


*The*  
UKRAINIAN  
QUARTERLY



Vol. X.—Number 3

Summer, 1954

**CARPATHO - UKRAINE'S STRUGGLE**

## *National Eucharistic Marian Congress of Oriental Rites*

At Philadelphia on October 22, 23, 24, 1954 a National Eucharistic Marian Congress of Oriental Rites will be sponsored by the Ukrainian Catholic Exarchate of Byzantine Rite under the guidance of Their Excellencies Most Reverend Constantine Bohachevsky, D.D., Exarch of the Ukrainian Catholic Diocese of the United States of America and Most Reverend Ambrose Senyshyn, OSBM, Auxiliary Bishop and Vicar General of the Exarchate.

The coming Congress is unique in that the participants will be the faithful of the Oriental Rites who are citizens of the United States including Armenians, Chaldeans, Maronites, and Byzantines—the latter including such nationalities as Melchites, Russians, Rumanians and Ukrainians (Ruthenians)—as well as Latin Rite faithful.

The program of the Congress includes Pontifical Divine Liturgies, Divine Liturgies of all Rites, Children's Divine Liturgy; Sermons by Cardinals, by the Apostolic Delegate to the United States, Most Reverend Amleto G. Cicognani, D.D., Archbishops, and Bishops; Devotions, Sacred Concerts, Processions, Exhibits; reception of the Sacraments.

The places where the Congress will take place are (1) Convention Hall, (2) SS. Peter and Paul Cathedral (Latin Rite), and (3) Immaculate Conception Cathedral (Byzantine Slavonic Rite) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Honorary Host to the Congress is His Excellency Most Reverend John F. O'Hara, C.S.C., Archbishop of Philadelphia. The Host is Bishop Bohachevsky. The Chairman is Bishop Senyshyn.

*Picture on the Cover: MSGR. DR. AUGUSTIN VOLOSHYN, (1878-1945), the first President of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic. Died in Soviet prison in Stanslaviv, Western Ukraine.*

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# THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

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VOL. X. — NUMBER 3.



Ukrainian ethnographic territory

Boundaries of Soviet republics and districts

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SUMMER 1954

\$ 1.25 A COPY

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Published by UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

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*Subscription:* Yearly \$ 5.00; Single Copy \$ 1.25  
*Checks payable to:* UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

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*Editorial and Managing Office:* THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY  
302-304 West 13th Street, New York 14, N. Y.  
*Tel.:* WAtkins 4-5618

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## THE SOVIET CROSSING OF THE CARPATHIANS

*Editorial*

Thirty five years have passed since there appeared in international diplomacy a new political unit, *Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia*, which on the basis of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye entered the Czechoslovak state as an autonomous province. The fact that this part of Ukraine (for Ruthenia was the ancient medieval name of Ukraine) at the time when the American doctrine of self-determination of peoples appeared, at the same time entered the alien body of the Czechoslovak Republic and not a Ukrainian State, as the population desired, shows how soon violence was done to this American doctrine. Another example was the failure to apply it to the neighboring part of Ukraine north of the Carpathians, Western Ukraine — and also to Eastern Ukraine.

The first bad results of this failure appeared openly in the beginning of 1939, when the Czechoslovak Republic was liquidated, Czechia was turned into a Protectorate of the Reich, Slovakia proclaimed its independence and the little Carpatho-Ukraine, left to its own fate, was destined to become the nucleus of an independent Ukraine by announcing its own independence on March 15, 1939. At the very time when the armored forces of Hitler entered without a shot into Prague, the capital of the Czech Protectorate of the Reich, the Carpatho-Ukrainians with arms in their hands resisted the attack of Hitler's ally, the Hungarian regiments of Admiral Horthy. Several thousand Carpatho-Ukrainian mountaineers laid down their lives in defense of the independence of Ukraine and were the first to fall from the Western world in the struggle against Nazism.

What happened in Central Europe in the next fifteen years? It was not Hitler who dictated his terms to the states of Central Europe, not the Hungarian forces of Horthy who in 1939 were on the summits of the Carpathians. The central Carpathians and the plains of central Europe are now behind the iron curtain under the orders of Moscow.

When forty years ago in August, 1914 at the beginning of World War I, the millions of the army of tsarist Russia occupied Western Ukraine, then a part of Austria-Hungary, in September they had to halt before the almost impregnable barrier of the Carpathians. From September, 1914 to March, 1915, the millions of the attacking Rus-

sians, coming from the north, tried without success to break through the Carpathian rampart. A million and a half of Russian dead lay in the Carpathian forests and wastes. The relatively weak Austrian forces including a Ukrainian Legion as a nucleus for a Ukrainian national army, succeeded in stopping the millions of the men in the tsarist divisions. The Carpathians guarded the Hungarian plain and the neighboring lowlands of Central Europe from the Russian threat from the north. The world understood then the strategical importance of the Carpathians for the East European colossus; in control of the Carpathians, was an open road not only to Budapest but also to Vienna and Trieste.

What the tsarist government could not accomplish, the red regime of Russia brought about by the clever use of its own policy and profited by the unsolved national problems in that part of Europe. Although modern methods and modern arms have changed, the strength of the natural barriers as the Carpathians has not been altered.

On the eve of the Yalta Conference (in February, 1945) the American State Department made some basic studies for a new boundary between Poland and the USSR. There were several American outlines but not one of them took into account the final factor — the national character of this border region. The American plans paid attention only to the strategic reasons for not extending the boundaries of the USSR to the central Carpathians with a complete disregard for the national relationships of this region.

On the other hand the Bolsheviks at the time of the Yalta Conference emphasized only the national reasons, "the need to unite the Western Ukrainians with their ancient fatherland Ukraine." They won. The Kremlin regiments reached the summits of the Carpathians and Western Ukraine became a part of Soviet Ukraine.

The strategic object of the Soviets to secure control of the central Carpathians, skilfully masked behind the phrases of liberating their brother Ukrainians, was still not fully achieved. This could come about only by the union of the small and almost unknown Carpatho-Ukraine with the USSR. The extension of the Soviet boundaries south of the Carpathians gave the Soviets the opportunity without great difficulty of dominating the Danubian plain and the whole of Central Europe.

Only five months after the Yalta Agreement on June 29, 1945, the Soviet government, represented by Molotov, concluded with the democratic government of Czechoslovakia, represented by Premier Fierlinger, an agreement for the transfer of Carpatho-Ukraine to the USSR. To emphasize the character of national liberation of this agreement it was written in Russian, Ukrainian and Slovak (and not Czech).



An important feature is the expression of the need of the change of the political frontiers between the USSR and Czechoslovakia. It is as follows:

Article I. — The Transcarpathian Ukraine (according to the the Czechoslovak Constitution called Subcarpathian Rus), which on the basis of the Treaty of September 10, 1919, concluded in St. Germain-en-Laye, became an autonomous unit within the Czechoslovak Republic, *is reunited in accordance with the desire manifested by the population of the Transcarpathian Ukraine* and on the basis of the friendly agreement of both the High Contracting Parties, *with its ancient mother country, Ukraine, and is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.*

In these democratic times what can be a stronger argument than the will of the population to be united with their old mother land Ukraine? All other arguments of the anti-Bolshevik world had to fade and to speak only against the democracy of their authors. This was the attitude of Molotov as against Fierlinger, even though Molotov was known among all the Bolshevnik leaders as the enemy of Ukraine and the partisan of the complete russification of the UkSSR.

The Soviet plebiscites, which purport to express the will of the population are known to falsify that will. But in the name of impartiality we must recognize that the expression of the will of the Carpatho-Ukrainian population in 1945 which preceded the final treaty, revealed the relatively true will of the population of Carpatho-Ukraine although it did not express fully the free will of the population. The election and the choice of delegates took place under a temporary Czechoslovak administration, although under Soviet military occupation. The local Communists who for the twenty years of the Czechoslovak government had constantly adopted the Ukrainian orientation, succeeded in evoking some enthusiasm of the population for the question of union with Kiev, the capital of the old dream of the Carpathian Ruthenians in the worst periods of that reckless Magyarization which had lasted for almost a thousand years. The most open anti-Communists in Carpatho-Ukraine understood that union with Ukraine was either now or never. All understood what political bargains would be driven if under different circumstances this strategical area was to be united with Ukrainian motherland.

The youth of Carpatho-Ukraine, which had also welcomed the union of their country with their own motherland, not infrequently a few months later disappeared into the Carpathian forests and joined the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to fight for the complete liberation of their united country from the rule of Moscow. What Amer-

ican is able to determine in this situation the community clash of interests?

The cooling of the enthusiasm for the liberation by the Bolsheviks came quickly. The former president of the independent Carpatho-Ukraine in March, 1939, Msgr. A. Voloshyn, was arrested by the Bolsheviks in Prague and died in a Bolshevik prison. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church of the Carpatho-Ukrainians was wiped out by force by red Moscow as it was in Western Ukraine and subjected to the Patriarch of Moscow. Teodor Romzha, bishop of Uzhorod, died a martyr's death; and two other bishops of the western part of Carpatho-Ukraine who remained in the communized Czechoslovak Republic, received unlimited terms in prison.

Carpatho-Ukraine fell under a more severe russification than any other part of Ukraine. The state university founded in Uzhorod, became at once more a source of russification than a spreading of Ukrainian science, and yet if you ask the average Carpatho-Ukrainian if he would wish to separate Carpatho-Ukraine from the Ukrainian body, he will reply: "Never." He understands that only the unity of the Ukrainian land, torn apart for a thousand years, can save the national identity and the national character of the Carpatho-Ukrainians. This shows the dynamics of liberating nationalism which is so little studied and understood in America.

Every one who understands the imponderabilia of the nationally enslaved peoples, especially the Ukrainians, will find it entirely incomprehensible why the American organization, the *National Committee of Free Europe*, is even now trying to attach Carpatho-Ukraine to the Czechoslovak state. May this lack of comprehension not bring difficulties upon America?

The Carpatho-Ukrainians joined a united but still enslaved Ukraine under tragic conditions but they achieved their purpose. Red Moscow did the same, for it placed a strong foot not on lands of a formally foreign state but on land really belonging to the USSR, from which without great difficulty it can control Central Europe, even if it were compelled to make peace with Austria and retire militarily from the satellite states. The sword of Damocles is hanging now over Central Europe and in twenty four hours it can strike Budapest, Vienna and Prague. The key to Central Europe is now in the hands of Moscow. What is the reason and what is the way out from this situation?

The cause for the successes of the Bolsheviks is that they are studying the national problems and know how to use them for their own advantage, and in some cases, as in Carpatho-Ukraine they can force even their most bitter enemies not to move against them. The

reason for the failure of the Western democratic world is because it with America in the van does not appreciate the dynamics of the movements for national liberation, which are now stronger than the atom bomb, because they are a power of the spirit. The desire to be nationally united, to be free from every foreign rule, the desire to be master on their own soil, to arrange their own national life on their own national pattern, is the essence of the modern movements of national liberation. It has come to dominate all Asia, it is inflaming Africa from Capetown to the Mediterranean Sea and it is even taking by the throat the all-powerful red Moscow.

If this spirit of national liberation is reaching even into the living body of red Moscow and compelling it to make concessions, it is in the interest of Western democracy and America to acquire that mighty dynamic force as its ally and to help it crush not only Communism but also the Muscovite empire, the prison of tens of nations. If America decides to move against this modern dynamic force and try to save the Russian empire which is doomed to disintegration, it will not preserve that empire but protect the Soviet power which is trying to project this anti-Bolshevik nationalism against the democratic world.

The mistakes of the democratic world began at the end of World War I when the victorious allies in the east of Europe did not take the side of the independence movements of the non-Russian peoples, but tried to rebuild the reactionary Russian empire. They did not succeed but they aided in the establishment of the more powerful Soviet empire.

After overthrowing the democratic Ukrainian National government in Eastern and Western Ukraine and giving the latter area with its Ukrainian and nationally conscious population to Poland, the victorious Entente aided in liquidating the Ukrainian democratic forces along the Dnieper, for Western Ukraine had given important help to the Eastern Ukrainians in their struggle against the red attacks from the north.

In overthrowing the Ukrainian government in Western Ukraine, the Entente prevented Carpatho-Ukraine from joining then with her ancestral Ukraine, which offered no threat to the democratic world. Twenty five years later that same Carpatho-Ukraine, by joining Soviet Ukraine, gave the key of Central Europe into the hands of Moscow, the Eurasian colossus.

What is now the means of throwing the red Colossus beyond the Carpathians? Whoever thinks in the categories of the National Committee of Free Europe and tries to separate Carpatho-Ukraine from the Ukrainian motherland, will certainly never liberate Central Europe, for it will be a hopeless task to go against the Ukrainian movement for

liberation and try to shatter the unity of the Ukrainian nation. If, at the present time, there is no power to shatter living peoples, there is a successful way of disintegrating artificially formed empires with the help of those movements for national liberation. These empires are doomed to destruction. So is the Soviet Eurasian Empire. It saves itself by its skilful manipulation of the mistakes of Western democracy in questions of the liberation of enslaved nations, and so the Western democracies under the leadership of America must take the movements for national liberation as their natural allies.

Only the disintegration of the Soviet Empire into national states will immediately liquidate the pressure of the Eurasian colossus upon the entire world. The formation of a Ukrainian independent state will at once destroy all pressure on Central Europe, the Balkans and Turkey, for the occupation of the Central Carpathians and the Black Sea by a peaceful Ukraine will be the signal for an economic and cultural exchange and not a threat to the existence of the small nations of Central Europe. The liberation of White Ruthenia and the Baltic states will bury the Muscovite dreams of controlling the sea. The liberation of the Caucasian peoples will remove the threatening pressure of the Soviet Russian Empire on Turkey and Iran. A free Turkestan will remove the menace hanging continually over Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. A free Siberia will defeat the world conspiracy of Red Moscow and Red Peking. The Soviet crossing of the Carpathians can only in the present situation be liquidated by the liquidation and dissolution of the red Russian Empire. There is no other way.



## MYTHS ABOUT CARPATHO-UKRAINE

By AUGUSTIN STEFAN

*"The sufferings of the Carpatho-Ukrainians under Moscow's reign of terror are beyond all imagination . . . You know, that even before the Soviets our people didn't live in abundance; on the contrary, many, many were in want of common necessities, but now, there is no comparison . . . Under the Soviets all, with the only exception of the NKVD men and high party functionaries, I repeat, everybody in Carpatho-Ukraine: no matter if he is a worker on a collective farm (there have been no private farms since 1950) or in a factory (we have under the Soviets a large number of new industrial works) or a civil servant — all are beggars, the worst off being the Greek Catholic priest. However, bad is never without good. Now, in our country everybody knows that he is a Ukrainian, even our 'famous' Svalava County . . .<sup>1</sup> In the passports (everybody must carry them) the nationality of our man is entered as Ukrainian . . . In schools the language of education is literary Ukrainian . . . We are allowed to travel to Kiev, to Lviv, Odesa, Poltava, Zhytomyr and other places . . . The people of all Ukrainian lands, from Galicia or Kuban, from the Kiev-region or Carpatho-Ukraine, from Podolia or Bukovina have learned to know to love each other as good brothers do. They all understand very well that the evil from Moscow has brought the inhuman misery."*

(Excerpt from a letter which slipped through the Iron Curtain from Carpatho-Ukraine, to a Research Center in U. S. A.)

### 1. FIRST MYTH: THE NAME OF THE LAND

"The name of the land under the Carpathians is Ruthenia, or Subcarpathian Russia or something similar, but not Ukraine and its inhabitants are Ruthenians or Uhro-Russians or Carpatho-Russians or like but not at all Ukrainians." — We read this often also in American journals dealing with Slavic material.

Present day Iran for more than 3,000 years was called Persia. In 1935 its name was officially changed by its government to Iran. Prior to 1931 there was no Yugoslavia; several centuries ago France was called Gaul . . . and there are several other examples.

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<sup>1</sup> A former Russophile stronghold in Carpatho-Ukraine.

Certainly, the name of a land and its people is connected with the tradition, but if national reasons make necessary a change, a mutation follows.

Now, we ought to bear in mind that about five thousand men<sup>2</sup> of CU (—abbreviation for Carpatho-Ukraine) sacrificed their lives in defense of the honor and freedom of CU against the Hungarian invaders.

We ought to know that more than 10,000 soldiers, escaping from CU, fell in battles against Nazi Germany at the Dukla Pass and elsewhere,<sup>3</sup> because they believed that the new Czechoslovakia would emerge with the same CU they had in 1938-1939.

We ought to remember that on the 12th of February 1939, Hungarian and Polish Armies stood on the southern and northeastern frontiers of CU, ready to march and to prevent the national elections in CU. Why? Because Horthy and Beck knew that the people of CU were Ukrainian and that they would manifest their Ukrainianism in these elections and electrify the enslaved Ukrainians in neighboring countries. But Hitler wanted a great price from his future ally Stalin for the new enslavement of a pronounced Ukrainian territory and knowing that Stalin was even more afraid of Ukrainian nationalism than Beck and Horthy, he ordered back the Hungarian and Polish Armies.

The people in CU did not know this at that time. They only knew that the moment had arrived, when they could tell the world that *they are Ukrainians and they prefer freedom.*

At that time the number of the registered voters in Carpatho-Ukraine was 284,356; the entire population at the beginning of 1939 was about 555,000.

It is necessary to recall that Hungary did not dare to hold elections with a secret and universal ballot in CU before 1918, nor after the occupation. From 1939 to 1944 Hungary did not dare to hold any elections in CU, not even for a village mayor.<sup>4</sup>

The Czechoslovak Government was more democratic. It held regular, democratic elections for the Parliament and Senate in Prague and for local administrative posts, but the elected representatives had no competence in deciding primary matters of local concern. During the 20 years of its regime, the Czechoslovak Government did not dare to

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<sup>2</sup> Estimate of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Four Fighting Years.* (Dr. H. Ripka), Hutchinson & Co., London, 1943, p. 165.

<sup>3</sup> *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Munich-NY, 1949, Vol. II. Vasil Markus, Hungarian Occupation, p. 590-1. Cf. also: M. Vayda: "The Tragedy of the Transcarpathian Ukr. Emigration," *America*, Ukr. Daily, Philadelphia, Pa., No-s 55-61, March, 21-29, 1951.


<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem.*

hold elections for the autonomous Diet of CU inspite of the obligation imposed upon it by the Peace Treaty of St. Germain and by the Czechoslovak Constitutional Law.

When the Ukrainian Government headed by Msgr. A. Voloshyn set elections in the fourth month of its existence, the Governments in Prague, Budapest and Warsaw became indignant and tried to prevent them by all means.

The final difficulty was the enactment of the law. President Hacha personally did not like the word Ukrainian. As president of the Constitutional Court, he announced in 1933 that the use of the name "Ukrainian" was illegal in legal matters (No. 5136/33). He refused twice to sign the necessary decree for the convocation of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet; finally he set it for March 21, but after the proclamation of Slovak independence, he agreed to have it meet on March 15, 1939.

The Bill for the formation of a new republic was presented by the autonomous Government at the Second Session. Dr. Michael Brashchaiko made the motion and said the following historic words: "... After one thousand years of slavery our Land becomes independent and proclaims before the



Dr. Augustin Stefan  
Speaker of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet

whole world that *this land was, is and will be Ukrainian*. And even if Fate should grant only a short life to our young State, our Land will remain *for ever Ukrainian*, for no power can destroy the soul, the strong will of our Ukrainian nation..."

After the second and third reading the Bill was passed unanimously with the votes of the Czech and Rumanian representatives (the German was deliberately absent). The independent Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic by the will of the people had become a reality.

From this Act we quote 'Article 1: *The name of the State is Carpatho-Ukraine*' and 'Article 4: *The official language of Carpatho-Ukraine is the Ukrainian language.*'

Adopting the names Carpatho-Ukraine and Ukrainian does not mean resentment against or disrespect for the ancient historical names "Rus, Rusin (son of Rus), Rusky." The CU-ians as well as their Transcarpathian brothers of Western Ukraine<sup>5</sup> regard them as an inheritance from their forefathers, as a national property, due a respectful veneration, with the same signification as for instance Gaul for the French. But the old historical names are just as out of date as arrows in modern warfare.

The objection may be raised that many Americans of Carpatho-Ukrainian (Ruthenian) descent have declined to approve these names. This is true. But we must take into consideration that they are alienated from their native land, which they left before the First World War and were not participants in the events which brought the great surge of the national consciousness and the national ambitions of their kinsmen. Besides many of them were systematically misinformed by persons who were in paid service of the Polish (Dr. S. Fenczik) or Hungarian (A. Brody) Government. At the conclusion of the World War I the referendum on November 19, 1918 in Scranton, Pa. proved that thirty times more Carpatho-Ruthenian delegates declared themselves for Ukraine (310) than for Hungary (9) or Russia (10).<sup>6</sup> The American Carpatho-Ruthenians already 36 years ago declared themselves as favoring the inclusion of their land in the Ukrainian Democratic Republic.

## II. SECOND MYTH: CONFUSION OF TONGUES

"It is hardly true that the Ruthenians are Ukrainians. The language is not the same. Besides, before 1918 Ruthenia possessed anything between a dozen and a score of peasant dialects. . . There were probably fourteen different dialect groups in the country, some of them with their own local patriotism. . . This people remained for so long without any national consciousness. . ." A prominent English scholar whose name we prefer not to quote, wrote this. Such confusing statements are often expressed also by some American Slavists.

First of all let us clear up the myth about the 14 dialects. The question is: What is a dialect? Some linguists assert that there may be as many dialects as speakers (then there would be not 14 but some 400,000 babies not being counted). Dr. Ivan Pankevich, the noted linguist of CU, who studied the CU-ian dialects for some 20 years and 'examined the

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. A. Mykytiak: "Meeting of the Ukrainian Mission with the Delegates of the U.S.A. in 1919," *The Way, Ukr. Weekly*, Philadelphia, No-s 13-14, 1951.

<sup>6</sup> *Encyclopædia* op. cit. Vol. II, p. 534.



language under the microscope,' found *three* real dialects: Lemko, Boyko and Hutzul — just the same as in Galicia north of Carpathian mountains — with a few more archaisms.<sup>7</sup>

About the language itself we consult first the Russian scientists.

Father of the Galician CU-ian Russophilism, reputed scientist, professor of the Moscow University *Michael P. Pogodin* (1800-1875) said in his report about CU after a journey in CU in 1839: "These Russins, inhabitants of Galicia and North-Eastern Hungary... are the same Russians, which we have in Poltava or Chernigov"...<sup>8</sup>

Today everybody knows that the "Russians" of Poltava and Chernigov are Ukrainians.

In 1905 *The Imperial Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg* in its report. No. 2076, to the Russian Cabinet Council, regarding the "lifting of constraint on the *Little Russian word*" declared that "the contemporary Great Russian language spoken in Moscow, Riazan, Iaroslavl, Arkhangelsk, and Novgorod cannot be termed 'all — Russian' (obshche-russki) in contrast with the Little Russian language of Poltava, Kiev, and Lviv..."<sup>9</sup>

In plain English: The Russian linguists recognized not only the existence and independence of the Ukrainian language, but also the Ukrainian character of the Sub-Carpathian language.

Now, we quote the statements of the Czech scientists.

*T. G. Masaryk*, first president of the Czechoslovak Republic, professor of Prague University, a distinguished scholar, in his *The Making of a State* p. 256 ff. said: "...*I had not forgotten the Ruthene, or Little Russian territory in Hungary... The importance of this region is obvious on account of its proximity to the other Little Russian lands... As regards the language question, I approved of introducing Little Russian into the schools and public offices... In this I adopted the view of the Great Russians themselves, as expressed by the Petrograd Academy of Sciences and by eminent Russian authorities on education.*"

On November 18th, 1919 a "*General Statute for the Organization and Administration of Sub-Carpathian Rus*" (SCR in the following) was issued by the Czechoslovak Government providing the introduction of the local language into the schools and offices and some administrative measures. Its language provision was based on the *Resolution of the*

<sup>7</sup> Ukr. Universal Encycl., Ridna Shkola, Lviv, 1935, Vol. III, p. 563-4.

<sup>8</sup> Ilarion Svencitsky: *Materials of the Rebirth of Carp. Rus.* p. 58, quoted after "Almanac Vozrozhdenie 1936," Prague, p. 41.

<sup>9</sup> John S. Reshetar, Jr. *The Ukr. Revolution 1917-20*, Princeton Univ. Press, 1952, p. 33-34, and Bonkáló Sándor dr, *A Szlávok*, Budapest, Atheneum, 1915, p. 69.

Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences in Prague in 1919. The first sentences of the provision are: "Because the local Rusin dialect of SCR, of which the Statute speaks, is indisputably a *Little Russian* dialect, (therefore) as the literary language for the population of that area (i.e. SCR) *the literary Little Russian language*, which is used by its (i.e. population of SCR) nearest neighbors and kindred stocks, is to be recognized..." Quoted from the Masaryk Scientific Encyclopedia, Prague, 1931, t.V, p. 781; (the stress and the words in paranthesis are mine, A.S.)

The first Governor of CSR, *Dr. Gregory I. Zhatkovich*, a lawyer in Pittsburgh, Pa., was pro-Ukrainian and repudiated the Great Russian ideas. There are many proofs for this in his semi-official paper *Rusin* (August 25, 1920 — March 26, 1921,) the fortnightly edited in Uzhorod by Rev. Theophil Zhatkovich and as the responsible editor, the writer of this article.)

