the Soviet Union can show conclusively the hollow meaning of the term communism, in whatever logical definitional form, when applied to the oligarchical framework of the Soviet Union.

In short, for the oppressed peoples of Central and East Europe, as indeed for those of Asia, the sole mortal enemy is Soviet Russian imperialism which has magnified the worst elements of former Tsarist Russian imperialism, viz., Great Russian chauvinism, mass deportations to the slow-death camps of Siberia, state terrorism, anti-Semitism and religious persecution, the feudal Third Rome complex, and premeditated national genocide. In country after country of the non-Russian peoples, these barbarities are being engineered today with the unspeakable aid of the native quislings. No other imperialist venture in modern history can match the blood-drenched record of traditional Russian imperialism.

DISTINCTIVE PROBLEMS OF THE NON-RUSSIAN PEOPLES

The recent course of history has given to the 800 million non-Russian peoples, from the Danube to the Pacific, a common basis of suffering as well as one of intense hatred against the bondage of Soviet Russian imperialism. Again as never before, the majority of the non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union and the peoples of Central Europe have been inextricably drawn together by the one common objective of shattering for all time the roots of traditional Russian imperialism. As many Western statesmen, analysts and writers now fully comprehend, this fiery and consuming interest is in the fundamental interest of the security and freedom of the non-Soviet world. No more powerful factor can possibly sustain the identity of interest existing between the West and the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Russian Empire.

It is vitally important to distinguish in our thinking between the basic issues and problems confronting these non-Russian peoples and

those involving the victimized masses of the Russian nation. In character and substance the outstanding issues before the non-Russian peoples are necessarily international for they obviously arise from the fundamental fact of foreign domination. Thus in the largest measure their resolution is predicated on the quickest elimination of this fact, which logically means the eradication of Soviet Russian imperialism. In sharp contrast, the problems of the majority of the Russian people are essentially national in character, and logically entail merely the overthrow of the autocratic communist government in Russia. It is no wonder, then, that for the Balts, Ukrainians, Poles and every other captive non-Russian people of meaningful size, the prime and ruling aspiration is the complete realization of national freedom and independence, self-government and sovereignty, equality and permanent peace. It follows, too, that the cherished goals of the subjected Russian masses can only be civil freedom and national democracy, the elevation of their economic standards and surcease from the costly burdens of centuries-old imperialist ventures, as well as permanent peace.

The pressing problem of national genocide is in essence an international one for the Balts, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Poles, Koreans, Chinese and others in the Soviet Russian Empire. By the very nature of the case, it is not a problem for the Russian nation which remains intact and unimpaired. Closely connected with this is Stalin's current program of Russification which is an additional scourge facing the non-Russian peoples. The instructive article by Michael Padev on "The Great Liquidation: Satellite Culture" clearly demonstrates that this diabolical program of Russification is destroying the traditions of the captive non-Russian nations and is mortally striking at the very sinews of their existence.⁵ What is now taking place in the so-called satellite states of Central Europe has long been the rule in the occupied states of Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia and others. Needless to say, the tyranny of Russification is obviously no problem for the Russian people.

From every conceivable angle—moral, intellectual, political, military—it would seem that we should begin to place the highest values on the essential realities that prevail behind the Iron Curtains of Europe and Asia. If justice and charity enter into our understanding, then surely the heavy burdens imposed on the common masses of the Russian people by the incredibly gigantic apparatus of the Soviet Russian elite can scarcely be put on the same plane as the murderous, genocidal onslaughts made on

⁵ *The New York Times Magazine*, February 10, 1952.

the non-Russian peoples. If security and geopolitical strategy enter into our most basic calculations, then an imposing fact to be duly respected is that the record of resistance on the part of the Russian people to their *internal* tyranny is almost blank when compared with that of the non-Russian peoples against an external tyranny. If the conservation of human resources is of importance, then it should always be remembered that on Stalin's own authority, as expressed on May 24, 1945, the Great Russians constitute the central core of Soviet society, a society of graded privilege for which millions of Russians will undoubtedly fight.

ACCESSIBLE CONCRETE AIDS FOR OUR NON-RUSSIAN ALLIES

The concrete aids that are readily available for the support of our sure and certain non-Russian allies deserve here at least a summary enumeration. The bold assertion of the principles embodied in our Declaration of Independence—"that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . ."—can furnish as nothing else a great moral and spiritual encouragement to the national independence movements of the non-Russian peoples which are founded on these very same principles. It is somewhat ironical that Soviet Russia, in its prostitute ways, should abet the national independence movements of the peoples of south Asia, in the Near East, and in north Africa, while we, with genuine avenues open to us into the very heart of the Soviet empire, should remain morally indifferent to the principles on which our own nation was established and to which other peoples are equally entitled. Last January, Peter Pospelov, high Communist theoretician and director of the Marx-Lenin-Engels Institute, keyed the Soviet line for the coming year by asserting that "in the countries of Asia there is developing a gigantic anti-imperialist revolution which is overturning the plans and calculations of American and British imperialists." This twisted line can be as easily turned against the real imperialists of Russia, and with a thousandfold greater effect.

Effective propaganda use can be made of Article 17 of the Soviet Constitution which nominally provides that "The right freely to secede from the U.S.R.R. is reserved to every Union Republic." A further aid is afforded in the Genocide Convention which now as an international statute can permit the explicit indictment of the Soviet Union for the planned execution of national genocide. An intrepid implementation of the so-called Kersten amendment to the Mutual Security Act would doubtless serve as a major stroke in our psychological warfare against the Soviet

Union. But above all, in the moral and political sphere the unqualified principle of national self-determination, which intrinsically means self-government, equal sovereignty, and responsible independent action of the peoples concerned, must at all costs be upheld if integrity and honor are to be the sterling attributes of our leadership in the world.

No less now than in 1918 when President Wilson urged this principle, our objective must be a world "made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression." President Truman has given added content to this when he declared, "The issue in Korea is the survival of the principles on which we have built our countries. The principle of national independence and self-government is at stake there, as well as the principle that government shall be for the welfare of the people."⁶ In brief, the phase necessarily succeeding America's realism toward Russia is one of America's powerful idealism toward the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union.

NIGHT ALARM IN KIEV

(Actual truth)

One night along a dark dirty corridor of the community house, one of the residents ran shouting: "Wake up, citizens, and run as fast as you can!"

Every one jumped out of bed, fear in their hearts, looked at the clock and thought: "It is one o'clock at night, time for the *Black Crow*, the auto of the NKVD to make the rounds and pick up people." "Probably for me" each one thought. The alarmist, however, ran along the corridor again, shouting: "Do not be alarmed, nothing terrible has happened. It is only that our community house has caught on fire."

All breathed happily, and jokingly walked out dragging behind them personal belongings. All were quite calm and did not regret leaving the dirty quarters. Tomorrow by order of the Kiev's Residence-Division some sort of a corner will be found for them.

⁶ *The New York Times*, March 27, 1951.

SOVIET LINGUISTICS AND RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

In one of his early stories, *My Travelling Companion*, Maxim Gorky describes a journey which he made from Odessa to Tiflis in company with a young Georgian princelet who by flattery, promises, and pretended helplessness induced him to slave, work and steal for his supposed friend. At the end after Shako Ptadze had vanished for good and all, — Gorky summarized his experiences in these words: "He taught me a great deal that you cannot find in thick folios written by wise men — for the wisdom of life is always deeper and broader than the wisdom of people."

Gorky wrote these words before he had become enamored with the Marxian philosophy and the advanced interpretation of it by Lenin and Stalin. To-day if he were living, he would find that that "wisdom of life" has disappeared from the science and humanistic studies of the Soviet Union or it would be described as an idealistic bourgeois devotion to pessimism and irrationalism. On the other hand we have words of Stalin, himself: "The science of the history of society can, despite all the complexity of phenomena of social life, become as exact a science as, for example, biology it can become capable of utilizing the laws of social development for practical use."¹

These laws to be effective and applicable must be based upon the infallible system of Marxism and Leninism as further elaborated by Stalin himself. This confers upon Stalin himself the final power of determining what laws are valid not only in the present but in the past and it gives to him the power to change his mind in the future and to promulgate new guides and new requirements not only for contemporary and future happenings but also similarly for the past. Under such circumstances the history of the human race or of any part of it can be rewritten at will, as a new and more pertinent truth is discovered not only by an examination of facts or a correction of the past through the discovery of additional evidence but as it seems best to the master of the Kremlin. The old jibe of Leonid Andreyev that the tsar was more powerful than God, for God did not change His laws and the infallible tsar altered his constantly, is

¹ "On Dialectical and Historical Materialism", *Problems of Leninism*, 11th edition, p. 544.

now seen to be a basic part of Marxo-Lenino-Stalinism and is to be treated with the greatest deference by all would-be scholars who must realize that their support of a position taken by Stalin does not serve them in any stead, if he changes his mind before they do.

Stalin is therefore able to lay down the following rules: "Marxism does not recognize immutable conclusions and formulas obligatory for all epochs and periods. Marxism is the enemy of all kinds of dogmatism."² Stalin's changing attitude towards all questions of history is well shown by his participation in the linguistic controversy over the theories of N. Ya. Marr, a distinguished, if ultra-imaginative, Soviet linguist who for his own sake fortunately died in 1934, when he was receiving the highest plaudits of the Soviet state. It would be wrong to see in Stalin's interference in this dispute over language merely a desire to express opinions on all subjects, for the text of his communications shows that he was thinking of fundamental political policies which would allow him to justify his stand on all matters of current interest including the fate of the millions of non-Russians in the Soviet Union.

Marr was the son of a Scotch engineer in the Caucasus and a Georgian woman and during his early years he learned almost no Russian and in fact his lack of knowledge of it put him at a disadvantage in his schooling until he was relatively grown up. He then developed into a brilliant scholar, working primarily upon the relations between Georgian and Armenian and the lesser languages of the Caucasus. He endeavored to identify with these such languages as the Basque of the Pyrenees, the indecipherable Etruscan, elements of Albanian and various references to other lost languages of primitive Europe. In his youth he was an ardent Georgian nationalist but later he threw his lot in with the Bolsheviks and was one of the first professors to welcome their accession to power. This brought him great fame and his work in archeology and material culture raised him to the highest point in Soviet scholarship.

From this point on Marr began to take seriously his role as the founder of Marxian linguistics. He broke completely with the accepted principles of the science in the Western world and denied absolutely the existence of an Indo-European family of languages. He endeavored by clever reasoning to trace language as a class phenomenon from the first cries of primitive man, which were uttered by the priests and medicine men as a means of holding the population in subjection as did the later

² *Pravda*, August 2, 1950, p. 2. The translations are taken from *The Soviet Linguistic Policy*, New York, 1951.

capitalists. He argued to the effect that when the ideal socialist and communist state would result, with the end of all oppression and exploitation, the various languages would voluntarily fuse through brotherly influence and there would be produced an entirely new human language which would retain the best features of all languages and could be called the language of the Communist State. It would be none of the hitherto existing languages but a new creation formed out of all of them.

This idea was not only philological, although as such it was presented to the Soviet scholars. It harmonized with the hopes and expectations of the theorists of Communism, with the principles of the Comintern as it had been originally conceived, and with the hopes of those groups in the various non-Russian Soviet republics who placed the welfare of their own peoples on the same level as that of the Communist Party, viewed as an international organization. Stalin welcomed this attitude and at the 16th Congress of the Party in 1930, he accepted this as the role of language in the future Communist state.

Marr from the beginning had embellished his theories with many extraneous propositions of linguistic paleontology, designed to give Marxian support for one of his basic and perhaps most valuable ideas that not all changes in language had been brought about by the actual migration of peoples into new territories but that certain changes of culture within a constant population might produce many of the same effects and that certain disputed questions of etymology and semantics might be explained in this way. However, as he grew older and more famous, he became more dogmatic and his students carried his interpretation of "Marxist linguistics" still further, until they ceased to make any sense.

It is of interest that when the attack on Marr's teachings was begun in *Pravda* in May, 1950, the opponents of Marr, beginning with Prof. Chikobava, directed most of their fire against the extremes of these theories, while they paid tribute to much of his early work when he was still busying himself with the Caucasian and adjacent languages. Even so, Prof. Chikobava made the point in quoting Stalin that "a nation is a historically formed, stable community of people which arose on the basis of common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up which is manifested in a common culture."⁸

Marr also held the idea that the creation of a single Communist state would facilitate the introduction of this language and that artificial means could be applied to hasten it. This Chikobava attacked by other quotations

⁸ J. V. Stalin, "Marxism and the National Question," *Works*, Vol. II, p. 296.

from Stalin, stressing the period of time before this state could be achieved and declaring that any effort to hurry it would be a type of assimilation which was contrary to Marxism.

The defenders of Marr tried to pass over their teacher's most peculiar linguistic theses and rested their case, so to speak, on the difficulties of assuming an early standard form of language. Thus Prof. Chemosanov in attacking Prof. Meillet's ideas of an original Indo-European could declare that with the classification of Hittite as Indo-European from the year 1,500 B. C., the origin of Indo-European would have to be pushed still further back. "Such a conception of ethnic unity in such a distant epoch contradicts the definition of ancient society provided by historical materialism, which teaches that that stage in the development of human society is characterized by ethnic units of small size and instability."

Prof. Filin in much the same vein pointed out that the students of the comparative method of language studied only what was common to languages and had no explanation for what was different.⁴ In his *Outline of the History of the Russian Language before the 14th Century*, he admitted a whole series of extremely complex problems of Slavo-Cimerian, Slavo-Sarmatian, Slavo-Celtic, etc., although ethno-linguistic relations became stabilized with the definite establishment of the clans. However he argued that the traditional theories involved merely disintegration of older groups, when there was no evidence of their existence. In another work he goes further and says: "The old Russian written language basically reflects the speech of the city population or, even more narrowly, the speech of its socially highest class — princes, their bodyguards, boyars and the strata of the monasteries and the churches. The language of the rural population, of the basic masses of Eastern Slavs, is represented in writings indirectly, only in so far as one can speak of a certain community in the speech of the upper and lower classes of the population."⁵

Filin sums up his views in another section, when he speaks of the relations of Russian and the other languages of the USSR. "From this the new science of language draws the conclusion that there is historical community (oneness) between Russian and the languages of many other Union nationalities; genetically they are interwoven among themselves in the preceding stage of development."⁶

It is very obvious that the debate went on in Pravda over the teachings of Marr were only superficially linguistic in any general sense. Marr,

⁴ *Pravda*, May 30, 1950, p. 3.

⁵ Quoted by S. Nikiforov, *Pravda*, June 13, 1940.

⁶ Quoted by V. Vinogradov in *Pravda*, June 6, 1950, p. 3f.

a non-Russian Communist, and his Russian pupils were operating in a dubious atmosphere. Marr had made his reputation as much from archaeology as from philology and it was with good reason that his name was given to the Institute of Material Culture. His other work had been done in the field of primitive Caucasian languages. He was not prepared either by training or by sympathies for discussing the problems of those languages which had a long historic background. He was prepared for the work of fitting together the peoples of the Soviet Union and encouraging the development of each toward a Communist society. In this respect he was at one with the dean of Soviet historians, Pokrovsky, who was willing to follow Hrushevsky's outline of the history of Eastern Europe and separate the early history of the Eastern Slavs to effect a rapprochement. In that respect he was at one with the general theoretical basis of Communism in the twenties.

Where did this leave the Russians and the Russian empire and the Russians in the USSR? If languages developed by hybridization and the future Communist language was to be distinct from all existing languages, would Russian escape unchanged and with it would the domination of the Kremlin be unchallenged?

That question had been raised very early and the actions of the various Communist parties, especially the Ukrainian Communists like Skrypnyk and Khvylovy left no doubt as to the ultimate answer. Hence the reaction which had started on a small scale very early and which was already gaining strength at the time when Stalin at the 16th Party Congress was apparently accepting Marr's theories. Stalin himself was the only outstanding non-Russian in the picture. He had just triumphed over his Russian opponents in securing the undisputed position that Lenin had once held and he chose this moment to start a large scale offensive against all those forces which under Communist theory as it had been understood might be in a position to challenge the leadership of Moscow.

The introduction of compulsory collectivization cleared the way and when he sent Postyshev to Ukraine to carry this through successfully, he gave him supplementary orders to bring the Ukrainian Communist party and the Ukrainian Communist intellectuals to heel and check a specifically Ukrainian Communism. The results were not long in appearing and by 1933 both Skrypnyk and Khvylovy had committed suicide and many of the most prominent Ukrainian authors and scholars had been convicted of bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism, a very convenient, if often meaningless, term.

Nevertheless the thirties passed with the assumption that the USSR had already become a purely socialistic country and the regime worked to produce a Soviet patriotism in which the dominating position of the Russians and the cult of Stalin himself as the all-wise ruler stood out more and more prominently.

With the outbreak of World War II Stalin's understanding with Hitler allowed him to recover still more of the territory that had been in the old Russian Empire, the Baltic Republics and Bessarabia as well as to gain Western Ukraine. The attack of Hitler upon the USSR showed Stalin that he had failed in his efforts to win the non-Russian nationalities to his new conception of Soviet patriotism and more and more he fell back upon the Great Russians who remained loyal to his cause.

This put a different aspect upon the whole situation. The theories of Marr had been directed towards a future unity with a great deal of hypothesis and improbable assertion about the past. The need now was the projection of the justification of the present domination of the Russians into the past and for that the theories of the Indo-European scholars who were ready to speak about a genealogical union of the East Slavic languages in some sense in the past now became far more attractive.

Hence the controversy over Marr with its constant tendency to express itself through formulae as to the role of linguistics in nation-building. It involves also the insistence of the opponents of Marr on a Slavic unity existing in the past. Vinogradov praised the editors of the Russian-Ukrainian Dictionary for writing: "Emerging from a single Eastern Slavic root, reflecting and confirming the eternal friendship and brotherly bonds of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, their languages during centuries developed in mutual connections and unity."

Professor P. Chornyk went further: "A materialist elaboration of a comparative grammar of related Slavic languages, with which the historical grammar of Russian is intimately connected, is hardly feasible without presupposing the common origin of Slavic languages, without an all-Slavic (even if very delative) linguistic unity in prehistoric times. The comparative historical study of Slavic languages leads inevitably to the conclusion that such unity did exist in the distant past. That which distinguishes the various Slavic languages from each other of the present time, (namely) differences in the pronunciation of many words and divergences in grammar and vocabulary, can, at least in the majority of cases, be explained and convincingly as a consequence of the fragmentation and splintering of a single unity." This unity of language existed, even though the author was modest enough to add, "Never in historic

times were the Slavic peoples united within the boundaries of a single state."⁷

S. Nikiforov rounds out the picture still more smoothly by dividing Russian history into four periods: 1. Early feudalism; 2. The liquidation of feudalism and the rise of capitalism when the Russian nation is emerging with a common language; 3. The period of capitalism; and 4. The period of construction of socialist society. "In this period a single literary language expressing socialist ideology gradually displaces the local dialect traits which had been preserved until then in phonetics, and, to a small degree, in morphology and vocabulary. In rare cases (this literary language) absorbs occasional words from the dialects and makes them part of the national language."⁸

The stage was then set for Stalin to utter the decisive word. His article published in *Pravda* was more political than linguistic, for it devastated the political theories of the Marxian Marr rather than his philological ideas. His basic attack was upon the conception that there was an intrinsic difference between the languages of different classes in one state so extreme that they should be scientifically treated as class languages. He made the obvious statement that a language, eternally changing, could serve any social order, developing all the while, so long as it maintained its basic grammar and its basic store of words. He denied sharply that hybridization of languages produced a third language. On the contrary he asserted "that hybridization retains one of the languages, retains its grammar and basic lexical fund and gives it a chance to develop by the internal laws of its own development..."

"True, in the process the vocabulary of the victorious language is somewhat enriched at the expense of the defeated language, but this does not weaken it but, on the contrary strengthens it.

"This is what happened, for example, with Russian, with which the languages of a number of other peoples blended in the course of historical developments and which always emerged victorious.

"As for the national originality of the Russian language, it experienced not the slightest damage, since, preserving its grammatical structure and basic lexical fund, the Russian language continued to move forward and to improve by the internal laws of its own development."

He then attacked the arrogance of Marr and his successors in their attempts to show that they understood Marxism.

⁷ *Pravda*, June 20, 1950., p. 4.

⁸ *Pravda*, June 13, 1950, p. 4.

