

The UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY



Vol. XI.—No. 2

Spring, 1955

Ten Years of The Ukrainian Quarterly

"Few more explosive issues exist in the whole domain of Soviet affairs than the question of Ukrainian independence... Yet there are few major aspects of the Soviet Problem on which Americans are so poorly informed and so desperately need information."

HARRY SCHWARTZ, *N. Y. Times*. Book Reviews, Sept. 13, 1953.

UKRAINE UNDER THE SOVIETS

by Prof. CLARENCE A. MANNING
of Columbia University

Bookman Ass. Publ. New York, 1953. \$3.50

A book written by an acknowledged expert on Eastern European peoples using the first hand materials of recent refugee Scholars from Soviet Ukraine.

Orders to:

THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

302-304 West 13th Street

New York 14, N. Y.

A monumental work on a sample of the old-Ukrainian architecture of the 11th Century is published by the *Ukrainian Academy of Art and Sciences in the United States*

THE CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA IN KIEV

by

OLEXA POWSTENKO

New York, 1954

466 pages of text in English and Ukrainian
136 illustrations in text and 200 full pages photoplates

Price \$12.50

Order to

THE UKRAINIAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

11½ West 26th Street

New York, N. Y.

(See picture on the cover)

Picture on the cover: CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA IN KIEV, a sample of the old-Ukrainian architecture of early part of the 11th century. Interior of the main nave with *God's Mother*, the *Orante*, mosaic in the conch.

THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

VOL. XI. — NUMBER 2.



 Ukrainian ethnographic territory

 Boundaries of Soviet republics and satellites

SPRING 1955

\$1.25 A COPY

Published by UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE PUBLICATIONS
of the UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA:
LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, *chairman*; NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY, ANTIN DRAGAN,
WALTER DUSHNYCK, HNAT BILYNSKY, MATTHEW STACHIW,
ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI — *members*

Editor NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY
Associate Editor LEV E. DOBRIANSKY
Artistic Advisor SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY

Subscription: Yearly \$5.00; Single Copy \$1.25
Checks payable to: UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

Editorial and Managing Office: THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY
302-304 West 13th Street, New York 14, N. Y.
Tel.: WAtkins 4-5618

Editor's Address: DR. NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY
250 Franklin Turnpike, Mahwah, New Jersey
Tel.: CRagmere 8-3767-M

C O N T E N T S

	Page
The Bandung Conference — The Third World Force <i>Editorial</i>	101
Ten Years of The Ukrainian Quarterly <i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	108
The Financial Policy of the Kremlin and Gold <i>Mykhaylo Pavlyuk</i>	118
The Soviets and the Emigration <i>Dmytro Andrievsky</i>	127
Ukraine in Germany's World War II Plans <i>Myroslav Prokop</i>	134
The Yalta Conference <i>Clarence A. Manning</i>	145
The Post-Stalin Nationality Policy in Ukraine <i>C. C. Gecys</i>	153
The Return From Kolyma <i>Petro Kolymsky</i>	163
Quarterly Chronicle of The Ukrainian Life	170
 BOOK REVIEWS:	
A Complete Ukrainian-English Dictionary, by C. H. Andrusyshen & Asso. University of Saskatchewan. Saskatoon 1955 <i>Roman Grodzicky</i>	179
The Origin of Russia, by Henryk Paszkiewicz. Philosophical Library. New York 1954 <i>P. Hrycak</i>	180
Documenta Pontificum Romanorum Historiam Ucrainae Illustrantia. Vol. II. (1700-1953) Roma 1954 <i>Nicholas D. Chubaty</i>	182
Ukrainian Nationalism 1939-1954, by John A. Armstrong. Columbia Univer- sity Press. New York 1955 <i>Lev Shankovsky</i>	183
Guide to Ukrainian American Institutions, Professionals and Business. Ed. Dr. Wasyl Weresh, New York 1955 <i>N. Chubaty</i>	186
I Survived, by Godfrey Lias. John Day Publishing Company. New York 1954 <i>Lev E. Dobriansky</i>	186
Ucrainica in American and Foreign Periodicals <i>L. E. D.</i>	187

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, Ph. D., American economist, professor of Georgetown University and author. President of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.

MYKHAYLO PAVLYUK, (*pseudo*), economist and author, emigrant from Soviet Ukraine.

DMYTRO ANDRIEVSKY, engineer, executive officer for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainska Nacionalna Rada (Ukrainian National Council); now in Germany.

MYROSLAV PROKOP, LLD., Journalist. Member of the anti-Nazi Underground during the World War II. At present in New York working on "Ukraine in World War II."

CLARENCE A. MANNING, professor of Russian and Ukrainian Languages and Literatures at Columbia University. Author of *The Story of Ukraine, Ukrainian Literature, Ukraine under the Soviets* and others.

CASIMIR C. GECYS, DD., Catholic priest, professor and author, emigrant from Lithuania; now in USA. Expert on Soviet Union.

PETRO KOLYMSKY (*pseudo*), agronomist from Soviet Ukraine. Imprisoned during Yezhov terror, served two years in Kolyma prison camp. Now in USA.

THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE—THE RISING THIRD WORLD FORCE

Editorial

April 18, 1955 will be regarded as a turning point in modern history. On that day there met in Bandung, an Indonesian summer resort, more than 2,000 delegates and guests who represented an awakened Asia and Africa. They met to consider questions of common interest to their nations which represent more than one billion four hundred thousand people, i.e. half of the human race. The initiative for calling the conference was taken by the five states of the so-called Colombo Plan — India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia. The host was President Sukarno of Indonesia. In his opening address he set forth the purpose and the agenda of the conference.

President Sukarno said that the nations of Asia and Africa “are no longer the tools of others and the playthings of forces they cannot influence.” He denounced colonialism and racialism. Noting that there were countries that were still not free, he said “colonialism in modern dress was in the form of economic control, intellectual control and actual physical control by small alien communities within a nation.” He referred to the American Revolution as marking the first successful struggle against colonialism. He said the conference must give guidance to mankind and evidence that a new Asia and a new Africa had been born. (N. Y. Times, April 19, 1955).

The prime ministers of the Colombo states laid out the agenda planned for the conference and this agenda was to be confirmed at the plenary meeting, i. e. the agenda covered seven main topics; economic cooperation, self-determination and human rights, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, world peace and cooperation, destructive uses of nuclear weapons and problems of dependent peoples.

The twenty nine nations gathered at the Bandung conference were nations for the most part recently liberated from colonial rule. They still do not have very much active economic power in international life, but on the contrary they need the aid of the great powers to be able to stand on their own feet. They have no military power to decide physically the fate of the world. But they also do not possess the Machiavel-

lian system of diplomacy and politics, whereby they say one thing and do another. Instead they do possess a great part of the population of the world, and the moral power of a just and noble nationalism, of a love of liberty and their countries and have freshly won their independence by great sacrifices in their struggle for that independence. This new movement of the recently liberated nations is an essentially democratic movement. It stands not only for political democracy internally and in foreign relations but also for economic and social democracy. It is a deeply moral and humane movement, the unflinching enemy of all oppression and so it is the spiritually close and natural ally of those nations still under foreign oppression.

The threat of this spirit of the conference in Bandung was well understood by the two Communist imperialistic powers: Soviet Russia and Red China. These two fear it even more than they do the atomic weapons of America, for no one is better able to unmask the perfidious policy of the Communist imperialisms than these recently awakened nations of Asia and Africa. It was among them that only recently Moscow was carrying on its pseudo-anti-colonial policy, cleverly using the new awakened nationalism and turning it against the Western states which had colonies and also against America which had none. By its use of this patriotic nationalism, the Kremlin, an infinitely greater oppressor of enslaved nations than ever were the western colonial powers, succeeded skilfully in defeating not only the western colonial powers but also America. We have not found the technique for tearing from the hands of Moscow its cynical juggling with the idea of the liberation of peoples; it is the newly liberated nations of Asia and Africa which have succeeded in doing this and they were the area which Moscow had planned to seize and so to dominate the world. Now these liberated nations can speak directly and without the barriers of a diplomatic hypocrisy. *They have said clearly what no one else has said, what neither American diplomacy nor the great American press has said, that in addition to the colonialism of the Western powers there is a Soviet colonialism and Soviet-imperialism, super-barbaric and super-violent.*

The two Communist powers and the western states adopted an attitude of veiled distrust of the Bandung conference. The Communist world sent a skilful diplomat, Cho En-lai, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Red China. He had the hidden plan of turning the conference in Bandung in the old way into an attack upon the western states and win wider sympathies for Communism.

Did China morally belong in Bandung? In fact China is not one of the recently liberated states from the colonial yoke but the Red Chinese starting from the fact that the old China was under the colonial influence,

pushed themselves in and adopted externally the cautious role of an observer rather than an actor. When the question of Soviet imperialism was raised sharply, more sharply than he had expected, Chou En-lai did not allow himself to lose his equilibrium; he talked on in a tone that was essentially conciliatory and emphasized primarily the need for coexistence, the need for peace which all felt and which was threatened by American aggression.

America also looked at the Bandung conference with secret distrust, we will not say with a secret fear, that this new international gathering could by the machinations of the Bolsheviks be turned against America. In our opinion this attitude was unfounded, for the political record of America furnishes no basis whereby we could lose in such a clash of ideals with the Communist world.

The author of these lines remembers a conversation with one of the counselors of the American State Department. When he asked him why America had not yet ratified the international convention on genocide, the counselor answered: "We are afraid that it can be used against us by the Bolsheviks in the question of discrimination against the Negroes in the south." The reply to this was that it would be absurd to apply the genocide convention to America even in regard to the position of the Negroes in the south. The Bolsheviks ratified the genocide convention despite the fact that they have on their conscience the Polish Katyn, the Ukrainian Vinnytsya and the starvation by an artificial famine of 6 million Ukrainian peasants in 1932 and 1933, not to speak of the million of their other victims. Their cynicism has often helped them win their international efforts.

So it is now. America had no reason to fear the Bandung conference; it could not be turned against America since at that conference there was open diplomacy, a lack of a desire for cheap compromise and a true conception of the liberation of all nations. Events showed that the Bandung conference turned against the Soviets.

The first person to attack *Soviet colonialism* was one of the initiators of the conference, Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon. He first discussed colonialism in its broadest sense and emphasized that there had now arisen a new Soviet colonialism for the nations of eastern and central Europe. He condemned both kinds of colonialisms and proposed the formation of a special commission to study thoroughly the question of colonialism.

The representative of Iraq, Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali, also attacked Soviet imperialism. He reviewed in detail the spreading of Soviet Russian colonialism in Asia and in eastern and central Europe and asserted that the Communists "confront the world with a new form of colonialism

much deadlier than the old" (*New York Times*, April 19, 1955). The representative of Iran, Dr. Abdoh, spoke in the same spirit. The Arab states also adopted an anti-Communist attitude on the question of the Communist danger. In a word, the free spirit of the Bandung conference rejected not only the western but also the Soviet imperialism as a menace to the freedom of the weaker nations. This is the historical significance of the Bandung conference.