The European scientists and linguists — as Rene Martel remarks<sup>10</sup> unanimously agree that *the language spoken by the Sub-Carpathian Ruthens belongs, at least in dialectical form, to the Ukrainian language.*

Space does not allow to quote the Subcarpathian writers and scientists who have expressed the same opinion. A good account may be found in R. Martel's excellent work<sup>11</sup> and in the booklets of Rev. Joseph P. Hanulya,<sup>12</sup> Mykola Vayda,<sup>13</sup> Yuriy Borzava (pen name of the most outstanding CU-ian poet of the XX. century)<sup>14</sup> and Augustin Stefan.<sup>15</sup>

To clarify the problem of national consciousness of Carpatho-Ukrainians, a short historical retrospect is necessary.

Although for centuries the Carpatho-Ukrainians were included in the Hungarian Kingdom and only during a short period in 13-14th cent. were incorporated in the Ukrainian political organism, they preserved a close connection with the Ukrainian people. The old name of the ancient Ukrainian Kievan Realm—"Rus," and of the ancient Ukrainian "Rusin" during this thousand years were venerated.

The ancient Carpatho-Ukrainian history is based on oral tradition, on certain passages of the Ukrainian (Nestor) and Hungarian (Anonymous, Kézay) Chronicles and on works of several Carpatho-Ukrainian

<sup>10</sup> René Martel: *La Ruthénie Subcarpathique*, 1935, Paris, Hartman, p. 22 ff.

<sup>11</sup> R. Martel, op. cit.

<sup>12</sup> Rev. Joseph P. Hanulya: *Rusin Literature*, Cleveland, O., 1941.

<sup>13</sup> Mykola Vayda: "Rev. Alexander Duchnovich," *Carp. Voice*, Philadelphia, Pa., 1953.

<sup>14</sup> Jurij Borzava (pen name) "From Ruthenia Under Hungary to Carpatho-Ukraine," *The Way*, Philadelphia, English weekly. No. 27-40, 1954.

<sup>15</sup> Augustin Stefan: "From Ruthenia to Carpatho-Ukraine," *Carpathian Star*, N.Y., 1954.

(Basilovits, Lucskay, Duliskovich, Kralicky, Kondratovich, Pachovsky) and Hungarian (Turóczy, Bonfinius, Pray, Horváth, Szalay, Karácsonyi) historians.

This history assumes that the ancestors of the CU-ians were the White Khorvats, who migrated from the original home of the different Ukrainian tribes in the north in the VII century and settled on the southern slopes of the Carpathians. When toward the end of the 9th century, the Hungarian Chieftain Arpad crossed the Veretsky Pass, the CU-ians already had a "Rusin" tribal state under prince Laborets with its capital in Uzhorod. Prince Laborets according to popular tradition fell in the battle with the invading Magyars. Arpad led his tribes into the fertile valleys of the Danube and Tisa rivers, while the CU-ians were pressed into the mountainous regions of Southern Carpathians. With the exception of 1281-1321, when CU was annexed to the Galician-Volynian State under King Leo, his son George, and George's son Leo, CU belonged to Hungary until 1918.

The Arpad Dynasty (1000-1301) did not attempt to alter the religion, customs or the language of CU. On the contrary, some of these kings intermarried with the Kievan or Galician royalty and adopted the rite and even the language of their wives or mothers. In consequence, the CU-ians enjoyed certain privileges and had a kind of autonomy with their own administration and judiciary. The documents from this period perished in 1241-3 when the Tatars crossed the region destroying, robbing and murdering. They burnt the Monastery in Hrushiv, the first cultural centre of the land.<sup>16</sup>

After the extinction of the Arpad dynasty, the new rulers did not respect the rights of the Ukrainian people. Petro Petrovich, the zhupan of Uzhorod and Zemplin led a bloody rebellion in defense of his people and perished in an unequal battle before the Castle Mak. Around 1360 the Ukrainian Prince, Fedir Koriatovich, migrated from Podolia to Carpatho-Ukraine after his conflict with the Central Lithuanian Government. As a vassal, the Hungarian king became Prince of Mukačevo and ruler of the whole Carpatho-Ukraine. During his reign the Ukrainian people under the Carpathians enjoyed freedom. He founded in Mukachevo, the St. Nicholas Monastery which became the center of the Carpatho-Ukrainian church-organization and eventually the see of the first Carpatho-Ukrainian bishop. But with his death, Ukrainian freedom also perished, and the fate of the people became worse.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Vasil Pachovsky: *History of Transcarpathia*, Munich, Bdzilka, 1946, p. 48.

<sup>17</sup> A. Stefan: Inaugural Address, *The Trident*, N.Y., Sept. 1939, p. 25.

Carpatho-Ukraine under the name "Ruska Kraina" (Ruthenian Region) possessed some form of autonomy until the last decades of the 18th century. The activities of the people were limited to the ecclesiastical and religious fields and cultural life, and achieved in the latter a high degree of progress. At the turn of the 18th century there were 300 schools in CU, the best ratio in any corresponding Ukrainian or Russian area at the same time.

Hungarian pressure on the whole cultural life of Carpatho-Ukraine steadily increased. This was exploited by the Russian Tsarist government which tried to convince the Carpatho-Ukrainians that the only salvation of their nationality was in Russia. The period of forcible Hungarization and Russophilism (1867-1918) brought about a decline in the cultural life of the Carpatho-Ukrainians. The revival began during the First World War when CU-ian soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian Army as prisoners of war visited Ukraine; they had the opportunity to see "Holy Kiev." What followed in 1918? — The desire to be part of the Ukrainian political organism — of the Ukrainian National Republic. Since this was impossible in 1939, the small Carpatho-Ukraine proclaimed its independence. The CU-ian peasantry preserved the finest sort of *national consciousness* through the long centuries of sufferings and contempt. This national consciousness was so powerful that the Carpatho-Ukrainian population in spite of the direct demands of Hitler not to resist the Hungarian invasion, ignored the will of the Nazi dictator and undertook a heroic defense of their native country. By this act, the weak Carpatho-Ukraine became the first opponent of the powerful Hitler in Europe. It frightened the twenty times larger Hungary and impelled her in March 1939 to such irresponsible actions as military invasion of CU, murdering peaceful men, merely for their Ukrainian feelings (D. Mitrovich, a half blind teacher, Rev. Charles Kupa, representative Ivan Griga and many others), and even to edit a Valuyev like ukaz forbidding the use of the Ukrainian language. Circular No. 3/1939 of the School Board of the Civil Administration of Carpathian Rus in Khust, signed by Géza Császár, Colonel of the Hungarian Army, District Commander, Dr. István Budia, President of the National Council and Nikolai Dragula, temp. Chief of the School Board, ordered: "Parties shall be addressed in their mother dialect, *with the exception of the Czech and Ukrainian languages.*"

This is a tragedy that the Western democratic nations left to Kremlin, the realization of century-long dream and aspirations of Carpatho-Ukrainians — to be united with Ukrainian national organism.

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# THE MARCH TO LIBERATION OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE

By JULIAN REVAY

On June 29, 1945 the Soviet Foreign Minister V. Molotov and Z. Fierlinger, then Premier of the still democratic Czecho-Slovak Republic, signed a treaty by which the most easterly part of the pre-Munich Czecho-Slovak Republic — Subcarpathian Ruthenia or Carpatho-Ukraine, became part of the Soviet Union as a new province of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This ended the century long struggle of the Carpatho-Ruthenians (Ukrainians) to preserve their national identity, to remain Rusins (as they preferred to preserve this ancient name of the Ukrainians), and to be under the sovereignty of Kiev. The dream of the Carpatho-Ruthenians (Ukrainians) to be with Kiev was fulfilled. But who united them with their motherland? The Red Army and the Moscow Soviet Government, the bitter foe of the independence of democratic Ukraine and her oppressor.

At the same time Msgr. A. Voloshyn, the *pater patriae* of Carpatho-Ukraine and the first President of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic which had been proclaimed on March 15, 1939, was in NKVD prison, arrested May 17, 1945 by the Soviet Communist police in Prague and died the same year in prison. Some members of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet, Prof. A. Stefan, the Speaker of the Diet of 1939, J. Revay, the Premier, Ivan Ilnatko, Leonid Romaniuk and Walter Komarynsky, escaped and found refuge in the United States. Remaining patriots were liquidated. A certain number of Carpatho-Ukrainian revolutionists are fighting against the Bolshevik domination for the real independence and democracy of their country in the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

At the present time in Indo-China, the Communist dictators have taken advantage of the political mistakes of the Western powers in not satisfying the natural and just effort of every subject people to become a fully free and united nation. What the Western democracies have refused to several peoples during the last decades, the Soviets have granted by their own methods and to increase their own Soviet power. Ukraine is the best example of this. After World War I, the victorious Entente refused to support the Ukrainian people to uphold their own independent, democratic republic. The Ukrainian National Republic was overrun by the

Russian Communist Army and was defeated. Then red Moscow set up a Communist government in Ukraine and proclaimed it a formally independent Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The victorious Entente approved the occupation of the territory of the Western Ukraine by Poland despite the wishes of the overwhelming majority of its population. What the democratic West refused, the Soviet did twenty years later. In 1939 Western Ukraine was united with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

By refusing to help the Ukrainian people in their struggle to preserve their democratic republic, the Western powers unconsciously aided the Russian Communists in establishing themselves in Ukraine, in uniting the separated Ukrainian territories with Kiev and finally in incorporating Carpatho-Ukraine in the Soviet Union. They aided in breaking the Ukrainian national and anti-Communist forces which could have undermined Soviet domination over Ukraine. Thus, by their clever policy the Communists have been able to exploit the national movement for liberation by offering at the same time liberation from their oppressors and subjugation to Moscow.

This seems strange to the Americans, for they are not familiar with the skilful Moscow tactics which exploit all of the modern movements for national liberation for the benefit and strengthening of the Soviet Union.

This apparently paradoxical situation as regards Carpatho-Ukraine was made clear by the Carpatho-Ukrainian leaders in exile in a memorandum for the use of the American authorities, the American people and the Czech and Hungarian political leaders in exile, so as to show the actual status and the will of the Carpatho-Ukrainians to be united with their motherland the independent Ukrainian National Republic.

This memorandum states:

#### A BRIEF SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL EVENTS LEADING TO THE PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY CARPATHO-UKRAINE IN 1939.

Recently in the United States of America, certain political leaders of some nationality groups have been attempting to portray themselves to the Government of the United States of America as representatives of the will and interests of the people of Carpatho-Ukraine. Such action has been demonstrated by the representatives of those nationality groups with which Carpatho-Ukraine has had legal ties in the past. In order to properly clarify the entire problem, we present the following:

The defeat of the Central Powers in 1918 by the Great Entente gave also to Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, which until that time had been occupied by Hungary, the opportunity to express her desire for self-determination, in accordance with the then recognized principle of the right of self-determination by all people. On

January 21, 1919, the representatives of 420 committees met in Khust and unanimously voted to unite Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia with the Ukrainian National Republic. The local national committees of Stara Liubovna, Svaliava and Sihot likewise declared themselves in favor of such union. Due, however, to subsequent war developments in Ukraine, and particularly as a result of the downfall of the Ukrainian National Republic before the onslaughts of the Bolshevik armies, this decision could not be put into effect. On May 8, 1919 the First Central Ukrainian (Ruthenian) National Council in Uzhorod, composed of local national councils, expressed its desire to unite Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, as an autonomous territory, with the newly created Czechoslovak Republic.

This decision, to unite the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia with the Czechoslovak Republic, was included in the international treaty by the Great Entente which was signed at St. Germain-an-Laye on September 10, 1919. This resolution of the international treaty was subsequently incorporated into the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic (paragraph 3 of the Constitutional Charter of February 29, 1920), which guaranteed broad autonomous rights to Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. In spite of these international and constitutional guarantees of rights of autonomy, the Czechoslovak Government, during its 20 years of existence, did not fulfill its obligations toward the people of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. This was realized only by the special constitutional law (No. 328 of November 22, 1938 — chapter III, paragraph 4) on the basis of which a three-member cabinet of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia was created which became a part of the Central Czechoslovak Government in Prague (paragraph 70, Constitutional Charter). By this act the Czechoslovak Republic was transformed into a Federated State of Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians. It is only proper to note here that Constitutional Charter of Czechoslovakia of February 29, 1920, as revised by amendment No. 328, was in force until March 14, 1939.

On November 2, 1938, on the basis of arbitration in Vienna, the capital city of Uzhorod and the two very important commercial and communication centers of Mukachiv and Berehovo were severed from Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and annexed by Hungary.

By the decree of the Government of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, on January 1, 1939, the name of the territory was changed from "Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia" to "Carpatho-Ukraine." The members of the Federal government of Carpatho-Ukraine performed their duties in the Central Czechoslovak Government in Prague from October 12, 1938 until March 14, 1939.

Taking the opportunity afforded by the right granted in the Czechoslovak Constitutional Law No. 328, on February 12, 1939, general elections were held for representatives to the Carpatho-Ukrainian Diet (Sojm), which had complete legal foundations and all the characteristics of democratic elections, being based on the constitutional right of equal, secret and direct vote. Thirty-two members were elected to the Diet which became the legal Legislature of Carpatho-Ukraine.

On March 14, 1939 the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine, complying with the will of the people and important constitutional laws, adopted a resolution proclaiming Carpatho-Ukraine an Independent State. This Declaration of Independence by Carpatho-Ukraine was ratified the following day, i. e., March 15, 1939 by a special law of the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine. In conjunction therewith extensive reorganization of the government took place and the government received broader legal powers. The government of Carpatho-Ukraine publicized this declaration and, through its legal representative in Prague, notified on that same day the em-

bassies of such governments as: The United States of America, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Poland and Rumania.

By a previous agreement with Chancellor Hitler, the Hungarian Army invaded Carpatho-Ukraine on March 15, 1939. This led to the well known armed conflict between the two peoples and, finally, to the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary, which lasted until August, 1944. In this conflict with Hungary, Carpatho-Ukraine was obliged to depend on her own armed forces because the Czechoslovak Army, by the order of the Central Government in Prague, evacuated the country. Following World War II Carpatho-Ukraine was ceded to the Soviet Ukraine by the Czechoslovak Government by the special treaty of June 29, 1945, signed in Moscow.

*Augustin Stefan*, Speaker of the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine

*Julian Revay*, Premier-Minister of Carpatho-Ukraine

*Ivan Ilnatko*, Member of the Diet

*Ing. Leonid Romaniuk*, Member and Secretary of the Diet

*Dr. Volodymyr Komarynsky*, Member of the Diet

*Dr. Vincent Shandor*, Representative of the Carpatho-Ukrainian  
Government in Prague

There can be no doubt of the thoroughly legal character of the events in Carpatho-Ukraine as given in this statement, although the actual happenings were influenced by such historical developments as the Munich decisions (1938), and later the creation of the independent Slovak Republic, which separated Carpatho-Ukraine from Czechia (1939). The final decision, the Molotov-Fierlinger Treaty, which ceded Carpatho-Ukraine to Soviet Ukraine, was made by the democratic post-war government of the Czecho-Slovak Republic with due regard to all forms of international law. To-day there are members of this government living in the United States as political exiles and active in the council of Free Czecho-Slovakia.

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Despite this clear situation some Czecho-Slovak leaders in exile working under the patronage of the American organization, the National Committee for Free Europe, have forgotten the recent history of their own country and of Carpatho-Ukraine and have asserted again Czech rights to this Ukrainian land. They have feverishly worked to produce in America "representatives" of the Carpatho-Ruthenian (Ukrainian) people and have organized a program through the radio of Free Europe for Carpatho-Ukrainians with these aims.

Everyone who has followed the hopeless efforts of the Czech political emigration has wondered for whom they are really working. Do they honestly believe that the situation which will arise after the final downfall of the Communist dictatorship in Eastern Europe will enable



them again to take Carpatho-Ukraine to Czechoslovakia by force when there exists a free and democratic Ukraine across the Carpathians? This is an impossible surmise which does not help in the consolidation of the anti-Bolshevik forces in America now and in producing good neighbor relations between Ukraine and her people and the neighboring nations in the future.

We know that in 1919 Carpatho-Ruthenia (Ukraine) was added to the Czechoslovak Republic, provisionally as a protection for the Ukrainian people until the establishment of a Ukrainian state and this was so stated by Thomas G. Masaryk, the Czech President Liberator, because at that time there was no other choice.

At that time the Czechoslovak Republic accepted the international obligation (St. Germain-en-Laye Treaty in 1919) which it included in its own constitutional law (1920) to give Carpatho-Ukraine the broadest autonomy. This was not carried out till 1938. The first governor of Carpatho-Ukraine, an American citizen, Dr. Gregory Zhatkovich, after a certain time resigned his post and returned to America (1921) with the statement that his position as governor of Carpatho-Ukraine was an empty form without any substance. Even after the fatal decisions for Czechoslovakia in Munich, in 1938, the Prague government made every effort to shelve the realization of the autonomy to this area.

There is no doubt that the life of the Carpatho-Ruthenians (Ukrainians) under Czech rule was far better than under the rule of the Hungarians before 1919, but the Czech government and its administrative organs, which actually took over all power in the area worked very diligently after the years of Hungarian denationalization efforts to keep the Carpatho-Ruthenians from seeking close ties with a Ukrainian nation and its liberation movement, the goal to which the Carpatho-Ukrainian masses were unconsciously striving.

Despite the decisions of the leading Slavic scientific institutions as the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences and the Czech Academy of Sciences that the language of the Carpatho-Ruthenians was a dialect of the Ukrainian (Little-Russian) language and that the Carpatho-Ruthenians were a part of the Ukrainian people, the Czech government made no effort to eliminate the chaos in the cultural life of the Carpatho-Ukrainians caused by the Russophiles who propagated the russification of the country. In the schools, the Czech government permitted different trends. Besides teaching in the native language, the local Carpatho-Ruthenian language, which is a dialect of the Ukrainian language, the Russophiles on the other hand enforced in some schools the teaching in Russian only. This linguistic chaos in the schools and cultural life brought about the fight between the two sympathizers of these trends. The Prague Government

was indifferent because it wanted to enforce the teaching in the Czech language. This chaos came to an end with the realization of the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine.

The falling apart of the Czechoslovak Republic brought to Carpatho-Ukraine first autonomy and then the proclamation of the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine as the first Ukrainian land liberated from foreign rule.

The Soviet government studied very carefully the situation in Trans-Carpathian area after World War I and quickly became convinced that the Carpatho-Ruthenians are a part of the Ukrainian nation and the practical result of this was that the Czechoslovak Communist party in the region adopted the Ukrainian line in its publications and organizations.

So it would be better for the Czech emigre leaders to turn their attention to organizing a common front for Liberation Movement among the Czechs, Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainians and other enslaved peoples than to carry on hopeless endeavors to seek what is not theirs and to embitter relations between the Ukrainian and the Czecho-Slovak peoples.

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The Czech emigre politicians are not the only ones to seek control of Carpatho-Ukraine for their country. The Hungarians are doing the same thing. The soul of this work in America is Karl Hokky, a former senator to the Czechoslovak Senate in Prague. The Hungarians have no legal or moral grounds for demanding the annexation to it of Carpatho-Ukraine, but emigre leaders in exile are carrying on this hopeless endeavor to find own agents among emigrants of Carpatho-Ukrainian origin in the United States, and especially among those who have had no contact with Carpatho-Ukraine for more than 20-30 years and have no idea of the national renaissance of the Carpatho-Ruthenians (Ukrainians) after World War I.

The occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary in March, 1939 took place despite the protest of its Government and the heroic resistance of the population, especially the younger generation which was organized in the semi-military Carpathian Sich. The Hungarian occupation cost the Carpatho-Ukrainians about 5,000 lives. It was in reality an ordinary unprovoked attack upon a neighboring independent state. It is noteworthy that during the five years of its occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine, Hungary did not dare to hold any election to determine what the people in an overwhelming majority thought of the Hungarian occupation. The government in Budapest tried to rest its role as occupant on a small group of old Magyarized Carpathian Rusins, who called themselves the

*Russian Central People's Council* under the leadership of Dr. Joseph Kaminsky. The political declaration of this group was completely ignored by the Carpatho-Ukrainian masses, but the Hungarian government of Horthy in Budapest, considered this declaration as a purpose for the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine by military force.

After World War II the historical facts were recognized and 70% of the territory of the Subcarpathian area now belongs to Ukraine with the official title of the Trans-Carpathian District of Ukraine. The rest of the 30% with the important city of Pryashiv forms administratively the eastern part of Slovakia and belongs today to the Czechoslovak Republic.

The annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine to the Ukrainian country has its own historical tradition. When we look into history, we see several efforts of the Carpatho-Ruthenian leaders to unite this territory south of the Carpathians inhabited by Carpatho-Ruthenians (Rusins or Carpatho-Ukrainians) with their motherland to the north of the Carpathians.

In the XIV century the Grand Zhupan Petro Petrovych raised an armed revolt against Budapest to unite the area with the then Kingdom of Halych, but was conquered and the action of Petrovych was for a long period without results.

Another attempt to liberate Carpatho-Ukraine from Hungary and to unite it with the other Ukrainian lands was made by Adolph I. Dobryansky in the years 1848-49. He was at the time the leader of the Carpatho-Ruthenians and took an active part in the Supreme Ruthenian Council in Lviv (Holovna Rus'ka Rada). He was also an active participant in the Slavic Congress in Prague. He emerged as the leader of the Carpatho-Ruthenians in the great revolution in Austria-Hungary in 1848 and he headed a delegation which presented to Emperor Franz Joseph a memorial asking that the Trans-Carpathian area and Western Ukraine (Galicia and Bukovyna) should be formed into a single province as an autonomous administrative unit in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

The efforts of Dobryansky were not successful, for in the meantime the imperial House had commenced negotiations with the Hungarian magnates and these ended in the Austro-Hungarian agreement of 1867. Dobryansky himself, who for a while was commissar for the Trans-Carpathian area, was hauled into court and later was compelled to leave his native land. He ended his life in exile in Innsbruck.

Another attempt to unite the Carpathian area with the Ukrainian National Republic was made after World War I. This was shown by the resolutions adopted at the *National Councils* in Lyubovnya, Svalyava and Khust. Delegations were sent to the government of Western Ukraine in Stanyslaviv with the request that the government of Western Ukraine

send military units of the Ukrainian Galician Army to defend the territory. A delegation from Carpatho-Ruthenians even was sent to Kiev to take part in the proclamation of the Universal of January, 1919 on the union of the Eastern and Western Ukrainian Republics. The Government in Stanyslaviv at the time considered Carpatho-Ukraine a part of the Western Ukrainian Republic.

Another example of the orientation of the Carpatho-Ruthenians took place in December, 1918, when the Hungarian government of Count Karolyi called a *Ruthenian Congress* of representatives of the country in Budapest. When the representatives of the Hungarian government proposed a resolution approving a law for autonomy for the Subcarpathian Ruthenia i. e. "Ruska Krajna" the majority of the delegates who had come from all parts of the country opposed this and shouted down the official speakers with the words: "We want to join Kiev."

The fact remains that the Carpatho-Ruthenians after World War I wanted to "get away from feudal Hungary." There were many reasons for this. They were of a different character cultural and national, ecclesiastical and religious or social and economic. The chief motive was the fear that the Ruthenians (Rusins) in their Carpathians were threatened by the same fate that had overtaken the Greek Catholic former Ruthenians (Rusins) in the countries of Szabolcs, Haydu Dorog, Satmar, and the southern part of Aba-Uj and Zemplin, who had lost entirely their national identity.

If now, the Czech and Hungarian emigre party leaders in the United States are advancing their claims to include the country of the Carpathian Ukrainians in either of their future respective states (Czechoslovakia or Hungary), they are nourishing the vain hopes that after the downfall of the Communist dictatorship in the East of Europe, American diplomacy and the army command will not only stifle the will of the Carpatho-Ukrainians but also give the entire area to them as a present. This fatal mistake can result in a sad disillusionment for both pretenders besides shame, that at a time when the free world mobilizes its forces against the present greatest imperialism, the exiled leaders of two small neighboring nations reveal their sickly imperialistic dreams.

Both groups should not forget that after the liberation from the Communist dictatorship in Eastern and Central Europe, an independent Ukrainian State will be a decisive factor in East European policy and will not allow the removal from its national organism of an integral part, the country of the Carpatho-Ruthenians (Ukrainians).



## CARPATHO-UKRAINE IN THE INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING OF 1918-1939

By VINCENT SHANDOR

The proclamation in January, 1918, by Woodrow Wilson, then President of the United States, of the right of enslaved peoples to self-determination may, in its power and significance, be regarded as the atom bomb of World War I. The proclamation of this right gave the enslaved peoples hope for their liberation and in a large degree activated and strengthened their opposition to the Central Powers.

The great failure of this otherwise sound principle was the fact that it was not applied to all peoples of Eastern Europe and especially to the entire Ukrainian people. In this way the Ukrainian people were deprived of the military and economic support of the victorious Entente and were left to defend their Ukrainian State with their own strength against the attacks of the White and Red Russians and Poland. To a considerable degree this serious political failure of the Entente affected the further fate of Europe and the world and it compelled Clemenceau, one of the makers of the political map of Europe of the time and a bitter opponent of the idea of Ukrainian statehood, to say later as a private citizen "weariness and apathy overpowered Europe at a time when it should have mustered all its forces and supported Ukraine and at one blow finished Bolshevism which is costing the whole world so dearly."<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with the proclamation of President Wilson, the Carpatho-Ukrainians (Rusyns) also spoke for their natural right. Separated for long centuries from their ancestral Ukrainian roots they had in themselves, — despite prohibitions and the persecutions of foreign regimes of occupation, the old national traits of the Ukrainians of the old state of Kievan Rus-Ukraine, including the name Rusyn, under which they now entered the international forum. In their first decisions on the future fate of their country, they listened to the voice of their blood both in Subcarpathia<sup>2</sup> and in the United States, where there was a large number of their emigrants.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> General Mordacy: *L. Clemenceau au soir de sa vie*, 1920-9. Tome premier, Librairie Plon 1933, p. 147 (Cited from O. Shulhyn: *Without Territory*, Paris, 1934, p. 25).