The political significance of Stalin's remarks were appreciated by many of the following letters and articles that appeared. Prof. T. Lomtev at once realized the relationship between Marrism and bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism, in their objects of separating Russian and Ukrainian.*

Still later in an article in *Bolshevik* reprinted in *Pravda*, August 2, 1950, p. 2., Stalin in an attack on the "exegetes" and "Talmudists" who had raised questions on the difference between his statement of 1930 and of 1950 on the hybridization of language stated that in his earlier article he had spoken of the period *after* the world-wide victory of socialism. In 1950 he was speaking of the period *before* the world-wide victory of socialism. He fails to make one point clear. Does he believe that before the final world-wide victory of socialism, the language within the USSR can be hybridized to produce one Russian language which will merely gain from the submerged languages in some richness of vocabulary?

This omission or ambiguity of Stalin holds the key to the relations between the USSR, the Great Russians, and the non-Russian nationalities. If hybridization is to continue until the triumph of world-wide socialism in the Marxo-Lenino-Stalinist sense and result in the steady victory of the Russian language, Stalin's lecture on linguistics and his explanations of the meaning of class and language sets forth with rare fidelity the definite policy that he has been applying in all branches of life and activity. It explains the increased emphasis on russification that has gone on since World War II, the increased deepening of the iron curtain, the increased application of russification to the national republics of the USSR and to the satellite states. All cultures on his theories converge under similar economic conditions; so do languages. Marr admitted this but he saw them coming together in a greater supernational unity; Stalin sees it in the strengthening of Moscow domination, the secularization of the idea of the Third Rome, and the creation of first a great Eurasian Russia, and then a world Russia. Soviet historians, philosophers, economists, and all other specialists have thus received their instructions to be Russian first and Russian Communists second.

We can only hope that the world which has hitherto harkened to them only with indifference may give heed to the words of Stalin and act accordingly to restore freedom and human dignity to their rightful place in the world and to reduce this Russian Frankenstein again to its real shape for the welfare of humanity and civilization.

* *Pravda*, June 27, 1950, p. 3.

LABOR LAW AND LABOR PRACTICE IN THE USSR

by PETRO PEKIV

In the legal system of the USSR, the labor law occupies a very special place. In 1917 a group of Communists seized the ruling power in the former Russian monarchy and called themselves the "government of the laboring people". The position of this new government as the government of the laboring people and the needs of Communist propaganda definitely dictated the fact that they had to regulate in a new way the mutual relations of the employer and the workers to improve the position of the latter. As a result there was published a Code of Laws on Labor on December 2, 1922 (and a whole swarm of supplements to it).

"The laboring people, liberated from their capitalist exploiters are in the USSR in a better position than anywhere else." This was the statement in the Labor Code. "Such a protection of the rights of the laborers can be given only by an actual worker's government." That was the boast of the Communists and they emphasized it in the Labor Code.

Foreign delegations, which visited the USSR, became familiar with this Code and were enthusiastic: "It is simply marvellous what protection for labor has been established in the USSR. There is nothing like it in the world." "That is very natural," the Communists emphasized. "Where can the workmen have such rights, except in the country of socialism?" As a result there started abroad the exaltation of the USSR where "everything is for the workers." These praises were written by those persons who with their own eyes had seen and read the text of the Labor Code and were witnesses to the *text*. Yet it is hard to determine which quality predominated in their praises; intentional lying or sincere blindness. Besides the greater part of the foreigners came logically (or naively) to the conclusion of the innumerable number of rights of the workmen in the USSR, the country of socialism." This was the course of their thoughts: up to 1917 Russia had been a monarchy, and now under the rule of the Communists it had become the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. Formerly the country had been governed by the nobles and now it was in the hands of the workmen and peasants. There are now no capitalists in the USSR and that means that there is no one to exploit the workmen. The question as to the exploitation of the workers

cannot be raised, for, as the Communists say, "The workers are the masters of all factories and plants." Hence the conclusion that the USSR is a "paradise for the workers."

So the rights of the workers according to the Labor Code and logic bring foreigners to the *truth* about the happiness of the laboring people in the USSR, under the sun of a labor government, i. e. the Communists.

But for all those who have had the misfortune to live in the USSR, it is well known that this "truth" is an unprecedented lie in the history of humanity. To reveal this lie, to analyze some principles of the Labor Code and the supplements to it, to show their changes, the dying out of ideas and the birth of new, diametrically opposite principles is the object of this article. We know "in the revolutionary struggle the workmen can lose only their chains." Those are the words of the well-known theoretician of the revolution Comrade Karl Marx. These words are attractive and optimistic but they are not complete. What can the workmen find in the revolutionary struggle? Nothing is said in answer to that question. At the same time the life of the workers in the USSR does give the answer and allows us to complete the utterance of Marx; in losing their chains in the revolutionary struggle, the workmen in the USSR have found new socialist chains, which are infinitely heavier and more galling than the old ones. The lot of workers is not changed by the fact that the chains are somewhat hidden by, "surprisingly good" laws for the protection and defence of labor or whether they are applied openly by a labor law which has betrayed the principle of protection of the workers and acknowledges not the person but only the work.

The Labor Contract. One of the bases of the Labor Law of 1922 is the principle by which *the employer is deprived of the right to a free breaking of a labor contract*, which is an indefinite term (usually). An employer can discharge a worker only on the basis given in Art. 47 of the Code. This guarantees the workman security. There are only a few reasons allowed for discharge under this article. These are:

1. The liquidation of the enterprise;
2. the stoppage of work for more than a month;
3. the abridgement of the plants, i. e. the reduction of the staff;
4. the unusability of the workman;
5. his failure to perform his duties;
6. condemnation by a court;
7. failure to go to work for more than 2 months because of illness;
8. the removal of work by organs of the ministry of state control or a court;
9. the demand of a union that he be discharged;
10. failure to work without real reason more than 3 days in succession or 6 days a month.

Outside of these reasons the breaking of the labor contract by the employer is illegal and breaks Art. 47 of the Code and thereby involves the *criminal responsibility of the employer* for the breaking of this article of the Code.

This involves the important limitation of the rights of the employer and the protection of the workers. We must add also that the workers according to the Code have the right to break the labor contract and *full freedom to leave work without any reasons or motives*, (if they have merely notified the employer).

That is the theory which won the admiration of foreigners. Yet in practice this principle of the lack of freedom of the employer to break the labor contract was not a protection for the workmen nor did it guarantee them against discharge. Among the reasons allowed in Art. 47 was the reduction of the plants (reduction of personnel). This lawful reason is not merely an open door but an entire street for the free discharge of the workman by the employer. There is no need for the latter to seek the support of the Code and lawful motives for discharge. The reduction of personnel can always be made in one or another division of the enterprise and it is lawful to discharge a workman. This discharge for reduction of plants became easier when the Supreme Court declared: "the right of choice as to the selection of workers for discharge in the reduction of states belongs to the employer and "in this way the employer has the right to discharge not that workman whose position is affected but also him whose position is left." With this the principle of the lack of freedom of the employer makes no sense, for the whole system of Art. 47 is resolved into making an unlawful act lawful.

There is another interesting principle in the Labor Code, which concerns the breaking of the labor code by the employer. Not by all the reasons given in Art. 47 does the employer have the right to *direct* discharge of a workman. Under one of these reasons there is necessary a *previous resolution of the Conciliation Committee of the enterprise*. This is organized on the basis of parity with representatives of the administration and the union. If the representatives of the union do not agree with the administration as to the discharge, it cannot take place and so the employer does not have the right to break the labor contract (without regard to the lawfulness of the reason). The result is that the representatives of the union have by law the right to limit the freedom of the employer. This indicates that the union always supports the interests of the workers and will oppose the discharge of a worker and this appears to be

a great guarantee of the rights of the workers. Such a regulation has always evoked the praise of foreigners.

On the other hand this contains no guarantee. Theory is one thing, practice another (as is true of all aspects of Communist government in the USSR). Even at the time when the union according to one of the Communist leaders Kaganovich "must show the greatest attention to the individual worker and his needs," (Kaganovich: *On the Tasks of the Unions*, Partizdat, 1932, p. 19) it was enough for the administration to appeal to the Conciliation Committee to secure permission for the discharge. It could not be otherwise. The administrative director of an enterprise is usually a Communist, a prominent Communist bureaucrat and a Communist bourgeois, and how could the worker contradict him and at the same time act as representative of the Union on the Committee? If the representative of the Union on the Committee is a non-party man, he cannot act against the will of a Communist director; if he is a Communist, he cannot go against a Communist of higher rank. During my long experience with the Unions I never knew a case where the union representatives opposed the administration on a discharge where the preliminary consent of the Conciliation Committee was needed. With their change of functions, the unions instead of having the greatest attention for the individual worker and his needs now had the task of "performing and overperforming the production plans," when the unions became the drivers of the workmen in the productive conveyer with the slogan of "overtaking and surpassing the foremost capitalist countries." There was no word of labor protection in these committees. With the development of the directorial full power when the order of the director became a law for his subordinates (*The Disciplinary Statute of Railroads* from 18. 6. 1949) the limitation of his will by a committee on the basis of Art. 47 became an outmoded and unnecessary formality — nothing more. Thus the labor law in limiting the power of the employer was no protection for the worker. The theoretical regulations which so impressed the foreigners who read the labor law were practically annulled and the protection of the rights of labor was not achieved. In time even the law for breaking labor contracts began to be changed and there was manifested a clear tendency to increase the rights of the employer.

Earlier by Art. 47 the failure of a workman to work for 3 consecutive days or 6 days a month was a legal cause for discharge. Later the period was reduced to a single day. Along with the increase of the rights of the employer, as we have said, was a tendency to reduce the rights of the workers to free leaving. No one now but the union limited the rights of

the workers. The worker who was discharged from one enterprise and went to another was called a "flyer." If he went to another enterprise in search of more income, he was called a "grasper." All the union papers and committee sessions and rallies attacked these flyers and graspers, saboteurs of the production plan, enemies of the working class of the people, etc. The wild agitation against such workmen could lead to the accusation that they are "enemies of the people" (one of the most terrible accusations in the Soviet Union, which could easily involve sending to a concentration camp) and it kept the workmen from profiting by those rights on discharge that were guaranteed them by the Code. Soon the right of the workmen to a free breaking of the labor contract was annulled, the free will of the workmen was paralyzed and the administrator employer gained the right not to give permission to the workman to leave his job.

Under the law of June 26, 1940 the breaking of the labor contract by a workman without the permission of the employer was made illegal. It subjected the workman to criminal responsibility and threatened him with 2-4 months of imprisonment. But according to the criminal law of the USSR a person is subject to criminal responsibility for a crime. This means that the former right of the workman to leave his job under the Code is now a crime and the workman who tries to make use of his former right is a criminal. The old principle of the Labor Code has been changed to the diametrically opposite position.

Even in the case that the enterprise is moved to another locality the right of the workman to leave which he had under the Code, has been abolished. By an order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of October 19, 1940, the *compulsory* removal of qualified workmen to another locality is permitted by the order of the All Union and republic ministries. For disobedience to this order of removal the workman is subject to the law of June 26, 1940 of criminal responsibility (with imprisonment of 2-4 months). We must also indicate that in addition to the law of June 6, 1940 and the order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of October 19, 1940 the unions are bound by all forms of agitation to dissuade the workman from using his right of leaving on the removal of an enterprise. By talk about labor heroism, sacrifice, for the limitation of his rights for the future life in paradise in the building of socialism and by unprecedented hints on the bad consequences for the workman who refuses to be moved with the enterprise, they have achieved "*the good*" of the workman. The workman has been moved "for the great goal of performing and developing the production plans," but as we have seen, the very law has de-

stroyed the rights of the workman and has brought it about that a qualified workman not only has lost his right to leave his post and his right to reside in the place where he was born and where he as a citizen of the USSR has a right to live.

It is a surprising feature of the Labor Code of the USSR (and not only of that) that with time the development of this Code has made the former right of the workman a criminal offence and him a criminal. It is the more surprising that this took place after the famous speech of Stalin in 1936, "the basic building of socialism is finished." (Article in *Problems of Leninism*, XIth ed. p. 514). It turned out that just after the completion of the definite building of socialism the worker as the *builder of socialism* lost his labor rights and also his general human rights (the right to freedom of leaving and of residence).

Administrative Acts on Compulsion to Work. — In the foregoing, although the workman lost his labor rights, yet he was regarded from the side of the labor contract which served as the basis of labor relations. The practice of individual labor contracts and of the local-collective definitely regarded the workman as a party to it. But as time passed the government of the USSR rejected this principle. The basis for labor relations became not the labor contract but the will of the government which by administrative act bound the workman to his work. According to the order of October 2, 1940, the former teachers of the factory and plant schools, trade and railroad, who had been mobilized for these schools and built them were sent to enterprises for 4 years of work. By an order of the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR of June 10, 1948, those who had completed special middle and higher schools were sent to work in an enterprise for 3 years. By these two acts the position of the workman as a party to the labor contract was liquidated for the government established the period of work, the character of the work and it appointed also the pay just as it selected the enterprise and the place of residence of the workman. These acts are the most dangerous precedents for the Labor Code of the USSR. The fact is that recently in Communist legal literature the point of view is more and more spreading that the workman in the USSR in general *does not work according to the labor contract of employment. He is not a workman but a master of an enterprise* from the time when capitalism vanished from the USSR.

This point of view can lead to new acts of attachment to work in the state enterprise (the former workmen), but without any consideration for the labor law, its guarantees and protection of the work of the worker. There is no need to consider the labor law for that was made for

workers and now there are only *masters of enterprises* who are not subject to the labor law. It is impossible to imagine to what labor legislation the Communists will come (i. e. to what lack of rights they will bring the workers), if this view becomes official and is used by the government.

Thus the process of the loss by the workers of their rights as granted by the labor contract and the development of the rights of the employer are connected. The Draconian law of October 19, 1940, the order of October 2, 1940 and the order of the Ministry of Higher Education of June 10, 1948 deprive the worker of his basic rights as a subject of rights in the labor contract and annul the conception of a free contract.

We can draw well-founded conclusion that by the efforts of the Communist government of the USSR the workers after the completion of the building of socialism (definitely finished in 1936) *have actually received a full "liberation" from those rights, which the workers of every capitalist country have.* The process of the "liberation" of workers from exploitation will be considered in another section on earnings.



THE CASE OF THE MISSING SIDEWALK

The Ukrainian National Museum in Lviv is located in a building not very large, but fine in proportions. In 1936 the museum celebrated the 30th anniversary not only of its establishment, but also of the lack of a sidewalk which should have been built by the City's construction department. The sidewalk ended exactly to the inch at the wall where the museum premises commenced and as accurately to the inch it was continued on the other end of the wall enclosing the grounds. Between the two ends of the sidewalk was a stretch of the pure yellow clay, common to Lviv, which tended to develop a rich whipped-cream texture at the slightest hint of dampness. Nobody was too surprised at the lack of a sidewalk in front of a Ukrainian museum, in a city where the administration was Polish, as only the municipal department had the authority to lay sidewalks.

When the 30 year anniversary neared, many outstanding and prominent persons were invited to the special exposition held in honor of the occasion: the consuls from foreign legations, church dignitaries of various rites, luminaries of the artistic and scientific world. Out of courtesy the museum's director invited also the mayor of Lviv, who was of course a Pole, — not expecting him to accept. The mayor, however, did appear in a sumptuous limousine, but seeing so many distinguished guests he hastily left unobserved.

The next day a gang of municipal workers drew up before the museum and without saying a word to anyone, proceeded to lay the long missing sidewalk. (S. H.)

WAR WORLD II AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

M. AYTUGAN

From their study of World War II, the officers and statesmen of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR have become convinced that the government and General Staff of Germany did not take into account the question of nationality which played an important and perhaps decisive role in the war and which to a large degree brought about the defeat of Germany.

THE GERMAN GENERALS ON THE CAUSE OF THE GERMAN DEFEAT

The officers who planned the war and led it were Colonel General Jodl, who was directly in contact with Hitler, Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of the General Staff of the German High Command, and General Kesselring who commanded the German armed forces in Italy. They ascribe the defeat of Germany only to two or three tactical failures in the operations.

First and foremost in their opinion was the failure of the German attacks in Avranches, Normandy and the success of the Anglo-American landing in France. This opened the way for the Anglo-Americans to pass through France. The landing of the Seventh Army of General Patton in Southern France along with the northern landing cut off the entire German forces in French territory. The German generals have seen the entire cause in the failure of the operations at Avranches.

The second reason for their defeat they assign to the loss of the Rhine bridge at Remagen.

As the third reason they say that no one had expected the Anglo-American landing in Africa, until the Allied fleet arrived at Gibraltar.

Gen. Jodl, Keitel and Kesselring have made no mention of the political or national factors which led to the German defeat in eastern Europe. In the same way General Paulus who took part in the drawing up of the Barbarossa plan and knew the opinions of the population and the armed forces which he personally led till Stalingrad where he surrendered, does not take into account any national questions but thinks that a defective plan and strategical errors and failures were the cause of the defeat. Paulus writes: "The operating tasks behind the Barbarossa plan in the opinion of High Command were the capture of Moscow, Leningrad,

Ukraine and further the north Caucasus with its petroleum supplies. The definite limit was to be the attainment of the Astrakhan-Archangelsk line. Such a mission shows that this was an offensive." Thus Paulus too sees only strategic problems, the failure to attain which was a mistake and failure.

The German generals have thus found the cause of the German defeat in tactical and strategical errors and failures. However the outcome of the war depended not only on a mass of material, strategic, moral and political factors but also especially on factors of a nationalist and political nature. Thus the German generals try to make it seem that they would have won, if they had been able to win a victory at Avranches or to keep General Eisenhower from landing in Africa.

However the military experts and the statesmen of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR, i. e. the representatives of the colonies of the Moscow Empire, believe that the defeat of Germany was caused not only by the tactical and strategic mistakes of the German leaders but also by their national and political mistakes. Clausewitz, a German military leader of the last century, remarked that war is the continuation of politics in new forms. The German generals of the 20th century have forgotten this truth, but when diplomacy has exhausted its resources, there is a transition to military arguments. Thus in the last analysis we must return to the policy of colonizing, levying tribute, or liberating.

In the east the colonial peoples of Russia are not separated from their master-people as colonies of European powers. They are united in the territory of the conqueror which lives at their expense, spreads out and gradually assimilates or annihilates the conquered, i. e. turns their land, their wealth and themselves into Russians; it robs and murders them openly in broad daylight for the advantage of the ruling nation. Such countries are Russia (USSR), China in Manchuria, Sinkiang and Tibet, Poland in Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. There is a constant war in these countries but it escapes the notice of the world. In these states there is carried on the destruction of the national spirit of the weaker peoples and for their efforts to save themselves the masters call these defeated people chauvinistic. Thus the national problem is very tense in these countries. Those who have to fight these anti-moral states must seek within them for allies by fostering the movements for national liberation. In oppressed countries it is always possible to find allies against the conquerors but the German General Staff did not consider this a reliable method.

War in the 20th century does not end with the seizure of a hostile capital or the annihilation of the army of an enemy. No. It is necessary to come to an understanding with the population of that country, especially its colonial peoples, with the nations allied with them, with their neighbors, with all possible allies. For example there are Finnic tribes in Russia which have been subject for 600 years, the Turko-Tatars of the Volga, Urals and western Siberia, about 400 years and also more recently conquered north Caucasus, Ukraine, Crimea, Byelorussia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Georgia, Armenia and Turkestan. These peoples are not yet annihilated, they are not assimilated; they still exist on their own land and strive to be free. The German General Staff neglected this important factor of strategy and war.

The success of the fighting powers depended upon the sympathy or lack of it which they showed to the nations; the degree to which they recognized their sovereign rights; helped them to recover their losses, overcome their backwardness in economy and culture, renew their national statehood, respected their national customs and cultures and could establish normal relations with them. If the Germans had found the answer to these questions, they would not have made strategic and tactical mistakes and met with failures in eastern Europe.

In thus summarizing World War II in its operative and national political sides, I as a Soviet officer member of the non-Russian nations of the USSR, ask the pardon of the members of the German General Staff for this is written not for criticism of them but to emphasize this failure to appreciate the national political question in the last war.

The technically armed and modernized German army fought in Western Europe from Sept. 1, 1939 to June 22, 1941 a lightning war, for the countries were small in area with a small population (not more than 40 millions), and they were compact nationally but were militarily weaker than Germany. Germany achieved supremacy very rapidly. This gave the officers and the General Staff the idea of a lightning war and this idea hypnotized the German officer corps and especially the operating divisions of the staff. In drawing up their plans for military operations they began to neglect many questions which they should not have neglected, as nationality, morale, possible allies, the mood of the population in the occupied territories, the health service, technical and economic questions, the patriotic underground movements in Warsaw, Prague, France, Yugoslavia, the Baltic, Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Turkic and other regions. The operating sections neglected these and instead the governor-generals needed supplementary troops and large forces of police to put down all

risings. So when the second front was opened, there were no reserves. As we see, a struggle on two fronts is a very complicated problem of which the Moscow general staff is afraid.