There is no doubt that the chief initiator of this conference was Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India and that he wished the conference of awakened Asia and Africa to adopt his policy of neutralism between the free world of western democracy and the Communist world. He wished it to declare for peaceful coexistence with Red China. He did not succeed, for the conference escaped from his leadership and condemned in its own way the two kinds of colonialisms and by its recognition of the rights of nations to defend themselves linked itself into a union for the defense of its liberty (the states of the Manila Pact).

It would be self delusion not to see that at this conference whether by the pressure of America or independently from a feeling of justice and gratitude there was created a preeminently pro-American group of states, far stronger than the pro-Communist group. But it is a fact that those states which in addition to western colonialism have so concretely felt the Soviet colonialism, used their full freedom in criticizing also the allies of America. These were serious and independent statesmen, far from being the puppets of the satellite states.

Together with the other states of the neutralist front, the Arab bloc and the new nations of Africa, they introduced a fresh spirit of liberty and of a complete refusal to compromise with any sort of oppression, as was keenly remarked in an editorial of the *New York Times* for April 24 under the title "Appraising Bandung." The author says: "There is not a state in the Bandung list whose representatives did not speak for the peoples who have undergone profound and even revolutionary changes in political and social environment within a relatively short time... An important aspect of the changes that have been taking place nevertheless is the emphasis that has been given to freedom of thought and expression. This is something new among peoples who have been ruled from without and it is not surprising that it should have given a tone of freshness and spontaneity to the Bandung meeting... The conference not merely departed from a preconceived pattern but disregarded it entirely."

It was a conference of idealists, for whom freedom and liberation had a serious and great meaning. That is its significance as the beginning of an organization of a Third World Force—the Moral Force of

the Liberated. Its appeal can easily reach all the still non-liberated nations, wishing to throw off the yoke of their oppressors. There is a close spiritual bond between the nations of the Bandung conference and the non-Russian nations of the USSR, especially Ukraine.

Unfortunately this new force has not yet received recognition in the great Western Powers, including America. We have again and again emphasized that our country has no understanding of the modern national idea among the enslaved nations, although it is the most powerful moral anti-Communist force. The word "nationalism" has only in very recent times become tolerable to the ears of the American public, especially since America resolutely took the side of the Vietnamese nationalists headed by their leader *Ngo Dinh Diem*. Our press has now for the first time begun to write explicitly that America is supporting the nationalists. Up till very recently the words "nation" and "nationalism" were in public opinion, coined by the American Communists and their fellow-travellers, words constantly associated with the bestial Nazism of Hitler and totalitarian fascism. This was especially true of Ukrainian nationalism, the most dangerous nationalism for Red Moscow. It was often condemned in America and its holy struggle against Communism was passed over in silence or perverted, although it is of the same flesh and blood as the nationalism of all the other anti-colonial nations which showed themselves at Bandung as a new moral force in the world.

Ukrainian nationalism was not the only one branded in the United States and coldly received. All nationalisms, that is, all the movements for liberation of the peoples of the USSR enslaved by Moscow and extending from Byelorussia to Turkestan, met the same attitude. Scarcely a person in America before the Bandung conference used the phrase "Soviet colonialism"; it was discovered by Sir John Kotelawala, the Prime Minister of distant Ceylon. For the first time this phrase was brought from Bandung to New York to the pages of the great American press and even then in a distorted interpretation of the words spoken in Bandung by Kotelawala and the other anti-Soviet spokesmen for Iraq and Iran. They were definitely talking of the colonial nations of Eastern and Central Europe and Asia that had been the victims of the Soviets. In New York the American democratic journalists limited the nations enslaved by Soviet imperialism only to the satellite nations of Moscow.

The author of the editorial in the *New York Times* on April 20, "The Turnabout at Bandung" was pleasantly surprised that not only Western colonialism but also "Soviet colonialism" had been condemned at that conference. So he carefully wrote: "Instead of indicting the West, the initial speakers drew up a powerful indictment on the same issues

against the Communist Powers and marshaled facts which the West has long since recognized but which are still too little known in the two underdeveloped continents... the Western Powers have been gradually abandoning their imperialism and have freed during and since the war no less than fourteen now independent countries. In contrast, the following countries or parts of them have been converted by conquest or subversion into Communist colonies—in Asia: China, Tibet, North Korea, North Vietnam, Tannu Tuvu, Mongolia; in Europe: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany, with Eastern Austria now hoping to emerge from that status.”

It is strange that the author passed over the old and larger suffering victims of the Soviet-Russian imperialism: Ukraine, Byelorussia, Tataria, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkestan and other smaller nations. Prime Minister Kotelawala was talking of Soviet imperialism in central and eastern Europe; we know that Ukraine is the largest nation in eastern Europe that has been enslaved by the Soviets. We read in the same number of the *New York Times* (April 19) that Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali, the delegate of Iraq “reviewed the history of Communist aggression in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.” At the same time the delegate of Turkey declared: ‘the remnants of old imperialism which are already on their way out, should be made to vanish from the face of the earth,” (*New York Times*, April 20, 1955.)

The nations of the “underdeveloped continents” very clearly and definitely condemned the Soviet Russian imperialism and colonialism as a whole and did not limit it to the satellite states of Moscow in Europe. The American journalist in New York, the metropolis of the world, however, limited it only to the satellite states. He obviously wished to preserve Soviet colonialism over the non-Russian nations of the USSR, whether in eastern Europe or Asia. That this is no accident can be shown by the fact that the author writes logically along the same line which has been followed for years in its propaganda by a semi-official American institution which bases its attitude toward the nations of the USSR on the principle of “non-predetermination” as concerns the Soviet colonial Empire in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Thus by its preservation, they endeavor to appease the Kremlin.

We have the right to assert clearly, openly and honorably that the Soviet Russian colonialism and imperialism have been condemned mercilessly and unanimously by the nations of Asia and Africa, but they still have their protectors and defenders in America. So it seems unparadonably out of place for the author of that editorial to write of the nations at Bandung “they drew up a powerful indictment on the same

issues against the Communist powers and marshaled facts which the West has long since recognized, but which are still too little known in the two underdeveloped continents." This is not so. We can assure the writer of that editorial that the nations of these "underdeveloped continents" are greatly interested in the Soviet colonialism especially its enslavement of Ukraine and this is shown by the orders of published materials on Ukraine by these recently liberated nations of Asia. The nations enslaved by the Soviets are far closer to the nations of the Bandung conference than some persons in New York believe.

So it is not surprising that the Bandung conference found a very strange coverage in the great American press. At first there was distrust and the suspicion that it was a Bolshevik action to compromise America, then surprise, because of the anti-Soviet declarations and gradually the assertion that the conference would be entirely split into blocks and that there would be other failures in this first conference of the free, awakened nations of Asia and Africa.

The congress of the awakened nations of Asia and Africa, to which American public opinion had reacted with distrust, did not turn out to be a force antagonistic to America and it will never become such, if our country recognizes the spirit of this Third Force in the world. The unofficial American observer at the conference, Repr. Adam C. Powell, expressly stated that at the next Asian-African conference America will not have as many partisans as at Bandung, if it continues to maintain a neutral position in the question of colonialism and continues to abstain in colonial matters in the United Nations. It is also a menace to America, if its responsible statesmen continue to maintain Soviet colonialism — the indivisibility and the untouchable character of the colonial Russian empire, the USSR.

The conference of the revived nations of Asia and Africa at Bandung has shown that these nations are a positive factor in the present international situation, that the Soviet hypocrisy toward these nations has been seriously unmasked and that Moscow will find it far more difficult in the future to use the noble feeling of nationalism for the further enslavement of the world. Finally it has shown that the Bandung nations are a powerful barrier to the Soviets on their road to world domination. The moral force of the local patriotisms and of their high regard for their hard won liberty is a Third Force in the new structure of the world.

TEN YEARS OF THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

by LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

However one may wish to define it, tradition is in essential form the success of the past sustaining the progress of the present for our prudent understanding of the future. Today, in its over tenth year of continuous existence, *The Ukrainian Quarterly* has truly carved out a tradition in the field of its specialized endeavors. When the first issue of this East European journal appeared in October, 1944 — in the midst of World War II itself—the initial editorial on “Introducing The Ukrainian Quarterly” clearly set forth as the “main goal of and justification for the appearance of this *Ukrainian Quarterly* . . . the endeavor to present a picture of the real circumstances surrounding the people of Eastern and Central Europe, and to point out the existence of those dynamic forces which can easily cause a new war.” Looking back over these ten years, one can justly state that this main goal has been superbly realized, and the prevision of developments indicated in this original editorial will always stand as a shining tribute to the intellectual resources which launched this publication. While most of our American literary organs were immersed at the time in all varieties of wishful thinking concerning Russian Communist intentions and the durable peace that was to follow the defeat of the Axis powers, the inauguration of this periodical was realistically sounded on the note of “the existence of those dynamic forces which can easily cause a new war.”

In a real sense *The Ukrainian Quarterly* has become an institution supported by an American institution concerned essentially with all aspects of Soviet-American affairs. It is published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America which is the central national body of all non-communist groups and organizations of Americans of Ukrainian ancestry. It is a medium of expression for the basic convictions and thoughts of a million and a half American citizens. These convictions and thoughts are reflected in the objective and scholarly treatments of diverse subject matter pertaining to communism and the Russian Communist empire which constitute the very negation of the values and moral and political principles that guide the publication of this journal. The day has long past for the irresponsible charge that such

guidance by value and principle detracts from the literary and scientific objectivity of a political or economic analysis. On the contrary, both experience and scholarship show that in these fields of analysis the luminous light of fundamental values and fixed moral principles enhances the objectivity of an investigation by focusing attention upon empirical matter which exists incongruously with the natural order of things. That the policy of this journal rests on the traditional Christian values of Western Society and is firmly predicated on the principles of the intrinsic dignity of a man and the natural rights of all peoples and nations to exercise independence, self-government, and sovereignty, is a credit, rather than a discredit, to its standard of objective appraisal.

One need only compare the content of the issues of this journal with that of some other publications in the field, which are not guided similarly, to appreciate the importance of value and principle to objective, systematic analysis. Indeed, one of the chief purposes underlying the publication of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* has been to dispel the many myths and pieces of disinformation that continue to be circulated with regard to the Soviet Union and the concrete nature of communism. Myths on the "monolith Soviet state," the identity of the U.S.S.R. with "Russia," the alleged existence of "Russia's national minorities," the Soviet population of "200 million Russians" and so forth can easily be shown to circulate not only in areas marked by lack of information and knowledge but also in those marked by a callous indifference toward the criteria of justice and charity in the field of international relations. Oriented in the sound direction of truth coupled with justice, this journal was bound to succeed in dispelling in major degree many of such myths, and it can be fairly stated that its development is in paramount and indispensable part attributable to the guiding vision, initiative and indefatigable labors of the founder of this journal, editor and eminent historian on Eastern Europe, Dr. Nicholas D. Chubaty.