<sup>2</sup> Subcarpathia is the name of the territory inhabited by Ukrainians (Rusyns) in the southern part of the Carpathians. This territory was formerly in the counties of Spish, Sharysh, Abauy, Zemplyn, Uzh, Bereh, Ugoca and Maramorosh.

<sup>3</sup> In the USA there were at the time about 500,000 Rusyns.

The Narodna Rada of Subcarpathia, in Pryashiv, Khust and Svalyava, and also the later All-National Congress in Khust on January 21, 1919, unanimously resolved that the land should be included in the Ukrainian state beyond the Carpathians. The American National Rada of Rusyns, which represented about 500,000 Rusyns in the United States at their meeting on 23. VII. 1918 in Homestead, Pa., expressed the desire that: a) the Rusyns should secure full independence, and if this were impossible, that b) they should be united with their brothers in Galicia and Bukovyna, and if this were impossible, that c) they should receive autonomy.<sup>4</sup> A later National Congress in Scranton, Pa., resolved on November 19, 1918, when it recognized the impossibility of a solution on the Ukrainian platform that there should be a union with the Czechoslovak Republic. In addition 28% of the votes, i.e. 210 delegates of the communities of the American Rusyns in the United States voted for union with Ukraine. Only 1% were for further union with Hungary.

Hungary for its part also tried to retain the Rusyns. These had previously been regarded by the Hungarians only as a field for economic exploitation, political and national enslavement and Magyarization. Now, when as a result of the declaration of the right of self-determination, the Rusyns in Hungary called for their natural rights, the Hungarian government issued in its official register for December 25, 1918, law No. 10(X), for the formation for them of an autonomous Rus Land. The Rusyns, who had had a long and sad experience with Hungarian guarantees of rights for other peoples, did not take advantage of this offered autonomy and the other efforts of the Hungarian government and expressed themselves against a further state connection with Hungary.

In view of the fact that the Ukrainian state was then in war on three fronts and could not carry out these decisions, the representatives of the American Rusyns by an agreement with the First Central Rus National Rada in Uzhorod finally decided for attachment to the Czechoslovak Republic under the name of Podkarpatska Rus, with the widest autonomous rights; the territory was already 4 months under Czechoslovak military occupation.

#### THE TREATY OF ST. GERMAIN

The basis of the legal position of Podkarpatska Rus in the Czechoslovak Republic was the international treaty signed in St. Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 1919 between the victorious Great Powers and

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<sup>4</sup> Open Reports of Dr. G. Zatkovich, former Governor of Podkarpatska Rus. Published by Russia Information Bureau, Greek Catholic Union Bldg., Homestead, Pa.

their allies and the Czechoslovak Republic. This treaty insured for Podkarpatska Rus:

1. The fullest degree of self-government compatible with the unity of Czechoslovakia (Article 10 of the Treaty).

2. Its own legislative assembly (Diet) whose competence was to comprise all linguistic, scholastic and religious questions, matters of local administration and other questions to be determined by the laws of the Czechoslovak State (Article 11).

3. Officials in Carpatho-Ruthenia were to be chosen, as far as possible, from among the local population (Article 12).

4. In addition to an Autonomous Diet, the Treaty of St. Germain guaranteed to Carpatho-Ruthenia an equitable representation in the Parliament of the Czechoslovak Republic (Article 13).

5. These provisions of the treaty were placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations (Article 14).

The conditions of this treaty were incorporated in the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1920 and thus Carpatho-Ukraine — *Podkarpatska Rus* had an international and constitutional guarantee of its autonomous rights.

Yet despite these guarantees, the Czechoslovak government did not take the steps to grant the autonomy. The government constantly advanced new reasons for postponing autonomy despite its official promise to realize it in the near future. Thus for example, Dr. E. Benes, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, during his visit to Uzhorod, the capital of Podkarpatska Rus, in 1934, made a speech in which he said on the question of autonomy among other things: "I will declare to you categorically that the Czechoslovak Government has never forgotten its obligations, will never forget them, and will carry out whatever is in the peace treaties at all costs. Autonomy in the not distant future will be introduced as the Czechoslovak Republic promised and included this promise in its Constitution. This autonomy will be introduced honestly and consistently in agreement with you all, step by step, gradually after the various preparations for it will be completed." In his further remarks, Dr. Benes declared that the Czechoslovak government "is now almost at the end of the preparatory work and in the near future will proceed to the practical introduction of autonomy."<sup>5</sup> In connection with this, we must mention that Dr. Benes and his party, the National Socialists, were the most opposed to the introduction of Carpathian autonomy.

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<sup>5</sup> Dr. Eduard Benes: *Speech on the Podcarpathian-Rus Problem*; Published by Local Govt. of the CSR-Legion Society, of Podkarpatska Rus in Uzhorod, 1934.

As we have said, Article 13 of the Treaty of St. Germain promised "to Carpatho-Ruthenia an equitable representation in the Parliament of the Czechoslovak Republic." This was not fully granted by the Czechoslovak Government. Podkarpatska Rus had in the Prague Parliament 9 representatives and 4 senators instead of the proper 14 members and 8 senators, as required by the number of the population.

The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic which was without doubt a democratic state, lasted until the end of the Republic but as regards Podkarpatska Rus, it had certain formal legal defects, i.e.:

1. It was adopted by the Revolutionary Parliament and not by a Parliament elected by the people. The elections to Parliament took place after the adoption of the Constitution, when they should have preceded it.

2. The representatives of Podkarpatska Rus did not take part in the debates and voting on the Constitution for they did not form part of the Revolutionary Parliament and the first elections to the Prague Parliament on the territory of Podkarpatska Rus took place only in 1924.

#### AUTONOMY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR IT

20 years of growth and struggle were necessary to secure the autonomy of the region. The struggle began at the time of the resignation of the First Governor of the region, Dr. G. Zatkovich — 1921 and ended in November, 1938 with the adoption of Constitutional Law No. 328.

In answer to the tendentious and false assertions of some Czech authors we must assert that:

- a) The efforts of the Carpathian Ukrainians to secure autonomy had a constitutional and international legal basis.

- b) It was carried on by the Carpathian Ukrainians out of their own resources, by legal means and had no connections with political workers of foreign countries.

- c) The legal status of the Carpathian Ukrainians in this connection was entirely different from that of the Germans, and Hungarians, who formed national minorities, or even the Slovaks and so this struggle of the Carpathian Ukrainians cannot be connected with the struggle of the other peoples in the Czechoslovak Republic. Thus the achievement of autonomy for Carpatho-Ukraine was a constitutional action, a fulfillment of the obligations which Czechoslovakia assumed in 1919 by the Treaty of St. Germain and as a result of a legal internal struggle of the Carpathian Ukrainians.

By the constitutional law of November 22, 1938, No. 328, *Collection of Laws and Decisions*, Czechoslovakia was turned into a federated



state of the Czechs, Slovaks and Ukrainians. This post-Munich Czechoslovakia, greatly reduced territorially to the advantage of Germany, Poland and Hungary, needed peace for its internal recuperation. But the development of international affairs did not offer anything good in this direction.

The law for the autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine, No. 328, basically corresponded to the demands of the Treaty of St. Germain in 1919 and the constitutional obligations of Czechoslovakia. The basic thesis of the Treaty (Article 10), as to the extent of the autonomy, was really carried into force by this law. In accordance with Art. III of this law, the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine consisted of 3 members, who were at the same time members of the Central Council (Art. 70 of the Constitution). The members of the government of Carpatho-Ukraine were named by the President of the Republic on the nomination of the Presidium of the Diet of autonomous unit — Carpatho-Ukraine. Besides this, the law provided for elections to the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine and its competence, the state property, citizenship, changes of regional borders, the judiciary, finances, etc. Thus this law offered a solid base for the further development of the legislation of the federated Carpatho-Ukraine and its legal relations with Czechoslovakia.<sup>6</sup>

Carpatho-Ukraine, as part of the federated Czechoslovakia, aroused at the time unusual interest in the political world. This interest was caused by the fact that it was regarded as an approach to the solution of the whole Ukrainian problem and in connection with this, in international circles, there were formed various political and military combinations. Carpatho-Ukraine presented a threat to the other occupied Ukrainian lands not by its military power but by the force of the ideas of freedom, and its own state life, which this small part of the Ukrainian lands was then enjoying.

In circles hostile to the Ukrainian liberation movement, it has been customary to connect this with the initiative of Hitler. Hitler well understood the weight and importance of the Ukrainian question and so in his political strategy he used it accordingly, chiefly when it was a question of the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. To-day we have the material to assert that it was to a large degree the Ukrainian problem in connection with Carpatho-Ukraine which led to the alliance of Hitler and Stalin. The latter quickly took into account the danger of a political use of this problem by such a dangerous gambler as Hitler, and decided that it was better to have him in this "gamble" as a friend than as an enemy. The economic negotiations commenced by the Soviets early in

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<sup>6</sup> Collection of Law and Decisions of CSR. No. 328.

January, 1939, gave a positive political result. Stalin in his speech at the XVIII All-Union Congress of the Party on March 19, 1939, devoted an unusually large amount of time to Carpatho-Ukraine. In speaking of it, he indulged in some irony but this irony, as his further words, clearly indicated how deeply and fundamentally Carpatho-Ukraine concerned Soviet foreign policy. Stalin referred to the British, French and American press as spreading the news that "the Germans were marching on Soviet Ukraine, that they now had what is called the Carpathian Ukraine with a population of some seven hundred fifty thousand, and that no later than this spring the Germans would annex the Soviet Ukraine, which has a population of over thirty million, to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds."<sup>7</sup>

To the European and American politicians he said: that they "having lost patience waiting for the march on the Soviet Ukraine are themselves beginning to disclose what is really behind the policy of non-intervention.<sup>8</sup> They are saying quite openly, putting it down in black on white, that the Germans have cruelly disappointed them, for instead of marching further east against the Soviet Union, they have turned, you see, to the west and are demanding colonies."<sup>9</sup>

In connection with this it can be affirmed that at the time of the delivery of this speech, Stalin had assurances from Hitler of the liquidation of Carpatho-Ukraine, as also they had basically agreed on the separation of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian territories from Poland. With such views in prospect, Stalin could with a light heart let "down the river" the negotiations for a Franco-Soviet alliance, begun in May, 1938, in which he sought a lasting military alliance between the two countries and "a triple guarantee of all the border States from the Baltic to the Black Sea."<sup>10</sup>

During these long negotiations, Stalin did not find enough agreement among the partners for his aims. He insisted on guarantees of the Soviet borders, because the Soviet General Staff well remembered the well-known answer of Marshal von Hindenburg to Baron von Kuhlmann on the eve of the peace conference in Brest-Litovsk in December, 1917. The

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<sup>7</sup> *Documents on International Affairs, 1939-1946*. Vol. I March-September, 1939. Oxford Univ. Press, 1951, p. 367-368 (Speech by Stalin at the XVIII Congress of the All Union Communist Party on March 10, 1939).

<sup>8</sup> *ibidem*, p. 404.

<sup>9</sup> *ibidem*, p. 367-368.

<sup>10</sup> John W. Wheeler-Bennet, *Munich-Prologue to Tragedy*, New York, 1948, p. 395.

German Foreign Minister had asked why the Field-Marshal so particularly wanted the eastern border states for Germany. "I need them," Hindenburg had replied in his growling voice, "I need them for the manoeuvring of my left wing in the next war."<sup>11</sup>

Thus Hitler used his "interest" in the Ukrainian problem with Stalin. For the price of liquidating Carpatho-Ukraine and Poland, he won to his side the Soviet Union, and thus turned it from an alliance with England and France, which would have been very dangerous for Hitler, and satisfied the desires of the German General Staff not to carry on a war on two fronts. In addition he won for himself a loyal ally in Hungary.

#### THE NEIGHBORS

a) Hungary: Hungary fought in World War I on the side of Germany and suffered the consequences of defeat. The 14 Points of President Wilson were applied to it, for there existed in its state organization alien peoples, some with unimportant national or cultural rights and some with none. By the Treaty of Trianon, signed June 4, 1920, Hungary relinquished its alien territories and some of these, Slovakia with 63,000 sq. km.<sup>12</sup> and Podkarpatska Rus, were included in the Czechoslovak Republic.

The foreign policy of Hungary during the entire 20 years was directed toward a revision of the Treaty of Trianon, or more correctly, to its destruction. Hungary belonged to the same camp of dissatisfied nations as Germany and they dreamed for the whole 20 years of revenge for the "crimes" of World War I. The opportunity for Hungary's revenge came when Hitler, with the help of the party of Henlein and the Munich Agreement, united the Sudetens to the Reich, weakened the Czechoslovak Republic and thus shattered the Little Entente, the chief object of which was to watch Hungary. These actions led up to the Vienna Arbitration of November 2, 1938, which returned to Hungary about 1700 sq. km. of Carpathian territory with 194,000 population, among them 37,400 Carpatho-Ukrainians.<sup>13</sup>

During the Vienna Arbitration, the Hungarians in private conversations advanced the idea that Carpatho-Ukraine should be included with certain autonomous rights entirely in Hungary and that they then would abandon their territorial demands before the court of arbitration. The

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<sup>11</sup> John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

<sup>12</sup> Tarján Odön and A. Fall: *Hungarians, Slovaks and Ruthenians in the Danube Valley*, Budapest, 1938, p. 5.

<sup>13</sup> *Nova Svoboda*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 115, Nov. 9, 1938 (Semi-official newspaper of the Carpatho-Ukrainian Government).

Carpatho-Ukrainian delegation headed by Prime Minister Voloshyn rejected this possibility and was unwilling even to discuss it.

Immediately after the Vienna Arbitration, when Hungary acknowledged its territorial demands as satisfied, it planned further aggression. On November 20, 1938, it planned an armed attack on Carpatho-Ukraine. For this it secured by an approach to Mussolini 100 airplanes by telling him that Germany was agreeable to this Hungarian action, but this was false.<sup>14</sup> The pilots of these planes were to be Italian soldiers in Hungarian uniforms. Germany and then Italy informed Hungary that in case it attacked Carpatho-Ukraine — and thus the Czecho-Slovak Republic, they would not feel it their obligation to help Hungary. As a result, Hungary gave up its plan. In connection with this, we must note that even before the Vienna Arbitration, the Hungarian Government had organized an irregular force of 20,000 men to create disorders in Carpatho-Ukraine and carry on there all kinds of sabotage and terroristic actions. This was commanded by officers of the army under Sándor Homlok, Colonel of the General Staff and Head of the Second Department of the General Staff.<sup>15</sup>

Some detachments of this force were trained by the Polish General Staff.<sup>16</sup> By instructions of the Hungarian Government, these units actually did carry on terroristic acts and all kinds of sabotage on the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine. The Poles on the other side of the frontiers gave them outstanding help.

Hungary used its own agents in propaganda against Carpatho-Ukraine in the international forum and claimed that "there was no order there, but a threat of Communism, etc." The peaceful life of the region and the foreign journalists present in the area successfully opposed this propaganda. Ciano, who was without doubt a friend of Hungary, expressed himself against this method of carrying on a policy, and wrote in his diary: "It follows from information which we have received that the responsibility for the border incidents between the Hungarians and Czechs does not rest exclusively with Prague. On the contrary, the Hungarian position is not sympathetic. From the very beginning, she has endeavored to work against the Vienna Arbitration. A foolish policy."<sup>17</sup>

b) Poland. — The territory of Carpatho-Ukraine had never been part of Poland. Despite this fact, Poland showed a lively interest in Carpatho-Ukrainian questions, chiefly because: a) it opposed on principle every-

<sup>14</sup> *Ciano's Hidden Diary, 1937-8*. New York, 1953, p. 196.

<sup>15</sup> Walter Hagen, *Die geheime Front*, Linz und Wien, 1950, pp. 182-3.

<sup>16</sup> *ibidem*.

<sup>17</sup> Graf Galeazzo Ciano, *Tagebücher, 1939-43*, Bern, 1946, p. 22.

thing of Ukrainian character; b) it was agitating for a common Polish-Hungarian frontier, which was possible only at the expense of Carpatho-Ukraine; and 3) it had at the time within its borders 7 million Ukrainians with greatly limited national and civil rights. It tried not to recognize the existence of Ukrainians in Poland and was angry that further to the west on the other side of the Carpathians there was a part of the same Ukrainians with those broad rights of autonomy which it so consistently refused its own Ukrainians. It was a very revealing fact that Beck, the then Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an interview on March 21, 1938 with Mr. Ward Price, editor of the English newspaper, *Daily Mail*, stated that "The 250,000 Poles living under Czechoslovak rule form an alien compact population in the Cieszyn (Tesin) area and it is their good right to demand such a local autonomy, as is demanded by the Sudeten Germans." The same Beck refused 7 million Ukrainians in his state their elementary rights!

Poland carried on a stubborn campaign against Carpatho-Ukraine and not only at home by press and radio but in the international forum. In the official memoranda sent to the embassies of the various countries in Prague, it attacked the administration of Carpatho-Ukraine as Communistic and even named localities in which Soviets existed. This caused us serious difficulties and answering them in Prague involved great labor and energy.

Poland exerted strong diplomatic efforts in Germany to secure common Polish-Hungarian frontiers. Its official circles — Minister Beck, his ambassador in Berlin, Lipski, etc. — used every opportunity to secure the liquidation of Carpatho-Ukraine, by claiming that it was "the wellspring of every conceivable sort of political current, a downright hot-bed of Communism"<sup>18</sup> In these diplomatic endeavors to secure joint frontiers with Hungary, Poland used a double argument: "The Western Powers were told that it would create a barrier against German expansion in Central and Eastern Europe, while Germany was told that it would further the establishment of an anti-Soviet bloc."<sup>19</sup>

Up to March, 1939, Germany carried on diplomatic negotiations with Poland to end their mutual points of difference (Danzig and the Corridor) and to lay a basis for a common policy in the East of Europe, in which Carpatho-Ukraine played a large role. On October 24, 1938, Ribbentrop told Lipski in Berchtesgaden that "if an all-round solution could be reached between Germany and Poland, a happy arrangement

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<sup>18</sup> *Documents on International Affairs, op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>19</sup> Dr. Hubert Ripka, *Munich Before and After*, London, 1939, pp. 223-4.

could certainly be found to solve this problem (Carpatho-Ukraine, remark of author) too."<sup>20</sup>

In view of the interest of Poland in the Ukrainian question, Germany made far-reaching proposals, as Lipski reported to Warsaw. He gave among other terms that "at this stage he (Ribbentrop) mentioned that, for instance, Germany recognized Poland's priority of right in the Ukrainian question, despite the fact that this might not please certain sections of German public opinion."<sup>21</sup>

This can explain the fact that Germany did not put forward and exploit in the international forum the nationalistic problem of Poland as it did in the case of the Czechoslovak Republic. Hitler, not having found a common language with Poland, went against it with his new partner Stalin. So, when on April 6, 1939, Lipski went to the German Ministry to express the anxiety of Poland over the German ultimatum to Lithuania, Weizsäcker interrupted him and in an unusual tone declared: "I should not have been surprised, if he (Lipski) had thanked us for not opposing Warsaw's ardent desire for a common Hungarian-Polish frontier."<sup>22</sup>

#### THE PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE

Despite all the difficulties which the neighbors of Carpatho-Ukraine caused it, the development of its life went on at a normal tempo. The necessary economic arrangements were made, an agreement was reached with Hungary for the passage of trains through the territory taken by the Vienna Arbitration, the food supplies for the population were provided, a school system, judiciary and administration were set up. Elections were held for the Diet and the results of these strengthened the political position of the country and were in a way a plebiscite and a clear answer to the Hungarian imperialistic plans.

Then, while internally life in the country was being consolidated, the danger of hostile aggression grew on the foreign political scene. It became acute, when Hitler, as a result of his political interests, began to change his policy toward Czechoslovakia and especially Carpatho-Ukraine. The month of March was critical. Things were "arranged" as Stalin said on March 10, 1939 and Hitler began those moves according to the plan which included the liquidation of Carpatho-Ukraine.

On March 13, Hitler called the Hungarian envoy in Berlin, Dóms Sztojaj, and told him that "Hungary could now occupy Carpatho-Ukraine

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<sup>20</sup> *Documents, op. cit.* p. 89.

<sup>21</sup> *ibidem*, p. 122.

<sup>22</sup> *ibidem*, p. 127.

and was to do it at once." Sztojaj at once flew to Budapest in company with a high official of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and presented the matter for decision. The news aroused great enthusiasm in Hungarian governmental circles. The Hungarian government asked at least 14 days to prepare action, but Hitler gave it only 24 hours. Horthy, the Regent of Hungary thanked Hitler for this kindness in a letter written in his own hand:

*Budapest, March 13, 1938.*

"Your Excellency: Heartfelt thanks! I cannot express how happy I am, for this headwater region (Quellgebiet) is, in fact, for Hungary — I dislike using big words — a vital question.

"Notwithstanding our recruits of but 5 weeks, we are tackling the matter with enthusiasm. The plans are already laid. On Thursday the 16th of this month a frontier incident will take place, to be followed on Saturday by the big thrust.

I shall never forget this proof of friendship and Your Excellency can at all times ever rely steadfastly (felsenfest) on my gratitude.<sup>23</sup>

*Horthy."*

With the consent of Hitler to the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine, the government of Hungary sent on March 14 an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak government in Prague, demanding that:

1. The Czech army leave the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine within 24 hours.
2. Hungarian political prisoners be released without delay.
3. The Hungarian population be given arms.<sup>24</sup>

The Prague Government answered that in questions of Carpatho-Ukraine, its government was the competent body. The same day a delegate representative of the Hungarian government appeared in Khust and presented the new demands of his government. The Prime Minister, Msgr. Voloshyn, after a short council, gave him a negative answer. Meanwhile the Hungarian regular army and irregular units<sup>25</sup> had already crossed the frontiers of Carpatho-Ukraine and attacked the state by force. The Carpathian Sich,<sup>26</sup> all classes of the population and the Ukrainian soldiers<sup>27</sup> determined on armed resistance. Colonel Serhiy Yefremov was

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<sup>23</sup> *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*, Series D, Vol. IV, Department of State, Washington, D. C. 1951, p. 241.

<sup>24</sup> *Documents, op. cit.* Statement by the British Prime Minister, March 15, 1939, p. 59.

<sup>25</sup> The Hungarians themselves called them *rongyos banda* (red bands).

<sup>26</sup> The Carpathian Sich was a semi-military organization.

<sup>27</sup> The Ukrainian soldiers were serving in the Czecho-Slovak army in Khust.

named commander-in-chief of all Ukrainian armed forces, when Czech General Svátek refused to take over the post, although previously in a conversation with Prime Minister Msgr. Voloshyn, he had indicated his willingness to do so.

On March 14, the Government of Carpatho-Ukraine, complying with the will of the people and important constitutional laws, adopted a resolution proclaiming Carpatho-Ukraine an Independent State. This Declaration of Independence by Carpatho-Ukraine was ratified the following day, i. e. March 15, 1939, by a special law of the Diet of Carpatho-Ukraine. In conjunction therewith extensive reorganization of the government took place and the government received broader legal powers. The government of Carpatho-Ukraine publicized this declaration and, through its legal Representatives in Prague, notified on that same day the embassies of such governments as the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, Poland and Rumania.

The opposition of the Carpatho-Ukrainian population to the Hungarian occupation caused dissatisfaction in German political circles. This was shown by the actions of A. von Hencke, the German Chargé d'Affaires in Prague and Consul Hoffman in Khust. The latter, we must mention, when he was invited by a delegation from the Government to take part in the session of the Diet replied that he would not attend a Ukrainian meeting.

It was the desire of Germany that Hungary should occupy the country boldly and quietly, for the guarantees of Germany and Italy to the borders of Carpatho-Ukraine after the Vienna Arbitration and the many declarations of Ribbentrop on the subject were still too fresh.

After the proclamation of the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine, Prime Minister Msgr. Voloshyn sent a telegram to the Prague Government in which he thanked the Czech people and their government for 20 years of common existence. That same day I met in the building of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers in Prague Dr. J. Kapras, my former professor in the University and then Minister of Education in the last Government. He was greatly touched by the telegram of Msgr. Voloshyn and said: "We have done you much wrong and I did not expect that you would act so nobly. By that telegram in these hard times your Government has given us great pleasure. Please repeat to your Government and the Ukrainian people our sincere thanks," and tears streamed from the eyes of the old professor. This ended the official relations between the two governments.

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## THE LINGUISTIC QUESTION IN CARPATHO-UKRAINE

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

For a brief period in 1938 Carpatho-Ukraine seemed to hold the centre of the European stage. After the Munich Agreement "to preserve peace in our time," the region received the autonomy that it had been promised years before by the Treaty of St. Germain, even though it was deprived of its most important political and economic centres, Mukachevo and Uzhorod. The growing estrangement of the Czechs and Slovaks isolated the region and it declared its independence March 15, 1939. This was short-lived for almost at once it was invaded by Hungary and its government was forced to flee. The outbreak of World War II soon cast into the shadow this episode and the hopes of the Ukrainians in it were again forgotten, until at the end of the War, the new Czechoslovak government graciously handed it over to the Soviets as a preliminary to its own disappearance behind the iron curtain.