WAR WITH THE MANY-NATIONED USSR

22. 6. 1941—8. 5. 1945

One of the finest chiefs of staff of a European army which had been able to carry on a defensive action for 2-4 months with forces ten times smaller against the colossal army of Moscow, the Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, Lieut. General Heydrich went to Germany in December, 1940 and in the headquarters of the German ground troops he gave a report on the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. In this he connected the magnitude of the danger from the Moscow armies and also the shameful results of that war for Moscow, when the Kremlin tried to impose a peace on little Finland. After the Finnish campaign there was an enormous upheaval in the staffs and command of the Red Army and the leadership of the entire force passed into Russian hands. This was finished in the beginning of 1942. The national feeling of the Muscovites demanded it. What happened in Berlin?

After the manoeuvres in Soseno the Barbarossa plan was adopted, i. e. regarded as possible and useful for victory over the USSR — the advance to the line of Archangelsk-Astrakhan. The ultimate object was the subjugation of the so-called Russia and its colonization. But this solution of the problem was absurd. Of course Russia could be defeated but it was possible only with the liberation of all peoples whom it oppressed. Yet the German General Staff thought of the USSR as a unit. That was the main mistake. The General Staff did not look for allies among the oppressed nations of this very many-nationed state. After their lightning victories in Western Europe, the German General Staff did not pay attention to the fact that in the USSR there were many other nations than Russians and that these only recently in 1917-20 had their own national states with independent democratic governments, and that they wanted to be rid of the Moscow yoke. This was the greatest opportunity for solving the chief national questions in our times. Other general staffs can suffer from the same shortsightedness. In the opinion of officers of the non-Russian nations of the USSR, they must take into account the mistakes that were made in the two past World Wars.

The German General Staff to carry out its plan of acquiring the greatest colony in Eastern Europe through the erroneous theory of a

lightning war moved the German armies against the USSR in three groups of armies. The first group advanced through the Baltic countries to Leningrad under General von Laip. The Finnish army, strengthened by some SS Divisions aided with a blow at Leningrad and Murmansk. The second group of Field Marshal von Bock, reinforced by the tank army of General Guderian, advanced through Byelorussia toward Moscow. The third and largest group under General von Rundstaedt, reinforced by Rumanian, Hungarian, Italian and other divisions and units advanced through Ukraine toward the Caucasus to secure control of the oil wells there.

The Moscow General Staff did not rely upon its own internal strength. The struggle of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR made them completely unreliable allies of Moscow. A clash with Germany was inevitable and so Moscow commenced to seek its allies among the Western Slavs. To remove the danger of a second front, in April, 1941, Molotov made with Matsuoka a treaty insuring the neutrality of Japan for 5 years and demanded from the Allies the opening of a second front in the West in 1943. After this Moscow could concentrate all its efforts on its own western front and its hands were free in the far east.

The German military machine, after breaking into the USSR on June 22, 1941, pushed ahead with lightning speed. On July 8, it had passed through Byelorussia and the Germans began the conquering battle at Smolensk. On July 13 began the operation against Leningrad. On September 26, commenced the battle at the Sea of Azov and at the same time battles raged between Lakes Ladoga and Ilmen. On October 2 began a fierce struggle between Vyazma and Bryansk. Success followed success like lightning and headturning.

The German General Staff did not study why the campaigns were going so quickly and successfully and yet that they were now meeting opposition. Marshal Keitel did not notice that his "victorious" armies without the expected great battles in the beginning (except for some unsuccessful attempts at opposition near Minsk and Kiev) had by October 1941 gone through six non-Russian republics, more accurately the territory of six nations who sympathized with the success of the German armies, i. e. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Byelorussia, Ukraine and the Crimea. Ukraine waited for the return of its exiled legal government. Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Crimea and Byelorussia also waited for their former democratic ministers who had emigrated to Europe, but this did not eventualize and they did not come, for it was not according to the plans of the German General Staff.

Meanwhile in August, 1941 Moscow called a Pan-Slavic Congress. This agitated for the support of the Western Slavs. At the same time in the Russian cities and villages the Orthodox churches were reopened and bells were again rung for church services. Moscow at this moment not only did not persecute this "opium of the people" but accepted the revival of Orthodoxy. Of course, for patriotic purposes! This was the first phase of the war with the Germans when these rapidly entered the country and took prisoners without great battles of millions of the Soviet army. This was because e. g. in the 10th Army of Gen. Pavlov, all the divisions except one, the 1st Proletarian Division, were formed of soldiers of the non-Russian people. Why did it not occur to the German General Staff to form from these former soldiers of the Red Army national Lithuanian, Estonian, Latvian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Turkic divisions and even armies? They would have fought against the Moskals on the eastern front and the Germans would have had enough reserves for the second front in the West.

The second phase of the war in Eastern Europe consisted not of a victorious advance of the German armies but of fierce battles on truly Russian (Muscovite) territory. In these stubborn battles for every village, every town, the Germans reached by the end of December, 1941 the line Murmansk—Petrozavodsk—Tikhvin—Kalinin—Dmitrov—Mozhaysk — the Moscow suburbs—Tula—Rostov. The German generals saw the cause of their delay in the harsh conditions of the Russian winter. The Moscow General Staff made the same boast "that we Russians have taught Napoleon and the Germans how to spend the winter in our country and we can treat any other enemy in the same way."

Of course the winter was not the only question for the Russians were in the same conditions. The cause was the patriotism, the use by the Kremlin of the national feelings not only of the Muscovites but of the other non-Russian peoples. They used religion to aid in the revival of the national patriotic spirit and stern military punitive measures. The national patriotic feelings were shown by the fact that Moscow alone turned out 20-25 volunteer divisions, old men, children and women (Minsk and Kiev had not done it). In the regions of Smolensk, Vyazma, Staraya Russa, and the Bryansk woods Russian partisans appeared. They had not in the Baltic. Partisans did appear in Byelorussia and Ukraine, patriotic partisans, to fight against both the Germans and the Russians (Moskals). That was the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Moscow was compelled to prepare for Ukraine special pro-Moscow partisan bands who were trained in Moscow to imitate the anti-German partisan movement of the "local

population." These were the bands of Kolpakov, Fyodorov, Saburov, Melnikov, etc. The German General Staff did not see or understand these problems. In the same way anti-Bolshevik partisans appeared in the Caucasus, Turkestan, and Siberia, as those in the Caucasus under the command of Safarov.

Before the spring of 1942 Moscow, using the reserves of the newly formed divisions, especially the Siberian, began to push back the German armies to the line Leningrad—Stara Russa—Rzhev—Vyazma—Bryansk—Orel—Kharkiv—Stalino (in the Donbas).

The third phase of the war began in June, 1942 when the German General Staff began a new attack on Stalingrad and the Caucasus for the oil wells. At this time the German army reached the territory of the non-Slav peoples of Eastern Europe along the Volga and in the Caucasus, reaching in the south the line indicated by the Barbarossa plan. The Caucasian peoples like the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Baltic peoples hoped from the Germans for aid in their liberation. They expected back Noe-Jordania in Georgia and Memat-Amin Rasul Zade in Azerbaijan. The officers of Georgia, Armenia, and of the Turkic peoples waited for the formation of their national armies. The Germans did nothing, although the army of Gen. von Bock around Stalingrad was already on the territory of Idel-Ural. Hundreds of Turko-Tatar villages were already in the hands of Marshal Paulus. Holding at Stalingrad for 5 months from July 12, 1942 to February 2, 1943 Paulus did not notice this and showed no political initiative in this sphere and on the other side of the Volga the Turkic peoples of Idel-Ural and Turkestan, millions of anti-Moscow soldiers were waiting for the slightest possibility for arming themselves and rising against the Moscow slavery.

Von Mannstein was in the northern Caucasus along the river Terek near Grozny. Almost half of the territory of the Kalmuks and of north Caucasus was in his hands. Dozen of German divisions held this front, and with them were 5-6 battalions of North Caucasian legionaries, 3-4 battalions of Azerbaijanian, Georgian and Armenian legions, all separated among German units and completely without any connection with one another. Why were there not organized Caucasian armies of liberation which would march against Muscovites with the slogan of freeing from their rule each nation of their country? Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanians, Dagestanians, Chechens, Ingush, Karachayevy and other peoples of the Caucasus and their capitals of Tbilisi, Baku, Erivan, Makhach-Kala were waiting for their sons to appear as liberators and they would have

opened to them their doors and their hearts. The Germans would then not have needed so many divisions but their generals did not see it.

At the same time Moscow was playing on the national and religious feelings of the non-Russian peoples. It began to form national units and divisions and to summon churches and mosques, priests and mullahs to serve the cause of Moscow Communist imperialism. Moscow blared day and night by radio, from the pulpits, in the press, from minarets, in the movies and the speeches of agitators that German Nazis were threatening to destroy the "freedom" of the nations of the USSR and to turn their land into their own colony, as if that land were not already the colony of Moscow. They even called some fronts by national names, as Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Caucasian. They gave the armies national names as the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian armies! Was this not an open play for nationalist sympathies? They created an order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the liberator of Ukraine from the Poles and allowed the printing of Ukrainian patriotic verses and tales.

Here are two true anecdotes. A Georgian legionnaire was asked: — "Why do you wear a German uniform?" He answered: "If the army of the devil was fighting Moscow, I would fight with them." But the Germans devoted to their Fuehrer could not see this.

Or again. Two men from the same village met on the battlefield. One wore a Soviet uniform, the other a German. The "Soviet" soldier asked: "Why are you in a German uniform?" The answer came: "Why are you in a Russian uniform?" Both remained silent, for they had no answer. A third remarked: "It would be much better to be in your own national uniform."

At the same time the Western front in Normandy was draining off so many divisions from the eastern front that it became very weak. The "victorious" Red Army marched forward over the unprotected fields of Poland and eastern Germany. From Warsaw to Frankfurt on the Oder was only a question of 5-6 days.

So without paying any attention to the problem of national liberation Germany not only lost herself but ruined the chance for the liberation of the non-Russian peoples who were at first inclined to think of the Germans as liberators. Many small national units of the non-Russian peoples either perished uselessly or abolished themselves after the war.

Should we not rather follow the example of the American General Staff which aided in forming and arming the French Army of De Gaulle? After the victory of the American landing, these national French units first entered Paris and Lyons. This inspired the souls of the young French

and along with the Anglo-Saxon armies, they expelled the foe from their country. The American General Staff might have organized only a few battalions but in fact it organized a French national army of liberation. That was the true and successful strategic action at the time.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The basic German strategy was built upon the recognition of the international status quo. The Germans did not take into account that for 20 years there had been a spirit and a desire for national liberation which they could use against the Soviets. The German General Staff did not recognize this fact or give it importance. As a result their military strategy by ignoring this, failed of results.

2. The European and American General Staffs should remember this, when they consider plans in case of World War III against totalitarianism.

3. We think that the General Staff of the democratic countries should follow the policy of the American General Staff in forming and preparing a French national army of liberation. That involves the preparing of an officers corps for the future national armies of liberation of all non-Russian peoples.



BUCHAREST STORY

A Bucharest husband, sent by his wife to buy two kilograms (kg. — 2¼ lb.) of carrots stood a couple of hours in the queue. When he reached the counter, there was not a single vegetable left in the greengrocer's shop. He dashed home, threw down the shopping bag and began rummaging in his chest of drawers.

"What are you doing?" — asked his wife.

"I cannot stand it any longer," he shouted, "I'm going to shoot Ana Pauker." Pocketing a big, old-fashioned service revolver, he rushed out, banging the door.

His distracted wife wept and prayed. Four hours later he returned looking worn-out, his head hanging. "Have you done it?" she muttered, awe-stricken.

"No. There was a queue there too."

595 DAYS A SOVIET PRISONER

by IVAN NIMCHUK

After the "liberation" of Western Ukraine by the Soviets in 1939, hundreds of Ukrainian intellectuals, who did not manage to escape in time were arrested by the "liberators" in the first days of the occupation. Among them was Dr. Ivan Nimchuk, the chief editor of the Ukrainian daily *Dilo* (Deed). After four weeks in a Lviv prison he was put in a freight car divided into small cages, and transported to Moscow, where he was held for a year and a half in the famous Lubyanka prison. At a time when almost all deported disappeared without a trace Dr. Nimchuk had the good fortune to be freed shortly before the German-Soviet war. These excerpts are from his book "595 Days a Soviet Prisoner." (Basilian Fathers Press, Toronto, Ont., Canada, 1950).

Two or three weeks after I came to the Lubyanka, the Moscow headquarters of the NKVD, I was again called for preliminary hearings. This time I was not questioned by Sigov, but was brought before a different examiner. He was much older than Sigov and probably higher in rank. He never questioned me again. He seemed about fifty years old or even more, had thick grey hair, the suave expression and dignified manner of a diplomat, and was dressed in civilian clothes. After looking over my papers he started to question me, at first putting only indifferent questions. Finally he asked me if I acknowledged my previous statement made in Lviv, if I wanted to add anything to it or have anything taken off. I told him that not being guilty of anything I made no statement in Lviv.

He seemed surprised.

— How is that? — he asked.

I explained: "I was an editor of the *Dilo* which was the organ of a publishing company of the same name, consisting of a hundred members, all of whom were prominent citizens. *Dilo* was never a party paper, although its platform was similar to that of the Ukrainian National Democratic Organization (UNDO). The UNDO was not a political party in the European sense, but rather a form of a wide spreading national movement. Beside the *Dilo* UNDO had its own press (*Svoboda* - Liberty, *National Politics*). But that was not all. Backed by the majority of the members of the publishing company the editorial staff of *Dilo* had the courage to oppose firmly the recent policy of the official leaders of UNDO

for its "normalization" trend toward the Polish government in a series of articles. As for myself, my work as the editor of the daily paper left me no time for active politics.

— How can you say that? — the examiner interrupted. — *Dilo* as well as the rest of your press was in reality a publication sponsored by the Polish police...

I was indignant on hearing this.

— Sponsored by the Polish police? — I repeated angrily. — The paper which during the sixty years of its existence was constantly persecuted and confiscated by the Polish censors, even during the Austrian regime, and you say it was sponsored by the Polish police? Would the Polish students begin their university year every fall by smashing up its printing house if it printed the organ of the Polish police? Would a police paper...

But he did not let me finish.

— Don't get so worked up. All that was merely a Polish comedy to deceive you. Mere child's play. But tell us calmly exactly how high a subsidy did the *Dilo* get from the Polish government?

Such a question left me speechless. I expected anything but such offensive nonsense. After some consideration I answered.

— One could say that the Soviet Union also helped to finance *Dilo*. As I said the publishing company had its own printing establishment where not only *Dilo* but many other Ukrainian papers and magazines were printed, regardless of their political outlook. The publishing company was a commercial institution doing business, just as all the other printing establishments in Lviv, and it accepted every commission which brought gain. Thus for some time the weekly paper *The Will of the People* was printed there, and it was a public secret in Lviv that the Soviet consulate financed this paper. But from its first to its last issue *Dilo* belonged to the leading factors in the Ukrainian struggle against Poland, which tried by all means to Polonize us and our country.

— That struggle is not worth mentioning — he said, but it was plain that he was surprised at my words.

— *Dilo*, — I continued, — was the organ of those democratic factions of our nation who fought against the Polish regime by legal means. There was also another group which protested against Polish oppression by revolutionary action. But neither *Dilo* nor UNDO, whose editorial members were for the most part older and mature thinking people, ever took part in terroristic actions.

The examiner did not argue the point any longer.

For some time after this I was left in peace, and several weeks went by before I was again called for hearings. The new examiner's name was Yevtyekhov. He insisted that I give him my impression and thoughts of the last Mayor of Lviv, Dr. Ostrowski. In a former chapter of this book I have described his imprisonment in one of the Lviv prisons, where he was held in one cell with the former UNDO President Kost Levytsky. I surmised that now Dr. Ostrowski was in the Lubyanka.

Yevtyekhov refused to believe me when I assured him that I did not know Dr. Ostrowski.

— But how can it be possible that the editor of *Dilo* was not acquainted with the mayor of Lviv? I will never believe such a thing, nor will anyone else.

When I tried to explain that we had nothing in common, and on the contrary we stood very far apart, as Ostrowski was a member of the Polish ruling class and we belonged to the opposition, Yevtyekhov remarked profoundly:

— Is it so far from No. 10 City Hall Place in Lviv (the address of our publishing house) to the City Hall? How many paces separated you?

I could only say that it was not a question of paces, of physical distance, that we belonged to two separate and hostile camps in the national and political aspect.

— You had better stop evading the question and tell me at once all you know about Ostrowski. And here is a paper, write out all the subjects on which he wrote in *Dilo* and his pen name.

Such words positively disarmed me; I had difficulty in controlling myself not to laugh outright. As calmly as I could I told him that it was not the custom in our circumstances for a Pole to contribute to any Ukrainian paper, even under a pen name, and the same applied to Ukrainians. It was unthinkable that the Polish Mayor of Lviv, which was a political volcano so far as Poles and Ukrainians were concerned, would write for the Ukrainian papers. How could he contribute to *Dilo* when it was hostile to him and the entire Polish municipal administration?

I do not know if my arguments convinced him. In the end however, he had to be satisfied with a general outline of the Polish chauvinistic policy toward the Ukrainian and the Jewish population of Lviv, which was always more or less hostile to say the least.

Once again I was questioned by Sigov. A new examiner hitherto unknown to me, was also present, but he said hardly anything. At first Sigov questioned me on all sorts of unrelated matters, and then suddenly asked:

— Tell me what is your article? (According to what paragraph of the penal law I was arrested and held for trial).

When I told him I did not know he worded his question differently: "What clause were you given in Lviv? — After all you had to be given some clause."

To this I answered that during the four weeks in prison in Lviv I was "given no clause," and was transferred to Moscow without a clause. In Moscow I am still without a clause, which means that I do not know of what I am accused. On hearing this both the examiners exchanged glances. Their faces clearly showed that they were taken aback. It seems that such instances are rare in the Lubyanka. All the following examiners asked the same question, and always the fact that they were dealing with a prisoner "without a clause" seemed to surprise them. But to the end of my stay in Lubyanka I remained a "clauseless" prisoner.

I remember best of my prison cell mates the big and blond Ivan Fyodorovich Golishov, a young worker from the largest bakery in Moscow named after Stalin, which supplied bread to the Red Army on the Finnish front. In some of this bread glass was found. Golishov told us that he came from a village near Moscow, was married and had served as a soldier in the Finnish campaign. The bakery employed 600 workers, most of them likewise married and with families. These workers lived in the old barracks adjoining the bakery and worked in three shifts, as the bakery ran 24 hours daily. The living conditions in the overcrowded barracks were fearful: sleeping bunks were arranged in a double decked row along the walls, and every worker had the right to use his bunk for eight hours and no longer. After that time he had to make room for the second shift, and they in turn had to vacate the bunks for the third — and so on without end. It is plain that in such circumstances even the most elementary sanitary and hygienic principles were bound to be neglected. It is no wonder that in every barracks human odors mixed with the stench of decaying garbage and all kinds of other filth, contributing toward making the atmosphere a combination of the filthiest possible bathhouse with a contaminated realm of the black death. The only wish of every inhabitant was to get out of there as soon as possible.

It is difficult to imagine how these miserable people suffered from the hordes of all sorts of vermin, particularly bed-bugs, from which there was no escape at night. So lived 600 workers with their families. The families who shared the same barracks tried for the most part unsuccessfully to acquire a corner for themselves, nonetheless family life in its most intimate aspects was conducted under the eyes of the other inhabitants.

Needless to say this lowered the moral standards; shameless and open vice flourished. These conditions, however, were no concern of the management or the civil administration, and although this state persisted for years, no one considered it worth while to protest against it.

It is peculiar to say the least that Golishov's description of life in the barracks which belonged to the Stalin Bakery and was under the Bakery's administration, seemed to make no impression whatever on the other cell inmates. On questioning them I was told that living conditions in other factories were far worse. Very often if they were lucky enough, one miserable and damp room housed two families with children; if they were not lucky the workers were compelled to live in dugouts. In fact the employees of the Stalin Bakery were considered as privileged . . . This Golishov became notorious in our cell for one extraordinary feat. He was the only prisoner, who during my entire incarceration in the Lubyanka prison endeavored to speed trial by a hunger strike. In reality it could not be called a hunger strike, as such methods of protest are considered counter-revolutionary in the state of "proletarians and peasants." After all his attempts to reach the prosecutor and attain a speedy trial had failed, Golishov simply refused to accept any food. To all questions of the wardens directed toward breaking his decision or forcing him to an open statement, he answered very clearly that he was not on a hunger strike, he merely refused to accept food until he was called before the prosecutor. And so Golishov ate nothing four days, but still was not summoned. After all the threats of the wardens and the persuasions of the other cell inmates and even the prison doctor proved of no avail, the exhausted Golishov was carried out of the cell on a stretcher and brought back in a half hour still on the stretcher. It was evident that he had been submitted to the procedure of forced feeding. Later he told us about it, — he tried to defend himself as best he could, asking for only one thing — to be brought before the prosecutor, but he was shackled and fed under such revolting conditions, that he gave up all attempts to see the prosecutor in the hope of convincing him of his innocence, and advised every one not to resort to his method.