DEVELOPMENT AND REACTIONS

The *Quarterly's* early phase of development was not an easy and smooth one. As one would expect, many problems of a technical and financial sort quickly emerged. The problem of general presentation had to be coped with in a period when popular and scholarly interest in the Soviet Union was still relatively undeveloped. The cold war was a couple of years off yet, and the misnomered Russian Institutes and courses on "Russian" history and culture at our various educational institutions had barely been established. In these circumstances which entailed also the problem of building up as rapidly as possible a sub-

scription list to offset a major portion of the total publication cost, the prudent decision was made to present the contents in the journal in a sufficiently light literary vein in order that both popular and scholarly interest might be satisfied. Improvements in editing, style and cover appearance were constantly made, as the institution of the colorful frontispiece in 1948 well exemplified, and a balanced diversification of topics has been consistently maintained in every issue except two recent ones devoted to the general subjects of the Moscow-sponsored celebration of the Pereyaslav Treaty (v. X n. 1, Winter, 1954) and Carpatho-Ukraine (v. X n. 3, Summer 1954). To be sure, as concerns every human institution, certain improvements are still in order, and the board of publications is making every attempt to realize them so that the technical and literary attractiveness of the journal would approximate perfection itself. The precarious future demands a frequent reappraisal of what has become a valuable instrument of knowledge and interpretation regarding America's foremost enemy.

The reaction to the first few issues was most satisfactory and encouraging. It inspired the management of the publication to carry on with great enthusiasm which in time resulted in the production of still more stimulating issues that precipitated broader favorable reaction. It is, of course, not possible to reproduce these notes of favorable acceptance in their entirety here. But a few examples will serve to indicate the sources of inspiration that emerged to assist in the scholarly pioneering effort represented by this new periodical on Soviet-American affairs. In a letter to the editor, written in 1946, Norman Thomas observed, "I think you get out a very interesting and important magazine..." In the same year Justice Harold H. Burton of the United States Supreme Court wrote, "I am deeply interested in your publication." The Honorable Harry P. Cain, now former Senator from the State of Washington and member of the Subversive Activities Control Board, commented, "I have read this material with considerable interest and would appreciate receiving from you any back copies that you might have." Major Tufton Beamish of the British House of Commons declared, "I always read the Ukrainian Quarterly with great interest." The Honorable N. B. James of the Social Credit Board in Canada expressed his congratulations on "an excellent magazine that will not only advance the cause of the Ukrainian people, but is also a real contribution to the literary world." The director of the Institute of Ethnology and Sociology in Torino, Italy, Dr. Geremia Dalla Nora, speaks of the Quarterly as being "so necessary for the true representation of a people so badly made known to the world by an adverse propaganda hostile to its real interests." A graduate of the University of Michigan, a Mrs.

Allen Dear, stated at the time, "The Ukrainian Quarterly should have been read more widely... by the educated and the men who have shaped this country's affairs. If that had been the case, the future outlook would not be so gloomy now."

This represented only a sample cross section of opinion expressed toward the initial issues of the publication. It broadened in time as greater use was made of the material published in the periodical. Five years after its inception there was substantial ground for the observation that appeared in the editorial of the Winter, 1950 issue on "The Anglo-Saxon World and Information on Ukraine": "After five years our point of view has found greater acceptance, in no small degree because of the stark reality of Soviet conduct. That we have been tested and found true in this short period of time indicates the validity of Ukrainian aspirations and the crucial importance of the national problem in the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian Quarterly will continue to champion the cause of the nationalities subjugated by the Communist Russians."

Since then, this point of view has found even greater acceptance with the expanded distribution of and subscription to the journal. Its listing in a number of indices, such as the Wilson International Index, Books Abroad and the United Nations Monthly List of Selected Articles, has facilitated this. Additional listings in outstanding American journals, as the American Historical Review, The Review of Politics, the Journal of Central European Affairs, the Catholic Historical Review and numerous others, have contributed greatly to the same end. Requested use of material for study and research purposes by many institutions, such as the National War College, the National Guard Bureau in the Departments of the Army and the Air Force, has more than confirmed the intellectual utility of this instrument of knowledge on the Soviet Union. The extended subscription and exchange lists, including major official American departments and agencies, numerous foreign embassies, and domestic and foreign research institutions, among which can be cited the Departments of State and Army, the Indian Embassy, the Soviet Academy of Marxism in Moscow, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, Slovansky Ustav in Prague, Tokio University and others, give added demonstration of the study that is being undertaken on Ukraine and the expert analyses provided in the journal on almost every conceivable aspect of the Soviet Union.

EXPERT ANALYSTS OF NON-UKRAINIAN BACKGROUND

The contributors to *The Ukrainian Quarterly* are experts on Ukraine, Soviet-American relations and communism generally. They are not only

men and women of Ukrainian background, but include also numerous authors and writers of non-Ukrainian ancestry, experts who have carefully studied and mastered the problems and issues pertaining to Eastern Europe. Over these past ten years the list of contributors of non-Ukrainian background has developed into a rather long one and in many ways measures the increasing importance of the subjects treated in this journal. The contributions of these intellectual and scholarly persons are of enduring literary and scientific worth, and provide the American reading public with weapons of thought and knowledge for the eventual defeat of communism. Along with the revealing contributions of those who lived under communism in Ukraine and elsewhere, they furnish a mine of information and sound interpretation for the countless students who have embarked upon these special studies in our universities and colleges. In short, their ideas and facts are currently shaping the intellectual outlook of our studious youth throughout this Nation, and the impact of this could never be equalled by any amount of political representation and activity on the part of any one national organization dedicated to the precepts stated earlier.

It would do well for us to survey this list of prominent authors of non-Ukrainian background who have contributed so much to the advancement of truth concerning Ukraine and other non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. Some have necessarily written under a nom de plume, as Americus who contributed the stirring article on "The Russia First Movement in the United States" (v. IX n. 3, Summer, 1953) or Hans de Weerd, a Dutch journalist, who wrote on "Erich Koch and Ukraine" (v. XI n. 1, Winter, 1955). Others, with their well known literary names, have been regular contributors to the *Quarterly*. William Henry Chamberlin started with the very first issue, writing on "The Ukraine and Soviet Nationality Policy," and contributed regularly with a whole series of articles, such as "The Issue of Ukrainian Nationhood" (v. I n. 3, June 1945.), "The Ukrainian Struggle for Freedom" (v. II n. 2, Winter 1946), "Ukraine: Ally Behind the Iron Curtain (v. IV n. 1, Winter 1948) and many others. Even more prolific have been the works of Clarence A. Manning, professor at Columbia University and world renowned author whose name is frequently attacked by Moscow because of the truths he conveys in his literary activity. Dr. Manning likewise is an original contributor with a scholarly article in the first issue on "The Democratic Trend of Ukrainian Literature," followed by "Panslavism, Its Use and Abuse" (v. I n. 3, June 1945) and a host of others.

The long list includes also, with only some of their contributions, the following: G. W. Simpson, prominent Canadian scholar and edu-

ator, on "Hrushevsky, Historian of Ukraine" (v. I n. 2, February 1945); Joseph D. Roucek, educator and extensive writer on East European affairs, on "Ukrainian Sociology After the First World War" (v. I n. 2, February 1945); J. Davies Rhys, Labor Member of the British Parliament and specialist on Ukrainian-Polish affairs, on "Some Lessons of the European Conflict, 1939-1945" (v. I n. 3, June 1954); Floyd A. Cave, professor at San Francisco State College, on "Appeasement of the U.S.S.R. and the Rights of Small Nations" (v. II n. 4, Summer 1946); Ilya J. Goldman, scholar and expert on the economy of the Soviet Union, on "West-East Antagonism in the Pereyaslav Alliance" (v. X n. 1, Winter, 1954); Rep. Michael A. Feighan, Member of Congress and authority on the non-Russian nations in the U.S.S.R., on "Nationalism vs. Internationalism" (v. X n. 2, Spring, 1954); Julius Epstein, noted journalist, on "American Forced Repatriation" (v. X n. 4, Autumn 1945); Watson Kirkconnell, eminent Canadian author and educator, on "The Future of European Freedom" (v. II n. 3, Spring 1946); Percival Cundy, Presbyterian minister and educator, on "Marko Vovchok" (v. III n. 2, Winter 1947); David Martin, author and refugee expert, on "Not Displaced Persons—But Refugees" (v. IV n. 2, Spring 1948); Arthur P. Coleman, president of Alliance College and educator, on "Understanding the Russians" (v. VI, n. 3, Summer 1950).

Included, too, are James Burnham, outstanding American political analyst, on "The East European Strategy" (v. VIII n. 4, Autumn 1952); Amedeo Giannini, Italian statesman and author, on "Ukraine as a Mediterranean Power" (v. VIII n. 4, Autumn 1952); Kurt Glaser, author and journalist, on "Liberation and Self-Determination" (v. X n. 4, Autumn 1954); C. C. Gecys, of Fordham University, on "Present Russian Nationalism" (v. IX n. 2, Spring 1953); George F. Mentz, American admiral and honorary member of non-Russian organizations, on "The Great Stalin Myth—The Solution of the Nationality Problems in the U.S.S.R." (v. IX n. 4, Autumn 1953); Geza B. Grosschmidt, professor at Duquesne University, on "The Kremlin and the Eastern Catholic Church" (v. IX n. 4, Autumn 1953); and Agnes Louise Hovde, American poetess and author on "Answer to Shevchenko" (v. IX n. 4, Autumn 1953). This list of contributors, in a real sense, an unsurpassed honor roll of scholars, educators, authors, writers, journalists, and intellectuals lending their individual power and strength to a sacred cause, that of freedom itself, will certainly be extended in the years ahead.

RICH CONTENT IN TOPICAL VARIETY

The captions of the articles indicated above disclose to some degree the rich content of the *Quarterly* issues which are published in accordance with the general rule of topical variety. Every conceivable aspect of the Soviet and East European situation receives objective and scholarly treatment not only at the hands of writers and analysts of non-Ukrainian background but also from those who lived under communism in various strata of life in Ukraine and other areas of the Soviet Union. In the list of contributors are those who are not of Ukrainian background but as Georgians, Armenians, Turkestani and others have shared this experience and understand the full import of the common identity of problems confronting all of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. To mention a few, John Ermachenko has written on "The Aspirations of the White Ruthenians" (v. V, n. 1, Winter 1949); Emin Rezulzade, former president of the Azerbaijanian Democratic Republic, contributed on "The Republic of Azerbaijan" (v. VII, n. 3, Summer, 1951); James G. Mandalian wrote on "How the Soviets Wrecked Armenia's Independence" (v. VII n. 4, Autumn 1951); Mustad Aytugan delivered one on "World War II and the National Question" (v. VIII n. 1, Winter 1952); and the two Idel-Uralians, Ajaz Ishaki Idelli and Iskender Akchura, submitted respective articles on "The Turko-Tatars of Idel-Ural in Their Struggle for Freedom" (v. VIII n. 2, Spring, 1952) and "The Extermination of the Turko-Tatar Population of the USSR" (v. X, n. 2, Spring 1954).