This temporary period of independence cast a surprising light upon an area which has been largely veiled by silence throughout the centuries. Nevertheless Carpatho-Ukraine has not escaped its own participation willingly or not in the general stream of events and to an unexpected degree it has been concerned in most of the Ukrainian vicissitudes.

The bulk of its population is and always has been Ukrainian, although there was a large Jewish minority. It is hard to say when the Ukrainians first arrived in the region, but it was at a very early period. One fact is clear — at a relatively early period they passed under Hungarian domination, although it is still uncertain whether the great Hungarian feudal lords who held sway in the area were themselves of Ukrainian or of Hungarian origin. We only need to recall that the Szechenyi family, among the most important of these, as opposed to the attempt in the nineteenth century to make Hungarian the official language of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen in place of Latin and spoke themselves for generations, at least with their retainers the local tongue.

Despite the political systems, there grew up a very definite contact between the population of Hungarian Rus and the Ukrainians of Galicia who were early included in Poland proper shortly after the foundation of Lviv and the downfall of the Galician-Volynian Kingdom. Both Poland and Hungary in the Middle Ages tried to pass over in silence the Ukrainian situation. Yet it is noticeable that the Church Union which

took place in Mukachevo, whereby the Orthodox acknowledged the Papal supremacy was definitely based upon the agreement reached at Brest some half century earlier.

The population of the area, despite their own conflicts with their Hungarian overlords, was affected by all of the national movements among the Ukrainians in Poland. Like the Ukrainians in Galicia, the leaders of this area, especially the Greek Catholic clergy, received their education in the institutions erected by the Hapsburgs in Vienna and Lviv at the end of the 18th century.

At the end of World War I, Carpatho-Ukraine under the name of *Podkarpatska Rus* was made an autonomous part of Czechoslovakia, but the autonomy promised was never realized until 1938. The Czechs did a great deal in the furtherance of education and the foundation of schools but they basically used the area for their own political purposes without consulting the population. Their object at first was to maintain a common boundary with Romania in the name of the Entente and to keep separate Poland and Hungary. No one spoke of the wishes of the native population.

The Ukrainian people were thus largely left to their own devices and their own scanty resources in the determination of the course that they would pursue. They received aid from their brothers in Western Ukraine and from refugees from the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and their progress was such and so unnoticed, that few had expected that they would rise to the occasion when Czechoslovakia began to fall apart. It was only noticed by the Ukrainians elsewhere who volunteered their aid in the crucial moments.

We must notice another factor. When the Ukrainian revival began in Western Ukraine, Markian Shashkevych was able to publish his works in Budapest and they circulated to some extent in Carpatho-Ukraine, though they were denied admission to Galicia. The movement of Magyarization headed by Louis Kossuth (against the wishes of the Szechenyis) checked but could not stop the Ukrainian revival in the Carpathians. It served to warp the movement and to paralyze it for decades by drawing into the Hungarian sphere the bulk of those young men from the area who received a formal education. This was to play later an important role.

Yet while the area was backward politically and economically, it was the delight of linguists and ethnographers. Ivan Franko in 1883 used the rural life to preach the moral of democracy in his novel, supposedly of the 13th century, *Zakhar Berkut*. Kotsyubynsky found much in the legends of the people and their superstitions to lend color and charm to his story, *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors*. Many a Ukrainian

scholar, especially from Western Ukraine, welcomed every opportunity to travel in this area and to collect material that would be of value for further studies, even though the museum in Budapest sought to give the impression that the population was naturally Hungarian more by implication than by outright statement, for they recognized the difference between Slavic and the Hungarian Magyar kernel of the state.

All this hampered the development of a strong and vital sense of national union. Long after the population of Galicia became conscious of their national identity, far too large a part of the population of Carpatho-Ukraine was still content to call themselves Rusins, Rusnaks or even natives and avoid any too clear definition of their racial stock.

This was only natural in a mountainous area where in many sections, agriculture was second to cattle raising and where a considerable part of the population went each year to the high pastures and followed their grazing flocks and herds from place to place. The Vacuum Oil signs distributed throughout the territory by American salesmen after World War I cast a lurid light upon the still almost primitive economy of many areas. There was much in the area reminiscent of the mountain whites of the southern United States, who maintained until recent years old customs and forms of speech that were often survivals of the seventeenth century in the British Isles and had not yielded to the modern mode of living.

The Ukrainians of Carpatho-Ukraine, separated by the administrative divisions of Hungary and also by the diocesan boundaries of the Church, still lived until very recent times with those tribal divisions and dialectic peculiarities that had disappeared from the more open and accessible lowlands. The Hutsuls, the Lemky and the Boyky lived their own lives, engaged in their own occupations largely determined by the nature of the region where they lived and maintained their own native dialects as in the ancient past. Their contacts with the outside world were limited and led them to seasonal labor in the Hungarian plains, in Austria and Germany. Many of them were among the early Ukrainians to come to America and here as Carpatho-Ukrainians, many of them fell under Muscovite influence for far too many of their clergy were almost openly pro-Hungarian and Magyar in their political sympathies.

The confusion that prevailed among many of these colonists was so great that when a few years ago an examination was held in New York in Carpatho-Russian, no two candidates used the same language. Some wrote pure Russian or what passed for it. Others employed the Russian of the pre-Revolutionary period or tried to. Others wrote Ukrainian and still others either Muscovite or Ukrainian in Latin characters. It was a

symbol of the indefiniteness of many of American Carpatho-Ukrainians as to their national origin.

The basis of all these dialects was definitely Ukrainian and this was early recognized by all of the scholars who were unbiassed and capable of judging. The only alien influence which appeared in certain districts was that of Slovak for the boundary line between the Carpatho-Ukrainians and Slovaks was often crooked and involved and there were many small islands of each included in the territory of the other.

On the other hand this area had been definitely Christianized from the east. The Church Slavic language which had been carried into Kiev from the Southern Slavs was still in use in the church services and outside of the Hungarian, taught in the few schools existing before 1914, was the chief vehicle of written communication among the largely illiterate peasants. This had undergone transformations and changes through the centuries similar to those in the other sections of Western Ukraine. It gave the Ukrainian revival somewhat the same features as in Galicia but even there Polish was a Slavic language while Hungarian belonged to an entirely different linguistic family and this led many of the educated class almost entirely away from their native tongue, for a Hungarianized Ukrainian soon ceased to be Ukrainian.

This was a situation very favorable for the development of Moscovism, that phenomenon which for many years played so strong a role in the Ukrainian sections of Galicia. Here it was even more intense. The Russian agents (and there were many of them even in the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) easily persuaded a part of the population that they were speaking in their dialect something that was often labelled as Old Russian. How often it was said to win these people over to the Russian side that they were speaking old Russian, the old language of Rus which was then identified with modern Russians! Everything to induce them to abandon their own form of speech and to adopt as their standard not Ukrainian but modern Russian!

Under such conditions and in such an environment, the Russian agents sent to Carpatho-Ukraine for political agitation before World War I were not inclined to pay any attention to the Imperial Russian Academy of Sciences when it declared that Ukrainian was a distinct and separate language and not a dialect of Muscovite Great Russian. There was no one to raise the argument as to the impossibility of a situation in which the language of this mountainous area could be more closely related to the speech of Moscow than to that of Lviv or Kiev, which were far closer to the Carpathians.

The extreme Moscoviles in Carpatho-Ukraine became so obsessed with their hatred of everything Ukrainian that they clamored for a re-

union of the area with Moscow, whether they were Communist or not, so long as Moscow would assign them to the Russian Soviet Republic and not to the Ukrainian. This seemed almost the last straw, for it not only flew in the face of all linguistic and ethnographical observations but also all geographical principles by which the Soviet Union had been built up.

During the Czecho-Slovak regime there were three main linguistic schools in Carpatho-Ukraine and they were reflected in the choice even of textbooks for the elementary schools. The first and the only one that had a serious and practical basis was the Ukrainian which accepted the basic identity of the Ukrainian language of Carpatho-Ukraine, Galicia and Eastern Ukraine. This paid all respect to the special words and idioms that had been developed in the Carpathian dialects and continued that same process of standardization which had produced all the languages of the world out of a series of local but related dialects under literary tradition.

The second was the Moscophile or Great Russian trend which was willing to deny everything native and under the guise of modernization to reject the progress of centuries, to deny the reality of the old Church Slavic and to substitute anything that was stamped with the label of St. Petersburg and later of Moscow. The political objectives of this trend were so obvious that it was beginning to lose ground just as the less violent manifestations in Galicia had yielded under the influence of Franko and his followers.

The third trend of Ruthenianism, of an endeavor to standardize all the dialects of Carpatho-Ukraine on the basis of the inter-relation of the dialects themselves, was supported by the pro-Hungarians. It bound the Carpatho-Ukrainians to an inferior literature or to the imitation of those models which had been outmoded in all parts of Ukraine. It is small wonder that this school gradually receded in importance with the weakening in Carpatho-Ukraine of the Hungarian influence.

It was under such conditions that Carpatho-Ukraine commenced its cultural and political rebirth. This revived the old kinship with the Ukrainians of Galicia which had prevailed under the Galician-Volynian Kingdom and had survived throughout the ages despite the frequent re-organization of the Hapsburg lands. Had fate smiled upon the independent Ukrainian states developed at the close of World War I, the Carpatho-Ukrainians would have had an easier time. As it was, they were marching slowly but steadily toward that goal that was becoming increasingly clear, the association with their brothers in the other sections of their country in a free state.

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# CARPATHO-UKRAINE UNDER HUNGARIAN OCCUPATION (1939-1944)

By VASYL MARKUS

The occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine by the Hungarian armies in March, 1939 and the military operations commenced on March 14 of that year must be considered an act of aggression. The Budapest government had no legal right to begin these military actions. The reasons proclaimed by the Magyar Telegraphic Agency (M. T. I.) on March 15 for the advance of the Hungarian armies into the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine misrepresented the actual state of affairs in Carpatho-Ukraine. The ultimatum of Count Chaky, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was couched in such terms that Msgr. A. Voloshyn as head of the government could only reject it. A fight to the death began. The unpreparedness of the new armed forces of the Ukrainian National Defence Force — the Carpathian Sich — for a prolonged struggle, the hostile attitude of Poland and the approval of the Hungarian action by Berlin and Rome, resulted in the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine. This struggle cost the Ukrainians more than 4,000 human victims — who fell in battle or were shot, including both soldiers and civilians.

## THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL POSITION OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE

As a result of the occupation, Hungary increased its territory by 11,085 sq. km. and 552,124 in population (Census of 1930). Before this as a result of the Arbitration in Vienna, it had received from the former administrative units in "Podkarpatska Rus", 1,552 sq. km. and 181,609 in population. In all, Hungary gained 12,631 sq. km. and 733,733 in population.

Carpatho-Ukraine was organized by Hungary as a separate administrative unit, but its territory was changed by Budapest several times.

The final area of Carpatho-Ukraine consisted of 12,061 sq. km. with a population of 621,900 (according to the Hungarian statistics for 1941).

## THE "AUTONOMY" OF CARPATHO-UKRAINE IN 1939-1944

From March to July, 1939, the area was under military occupation. While in Carpatho-Ukraine the gendarmeries and army and especially

the terroristic groups (Hungarian volunteers) were pacifying the population, arresting and liquidating without trial the active Ukrainian workers, Budapest was considering the question of the future organization of the region.

In July, 1939, the Hungarian government created a temporary status for Carpatho-Ukraine, to continue until it could arrange by legitimate ways to decide the organization of the country (this did not happen before the end of the Hungarian occupation). An official decree No. 6,200-1939 M. E. set up the following system of administration.

The name — so-called Subcarpathian Territory was composed of three counties (previously the Ugots County had been withdrawn from it): Ung, Bereh, and Maramorosh. The administrative and executive powers were in the hands of a Commissar of the Regent, named by the head of the state on the nomination of the government. He was assisted by a chief counsellor and an advisory committee. The competence of the Commissar was similar to that of the zhupan (the prefect of a County) plus the field of education which in Hungary proper was under the Inspector of the Academy.

Hungarian and Rus were the official languages in the area; in practice only Hungarian was official and the bilingualism was used only in proclamations, decrees and the Official Journal.

We must note that the Commissar of the Regent was always a Hungarian (Zsigmond Perényi, Miklós Kozma, Vilmos Tomesányi) and the chief counselor was a local prelate, Monsigneur Aleksander Ilnytsky.

The practical result of the so-called autonomy was negligible. This status was very far from the regime guaranteed to Carpatho-Ukraine in Czechoslovakia by the Treaty of St. Germain. The Hungarians did not carry out on the annexed territory even that general plebiscite, by which occupants usually try to give a legal title to their occupation. During the 5 years of occupation here Budapest held no elections, although in June, 1939 there were parliamentary elections in Hungary. Instead of proclaiming elections, the upper and lower houses of Hungary appointed of their own will several representatives of Carpatho-Ukraine, half of whom were Hungarians. Some of them had been in the Czechoslovak Parliament or the Uzhorod Regional Representation; their nomination was as "a parliamentary representation of the acquired territories."

This parliamentary delegation was headed by Andri Brody, a former member of the Czechoslovak Parliament, who had been arrested in 1938 in Prague for his pro-Hungarian policy.

FURTHER EXPERIMENTS OF THE HUNGARIANS AND THEIR CULTURAL  
POLICY IN CARPATHO-UKRAINE

After taking over Carpatho-Ukraine, the Hungarian revisionists desired to root their occupation most securely in this Ukrainian land. The anti-Hungarian mood of the people at once showed that they had a national and political Ukrainian consciousness and that the entire generation had been reared on democratic principles and in a sense of unity with Ukraine and the Slavic world. The Hungarians met a pan-Ukrainian patriotism founded on opposition to Hungary and on old and fresh anti-Hungarian resentments.

In this situation Budapest could not, at least openly, continue its well-known old minority policy, which had tried in multinational Hungary to form a uninational state. It was also dangerous to adopt this extreme chauvinism, because in their anti-Czech struggle to recover the country, the Hungarians had condemned the Czechization of Carpatho-Ukraine and promised wide cultural and political rights to the Ukrainians, if they acquired the area.

Therefore, Budapest acquiesced in the fact of the existence of a separate national minority and was ready to grant certain cultural rights. But, in order to weaken the spiritual connection of the Carpathian Ukrainians with general Ukrainian culture, and especially from fear of political irredentism, they opposed everything Ukrainian. So at first the Hungarians favored the Russophile cultural trend, the partisans of which supported Hungarian revisionism. Ukrainian publications, cultural societies, the press, theatre, even the name "Ukrainian" as applied to the Carpathian region, were banned, Russian culture, publications and literature were tolerated. But the younger Russophile intelligentsia quickly lost the confidence of the regime and then the Hungarians began to look for other loyalists.

In Budapest, with the help of some Hungarians and local partisans of Hungary, the idea was advanced that the population of Carpatho-Ukraine was different from the Ukrainian and other Slavic peoples and formed a people with their own culture. This was clearly an attempt to separate the Carpathian Ukrainians culturally from their own stock in order thus to implant in them the idea of the state of St. Stephen.

The Hungarians organized a scientific institution, The Subcarpathian Scientific Society, which was to create a separate language, literature and culture. The enthusiast of this autochthonous idea was a Hungarian W. Kozma (who at the opening of the Subcarpathian Society in Uzhorod 26. I. 1941 declared: "The Rus people in Subcarpathia do not wish to be a bridge or a hotbed of foreign interests from across the frontiers —



either in political or cultural relations. This people wish for themselves their own; as they exist, i. e. as Rus, they wish to develop their own independent and separate culture within the frame of the idea of the state of St. Stephen and its politico-legal and ethical and moral thought and in the realization of a Hungarian-Rus understanding."

The government financed these institutions and they carried on some publicational activity; some periodicals, books and textbooks. They published a grammar based upon the Ukrainian literary language with an artificial and archaic orthography. In time and content these publications started with the Hungarian conception but because of the banning of Ukrainian literary publications, the Carpatho-Ukrainians gradually rallied around them.

Besides the plan of separating the culture and language from their Ukrainian sources, the Hungarians carried on a process of Magyarization in the schools, press and cultural life. To the Hungarians, the Ukrainian intellectual groups seemed to be enemies. Instead of 7 Ukrainian gymnasiums in 1939, only 3 were permitted; in their place 4 Hungarian gymnasiums were founded in Carpatho-Ukraine; of 25 community (lower middle) schools only 12 were opened. On the "Subcarpathian Territory" there were 692 elementary schools and they held 1387 Ukrainian and 297 Hungarian classes, i.e. there were 4.5 Ukrainian classes for 1 Hungarian while there were 25 Ukrainian children of school age for each Hungarian child. Naturally, these schools were intended to Magyarize the Ukrainian children, not to mention the fact that instruction in the Hungarian language was introduced into all Ukrainian schools and in the middle schools, the chief subjects were also taught in Hungarian. We must also note that for the 80,000 Ukrainians outside the autonomous territory there was not a single Ukrainian school.

The cultural and intellectual life almost did not exist; the educational societies which had existed previously were banned. The Ukrainian youth was forced to join Levente the semi-military organization.

#### ANTI-HUNGARIAN RESISTANCE

The Hungarian terror in the first months of the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine was intended to terrify all anti-Hungarian elements and to liquidate or arrest the leaders of the Ukrainian movement as the most dangerous persons. In the beginning the Hungarians succeeded.

But there soon commenced very serious anti-Hungarian actions which in part were dependent upon the foreign political situation. The resistance in Carpatho-Ukraine took three main forms: 1 Ukrainian national underground; 2. Mass flight abroad and 3. Sovietophile underground and partisan movement.

It was not long before there commenced a flight of Ukrainians from Hungary. In the first months of the occupation several hundred of the intellectual youth fled to Slovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Galicia. From the autumn of 1939 to the spring of 1941 some 25-30 thousand young people of all classes (workers, peasants and students) fled from Carpatho-Ukraine. This population movement was caused by the intolerable Hungarian régime, the persecutions and recruiting for the army and labor camps. Besides, with the Hungarian attack on everything Ukrainian, people got the desire to reach Ukraine and some sought this even in the form of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Scarcely 5% of the fugitives through the Carpathians to the north were Communists; the rest were nationalists, very naive, unacquainted with Bolshevism and without experience. They all, after crossing the frontier, landed not in schools but in Soviet prisons; instead of studying in technical and engineering schools, they worked and perished in northern labor camps; instead of "becoming free citizens of a Ukrainian Republic," they knew the fate of the Soviet deportees, receiving 3-10 years of exile for "espionage, diversion, and enemy propaganda."

The national resistance was better organized and ideologically oriented. In the occupied region there were quickly organized cells of the underground Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The underground united under a strict conspiratorial system the best ideologically prepared elements of the intellectuals, peasants, and especially the student youth. The actions of the nationalists were rather of a propagandistic character.

In 1941 a group of nationalists were arrested for a widespread anti-Hungarian propagandistic activity on the 2nd anniversary of the proclamation of the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine. A larger wave of arrests came in 1942, when the Hungarians discovered the chief network of the OUN in Carpatho-Ukraine and arrested about 200 persons. In July, 1942 they held three large trials in Mukhachiv before a court martial and at these the members and partisans of the OUN were condemned to various terms in prison up to 12 years. In a third wave of anti-Ukrainian activity in 1943 the Hungarians arrested the former social and political workers who were accused of cooperating with the underground. In general in Carpatho-Ukraine the partisan struggle did not enjoy great significance because the armies of the Axis, being pressed from the south and north by the Red Army, did not put up any resistance and quickly evacuated Carpatho-Ukraine.

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## AT THE CROSSROADS OF THE WORLD HISTORY

*By* DMYTRO ANDRIYEVSKY

The months of July and August, 1954, will enter history as a crucial period. In those events which took place in the second half of July and the first half of August have been focussed as by a lens, the chief tendencies of the present historical epoch and they throw a clear light upon the future development of events.

On the night of July 20-21 in Geneva at the so-called Asiatic Conference there was reached an understanding on Indochina between the Communist powers, the Soviet Union and China, on the one hand and the western powers of the free world, chiefly France, on the other. The agreement reached at Geneva was nothing more for the West than a saving of face, for in the final analysis it gave the victory to the East, first to Asia and then to the Soviet Union. The division of Indochina into two parts was only a postponement till a later occasion of its complete domination by the Communist government of Viet Minh, which acquired the northern part and parts of that southern section which were allotted to the government of Viet Nam. The government of Emperor Bao Dai is powerless to struggle against the ideological and political infiltration by the Communist influence of Ho Chi Minh. The elections which are to take place after two years will certainly, if there are no radical changes in world policy, insure the legal transfer of the whole of Indochina to a Communist regime. The decisive factor in Geneva was perhaps the Premier of China, Chou En Lai, but Molotov clearly remained to the end the chief spokesman of the Communist side. The role of England and America in these negotiations was reduced to that of counselors and guarantors of France. In addition the United States, after the departure of Secretary Dulles from Geneva, voluntarily receded from its uncompromising opposition to Communism by refusing, not without the support of England, the plan of an armed intervention in the Indochina War, and retaining only the idea of a defensive pact for Southeast Asia, but this is still far from realization because of the lack of agreement among the Western powers.

Soon after this action at Geneva, there came on July 27 the signing of a treaty between Great Britain and Egypt. England after possessing for 72 years the commanding strategic positions in the valley of the Nile, promised within 20 months to withdraw its armies from Egypt. The

lifeline of the British Empire, the sea road which leads through the Suez Canal to India, Australia, and New Zealand is passing into the hands of Egypt which is taking over the defence of the Canal. This shows how far England has been compelled to reckon with the national prestige of Egypt. The present revolutionary and military government of Egypt under Colonel Nasser, after expelling King Farouk, gained control of the situation by the slogan of removing from the country the remains of the British army of occupation. Only the deep political sense of the English, who knew how in time after World War II to come to an agreement with India by recognizing its independence and still keeping it in the Commonwealth, could allow them to maintain their political position in the valley of the Nile. What is more, it secured the inclusion of Egypt in that international political system, against the efforts of Moscow to bring it into the Communist system. This solution was not arranged without the help of the USA, which promised Egypt the economic and technical aid which it needs for its further development.

A few days after the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, P. Mendes-France, the Premier of France, made the decision to go on August 1 to Tunisia to promise internal autonomy within the frame of the French Union. Tunis has been under the protectorate of France since 1882 and according to the Treaty of Bourdeau, was to retain full sovereignty. But France, without paying attention to the treaty, introduced into the country, a nominally independent, but actually colonial regime. Even before World War I the Tunisians had commenced an armed and political struggle for the return of their independence. The *Destour* party (and the name in Arabic means "constitution,") succeeded in securing certain reforms after that war. In 1930 it split and since then the political leadership in the country actually passed to the *Neo-destour* Party, which under its leader H. Bourgiba has carried on the struggle against the French colonialism which has assumed severe forms in the last years. In answer France applied repressions and interned H. Bourgiba and even removed him from Tunisia. Again under the pressure of terroristic action, fanned by the forces of the detachments of the Felaha, composed chiefly of various kinds of outlaw elements, but joined by the idealistic strugglers for the national cause, France decided to make the concessions which it had officially promised in 1950, the granting to Tunisia autonomy, i.e. a national assembly, an entirely separate government, etc. H. Bourgiba regards them as a "temporary and rational step toward the renewal of full sovereignty. Independence is still the idea of the Tunisian people."

These words of the leader of the Tunisian independence party are a valuable guide to the path that events are taking in North Africa under

the protectorate or administration of France, i.e. in Morocco and Algiers which are in a somewhat different legal position from Tunis but which belong to the same Arab world. The concessions given to Egypt by England and to Tunis by France will have a great reaction in the colonial countries. Their efforts to avoid this by the method of deposing nominal sovereigns, as happened a year ago in Morocco, not only do not solve the problems but complicate them still more. Behind the countries of North Africa is the entire Arab world of the Middle East and North Africa, united in the so-called Arab League, which is located in Cairo. It was no empty phrase of Colonel Nasser when he said: "We consider the question of the Arab world as our question. . . And now, when we have settled the question of Suez, we will help all Arab and Moslem countries to achieve their aspirations." We must take account of these words, for defence of the Near East from Communist expansion, which can be felt in the opposition to the French colonialism in North Africa, is impossible without Egypt. On the other hand the Arab countries are the chief bases for the American strategic Air Force, which maintains a threat against the Soviet Union and its forays against the free world.

Then there has been still another important event of the same character. On August 10, in the Hague, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Holland, Mr. Luns, and Mr. Soenorjo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, signed a pact which annulled the political relations between their two countries. In 1949 after armed efforts during World War II for its independence, Indonesia ceased to be a colony of Holland and acquired the status of a free member of the Dutch Union. But even this connection, as a relic of colonialism, insulted the national feelings of the Indonesians and they decided to rid themselves of it in return for the usual international treaties between two independent and equal states. This change of the legal situation does not change the economic relations between them. Each needs the other, for the capital investments of Holland in Indonesia which are estimated at a billion and a half of dollars are very profitable for both sides. The value of Holland to Indonesia will scarcely diminish in the near future, in spite of the Communist influences which are quite obvious in this Asiatic country. The break between the old metropolis and the colony has taken place for reasons of a national and political character and not the least role has been played by the question of the administration by the Dutch of New Guinea, which the Indonesians include in their area and which Holland holds.