The second interesting prisoner in cell No. 14 was an extremely handsome fifteen year old Georgian boy — Laboka, of the belligerent mountain tribe of Abkhazia. His father was the chief of this tribe, counting only 250,000 members, and had done much toward the establishment of Stalin's power in Georgia. He helped the red rulers to overcome his own proud tribe, and even during his life monuments were erected in his honor. Beria himself was a frequent guest at the Laboka house and was Laboka's

friend. But during the time of the bloody Yezhov purge the father was arrested and shot as a "monstrous nationalist" and a "wicked enemy of the people." His monuments were of course leveled with the ground. When his faithful tribesmen began to gather at his grave in pilgrimages from all parts of their country, the Soviet administration dug up his remains and made away with them. At the same time they arrested the entire family, Laboka's wife who was a doctor, and two children, our handsome lad and his younger sister. At first they were held in Georgia, later the children were transferred across the Black Sea to Ukraine, where they were separated and placed in schools. There the boy remained over a year; he learned the Ukrainian language and even recited for me "The Stone Breakers" a well known poem of the Ukrainian writer Ivan Franko. He remembered with enthusiasm the beautiful orchards in Ukraine, and told me how he and other pupils made forbidden excursions to the closed and decaying Catholic church in Lityn, crawling on all fours up the tumbled down staircases to try the organ.

He did not know what happened to his mother. The last time he saw her was in a prison in Georgia, when she was led out into the prison yard, but he could not even wave his hand to her. Every time he mentioned his mother he bit his lips in order to keep the tears back.

Laboka came to our cell sometime toward the end of April or the beginning of May. He was brought straight from Lityn in Ukraine. He did not know why he was arrested. One could only surmise that he might have mentioned the fate of his family, and these few careless words brought the lad all the way to Lubyanka. He must have been starved during his long journey to Moscow, for he ate the burnt and cast off bread crusts, which some of the toothless prisoners could not manage, and licked all the plates clean, although to tell the truth there never was much left on them.

He was taken away after a few weeks, none of us knew where and to what farther hardships.

There were other juvenile prisoners in the Lubyanka. They were all locked together in one cell. We learned about this from one of the newcomers. This group consisted of the entire editorial staff of a wall bulletin in one of the Moscow ten-grade schools. They were the best pupils, and among them was the son of a prominent Soviet figure. They were imprisoned because they placed on the title page of their bulletin not the five pointed Soviet but the six pointed Zionist star. The hint was after all quite obvious. This event trivial in itself, became the talk of Moscow and the NKVD arrested the entire editorial group. In a way the

prisoners' school chums were responsible for this notoriety, by spreading surreptitiously the news all over town to the great annoyance of the NKVD which could do nothing to whitewash the affair. Due to this unwelcome notoriety as well as to the fact that the son of a highly placed Soviet dignitary was among the arrested, everything ended well — according Soviet conditions, — the boys were sentenced to six months each in prison, a term which they had already served waiting for their trial.

In those long, long months I had opportunities to learn about the life of the Soviet individuals and peoples from conversation with my fellow prisoners. I heard many things that appeared incredible. Thus I heard that there is no outlawing of a penalty in the USSR, as guaranteed by appropriate laws in all other states of the world; therefore the Soviets punish a person with all possible severity for a crime against the Soviet laws committed 25 or 30 years ago. It is likewise of no importance, whether the crime was committed on Soviet territory or anywhere else in the world. That, I was told, is why the Soviets arrest hundred thousands of people from all classes of society in the newly occupied territories, be they officers, underofficers, policemen, judges, lawyers, prosecutors, members of political parties and all leaders in general, who from the Soviet standpoint are "enemies of the people" and dangerous "counter-revolutionaries" and should be destroyed. The Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the chief of the NKVD Beria issued a special secret instruction in which 19 kinds of such "criminals" were listed who were to be immediately destroyed by the NKVD.

I learned also about that terrible principle of the communist law: it is better to sentence a hundred innocent people, than let escape one guilty. I even heard a joke a propos this principle:

A frightened rabbit is scurrying toward the boundary. He meets a horse: "What are you so scared about?" — the horse asks. — "Haven't you heard about the new order that all camels in the Soviet Union must be shot?" — "So what," — said the horse, "you're no camel." — "Sure, but once you're caught and shot, try to convince them that you're no camel!"

But I heard most about the so called "collective responsibility" of the family, when one member is arrested. All the prisoners worried not only over their trials but also over the fates of those members of their family whom they had left. They spent many sleepless nights thinking about the safety of their wives and children. This responsibility had two or rather three aspects: 1) when one of them belonged to the category of the repressed — that is, was arrested; 2) when one of the family was abroad,

and the NKVD found it out, and 3) when one the family was sent abroad by the Soviet regime no matter to what purpose — as its political, commercial or military representative, as an ordinary clerk or a well trained spy. All these persons were responsible for the fate and safety of their families left in the Soviet Union, by their conduct. Uncounted numbers of those who had someone in their family arrested or commissioned abroad paid for it by the loss of their liberty or even life.

I also learned about atrocities of the Yezhov Purge in 1936-1938 in all parts of the USSR, which counted its victims by the millions. A prisoner who shared the same cell in the Lubyanka with a former secretary of Yezhov was transferred to our cell. He told us that this secretary admitted that in the two years of his work 78-80,000 people were shot on the basis of his lists, and nearly 3 millions were thrown into prisons or concentration camps. And this monstrous crime against all the peoples of the USSR finally ended with the liquidation of Yezhov alone. Not a hair fell off the heads of Stalin's entire clique which set loose this hell on earth. Would anything similar be possible in any other state of the world?

But even as I sat in Lubyanka the Yezhov purge of accursed memory was already remembered only as a nightmare, and only the examiners mentioned from time to time the 3 million spies and subversives who are annihilated by the mighty army of the NKVD on the territory of the USSR. What kind of a state is it that has 3 million spies and subversives? And what normally thinking person could believe that those 3 million unfortunates were really spies and subversives and not long suffering citizens, who for one reason or another had lost favor with the NKVD and so were destroyed? What a force is the NKVD itself, how many millions of members, armed to the teeth, does it have to be able to repress the millions of citizens, who dare to reveal their discontent in any way, or who seem the least bit suspicious to the administration?

Sometimes we compared the percentage of the USSR prisoners with that of the other countries. We estimated that during even the most troubled years in Poland a 100,000 people at most were imprisoned (that is 0.3% of the entire population), while there were as a rule 10-12 million prisoners or slave laborers in the USSR (6-8% of the population). When I told my fellow prisoners that often in the large cities of Sweden the prisons hang out a white banner as a sign that the prison is empty, their wonder had no end. It is then they began to realize fully their own tragic fate and the still greater tragedy of all the peoples compelled to live in the horrible shadow of the Kremlin.

THE METALLIFEROUS BASE OF UKRAINIAN INDUSTRY

by STEPHEN PROTSIUK

I.

During the past thirty years the economy of Ukraine has been changed considerably. From a predominantly agricultural country with a small urban population, Ukraine has become a country with an unusual diversified and dynamic industry, which is playing an increasingly important role in its entire life. By the eve of World War II, certain branches of Ukrainian industry, especially coal-mining and the metallurgical, machine, coke and sugar industries had become of world importance and such industrial areas as the Donets basin or the Dnieper region almost equalled in their productivity the Ruhr or the Saar.

After World War II came a period of difficult and expensive reconstruction which was constantly delayed by the interference of the Kremlin but finally Ukrainian industry resumed its proper place in the life of the country. According to the report of E. Kirichenko, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, the gross production in 1950 was 15% above that of 1940. The machine industry was 25% above its pre-war level.

Soviet industry has the habit of fulfilling hastily its quotas at the end of the planned period. Ukrainian industry follows the same pattern. As a result special efforts were made in 1950, the last year of the 4th Five Year Plan to reach the quotas set and so the total production in 1950 increased 24.5% over 1949, while the increase in the production of pig iron was 30%, of steel 28%, of rolled iron 22%, of trucks 180%, of tractors 25%, sowing machines 100%, and combines 50%.

We may be justly suspicious of Soviet statistics but even so we may well ask the cause of such figures, despite the tremendous shortcomings and the weak points of the Soviet economic system, especially in Ukraine, where the policy of Moscow is clearly to exploit the country. The results are due to the high productivity and the industrial initiative of the Ukrainian population as a whole and to the exceptional wealth of the economic resources of Ukraine, in which the metalliferous riches are playing the most outstanding role.

II.

The most important ore-producing areas of Ukraine are Krivy Rih, Kerch and Nikopil. The great deposits of iron ore are at Krivy Rih and Kerch, while the Nikopil region produces manganese.

The Krivy Rih range begins south of the town of Krivy Rih and runs for 50 km. in a narrow belt to the north—north-east. The most recent explorations show that it deflects further to the north and crosses the Dnieper to the upper reaches of the river Psiol.

The ore-bearing formations are of the Pre-Cambrian age. These are irregularly distributed. They have been eroded and later covered by horizontal strata of Tertiary and Quaternary deposits. The Pre-Cambrian rocks are of two kinds: the older are composed mostly of gneisses and granites covered with strongly metamorphosed green rocks. The younger formation, which is also called Krivo-Rizhian is composed mostly of metamorphosed rocks. A stratigraphical cross-section of the Krivy Rih formation is as follows (starting from the bottom):

1. Arkosic sandstones with quartz and quartz-sericite cement; —
2. Sericitic schists (phyllites); —
3. Talc and actinolite schists; —
4. Chlorite and amphibolitic schists; —
5. Iron quartzites. Two types are distinguished: the jaspilites and the iron (chert) hornblendes.

The deposits are about 50 m. in thickness. The jaspilites and the iron hornblendes form a peculiar geological structure characterized by the intermixture of thin ore and quartz layers. The ore minerals are magnetite, martite and hematite. Secondary minerals are sericite, chlorite, amphibolite and siderite. The ore strata contain about 70% of ore materials and about 30% of quartz. The quartz or hornblende strata have 80-90% of quartz and 10-20% of ore.


6. The topmost stratum consists of aspid, clay and carbonaceous slates of unknown thickness.

The whole deposit of Krivy Rih is broken by dikes of diabase which cross it vertically. The thickness of these dikes varies from 0.5 to 10 m.

The jaspilites and the hornblendes are ores of the quartz type which require enrichment. The maximal iron content of the jaspilites is 40%, that of the hornblendes 25%. The components of the iron quartzites, mostly martite and to a lesser degree, magnetite and hematite, contain up to 65% of iron and even more. These ores were developed from the jaspilites and the hornblendes by the hydrothermal replacement of the quartz by hematite and magnetite.

According to the form of the ore bodies, the deposits of Krivy Rih fall into two types:

A. Those of columnar type which in a cross-section have the shape of a lens and extend for hundreds of metres in depth. Their length is 100-



500 metres and their thickness 10-30 metres. Sometimes there are columns 1 kilometer in length and 100 metres in thickness.

B. The horizontal deposits sometimes several kilometers in width. Their thickness rarely exceeds 10-15 meters. These are located between the quartzites and the upper layer of the clay schists.

The high grade ores of Krivy Rih are divided into three grades depending upon their iron content: 1. 62% of iron or more; 2. 62-58%; and 3. 58-55%. Brown iron ores are also found in the Krivy Rih deposits. These developed from the weathered layers of the iron quartzites and also from the chlorites and amphibolitic schists. They are either found at the place of their origin or have been deposited by the Tertiary sea.

The origin of the Krivy Rih deposits is quite complicated. The problem was studied by P. P. Pyatnitsky and others. Their studies show that the jaspilites and iron hornblendes were formed as marine deposits consisting of intermixed layers of amorphous hydrated silica and ferrous minerals as ferrous hydroxide, siderite, thuringite, etc. Later these deposits together with the layers of the Pre-Cambrian rocks underwent a regional metamorphosis. The circulating hydrothermal solutions laid the basis for the rich iron ores, which originated by the replacement of the quartz by the magnetites and hematites. Consequently the Krivy Rih range is a type of metamorphic sedimentary deposit. The deposits of the high grade ores of the three grades were estimated in 1938 to amount to 1,142 million tons and those of the jaspilites with not less than 40% of iron content, were placed at 20 million tons.

III.

The second important iron ore deposits in Ukraine are located in the eastern and northern part of the Kerch peninsula. This is in character an Upper Tertiary deposit. It consists of short and relatively flat folds which run mostly in a north-easterly direction. The anticlinal slopes of the folds are frequently much eroded. The ore-bearing layers are on the synclinal slopes in the shape of synclines. The most important are the Kizautska, Kamysh-Burunska, Northern Aksanaiska, etc. The synclines are 6-10 kilometers in length and 1.5-2.0 kilometers in width. There are also synclines of smaller dimensions and several ore-bearing deposits which represent non-eroded remains of otherwise completely eroded synclines.

A stratigraphical cross-section of the Kerch deposits is as follows:

1. The Tertiary deposits represented by the brown loess-like loams which sometimes pass over into brown sands.
2. The deposits of the so-called Kuyalnitskian strata of the Pliocene, which appear in the form of thin, variegated, noticeably sandy, gypsum-bearing clays and finely-grained white or variegated sands.
3. The upper Cymmerian deposits, represented by clays with interlayers of iron-enriched sands. The characteristic feature of these clays is

the presence of sulphur compounds, which, when acted upon by hydrochloric acid give off H_2S . In places, especially in the lower stratum kertschenite is found (chemical formula $(NmCaMg) \cdot (FeON)_2 \cdot (PO_4)_2 \cdot (6H_2O)$).

The median part of the Cymmerian deposits consists of the ore. Structurally it is composed of oolites of brown iron ore ranging from 0.1 mm. to 1 cm. in size imbedded in a brown sandy-clayish cement. Often there are interlayers and cracks filled with pure brown iron ore. At the base of the horizon there are quite often lenses or interlayers of shell rocks. We also find in the ore horizon secretions of baryta and vivianite ($Fe_3 PO_4 \cdot 2.8H_2O$). The latter forms, in the shell rocks, interesting brush-like structures. On the edges of the synclines, the thickness of the ore horizon is several meters; towards the middle of the syncline it increases to 25-30 meters.

5. The ore horizon is located in the lower part of the Cymmerian group which consists of yellow and brown ferrous sands, with one or two interlayers of oolite ores and hornblendes. In some places there is the so-called deep water variation of these deposits in the form of plastic clay with a characteristic bluish-green hue.

6. The Pontic stratum is represented in the upper sections by hornblendes and in the lower mostly by clay sediments.

The ore as we have mentioned consists of oolites of brown iron and brown sand cement. In places we find manganous and ferro-manganous cement of a black color which occupies usually a small area and forms the so-called concretions. The barytic cement appears in the ore sometimes as whole interlayers and includes the oolites of the brown iron, the latter being approximately equal in amount to the baryta. Most of the Kerch ore is so weakly bound together that when it is dry, it can be crushed in the hand. These concretions and the siderite are really not common and so they are not of much importance. We differentiate several types of ores by their color; red and dark red (i. e. ores with a manganese base), black (especially with large inclusions of manganous compounds in the cement), tobacco color and siderites. The red color is caused by the presence of manganous oxides. The tobacco (greenish brown) is caused by oxygen compounds of iron.

The iron content of the Kerch ores varies between 20 and 51%. Most of the analyses show 33-40%, in some synclines 34-37% on an average. Ores with 36-38% of iron are regarded as industrial. The manganese content is 0.1 to 1.11%. A technical drawback to the use of Kerch ore is its noticeably large phosphorus content (0.4-1.3%, with the practical average

0.7-0.8%). Other compounds are: not more than 0.4% S, As, 0.01-0.16%; V, 0.03-0.04%. The total Kerch ore deposits before the war were estimated as 2.7 billion tons.

IV.

The manganese basin of Nikopil is located on the left bank of the Dnieper river on the railroad line between the Krivbas and the Donbas. It includes two independent mining centres; the western or Pokrovsky on the rivers Solona and Buzul, northwest of Nikopil, and the eastern on the river Tomativka in the vicinity of the railroad station of Manhan (the present official title is Manhanets), to the southeast of Nikopil.

On the uneven surface of the Pre-Cambrian gneisses and granites, which are strongly kaolinized in places, are Tertiary deposits, i. e. clays of the Oligocene era, which sometimes pass into sands; nearer the surface are ferrous clays. Above them is a single stratum of greenish clays. On the surface of this area are clayish sands and marl sands of Sarmatian origin. Above this stratum is Pontic limestone covered by a layer of Tertiary clays and loess-like loams with chernozem. The ore deposits are spread more or less horizontally in small, isolated depressions in the crystalline body of the gneisses and granites. The thickness of the ore-containing layers diminishes with the elevation of the contour of the crystalline rocks. The total area of the ore deposits exceeds 15,000 ha.

Unlike the other important manganese deposit in the USSR, i. e. in Chiatur, Georgia, the Nikopil basin has only a single stratum, 1.5-2.0 meters in depth and rarely reaching 3-4 meters. This appears as a layer of light, clayish rocks, more or less enriched with manganous inclusions of oolite origin. These have either the form of spongy aggregates, the size of which varies from several meters to several centimeters in cross-section or a form of interstratification, (laminae intermixed among themselves). The deposits of the Nikopil basin consist mostly of psilomelane, pyrolusite and manganite. The concentrates which are secured after enrichment are divided into three technical grades: Grade I, over 48% Mn; grade II, 42-48% Mn., and Grade III, 35-42% Mn. The silicon content of the ore is quite high, 8-16%. The phosphorus content of the washed ore seldom falls lower than 0.15% and sometimes reaches 0.2%. The iron content varies from 1.5 to 2.0%.

It is generally agreed that the Nikopil deposits originated in the so-called fresh water conditions. Contrary to the deposits in Chiatur, the Nikopil ore does not lie on limestones but on rocks of a granite type, and

occurs not as a continuous layer but in separate depressions in the surface of the rocks. According to the estimates of 1934, the manganese deposits in the Nikopil basin amount to 380 million tons, of which 89 million were of the first two grades. Because of the especially good lumpiness of the ore and the advantageous position of the basin, the Nikopil ores play an especially important role not only in the industry of the entire USSR but also in its export trade. The possibilities for the development of the basin became even greater after the construction of the Dnieper ferro-manganese works built in 1938 and reconstructed after the war in 1948-51.

V.

Besides the iron and manganese ore deposits which play a dominant role in the industry of Ukraine and which undoubtedly caused the spontaneous growth of both the metallurgical and machine branches of industry, Ukraine also has deposits of other metals which are very important.

The largest of these are the mercury deposits at Mykytivka which are four kilometers from the station of the same name in the Donbas and which have been worked since 1885. Geologically this region contains sedimentary rocks of the Median and Upper Carbonaceous periods (sandstone, aggregates and clay schists, which contain interlayers of coal). The mercury deposit appears as an anticlinal fold running in the north-westerly direction. Due to the fact that the axis of this fold rises in part and sinks in part, the area includes a series of domes with various names as Sofiysky, Novy, Chaharnyk, etc., on which the main mines are located. The anticlinal fold is broken by a series of covers, the largest of which is located in the northern wing of the fold and is in some places 12 meters deep. In olden times hydrotherms passed through the beds of these covers and were genetically connected with a magnetic chain, concealed in the depths. The underlying strata consist of coarse-grained sandstones, and also of aggregates and schists, especially where coal veins are found. These strata are distinctly connected with the covers which are located in the cracks in the range.

The cinnabar (mercury ore) is found in the form of small grains, or beside the cracks which often crisscross in various directions. Occasionally the cinnabar forms condensed aggregates along with antimonite. These appear as veins of various depths. The cinnabar is the chief component of the Mykytivka deposits, for the antimonite occurs only spasmodically. In addition we find also pyrite, markasite and rarely arsenopyrite. Most of these appear in cracks in the sandstones. In the ore-producing zone

the sand structure has been enriched by quartz. At time we can notice kaolinization of the side rocks. Shortly before World War II, the deposits of the Sofiysky dome in the northern wing were investigated to a depth of 300 meters and the Chaharnyk dome to a depth of 380 meters. The production of mercury in the Mykytivka deposit in 1937 was 8.5% of the total world production.