The topical variety of the articles accepted encompasses also every cultural, scientific, religious, political and economic subject that is of significance for our understanding of Ukraine, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe generally. It entails also comprehensive analyses of every major current development bearing on American relations with the Soviet Union and other regions of the Russian Communist empire. Of tremendous aid in connection with the first item are the intellectual and experimental resources of former professors, officials, military personnel, journalists, scholars, artists etc. who have escaped from the communist slave world and are now living in various parts of the free world. The articles of N. Prychodko, Stephen Protsiuk, Ulace Samchuk, S. Hordynsky, I. Bahryany, B. Krupnitsky, Alexander Ohloblyn, Ludmila Ivchenko, Julian Revay, W. Marchenko, M. Zerow, Matthew Stachiw, Vincent Shandor, I. Kedryn and numerous other analyst and expert observers who experienced in one form or another the conditions of communist enterprise and aggression, are solid contributions to American and free world knowledge and understanding of Russian Communist imperialism.

A brief enumeration of the titles of several selected articles from the issues of these past ten years is sufficient to impress the reader with the breadth and scope of the periodical's diversification of subject matter. As examples, "Ukrainian Underground Publications in USSR", by Lev Shankovsky (v. VIII n. 3, Summer 1952); "Red Russia and the Catholic World," by N. Chubaty (v. I, n. 3, Summer 1948); "The Ukrainians of the Russian Soviet Republic," by V. Chaplenko (v. VII, n. 1, Winter 1951); "The Ukrainian Americans," by Stephen Shumeyko (n. 1, October 1944); "The Importance of the Problem of Displaced Persons," by Walter Dushnyck (v. II n. 3, Spring 1946); "The Ukrainian Cooperative Movement," by Roman Olesnicki (v. II n. 1, Autumn 1945); "The Genocide Convention," by Roman Smal-Stocki (v. V, n. 2, Spring 1949); "The Problem of Nationalities in Soviet Asia," by John V. Sweet (v. IX, n. 3, Summer 1953) and many other articles covering the Soviet and Ukrainian economies, Ukrainian history, art, architecture, archeology, the Russian N.T.S., Soviet labor camp, transportation system, agriculture and monetary affairs.

YOUTH'S EDUCATORS AS CONTRIBUTORS

The importance of having contributors working at American academic schools requires explanation. The seats of learning and knowledge are the intellectual roots of any civilized society and breeds the men and women who are to assume responsible positions in government, industry, labor and other spheres of society. The contributors to this journal who occupy university and college positions cannot but make the influence of their ideas and thoughts felt in the rising generation of this country and others. We have noted the university affiliations of several contributors of non-Ukrainian background. There is, however, also a rising trend in the university and college affiliation of writers with a Ukrainian background who have the opportunity to inculcate into the minds of their students the ideas and facts that are contained in their contributions to this publication.

The many distinguished scholars and teachers of such background, whose writings have made possible the success of this journal, are as follows: Dr. Alexander A. Granovsky, University of Minnesota, on "Free Ukraine Is Vital to Lasting Peace" (v. I, n. 2, February 1945); Dr. Constantine H. Andrusyshen, Saskatchewan University in Canada, on "Skovoroda, The Seeker of the Genuine Man" (v. II, n. 4, Summer 1946); Dr. Roman Smal-Stocki, Marquette University, on "From Bolshevik Stalin to Menshevik Dallin" (v. VII, n. 4, Aut. 1951); Prof. Michael Nagurney, St. Basil's College, on "The Bolshevik Freedom of Religion" (v. IX, n. I,

Winter 1953); Dr. Ivan Mirtchuk, rector of the Free Ukrainian University, Germany, on "Western Tendencies in Ukrainian Culture" (v. IV, n. 3, Summer 1948); Dr. Yuriy Sherekh, Columbia University, on "Why Did You Not Want to See, Mr. Steinbeck?" (v. IV, n. 4, Autumn 1948); Prof. Wasyl Halich, Wisconsin State Teachers College, on "Ukraine: Russia's Most Violent Headache" (v. IV, n. 4, Autumn 1948); Dr. V. J. Kaye-Kisilevsky, University of Ottawa, on "A Great Byzantine-Slav Cathedral" (v. VII, n. 3, Summer 1951); and Prof. Nicholas Pappé, Washington State University, on "The Crimean Tatars — Annihilation or Survival?" (v. VIII, n. 3, Summer 1952). This particular list, too, will be greatly extended as the many more now occupying university and college positions will find the opportunity to make their contributions to the steady growth of this journal.

ADDITIONAL ASSETS OF THE QUARTERLY

In addition to the informative articles in this journal are the assets of its interpretative editorials, critical book reviews, running commentaries on American and foreign periodicals, and documentary presentations of varied sort. These sections, in their different ways, are fundamentally related and integrated by the common endeavor to transmit accurate knowledge, enforce proper terminology and conceptions, and form sound perspectives on the realities and problems of Eastern Europe. That this objective must be carefully and meticulously upheld may be gleaned from the extensive bibliographical references made to the material in this journal in books and theses prepared at our various universities. This writer, for example, has just completed his examination of an advanced thesis on the Communist liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church which relies heavily on much of the revealing data found in a number of articles that have appeared in the *Quarterly*. Letters from graduate students at various institutions throughout the country indicate an extensive interest in Ukraine and the other non-Russian nations in the USSR and an equal dependence on the instructive material published in this periodical.

The well written editorials of the *Quarterly* are calculated to advance public understanding of every major problem that arises in connection with Soviet-American relations. They aim to influence proper and sound judgments on the basis of knowledge and experience rather than groundless notions which some, even in high places, continue to operate with. Many of these editorials have formed a basis of study and discussion at a number of our most important institutions, as, for instance, the National War College. A glimpse at the titles of some of these editorials will show their striking pertinency, currency and interest, as, for example:

"Ukraine and the United Nations" (v. XI, n. 1, Winter 1955); "The Pospelov-Acheson Clash" (v. VII, n. 1, Winter 1951); "Eastern Europe and the Truman Doctrine" (v. III, n. 4, Autumn 1947); and "Faith in Eternal Russia" (v. VII, n. 3, Summer 1951).

The book review section consists of critical accounts of all works that can possibly be included in order to present the most recent literary output on Eastern Europe. The rule of objectivity in criticism prevails here as elsewhere. For example, one may find a favorable review of the work of a given author at one time, as *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*, by David J. Dallin and Boris Nikolaevsky (v. III, n. 4, Autumn 1947), and a rather unfavorable one of another work later, like *The New Soviet Empire*, by David J. Dallin (v. VII, n. 1, Winter 1951). The grounds of fair criticism in all cases cannot be anything but accurate data and logical interpretation. The Ucrainica section, dealing with foreign and domestic periodicals containing articles on Eastern Europe, is managed strictly along the same lines. Commentaries in this section have led to many constructive actions on the part of organs that have let slip by some errors with respect to the Soviet Union. Occasionally, space is afforded for the reproduction of important documents of our time, as the Ukrainian Free University and the Harvard University Refugee Project (v. VII, n. 3, Summer 1951).

From this outline account of the successful development of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* in the first decade of its existence, it should be manifestly evident that its format and material content are so constructed as to furnish a comprehensive picture of the political framework and dominant events in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Ukraine. To justify the need for this picture of knowledge and understanding in these times would mean to overstate the obvious. As gauged by performance and acceptance, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America takes great pride in publishing the *Quarterly*. Despite the appearance of other periodicals in this field, the position of this publication, fortified by tradition, experience and achievement, will undoubtedly remain unsurpassed. As stated previously, it is veritably an institution in itself, generating an ultimate power—knowledge itself—without which any form of political activity becomes aimless and arid. It is a creation that few similar organizations have been capable of producing. It has already entered into its second decade of existence, one that promises to be most eventful and at the same time turbulent and perhaps catastrophic. As a protected but expanded reservoir of knowledge and truth, the *Quarterly* needs for its continued success no words of guidance and inspiration other than those declared in its first editorial ten years ago:

"In our work we shall strive to be guided by the words of the Gospel: *ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make ye free.*"

THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE KREMLIN AND GOLD

By MYKHAYLO PAVLYUK

Before the October Revolution Lenin made the statement that after the Communists took power in Russia with a socialist society, the importance of gold as a metallic base for a financial system would become zero. He even went so far as to promise in the near future such a drop in the importance of gold under the socialistic economic system that the triumphant Communist party would use gold not as a value or a means of adornment but for ordinary things and would in short destroy the old power of gold. Lenin predicted that in the near future gold would be used for the specific decoration of toilets.¹

When the Russian Communists headed by Lenin seized the power in Russia, it soon became clear that they were not able to struggle against the role of gold as still a firm measure of value and because of its commonly accepted function in the world money market. Since that time for almost 40 years, the Communist government of the Kremlin has been stubbornly fighting not to diminish the role of gold but to have as much of it as possible in the possession of the Communist government of Russia. The dreams of Lenin soon evaporated. The effort to pass to a direct exchange of goods did not succeed. The Soviet financier A. Yurovsky so defined this experiment: "The difficulties lay in the fact that first it was infinitely hard to establish the great number of different relationships, despite the fact that at the time the questions of the quantity of goods was regarded as secondary and secondly because for purposes of trade the buyer and seller had to meet to satisfy each other."² So the attempt to create a "goods ruble," i. e. "trade" was discarded within six months as ineffective.

At the end of Militant Communism it became clear to the Kremlin that the point of view of Spunde, the chief commissar of the People's Bank, which he had expressed in May, 1918, was the only way for the Communists of Moscow. Spunde asserted: "The task of the Soviet government is to go over to a paper currency. All precious metals in

¹ Lenin, *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, Vol. 17, p. 155.

² A. Yurovsky, *The Financial Policy of the USSR*, p. 131.

such a circulation become ordinary objects of purchase, which can serve as a fund for settling accounts abroad.”³

The Soviet financial policy thus formulated by Spunde is the basis of the financial conception which has been carried on by the Soviets during the entire period of the Soviet regime. Even the best times of the NEP really form no exception in this general line, for the ruble as a gold coin was not put into circulation.

It is not hard to see that the Soviets used the system of a paper currency to exploit their subjects and had and have in this connection great success, since in the course of 30 years they have brought the worth of the paper ruble on the internal market into four values.

But the second part of the financial policy of the Soviets, the acquisition of precious metals and especially gold, has been a severe problem which has constantly called from the Kremlin the most diverse and decisive measures. There were many causes for this and it is worth while to consider them.

Before World War I the tsarist regime had quite large reserves of gold in the vaults of the State Bank. According to some sources these amounted to 2 billion rubles with a gold parity of 1 ruble to 0.77423 grams of pure gold. Other sources state that there were in circulation 494.2 millions of rubles in coin. The amount of gold in the hands of the population in money, manufactured articles and safe keeping cannot be counted for the people are never inclined to tell the amount of gold in their possession.