In all these events of the last months there is a certain consistency which can be overlooked or discounted only by those who do not like them. All these events are examples of the one rule that is evident that nations, rapidly maturing in our time are undergoing great changes and

a heightened sensitivity to national and state consciousness, and are being emancipated from their former dominating centres and as a result, the old empires are falling apart or assuming completely new forms and constructions. We might even assert, if it were not contradicted by the practice of the Communist regimes that in our time, force in international relations is giving way to law and the freedom of peoples. This process began still earlier but it has taken more definite forms and showed itself more often since World War II.

Another clear element in these events is the fact that we can see in all of them the hand of the Soviets. They found the mutual relations of the old centres and their colonies a fertile field for attacking the Western powers. In some cases the Bolsheviks have gained a complete victory as in Indochina and in others they have suffered defeat as in Egypt. The role of the ferment of the Soviets in these events is not accidental. Even in the very days of the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks placed their mark on all anti-colonial movements, especially in Asia. They began at that time to train in special educational institutions which Stalin headed at one time, cadres of propagandists of various nations, even including the Negro tribes of Africa.

On the basis of these facts, we can assert that we are living in a period of national revolutions when previously enslaved peoples are rising and demanding their place in the sun. Europe went through a similar period in the beginning and middle of the last century, when the so-called non-historical peoples raised their voice and Italy was reborn. At that time France stood out as the protector of the oppressed, but now it holds a different role. Other peoples offer to-day the ideological basis for movements of liberation. Nationalism is to-day the motive force which moves the masses and produces events. But it is not the nationalism of the "haves," who are in retreat on every sector, but the nationalism of the peoples who have been robbed of all their rights and are desirous of freedom and existence as states. There is a struggle between the imperial and the national ideas. So in this field, too, the issue between the Communist system and the system of the free world is being made sharper. Both sides are using the same weapons, the same slogans of freedom but interpreting them in their own way. Hence there has arisen the chaos in conceptions advanced and in the results of the efforts, which it is not easy to unravel. We can assert that until now the Soviets have shown themselves to be the better tacticians than their opponents, but that their gains have not been so great. Only where the Western powers are maintaining or hesitating to give up their imperialistic positions as in Indochina are the Communists winning.

In general we can say that as the colonies are being emancipated, the Soviets are losing the ground for their political manoeuvres. In Asia actually Malaya is the only colony left. It is true that the neutralism of India and the other members of the Colombo bloc, which are wavering between Moscow and Washington, still offers chances for the Communist system to draw them into the sphere of its influences. The final outcome of their hesitation will depend upon the politics and tactics of the Western powers. In every case we can to-day foresee that the Communists have already exhausted their arguments of anti-colonialism in Asia and there can come a clash between the imperialistically inclined Communist powers, Russia and China, on the one side and the nationalisms of the people reborn to a free and independent life. Communism both in theory and practice is centralistic. It was such in the works of Karl Marx and Lenin and in the actions of Stalin. So we can assume that ere long there can arise divergences between the excessive pretensions to leadership between the capital of World Revolution and the China of Mao Tse Tung, and still sooner between them on the one side and Indonesia, Indochina and even India on the other.

Here it is worth while to point out some prophecies of the Ukrainians who have had a great deal of experience with the Communists. A Communist himself but also a Ukrainian patriot, Khvylovy with wonderful intuition foresaw even in the twenties what is happening to-day. He welcomed an "Asiatic Renaissance" and called upon Ukraine to take the leadership of the efforts of the enslaved peoples to free themselves. At the same time he became involved in a sharp conflict with Moscow and neither the admonitions of Moscow nor the thunderings of the Party could compel him to give up his position. He rested his case on two slogans: "Away from Moscow," which in his opinion gave his people nothing good and "Orientation on psychological Europe," i.e. not the social and political form of Europe but on the spirit and culture of the European community with its historical traditions. We believe that these slogans will soon become the slogans of the former colonies of the old European imperial centres. It is not for nothing that Ho Chi Minh sought and still seeks for cooperation with France. Bourgiba wishes to maintain an intimate contact with French culture and Colonel Nasser political inclusion in the western defence system. The further orientation of these leaders and their peoples will depend upon the attitude of the Western powers toward the nationalistic aspirations of the previously enslaved peoples.

As a result of this position and then the orientation of the peoples of the world, who are struggling for freedom, will come one or the other solution of the struggle between the Communist system and the system of the free world. W. Lippman has warned that Communism conquers

where it succeeds in mastering the local nationalism and loses ground where these nationalisms turn against it. The Bolsheviks appreciate very well the importance of the national movements and so, in arousing the colonial peoples against their masters, they never advance their social and economic slogans but only the national. It is characteristic that at the exposition dedicated to Indochina which they organized in May, 1954 in Berlin, they presented the struggle between Viet Minh and Viet Nam not as a civil war but as a patriotic struggle for liberation. Moscow does this on the basis of its own experience, for it knows well that even in the Soviet Union its most dynamic and the most dangerous enemy is not the social opposition of the population but the national reaction of the enslaved peoples, who have their territories, their cultures, their traditions different from those of the Russians and also their own separate national republics. On this basis there are growing in the Soviet Union centrifugal movements, which disintegrate from within the Soviet Empire and threaten the very existence of the Communist regime. The downfall of the regime could easily come from the disintegration of the Empire. To check these centrifugal movements, the Soviets try to flatter the dissatisfied peoples of the USSR by illusory concessions. An excellent example of these are their tactics toward Ukraine, when they arranged grandiose celebrations of the 300th anniversary of the union of Ukraine with Moscow and in every way tried to convince the Ukrainians that they were joint leaders of the Soviet Empire.

The West, opposing Communist expansion is still indifferent to the efforts of the non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union for liberation. What is more, the American policy has accepted as its own the theory of the Russian emigration, the so-called "non-predetermination." By this the Russian imperialists deny the fact that happened in the Russian Revolution, when the people made their own self-determination in the old Russian Empire, even though the results of that self-determination still survive in the form of the national republics of the USSR. Without taking account of reality this theory conditions the liberation of the peoples on the fall of the regime and thus puts the cart before the horse. In the past, the 14 points of President Wilson with the slogan of self-determination disintegrated the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. They also inspired the peoples of the old Russian Empire to demand self-determination. This slogan no longer has any effect upon the peoples of the Soviet Union, for they have passed through this stage and they now have other demands. The Bolshevik government has imposed upon them new fetters, by depriving them of their right of sovereignty in their national republics as they have the peoples of Central Europe, when they made them satellites. For them it is not a question of securing their right



to existence as a state, a right which even the Russian people have recognized to them, but the endowing of this right with sufficient strength and a concrete political meaning.

So as Moscow correctly estimates the importance and role of the national problem in the entire world and cleverly uses it against its opponents, so the Western democracies have undervalued this problem and are blunting their most powerful weapon against the Soviets. What is more, the Western democracies are turning against themselves the non-Russian peoples of the USSR by denying in practice the states created by their initiative and preserving the unity of the Russian Empire against the danger of disintegration. They are frightened at the prospect of a Balkanization of the wide expanses of the Soviet Union and are trying by every means to maintain the unity of the present territories of the USSR, i.e. the old Russian Empire. Thus the East European people of the Baltic, Ukraine and Byelorussia can belong only to the Eurasian complex and not to a United Europe. Does the welfare of the free world and especially of the present free Europe as well as the good of the enslaved peoples of Eastern Europe not demand their inclusion in the European community? The preservation of the power of Moscow which now threatens the entire world is not to the advantage of humanity but at the same time its weakening means a reduction in the general danger. In spite of this the Western policies force the Western neighbors of Russia into the bosom of Eurasia *ad majorem gloriam* of the Muscovite.

The future orientation of the former colonial peoples of Asia, Africa depend in a large degree upon how the Western democracies act toward the efforts of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union for liberation. By this they can judge the sincerity of their acknowledgement of the right of peoples freely to determine their own fate. No theories of non-predetermination can free any one from the clear and unambiguous answer to this question. In the present historical period humanity is passing through the stage of differentiating the old state unities by the test of national diversities. The Soviet Union as the former Russian Empire in a new garb cannot be an exception. After this process and really along with it, there is going on also the process of integrating the different nations into larger state unions, as e.g. in Western Europe. To oppose either process means to expose oneself to disillusionment and even to blows.

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## THE OIL INDUSTRY IN UKRAINE

By STEPHEN Y. PROTSIUK

Oil was first discovered in Galicia (Western Ukraine) in the middle of the XIX century. The region in which these discoveries were made, extended along the north slope of the Carpathians on both sides of the Syan River: west of the Syan, near Jaslo and Krosno, but more important, east of the Syan in the regions of Boryslav, Skhidnytsya, Tustanovychi and Mraznytsya somewhat to the south of the Boryslav region there was an outcropping of the oil fields near Bytkiv. The Carpathian oil-bearing deposits extend for about 300 km in length and by their geological structure are divided into three belts; the first, to the west is the so-called Krosno-Shypit stratum; the oil-bearing deposits here are on the crests of narrow, steep, saddles under the summits and their spurs, and the average depth at which the deposits are buried is 150-800 m. and sometimes more (Rohy, Rivne — 900-1100 m.). The life of the oil-wells is short — 6 to 18 years and the amount yield of the well is from 3000 to 4000 tons. The larger part of this geological stratum lies on the territory of present-day Poland but the most productive wells are in the region of Drohobych (Vankova) in the western districts of Ukraine.

The second stratum includes the chief West. Ukrainian sites of the region of Boryslav, Tustanovychi, Mraznytsya, Urych, Rypne and Sloboda-Rungurska. The average features of the yield are:

Regions	Depth in metres	Life of oil-well in years	Average production in tons
Boryslav, Mraznytsya	1500	6	20,000
Skhidnytsya, Urych, Opoka	150- 520	6-18	5,000-8,000
Bytkiv	500-1200	6-18	5,000-8,000

The third stratum includes the regions closest to the crest of the Carpathians, especially the gas-producing regions of Dashava and Kalush.

Exploitation of the oil of the Boryslav region on an industrial scale began in the 80's of the XIX century. In 1880 the entire basin produced 32,000 tons; in 1894, the production by regions was: Drohobych — 30,000 tons, Jaslo — 7,500 tons, Stanyslaviv — 1,000 tons. The oil production of the Boryslav basin reached its height in 1909, with a yield of 2,086,000 tons in the year. The then production

of the Western Ukrainian fields was 5% of the total world production of petroleum. But the recovery of it was by irrational and wasteful methods and these led to a drop in the output of the Carpathian oil fields. The foreign capital (chiefly French and Belgian) engaged in the oil industry showed no interest in the planned development of the Boryslav basin and tried to secure as rapidly as possible as much profit as possible by any means. We must remark that the geological conditions for recovering the oil and the special quality of the Boryslav oil pool created exceptional conditions for the workers and these, thanks to the backward technical level of the time, were not easy to solve. The majority of the oil bearing deposits were below 1,000 m. and often more than 1,300 m.; they required exceptionally deep drilling and the methods for doing this were perfected in Ukraine only in the 30's of the XX century. Another complication was the fact that the Boryslav petroleum contained a noticeably high percentage of paraffine (sometimes even 6%) and this prevented the transportation of the petroleum through the pipes, the cheapest method and adapted to the petroleum and natural gases. In general the oil of the Ukrainian Carpathian basin has these characteristics: specific weight — 0.825 — 0.835, content of light commercial fractions (derivatives), including basically gasoline: 5-12%; medium-heavy derivatives (including illuminating gas) — 53-56%; heavy derivatives, also especially important for industry — 24-30%; there was also, as we have said, an amount of paraffine. We see also that the Boryslav oil was not high in light and heavy derivatives which are the most valuable. But the technical development of the last years has aided in making use of the entire oil production of the Boryslav basin. At the beginning of the XX c., during the intense exploitation of this basin, the technical knowledge was too poor to surmount the difficulties. Besides this, oil at this period was just beginning to become of great importance and it was the time of the discovery of other sources, sometimes richer than those in Ukraine, in the Caucasus, Texas and the Near East and these gave a large production by cheap and easy methods of drilling. It was in the 30's and 40's of this century, thanks to the colossal development of the automobile and still more the airplane that the use of oil products became so great that<sup>1</sup> it became necessary to use *all* the existing possibilities for the extraction of oil, even that which was connected with a complicated technique in drilling and special process in refining and purification.

But in the period before World War I this need was not felt and in 1910 the yield of oil in the Carpathian regions began to diminish until

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<sup>1</sup> The use of oil products increased from 170 million tons in 1929 to approximately 600 million tons in 1951 (actually 184,805 million barrels) with a 60% increase in use between 1946 and 1951.

in 1914 on the eve of the war, it was only 850,000 tons. Between the two wars, there were two periods: the first from 1918 to 1928, when the oil production averaged 750,000 to 760,000 tons a year; and the second, 1929-39, years when the oil production continued steadily to diminish.

Unfortunately, even the new drillings were made in already developed fields and there were extraordinarily few test borings to find in general new deposits of oil; thus in 1927 only 3 such drillings were made in Drohobych, 6 in Jaslo and 11 in Stanyslaviv.

The methods of drilling were usually on a low level; e.g. the use of the so-called Pennsylvania method, which allowed the economizing of 57% of the cost and 47% of time was only later applied in the Boryslav basin (with a few exceptions), i.e. 1925-7. But even after this the losses in the storage of petroleum and petroleum products in containers (tanks) reached in the region of Boryslav 12% (at the same time in the USA — 1.15%). The losses were especially great because of the antiquated construction of the tanks.

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So much for the recovery of petroleum in Western Ukraine. The industrial processing of this petroleum was also organized in an unsatisfactory manner. There were quite a number of oil-extraction plants in the Carpathian basin of Western Ukraine but in fact there were few plants that deserved the name.

The most striking feature of the oil refining industry of the Carpathian basin was the fact that the largest refining companies were not themselves the owners of the oil fields and were compelled to buy oil on the market. This was so unsatisfactory that some economists proposed in the 20's that they import oil from the USSR or Romania to refine it in the plants of Western Ukraine and thus obtain the full capacity output of the plants. But this scheme was obviously doomed to failure, for the processing of the petroleum in the Ukrainian plants, which were then suffering from the vagueries of the Polish economic policy was so expensive that the final products of the refining, especially gasoline would not have been able to compete on the international market with those of the refineries of other countries. There was no point in processing imported petroleum for their own, local demand, for the demands in Western Ukraine for fuel, oil and lubricants was not great and the then, even partial production of the Western Ukrainian refineries fully supplied not only the needs of Western Ukraine but of the whole of Poland. Here we have a proof, definitely, of the very weak industrialization of the Ukrainian lands under Poland and also of all of Poland.

We have a clear illustration of the difficulties in the largest plant in the Boryslav basin in Drohobych (the so-called Polmin Refinery). This was built by the Austrian government, when the western districts of Ukraine (Galicia) were still part of the Austrian Empire (before 1918). It was intended to process only the surplus of the then production of petroleum which was at the beginning of the XX century, as we have seen, quite large. It was planned to use this surplus, among other ways, for oil fuel for the locomotives of the then Galician railroads. It was planned to change the fuel of a part of the locomotives from coal to oil, something which was from the economic point of view both proper and progressive at the time. But later, when the production of petroleum in the Western Ukrainian basins began to fall off, the refinery in Drohobych proved to be twice too large to refine the existing production and worked more or less at 50% of its capacity. It is then not surprising that the losses in production at this time reached 9.30% in the refineries, while in the USA they came to only 1.51%.

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As we have said, the second period between the wars covered the years 1929-1939. It was one of a constant decline in the production of petroleum from 743,000 tons in 1928 to 523,000 tons in 1939. To tell the truth, the production of petroleum really exceeded 523,000 tons in the entire Carpathian petroleum belt, including the regions of Jaslo and Horlytsi (Gorlice), a place in Western Galicia. In 1938 the production in the Boryslav basin alone was 371,000 tons and natural gas 581 million cubic metres. Also in 1939 thanks to the arming, which dominated Poland on the eve of the war, the production of petroleum increased from 501,000 tons in 1938 to 523,000 in 1939. The ten years 1929-39, were marked by the decline in the production of petroleum for two reasons. First in the beginning of the 30's there was throughout the entire world a serious economic crisis, which had an influence on the situation in the Boryslav basin. Secondly, during these same ten years there was an interference by the Polish government in the methods of handling foreign capital and financial arrangements. The Polish government of the time was planning to construct the so-called Central Industrial Region in the eastern and central lands of Poland (the present Rzeszow district) and its needs for power were to be met not only by the building of hydro-electric stations but in large part by developing the western parts of the Carpathian oil fields (Jaslo-Krosno).

The war years depressed still further the Boryslav basin. It is known for example that the retreating units of the Bolshevik army blew up at

the end of June, 1941, parts of the oil refineries of Drohobych.<sup>2</sup> Usually such installations as oil tanks, pipelines and refineries were the first target of military activities during the war.

It is hard to say what is the position of the Boryslav basin in the post-war period, for we have no data. Mention is made in the 4th Five Year Plan (1946-50) of the building of four new refineries and 16 other oil-extraction and purification plants on the territory of the entire USSR, but we only know that the great majority of these were built in the Bashkir and Tatar ASSR and in Central Asia; this same program included the restoration and building of some new oil-extracting plants in Lviv, Mukachiv and perhaps Drohobych. The plan of the 5th Five Year Plan (1951-55) mentions the rebuilding (ten years after the war!) of three refineries of the "South" of the USSR but it is hard to assume that by this was meant any plants in the Carpathian basin, since they are more probably the oil-processing plants of Odesa or Trudova (Donbas). The results of the 4th Five Year Plan announced in 1951 give no details of the Ukrainian oil industry. They only remark in general that in Ukraine, especially in the western districts, there had been opened new geological deposits of petroleum and that the Ukrainian refineries destroyed in the war, had been completely rebuilt. We have only hints of the building of new plants in the western districts and again there is mention of Lviv, Mukachiv and Drohobych. As regards the data of production, we have only the planned figure of 1950, under which the production of petroleum in Ukraine was to amount to 325,000 tons, i.e. less than in 1938 in the Boryslav basin alone (371,000 tons). But we can also say that the reserves of the Boryslav basin may be larger than was calculated in the 1930's.

However this may be, the oil fields of the Carpathian region still have not seemed sufficient, especially because of the increased industrialization of Ukraine. So, taking into consideration the difficulties of procuring petroleum in the Carpathian basin and the fact that the situation of this is not especially profitable for the industrial areas of the Dnieper and the Donbas, the Ukrainian geologists have begun to look for new oil fields. The great difficulty in this has been the lack of a deeper geological field exploration of many parts of Ukraine and it is well known that a geological survey gives the best hints for the search for profitable mines. A special attention of the explorers has been directed to the Dnieper-Donets depression.

After the revolution of 1917-20, although more attention was then paid to the economic questions of the country, the problem of Ukrainian

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<sup>2</sup> K. Heinrich, *Die Technische Truppen im Ostfeldzug*, report to the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), 1942.

oil was left for years outside the interest of the official circles. When, for example, there was some talk of the region of Romen about which we shall speak in more detail, we can assert that up to 1928 no geological investigations had been made there. From 1928 to May, 1934, experimental drilling was done on Mount Zolotukha but only to a depth of 335 metres. One of the reasons for this was that the institutions which were somewhat interested at the time in question of the geological structure of the district of Romen, i. e. the Romen Rayvykonkom Regional executive committee and the Ukrholovtrest — Ukrainian Trust of Geological Research — did not have adequate financial means and scientific apparatus to investigate the area in a proper way.

The situation somewhat improved only in the second half of 1934, thanks to the fact that the Committee for the study of the productive resources of the UkSSR in the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR became interested in the Romen region. The head of this Committee, Academician O. H. Shlikhter, was able to persuade the appropriate persons of the need for further geological exploration of the Left Bank. In 1935 the Institute of Geological Science in the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine sent to Romen a complex, geological expedition which made a plan for new drillings. In October, 1936 oil was found in one of these drillings at a depth of 987 feet. Soils saturated with petroleum bitumens were found also in the drillings of the Institute of Geological Science in the village of Isachky at a depth of 619.4 feet. These initial success of the Ukrainian geologists<sup>3</sup> aroused the attention of the most important institution competent in this field, the Ukrainian Section of the Holovnafta,<sup>4</sup> which decided in April, 1937 to make rotary borings in Romen. This was done to a depth of 1498 feet under not easy conditions. Between June 9 and July 23, 1937 the first two tons of petroleum were recovered. Encouraged by this, the engineers of the *Glavneft* made some new drillings, especially of the *crelius*-type. In the summer of 1938 and January, 1939, they found some quantities of high quality petroleum, rich in gasoline and gas. They declared also that the crude oil at a depth of 300 metres was under the pressure of 30 atmospheres.

The geological work done in the region of Romen, gave not only proofs of the occurrence of petroleum in the area but also aided in developing more detailed theories and hypotheses on the wealth of the Dnieper-Donets depression. In the 30's a number of Ukrainian scholars

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<sup>3</sup> V. P. Kutsiv supported by Academician I. M. Hubkin, did special work on the petroleum possibilities in the Romen district.

<sup>4</sup> Not only the production but the geological search for oil fields is centralized in the USSR in Moscow. The Holovnafta is the name of the Department in the Ministries in Moscow — The Holovnafta is the Main Board of the Oil Industry.

published a series of works on this question; especially important were the writings of D. N. Sobolyev, V. I. Luchytsky, M. M. Tetyayiv, K. I. Makiv, O. M. Kutsyba, P. L. Shulha, I. T. Shameka, V. I. Fomenko and others. These works basically concerned the saline tectonic structure of the Dnieper-Donets depression, for it has been shown that oil deposits are connected to a certain degree with the appearance of rock salt, calcium salts and sometimes sulphur. The works of these scholars disproved among others ideas, the hypothesis of the so-called North Ukrainian trough and have shown that the structure of Poltava and the neighboring regions are connected still more closely with that of the Donbas and the Oziv-Podilya crystalline mass.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand to define this connection in detail, we must study minutely the salt foldings of the Dnieper Donets depression; much work on this has already been done; cf. the Proceedings of the Conference on the study of petroleum exploration in Ukraine, Kiev April 20-23 1938, ed. of Academy of Science of Ukraine. The post-war work of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine is only slowly coming to a definite solution of the geological structure of Left Bank Ukraine and it has been shown that the Black Sea depression (the region of Melitopil, etc.) are connected also with the structure of the Dnieper-Donets depression.

In general in regard to the years 1945-54, we cannot fail to say that the question of studying the petroleum resources of Ukraine has lost somewhat in comparison with pre-war days its primary importance. This question has been perhaps excluded by orders from above in the program of the work of the Institute of Geology of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR and the Committee for the study of the productive resources of Ukraine in the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR. This does not mean that these institutions have reduced the scope or the tempo of their work, for on the contrary, the Committee for the study of the productive resources of Ukraine, works under the leadership of Academician P. S. Pohrebnyak and with the collaboration of such scholars as H. M. Davydiv, B. A. Pyshkin, D. K. Zerov and others.

The Institute of Geology has been working basically (1948-52) on the problem of the so-called Great Donbas and questions of the development of the brown coal industry of Ukraine. The problem of the petroleum resources of Ukraine has not been completely neglected in the circles of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, as is proved by the series of important works devoted to this subject, especially those directly after the World War by Academician V. O. Selsky and Prof. V. B. Porfiriev. The

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<sup>5</sup> It is interesting to note that the works of the geologist, I. T. Shameko, correctly call the Oziv-Podillyan crystalline mass an inexhaustible source of granite and colored, rare metals.



Branch of the Academy of Sciences in Lviv, the Institute of Geology has been drawn into this and entrusted with the continuation of the study of the Boryslav basin and the neighboring Carpathian belt. The study of the petroleum resources of Ukraine is also in part involved in the program of the work of the Commission to study the Quaternary Period in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

To hasten the study of the petroleum resources of the Ukrainian lands there has been applied a methodology based upon new and modern paths. As is known, geological investigations often demand deep borings and these are very expensive. To avoid this expense it has been found useful to apply geophysical methods of investigation. But we must emphasize that the main reason for applying these methods is the actual relation between applied geophysics and geology. In the theoretical and practical development of these new methods, Academician O. Ya. Orlov and also younger scholars as Myhal, Handzyuk and others have accomplished a great deal. An obstacle to the spontaneous development of the new methods has been also the lack of properly equipped research laboratories in Ukraine, as Academician Selsky and Orlov pointed out at the meeting of Geophysicists in Kiev on May 25-27, 1939. There has been felt also the lack of fresh, young cadres of geophysicists, whom, thanks to the pressure of Moscow, the universities and institutions of Ukraine have not been able to train.

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The investigation of the *petroleum of the Romen fields* has shown that from the technological side we have to deal with two kinds of petroleum; light and heavy. In the following table we give the characteristics of both kinds. (vd. p. 176).

As we see, the refining of the light type of oil gives fractions especially useful for internal combustion engines, especially for automobile and airplane motors. As for the heavy fractions of the light oil, i.e. lubricating oils they are basically marked by a quite high specific weight, good viscosity, good stickiness, and lubricating capacity. The heaviest lubricants solidify at a temperature of --17.6 degrees F. They can find very wide use as ordinary machine oils, for their important content of aromatic coal oils may cause a certain instability of them in the unfavorable conditions of the work of motor. The pitchy remains of Romen oil can be processed (by the blowing of air at a temperature of 504°-540° F into asphalt bitumens of high quality.