Other deposits which have been found in Ukraine and the exploitation of which has been started recently are magnesium, vanadium, titanium and among rarer metals, zirconium, hafnium, cerium, tantalum. The magnesium deposits are found in the desert salt soils of the Crimea and Perekop in the form of epsomite ($MgSO_4 \cdot 7H_2O$), kieserite ($MgSO_4 \cdot H_2O$) and bishofite ($MgCl_2 \cdot 6H_2O$). It should be noted that the magnesium ores are used not only in metallurgy but in other branches of industry. Thus epsomite is employed in medicine and in the leather, textile, paint and varnish and soap industries, kieserite and bishofite in the manufacture of quick-setting cements, etc. Epsomite is seldom used in metallurgy, for pure magnesium is secured from kieserite and bishofite.

The tantalum ores appear in the form of tantalite ($FeMnTa_2O_6$) usually in combination with the ore of niobate-columbite ($FeMnNb_2O_6$), chiefly at Eliseivka where we find relatively large crystals in the paragenesis with albite, betafite, gilberite, and gahnite. In Eliseivka bismuth (bismutite $Bi_2O_3 \cdot CO_2 \cdot H_2O$) occurs. Vanadium is mined chiefly in the Kerch deposits. Zirconium (as $ZrSiO_4$) appears in the neighborhood of Mariupil (now Zhdanov) in the eleolitian sienite, where albite, eleolite, lepidomelane, apatite and other minerals occur. In the Naholny Kriazh (Stalin region), native silver occurs in places as a secondary mineral. The ores of the colored metals and the rare metals are now being searched for more thoroughly.

Full industrial utilization of these minerals would undoubtedly give a further stimulus to the development of Ukrainian metallurgy, especially in the production of high quality special steel, which is finding constantly wider applications in the machine industry, especially in the military and chemical spheres. The production of such steel has been hampered by the policies of the Muscovite occupants and has therefore been one of the weakest links in the metallurgical industry of Ukraine. Of course it would be necessary to import such metals as aluminum, nickel, chromium, copper, tin, and wolfranium which are not found in large quantities in Ukraine. These play an important role in the production of modern grades of steel, since up to the present it has been impossible to find substitutes for them.

TWO TRENDS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

by NICHOLAS CHUBATY

On occasion of its 35th Anniversary

Thirty five years ago, on March 12, 1917, during the third year of World War I, the tsarist regime, the traditional governmental form of the Russian Empire, fell. Unable to continue the war, Russia sank into complete disorganization. Favorable conditions for the fall of tsarism had been prepared by the revolutionary activity of the progressive intelligentsia which after destroying the tsarist system, did not know how to form a new constitutional and legal system.

After the fall of tsarism the Russian Empire faced not only the demand for fundamental social reforms and the introduction of a constitutional form of government but also the very grave problem of solving the needs of the several nationalities, of which the Empire was composed. The responsibility for the oppression of the non-Russian peoples before the Revolution had rested upon the absolute power of the tsar but now the democratic and socialistic government was compelled to undertake the solution of questions on which might depend the very existence of the empire as a unit.

It was not for nothing that the fall of the tsarist regime was decided by the brave action of the Volynian Guard Regiment, composed of Ukrainians, which was first at the call of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic organization in Petersburg to take the side of the workmen and carry along with it the 60,000 man garrison of the Russian capital which had hitherto been neutral. A few days later, on March 19, there was a Ukrainian mass demonstration of a hundred thousand people on the most prominent streets of Petersburg. The demonstrators carried at their head a huge portrait of Taras Shevchenko, the greatest Ukrainian poet and hundreds of blue and yellow Ukrainian national banners. This indicated that the upheaval in Russia had a double character as a national revolution as well as a social and political one. The most important Russian democratic paper *Rech* (the Word) next day had written: "The Ukrainian question is now one of the most important questions which face the Russian state."

On the fall of tsarism, the power passed automatically into the hands of the Duma which was far from reflecting the revolutionary moods of

the masses. The Provisional Government of Prince Lvov, which was composed chiefly of moderate democrats, could not deal with the chaos that the revolution produced. Beside the official government there was organized in the Tauric Palace an unofficial government, the Soviet of Soldiers, Workers and Peasants, which was controlled by the Socialist party largely of the Menshevik faction. The Bolsheviks in the Petersburg Soviet, as in the majority of the great cities of the empire, formed at this time a small but dynamic minority which knew how to put out in an unending stream slogans which appealed to the not very critical masses of workers and peasants as: "End the War!"—"Peace without annexations or indemnities!"—"Peace to the cabins and war to the palaces!"—"The land for the laboring peasants!"—"Grab what has been grabbed!"

Under the pressure of the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets in Petersburg on June 3, 1917, the Provisional Government swung further to the left and finally passed under the control of the socialists led by Alexander Kerensky. His assumption of power did not change the position of the Soviets of Soldiers, Workers and Peasants but on the contrary the Tauric Palace became more and more a second revolutionary government of Russia with a greater popularity than the Provisional Government enjoyed, for the masses of workers could go there to listen to the never-ending debates and could directly exert their pressure upon the official government. This government in fact was completely helpless for the entire country was swept by a wave of anarchy. The army at the front understood freedom in its own way and rejected their officers, took off their officer's insignia and appointed their own commanders.

Throughout the country security became illusory. Robbery and murder spread with the revolutionary tide. The peasants drove away the landowners and seized their property. This anarchy which spread rapidly among the soldiers, workers and peasants was fanned still more by the Bolsheviks with their extreme slogans. They could not secure a majority in the Petersburg Soviet after the return of Lenin from abroad and so they decided on July 16 and 17 upon an open revolutionary attack against the Provisional Government to seize the control of the capital by force. They did not succeed but their actions increased the anarchy.

The next month a conspiracy in the army which had its centre in Moscow and in general headquarters at the front was made under General Kornilov but it also did not succeed and the country was plunged into complete anarchy, for no one trusted any one. Each suspected the other of counter-revolution and this prepared the soil for the action of the well

organized Bolsheviks who finally secured a majority in the Petersburg Soviet and in the Soviets outside the capital. There was indeed freedom in the entire Russian Empire but it was not the freedom of a free country but freedom limited by no law, — in a word anarchy.

At the same time throughout the entire Russian Empire outside of the territory of the Russian people there developed the second tide of *national revolutions* and these crowded into the background in the non-Russian territories *the socialist revolution proclaimed by Lenin* on his return from abroad on April 3, 1917.

This wave of national revolutions quickly turned against the centralization of the Russian Empire also among the armies at the front. Even amid the army anarchy there were organized Polish, Ukrainian and other divisions. Each established officers of their own nationality in the regiments where they formed a majority and introduced their official language. This movement spread to the corps and led to the elimination of soldiers of other nationalities who were transferred to their own national units and thus were formed Polish, Ukrainian and other corps. The movement was especially strong among the Ukrainians, who became so well organized that on June 1917 they held in Kiev the first Ukrainian Army Congress with representatives from the front and from all sections of the Russian Empire. The delegates spoke for more than a million organized Ukrainian soldiers and sailors. They set up a Ukrainian Military Committee which was to carry still further the Ukrainianizing of the army and navy.

The Ukrainianizing of the army was hastened by the generals, for in the regiments and corps of the various nationalities the national slogans gained the predominance over the slogans of the social revolution. The national solidarity did not permit assaults on the higher officers, disrespect for them and their murder. On the contrary the generals who put themselves at the service of the Ukrainian units were welcomed and received appropriate respect. This tendency hastened the Ukrainianization for the higher officers, when they were Ukrainian by origin, even though they had been strongly russified, now proclaimed themselves again Ukrainian.

The Ukrainianized units preserved not only internal discipline but in the general breakdown of the old tsarist army, they showed themselves a reliable element at the front and this allowed them to give help to the Russian central military and civil authorities which desired at any cost to continue the war against Germany and Austria.

On the other hand the Ukrainianized units of the army became a strong support for the national and autonomous political institutions which were set up in the various non-Russian parts of the Empire and they began to work for the reconstruction of the Russian Empire into a federation of free national republics which at the moment had not thought of withdrawing entirely from the Empire. *Ukraine was the classical example of the national revolution which was spreading throughout the Russian Empire along with the socialist revolution proclaimed by Lenin. A similar development took place in the other non-Russian territories.*

Yet apart from its proclamations on the Polish and Finnish questions, the Provisional Government of Russia took a firm stand against the efforts of the non-Russian peoples and especially Ukraine to secure autonomy; the hostile position of the Russian Provisional democratic government hastened its own downfall and the communizing of the old Tsarist Empire.

It was only on the non-Russian territories that the socialist revolution met with strong opposition and the triumph of the Communist government in Russia hastened the breaking up of the old Russian Empire into national states which one after the other proclaimed their independence in December 1917 and in the first months of 1918.

Then the Communism which had triumphed on the territory of the Russian people with the aid of the strength of the Russian people went to the aid of the weak Communist movements on the non-Russian territories and it was only through the aid of the Communist forces of the Russian people that after a bloody struggle Communism triumphed on the entire territory of the old Russian Empire and recemented it together. This is the way the socialist-Communist revolution developed in the Russian Empire. Let us look more closely at the situation in Ukraine.

The *Ukrainian Central Rada* arose in March, 1917 with the slogan: "*Without national liberation, there can be no social liberation.*" It was formed of representatives of all Ukrainian parties as a national revolutionary centre for the whole of Ukraine. On April 5 through 7 the All-Ukrainian National Congress was called in Kiev. It brought in duly mandated representatives from all parts of Ukraine into the *Ukrainian Central Rada*. This alarmed the Russian democratic minority in Ukraine and the Menshevik, K. Nezlobin, as head of the Kiev Soviet of Soldiers, Workers and Peasants openly threatened that he would scatter the Ukrainian Congress with bayonets.

In May, 1917 were held All-Russian Congresses of the leading Russian democratic parties, the Kadets, and the Menshevik Social Democrats;

they declared in principle (theoretically) for the self-determination of the peoples of Russia but in practice they declared themselves against any territorial autonomy of Ukraine.

In June, 1917, a delegation of the *Ukrainian Central Rada*, backed by the authority of the First Ukrainian Military Congress went to Petersburg to reach an understanding with the Russian Provisional Government on the question of the territorial autonomy of Ukraine. The delegation was coldly received during several discussions and returned home without any result. The Provisional Government promised to send its final decision in a letter.

The decisions of the Provisional Government arrived in the middle of June. They rejected the demand of the territorial autonomy of Ukraine and forbade a Second Ukrainian Military Congress in Kiev on the authority of the Minister of War Alexander Kerensky. Prof. Michael Hrushevsky, the head of the *Ukrainian Central Rada*, read the answer of the Russian Provisional Government at a session of the *Rada* and then made the famous remark: "*The honeymoon of the Revolution is over; now comes the critical period. Ukraine must organize its own government.*"

Ukraine then took up the revolutionary struggle with the Russian Provisional Government. In its answer, the *Ukrainian Central Rada* increased its membership by adding representatives of the Peasant Congress of the whole of Ukraine which was being held in Kiev and decided to organize an autonomous government for all Ukraine against the will of Petersburg and it determined at the end of June to hold a Second Military Congress in Kiev despite the ban of Petersburg.

At the end of June the *Second Ukrainian Military Congress* gathered. It contained 2,300 members who represented 1,600,000 of the Ukrainianized army and the Ukrainianized Black Sea fleet. The Congress with great national enthusiasm met on the Square of St. Sophia, the 900 year old national shrine of the Ukrainian people, and swore that it would uphold the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination and support the *Ukrainian Central Rada* and urged it not to renew appeals to Petersburg but to organize itself a Ukrainian government on Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian people were thus laying the foundations for their own government.

The *Ukrainian Central Rada* issued its *First Universal* to the people on June 23, 1917 and formed the first autonomous government, the *General Secretariat*, under the leadership of the writer Volodymyr Vynnychenko, granting the personal cultural autonomy of all national minorities

of Ukraine by placing national secretaries in the government for Russians, Poles and Jews.

Surprised by these actions, the Russian Provisional Government sent to Kiev three ministers, Kerensky, Tseretelli and Tereshchenko to negotiate with the *Ukrainian Central Rada*. The results of the visit were expressed by a compromise — *the Statute of the Higher Administration of Ukraine*, which emphasized the autonomous position of Ukraine within a Russian Federated Republic. As a result of this, representatives of the national minorities of Ukraine — Russians, Poles and Jews, entered the *Ukrainian Central Rada* and sent their ministers to the *Secretariat*.

Meanwhile in Russia the wave of the Bolshevik Revolution was rising and the Bolsheviks made their unsuccessful attempt to seize power by armed force (July 16-17). As a result Alexander Kerensky became the hero of the revolution. He took the post as Premier of the Provisional Government and thus became the head of a purely socialistic government. *One of the first questions to arise was the confirmation of the Autonomous Statute of Ukraine which had been drawn up also by Minister Kerensky in Kiev a month before. Now as Premier of the Provisional Government, Kerensky at the height of his power rejected the Statute (August 17, 1917). In place of an Autonomous Statute for the whole Ukraine, as had been proposed, the Provisional Government of Kerensky sent an Instruction to the Secretariat of Ukraine, which denied the autonomy of Ukraine, took away half of the territory of Ukraine and kept it from access to the Black Sea and the industrial areas, i. e. the entire wealth of Ukraine, the governments of Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson and Tavrida.*

The *Ukrainian Central Rada* rejected the Instruction of the Russian Provisional Government. To support its position and that of the other non-Russian peoples in defence of their right of self-determination it held in September in Kiev a *Congress of the non-Russian Peoples of the Russian Empire, which became a demonstration of the solidarity of the non-Russian peoples against the centralization of Petersburg*. Ukraine began to prepare for the proclamation of a Ukrainian Republic only freely federated with other republics of all the peoples of the Russian Empire.

This development was hastened by the *Bolshevik Revolution in Petersburg* and on the entire territory of the Russian people on *November 7, 1917*. Not wishing to admit the government of the Bolsheviks to Ukraine, the *Ukrainian Central Rada issued in the Third Universal the proclamation of the Ukrainian National Republic as part of a free federation with Russia (November 20, 1917)*. However in view of the Bolshevik government in Petersburg Kiev broke with Petersburg and became the capital

of an independent Ukraine which was at the same time the most orderly region of all the former territories of Russia. There came to Kiev diplomatic missions from France and England which recognized the Ukrainian government de facto. The formation of a Ukrainian state was completed.

Then began the war between the Ukrainian National Republic and the Bolsheviks. To compete with Ukraine, the Russian Bolsheviks created a satellite red government of Ukraine in Kharkiv; December 27, 1917 they proclaimed Soviet Ukraine an independent state.

The Ukrainian Central Rada then in its Fourth Universal on January 22, 1918, proclaimed the complete independence of Ukraine and a few days later signed a treaty of peace at Brest with the Central Powers. Its example was followed by the proclamation of the independence of the other non-Russian peoples of Russia. Before only Finland proclaimed its independence (December 7, 1917). The proclamation of independence of Ukraine was followed by: Lithuania February 16, 1918; Latvia February 18, 1918; Estonia February 24, 1918; Byelorussia March 24, 1918; Georgia, Armenia May 26, 1918; Azerbaijan May 29, 1918. The independence movement at the same time engulfed also North-Caucasia, Turkestan and the Far East Territory at the Pacific Ocean.

The national revolution triumphed thus over the socialist revolution and it is idle and incorrect for friends of the Russian people to ignore these developments in their efforts to simplify the Russian situation and to see no elements except the struggle between the Provisional Government and the Bolsheviks. This is a denial of history, the support of the new and ever old Russian imperialism which under whatever form is a menace to the hopes of mankind for a peaceful cooperation through the United Nations.



THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE UKRAINIAN FARMER AFTER WORLD WAR II UNDER THE SOVIETS

by MYKOLA VELYCHKIVSKY

Ukraine is an agricultural and industrial land. According to the census of 1939 66.6% of the population were agricultural and 33.4% were urban and industrial. Thus the majority of the population lives in the vil-lages and the village is the chief producer of those articles on which the general economic system of Ukraine is based. In view of the normal position of the chief producing class in the basic parts of the economic system the farmer should be, if not better off, at least not worse off, for his heavy work than the city workman. As a matter of fact the position of the Ukrainian farmer under the Soviets in general and after World War II in particular is far worse than is that of the cruelly exploited Soviet workman. However hard the position of the laboring class under the Soviets is, their position and especially their material position is incomparably better than is that of the member of the kolhosps. We cannot speak at all of the individual landowner for he is entirely without any rights. From the member of the kolhosp the Soviet government takes a large part of the products of his labor. Thus before World War II there was assigned for distribution for labor days the following percentages of the total harvest:

1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
19.5	23.8	23.8	30.9	23.5	22.9	21.5

This shows how little the government left to the individual members of the kolhosps and how much it took for itself.

The following table shows the percentage taken by the government:

1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
46.0	44.5	43.1	36.8	44.3	43.1

The member of the kolhosp thus is left about one fifth of the entire crop. The pay for one labor day varied before the war from 1.3 kg. to 2.4 kg. of grain in different years. After the war it was reduced and there have been kolhosps where the pay for one labor day was put at 0.5 kg.

The small return of labor days required for one eater is very low as is shown by this table:

1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
58.0	60.5	82.8	90.5	100.5	104.8	107.2

Thus the individual received very little in kind and the cash payments were insignificant.

The average amount of cash payments per kolhosp member were (in rubles):

1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
156	151	212	276	291	466	490

One labor day was compensated in money (in rubles):

1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
0.52	0.75	0.93	1.20	1.20

To have a comparison of the value of the Soviet money, we will give a list of prices of food, clothing and shoes in 1913, 1939-40 and 1948 per kg.:

Products in kg.	1913	1939-40	1948
Baked wheat bread	3.75 kop.	90 kop.	2 rub.
Lard	40 kop.	25 rub.	60 rub.
Veal, 1st class	22.5 kop	18 rub.	80 rub.
Beef, 1st class	55 kop.	24 rub.	64 rub.
10 Eggs, 1st class	12-15 kop.	8 rub.	16-20 rub.
Buckwheat	7.5 kop.	4.1 rub.	12 rub.
Refined sugar	47. kop.	5.2 rub.	15 rub.
1 pair farmer's boots	3 rub.	450 rub.	700 rub.
1 farmer's suit	7 rub.	500 rub.	1000-1200 rub.

When we compare these figures with the payments made to the members of the kolhosps per worker, we will get an idea of the terrible situation.

We may remember that Lenin in his book *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* pointed in 1890 to the cruel exploitation of the hired workers who received for a year 412 kg. of grain and 13.8 kg. of fats. We agree with the statement of Lenin that the landlords in Ukraine in tsarist days cruelly exploited their hired workers and this produced a large number of uprisings against the landlords. But now in the days of socialism how does the position of the Ukrainian peasant compare? The figures that we have cited and which are taken from Soviet sources can be compared with the statement made by Lenin, the founder of Soviet Communism. Ac-

According to our calculations the average member of a kolhosp in Ukraine spends to feed each member of his family about 50% of what the peasant spent in 1915-1916, i. e. 55.35%.

As we have shown, the Soviet government takes from the average villagers the larger part of his production and also supplies the village more poorly with manufactured products than it does the city.

Before the World War II 70% of the manufactured products were distributed in the cities and 30% in the villages. Since 66.6% of the population were in the villages, this means that the average villager received of these three times less than the average city person. After the war the percentages between city and village remained the same.

In its press the Soviet government shows the great amount of trade but the Bolsheviks include in this exchange of wares objects of use which are either lacking on the market or in very small supply. Thus into the commercial trade enters 75-80% of all the flour and grain of the trade and the rest of the percent are the concentrated funds for the army, the NKVD, the government and the concentration camps. Meat in the city markets forms not more than 30-40% of the detailed exchange and in the village where it is not distributed for sale, meat, cloth of cotton 35-45%, woolsens, 20-30%, leather shoes 40-50%, automobiles 2-3%.

We must remember that many products are distributed unequally. Besides the fact that the villages receive less than the cities, the amount is distributed according to the area. The entire Soviet Union is divided into areas and such Soviet republics as Ukraine are not in the first area. The first area to receive supplies are the industrial regions of Moscow and Leningrad.

In general the sale in the retail market of such products as cloth and clothing since the war has dropped to 5-10% of the pre-war level and leather shoes are not given to the average laboring population and especially to the peasants.

To stabilize the currency the Soviet government has compelled the village by compulsory loans and various voluntary sacrifices to hand over a large part of its money. With the aid of the financial reform of 1947 the savings of the villagers were reduced to 1/10 of their normal value.