In World War I the tsarist state used a considerable part of the state gold to cover Russia's unfavorable balance in foreign trade, especially after the entrance of Turkey into the war on the side of Germany. During the war the gold which was in the hands of the population in coin and articles went out of financial and trading circulation as a result of the depreciation of the tsarist paper ruble. The October Revolution and the almost four years of civil war brought a catastrophic reduction in the gold reserves in the People's Bank of the Soviets. So at the beginning of the currency reform of 1922-24, the Kremlin had only 31 million gold rubles.⁴ Such miserable reserves of gold even after the confiscation of all the valuables in the safes and the seizure of gold, silver and precious stones from the churches of all faiths clearly showed the catastrophic situation of the gold reserves

³ *The Currency Circulation and Credit in Russia*, Vol. I, 1914-1921, Moscow, pp. 447-448.

⁴ A. D. Gusakov and I. A. Dimshits, *The Currency Circulation and Credit of the USSR*. Derzhfinvidav, 1951, p. 76.

in the People's Bank of the Soviets. This was explained not only by the fact that the Kremlin for lack of goods for export at the time was compelled to cover all imports and other payments abroad by the export of gold. An important part of the gold was taken abroad by the governments of the new independent republics when they went into the emigration. Many emigres took with them gold and insofar as they belonged to the richer classes of the population, not a small amount of gold went abroad with them. Not a little gold was stolen by the people from the state. That gold which remained with the population went, so to speak, into the internal emigration. After the Communists came to power, there developed throughout the whole of Sovdepia an infinite number of hiding places for gold which was buried in the earth, in gardens and forests. This gold was not the property of the former bourgeoisie but belonged to the workmen, peasants, and city dwellers. The Kremlin had the task of securing this gold.

Only the financial policy of the Kremlin at the beginning of the NEP brought it a certain success. The private initiative in trade, even retail trade, in craftsmanship and light industry, not to mention agriculture, increased the need for coins to satisfy even the minimum needs for current use of a sound currency of the new bourgeoisie, the so-called Nepmen. There was a great lack of paper money in cash. The Soviet government took advantage of this. It was unofficially allowed to carry on trade in hard money in exchanges on the bazaars, black and money markets. On these bazaar exchanges there developed and was openly carried on the buying and selling of gold tsarist coins of 10 and 5 rubles at a rate which varied from 13 to 10.5 rubles for 10 gold tsarist coins. There were times when the supply of tsarist coins was so great that the rate even fell to the offer of 9 rubles, 50 kopecks of paper money for 10 tsarist gold rubles. This interesting and very rare phenomenon in the history of currency was caused by the great need of the Nepmen to sell their reserves of gold coins to carry on their business which could be financed only by paper rubles and not by tsarist gold coins, which were not legal for payments.

It is not hard to show that at the financial, black and bazaar exchanges secret agents of the financial section of the government bought for the state tsarist gold coins in return for paper currency. It is hard to state even approximately how much gold was thus secured by the Soviet government but in any case the fact was that the Kremlin actually not only did not put the gold ruble into circulation but by the currency reform it acquired some quantity of gold for the state in return for paper rubles.

In this way at the beginning of the NEP the Soviets took a considerable amount of gold from their subjects. But the Kremlin at the end of the period of the NEP issued a special secret decree for the application of methods for bringing coins and other valuables to the deposits of the Bank. This resolution aimed to apply two methods of especial force and severity to secure from the population i. e.: 1) the arrest of persons who in the opinion of the NKVD might have gold and to detain them along with common criminals until the arrested persons told where their gold was hidden. At this time the prisons in the entire USSR were filled with such prisoners and this went on for two years. These arrests of citizens of the USSR were called the disease of "golditis". — 2) When the "golditis" had claimed all its victims caught by the NKVD, the shops of the Torgsin, which had previously served only officials, began to sell to the starving population products for gold, silver and precious stones at prices of gold and products before World War I. The Torgsin stopped its activity only when its operations became very small.

How effective these two methods of compelling the population to give their gold to the state were can be seen from the fact that even Molotov said: "Along with this the acquisition of gold in the USSR together with the receipts from the Torgsin increased in the 4 years (1932-1935) 6 times."⁵ Usually Molotov did not mention golditis and the fact that the Torgsin sold gold not to foreigners but to the starving population. These two devices gave the most gold to the Kremlin, for they were extremely simple and quicker than the development of the gold-producing industry.

We can consider that with the closing of the Torgsin in 1935, the Kremlin basically stopped its efforts to recover gold from the population, for it believed that its operations had been so effective that the population still retained very little gold and silver, either in coins or articles.

This short survey of the methods of the Kremlin to secure gold from the population gives us the possibility of assuming that on the territory of the USSR and within its borders the population possess little gold and other valuable metals.

At the beginning of the NEP the Soviets laid the most stress on the acquisition of gold from gold bearing ores. This part of the gold recovery in Siberia was given as concessions chiefly to the English and when the concessionaires introduced modern machinery, the concessions were liquidated by the Kremlin at the date set in the agree-

⁵ See V. M. Molotov, *Definite Report on the Work of the Government to the 7th Congress of Soviets*. 1935, p. 23.

ment. There was no special increase in gold production until the beginning of the thirties. In 1929 gold was mined only to the amount of 15 million dollars according to Soviet unverified data. In the beginning of the thirties, when the Kremlin became convinced that the reserves of building lumber in the northern part of European Russia, which after 1929 had been exploited by 5 million prisoners, the former kurkuls, who cut wood chiefly for export, had so diminished that there was an obvious danger of a lack of building lumber for export and for domestic needs, the period began for a more intensive search for gold in the Far East of Siberia. This was not because especially rich new gold mines had been found in Siberia. The fact is that in tsarist times the methods of mining gold had been very primitive. At that period there was a common idea among economists that in Siberia "more gold was being buried than was being secured." But in the beginning of the thirties the Kremlin through the work of millions of prisoners began to rewash with modern machinery the gold-bearing ores which had been washed in a primitive way. The cheap labor of the prisoners made this profitable. So the millions of prisoners increased the production of gold. The following table gives the picture of the increase in the production of gold in the USSR in comparison with the world production and that of the USA. The data has been compiled from the close calculations of American experts.

The value of the gold in millions of American dollars

Year	World production	USA	USSR	Remarks
1930	401.0	47.1	31.0	The value of an ounce of gold is based on 1 ounce — \$ 20.67.
1931	426.4	49.5	34.0	
1932	458.1	50.1	40.0	
1933	469.3	52.8	56.0	
—	—	—	—	—
1933	794.5	89.5	95.0	The value in dollars is based on 1 ounce — \$ 35.0
1934	823.0	108.2	135.0	
1935	882.5	126.3	158.0	
1936	971.5	152.5	187.0	
1937	1041.6	168.2	185.0	
1938	1196.4	178.1	180.0 ⁶	

There is no doubt that the Soviets during these years increased the production of gold. At the same time we must mention that the data on the Soviet gold production by American calculations is exaggerated, thanks to Soviet propaganda. Thus in 1933 Stalin told an

⁶ *American Almanach, World Almanac, 1945, p. 550.*

American correspondent: We have many gold-producing areas and they are being developed rapidly. Especially during the past two years we have improved the methods of our gold mining and have found great reserves.”⁷ These improved methods as we have seen in the years 1931—1933 were the application of the methods of the Torgsin and golditis. The new gold-bearing regions were primarily the shops of the Torgsin and the prisons of the NKVD. There were many of these “new regions” and they did give the Kremlin not a little gold.

Molotov also used for propaganda the data of the State Bank, which placed the gold reserve at 970.8 million rubles at the value of 1 ruble — 51.46 cents, and at the congress he painted the question so that it appeared that despite the difficulties of 1929-1934 the Soviets even had more than a billion rubles in term obligations of bonds, gold, platinum, drafts and foreign currencies.⁸ But such economists as the Russian emigre Prof. S. N. Prokopovich hastened to check on Molotov and Stalin and by their authority favored the Soviet propaganda by asserting that the Soviets had extremely great gold reserves; it was the gold collected by the Torgsin and the method of golditis and that recovered by the prisoners in Siberia through rewashing the already treated gold bearing ore. This was in addition to that collected in such a brutal way to pay the fixed obligation on imports in 1929-1931.⁹

To analyze the correctness of the calculations of the American experts as to the recovery of gold by the Soviets in the years 1934-1936, it is useful to make a comparison of the exports, imports and the gold production of the USSR in these years.

(The exports and imports of all kinds of goods and the gold is given in millions of rubles according to the value of the ruble on 1. III. 1950).

Year	Exports	Imports	Gold Production in the USSR
1934	1458.0	810.0	440.0
1935	1281.0	841.0	632.0
1936	1082.0	1077.0	748.0
1937	1305.0	1012.0	740.0
1938	1005.0	1074.0	720.0

Total	6131.0	4814.0	3280.0 ¹⁰

⁷ See *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, Vol. 17, p. 155. Works, Vol. 13, p. 277.

⁸ See *Detailed Report on the Work of the Government to the 7th Congress of Soviets*, 1935, p. 23.

⁹ The Soviet financiers, Prof. A. M. Smirnov, Prof. Z. V. Atlas and many others in their basic works do not mention concretely the great amount of

From this table it is clear that if the production of gold shown is not exaggerated, the average gold production in the USSR for years was about 68.4% of the entire imports. In such a condition the imports into the USSR should have risen sharply. But since this has not been observed, we can say that the American experts on the USSR, in calculating the amount of gold produced in the USSR for these years were mistaken and greatly exaggerated the gold production of the USSR. The Kremlin always tried to increase its imports but especially in these pre-war years. The obstacle always was the lack of goods for export.

The territorial accessions of the Kremlin, which were incredibly great as a military prize after the war, gave the Soviets the power to pump gold from the satellite countries and the population of the satellites usually through their communist governments. How this question stands can be seen from the contents of a law in satellite Poland, in which we find forecast in 1950 "the removal from the capitalistic elements of their reserves of gold, platinum and foreign currencies". Also "Strict penalties were set up for speculation in gold and foreign currencies".¹¹ When we take into account how widely the Communists apply the term "capitalistic elements," it must mean the inclusion of both workmen and peasants, if they have gold in their possession.

In addition, the proclamation of a law by the Soviets dated January 3, 1950, setting parity for the Soviet ruble as 1 ruble — 0.222168 grams of pure gold beside its value for propaganda and prestige gives the Kremlin the power to secure from the satellite states at a high value of the ruble payments in gold for the constant great increase of world export to the satellite countries including China.

This is a short survey of the struggle of Communist Moscow to secure for the Kremlin gold from the start of the Communist domination to the present time. The whole weight of this long continued action, as we have seen, fell on the shoulders of the Soviet citizens and among them mostly upon the Ukrainians who perished in the camps, getting gold in Siberia, in the prisons of the NKVD, suffering from golditis and dying of

gold, for they know its origin and where it went to pay the fixed obligations, the ending of which was in 1936.