From the point of view of transportation, the Romen oil has a very favorable quality, its low temperature of solidifying and this allows it to be sent through pipes even in winter (after the necessary removal of

## THE PETROLEUM OF THE ROMEN FIELDS

Oil specification	Specific gravity (20°C)	Freezing Point (Point of Solidifying)	Viscosity in Engler Degrees		Inflammation Point (acc. Brenken) in °C	Sulphur (Eschke, %)	Paraffin % (before destruction)		mg KOH	% SO <sub>2</sub>	Naphthen-type acid in % of weight	Saponification No.	Etherification No.	Flash Point, °C	
			Temperature in °C	Temperature in °C			Standard-type %	Silicahel-type %							
light type oil	0.8359	below 68°F	60°C	70°C	below 32°F	0.44	0.6	8.5	3.36	0.04	0.003	0.06	1.89	1.85	—
heavy type oil	0.9394	-17.6°F	29.36	10.96	+118.5°F	0.6	—	54.0	36.74	0.28	0.02	—	1.1	8.82	+72°C

\*) Kinematic Viscosity (in centistokes,  $\nu$ ) = °Ex7.6 (1—°E.3)

The light petroleum is very valuable, for it has a series of high quality fractions. The following table analyzes them.

Temperature-scope of derivation from crude-oil °F	Industrial Specification of derivatives	Quantity of derivate in % oil quantity	Hydrocarbons (%)			Specific Gravity	Evaporation point (98% evaporated) °F	Doctor test	Copper plate test	Color acc. Schtammer
			Methane-type	Naphthen-type	aromatic					
65 — 300	Aviation Gasoline	24	53.6	33.7	12.7	0.746	303.8			—
65 — 350	Gasoline 1st quality	30	53.9	31.8	14.3	0.749	350.6			1.8
65 — 400	Gasoline 2-d qual.	35	51.3	30.2	18.5	0.753	388.4			1.8
200 — 450	Ligroine	34	44.3	31.7	24.0	0.795	449.6			2.2
400 — 575	Kerosine 1-st qual.	18	36.4	36.4	27.2	0.827	563.0			2.9
400 — 600	Kerosine 2-d qual.	26	32.9	37.8	29.3	0.829	596.0			3.1

the gasoline). Further positive qualities of this oil are its freedom from pitch, its lack of parafine and its small amount of sulphides. But the heavy Romen oil does not have these qualities. It has a high content of pitch and solidifies at a low temperature and this noticeably prevents its transportation. It has also very few gasoline fractions. But it can be processed into lubricating fractions for industrial lubricants. The chief component of the Romen heavy petroleum is evidently pitchy remains, which have very good crude qualities and can be easily processed into asphalt bitumens and various by-products for the gum industry. Of course there is now no precise data on the extent to which the exploitation of the Romen field has been developed during the 4th and 5th Five Year Plans.

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In connection with the accelerated tempo of the exploration of the oil deposits of Ukraine both in Poltava and especially in the Drohobych district (Western Ukraine), the Ukrainian technologists and economists have been confronted with a series of new problems in the correct, economic and modern processing of petroleum. We must say that in the last years the technique of processing petroleum has changed and developed very noticeably, especially since the oil industry has become a link in the chain of chemical industry. This development was so sudden that it has happened, as a kind of paradox, that even new oil distilleries, the building of which lasted for several years, have been in a certain degree antiquated a few months after the completion of the construction. To avoid such occurrences, it has been decided to advance cautiously in new construction and to bring together technological processes of refining that are based on the use of petroleum components in their natural form and also to broaden the field of processing by destructive and synthetic methods. The need of such methods arose because modern technique is no longer satisfied with the natural petroleum components but demands the so-called compounds. Thus for example, the present gasolines, used in aviation, are exclusively catalytically cracked and synthetic gasolines in which the gasoline of direct distillation is only one of the components. The same is true in lubricating oils, especially of the higher grades, in which synthetic products and mixtures play a larger and larger role. So in the new and modern refineries in Ukraine, there a larger percentage of the crude is used for processes of paraphase-cracking, hydrogenation and synthesis. Even in the field of the manufacture of asphalt bitumens, which, containing heavy fractions of petroleum, are marked by an especially high quality, a synthesis of caoutchouc type polymers has replaced the process of direct processing.

Now in Ukraine there is a definite effort to combine closely the processes of the production of mineral and organic chemistry, i.e. refining works closely with the organic synthesis, the manufacture of chlorine, nitrate and sulphuric acid, and the production of coke. Thus there develops a complex of manufactures which, relying upon electric power which is used in large quantities, can give the Ukrainian national economy a number of products which it greatly needs and which have hitherto been lacking. It is especially important that during the complex processing of petroleum it should be possible to use the gas residues from blast furnaces and also natural gas and various by-products of the coal industry, which even in the post-war five year Plans have been badly used in Ukraine.

The trends of the refining industry of Ukraine are now:

1. To provide in the petroleum plants equipment for the extraction of gasoline from the natural gases and the light petroleums, and also equipment for demulsification in cases where the petroleum is secured in an emulsion bearing state.

2. To create in the plants organizations which will aid in the transportation of the crude oil.

3. To build petroleum refineries not necessarily near the oil fields but also at certain distances from them, more or less, depending upon the position of the industrial districts which are the chief consumers of the petroleum industry and which also form with it the complex of chemical industry.

4. In the refining plants it is necessary to make attempts to rectify the petroleum base by the processes: a) of cracking under conditions of evaporation, for non-commercial fractions; b) destructive hydrogenation for heavy type derivatives, c) reforming for gasoline of direct distillations; d) refining with the aid of hydrogenation and selective solutions; e) polymerization and condensation for the recovery of gasoline from gases and possibly lubrication oils of light olephines.

5. To pay special attention to the development of industrial organic synthesis in the fields of choline-distillates, spirits, aldehydes, ketons, oxide olephines, nitric compounds, acids and others.

6. To build still more the electric power in Ukraine and on this basis and the basis of the petroleum industry to increase the production of nitric acid, ammonia, chlorine, lyes and hydrogen i.e. articles the production of which is at an unsatisfactory level and which the industry of Ukraine needs in very great quantities.



# FREEDOM OF CULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION

By CASIMIR C. GECYS

Soviet propaganda is incessantly bragging of "incomparable achievements" resulting in the "unprecedented cultural progress" of its citizens. The answer to this exaggerated apotheosis is to be found in an analysis (a) of the nature of the Soviet Socialist culture, (b) of its subordination to the Party policy, (c) of its aim, and (d) its main features.

## I

As early as 1905, Lenin, in one of his articles, stated that under the dictatorship of the proletariat literature and science must become Communist-minded:

Literature must become party-colored. To counterbalance bourgeois morals, to counterbalance the mercenary bourgeois press, to counterbalance bourgeois literary careerism and individualistic 'seignoral anarchism' in pursuit of wealth, the socialist proletariat must put forth the principle of party literature, must develop that principle and introduce it into life in the fullest and most solid form possible.<sup>1</sup>

He rejected the possibility of the existence of cultural freedom in the Western world:

In a society based upon money power, in a society where the masses of the workers live in poverty and a handful of wealthy men are the parasites, there can be no real and actual freedom... The freedom of a bourgeois writer, artist and actress is only a masked (or supposedly masked) dependence on the check book, on bribery, and on dictated subject matter.<sup>2</sup>

Soviet socialist culture, according to Stalin, is "national in form and socialist in content."<sup>3</sup> What does this formula mean? It means that, whatever the difference in form or expression, a coherence with the central pursuits of the collective and with one another is to be assured for the various cultures of the nationalities through uniformity of content. The concept of this formula is a synthesis of national cultures and Communist internationalism. This was succinctly pointed out by Stalin himself:

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<sup>1</sup> Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), 4th ed., Moscow, Gosizd, 1949, X, p. 27.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Abridged Text of the Report of Joseph Stalin to the Special Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets, Delivered on November 25, 1936*, New York, Intern. Publishing Co., (n. d.), p. 10.

Proletarian in content and national in form—such is the universal human culture toward which socialism is marching. Proletarian culture does not cancel national culture, but lends it content. National culture, on the other hand, does not cancel proletarian culture, but lends it form.<sup>4</sup>

To make this clearer he explained the difference between a culture which is bourgeois in content and national in form and Soviet socialist culture: "What is national culture under the supremacy of the national bourgeoisie? A culture bourgeois in content and national in form, the aim of which is to infect the masses with virus of nationalism and to consolidate the supremacy of the bourgeoisie. What is national culture under the dictatorship of the proletariat? A culture socialist in content and national in form, the aim of which is to educate the masses in the spirit of internationalism and to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat."<sup>5</sup>

The concept of the formula "national in form and socialist in content," as well as *its transitory character*, was stated plainly by Stalin at the Sixteenth All-Union Communist Party Congress:

It may seem strange that we, who are in favor of the fusion of national cultures in the future into one common culture (both in form and in content), with a single, common language, are at the same time in favor of the blossoming of national cultures at the present time, in the period of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. But there is nothing strange in this. The national cultures must be permitted to develop and expand and to reveal all their potential qualities, in order to create the conditions necessary for their fusion into a single, common culture with a single, common language.<sup>6</sup>

## II

Until such time as the fusion of national cultures shall bring forth a common culture with a single common language, that is Russian, the Soviet regime does not promote the cultural freedom of the nationalities within the Soviet Union but destroys it. The paradox of the constitutional provision, that "equality of the rights of citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, *in the sphere of cultural life*, is an indefeasable law,"<sup>7</sup> may be explained by the fact that it is the Soviet regime, which determines the content of national culture and elaborates its form.

Soviet culture is directed by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, partly by the state machinery, and partly by specially created cultural agents, i. e., by the unions and associations of writers, poets, sculptors, composers, musicians, actors, and clowns. The unions

<sup>4</sup> *Stalin, Marksizm i Natsionalno-Koloniyalny Vopros (Marxism and the National and Colonial Question)*, Moscow, Partizd, 1935, p. 210.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 260.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 261.

<sup>7</sup> *Constitution of the USSR*, Art. 123, Cf. *Ibid.*, Art. 122.

and associations are not ordinary professional organizations, since all their members are not only obliged to subscribe to a definite political program, but are also tied down to a specific Soviet method in the field of culture. The unions and associations are held together by officially approved by-laws and hence are easily controllable. They are the typical by-product of a totalitarian regime.

At the top of the management of Soviet socialist culture stands the Supreme Leader. The Leader is assisted by the Department of Cultprop-(aganda) of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. On a lower level, he is also assisted by numerous specialized agencies: (a) the Literature Sector, which controls books and magazines in the field of literature; (b) the Science Sector; (c) the Art Sector, which supervises the activities of dramatists, musicians, and painters; (d) the Sector or Cultural Enlightenment; (e) the Broadcasting Sector. The Union Republican Ministry of Culture (combining the former Ministry for Higher Education, the Cinema Ministry and the Committees on Arts, Radio, Architecture, Polygraphic Arts and the Publishing and Bookselling agencies), the Academy of Science of the USSR, the Academies of Science in the component republics of the USSR, Glavlit, MVD, and the trade union clubs also play a large part in directing cultural expression.<sup>8</sup> All these agencies are headed by Communists and are staffed by Communists, in keeping with the constitutional principle that all means of influencing public opinion should be transferred to the All-Union Communist Party, which "represents" the laboring class.

### III

Ten years after the proclamation of the Stalin Constitution, on August 14, 1946, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party passed a resolution which marks the starting point of that *new era* in Soviet literature and culture which has since become associated with the name of Andrey Zhdanov. A week later, on August 21, 1946, Zhdanov in an address delivered before the Leningrad branch of the Union of Soviet Writers and Leningrad City Committee of the Communist Party, developed and clarified the main points of the resolution and laid down the new Party line on matters of art and literature.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> *The New York Times*, March 16, 1953. It must be added that the M.V.D. also controls all public performances: concerts, plays, movies, exhibitions and even circuses. (I. I. Evtikhiev and I. A. Vlasov, *Administrativnoe Pravo SSSR: Uchebnyk dlya Yuridicheskikh Institutov i Fakultetov* (The Administrative Law of the USSR: A Textbook for Juridical Institutes and Faculties), Moscow, Juridical Publ. of the Ministry of Justice of the USSR, 1946, pp. 385-87.

<sup>9</sup> *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Literary Gazette), September 21, 1946.

At that time Zhdanov discussed at some length the writer Mikhail Zoshchenko and the poetess Anna Akhmatova. Zoshchenko was denounced as "a vulgarian" who was "accustomed to mocking Soviet life, Soviet conditions, and Soviet people, while disguising his mockery under a mask of empty entertainment and fatuous facetiousness." Zoshchenko's famous story about the ape was characterized as "the epitome of all that is negative in Zoshchenko's literary production," and Zhdanov added that Zoshchenko deliberately portrayed Soviet life as "ugly, grotesque, and vulgar" putting into the mouth of a monkey a vile, poisonous, anti-Soviet statement to the effect that life in a zoo is better than life at large, and that in a cage one can breathe more freely than among the Soviet people. From Zoshchenko, Zhdanov proceeded to Akhmatova, whom he characterized as a "reactionary religious mystic and pessimist."<sup>10</sup> Zhdanov concluded his address with this general statement:

The Central Committee of the Party wants... the writers of Leningrad to understand well that the time has come when it is necessary to raise our ideological work to a higher level. The rising Soviet generation will be called upon to consolidate the strength and might of the Soviet socialist order, to make full use of the moving forces of Soviet society in order to promote our material and cultural progress. To carry out these great tasks the younger generation must be brought up to be staunch and cheerful, not to balk at difficulties, but to meet and be able to surmount them. Our people must be a highly-educated people of lofty ideals, possessed of high cultural and moral demands and tastes. To this end it is necessary that our literature, and our journals should not stand aloof from the tasks of the day, but should help the Party and the people to educate our youth in the spirit of supreme devotion to the Soviet order, in the spirit of supreme service to the interests of the people.<sup>11</sup>

From literature the fight against "servility before the West" spread rapidly to other fields: music, art, science, linguistics, motion pictures, etc. By 1949 even Soviet circuses were denounced by the official *Soviet Art* for their tendency toward "bourgeois cosmopolitanism" and "formalism." The Cultural Committee of the All-Union Communist Party followed up the resolutions of *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* with two others. One was entitled "On the Repertoire of Dramatic Theaters and Measures for its Improvement" and the other "On the Motion Picture 'Big Life.'" "

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<sup>10</sup> The magazine *Zvezda* (Star) published Zoshchenko's two novels: "Priklucheniya Obezyany" (The Adventures of a Monkey) and "Pred Vskhodom Solntza" ("Before Sunrise"), as well as Akhmatova's poetry. Similar accusations were leveled against another magazine, *Leningrad*, which also had published writings of Zoshchenko and Akhmatova as well as "a number of works imbued with the spirit of servility before everything foreign" (*Bolshevik*, 1946, Nos. 17-8, pp. 1-19. Cf. *Ibid.*, 1946, Nos 5, 9, 15 and 21).

<sup>11</sup> *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, September 21, 1946.



The first of these resolutions called upon the Committee on Art Affairs and the Union of Soviet Writers to concentrate on the creation of a contemporary Soviet repertoire: "Playwriters and theatres must reflect in their plays and performances the life of Soviet society... must contribute in every way to the further development of the best aspects of the character of Soviet man."<sup>12</sup> The task of Soviet playwrights and producers was described as the training of Soviet youth "in cheerfulness and joyousness, in devotion to their country, and in confidence in the victory of their cause." "At the same time," the resolution continued, "the Soviet theater is called upon to show that these qualities are characteristic, not just of a few chosen persons, not just of heroes, but of many millions of Soviet people." The second of these resolutions dealt specifically with the shortcomings of Pavel Nilin's film "Big Life," mentioning also other "unsuccessful and faulty" films.<sup>13</sup>

An echo of these resolutions on the drama and cinema, was heard in the address made by Konstantyn Simonov at the All-Union Conference of Theater Leaders and Playwrights in which he declared that "a playwright must be a politician," that "Soviet art" was not a mere "geographical conception," and that everything written and performed in the territory of the Soviet Union was not automatically Soviet literature. At the end of his address, he directed this message to Soviet playwrights and artists:

We declare in our most resounding voice, to the whole world, from the tribune of our art, that we are fighting and shall continue to fight for Communism; that we consider Communism the only future worthy of mankind; that our Communist ideals were, are, and always shall be unchangeable; and that no one can ever cause us to falter.

And to those who languish for 'pure' art, we say: there are different views on beauty in art and beauty in life. One view holds that beauty in life is found outside the limits of struggle, labor, and suffering; accordingly, beauty in art is likewise found outside their limits. But there is another view which holds that it is precisely within the limits of struggle, labor, and suffering that the greatest beauty of life lies, and accordingly that the beauty of art is also found within these limits. That is our view of life and art. This is a view which takes sides. We approve of it. More than that, we are proud of it.<sup>14</sup>

Finally, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party proposed "to the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee and the Committee on Arts that they "endeavor to

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<sup>12</sup> Cited after Gleb Struve, *Soviet Russian Literature 1917-1950*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1951, pp. 334-35.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 335-36.

<sup>14</sup> James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera, *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System*, Ann Arbor, The George Wahr Publ. Co., 1950, p. 398. Cf. *The New York Times Magazine*, December 14, 1952.

correct the unfortunate situation in Soviet music, liquidate the shortcomings set forth in the present resolution of the Central Committee, and ensure the development of Soviet music in this direction of realism."<sup>15</sup>

In linguistics there was a most remarkable about-face when Stalin himself, in the summer of 1950, came up with a denunciation of the linguistic theories of Prof. N. Y. Marr, whose opponents had been for many years hounded as "bourgeois cosmopolitans." Stalin's "contribution" to linguistics was hailed as "a work of genius" by many Soviet scholars and critics.<sup>16</sup>

Even the science of genetics received a coup de grace from a decree of the all-powerful Central Committee of the Party. This decree was announced by a Soviet plant breeder, Trofim D. Lysenko, who repudiated the principles set down by Gregor Mendel and Thomas Hunt Morgan.<sup>17</sup> The Academy of Science of the USSR last fall attacked the resonance theory as "constituting a brake on the further development of knowledge concerning chemical structure, as the theory rests on a methodologically faulty basis. Consistent use of the theory leads to pseudo-scientific conclusions."<sup>18</sup>

#### IV

Zhdanov's report and the resolutions of the Central Committee have become the keynote of the new Party line in cultural matters. All national cultures in the Soviet Union have been ordered to serve only the collective, to promote the Soviet ideology, to educate the masses in the Communist spirit, and to combat bourgeois nationalist culture.<sup>19</sup> The anti-West campaign has taken three principal directions: (a) ferreting out those guilty of "servility before the West," to whom the term "rootless cosmopolitans"<sup>20</sup> has been applied; (b) direct attacks on, and denunciations of the "decadent West," especially of the United States of America; and (c) glorification of everything Russian with the assertion of Russian superiority in every field.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *Sovietskaya Muzika* (Soviet Music), 1948, No. 1, pp. 3-8.

<sup>16</sup> *The New York Times*, June 21, 1950.

<sup>17</sup> *Pravda*, August 27, 1948. Cf. *The New York Times*, August 28, 1950.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, May 2, 1952.

<sup>19</sup> "O Sotzialisticheskome Soderzhanii i Natsionalnykh Formakh Sovietskoi Kultury" ("The Socialist Content and National Form of Soviet Culture"), — *Bolshevik*, 1946, No. 22, pp. 1-9. Cf. "Za Vysokuyu Ideinost Literatury i Iskusstva" ("Toward the High Idealism of Soviet Literature and Art"), *Ibid.*, 1946, No. 19, pp. 4-16.

<sup>20</sup> This concept is used in Soviet propaganda without exact definition. Charges of "cosmopolite" or "cosmopolitism" can be brought against anybody.

<sup>21</sup> Soviet claims of more and more "firsts" in all fields of science have become

To this end, all Soviet scientists, writers and artists must be utterly subservient to the rigid All-Union Communist Party controls; and they must cooperate to the fullest extent in retailing the ideology and glories of the Soviet regime to the masses, even if they have to create new 'proven' scientific theories in order to do so. The principles of Party spirit<sup>22</sup> and socialist realism<sup>23</sup> are the main principles of Soviet socialist culture, that is, of Soviet science, literature and art.

In order to utilize the harnessed talents of intellectuals and artists for Party purposes, there was organized in July 1947, the All-Union Society for Political and Scientific Research.<sup>24</sup> This organization has been mainly responsible for whipping up Soviet socialist patriotism, getting the "facts" on all the great Russian "inventions," and, so to speak, squaring the scientific circle. In other words, if scientific ideas do not conform to the basic ideology, this organization sees to it that the facts are changed. Soviet musicians, philosophers, architects, statisticians, physicists, actors, playwrights, critics, poets, economists, biologists, astronomers, historians, etc., who deviate from the spirit and letter of the resolutions and instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party are severely attacked in the press and their academic degrees and ranks, if any, are annulled.

It has made no difference whether or not the intellectuals and artists formerly had been praised to the skies, honored officially as "Heroes of Soviet Culture," or been winners of the coveted Stalin Prize for previous work.<sup>25</sup> They have now been publicly chastised and humiliated. The pattern is always the same — they are accused of being "apolitic thinkers,

a mania, and this self-preening continues at a heightened pace. It was *made compulsory* for students to memorize the "great contributions" by Russian scientists.

<sup>22</sup> In this connection it is interesting to ascertain what is meant by the "Bolshevik Party spirit." "The Bolshevik Party spirit of our science — Stalin said — means a direct, overt, consistent defense of the interests of socialism in the struggle against pseudo-science and those reactionary forces which are backing it." (*Bolshevik*, 1949, No. 12, pp. 23-4).

<sup>23</sup> A. A. Zhdanov, *Sovietskaya Literatura — Samaya Ideinaya i Peredovaya Literatura v Mire* ("Soviet Literature is the Most Idealistic and Most Progressive in the World). Moscow, Partizd., 1934, p. 13.

<sup>24</sup> This organization, according to one of its directors, must: (a) assist the growth of socialist consciousness in the masses; (b) explain the external and internal policy of the Soviet government to the masses; (c) inculcate a feeling of national pride; (d) popularize the attainments of science and technology; (e) combat all anti-scientific views and the remnants of any alien ideology" (A. Tarasenkov, "Sovietskaya Literatura na Putyakh Sotzialisticheskogo Realizma" — ("Soviet Literature on the Road to Socialist Realizm"), *Bolshevik*, 1949, No. 9, pp. 41-57).

<sup>25</sup> This is something like the Nobel Prize. The so-called International Stalin Peace Prize was created to be awarded to the citizens of any nation "for

atonalists, antipatriotic, deviationists, disharmonists, idealists in science, intimists, mystics, escapists, cosmopolitans, formalists, schematists, neuro-pathic egocentrists,"<sup>26</sup> and of practicing other meaningless schisms. The orgy of public accusation and self-accusation still goes on. The spectacle of an endless stream of scientific and cultural leaders freely confessing their "heresies" and verbally flagellating themselves in public in order to save their lives continues to be part of the Soviet scene.

Even textbooks<sup>27</sup> and scientific works published by scholars and scientists periodically undergo purges. When in 1940 the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic States and Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, one of the first measures of the Soviet authorities was to prepare lists of forbidden literature. On the basis of these lists the bulk of fiction published during the period of independence of the Baltic states, as well as almost all political, sociological and religious literature was removed from the bookshops and libraries. Even the translation of Karl Marx's *Das Kapital* was confiscated, as it no longer agreed with the version that was officially permitted in the Soviet Union at the time — in spite of the fact that the translator was Nigol Andresen, then People's Commissar for Education in Soviet Estonia.<sup>28</sup>

When the "general line" of the Party undergoes some change, all books previously published with the approval of the authorities are destroyed if they cease thereby to correspond to the new course. A typical example is the Soviet encyclopaedias. After the liquidation of Trotsky and other "injurious elements" some volumes of the encyclopaedia were

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strengthening peace and the struggle against warmongers." The new Stalin peace prizes are to be given annually to ten persons. The prizes have a value of 100,000 rubles each. The awards are made every December 21, beginning in 1950, by a special committee, which includes citizens of various nations. Prize winners receive a certificate, a gold medal bearing the image of Stalin and the prize money (Cf. *The New York Times*, December 22, 1949).

<sup>26</sup> In the official Communist language, almost all ideological deviations have been serious sins at one time or another. These are the most common errors: (a) *mysticism* — a belief in superstition which conceals untruth in the garb of religion and misleads the masses; (b) *intimism* — a preoccupation with personal and egocentric sentiments; (c) *escapism* — the avoidance of reality; and absorption in the realm of the purely imaginative; (d) *formalism* — the use of complicated and unnatural forms; the sacrifice of content for the sake of form; (e) *schematism* — an over-simplified and cowardly interpretation of social reality and its problems. (Cf. *News from behind the Iron Curtain*, April 1953, II, No. 4, p. 44).

<sup>27</sup> A. Samarin, Deputy Minister of Higher Education of the USSR, demanded that every Soviet university manual "should disclose fully the achievements of the Soviet Union in the political, economic and cultural spheres and emphasize the perfections of the social and political regime" (*Pravda*, July 7, 1948).