When we take into account the rise in prices of both industrial and food products, the savings of the villagers have been reduced to 1/40 of their nominal value. To speak clearly, the Moscow government in its treatment of the village has found a way of carrying on almost limitless robbery but it has included this in the legal state and Soviet system.

So the Ukrainian villager robbed by the occupying Moscow regime and in the miserable conditions which we have shown has tried to improve the productivity of his garden plot. To do this in the first place — the kolhospnik farmer using the confusion which was created during the war, when Ukraine was occupied by two greedy invaders, the Germans and the Russians, has tried to increase the size of his garden plot. These efforts of the kolhospnik villager have called out counter-measures on the side of the government. In 1939 and again after the war in 1946 the Politburo has published decrees against "the dismemberment of the communal lands." But it is still possible to see in the Soviet papers evidence that in Ukraine there are still illegal increases of the land in the garden plots.

The kolhospnik-villager has also begun to increase his own productive livestock, so as to support the physical existence of his family, for he receives, as we have seen, very little from the kolhosp and he goes to it unwillingly to fulfil his obligatory labor days. Here again the Moscow government has acted against the interests of the villagers. On April 19, 1949, there was published "a three year plan of cattle raising." This was directly aimed at the animal husbandry which has been carried on preeminently by the individual villagers.

The data here quoted for the classification of the productive cattle at the end of 1949 between the communal and private sectors shows that the larger cattle were more in individual care than in communal use. Besides from the official figures we see that the workmen and the officials were also striving to control their own cattle, obviously like the kolhospnik-villager, to improve the food of his family. But the workman and the official do not have their own supplies and they are compelled to buy fodder either at high firm prices or in the free market where the prices are still higher. But the wretchedness of the life of their families compel them also to practice animal husbandry.

This is the division as shown at the end of 1949:

	Large horned cattle	Sheep & goats	Swine
Kolhosps and sovkhoses	48.3%	72.0%	65.0%
In individual care	51.7%	27.0%	35.0%
Of which kolhospniks	32.9%	18.8%	17.1%
Workmen & officials	18.8%	8.2%	17.9%

On the whole this three year plan for the development of the communal animal husbandry is intended to destroy the miserable productive

cattle that are in individual care and also to enslave still more the kolhospnik-villager.

Then there was made a forced reduction of the young cattle in the hands of the villagers in individual use. The price paid for these young cattle was very low and even lower than the market price of meat by 10-20 times.

One and a half months later there was published a decree on the preparation of the products of animal husbandry. In this it was provided that the number of communal animals should be increased and at the same time it called for an increase of the supply of meat products.

To do this in the village it was necessary to reduce the amount of consumption. Besides usually each kolhosp after the fulfilment of its quota to the state and the various funds had the right to take to the city products, especially meat, for sale on the so-called kolhosp markets, but after this decree on the preparation of products of animal husbandry, this became impossible. In the cities the supply of meat on free sale in the kolhosp markets will be reduced and already it is noticeable. In other words, the workmen and officials in the cities will be left without meat and compelled to reduce the amount of it which they consume, for it has greatly risen in price. The financial income of the kolhosps which was never high will be likewise reduced.

In addition this decree is reducing the cattle in individual use by the kolhospnik-villagers for the amount of delivery of meat for the villagers who use their own cattle is defined by a special decree, which aims to eliminate these cattle. For the kolhosps the norms of the delivery of meat are not determined by the quantity of cattle but by the amount of land in the kolhosp. In a word the miserable existence of the kolhospnik-villager is being made still worse and he himself is being made by the Moscow government still more dependent on the favor of the kolhosp party command. In a word the individual is being made even more of a Soviet slave. So after the war the population of Ukraine especially in the village was doomed by the Soviet regime to hunger and at times to real starvation. In both cities and villages now the population is almost unshod and sometimes barefoot.

The collective village economy in the USSR or as it is officially termed the kolhosp by a special statute is not a state enterprise but a cooperative where all the working villagers are members with full rights. By the statute the kolhosps are the property of the collective of the villagers and not of the state. In reality to-day the kolhosps are the property of the state and the villagers have been reduced to the status of workmen bound to

this particular enterprise. The economic position of the kolhospnik has become far lower than even that of the workman on the sovkhoz. The only thing which has saved him from starvation has been his own garden plot. But as we have seen, the Moscow Soviet government is working systematically and progressively to abolish these. The land area of each plot has been reduced to a minimum and the productive cattle at the individual disposal of the kolhospnik through Soviet measures for the delivery of meat are to be completely destroyed and the kolhospnik-villager is to pass into the position of the true proletarian workman. We will soon see the transfer of the kolhospnik-villager by the Soviet government into the position of the average workman of a Soviet government enterprise by which name the kolhosps will be called. The kolhosps will be called a factory of grain, and the kolhospnik will be a worker in the factory. We can see hints of this clearly not only in the Soviet occupational policy but even in the Soviet press. In the journal *Bolshevik*, No. 4 for 1948 we read: "The difference between socialism and communism lies in the degree of economic maturity. As the development from socialism to communism goes on, there will be a rapprochement of the two forms of property (the state and the cooperative kolhosp type), and the condition for this is the assumption of the leading role by state property in the system of the national economy." The Soviet Moscow press is preparing in this direction, so that the state property may play the leading role in the national economy. In this way the Ukrainian village at the present time under Soviet Moscow occupation is experiencing a grave crisis.

On the whole the Ukrainian village is going through the most terrible and savage times of widespread slavery and it can receive no help to throw off its hated occupying government. It can count only on its own strength.

THE STRUGGLE WITH EAST-EUROPEAN SPACE

by ALEXANDER DOMBROVSKY

The daily increasing risk of an armed conflict between the east and the west on a global scale without precedent in history is attracting the most serious consideration not only of statesmen, military men and publicists but of all thinking people in the civilized world. Is Russia on her huge Eurasian expanses invincible?

Around 530 B.C., the Persian King Cyrus made an expedition against the Eurasian peoples. We do not know too much about this campaign but we do know that the Persian King entered the Eurasian expanse on the right bank of the River Jaxartes (the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea) and met determined resistance from the allied nomadic tribes. When he had reached the middle of the steppes, Cyrus suffered a great defeat at the hands of the Massagetae. He was killed himself and his army was shattered. This was probably the first time that such a powerful army had invaded the Eurasian steppes and despite the generally recognized military skill and bravery of the Persian soldiers, Cyrus would probably have fared better, had he relied upon political rather than military measures. Rome showed far more political sense by basing its policies on the political principle "Divide and Conquer."

The Persian Empire was hungry for power. In his efforts to establish a world empire, Darius, about twenty years after the defeat of Cyrus, made an expedition against the Scythians. Darius and his forces went deep into the East European expanses, (although not so far as was stated by Herodotus) but as a result of the well known tactics of the Scythians, who retreated before him and drew him on, while they harassed him with their partisan raids, he did not win the victory of which he had dreamed. Of course the story of Herodotus about his great "defeat" was apparently much exaggerated, but he did not succeed. Yet it is obvious that he had paid no attention to any political measures which might have disintegrated the forces of these nomadic hordes who could be attacked with difficulty because of the harsh geographic and climatic conditions under which they lived.

The nomadic Scythians who conquered Eastern Europe in the 8th century B. C. ruled as a small dominating caste the entire area from the

Urals to the Danube, gave their name to the territory (Scythia) and organized a kind of feudal state. Within this were many East European peoples and tribes who objected to the Scythian domination. Among these was the pre-Ukrainian agricultural population, which had lived in Ukraine from the time of the prehistoric Trypilyan culture. These people figured in the account of Herodotus as the "ploughing Scythians," who raised grain for sale (Herodotus 4, 17). These subjugated peoples, especially those on Ukrainian territory, had abundant reasons to hate the Scythians, who were few in number (Herodotus 4, 81). This is shown by their refusal to help their Scythian masters. Had Darius taken advantage of this political situation and offered these subjugated peoples their freedom in exchange for their assistance, the Scythians would most probably have been isolated and easily conquered. Further he could have secured food from the agricultural peoples and it would then not have been so difficult to enter the steppes. The military tactics, which the Scythians used against the Persians, would have made no sense. By thus shattering the military rule of the Scythians from within Darius could have won a complete victory and extended his power.

Alexander the Great in his invasion of Eastern Europe, as we can see from the account of Arrian (Book I, chap. 3-5), a historian of the 2nd century A. D., did make some attempts at political action. He received an embassy from the Scythians and neighboring peoples and tried to profit by opposing some to others. Thus he emerged from the Eurasian steppes as a conqueror.

The historical convulsions connected with the great folk migrations which separated the ancient from the modern world brought great changes in the political, social and cultural conditions. The Near East ceased to be the centre of political interest and the centre of gravity shifted to Western Europe where new nations were formed out of the old Roman Empire. At the same time in Eastern Europe the steppe raiders as the Pechenihs, the Polovtsy, the Tatars and finally the Turks destroyed the old Ukrainian state with its centre in Kiev and then the Galician-Volhynian state in the Western Ukrainian lands. With the breasts of its sons Ukraine defended Western Europe against these attacks and for centuries was an outpost of Christianity. With the fall of the Kievan state Eastern Europe declined politically.

Then with the beginning of the 13th century there grew up a strange political creature — Russia, founded on the principle of the political and social enslavement of the peoples and especially of Ukraine. The old historical process whereby the nomad Scythians acquired control of the

more cultured pre-Ukrainian, agricultural, autochthonous population was repeated through the operation of the same geopolitical laws. The successors of Ivan the Terrible, in whose veins flowed Finnic, Palaeoasiatic and some Slav blood enslaved a series of Eastern European peoples, among them the Ukrainians with their old culture and their historical tradition. Like Scythia Russia gave its name to the whole of Eastern Europe and with the aid of the tsarist dictatorship, a stern police regime and the ruthless policy of denationalizing defeated nations and of destroying their culture, it grew into an empire with farflung imperial aspirations. On this path of imperial expansion Russia came into conflict with other great powers.

In the 17th and the beginning of the 18th centuries Sweden became the strongest political force in northern Europe. The period of the Swedish wars ended with Charles XII who made a campaign against Poland and Russia. Young Charles XII understood that Russia had to be broken up politically and so he came to an understanding with the enslaved Ukraine and its hetman, Ivan Mazepa.

The physical strength of Sweden was too weak to destroy Russia. Besides the alliance of Charles XII and Ukraine was made too late, almost at the last moment. At the same time Charles did not make use of the Turkish interest in the dismemberment of Russia and the battle of Poltava between the Swedish-Ukrainian forces and Russia ended with the triumph of the latter (1709).

Towards the end of the 18th century and early in the 19th, Russia extended from the Vistula to the Pacific and from the White Sea to the south almost to the Mediterranean basin. Because of its political and social structure Russia could enjoy the sympathies of the revolutionary French citizenry and its ruling circles. The tendencies of French policy at the time were clearly expressed in the speech of the statesman Boisy d'Anglas at the National Convention of 1795, when he said: "Russia is a ranging mountain torrent, and if it is not to overflow, it must be checked. Is it necessary for me, citizens, to tell you that in the last 60 years, Russia, increasing its savage strength, and adding the modern tactical methods, has destroyed the Caucasus, enslaved the Kozaks, conquered Georgia, stormed Crimea, divided Poland, terrified the Turkish Empire and is now threatening Constantinople? I know that I will be told with a certain reason that the Russian Empire is a colossus with legs of clay, that corruption is devouring it, that slavery deprives it of all energy, that it is too large to be governed, that by expanding it is preparing its own ruin and that every new conquest is a step toward catastrophe.

I agree with all this but the giant, before he perishes, will crush us and fall on our ruins. Think about this; time is passing, the lightning is flashing, the Moscow torrent is gaining strength, Attila will suddenly burst forth and you will perish, if you do not in time consolidate your forces to check this destructive scourge."¹

In the instructions of the Committee of Public Safety to Rewbell it was stated that in carrying on with Russia only a political war in view of the space that separates the two countries, France must support "Ukraine, at one time the ally of King Charles XII of Sweden. This brave and formerly free people were enslaved by Tsar Peter. It is necessary to revive in this people the feeling for freedom, so that it can destroy the yoke under which it is groaning and so that the tree of liberty may blossom in Kiev." It was proposed in France to send to Ukraine a great number of secret agents to arouse the people against Russia and French military instructors to train cadres to be the nucleus of the armed forces of Ukraine.

This was the atmosphere as 1812 approached. Even before Napoleon set out against Russia, there had been a great political scandal. Tsar Alexander had sent to Paris as military attache a very skilful representative, Alexander Ivanovich Chernishev. Profiting by his connections, Chernishev organized a spy school on a large scale and placed his agents even in the French ministry of war. His actions were discovered, his agents were arrested and tried before a military court. Chernishev himself succeeded in leaving France at the last moment just before the arrest of his collaborators. He carried to Petersburg important documents on the condition and organization of all the armed forces of Napoleon.

Then the campaign started. The French army occupied Wilno, Smolensk and at Borodino it won a victory over the Muscovites. The arrival of Napoleon with his army gave new hopes to the enslaved peoples of Russia, including Ukraine, where the hostility to Moscow rose with the increasing cruelty of Moscow to the Ukrainian people. There were open expressions of sympathy for Napoleon throughout Ukraine. Thus Lukashchewych, a landowner in Poltavshchyna, proposed a toast at a banquet to Napoleon. A certain Fedir Hustan also from Poltavshchyna, refused mobilization and added: "If they send us to the front, *we will not shoot down the French but the Moskals to the last man,*" for which remark he was sent to Siberia. The Ukrainian patriots built their hopes on Napoleon.

¹ Borschak I., *Napoleon and Ukraine*, Lviv, 1937, p. 21-22.

Napoleon tried to break the Russians militarily and as Borshchak said:² he hesitated to solve radically the national question of Russia; he made a miserly attempt at solving the Polish question and left Ukraine merely a subject for study. An unsigned memorial of 1812 on the Ukrainian question, which was probably prepared by the political director of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alexandre-Maurice-Blanc de Nauete d'Hauterive, proposed to Napoleon the creation of an independent Ukrainian state including much of the Ukrainian lands and the Crimea. This was to be called *Napoleonida*. But his memorial remained as the plan of a French statesman and later, when Napoleon wanted to correct his basic mistake on Ukraine, it was too late. Thus in choosing a military solution and in leaving in the realm of theory the idea of the national and political dismemberment of Russia, the French emperor made the great mistake which led to his final downfall.

About 130 years later, Hitler made his attack upon the Soviet Union. During these years there had been a long series of political, social and psychological changes in peoples and states. The Spring of the Nations had aroused the national question, increased the national consciousness of the people and aided in the development of the national rebirth of the peoples including the Ukrainians. Bolshevism had come and it had made a compromise with the Great Russian chauvinism and the state idea of the Russian tsars which had been founded on the annihilation of the enslaved peoples. The Moscow Bolsheviks had accepted the policies of Ivan the Terrible, Peter I, Catharine II and the other Moscow autocrats and tyrants and had overthrown the young Ukrainian state which had arisen in 1917-1919. They had brutally oppressed the Ukrainian people and had consciously set about the execution of a frankly genocidal policy at a rapid speed and with diabolically refined techniques.

Then in 1939 came World War II and this aroused new hopes of liberation from the red terror in the Ukrainians. On June 22, 1941 the German divisions of Hitler began their march to the east and in a few months they had advanced from Peremyshl to Kharkiv, about 1200 kilometres³. The reason for this rapid advance was that the Bolshevik armies which contained an overwhelming number of Ukrainians surrendered to the Germans in divisions. Near Kiev an army of a half million men surrendered in a body.

² Borshchak, op. cit. p. 96.

³ The Germans who quickly mastered Ukraine saw only "the grain of the Ukrainian fields and the road to petroleum," as Cave Floyd cleverly remarks in *The Origins and Consequences of World War II*, New York, 1948, p. 401.

The Ukrainian population, which hated the Bolshevik-Muscovite government, in the beginning welcomed the invaders as liberators. Also at the very beginning of the war, when the Germans were entering Lviv, the capital of Western Ukraine, the Leadership of the Ukrainian Underground on June 30, 1941 proclaimed a government of an Independent Ukrainian state and thus indicated that the Ukrainian people wished a voice in the determination of their destiny and not to be the dependency of brown Berlin. The German answer to this declaration was imprisonments, mass shootings, concentration camps, the terrorizing and starving of the Ukrainian population. Several million prisoners died of hunger in the German prison camps and most of these were Ukrainians who had voluntarily surrendered. The Ukrainian people soon saw that the Germans, intoxicated by their victories, did not intend to proceed along the path of historical justice but were dreaming of *Lebensraum* and the inflicting of a new yoke upon Ukraine.⁴

The Prussian boot urged the Germans to limit themselves to military actions in the conflict with red Moscow and to ignore the political strategy and in that was to be found the principal cause of the defeat of Hitlerian Germany, before which Europe had trembled so long. As the result of the German deceit and terror, the whole of Ukraine became a revolting partisan camp. The Ukrainian national partisans, as distinct from the Moscow-Bolshevik partisans on the ethnographic Muscovite lands, occupied by the Germans, had been from the beginning organized into regular military formations which became the nucleus of the heroic Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA); they attacked German military units, took away their arms and used them against the Germans. The military power of the Ukrainian revolutionary movement was so great that the Germans felt themselves safe only in the larger cities where there were large German army and police forces. On the other hand, the provinces, the villages and the forests formed a really free Ukraine with the Ukrainian rebels in command. The German transports with guns, uniforms and food, which often fell into the hands of the Ukrainians were always heavily guarded but these guards were of little use. The Germans were helpless against the Ukrainian partisans.

Besides this the entire East European terrain gave the Germans the same difficulties as it had given Napoleon. In the beginning the Germans laughed when the allies called "General Space" and "General Winter"

⁴ Winston Churchill, *The Second World War*, Boston, 1948, p. 259-260, says that Hitler in 1937 talked with his closest assistants about Ukraine as the future German *Lebensraum*.

their allies but they were soon convinced that these "generals" were inflicting enormous losses. The German soldiers reached Stalingrad, the new Herodotean Gelyon and there foundered. The East European expanses, the severe frosts and the Ukrainian partisans broke the German army. That force which had passed the Maginot line and conquered France in four weeks was broken by the East European space.

Soon from the east to the west were rolling hundreds of trains with hundreds of thousands of German soldiers with hands and feet frozen or amputated as a result of freezing. The Germans retreated, plundering and burning everything on the road. This was the balance sheet of the shameful Hitlerian policy of *Lebensraum*, the result of the ignoring of the only rational idea of the political dismemberment of red Russia and the trampling upon the historical and human rights of the nations enslaved by Moscow, including Ukraine, to lead their own independent state life. Hitler made the same mistake, independent of his crimes, as Napoleon and he had to lose, apart from the fact that he used the most modern technique which under the given geopolitical conditions would have been far stronger, had it been applied in accordance with sound political strategy.

Sooner or later there will be an armed conflict between the east and the west. That is not only a historical and inevitable result but it is the basic postulate of our era in the defence of the most sacred, religious ideals, the preservation of Christian civilization, the preservation of peoples from the Moscow-Bolshevik genocide, in defence of the value of the individual, made in the image and likeness of God, in the end in defence of America! In that conflict America will be the leader of the free world. Will the leaders of America understand that Russia, red or white, can be overcome not by mere military actions but by the bringing about of the political dismemberment of the Russian empire and the confinement of Muscovite rule to its ethnographic territory. The history of invasions from ancient times to the present shows the power of the East European expanses, for the geopolitical conditions have not changed since the time of Darius and are as valid and important to-day as in the past.

America in grasping the hand of Ukraine which has bled in thirty years of warfare with Muscovite Bolshevism, a country whose best sons as Mazepa, Shevchenko, Petlyura, Konovalts, Chuprynka-Shukhevych and millions of others have struggled and are struggling for life and death to establish an independent Ukrainian State, will deal a death blow to the Russian prison of nations and thus fulfill its historical mission of protecting the rights of nations and people and will destroy once for all the conspiracy of the Eurasians against Christian civilization.

RUSSIAN STUDIES IN THE USA AND THE TERM "RUSSIA"

The *New York Times* on February 24, 1952, reported that on the basis of an official check there were in the United States not less than 500 studies being made of the USSR. They are usually called "Russian studies." They are being made in official bureaus, state and private universities and colleges, both Protestant and Catholic. When the press publishes the foundation of a new "Russian Study," the staff in majority is very often composed of old Russian immigrants, reactionaries of the tsarist type or new immigrants usually with totalitarian views with a sharply nationalistic (and often anti-Semitic) coloring and there is also no lack of recent Communophiles.