¹⁰ The data on imports and exports is taken from the book of Prof. A. M. Smirnov: *International Calculations and Credit Relations in the Foreign Trade of the USSR*. Zovnishtorgvidav, Moscow, 1953, p. 235. The gold production is from previous table.

¹¹ Prof. Z. V. Atlas. *The Strengthening of the Currency System of the USSR and the Lands of the People's Democracies. Inflation in the Capitalistic Countries*. Derzhvidav, 1951, p. 80.

hunger, when the Soviets covered by the export of products their lack of gold for export.

This raises another question. Where is that gold which the Soviets took from the population in such an inhuman manner and secured from Siberia?

This part of the problem is much simpler than the preceding, in which we listed only the chief methods by which the Soviets secured gold. In this part of our study the Soviets themselves give quite valuable material. We must turn to the Soviet information on foreign trade. According to the data of the Soviet Prof. S. M. Smirnov, we can give the following table of exports and imports for the period from 1918 to 1920 in millions of rubles at the value of the ruble on January 3, 1950.

Years	Exports	Imports	Balances
1918-20	33.3	477.8	— 444.5
1921-25	4409.0	5960.0	— 1551.0
1926-32	19587.0	21428.0	— 1841.0
1933-38	7856.0	6028.0	+ 1828.0

Total	31885.3	33893.8	— 2003.5 ¹²

The Soviets do not give any figures on exports and imports during the war from 1939 to 1945. They are also silent on imports through American lend-lease. As we know, these imports amounted to 11,650 million dollars or at the value of the ruble on January 3, 1950 — 46,600 million rubles.

The period 1946-50 shows also the movement of exports and imports at the value of the ruble for January 3, 1950 (in millions of rubles):

Years	Exports	Imports	Balance
1946-50 incl.	14944.0	16344.0	— 1400.0 ¹³

This Soviet material on the circulation and balances of Soviet exports and imports from 1918 to 1950 inclusive shows that the Soviets have almost always had an unfavorable trade balance in their foreign trade, which has even reached according to their own data, 3408.5 million rubles (at the value of 1 ruble — 0.25 cents of deficit. But actually the deficit which the Soviets covered with gold was far greater than the Soviet author indicates. The fact is that during the thirties the Soviets treated the export of gold as the export of goods, for they claimed the USSR

¹² Prof. A. M. Smirnov. *Op. cit.* Zovnishtorgvidav, Moscow, 1953, pp. 209. 194, 224, 235.

¹³ Prof. S. N. Prokopovich: *National Economy of the USSR*, Chekhov Publishing House, 1952, Vol. 2, pp. 235-6.

is a country which produces a great deal of gold.¹⁴ So in the amounts of exports the Soviets hide an important part of their gold export. This is especially noticeable in the years 1933-8, when they even had a balance of exports over imports amounting to 1828.0 million as a result of the sale of the gold taken from the population by the Torgsin and the golditis.

In considering the three arguments given above which show the constant loss of gold from the USSR abroad, we must emphasize that the most important fact is that the Soviets themselves recognize the deficit in their foreign financial trade balance. This makes it possible to conclude that the outflow of gold from the USSR abroad is so important and above all, so constant that the Kremlin cannot store up important reserves of gold. The Kremlin, as we have seen, is carrying on propaganda in every way that it has large gold reserves. Even recently when after the Berlin uprising in fear of further hunger disturbances, the Kremlin began to export in mass tons of gold as a deposit for the purchase of food almost exclusively, the Soviet propaganda on this side of the iron curtain began to spread statements that at Kolyma the Soviets had found exceptionally rich gold deposits. But when a little later the Soviets also began to export silver, it became clear that at a critical moment the Kremlin was throwing into its exports everything that could be easily sold abroad.

This analysis shows that the gold reserves of the Soviets cannot be so important, for no great country with such a large and steady export of gold abroad can amass it in any great quantities.

In summing up, we can state that the proposal of the chief commissar of the then Soviet People's Bank, Comrade Spunde, of whom we have spoken in the beginning of this brief article, to consider gold as goods for the payment of foreign debts, has, as we have seen, been followed by the Soviets in its financial policy for 37 years. It is natural that such a policy for such a long time would lead to a tremendous outflow of gold abroad. The advice of Lenin "we must keep gold in the RSFSR, sell it at a high price, and buy goods for it cheaply"¹⁵ was his idea only after he had ceased to dream of the use of gold for specific decorations of toilets, and ceased to help the Kremlin in storing up large reserves of gold.

When the Communists of the Kremlin used gold as goods to pay abroad, this could not satisfy the USSR which is constantly hungry for imported goods.

¹⁴ Prof. A. M. Smirnov. *Op. cit.*, p. 89.

¹⁵ V. I. Lenin. *Works*, Vol. 33, pp. 89-90.

SOVIETS AND THE EMIGRATION

By DMYTRO ANDRIEWSKY, *Munich*

In March, 1955, the newspapers of the Soviet Zone of Germany (*Taegliche Rundschau*, March 9, 1955) published a statement that there had been formed in East Berlin a *Committee for Return to the Fatherland*. Its head was Major General N. Mikhaylov of the Soviet Army and it consisted at first of four Russians and two Ukrainians. Somewhat later this group was enlarged by the addition of ten persons of various nationalities among whom we find the names of Georgians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, etc. The committee commenced to publish a newspaper the *Return to the Fatherland* and this is being sent to the private addresses of emigres who are in Germany or outside of it.

According to this published statement and articles in the newspaper, the object of the committee is "the defence of the interests of the patriotic movement of the DPs for a return to the fatherland," "the answering of the great scandal of anti-Soviet propaganda," which, they claim, asserts that those who return home are threatened with punishment, and also help and support for those who wish to go back. From this we see that the activity of the Committee has been launched on a large scale and that it is intended to function for a long period of time. As we write these lines, it is only beginning to operate and at the moment it is hard to determine its methods for inducing emigres to return and also the results that will come from this activity. But we can foresee some things.

In accordance with the appeal and the communication of the Committee, it appears that its members are former emigres who have returned to their fatherland. In reality this is not the truth. The very head of the Committee, Major General N. Mikhaylov, a former prisoner of war, was never an emigre. Immediately after the end of the war, he was at the head of a Soviet mission which in 1945 tried to influence the members of the 1st Ukrainian Division, which was fighting the Bolsheviks as a part of the German Army and later passed over to the side of the Americans so as not to submit to the Soviets. The Russians on the Committee are similar "emigres." Some of the non-Russians have actually been outside of the frontiers of their countries but only for a short time and returned during the period of repatriation after the end of the war.

Among the members of the Committee we can count only a few real emigres. Of these, Krutiy actually was for some years in Germany and

Austria and went over to the side of the Soviets in 1954. According to all the evidence, he had been a Bolshevik agent among the Ukrainian emigration but played no important role. Another emigre of the same type is the Georgian, General Maglakelidze, who also in 1954 disappeared from Western Germany under quite mysterious conditions and turned up in the Soviet Union. Both of these men are now attacking the political emigration of Ukraine and Georgia and blackening it according to the commands of the Bolsheviks.

The plans and intentions of the Committee have been defined as the result of the statements of V. Vasylaki. The Soviet news agency TASS reported on April 7, 1955 that the latter had voluntarily returned to the Soviets. This was almost the first result of the activity of the Committee. Vasylaki is by origin a Greek or Moldavian from Ukraine and has been in the emigration since 1944, calling himself a Ukrainian. He has been known for his sympathy with the Russian leader Kerensky. When in 1951, in Fuerstenfeldbruecke near Munich there were created in one night, with the active sympathy of some Russian and American engineers, six new Ukrainian political organizations which united in the so-called 'Ukrainian Movement for Liberation' headed by Gulay, Vasylaki took part in it as the leader of the "Ukrainian Democratic Union." This began the political career of Vasylaki and he is continuing it under the Soviets.

The artificial creation of the group of Gulay and Vasylaki was accepted by the Ukrainian emigres as an effort to break the Ukrainian national front and produced a sharp reaction by three young men whom the American court in Germany sentenced to seven years imprisonment. The Ukrainian Movement for Liberation declared for a federation with Russia and joined the Co-ordinating Centre of the Anti-Bolshevik Struggle (KTsAB) headed by Kerensky and Melgunov and supported by the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism. After a short time the Ukrainian Movement for Liberation began to disintegrate. Gulay was removed from its head and was succeeded by Vasylaki. Working within the frame of this so-called Ukrainian Movement for Liberation, Vasylaki formed in 1945 together with some groups of doubtful value among the various nationalities the so-called League of Anti-Bolshevik Organizations of the Soviet Union (LAONSS) and this passed suddenly from federalist position to the position of independence. At this time Vasylaki declared that he was financing the LAONSS and his newspapers *New Ukraine* in Ukrainian and the *Anti-Bolshevik* in Russian, from 10,000 German marks which he claimed to have won in a lottery. With such a past Vasylaki has now joined the Committee for Return to the Fatherland and is working with it.

*

*

*

The Committee of Mikhaylov is intended to work among the emigration from the territory of the Soviet Union, including the Baltic states. During World War II the number of persons who declared themselves voluntary emigres, or were war prisoners or in the still larger group of workmen compulsorily brought by the Germans, reached 5 millions. The largest national group was formed by the Ukrainians who numbered 2 millions. In accordance with an agreement between the Soviet government and the Western states this mass of people was to be returned to their native lands. Despite the agreement that this was to be done with the consent of those interested, the Soviets adopted methods of compulsory return and this caused great opposition, extending to the suicide of persons who did not wish to go back.¹ Nevertheless the great mass of the DP's returned. But there were left in Western Europe about 248,000 Balts, 225,000 Ukrainians and about 80,000 Byelorussians.

Through the efforts of the UNRRA at first and later the IRO these emigres began in 1947 to leave Europe for countries across the ocean. In 1952 there were left in the countries of Europe about 72,000 Balts, chiefly in Germany, Sweden and England, 66,000 Ukrainians, of whom 23,000 were in Germany and Austria, the same number in England, and the rest in other countries and 43,000 White Ruthenians (Byelorussians) 15,000 of whom had found asylum in England. After 1952 the movement continued but on a far smaller scale. This new emigration joined the older, which had gone abroad after the revolution and the victory of the Bolsheviks, or even earlier. So there sprang up outside the boundaries of the Soviet Union important cadres of political emigres who enjoyed asylum and refused to return home while their countries were under a Communist regime. These are living witnesses of Bolshevism and the alien Moscow invasion of the non-Russian countries of Eastern Europe. They are hostile to the Soviets and so their existence and activity does not suit the Bolsheviks. This emigration from the various nationalities is the goal of the activity of the committee of Mikhaylov.