<sup>28</sup> A. Kaelas, *Human Rights and Genocide in the Baltic States*, Stockholm, Publ. of the Estonian Information Centre, 1950, pp. 27-8.

so thoroughly destroyed that in a mysterious way they disappeared even from many Western European and American libraries.<sup>30</sup> Another example of this is the book—*Marxism and National and Colonial Questions*, printed by International Publishers, New York, 1934. All copies of this book were recalled by the Party. A new and revised version was issued later under the title *Marxism and the National Question*. The reason for this expurgation was that the 1934 edition contained a statement about Stalin's true policy in Asia in the chapter titled "China." This chapter was deleted from the new edition because it revealed Stalin's Chinese aims in what was termed "the three steps." Stalin called on the Communist Party first to unite with the Kuomintang, then to sabotage the Kuomintang, and finally to "punish officers maintaining contact with the Kuomintang." Another expurgated Communist Party pamphlet is *China in Revolt*, published by the Daily Worker Publishing Co., New York, 1928.<sup>31</sup>

Ukraine is the best example of the changing relations of Kremlin to the national cultures in the component republics of the USSR. After years of relative tolerance (1922-1930) there followed the years of bloody reprisals (1931-1939). Not only literary and historical works permitted in the former period were destroyed, but even the academical dictionary of the Ukrainian language was three times re-edited.

Today the technique of writing, the manner of description, the portrayal of characters, and even the choice of words and terms are planned and supervised by the Party. The only literary style sanctioned is that of the so called socialist realism which must depict favorably Soviet man and "the new lofty characteristics of the Soviet people or the radiant attributes of the Communists of tomorrow."<sup>32</sup> According to this principle, Soviet life has been so permeated with the lofty ideas of victorious communism that real conflicts have become but a memory of Russia's capitalist past, and are, therefore, out of place on the Soviet stage.

This strict Party control over the process of writing has brought about a very elaborate and very complex system of book production. Every month the Party announces its "target" for novels, short stories, plays and poems.<sup>33</sup> These are allotted to different writers at a meeting of the writer's union. Writers have to report frequently on their work, usually

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>31</sup> *The New York Times*, August 4, 1951.

<sup>32</sup> *Rahva Haal* (The People's Voice) — Organ of Estonia's Communist Party, July 29, 1951; A. A. Zhdanov, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>33</sup> "Our writers still have much to learn, they are in need of a considerable ideological bracing..." (*Rahva Haal*, October 4, 1951). "The unfailing condition for the artist in socialist realism is the Party tendency of his works... In their work, Soviet writers are guided by the policy of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state" (*Bolshevik*, 1948, No. 9, p. 44).

every month, and even when the manuscript has been completed it must be submitted to a final and more thorough examination.

Collective writing is also an additional means of Party control. A well-known writer is given a Party "secretary" or "assistant" whose job it is to guide the writer along Party lines. When the book is published the Party supervisor is announced as the co-author. This "cultural commissar" system is also applied in nearly all other fields of art, including music and painting.<sup>34</sup>

## V

The Soviet regime's *Kulturkampf*, engaged in a struggle to eliminate the influence of all factors obstructing the path to communism, be they anti-revolutionary, anti-materialistic, naturalist, objectivist, formalist, a-political, "art for art," or merely lacking in idealism,<sup>35</sup> has split the world irrevocably into two hostile cultural forces. Naturally enough, the salient feature of Soviet socialist culture is its materialism. Since spiritual values are ignored, this materialistic culture is diametrically opposed to all moral values based on the principles of Christian civilization as well as the idealistic culture of Western countries. Soviet dialectical materialism is more than orthodox Marxist "historical materialism" which viewed culture solely in terms of economic forces. The Stalinists go back to a straightforward, old-fashioned materialism, which is "dialectical" because it evolves through a struggle of opposing forces.

Free thought, an insistence upon a reasoned examination, the refusal to accept ideas simply because they are backed by authority, does not exist in the Soviet Union. Soviet socialist culture has destroyed one of the most precious values of Western civilization — the creative element. The Party's arbitrary will, characterized by an utter contempt for independent thinking has subjugated culture.

Objectivity is condemned in all Communist theoretical works as a false bourgeois value. In Communist eyes there is no such thing as "truth as such," or "pure science." There is only "collective truth."<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> *The New York Times Magazine*, February 12, 1952.

<sup>35</sup> P. Trofimov, "Edinstvo Eticheskikh i Esteticheskikh Printsipov v Sovetskoi Iskusstve" ("Unity of Ethical and Aesthetical Principles in Soviet Art"), — *Bolshevik*, 1950, No. 18, p. 31; N. Abalkin, *Sistema Stanislavskogo i Sovetskii Teatr (The System of Stanislavsky and the Soviet Theatre)*, (n. i.), State Publ. *Iskusstvo*, 1950, p. 278.

<sup>36</sup> Since the theoretical basis of Soviet ideology is the "scientific" theory of dialectical and historical materialism, all developments, facts and theories must be brought into conformity with this fundamental "truth" of Marxism and Communist Party ("Partiynost").

In these circumstances the Soviet socialist culture, in every one of its aspects, is the most political-minded, the most rigorously and most thoroughly terrorized culture in the life of the world, for here *even the right to be silent has been abolished for the first time in history*. Nevertheless Soviet propaganda boasts of Soviet socialist culture in the following words: "We are entitled to be proud of our Soviet culture, because it is the most superb, the finest, and most progressive culture in the world... The Soviet Union like the break of dawn enlightens the world with happiness, welfare and freedom of the human spirit."

### SUMMARY

1. The Soviet socialist cultural policy, interpreting all national traditions and shaping all current cultural progress in the light of Stalinism, destroys local nationalism and makes all national cultures constituent parts of one official Soviet socialist culture. Stalin's formula "national in form and socialist in content" gives the people of the Soviet Union the "freedom" to cultivate their socialist culture within the limits of a centrally-directed Soviet socialism and Soviet patriotism, which practically must be Russian patriotism.

2. The measures adopted by the Soviet regime have left no doubt that *the term "national in form and socialist in content" was destined to serve as a further means to the goal of enslaving the national groups of the Soviet Union in the interests of the common culture with a single and common Russian language*. When the Soviet regime proceeded to unite the national cultures in the name of the joint socialist culture, this meant in fact denationalization through Russification. Today Russian culture and Russian achievements are regarded officially as primary and all other national cultures viewed only as derivations of the Russian.

3. The cultural autonomy of the nationalities has been reduced to the right to praise communism, the Party and their "older brother — Russia" in their own language.

4. The Soviet cultural agent's brains and soul, like the worker's and peasant's muscles, have been nationalized by the Soviet regime. His captive mind is terrorized, bribed or propagandized in order to eliminate the spirit of human freedom and individuality.



## REAL SIZE OF THE POPULATION OF THE USSR TO-DAY

By MYKHAYLO PAVLYUK

(The dead souls of the census of the population of the USSR in 1939)

In the nineteenth century, M. M. Kovalivsky, a noted sociologist of Ukrainian origin asserted that the basic wealth of a state or nation lay in its land and its population. Thus, in his opinion the population of a state or nation was a primary factor in the development of its economy.

In the light of this remark it is interesting to look more closely at the question as to the real size of the population of the USSR at present.

During the period of the Communist domination there have been taken censuses of the population in 1920, 1926, 1937 and 1939. Thus the Soviets have paid attention to the size of the population. Similarly the number of births and deaths has been quite clearly recorded.

The Communists have not always maintained the same attitude toward the problem of the size of the population. During the NEP, when there was much unemployment in the USSR, the Soviet press began to popularize the well known theory of Malthus, that poverty was a result of overpopulation. With the "achievement of socialism," the Malthusian theory disappeared from the pages of the Soviet press. Then there appeared the propagandistic slogan of the extraordinarily high increase in the population in the "socialistic paradise." Molotov has several times emphasized that the yearly increase in the population of the USSR equals the population of the whole of Finland. Now the Soviets assert that within the territorial boundaries, the USSR contains 203 million people and apparently the West has accepted this figure as approximately correct. In fact, if we believe the census of 1939, when the Soviets announced the figure of 170,400,000 and add the population of the countries annexed to the USSR after World War II, about 29,000,000 the approximate number of 203,000,000 seems quite correct.

But the basic figure of the population in 1939, of 170,400,000, needs careful verification. The preceding census of 1926, which is considered correct, gave the population as 147,000,000. That means that during 13 years by Soviet figures the total population of the USSR increased by 23,400,000 or an average yearly increase of 12.3 persons for each 1,000 inhabitants. This is a very high rate and is only lower than the increase in



Germany and Russia before World War I, which was the highest in any country of Europe.

In his announcements Molotov has often emphasized the high percentage of increase in the USSR approximately 25 persons per thousand. Such a high percentage as the average for many years has never really existed. After the census of 1939, Molotov's remarks on the increase of the population stopped. Even before the beginning of World War II, according to official Soviet statistics, the population of the USSR had ceased to grow and for several years the population was given as 170,400,000.

It is only natural that the Kremlin wanted to show to the world the greatest possible population in the USSR and the greatest percentage of its increase since a high increase would certify the success of "Soviet society."

Both indices of the increase of the population, the average during 13 years of 12.3 and that of Molotov at 25 per thousand, as appeared later, were extremely inflated in two ways and these are:

1) The first average high percentage of increase the State Plan gave in a very simple form. It took the average percentage of increase during the NEP and for each year, on paper, without taking into account the detailed data on births and deaths, said high percentage of increase was figured out on the census of 1926, i.e. 147,000,000. This was done not in the central office but in the regional statistical bureaus.

As the staffs of these bureaus later affirmed, there were cases in the census of 1937, where the village had actually ceased to exist, for the people had died of the famine or had scattered in part but it was included in the lists, with the same population as in the census of 1926, and until the census of 1937 was shown with the same high percentage of increase. Naturally, such cases were not numerous but they reveal the methods of determining the size of the population and its increase. After the census of 1939 Stalin said publicly in almost these words that the State Plan had undoubtedly overestimated the increase of the population.

2) Molotov adopted a somewhat different manner of deceiving people when he gave, as we have seen, an exaggeratedly high percentage of increase in the population of the USSR.

During the long hunger, beginning in 1929, and the famine catastrophe of 1932-3 in Ukraine and the region of Kuban, among those who died from the famine and inability to endure were many of the chronically ill, those in delicate health and the old. So in the years after the famine, the mortality among the population diminished and had a lower rate than perhaps even under the NEP. Such is always observed after a famine or epidemics (typhus, cholera). Besides, the Kremlin applied a new method of increasing the number of births. About a year or a year and

a half before the census of 1937, a ban was unexpectedly issued on performing abortions punishable by 10 years in distant camps of both physicians and patients. Prior to that time abortions were performed freely by Soviet physicians. By this unexpected decree many births were carried through and many children were born on whom the parents had not counted. Obstetrical institutions were overcrowded that year and new ones were opened. Still this phenomenon, produced by compulsion and the threat of 10 years in prison, lasted only one year, for in time the parents still found a way not to produce undesired children. Afterwards this decree had little effect. But actually during the year before the statement of Molotov, as a result of the stern decree against abortions the increase was great and might have reached 25 per thousand. Molotov apparently gave this figure as the average for many years and did not mention that it had been achieved in only one year.

Passing to our basic observations on the increase of the population of the USSR, we must notice:

1) The average increase in the population from 1926 to 1939 12.3, is possible only on the condition that the average family in the state has 4-5 children.

We must take into account that the average one child family will bring about in 40-50 years the reduction of the population more or less by half. The two-child system will not be able even to maintain the same size of the population for 40-50 years.

Observations show that in the USSR the city population usually has only one child in view of the large number of unmarried and childless men and women. The village population which in the twenties under the NEP had 4-5 children per family, during the period of collectivization turned to the two-child system with a tendency to a still greater reduction. We find the basis for our assertions in the Soviet statistical material for 1939 even after the decree against abortions. Thus the guide the *UkSSR in Figures*, states that the population of the kolhosps was 15,~139,800 in 3,830,200 dvors (houses). We know that in the kolhosps one family and more can live in one house but in any case there cannot be a condition where one family lives in two or three houses. Thus the given figure of 3,830,200 houses can be reckoned as the minimum number of families which were at the time in Ukraine. From these two official figures, it is clear that the average family in the whole of Ukraine in the villages in 1939 contained only 3.9 persons. If we exclude the parents, there is left 1.9 children. This confirms our thesis on the two child system with a tendency to a greater decrease in the number of children.

2) This phenomenon can be explained by many peculiarities of the Soviet social structure, among which are the following:

a) The beggarly condition of almost the entire population of the USSR probably does not rank as the leading factor.

b) The largest role is played by the disintegration of family life and the decline of morale in family life.

c) While the village under the tsars and the NEP contained almost no unmarried men and women, this phenomenon spread very significantly during the period of collectivization.

d) The village population under the tsars and the NEP had a large number of children not only because the family morale was high but because from its earliest years a child could perform some useful labor in the economy of the middle peasant and added some supplementary labor power, without which the middle peasant would have been compelled to employ hired labor. Under the kolhosp system this did not happen and the child until it was ten or twelve involved only expenses.

e) In all countries the city dwellers have a significantly smaller number of children than the villagers. The inhabitants of the Soviet cities have since the Civil War maintained the one-child system. The basic causes which have especially caused the decrease of marriages and births in the Soviet cities have been the food difficulties during the Civil War in the cities, the unemployment under the NEP, the poverty under the achievement of socialism and the constant housing crisis which has been so severe that it has made marriage impossible, for the young people could not even secure a single room for their common life.

f) We must note that in the USSR after the revolution there came the destruction of the old patriarchal life with its naturally large number of children and its significant child mortality. This process went on in all the European countries and the USSR did not escape it. But in the USSR as a result of the socialistic experiments the process led to a still greater decrease in births. While in other countries this process was always accompanied by a decrease in mortality, especially among children, in the USSR again as a result of the system of terror, both police and economic, the average yearly mortality increased. Thus the famine of 1932-3 caused about 10,000,000 deaths. Besides, there were on the average 12-15 millions constantly in concentration camps and the mortality in these was very great, although there is no direct information as to its proportions. Furthermore, when we take into consideration the fact that of these 12-15 million prisoners, the majority were men 20 years and older, and when we assume that the average term in these camps was 5-8 years, we can see at once that such a long separation of so many men and women from family life would of itself ruin the family and reduce the births. It is true that the women prisoners who bore children (usually and primarily from the NKVD guards) had certain freedoms (and some aspired to these

freedoms), although afterwards the child was taken from the mother and she never saw it again. But such cases naturally could not make up for the loss of births which was the result of the stay of so many men and women in the prison camps.

From what we have said, it is clear that there cannot be any question of a growth of the population of the USSR from 1926 to 1939 while there was a clear tendency toward a reduction of the population even below what it was in 1926. The basic factor, the one-child system in the cities and the two-child system in the villages, is a completely clear basis for the correctness of our ideas.

It is most interesting to look at the census of the USSR in 1937 and 1939, which have been used by the Soviets to support the fact of the increase of the population by 23.4 millions.

We know that the Kremlin regarded the census of 1937 as unsatisfactory. The majority of the Soviet emigrés explain the failure of the census of 1937 by a desire to recount the number of the population, for the census revealed a falling off of the population in comparison with the data given it by the State Plan.

This motive could certainly have existed, but it was not the main one. The Kremlin had many possibilities for always producing the results of the census as it needed them to be.

We count that version more probable which circulated among the statistical workers. We know that the general censuses were taken only to make accurate the number of the population for the more or less regulated reports of births and deaths gives constantly a sufficiently accurate figure as to the size of the population. Other important data, however, on the population, as its division by age, profession and place of residence can only be secured by a census. These data give a great deal of material for an all-sided study of the population. All this information can be secured only through professionally composed questionnaire. According to the statisticians such a questionnaire professionally composed was made by the statisticians of Moscow for the census of 1937 and given to Stalin. In the USSR almost every one proclaimed Stalin a genius but few were as convinced of it as was Stalin himself, for he regarded himself as a genius in almost all fields of knowledge. In 1937 Stalin overlooked the questionnaire given to him and composed his own. No one dared to correct it and it later turned out that the material of the census secured in this incorrectly arranged questionnaire did not lend itself to further analysis, except as to the number of population, but it showed a great reduction in the population as compared to the figures of the State Plan. Actually, the census did not give what the Kremlin needed for its own most secret and private information. So it was afterwards decided

to point out the scandalous tale of the unsatisfactory character of the census, for the Kremlin had no other way out. It could not for its most secret statistical guide take the figures out of its own head, as the State Plan had really done.

Observations show that during the second census of 1939 especial attention was paid to the checking of the number of the population. The statistical workers of the Kharkiv district assert that the second census of the population did not increase the population over that of the 1937 census and the great loss remained as it was. There remained the great gap between the data of the census and the figures which the State Plan produced by its method of the so-called "planned count of the increase of the population." In spite of this the Kremlin for public knowledge gave the number of the population as 170,400,000 which almost agreed with the figures given in 1937 by the State Plan. It is clear that the Kremlin for its secret use adopted the real figures of the two censuses, and abroad gave propagandistic statistical material both as to the size of the population and the other items secured by the census. In fact the Kremlin gave out to the world a size of the population which was composed of living and dead souls. These dead souls were not less than 25-30 million. All those who had been tortured by the famine, murdered in the concentrations camps, shot and had not been born were included. (In fact it is said that the executions in 1939 were postponed until after the census, so as not to reduce the number of the living.)

We subtract this number of 25-30 million of dead and unborn souls from the census figures of 1939 on the following basis.

1). We assume that the census of 1926 gave an approximately clear picture of the size of the population in that year, 147,000,000. We assume that the years 1927-28 and in part 29 showed an increase in the population of 12.3 persons per thousand or about 5,200,000. So in 1929 the population of the USSR was about 152,200,000.

2). But the great upheaval made in the village by collectivization and the removal of the kurkuls, the mass flight of the villagers (especially heads of families) to the city, a clear forewarning of the coming famine and the famine itself caused almost a complete checking of births until 1935. The data as to birth in a large part of the USSR in the villages for almost 5 years had a strange accidental character. Besides this the mortality from the famine and an epidemic of typhus, the so-called hunger typhus which occurs always in mass famines, was so great that it reduced the number of the population even below what it was in 1926. The number of deaths from the famine and typhus have been estimated differently. Under the Soviets at the time the number was given as 15 million. It cannot be defined more closely but it is enough to say that the mortality from

the famine completely wiped out the increase in the population between 1926 and 1929 and reduced it by some millions below what it was counted in 1926.

3). The use of concentration camps in the USSR assumed huge proportions beginning with 1929 and continued to grow and take in more and more victims on a large scale.

4). The effort of the Kremlin by force and under the threat of 10 years in a concentration camp to compel the parents to produce children against their will certainly produced a large number of births but chiefly in the cities and only during one year and this might produce one or two million but not the 30 million needed to cover the loss in the population between 1929 and 1939.

In summing up we can determine that in 1939, the USSR had approximately 140 million in population with a definite tendency to a further drop and not an increase, for judging by the size of the average family, there was and could be no increase, since this continued to grow smaller.

In the period from 1939 to 1951 the USSR during World War II suffered also heavy losses and had such a small number of births during the five years of war that we believe the population fell even below that of 1939.

Thus we believe that the figure of the population of the USSR, 203 million must be corrected by a reduction of some 30-35 million, chiefly of these dead souls of the census of 1939, whom, we believe, the Kremlin lists apart in its secret files although they appear as masses of people in the propagandistic statistical files.

We must notice also the very great reduction in births, the very great mortality from the famine and in the concentration camps among the population of the colonies of Moscow in Turkestan, the Caucasus and above all Ukraine.

This short analysis of the state of the population in the USSR as to its numbers and the tendencies of these numbers to change allows us to make some generalizations.

In a socialistic state as the USSR with a full proletarianization of the masses of the population and a completely planned economy, an increase in the population or its maintenance at its present level can be brought about only by force, i. e. by applying the plan of births to each separate family, to the man and to the woman. The Kremlin rulers know this but the terrible scandalous unpopularity of this form of planning has kept the Kremlin the whole time from such a measure and it made only the attempt to increase the number of births by forbidding abortions.

After World War II the USSR brought under its control some 25 million people including entire states. In this way the USSR made up for

its war losses and acquired new millions of people. Despite these additions the population of the USSR in its new boundaries is not over 170,000,000. The latest refugees from the USSR have very interesting news. According to them in the last years, the Kremlin has introduced a bonus for men and women over 18 years of age of 160 rubles a year for the members of the collective farms and of 80 rubles monthly for workmen and officials. This bonus is withheld unless a man and wife have three children. Such a method of planning births usually produces for 6-8 years an increase in births but the very method of paying to produce children confirms the fact that the Kremlin is unable to check the decrease of its population, which as we have said, began with the time of collectivization and has recently become a threatening phenomenon for which the Communists can find no other outcome than by adopting methods which are essentially the planning of births, although in a hidden form for the financial sanctions introduced are of a broad scope.

By this new decree the Kremlin has itself admitted that the system of a one-or two-child family is an established and basic phenomenon in Soviet society, and this leads to a constant reduction in the size of the population and not to its increase, as the new Soviet propaganda asserts.



*O. Vlyzko*

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*(Translated from Ukrainian by Mira Hordynska)*

From lofty towers we gaze into the world, —  
With our hands we reach the distant stars . . .  
And from the blue smile pussy-willows gold,  
And sunny flowers gilded petals open . . .

We blossom in the groves of days and years,  
We ripen like the clouds' rare crop,  
Till grief becomes a half forgotten myth,  
Till it dissolves in ages like a mist.

(The author was executed by the Soviet firing squad in 1934).

## BOOK REVIEWS

DOCUMENTA PONTIFICUM ROMANORUM HISTORIAM UCRAINAE ILLUSTRANTIA (1075-1700). *Documenta Romana Ecclesiae Unitae in Terris Ucrainae et Belorussiae cura PP. Basilianorum Collecta et Editata. Vol. I. Romae, 1953.*

At the time when the Patriarch of Moscow Aleksy, relying upon the help of the atheistic Bolshevik government of the Kremlin was liquidating the last part of the Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite in Western and Carpathian Ukraine, the Basilian Fathers in Rome were preparing the first volume of the Vatican documents on the history of Ukraine, to explain to the Christian world the actual reason why Moscow — both the old tsarist, religious Moscow and the new atheistic Bolshevik Moscow — with such an incomprehensible hostility throughout the centuries has attacked and still is attacking the Catholic Church of the Eastern rite, and especially the eastern Catholic Church in Ukraine and Byelorus.

The reason is that the territory of the Kievan Metropolitanate, i.e. Ukraine and Byelorus, was the area where two religious worlds clashed—the first Old Rome and the Third Rome, Moscow; the ecclesiastical interests of the Pope and of the Patriarch of Moscow. On the territory of Ukraine and Byelorus there had been since the beginning of the XV century a struggle whether the religious soul and the ecclesiastical organization should belong to Rome or Moscow.

Rome in advancing to the east did not at first have a clear program as to whether Catholicism in the east of Europe should come under the foreign form of Latin Christianity in a Polish cultural dress or under the form of Eastern Christianity, i. e. in a form culturally and ecclesiastically close to the Ukrainian and Byelorus spirituality. It soon appeared that the advance of Latin Catholicism was hardly dangerous for the idea of the Third Muscovite Rome. Tsarist Moscow, like the present red atheistic Moscow, tolerated Latin Catholicism which was culturally alien to the Ukrainians and Byelorussians as the "lesser evil." But the entire fury of Moscow was turned against Catholicism in its eastern form as a dangerous competitor, which could seriously block the progress of the Third Muscovite Rome in Ukraine and Byelorus and even might put in question the proud ambitions of Muscovite Orthodoxy in Muscovy itself. This was the real reason why Peter I, Catherine II and Nicholas I were the open deadly enemies of Catholicism of the Eastern Rite and the miscalled "Union", and were extremely tolerant of Latin Catholicism, even in the lands of Eastern Europe.

The Catholicism of the Eastern Rite in Ukraine and Byelorus became the subject of special misrepresentation in the Russian historical science, Russian literature and Russian publicistics. The words "Union and Uniat" became words of abuse and almost identical with traitor and religious renegade. This abusive treatment of Eastern Catholicism — by the Russian science and publicistics succeeded in influencing some Catholics and the conception of "Uniatism" was adverse even for Russian Catholic converts.

So it is not strange that for the Russian government and the Muscovite Orthodox Church, which supported the idea of the Third Muscovite Rome, and was constantly in the service of the imperial interests, the basic position toward



Eastern Catholicism in Ukraine, Byelorussia and even in the neighboring countries of Romania and Bulgaria was: "Unionem Delendam Esse." Russia carried this political policy with entire consistency, wherever it could have the opportunity. A favorable chance came with the division of Poland and the annexation of the Ukrainian-Byelorussian lands to Russia. In the first fifty years after the annexation, Russia destroyed the Uniate Church with fire and sword.

Outside the borders of Russia, the Eastern Catholic Uniate Church continued in Western and Carpathian Ukraine. The Bolsheviks took over this tsarist ecclesiastical policy one hundred percent and only applied to it their own more perfect methods of terror. Within five years after the annexation of Western and Carpathian Ukraine to the Soviet Union, Eastern Catholicism in these lands had been annihilated also with fire and sword and forced completely into the underground. It is characteristic that despite the ideological hatred of the Bolsheviks for Rome, they still tolerate in Western Ukraine some Latin Catholic churches, which are open, but not a single Ukrainian Eastern Catholic Church, despite the fact that Eastern Catholicism is the predominant religion of 99% of the native Ukrainian population.

A similar fate has overtaken the Eastern Catholic Churches in Romania, Bulgaria and communized Czechoslovakia. The Third Muscovite Rome has used the power of the MVD to settle with its dangerous rival, Eastern Catholicism, in Eastern Europe. The ecclesiastical imperialism of the Patriarch of Moscow and the state imperialism of red Russia combined for their joint interest and so the ruin of Eastern Catholicism in territory under the domination of Moscow became inevitable.