The Americans are spending millions on these "Russian studies" for various motives. The government institutions are in actual need of persons with the knowledge of the Russian language and basic information on the USSR. Others are supported by American capitalists in the mirage that the Russians whom they have protected will be able in a post-Bolshevik Russia to give them the opportunity to exploit the wealth of the Ukrainian Donbas, Azerbaijanian Baku or Turkestanian mines. Religious institutions are hoping naively that by favoring the Russians they will be able in a post-Bolshevik Russia to have the gates opened in Moscow, the orthodox "Third Rome" for their religious propaganda. In a word the Russians in majority have become the teachers of America about Russia despite the fact that America is now facing a mortal conflict with Russia. This may seem paradoxical but it is the truth. In their naivete some Americans hope that their Russian teachers will become the foes of Russia and will set out to ruin the works of present mighty Russia. In reality the Russians are good Russian patriots and to the fourth generation will place first the welfare of Russia.

The 500 Russian Studies are teaching the Americans about Russia but not what Russia is. As Prof. Eugene Van Cleef wrote in a letter, dated January 22, 1952, to the *New York Times*. "Many errors creep into the geographical world. *Currently one of the worst of these is the use of the word Russia, when what is meant is the USSR. Incidentally journalists are seriously at fault in this incorrect usage. It is just as wrong to use the*

word Russian meaning the USSR as it would be to use the name New York when one meant the United States of America."

But the incorrect use of the word Russia by the scholars in Russian Studies is only the smoke of an invisible fire. The Russian imperialists who often are developing these Russian Studies are acting with a deliberate purpose. Their object is to conceal from the Americans the vital fact that Russia is not the USSR and that Russia is only a part of the USSR and that the rest is the territory of the non-Russian peoples, and among these the most populous and richest is the Republic of Ukraine. In addition there are about ten other peoples older in culture than the Russians and these after years of enslavement by Russia are fighting for their independence. The full details of this tragic mortal conflict between Russia and the non-Russian peoples is concealed from Americans.

In America another Iron Curtain is placed over Russia by the Russian scholars in the Russian Studies and the American scholars rarely recognize it. The Russian Studies deal only with Russian literature, they handle Russian history from the Russian imperialistic point of view. They teach the Russian Revolution, carefully concealing the fact that the Russian Revolution had two aspects: a social revolution in Russia and a national struggle for liberation in the non-Russian territories of the Empire. They conceal this fact or present it in a biased manner or frivolously as small and unimportant questions not worthy of careful study. As a result Russian Studies lead to a worshipping of Russia rather than to a knowledge of the true USSR.

Out of these 500 Russian Studies there is not a single one today devoted to the study of the other parts of the USSR, the potential allies of America, i. e. the non-Russian peoples, their literature, history economy, religion and their way of life. The Russian specialists have thus thrown at the American people an Iron Curtain over the efforts of these people to win their liberty, and so far they have prevented the organization of any such study, which would analyze the Achilles' heel of the USSR. Without a detailed knowledge here, the American practical policy is floundering in the dark and often adopting methods that can only result in harm to America.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE SOVIET UNION. *Background, Ideology, Reality*. A Symposium edited by Waldemar Gurian. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1951, pp. 216.

The active Prof. Waldemar Gurian, editor of the journal *The Review of Politics*, organized last year at Notre Dame University a symposium of experts on the Soviet Union. The members besides the organizer were Prof. Michael Karpovich of Harvard University, Naum Jasny an economist from the Food Research Institute at Stanford University, California, Prof. Philip Mosely, Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, Stephen Kertesh of Notre Dame University, Vladimir Petrov, a refugee from the Soviet Union, S. Timasheff of Fordham University and Francis Dvornik of Harvard University. The addresses of these speakers are included in this volume.

At the present critical period the most real and basic addresses were those of Naum Jasny, "The Results of the Soviet Five Year Plans" and of Prof. Mosely, "Soviet Policy and National Conflicts."

The economist Naum Jasny analyzed with great learning the problem of the growth of Soviet production during the last 20 years and came to the conclusion that this increase is by no means as great as is indicated by Soviet statistics. It is necessary to know how to read these statistics and to estimate the different values of the ruble not only at different periods of time but also its varying values in the Soviet Union at one and the same time. In all fields of internal production the Soviets assign different values to the ruble, when they procure raw materials from their citizens and when they put these materials on their own or a foreign market.

Wherever the Soviets wish to show a low level of increase, as in the case of military production, the figures of increase are small. They correspond not only to the actual increase but they even reduce it. Expenses for such a purpose may even be hidden under other non-military data. This is an interesting study on the secrets of Soviet economics.

Prof. Mosely points out how the Soviets have studied fundamentally the national questions of those areas in which they are operating and they cleverly use these national conflicts in their own interests, on the principle of Divide and Conquer. It would take too much space to go into details as to all the conflicts and the Soviet solution of them between the Poles and the Czechs, the Poles and Ukrainians, the Hungarians and Rumanians, the Slovaks and the Czechs, the Serbs, Bulgarians and Macedonians, the Germans, Czechs and Poles. In spite of this, he asserts that the Soviets by their radical methods of solving these conflicts, as the violent settlement of millions of people, have produced a clear picture on the nationally mixed territories of Central-Eastern Europe. It is very natural that the Kremlin has used all these changes in international relationships for its own Russian interests with the intention of securing the widest possible support for its policy in this part of the world.

The basic comprehension of these confused national problems of Central Europe possessed by this American professor of an Anglo-Saxon background will surprise every European scholar by their exactness and their solid acquaintance with the subject.

The religious question of the Soviet Union are discussed by Prof. Timasheff and Dvornik. The first deals with the religious questions of the Soviet Union at the present time and the second with the religious questions of central Europe from the point of view of the relations of the church to the state in former times. While the article of Prof. Dvornik is completely objective, the work of Timasheff is written from the standpoint of Russian nationalism and imperialism. The author tries to show the positive religious values of the Russian patriarchal church, even where they do not exist. He even shows a tendency to whitewash the cooperation of the church with the atheistic regime.

The author is familiar with neither the Soviet nor the anti-Soviet literature on the history of the suppression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in western and Carpathian Ukraine and the Rumanian Catholic Church. He passes over with a chance remark the taking of the faith from five million Ukrainians and Rumanians in the most brutal manner and believes that it is not a religious persecution of the Catholic faith but only "a separation of the church of Eastern Galicia and Carpathian Russia" from Rome. He does not mention even in one word the struggle of this Church for its faith or the existence of an underground church about which the Vatican and Ukrainian sources are well informed and he does not believe the information given by the author of "the book concealed under the name of Father George" on the underground Church in Ukraine, the tendencies toward Union with Rome in left bank Ukraine among the Ukrainian Orthodox. The knowledge of this professor of the Catholic Fordham University is surprisingly scanty and his approach is extraordinary.

He also knows nothing of the existence of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in Ukraine and its brutal persecution, on which there exists a large amount of literature. He does not even try to explain the phrases of Patriarch Aleksey on the opposition within the Patriarchal Orthodox Church, or the Self-consecrated or point out to whom he refers . . . It refers to the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church.

Prof. Timasheff has carefully studied the sources on church life under the Soviets and so we cannot help thinking that he has deliberately avoided any reference to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church so as not to mention before the American audience at the symposium or the readers of this book the existence of Ukraine and the struggle of its churches against Russian church imperialism. He even does not call Carpathian Ukraine by its official name but calls it "Carpathian Russia."

The whole work is an important contribution to the scientific literature on the Soviet Union. Prof. Gurian deserves recognition for his organization of such an interesting symposium.

N. CHUBATY

Andrew M. Scott: THE ANATOMY OF COMMUNISM. New York, Philosophical Library, 1951, pp. XIII, 197.

This short volume deserves more attention than it will be apt to receive, for it is a brief, logical and concise study of the basic dogmas of Marxism as modified by Lenin and Stalin. Among the large number of works on Communism, this book stands out as one of the few attempts to analyze exactly what are its basic and fundamental doctrines and to show the fatal fallacies in the entire intellectual setup.

It is not hard for the author to show the artificial and unreal character of the Marxian theory of classes which was created by hypothesis rather than by a study of human history at any period of its existence. It is easy for him to show that Marxism is an unhistorical and anti-historical perversion of Hegelianism with the class will substituted for the ideal of the older philosopher and with man "dissolved from a human being in to his conditions of production." Under such conditions man is but a mirror of the economic forces without a personality, while History is a "ballet in which these great, ghostly categories, (as Capital, Modern Industry, Proletariat, Bourgeoisie, etc.), dance to the dialectical music of the Universe" (p. 8). The joining of the German Hegelian dialectic and French materialism produced a logical monstrosity in which the two elements were juxtaposed but not logically connected.

To this system, Lenin and later Stalin added the idea of the dictator who is the interpreter-creator of the present form. "Theory" follows practice and does not precede it, while the Dictator is by hypothesis the only person who understands Marxism and therefore any criticism of his opinion of Marxism is an arrant corruption of the truth of the doctrine. It is for this reason that both the Right and the Left deviationists, the man who goes less far and the man who goes further than the Dictator are both part of the tools of the anti-Marxians and both deserve annihilation.

Lenin was primarily interested in the acquisition and maintenance of power and the gaps in the Marxian theories made that system his weapon whereby he could do with it what he would to create a pure Totalitarian state and Stalin has only logically continued the process which Lenin began. Even the maneuvers of a Tito are only another application of exactly the same power principles.

Hence granted the Marxian theories, and Lenin's additions together with the explanations of Stalin, the inevitable result is the present Soviet state which by hypothesis can never be an aggressor and which serves to anchor Marxist doctrine to a single country, Russia, while it uses "the horizontal class doctrine to persuade citizens of other nations that they owe their primary allegiance, not to their own 'bourgeois' societies, but to the Soviet Union, the land of the proletariat." (p. 167).

The author does not discuss the question how far and when the Russian view of government and the Russian mode of thinking entered into this complex of the ideas of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. That question is outside of the task which the author has set himself, since he is trying merely to present the dogmatics of Communism without studying the personality of the Dictator. It is of supreme importance for the full evaluation of Communism and the Communist ideas but its omission in a book like this does not vitiate the argument which is a discussion of the results of the thinking of the Communist leaders rather than a study of the specific influences that have worked upon them.

The careful reader of this volume will become aware of the total menace of Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism. He will see the inevitable train of events, the logical sequence of thought, and that is the main problem to which the world needs to awake. The volume shows the utter incompatibility of Communism and democracy and sweeps aside all of those naive thinkers who are hoping for the joint existence of the two systems of life and thought. That is the strength of the book as a study of ideas and dogmas, the field in which most critics of Communism have been the weakest. That is why this book should be read and studied and why it has filled a real gap in the intellectual armament of the free and anti-Communist world.

CLARENCE A. MANNING.

RUSSIAN EPIC STUDIES. Edited by Roman Jakobson and Ernest J. Simmons. American Folklore Society, Philadelphia, 1949.

This volume contains eight articles by various authors on *The Tale of Prince Ihor's Campaign* or on subjects related to it. The longest of the articles is "*The Vseslav Epos*" by Roman J. Jakobson of Harvard University and Marc Szeftel of Cornell University. The authors indicate the striking similarities in the account in the Primary Chronicle, the digression in *Ihor's Tale* and the *bylina* about the Prince-werewolf. They hold that the most plausible supposition would be that all three narratives go back directly to one common source, presumably to an oral Vseslav epos, which arose from the immediate impression his adventures made on the imagination of his contemporaries. The conclusions are convincing, and thus serve to explain why the author of the *Tale* made such an unexpected digression on the subject of Prince Vseslav which seems out of place in the general composition of the poem. Besides they throw an explanatory light on the difficult passage in the original text of the *Tale* about the "second body" which has puzzled all the editors of the *Tale* till now.

"Classical Influence on the Slovo" is the subject of an article by Clarence A. Manning of Columbia University. The author points out the similarities of certain passages of the *Tale*, to Homer's *Iliad*, particularly in the epithets. There can be found also distant comparisons with Aeschylus and Euripides, and the pagan gods of the *Tale* are represented in a manner similar to the traditions of classical Greek and Roman mythology. Manning concludes that it is fairly certain that the author was familiar with all the writings of the Byzantine period that had been translated, as well with much of the classical literature as it was preserved and distributed in Kiev. However, it is extremely difficult to state with any degree of certainty the total extent of his knowledge.

Margaret Schlauch writes about the "Scandinavian Influence on the Slovo?" The author finds the previous works on this subject (Abicht, Hoffmann and Sievers) very unconvincing in their results. There are undoubtedly many passages similar to the Old-Norse epic models, especially the Edda, but these parallels are common motifs of the chivalrous poetry. Also similar tautological phrases, sentences, repetitions, refrains, metamorphic comparisons etc. can be found here, but no direct influence be traced. The author mentions also that any rhythmic influence of the Norse poetry on the *Tale* has been already disproved by M. P. Shtokman. (Shtokman in 1941 maintained that "we do not have a single indication that the Slovo was created in connection with any kind of melody;" this is, however, not true, as

there are at least fragments of the poem which have a rhythm taken directly from the Ukrainian folk poetry).

In the fourth article Dmitry Cizevsky of Harvard University writes on "Alliteration in Ancient Russian Literature." He shows that the Chronicle has many passages with all the characteristics of alliteration. This can not be denied but the conclusions seem to be unconvincing when the author mentions as an analogy the alliteration of the old German and Celtic poetry, various Umbrian, Frisian and Latin sources, and the Latvian folklore. Why not search for analogies closer — namely where the *Tale* and the chronicles were created? It is sufficient to quote a simple passage of the *Tale*: "v pyak' potoptasha pohanyya polky polovetskyya l... po polu pomchasha..." (instrumented on "p") and compare it with a form of folk magical incantations (which are known as the oldest form of poetry), for example: "v panske piryi perevyvaty i v panski potrukhy sy vpykhaty..." (Shukhevych, III). It is clear that both forms originated within the frame of the same language and its rules of pronunciation, and that there is no need to emphasize Latvian folklore or any other material as possible sources of alliteration in the literature contemporary to the *Tale*.

Henri Gregoire is inside his sphere as a Byzantinologist when he writes in French about "Le Digenis russe." In opposition to Andre Mazon, he points out the importance of this manuscript which was lost together with the *Tale*. Gregoire's article has no direct connection with the *Tale* but it throws a light on a literary work contemporary with our poem.

Manfred Kridl of Columbia University characterizes the "First Polish Translation of the Slovo" made by Cyprian Godebski in 1806, and Andre von Gronicka, also of Columbia, publishes the text of the first complete translation of the *Tale* by Rainer Maria Rilke, made in 1902-1904. In his translation Rilke introduced the principle of alliteration ("Vom Zuge Igors zu erzahlen") so characteristic of old German poetry. The translation of the great German poet is interesting not so much as a more or less accurate rendition of a foreign text but as a work of a master of German language.

The last article is by Avrahm Yarmolinsky of the New York Public Library. He points out that the interest of the English speaking world in the *Tale* was aroused relatively late, with the first incidental mention in 1824 and the first complete translation by Leo Wiener in 1902. The author considers all the translations into English made till now, and finds that so far there is not yet an ideal one, although such translations as Cross's are quite good.

This book gives much valuable material, although not all of it is directly related to the *Tale* itself. But why include "the Slovo" in "Ancient Russian Literature," why deny Ukrainians the right to call the *Tale* a monument of Ukrainian literature when no one can deny that the poem was created on Ukrainian territory by an Ukrainian author treating Ukrainian topics? The Ukrainian scholars long ago stressed the fact that the names *ruskyj*, *rusych* of the *Tale*, and *rusyn* of the chronicle can be translated only as *Ruthenian* (this is old-Ukrainian), and not *Russian*, because both nominative forms do not exist at all in the Russian language. In commenting on the term "Rus" Leonard A. Magnus, the author of the first British translation of the *Tale* (1915), carefully explained the significance of this name which "was at first applied to the Kiev district, not to Suzdal, Novgorod, or

other outlying dependencies and colonies," and he stressed the fact that only "in the reign of Alexis (1654-1670) the modern name *Rossiya* first came into use, being modelled on the Greek form." Now many Western authors do not even take this problem into consideration as they mechanically repeat the unscientific views of Russian science.

S. HORDYNSKY

A CORRECTION

In the previous issue of the *UQ* (Vol. VII, No. 4, page 366) a distorted sentence of Msgr. Fulton J. Sheen was printed: "The Russians, who, though presently delayed in the totalitarian drive of Communism, are nevertheless on the way to that Communism (should be: Communionism) where Christ is the brother of all men..."

RUSSIA'S SOVIET ECONOMY. By Harry Schwartz. New York. Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1951, 592 pp.

This skilful discussion of the structure, operation and functional performance of the economy of the Soviet Union may be justly regarded as a solid contribution of painstaking scholarship in the realm of applied economic analysis. Its outstanding feature is the neat, systematic arrangement of the voluminous data incorporated in the empirico-analytic treatment that the author succeeds with such remarkable cogency and clarity of exposition to provide for the instructive benefit of even the general reader. His dispassionate use of these data in a cool, temperate approach with a very satisfactory level of objectivity is also impressive. Certainly for one who has not kept abreast with the many socio-economic analyses that have appeared in the past twenty years on this subject, this volume is real and comprehensive summation of the developments that have taken place in the major spheres of Soviet economy. For the more conversant body of students and observers its superb organization of material and its reasoned analyses grounded in the determining elements of significant situations afford those refreshing insights and new perspectives which always result from a competent study pursued from the reassuring vantage point of accumulated knowledge.

The subject matter covered is extensive and interesting for it includes such inter-related topics as natural resources, the historical background of Soviet society, ideology, composite Soviet economic development, the determination of the integral parts of the general economic plan, and a concise investigation of each of these sectors of the Soviet economy covering the broad range of industrial and agricultural organization, the financial system, foreign economic relations, production and trade, transportation and communication, and the forced labor system. In a general way much of the data presented for these various areas of Soviet economy are quite familiar to students of the subject. The same problem in the accurate statistical determination of factors at work is posed by the glaring lack of available data on production, real earnings etc. This invites a good deal of "guesstimal activity" on the part of disinterested students as well as grossly misrepresented Soviet claims of economic achievements, as in the case of the supposedly marked increases in real earning power over the past twenty-three years. The figures on population distribution are derived from the 1939 Soviet census with scarcely minimal allowance made for conservative projections based on known growth trends in the several

republics during the thirties. Contrary to the Russian majority indicated in the census, reasonable extrapolations made from these bases by our governmental demographers show a non-Russian majority of approximately 110.5 million in a population currently estimated at about 202 million. With the mass deportations from Central Europe a further augmentation of this non-Russian majority can be expected.

In depicting the resources and the helpful informative maps the author furnishes a constructive account of the physical distribution of vital mineral deposits which to a large degree are in the broad non-Russian periphery of the Soviet Union. The coal from the Donets basin in Ukraine, petroleum from Azerbaijan and western Kazakhstan, manganese in Georgia and at Nikopol in Ukraine, copper in Kazakhstan etc. are economic assets that have influenced the historical course of Eastern Europe and the central Asiatic region of which the author, despite his concern with the historical and ideological backgrounds of Russia, appears to be little conscious—at least in this work. The only tenable ground for the title of the book itself is the strong connotation of empire and traditional Russian imperialism which in this respect manifests itself as extreme economic colonialism. This dominant historical force is virtually ignored to the manifold disadvantage of the reader.

Terms as "the basic Russian people" become nonsensical when related to the actual histories of the respective peoples in East Europe, and cause regrettable confusion in any historical account of the economic institutions that have evolved in this area of the world. The widespread feudalistic condition of economic bondage which has characterized most of Russia's history cannot be loosely applied to the propensities and habits of the Ukrainian, Georgian and other peoples the individual histories of which have been in parts blighted by the dark institutions imposed upon them. A keener awareness of this and preceding points would have enabled Dr. Schwartz to perceive the larger socio-economic significance of his statement "'Let us starve but export', the slogan of Finance Minister Vyshnegradsky almost 50 years before Stalin let Ukrainians starve while shipping grain abroad to pay for American farm machinery."

The chapter on Marxism is interesting and compactly organized, but the informed student cannot but entertain certain serious doubts as to several oversimplifications on the current pertinency of Marxist ideology to the totalitarian Soviet system in which collectivization has been reduced to a mere instrument of terroristic political control adapted to the undisguised advantage of a huge imperialist enterprise. The crucial economic problem of the optimal allocation of resources among alternative ends receives serious consideration in the instructive discussion of the National Economic Plan which only serves to affirm the arbitrary nature of investment activity in an unfree system. Numerous other generalizations arrived at in this work lend further support to many theoretical observations in earlier works written with far less available information, especially that related to the tremendous and incalculable cost in lives and treasure to achieve the dubious economic progress paved by the successive plans of the Kremlin. Notwithstanding this, Dr. Schwartz's book deepens the theoretical insights that one may have into the factory-like operation of the Soviet system.