The importance of this emigration and its danger to the Soviets does not lie so much in its numbers but in the fact that it contains an important number of intellectuals and politically active elements. The emigres have formed abroad many social, relief and cultural organizations, including universities, Academies of Science, middle and elementary schools. They have a large press, technical, informative and also under

¹ See: American Forced Repatriation, by Julius Epstein. *The Ukr. Quarterly*, Vol. X., No 4.

political parties, there have been created or reorganized abroad political groups. This emigration has furnished a base and support for the governments in exile which left their countries under the pressure of the Bolshevik invasion or formed new national political centres. In this way the national emigres from the USSR reflect the social structure and political tendencies which would be developing in their countries, if they were not dominated by the Bolshevik dictatorial and totalitarian regime. The emigres are the living conscience and the spokesmen for their peoples to the free world. They speak for the millions of their brothers, for their peoples in a new world and they form an important element in the struggle against Bolshevism.

The Committee for Return to the Fatherland is to be the tool of the Bolsheviks to destroy this emigration morally. It is intended to create confusion among the emigres, to disintegrate their centres, to compromise them in the eyes of their compatriots at home and to take from them the confidence of the free world. The Soviets are obviously counting on the fact that they can win over a large number or at least some prominent emigres. On the basis of forced statements or falsified confessions the Soviets will try to prove to their citizens that the emigration is a reservoir "of spies and diversionists" in the service of foreign powers, especially the United States of America and are being used "for dirty work against the Soviet Union and the countries of the people's democracy" as Vasy-laki has stated. If they should succeed, the Soviets would try to instil in their citizens the idea that they can have no hope in the emigres in their struggle against the regime on the one hand and on the other, to prove to the free world that it should have no confidence in the emigres. Thus the Soviets have a double purpose in mind.

We can assume that the action of the Soviets against the emigration has been caused in part by their cooperation with the anti-Bolshevik forces of the free world. Open evidence of this cooperation on a large scale is the participation of the emigres in the work of the Kersten Commission of the US House of Representatives, the activity of the American Committee of Free Europe and of the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism. The Kersten Committee in 1954, studying the aggression of the Bolsheviks, collected from the emigres a mass of material, part of which it has already published, and which is a general indictment of the Soviets. The Committee for Free Europe has been carrying on for years under the name "A Crusade of Truth" along with the emigres of Central Europe a psychological war against Communism. The Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism is doing the same thing with the emigres from the Soviet Union and is trying to form a united front of the peoples of the USSR. Similar work is being done through the radios of Rome,

Madrid, and Canada, although with a lesser participation of the emigres. The breaking of the backbone of the emigration would be a heavy blow to all these efforts.

Apparently the Soviets understand better than the free world the role of the emigres in the struggle for liberation of the nations enslaved by Moscow and the dominant Russian people. They call the emigres a "reactionary force," i. e. one opposed to Communism. They are afraid that the peoples of Soviet Union will rather believe the spokesmen of the free world in the struggle against Soviet aggression, together with the representatives of the emigration and that the Soviet population will not take up arms against that world. So, Vasylaki accuses the emigration for such acts of an international character as the ratification of the Paris Treaty for the union of Western Europe and also the assumed preparations of the West "for a new war against the USSR and the countries of the people's democracy."

As we write these lines, there are rumors that Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the other satellite states are going to proclaim amnesties for the emigres on the tenth anniversary of their "liberation" by the Soviets. The propaganda of the Mikhaylov Committee is presenting the action of repatriation as a sign of patriotism. It is the sacred obligation to the fatherland, so states the Committee, to return to it. This argument may be true in the case of the Russians, for actually under the Soviets, Russia has gained more power than ever in the past and has extended its control further to the West. To adapt this argument to the Ukrainians, the Soviets are trying to raise the prestige of the Ukrainian SSR as a sovereign state, which includes all the national territory. This was the meaning of Voroshilov, when in March, 1955 he conferred in Kiev the order of Lenin awarded to Ukraine by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in honor of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav. Kyrychenko, the Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, emphasized the same thing in his address in the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. It is no accident that recently many Ukrainians in Germany, America and Canada have received letters from their families in Ukraine which suggest the same points, not without suggestions from the government. At the same time Czechs in the emigration are also receiving anonymous announcements appealing to them to return home. These are but some of the tactical methods which are and will be used by the Communists to further the work of repatriation.

The question arises what reaction the emigration will have toward these appeals of the Bolshevik siren. It will not be the same in all the emigrations for different reasons. The reaction will not be the same by those emigres who have had dealings with the Soviets for 35 years and

those whose countries have been seized by Red Moscow in the last 10 years. If among the emigres from the USSR there will be strong opposition, it will be less among the countries of Central Europe. So, although the Mikhaylov Committee talks of "the movement of the DP's to return, in reality there are few cases of this among the peoples from the USSR. There will be some like Vasylaki, suspected as a Bolshevik agent. Yet at the same time there returned in three months of 1955 to their fatherland some 300 Czechs and more are preparing to go. There are various motives including the old Russophilism of the Czechs, but this cannot and does not exist among the peoples of the USSR, who have been oppressed both by tsarist Russia and Soviet Russia.

Let us look more closely at the Ukrainian emigration and we shall see through it the soul of the entire emigration and understand the effect of the appeal to return. In the twenty years after World War I some of the Ukrainians might have had the illusion and returned to Ukraine to serve not the Soviets but their people under the Soviets. All the more prominent persons who went back perished in one way or another at the hands of the Bolsheviks. Now after 35 years of Moscow-Bolshevik rule, the destruction of the Ukrainian scholars and writers in Ukraine, after the trial of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in 1930, after the artificial famine of 1933, organized by the Bolsheviks to stifle Ukraine and causing the death of about 6 million persons, after the liquidation of a long series of Ukrainian Communists as Skrypnyk, Shumsky, Khvylovy, Lyubchenko and others because they defended the interests of Ukraine, after all this, 225,000 Ukrainians joined the emigration and refused to return. After the new filling of the camps of Vorkuta and elsewhere with Ukrainians, a fact confirmed by foreign witnesses, did many wish to go back?

It is a different fact that among the Ukrainian emigration there are certain elements which found themselves abroad accidentally. Compulsorily deported by the Germans, they did not go back in the hope that they would be sent across the ocean, but were not allowed to go for various reasons, chiefly illness. They stayed in Germany and found themselves in very bad economic conditions and without work. They were compelled to live on miserable relief aid. Their true nationality is not always recognized, the countries of their residence consider them a burden, and they have no foreseeable chance of improving their condition. For such elements an amnesty by the Soviets and a return to their country may seem a way out. It is another thing that in their country they will be met with distrust and suspicion from the organs of the government and perhaps undergo persecution and punishment. Nevertheless we must reckon on the departure of these elements. We must recognize

also that the Soviets will call back from the West a certain number of their secret agents, active among the emigres as we have said, so as to give an example to others.

The departure of the two categories of emigres cannot change the attitude of the Ukrainian political emigration toward the Kremlin or their opinion of it in the free world. Nevertheless the Bolshevik activity for repatriation will put before the Free World the task of caring for the improvement of the conditions of life among the emigres. Even their poverty and need serves the Mikhaylov committee as an argument to blacken the "capitalistic world" for its indifference to human sufferings and thus to undermine the confidence of the Soviet peoples in it.

The most important task is to correct those political errors, which the free world is committing in the political area, especially in the case of the peoples enslaved by the USSR. This is the weakest point in the struggle of the West against the Soviets. We have mentioned very briefly how the Soviets are using the fact of the existence of the Ukrainian SSR, and at the same time the spokesmen of the West do not recognize even the existence of a Ukrainian State and the states of the other peoples of the USSR but still adhere to the old formula of non-predetermination which denies even what those peoples have under the Soviets. The Free World promises that right to "self-determination" which the peoples of the USSR have already exercised.

Even if the activity of the Mikhaylov committee does not basically change the attitude of the emigration from the USSR, it can effect unfavorably the position of the West behind the Iron Curtain. This possibility must inspire the workers in the international field to oppose the Bolshevik activity and efforts to compromise the West through appropriate actions. These can take the form of a Universal Declaration of Independence directed to the nations oppressed by the Soviets and especially to those who are suffering from the Bolsheviks in two ways, socially and nationally. It is only in this way that the West can maintain the confidence of these peoples in the free world and thus support their hope for liberation.

UKRAINE IN GERMANY'S WORLD WAR II PLANS

By MYROSLAV PROKOP

The article by Mr. Hans de Weerd, "Ukraine and Erich Koch" in vol. XI, No 1. (1955) of *The Ukrainian Quarterly* shows one side of the medal of German policy in relation to Ukraine during the last war. Reichskommissar Koch was undoubtedly a faithful executor of the official policy of destroying the Ukrainian people, a policy pursued during the war by Hitler and his closest associates. They all aimed for the conquest of colonies in Eastern Europe and the turning of the nations inhabiting those parts into slaves of Germany.

Nevertheless there were circles in the Third Reich which deemed such a policy catastrophic and attempted to have it changed. There were two groups among them. One believed that the destruction of Bolshevism would be feasible only if there were collaboration with the Russian imperialist elements which aimed at transforming the existing Soviet empire into a new non-communist type of empire. Such ideas were defended mainly by the Prussian aristocracy, the Baltic Germans and all those who nurtured a hope of realizing Bismarck's political concept of permanent collaboration between the German and the Russian empire, directed in unison against Western Europe. This group believed, moreover, that the Russian people, i. e. the masses, could be won over to this concept. The defecting Russian General A. A. Vlasov was taken in tow by this group to realize the above mentioned concept and he was recommended as the prospective head of government of the new Russian empire. As far as the Russian emigres were concerned, the chief partner of this German group's activities was "Natsionalno-Trudovy Soyuz" (National Labor Association, commonly known as NTS), an old Russian emigre group of an obviously fascist trend.

But, inasmuch as Hitler planned to enslave all the peoples of the USSR, including the Russians, the activities of Vlasov and his mentors had no chance of being recognized for quite a long time. Only towards the end of the war, strictly speaking during the latter part of 1944, did the situation change. This happened when Vlasov and his idea of a renewal of the Russian empire found a powerful protector in the person of S.S. Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler and his associates. Thanks to this

protection, Vlasov became an official ally of Nazi Germany and proclaimed in November, 1944 his manifesto "to the Peoples of Russia."