As we have said, this religious and ecclesiastical problem in Eastern Europe has been systematically falsified by Russian historiography and it is not strange, therefore, that the mistaken views on religious conditions in Ukraine and Byelorussia have been set forward even in the works of some Ukrainian historians and in the books and publications of western Latin Catholics, etc. It was a happy thought of the Basilian Fathers in Rome to publish the documents setting forth the role of Rome in the spreading of Eastern Catholicism in the east of Europe. The plan of these publications includes several and perhaps several dozen volumes of Vatican documents and to give the *Monumenta Vaticana Historiam Ucrainae Illustrantia*. The first volume brings us documents of the popes from the XI century, beginning with the papal document in the case of the Kievan prince Izyaslav Yaroslavych (1075) and ends with the beginning of the XVIII century. The second volume will include papal documents touching Ukraine of the XVIII, XIX, and XX centuries.

The publication of the documents has been made very carefully. The editors of this volume have not only with the greatest accuracy given the ancient depository, where the document is in Rome, but also where it has been previously published. The notes to each document greatly facilitate the use of the document even by beginning students of the history of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Church.

There are also given pictures of the popes, the seals on the papal documents, photographs of the pages and of the miniatures and maps and these make this first volume a living and very interesting publication. The editors have taken the position that they should include papal documents not only directly concerning Ukrainian ecclesiastical and political figures but also letters of the Popes to foreign individuals on Ukraine and Byelorussia; it is natural that this is a complicated task, since it is not rarely hard to decide how far to go in this direction. There is no doubt that such documents of the Popes on Ukraine written to disinterested persons are sometimes more often cited. There was an agreement among the editors not to go too far or not far enough.

The appearance of the first volume of Vatican documents on the history of Ukraine will certainly be welcomed by the historical world as a valuable publication, especially now when in the present nervous crisis of the war and post-war periods there are few scholars ready with Benedictine thoroughness and patience to devote themselves to minute studies and the publication of documents — a task hardly important at first sight, but basic for long centuries.

We are convinced that the editors and publishers of this projected collection of Vatican documents on Ukraine will accomplish their purpose, for they will give the historical scholars of the world the material for securing a true knowledge of the role of Eastern Catholicism in the east of Europe.

NICHOLAS CHUBATY

GUENTER STOECKL. DIE ENTSTEHUNG DES KOSAKENTUMS, Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes, München, Ed. Hans Koch, B. III. Isarverlag, pp. 191. 1953.

The author of this work spent some years on the study of the German-Slav southern border in the XVI century. From this work has come his interest in the origin and early stages of the Kozaks. The author has made a very praiseworthy effort. He is an advocate of the sociological method of history and he has tried to derive the appearance of the various Kozak formations from conceptions of broad spaces and social culture. This demands from the historian great caution, so as not to draw incorrect conclusions.

In the opinion of the author, previous studies of the origin of the Kozaks are contradictory and insufficient and this has led him to review the source material and the historical literature of the subject.

He gives a critical survey of the theories for the origins of the Kozaks, the so-called Karakolpak, Tatar, social and autochthonous. Referring to the previous representatives of Ukrainian, Polish, Russian and modern Kozak historiography, he objects that they concentrated their studies chiefly on the latter part of the XVII cent. and the Dnieper Ukrainian Kozaks of the time, when the institution at its height was coming near the conception of a state. He believes that their estimate of the Kozaks depended especially upon their national and political sentiments. This created the contradictory views on the origin of the Kozaks, a social phenomenon — in his opinion, — which was general to eastern Europe and which was conditioned by the steppe belt of the Black Sea.

Passing to his own review of the sources, the author in a short section discusses generally the area and the period of the appearance of the Kozaks, and then he analyzes the references to them in the oldest sources from the end of the XIII to the beginning of the XVI century; — the oldest mention in the *Codex Cumanicus*, the Greek *Synaxarion* written in 1308 in a Greek collection of the lives of the saints and the most definite statement from the region of the *Crimean peninsula* in 1449, the instructions of the city of Genoa to its colonies on the Black Sea and its capital Kaffa.

The Kozaks mentioned in these sources, especially in those of Genoa, are defined as to their social structure and function — they were scouts, people acquainted with the conditions of the steppe region of the Black Sea, border and city officials, interpreters, and also free traders in the service and under the protection of the laws of the colonies. As to their ethnic origin, they were *homines illius loci* — men of this place, although they could not have been of one ethnic stock.

The author devotes most space in his work to the notes on the "Tatar Kozaks," so-called in the *Nikon Chronicle* of 1444 and the *Ermolin Chronicle* and other Muscovite documents of the end of XV and the beginning of the XVI centuries.

He tries to prove that the Tatars carried the institution of the Kozaks into the Siverian region between Moscow and Lithuania and seeks analogies in the beginnings of the Dnieper Kozaks. Here he confuses the unclear mention of the *Ermolin Chronicle* of 1448 and the quite clear mention in the Genoese source of 1474 and the memoirs of the Polish chronicler Dlugosz in 1469 with their definite reference to the character of the Tatar Kozaks and finally the very expressive mention in 1492 of the character of the Dnieper Kozaks. This is the answer of the Grand Prince Oleksander to the Crimean Khan Mengli-Girey on his complaint that "people from Kiev and Cherkasy" had attacked near Taginya a Tatar ship.

It is a pity that the author stopped his study at the end of the XVI century, for a person interested primarily in the Kozaks and historical and sociological comparisons of analogies could find better material for this purpose at a somewhat later time. We should compare the institution not only in its embryonic stage but in its complete form. In the first stage we can rely only upon the philological method and even the name of the Kozaks, although their origin, role and historical situation differed in different places. It seems to me that even in these early sources which the author uses, the difference in the sociological phenomenon of assimilation in various places was definitely evident. It would have been worthwhile for the author to retest at least the first Kozak registers, and compare in more detail the geographical, social and national political factors which formed the *Natio Cosacorum*, known in Western Europe and then try in retrospect to verify his feebly based generalization on the "Eastern-Slav Kozaks." The author complains that previous students of the Kozaks, and especially the Ukrainian scholars concentrated on the Dnieper-Ukrainian Kozaks and handled the problem rather in isolation and tried to connect them with the traditions of Kievan Rus. The growth and development of Kievan Rus was marked by a social and economical factor, "the road from the Varangians to the Greeks." It was not only Ukrainian historiography that has noticed this but also the Kozak ideologists of the XVII century.

The author has shown a scientific interest and zeal in his analysis of the first sources of the history of the Kozaks and his efforts to use critically and to bring together the large (but still incomplete) literature — as the work of D. Evarnytsky; *History of the Zaporozhian Kozaks* I-III, 1895. We do not deny the existence of some analogies in the history of the beginnings of the Kozaks of the different regions of Eastern Europe, which the author cites in his hypotheses, especially in connection with the social and political changes in the East of Europe toward the end of the XVI century. Yet these analogies do not give the scholarly basis for maintaining that the separate Kozak organizations formed a single Kozak body.

DR. ILLIA VYTANOVYCH

JOHN P. SYDORUK: IDEOLOGY OF CYRILLO-METHODIANS AND ITS ORIGIN. Winnipeg, UVAN — Slavistika, No. 19, 1954, pp. 64 8°.

This work of Dr. Ivan Sydoruk, *The Ideology of the Cyrillo-Methodians and its Origin* is the 19th number in the series *Slavistika* published by the UVAN. The subject is not new, when we take into account the works of M. Voznyak, L. Biletsky, D. Bahali, M. Markovsky, B. Pilhuk and the others whom the author has listed among the works consulted, and some that are not listed as the monograph of A. Jensen on Shevchenko. Nevertheless, the author has made a new approach from

the standpoint of present day knowledge and also on the basis of the present political situation, whereby the Ukrainians are compelled to defend the truths of own history and culture.

The brief existence of this secret political organization, the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood in Kiev (January, 1846 — May, 1847) showed the firm will of the then leaders of Ukrainian culture as M. Kostomarov, M. Hulak, O. Markovych, P. Kulish, etc. to try to free themselves from the despotic chains that bound the peoples of Russia, and to form a federation of equal Slav states on the pattern of the United States of America.

In his work, I. Sydoruk has explained the history of the rise of the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood and from the modern situation has probed the motives for its foundation on the ideological bases produced by the conditions of the time. While some non-Ukrainians have explained the origin of the Brotherhood by the national hate of the Ukrainian people for Russia and tsarism, Sydoruk has definitely and clearly emphasized the real cause for its creation: the Slavophile ideas, which had grown up among the Ukrainian people and had taken shape in the statutes of the Brotherhood and had been further set forth in the book of M. Kostomarov, *The Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People*. Sydoruk has given two sources for the origin of the Brotherhood: the Ukrainian Kozak dmy and the historical songs, of the recently past Kozak tradition, popularized at the time by the *History of the Rus'* and the highly patriotic and militant poetry of Shevchenko, who called upon the Ukrainian people to cast off the chains of national and social slavery and to revive an independent Ukrainian state. The second source was the Western European slogans which had penetrated Ukraine. These were the ideas of humanity and freedom, developed by the Western European thinkers, statesmen and writers as Rousseau, Lammenais, Schiller and the Polish poet A. Mickiewicz (*The Pilgrimage Books of the Polish People*). The romantic ideas set forth in the writings of the Western and Southern Slavs, who were the pioneers in their national rebirth and the writings of Herder also had an effect. The Brotherhood opposed its humane ideology of Slavophilism to the chauvinistic ideology of some other peoples and especially to the Russian Pan-Slavism which had changed into Pan-Russianism.

At the conclusion of his work Sydoruk emphasizes the idealistic basis of the Slavophile slogans of the Brotherhood, which strove to create a state federation of the Slavic peoples. At that time there was no understanding for those ideas, just as there is none to-day in the present conditions of the enslavement of the Slavic peoples by the Communist Russian imperialism, which has scarcely changed and which is not distinguishable from tsarism and is threatening the free world. So the ideas of the Brotherhood are vital even to-day, when two worlds are facing each other: the Russian Communist imperialism and the American democracy. The Brotherhood confirmed the right to free development of every people a hundred years ago.

Dr. VASYL LEV

UKRAINE IN FOREIGN COMMENTS AND DESCRIPTIONS FROM THE VITH TO THE XXth CENTURY by Volodymyr Sichynsky, published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, Inc., New York, 1953.

In compiling this book, Professor Sichynsky has rendered an important service to students of Eastern Europe. Much of Eastern Europe is *terra incognita* not only to the average man in the street, but too often to those in public life including the individuals responsible for the shaping of our foreign policy. Byelorussia,

Ukraine, the Baltic states, the Kozak lands, are areas concerned of which in the West there is no knowledge only "varying degrees of ignorance" as has been said of Russia.

This is particularly true of Ukraine, country of which physical size, population and natural and industrial wealth make it one of the four leading nations of Europe but which in spite of this is not well-known, either in terms of its past or its present history. It is this lack that *Ukraine in Foreign Comments*... seeks to remedy.

*Ukraine in Foreign Comments*... consists of "a collection of memoirs, descriptions and comments on Ukraine by foreign travellers and observers, both official and private..." The materials, begin with comments on the "Sclavines and the Antae" (the ancestors of the present Ukrainians) by Procopius writing in the second half of the VIth Century and end with a quotation from a pamphlet written by a French politician, K. Delamarre, in 1869. Among the authors of the works quoted are classical scholars, missionaries, diplomats, soldiers, traders, and travellers. We find names which are familiar to the reader, names which are met with frequently — De Beauplan, Herberstein, Clarke. But there is also a host of names which are met here perhaps for the first time in this context.

They are men of almost every European nationality and their observations and comments are interesting not only because of the light they throw on Ukraine of their day but also because of the glimpses of the authors themselves which are given us.

The materials are arranged in chronological order and cover every significant period of Ukrainian history during the last thousand years and every area of the ethnic Ukrainian territory.

Professor Sichynsky's book is the only work of its kind available at the present time (and perhaps the only such collection ever to appear). Since it gives first-hand material on Ukraine as seen through the eyes of foreign observers it will prove a useful book for the student of Ukrainian history.

The book attempts to show the continuity of Ukrainian history, as the history of a nation whose statehood has been suppressed but whose national identity was never destroyed, from Kievan Rus' to the modern times. Whether it has succeeded or not will depend on the reader's predilection in this matter and also perhaps on his objectivity.

The author may also be accused of a lack of objectivity in that the over-all tone of the book is one-sided, favorable to the Ukrainians at the cost of their neighbors the Poles and the Russians, particularly the latter. Professor Sichynsky however does not claim objectivity, because the book is not a synthetic work. It is his intention to gather ancient sources, which indicate that not only has there been and is an organic, spiritual and, cultural difference between Ukraine and Russia, between the Ukrainians and the Russians, but that this can be substantiated by the accounts of objective observers.

Depending on whether the reader is a partisan or an opponent of Ukrainian independence, he will gladly approve of this book or violently disagree with it — but no matter what his views, he cannot disregard it or deny the observations on Ukraine made by foreigners.

One thing is certain. Any writer or student of East European affairs will find in this book an interesting collection of first-class material for study of the Ukrainian past.

I. LUCHKA

THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY IN FIGHT FOR FREEDOM. New York, United Committee of the Ukrainian-American Organizations of New York, 1954, pp. 223.

The full story of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (the UPA) has not been written. It probably never will be. Far too many of its leading figures, including its commander from 1944 to 1950, Gen. Taras Chuprynka, its political philosopher, Major Petro Poltava, and many others have perished in battle or in some cases, if they survived have passed within the iron curtain as the prison camps are well named. Yet there is much that is known. Some of its publications were carried out by those armed detachments which in 1947 fought their way into the American Zone in Germany. Others have been brought by the few courriers who have been able in one way or another to pierce the iron curtain from within.

From these scanty records we can learn something of the desperate character of this Ukrainian struggle for liberty during and after World War II. These men risked their lives in opposing for the sake of their country and their people both the Nazis and the Communists at a time when it was not fashionable in the West to question the nobility of Stalin's motives. Their role has been largely disregarded by the democratic forces. They have been blackened and called bandits by both the Nazis, the Communists and their satellites. Yet they were actuated by the purest patriotism; they helped to revive and strengthen the Ukrainian national spirit and thus prepared the people for the still continuing nightmare of their existence.

This book deserves a place in the library of all persons and institutions that are interested in World War II and in the Ukrainian problem. It is the raw material from which we can draw our knowledge of the Ukraine of the present. Here are stories, serious and tragic, and amusing satire. Here are illustrations of the underground artists and photographs of the UPA units. Here are articles that set forth the political philosophy of the UPA which, forged under adverse conditions, can explain that zeal for liberty, that hope for national independence that underlies so much of the struggle to-day against colonialism and exploitation.

It is a well assorted and well rounded volume. We can only be thankful to the men and women who brought this material to the free world and to the organization that has published it and made it available to non-Ukrainian public. It is the type of book that we need, if we are to succeed in our avowed efforts to create a righteous and just order in the world and to understand the hearts and minds not only of the Ukrainians but of all the people oppressed by the Russian Communist monster.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

PRELUDE TO A JOURNEY. A story of the Ukraine by *Agnes Louise Hovde* with drawings by *Helen Dorothy Hovde*. Vantage Press, Inc., New York, 1954.

"Prelude To a Journey" is in the form of a narrative poem with colorful scenes of romance and intrigue portraying the weaknesses, the aspirations, the splendor and the human faults of Man.

Ukraine, the land bordering the Black Sea, is portrayed as a victim of oppression and terror, exploited by her neighbors, and longing to be a free and independent nation and to take her rightful place among the other free nations of the world.

"Prelude to a Journey" is a story of Ukrainian aristocrats and peasants in the period of the liberation of the serfs by the Russian Imperial Government. It is the period of the Polish revolt and the period of the American Civil War. As Prof. Manning states in the Introduction "In Ukraine as in Russia and America it was a period when it seemed as if the ideal future were near and leaders did not yet realize the hard road that lay ahead of them."

It is a story burning with deep love for Ukraine and admiration for that fiery patriotism and courage to keep fighting for that cherished freedom as described by the following: "We are the shackle breakers; we are the driers of tears. We are the new bones and the new flesh of you, Mother Ukraine!"

It is a fine book and Miss Hovde has expressed her knowledge of Ukraine quite well, inasmuch as she is of Nordic origin.

J. GIBBONS

D. KAROV. THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT IN THE USSR, 1941-1945, München, 1954, Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR. Studies and Materials (Series I, No. 11), pp.121.

This interesting volume must be used with the greatest caution, for it deals essentially with a narrow subject — the work of the Soviet Central Staff of Diversion which aimed to organize and control the partisan movement in World War II. The bulk of the material from Soviet and other sources deals with the situation in Byelorussia and it gives a clear picture of the pro-Soviet partisans. It slurs over because of the "patriotism of the peoples of Russia," the activities of the non-Russian nationalities who were (in its opinion) finally moved to oppose the Germans because of their "Russian" patriotism.

The few references to Ukraine show the greater hostility of the Ukrainian people to the Soviets than of the Russian people but ignores the revolutionary activity of the Ukrainian and other non-Russian undergrounds, so long as they stood for national principles and alludes specifically to the Ukrainian anti-Soviet movements as growing "after the elimination by the Germans of the government of Bandera," which they had established. The volume is thus almost pure propaganda for the unity of "Russia" because of its neglect of all patriotic struggles except among the Russians. Following the example of all Russian imperialists, pro-Communist and anti-Communist orientation as well, the author definitely attacks the "Galicians" i.e. the Western Ukrainians. It would have been more honest and effective, had the author indicated in his title his real subject, the partisan warfare of the Great Russians, especially in its contacts with the Kremlin and the NKVD. The book is published by the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR in Munich, supported by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism in New York.

CLARENCE A. MANNING



## UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

NATIONALITY DOCTRINE IN SOVIET POLITICAL STRATEGY, by Frederick C. Barghorn. *The Review of Politics*. July 1954.

Prof. Barghorn of Yale University, an expert on Soviet Union, is studying at present the problem of Great Russian nationalism in the Soviet ideology. The quoted article is an excerpt from his planned work. The American public interested in the problems of the nations of Soviet Union can only welcome such studies.

The problem of the nations in the USSR, and especially of the non-Russian nations, is one of the fields of Sovietology in America studied least and known of, even to the present time. The work of Corliss Lamont on Soviet nationality politics is entirely worthless because it reflects only the official Kremlin party views.

We welcome Prof. Barghorn's article because in his address at the Notre Dame Symposium in December 1952 (*Soviet Imperialism: Its Origin and Tactics*, Ed. by W. Gurian 1953) his views differed little. He marked then a precise line between Soviet Imperialism and Russian Nationalism; he did not underline strongly enough the tactical use of national liberation movements by the Soviets in their fight against Western democracy.

In the present article, the author shows a deep study and knowledge of these problems. He gives analysis of the views of the Russian Communist writers especially Lenin and Stalin on the national problem as well as how Communists exploit them for a Communist revolution. The practical Soviet nationality policy, the author divides into three periods: The period of the formation of the Soviet Union 1922-24, the period of toleration of local nationalisms with simultaneous vituperation of the Great Russian chauvinism 1924-30, and third, the period after 1930 of the struggle against "bourgeois nationalisms" of the non-Russian nations and the increase of "Soviet nationalism with Great Russian symbols," he says. The author is still not inclined to accept that the Soviet Nationalism with great Russian symbols is a plain great Russian nationalism. How is this "Soviet nationalism with great Russian symbols" expressed? First, by emphasis of leading roles of the Great Russian nation among the remaining nations of the USSR; second, by positive attitude toward the Russian past; third, by russification of the non-Russian nations through intensive study of the Russian language, Russian past, culture, etc.

At the same time the positive attitude toward the national past of each non-Russian nation, the cultivation of own national culture, purity of national language, is persecuted by the central Soviet power. Putting together those "Great Russian symbols" and the persecution of similar non-Russian symbols, we will get a pure and a classical type of Great Russian nationalism rather somewhat of the type of Russian Nazism. Knowing the scholarly objectivity of the author, we hope that in his work, he will come to this only logical synthesis.

THE KREMLIN WOOS THE UKRAINIANS. By Roman Rakhmanny. *Saturday Night*, Toronto, July 10, 1954.

The author states in his article that the Bolshevik government tries by various means to capture the favor of the Ukrainian people when the danger of world



crisis is still imminent. For instance, Moscow permitted Ukraine own national flag; in high military positions there are now several Ukrainian generals and admirals. Moscow even agreed to the transfer of the very important Black Sea peninsula, Crimea, from the Russian Soviet Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Even the russification policy was denounced after Stalin's death. In spite, however, the Ukrainian revolutionists are still fighting Kremlin; the execution of the Ukrainian underground leader, Okhrymovych, announced via radio Kiev, is the best proof of Ukrainian resistance.

At the same time, when the Soviets are working industriously to acquire favors of the Ukrainian people, the Western democracies are doing nothing to convince the Ukrainians that they uphold the liberation of Ukraine. Neither the "Voice of America" nor the "Voice of Canada" encourage the Ukrainians in their struggle against Red Moscow. The treatment of the Ukrainian liberation movements by United States and Canada in the past does not encourage the Ukrainians to a confidence in their natural allies, the Western democracies. Statesmen of these two countries should deeply reconsider this situation which cannot bring any advantage to the Western democracy. We are facing a ruthless fight between Communist aggression and a free world. Who possesses a greater chance to win men's souls? Mr. Rakhmanny's article is an inspiring warning.

NO PEACE IN APPEASEMENT by William Henry Chamberlin. The Freeman. August 1954.

William Henry Chamberlin, a first class journalist and high authority on Soviet Union, tries justly to convince the western world that neither appeasement of the Reds nor the talks with Bolsheviks can bring any solution or advantage to the democratic world. Appeasement does not decrease the danger of general war but on the contrary increases the probability of war under more unfavorable conditions. The Munich agreement, the Yalta Conference and the last Geneva Conference are sufficient proof.

Mr. Chamberlin's statement is absolutely true in general but its weakness appears in details. "A firm stand by America and Great Britain for the rights of Poland and China and the principles of the Atlantic Charter at Yalta... would keep the Soviet Union within its boundaries of 1939... Instead, Stalin was permitted to extend his empire far beyond any frontier that could plausibly be claimed for Russia on nationality ground," such states Mr. Chamberlin.

It is hard to understand Mr. Chamberlin's position. Poland's right to her former Eastern provinces are incompatible with the Atlantic Charter. The pre-1939 Polish-Soviet boundaries run through the living body of Ukrainian and White-Ruthenian peoples. Historically and ethnographically they were not Polish, but Ukrainian in the South and White Ruthenian in the North. Just application of the Atlantic Charter (art. 2) in this case would demand creation of a separate Western White Ruthenian and Western Ukrainian political organisms because this was the true will of the population. They refused to be under Polish or under Soviet domination. The Polish government in exile even did not try to find any solution with Western Ukrainians and Western White Ruthenians to rebuilt new Poland on any sort of federative principles. The Polish government flatly denied that on those territories Ukrainian respectively the White Ruthenian population constitute the majority.

This stubborn attitude of Poland was very masterfully exploited by Kremlin which took the position of defender of Ukrainian and Ruthenian interest — the

unification of all ethnic Ukrainian respectively White Ruthenian territories with their motherland with Kiev and Minsk, which were always the sincerest desire of the peoples concerned but not with Kiev or Minsk ruled by Red Moscow. The Soviet Government was successful because its claims were based on national principles masterfully exploited for own imperialism. Of course, all Ukrainians and White Ruthenians prefer unification but in own national independent states.

What Mr. Chamberlin means under the phrase "plausable claims of Russia to the boundary on nationality grounds" is not easily understandable because Polish people do not have common boundaries with Russian people, the real Russian ethnic boundaries run about three to six hundred miles east of the Polish Soviet boundaries of the 1939 year.

In Yalta, the Reds succeeded because they exploited masterfully although hypocritically the Atlantic Charter against us. In Yalta, we and the Poles lost because by proclaiming the Atlantic Charter we refused to apply it justly and in the spirit of its stipulations.

LIBERATION FROM WITHIN by Konrad Kellon. *The New Leader*, Sept. 6, 1954.

In the forum of the *New Leader* on the topic "Alternative to H-Bomb" initiated by Lewis Mumford and followed by the articles of prominent political figures as Hans Kohn, Norman Thomas, Averell Harriman and others participated also Konrad Kellon of the Radio National Committee for Free Europe. In his opinion this alternative should be by word, which has to be transmitted behind the Iron Curtain. But what sort of word this must be? "I believe," the author writes, "that such words would unmistakably have to reflect a genuine disregard of racial differences."

If the disregard of racial of course, and national differences should be the deadly weapon against the Communist World, the alternative to H-Bomb, we are convinced that this weapon will be absolutely non-harmful to the Communist World. It is obvious that the internationalist bolsheviks apply very masterfully those racial differences over the whole world, in last month in Indo-China with an evident success.

AN END TO "CRACKPOT REALISM" by Lewis A. Coser. *The New Leader*, Sept. 20, 1954.

In the same forum of *The New Leader* with more success participated Mr. Coser associated with the Brandeis University. He criticizes America's foreign policy severely because we speak to the world on American freedom ideals but "America of Truman and Eisenhower had relatively little in common with the America of Washington and Jefferson. . . We have been incapable of exporting the ideas of American Revolution." The author brings several examples of our Asiatic policy but neglects to bring as example the Soviet Union which could be easily ideologically attacked by the American ideals expressed in the Declaration of Independence that all peoples shall be free of undesired domination.



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