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY
Georgetown University

DANCE OF DEATH. By Erich Kern. Translated by Paul Findlay. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1951 Pp. 255. \$3.00.

Erich Kern, a former Nazi Storm Trooper and journalist attached to a German combat unit on the Eastern front, survived to write this excellent book about the German campaign in Ukraine. This German campaign was characterized by unbelievable stupidity on the part of the German High Command and the entire Nazi government, which though militarily victorious, failed to understand the hopes of the enslaved people of the USSR and ultimately lost the war in the East.

In many ways the *Dance of Death* is an extraordinary book; it certainly has far more to offer to the discerning reader than the somewhat lucid title would suggest. It is a serious work by a man who was and is today (as his publishers intimate) a staunch and loyal Nazi. A journalist by profession, he became a Nazi Storm Trooper and took part in the Nazi *blitzkrieg* campaigns in Yugoslavia and Greece. He served in the *inferno* of the Eastern front, passed through the whole of Ukraine, reached the gates of Stalingrad, and barely escaped with the remnants of the once proud *Wehrmacht* to be interned by the U. S. military authorities in Austria.

The importance of Kern's book is derived from his personal experience. He offers a frank and candid description of the German campaign against the Soviet Union from the viewpoint of a disciplined Nazi officer who reported not only what he saw on the fighting line, but also what was going on behind the German lines.

His remarks on the official Nazi policy with respect to the conquered peoples, especially those whom he met at the Nazi-Soviet front moved eastward, such as the Ukrainians, are revealing and of the utmost significance. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Georgians and others, he writes, who joyously welcomed the invading troops in the hope that they would bring liberation, were soon bitterly disillusioned. Between the Gestapo and the NKVD, they found, there was little difference. Instead of capitalizing upon these sorely dissatisfied peoples, the Nazi administration took the view that they were expendable members of an inferior race, marked for extermination by the Nazi totalitarian regime.

Although Kern himself approved fully of Germany's war objectives, nevertheless he grew progressively disillusioned at the methods used to attain these objectives.

In Chapter Five, which he appropriately termed "Squandered Chance," Kern writes about the greatest opportunity which Hitler ever had and lost by failing to support the Ukrainians in their quest for freedom and independence. He attacks the *gauleiter* of Ukraine, Erich Koch, for his policy of economic exploitation and political persecution in Ukraine. Kern lists two cardinal "sins" which the Nazis committed with respect to the Ukrainians and other peoples of the USSR: they failed to keep their promise to dissolve the collective farms and they forgot their promise of "political liberation" as soon as the Bolshevik troops were pushed to the East.

In point of fact, writes Kern, the Nazi administration experimented with the collective farms with a view of improving their productivity. On pages 103-104, Kern continues:

"... This was all very well for the immediate welfare of the German people, but it did immense harm to our cause in the Ukraine. The Germans, too, had made

a promise and not kept it—just like the Bolsheviks. The steady flow of Ukrainian volunteers for the German forces was ignored. True, a division here and there accepted volunteers at their own discretion but then only as auxiliaries for fatigue duties on supply or as kitchen orderlies. And even then they served with no legal rights or status of any kind or description and on conditions entirely dependent on the mood or understanding of the individual unit commanders.

"I became sick and tired of thinking about it. Until one day the truth dawned, and I realized that Hitler's Germany was not going to grasp the great opportunity it had been given in the East. The theory of the subhuman races was too strong and was triumphing over all the commands of reason and destiny. We were not prepared to grant the enslaved and tormented peoples the freedom and equality they deserved. We were refusing to recognize them as partners and barely condescending to accept them as auxiliaries. *The millions of Ukrainians, who by themselves could have turned the scales in the East, were not only being left unused, but were actually being repulsed and disillusioned.*" (Italics ours. W. D.).

Kern declares that the granting of independence to the non-Russian peoples would have created a powerful incentive among them to fight the despicable regime of Stalin. But, instead, "police methods were replacing the great and splendid idea of the liberation of the East. In place of national independence and freedom, the bit was being drawn tighter." As a consequence, the terrific German setback on the Eastern Front was principally due to the ignorance of the German government of the prevailing conditions in the Soviet Union.

"*Practically all the planning which was based on what we knew of the intellectual, economic and military conditions in the Soviet Union was wrong, because the data from which we had started were wrong.*" (Italics ours. W. D.).

Whatever information on the Soviet Union the Germans possessed came from the White Russian refugees, Kern writes. "... Their knowledge of their home country is not only conditioned by their personal feelings, but what is more serious, out of date. Not only is the White Russian ignorant of the Russia of today, but he even tends to paint a wholly imaginary picture of it, born of his own wishful thinking."

This frank confession of a Nazi writer that his government was misled to a greater or lesser degree by "Russian experts" in Berlin merits serious consideration. It is an open secret that the Soviet espionage agents infiltrated the Nazi "Russian departments" with a great deal of success. Not only were they to be found in Alfred Rosenberg's *Ost-Ministerium* as "advisers" and "experts" (always posing as Great Russian anti-Bolshevik patriots), but they succeeded in infiltrating the supreme staff of General Vlassov, where they exerted an influence of prime importance, and finally succeeded in rendering the Vlassov army wholly impotent. During the last days of Nazi Germany the Vlassov army was in Czechoslovakia, where the Soviet agents inspired a part of it to "revolt" against Vlassov and persuaded the remainder to surrender to the Soviet troops).

Another significant element of Mr. Kern's book is his ability to grasp Bolshevism for what it is. Stalin, he writes, had succeeded in unifying two spiritual forces rampant in the Russian people: Russian nationalism and Bolshevism, "which brought into being the deadliest of all dangers for the whole of the non-communist world." "Mother Russia" was beautifully blended into a communist "Stalinist Mil-lenium." The combination of these two forces, he suggests, is undeniable.

Other chapters of Kern's book are devoted to the fighting in the Caucasus, and the retreat of the Viking Division all the way from the Don to Australia. Significantly, Kern reports that after the bitter lessons learned by the Nazis in Ukraine, the Germans treated the Caucasian peoples considerably better, trying to win them over and to induce them to fight against Moscow. But by this time it was too late.

Kern writes also of his assignment to the SS Galicia Division, a Ukrainian division consisting of 30,000 young men, composed primarily of Ukrainians from Western Ukraine and Carpatho-Ukraine, which was thrown against the Soviet troops near the town of Brody, where it suffered heavy losses and retreated to Austria. He also mentions that behind the German lines there were Ukrainian "irregulars" (UPA), who fought against both the Germans and the Russians for their own freedom and independence.

All in all, *Dance of Death* can be considered as a warning coming from a totalitarian on how not to "solve the Russian problem," even if such a "solution" is offered by anti-Stalinist Russian "experts" and "advisers." The book merits the attention of not only our policy-making department personnel, but all those others who are seriously preoccupied with the threat to mankind emanating from Moscow.

WALTER DUSHNYCK

BRODY, A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES AND SKETCHES, edited by Oles Lysyak, Munich, 1951, pp. 164 (in Ukrainian).

This is a volume to commemorate the history of the Halychyna Division and the editor has entitled his introduction, "A struggle without acclaim". The Halychyna division had no acclaim, when it was organized during the German occupation to fight against the Bolsheviks, for it was not popular in Western Ukraine. It had no acclaim when it won its heroic battle against the Bolsheviks at Brody, whence the name of the book, although this action was one of the most heroic actions of any army against that foe of humanity — the red Kremlin. Before the capitulation of Germany the Halychyna division had left its undesired ally and had joined the Allies under the name of the "First Division of the Ukrainian National Army." It had no acclaim for anti-Bolshevik activity when it passed into allied captivity. Several years had to pass before the Western world understood its ally Stalin and comprehended better why and against what this unit of the Ukrainian Army in German uniforms had been organized. The world now understands that under these green uniforms was hidden an army allied to Western democracy and now six years after the war, it has been rehabilitated and given back its standing as an allied force. The volume *Brody* will help the historian of Eastern Europe to give to this army its well-deserved acclaim as a fighter against the Communist tyranny and as an army of liberation.

N. C.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

by L. E. D.

"THE GREAT LIQUIDATION: SATELLITE CULTURE," by Michael Padev. The *New York Times Magazine*, February 10, 1952, New York, N. Y.

"The same sordid pattern of barbarically contrived events" is the only reaction possible to this remarkable article by those familiar with what has been transpiring in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union over the past twenty years. Savage Russification and national genocide are now taking their heavy toll on the captive non-Russian nations in Central Europe under the guise of "world communism." To illustrate his unchallengeable thesis, the writer cites several clinching examples of Russian rule over the occupied region of Central Europe, although countless more can be readily mentioned. As he puts it, "They make every effort to blunt the sense of national history of the peoples under their rule, and try even to change their spoken and written language." In short, a further degradation of a higher civilization than what has historically characterized Russia itself.

The greatest Polish poet and national hero, Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855), is now portrayed under auspices of Soviet distortion as an admirer of imperialist Russia, although true history records him as a nationalist who fought this perennial menace all his life. How strikingly similar this is to the misrepresentation of Taras Shevchenko in Ukraine, a technique that is now employed even by imperialist Great Russians in the United States! In Bulgaria the national lingual structure is being disfigured with Russian words. The writer mentions, too, the report in Pravda of November 25, 1951 in which the Ukrainian writers' union is upbraided for using "nationalist words" instead of their Russian counterparts in an attempt to "wrench the Ukrainian language away from the Russian language." Communist artists themselves, like Alexander Jendov and Kolyu Kolev in Bulgaria—the first has been arrested, the other has committed suicide,—are now witnessing the true character of "world communism." The author is perfectly correct that we in the United States must meet the task of preserving the national traditions and culture of the captive non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Empire.

"RUSSIANISM AND COMMUNISM," an editorial. The *Los Angeles Times*, February 29, 1952, Los Angeles, California.

It is refreshing to observe the increasing awareness of our people to the mortal threat of Russian imperialism with its complement of communist weapons. Following in line with Mr. Acheson's historic testimony on traditional Russian imperialism last year, the editors of this important paper submit a constructive criticism of remarks made by Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas on the real enemy. They agree that it is traditional Russian imperialism, "an imperialism which carries on from where the Czars, starting with Peter the Great, left off," but they question

the implication of a complete separation between this and communism. As they accurately present it, "they are parts of each other—one is the conqueror; the other is his sword," just as pan-Slavism and Orthodoxy served as swords in the earlier phases of traditional Russian imperialism.

"REALISM IN SLAVIC AND EUROPEAN HISTORY," by Oscar Halecki. *The American and East European Review*, Vol. XI, 1952, New York.

Shifting to the field of historical scholarship the subject about which a political controversy flared up in the pages of the *New York Times* last summer concerning Mr. Acheson's unforgettable statement and the position taken by the editors of this paper, this well known Polish historian at Fordham University fully supports the views of our Secretary of State on 500 years of Russian imperialism. In his authoritative opinion there is no difference between the Tsarist form and the Soviet regarding the final goal of world domination. Agreeing with Mr. Acheson, he discerns differences only in the methods employed." Communism became established in Russia not by accident but because there was in that country not only receptive ground, but in particular an age-long tradition of expansion through aggressive imperialism." His treatment concerning the basic differences between the Muscovites and Ukrainians in culture and spirituality as well as other pertinent subjects is worthy of most careful thought and consideration.

"THEY'RE STICKING STALIN WITH A PITCHFORK," by Robert Shaplen. *Collier's*, February 23, 1952, New York.

Surely if anyone has been stuck with a pitchfork, it is the editors of this magazine. The inflated hoax of a Russian underground conducted by the N. T. S., a conglomeration of former Nazi collaborationists, receives further cheap publicity in this sensational article of shameless contradiction of known facts. The uninformed status of the average American reader of this periodical is heavily capitalized by the mass of untruths embodied in this latest edition of human fantasy. He is told, for instance, of the momentous creation last year of "a single anti-Soviet front, the Council for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia." The blunt fact is that the minority of Russian groups themselves failed to unite in this amateur enterprise. He is told, also, that the high-sounding NTS "molecular system" of underground operations is in full swing. The fact is that this analogic subterfuge for a non-existent underground has become a standard joke on the psychological fission of imaginary characters whizzing in the minds of the N.T.S. scenario writers. Only the super-mysterious "T. himself knows the exact whereabouts of all these 'molecules'." For anyone familiar with Slavonic names, even the fable about the editor of *Possev*, Dr. Eugen Romanov, "a thirty-seven-year-old Ukrainian," is indecently crammed down the undigestive tract of the reader. Whether Soviet or anti-Soviet, Russian propaganda is undoubtedly unitary in molecular substance.

"WORLD WAR III, RUSSIAN STYLE, IS HERE," *U. S. News and World Report*, November 2, 1951, Washington, D. C.

Describing in a succinct way the strategy of modern Russian imperialism and its cheap victories in the recent period, this well-written editorial assumes a perspective that is gaining ground in many thinking circles of the country. For one,

as it perceives the true enemy, "Russian strategy is that of a modern imperialism." discordant nationalities that make up Russia." It is evident that the terms used Also, as it well recognizes, "There is no single language no common bond for discordant nationalities that make up Russia." It is evident that the terms are confusing since the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union can scarcely be construed as parts of "Russia." But in a later passage a more accurate usage is employed where the editors state that "The degree of unhappiness and discontent within the Russian empire is pictured as more intense than in any other part of the world."

"THE 'COUNTER-REVOLUTION' IN RUSSIA," by Sir David Kelly. *The New York Times Magazine*, December 23, 1951, New York.

Written by a British diplomat who served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1949 to September, 1951, this article reflects a keen power of observation and a sound understanding of ethnic Russia and its people. The writer's general thesis, which empirically is well supported, is that the ideals of socialism or communism are without real and concrete meaning in this center of supposed world communism. Concerning the international ideal, the "only true internationalist in every country is he who gives priority of interest to the Soviet Union. Peter the Great and Marshal Suvorov are national heroes, Russian and world history is being rewritten in the interests of Russian (not Ukrainian or Caucasian) nationalism, and the origin of an astounding list of modern inventions, from railways to tanks and airplanes, is claimed for Russian scientists." The Red Tsar, on this score of wholesale distortion of history—chiefly non-Russian histories—has a long tradition of Russian political behavior to freely draw up on.

As to morals, the family, Orthodoxy for the masses, the abandonment of the principle of social equality, despotic statism, the hierarchy of graded privilege, and dedication to the sacred Doctrine on the inevitable downfall of the West, the writer convincingly shows the hollowness of the communist dream. The verbalisms of Marxist socialism now serve as the trappings of traditional Russian imperialism. Striking above all is the realistic emphasis he places on his observation that "*One thing we must not count on the wishful thought that the Russian people are seething with discontent against the regime... my personal opinion is that the majority of Russians are 'sold' on the regime, are proud of it, and are content with the officially encouraged public criticism of individual factory managers and lower officials.*" Of course it is not to be inferred that a psychological campaign toward creating defection in Russia should be minimized, but where relatively scarce resources are available, it stands to reason that a distribution of effort be adjusted toward magnifying the existing weaknesses in the Soviet Empire, notably in the non-Russian areas.

"THE UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE HISTORY OF EASTERN EUROPE," by Nicholas Chubaty. *Proceedings of the Historical-Philosophical Section*, Vol. 1, Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1951.

This lucidly written scientific paper by a prominent historian on Ukraine represents an excellent exposition of the objectively determined Ukrainian conception of the history of Eastern Europe, which is shared by all Ukrainian historians,

Byelorussian scholars and a minority of impartial Russian scholars, as against the politically shaded Russian imperialist conception. Concrete factual arguments are offered to support the continuity and substantial independence of Ukrainian historical development from the 9th century, in the form of Kievan Rus, to the present, a position accepted with intellectual objectivity and integrity during the period of idealist communism by the leading Bolshevik historical school under the famous Russian historian, Mikhaylo Pokrovsky. With the advent of official Great Russian chauvinism in 1930, Pokrovsky and his followers were censured and their works in historical research abolished. The resurgence of controlled historical thought ensued under the authoritative guidance of that omniscient thinker, Joseph Stalin, to justify verbally the mythical historical unity of the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian nations. The author portrays vividly the theoretic makeshifts undertaken by state-controlled Russian historical research in the course of the predatory construction of the empire. It is a superlative account worthy of careful examination on the part of disinterested American historians.

"THE MYSTERY OF MRS. ROOSEVELT," current comment. *America*, National Catholic Weekly Review, January 12, 1952, New York.

Mrs. Roosevelt's Pollyanna approach to world problems is properly scored in this forthright account of her inane comments concerning Soviet genocide. Her baseless attitude toward this horrible phenomenon was expressed last December 30 in this fashion: "How could you prove it? I'm not sure you can prove that." In effect, our delegate to the U. N. desires a ringside seat in Stalin's arena of Soviet national genocide. Overwhelming evidence exists with our government, yet she demands further proof. As quoted from the West German 'Mindener Tageblatt' of November 13: "Without cessation the Lithuanians and Poles are being shipped into the interior of Russia." It is becoming evident that two reasons explain Mrs. Roosevelt's fantastic position, which is shared also by the State Department. One, an inability to understand that mass deportations into slow-death camps is the current medium of Soviet national genocide. Second, an obsessive attempt to put over her pet Human Rights project in the U. N. as a vain substitute for the Genocide Convention, which in itself is inane. For where humans are being steadily liquidated, the exercise of rights can scarcely be expected.

"PURGES, PROPAGANDA AND CONTROL." *News from behind the Iron Curtain*, January 1952, New York.

As the first issue of a new publication sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe, this additional source on current events in the so-called satellite region of the Soviet Russian Empire is beyond peradventure a most valuable one. From actual newspaper accounts, events on Soviet Russian oppression in all its varied forms are clearly presented, covering purges, anti-West propaganda, resistance etc. Most interesting in this initial issue is the violent Soviet reaction to the famous Kersten amendment to the Mutual Security Act.

"THE SLAVE EMPIRE WITHIN THE SOVIET EMPIRE," by David J. Dallin. *The New York Times*, October 14, 1951.

Loyal to the propaganda line of "Eternal Russia" and its everlasting hegemony over the non-Russian nations, this once reliable writer has so compromised

himself intellectually that what has become of pertinent interest to many observers it not so much what he has to say as how he says it. Groundless apologies, omissions and distortions have become his main stock in literary trade. For instance, we are told, "It is wrong to suppose that Soviet forced labor is in any sense a product of the Russian character and therefore an inevitable feature of any Russian state system." Surely the author must know that even the average high school student is aware of the traditional Russian political institution of Siberian exile. Interesting also is the writer's purposeful neglect to mention Ukraine or Ukrainians in instances where, as in the case of the government-sponsored famine in the early 30's, it is most relevant historically.

"OUR ENEMY IS NOT THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE," "THE 'UKRAINIAN ARMY' MYTH," and "EUROPE AFTER STALIN FALLS," by David J. Dallin. *The New Leader*, November 26, December 3 and 17, 1951, New York.

In this series of three articles further substantial evidence is provided to prove the existence of the Russian imperialist mania that paralyzes the thinking powers of this acutely chauvinist writer. The first plays on the ludicrous theme that anyone seeking the liberation and sovereign freedom of the enslaved non-Russian nations imprisoned in the Soviet Union or scientifically assessing the present capacity of the Russian people to attain to democracy is per se an enemy of the Russian people. There is even a glimmer of thought control in this typical Great Russian production. The obsession of the writer with the Empire interests of a minority of the Russian people is further gleaned from his misinterpretations of certain events and self-revealing implications of statement. As everyone knows, last year the Congress declared its friendship for all the peoples of the Soviet Union and not merely for the Russian people. Furthermore, in what lights of reason is it inconsistent for us to express friendship for the Russian people as well and to seek the liberation of the non-Russian peoples, unless an unstated premise exists that the former is imperialistically bent? In Mr. Dallin this is obvious for the Soviet Union to him is "Russia."

The second article in this medium of Great Russianism is truly a literary peach. As one officer in the Pentagon put it, "Dallin is becoming as omniscient as Stalin, an authority in all temporal and, perhaps soon, divine matters." His virtual identification of the UPA and the Bandera group is adequate to indicate the depth of his authority, and his virtuous distaste for terrorism scarcely qualifies him to treat some recent facts on UPA activity which, contrary to his wishful hopes, demonstrate that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is very much alive, struggling for the freedom and independence of its homeland.

This last article really caps them all in its spirit of intellectual erraticism and confusion. The bogey of an imperialist Germany after Stalin falls is conjured up to justify the retention of the Russian Empire as a sort of balance of power. Need more be said about the vision and judgment of this writer?