Vlasov's weak points were his imperialistic concept and the fact that he, a Russian, wanted to represent all nations of the USSR. He was opposed by the non-Russians who aimed to restore their own independent states following the destruction of Bolshevism. That is the reason why Vlasov did not succeed in gaining adherence to his political program of any representative circles of non-Russian emigres, notwithstanding the fact that he had the backing of powerful German protectors who exerted much pressure on the non-Russians. Thus the Vlasov experiment ended in failure not only because of the disintegration of Germany, but also because the political conception of the restoration of another Russian empire was accepted with no less hostility by the non-Russian peoples than communism itself. There is also room for doubt as to whether the concept would have found support among the popular masses of Russia which are not enthusiastic about subjugating non-Russian peoples.¹

In addition to the above mentioned concepts of eastern policy, i. e. the subjection of all peoples of the USSR and the renewal of a Russian empire of a non-Bolshevik type, there existed in Germany yet a third concept. It was based on an attempt to wreck Bolshevism with the active aid of all peoples of the USSR, i. e. Russians and non-Russians. This was a plan to erect, in place of the USSR, several separate states which were to be either allies of Germany, or her satellites, constituting a terrain for future economic and political expansion. Such plans accentuated three basic points of departure: 1. the USSR is a communist centralized

¹ On October 25, 1942, the assistant chief of the political department of the German Ministry for Eastern Territories, Dr. Braeutigam, at the present time a leading political figure in the West German Republic, wrote a memorandum to the German government in which he criticised the then eastern policy of the German government very sharply. He demanded immediate changes, in particular the removal of Reichskommissar Koch from Ukraine and recognition of the right of state sovereignty of all nations of the USSR. He maintained that the only factor which had mobilized the nations of the USSR against the Germans was the plan of establishing colonies in the East. On the other hand, there would have been no opposition by virtue of the war against communism, because it was hated by these nations, neither were they opposed to a war against the existing Soviet Russian empire. Braeutigam wrote: "Also the dissolution of the Greater Russian Empire into its national components would not have provoked the resistance which we meet now. As the numerous prisoner interrogations and other experiences show, the shrewd Russians have a complete understanding that this war will end in territorial losses for them, and the non-Russian peoples will break out from the confinement within which Russia has forced them."

"Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression," Washington, D. C., 1946, vol. III, p. 242.

empire imposed upon its people which consists of different nations desiring their separation as states; 2. the war against Bolshevism can be won only on condition of gaining the active cooperation of the peoples of the USSR; 3. these peoples can be won over to collaborate with Germany only by granting political guarantees to them, and promising some of them state independence unequivocally.

This was primarily the position of those German students of Eastern problems who had had an opportunity to become acquainted with the nations of the USSR either in their studies or by direct contact. Such people could be found scattered all over different German institutions; they were in the army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and mainly in the Ministry for the East which was headed by Alfred Rosenberg. These people never had any real opportunity to formulate a policy for the East, particularly for Ukraine, in spite of the fact that Rosenberg occupied a high official position in the Third Reich. As a weak-willed intellectual, Rosenberg never had the manly courage to oppose Hitler's and Koch's policy of genocide, and sometimes, as a result of his own opportunism, he even actively supported them. Nevertheless it is a fact that he and his collaborators worked out, on the eve of the war, general directives for a German policy proposed by them toward the peoples of the USSR in which they exposed the views referred to above. Their proposals are significant not only by virtue of being opposed to the subsequent policy of Hitler, but also by the fact that they were of a thoroughly official nature. The point is that as early as April 2, 1941, when Hitler notified Rosenberg about the future war against the USSR, he authorized the latter to prepare the political plans for this campaign. And on April 20, 1941 Hitler appointed Rosenberg "Commissioner for the Central Questions connected with the East European Region." Relying on this authorization, Rosenberg not only worked out projects of policy in the East and organized his staff, but also held conferences with many high personages in the Reich and informed them of his views on the Eastern policy as the official position of the government. Thus, e. g. he conferred with Field Marshall Brauchitsch, Admiral Raeder, counter-intelligence chief Admiral Canaris, and others.² Under these circumstances it is quite understandable that for example commanders of German military units which were entering Ukraine during the first weeks of the war believed that Germany would permit a renewal of independent statehood of nations of the USSR.

² International Military Tribunal. Trial of the Major War Criminals, Nuremberg 1947, vol. XI, p. 476. *Nazi Conspiracy...* vol. I, p 816, vol. III, p. 696.

The record of the Nuremberg Trial contains several original documents which are valuable as prime sources for the study of this problem, and in particular of German policy in relation to Ukraine. Those documents consist of the memoranda of Rosenberg and his associates referred to above, notes and instructions. They were written during the period between April 2, 1941 and the beginning of the war against the USSR. in June, 1941. In 1945, after the fall of the Third Reich these documents came into the hands of the Allies and were introduced into the Nuremberg Trial record under proper identification. Six of these documents have reference to the problem under our discussion.³ It should be noted in this connection that there are serious contradictions among some of these documents. This would indicate that the problems treated by them were as yet insufficiently decided upon and that to the extent that the war was drawing closer, the authors of the documents and their readers were aware of the fact that the views expressed in them would meet with strong opposition on the part of Hitler and his close associates.

Let us consider these documents in turn.

The first is a memorandum in handwriting, dated April 2, 1941, that is on the day when Hitler first notified Rosenberg about the forthcoming war with the USSR. In this document we find, among other points the following:

"Bolshevik Russia, just as one time Czarist Russia, is a conglomeration of peoples of very different types, which has come into being through the annexation of states of related or even of an essentially alien character... it is a matter of urgency to fix the political goal which is to be obtained, for it will, without doubt, also have an effect on military operations... Anyone who knows the East, sees on a map of Russia's population the following national or geographical units: A. Greater Russia with Moscow as its center, B. White Russia with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital, C. Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, D. The Ukraine and the Crimea with Kiev as its center, E. The Don area with Rostov as its capital, F. The area of Caucasus, G. Russian Central Asia, or Russian Turkestan.

Continuing, the author of the memorandum proceeds to appraise the role and importance of the different component parts of the USSR and states:

"A. *Greater Russia.* After the rule of the Tartars, the Russian Empire, Czarist in character, developed out of the Grand Duchy of Moscow. This nucleus area possesses even today the greatest driving power. The political aim of operations against the USSR therefore would be the permanent weakening of this area...

³ 1017-PS, 1019-PS, 1024-PS, 1028-PS, 1030-PS, 1058-PS.

B. *White Russia*. White Russia comprises a part of the USSR which is very backward culturally, as well as economically... The awakening of an independent life and the setting up of a living state system must be considered as an extremely tedious and difficult undertaking... Nevertheless, having regard to the necessity of weakening the Russian nucleus area, such an attempt should be advocated...

C. *Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania*... in the course of one or two generations this area can be joined up with the German nucleus area as a new Germanized country...

D. *Ukraine* (Border territory). Kiev became the main center of the Varangian state with its superimposed Scandinavian character. But even after the rule of the Tartars, Kiev was for a long time diametrically opposed to Moscow. Its independent national life is based, contrary to the assertions of Muscovite historians, whose ideas also dominated the whole of European learning, on a tradition which is really almost unbroken. As far as this area is concerned, the political task would be the encouragement of independent national life until, possibly, an independent state could be created, with the object, alone or in conjunction with the Don area and the Caucasus as a Black Sea Union, of holding Moscow constantly in check and ensuring Lebensraum for Greater Germany to the East... Strips of border territory from the Russian nucleus area, too, would have to be added to that part which is regarded by the USSR as purely Ukrainian... The administrative and economic handling of the whole area would then be directed towards the attainment of the political aim...

E. *The Don area*. — It is inhabited by Don Cossacks. As a nation they are far less independent than the Ukrainians... The task in this area would be similar to that in White Russia...

F. *The Caucasus*. The Caucasus is inhabited by sections of the population which are racially entirely different, and also by national units. The river plain of the Kuban and Terek, and the present administrative districts of Krasnodar and Ordzonikidze are inhabited by Cossacks, the majority of whom consider themselves to be Ukrainians. The most advanced nation as regards culture is Georgia... Then comes Azerbaijan... the Armenians.

G. *Russian Central Asia or Russian Turkestan*. We can assume that, after the military collapse of the Soviets in Europe, very small forces would be needed to dispose of the Moscow Tyranny in Central Asia... They feel themselves to be in longstanding racial and religious opposition to the Soviets, and at the same time to the Russian people too, without being able, for the time being, to throw off the Russian yoke by their own efforts..."⁴

The second document also found in Rosenberg's files, is dated April 7, 1941, and contains personnel proposals on filling vacancies in German Commissariats in the East and in the future Ministry of Conquered Territory. This document proposed for the position of Reichskommissar of Ukraine Arno Schikedanz who had worked in Eastern Europe for 20 years and knew its problems. Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia was the proposed Kommissar for Moscow.⁵

⁴ *Nazi Conspiracy...* vol. III, pp. 674-679.

⁵ *op. cit.*, pp. 681-682.

The third document is dated April 29 and formulates the tasks of the political department of the Ministry for the East. This document mentions only five separate political units in the East, and states, among other points:

“This [political] department is charged with the task of further working out the staked-out political goals in the several projected five areas, and to sum up the historical reasons for the new partitioning of the whole East European area. It must result from this work that the proposed districts shall not be of a haphazard nature, but are due rather to the historical and national developments, and thus represent a political necessity for the future. The substantial treatment of those problems is closely connected with the history and nature of several nationalities in the East...⁶

The fourth document is of May 7, 1941 and consists of instructions for the Reichskommissar of Ukraine. It states, among other points:

“The task of the duties of a German Reichskommissar in Ukraine is first the assurance of food supplies and raw materials for the German Reich, and thereby aid to the German conduct of the war, and then the establishment of a free Ukrainian state in closest alliance with the Great German Reich. The Ukrainians and Russians have been fighting for centuries, although the Great Russian policy and science of history has succeeded to conceal this struggle which goes on incessantly...”

The document further mentions that the time of the proclamation of a renewal of Ukrainian statehood would be determined later, but even now preparations must be made for this, because Ukraine, will in her own interests become Germany's ally against Russian imperialist oppression which may rise up again very soon. For this reason the increase of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, which was much persecuted by the Bolsheviks, must be supported. In conclusion the author of this instruction says:

“The tasks of a German Reichskommissar in Ukraine can be of worldwide importance. If we succeed with the application of all political, psychological and cultural means to establish a free Ukrainian State from Lemberg [Lviv] all the way to Saratov, then the centuries-old pressure which the German people have had to suffer from the Russian Empire, will be broken...⁷

It is interesting to note that the words “from Lemberg” were crossed out in the typewritten text. This would indicate that as the war was drawing closer, or beginning, the author, or the reader of the instruction realized that these words are out of place, inasmuch as Hitler had annexed not only Lviv (Lemberg) but all of Galicia to the Government-General.

The fifth document, dated May 8, 1941 is an instruction to all Reichskommissars in occupied territories, and says among other:

“The German Reich has to beware of starting a campaign against Russia with a historical injustice, meaning the reconstruction of a Great Russian Em-

⁶ *op. cit.* p. 685.

⁷ IMT Trial. Vol. XXVI, pp. 567-573.

pire, no matter of what kind. On the contrary, all historical struggles of the various nationalities against Moscow and Petersburg have to be scrutinized for their bearing on the situation today... Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its historical and racial conditions into Reichskommissariats, each of which bears within itself a different political aim. The Reichskommissariat Eastland including White Ruthenia will have the task to prepare, by way of development into a Germanized Protectorate, a progressively closer cohesion with Germany. The Ukraine will become an independent state in alliance with Germany, and Caucasia with the contiguous Northern territories a Federal state with a German plenipotentiary. Russia proper must put her own house in order for the future."⁸

The sixth and last in this series of documents is a speech by Rosenberg which he delivered on June 20, 1941, i. e. two days before the start of the war between Germany and the USSR. He spoke to party leaders, military and government officials who were engaged in Eastern affairs. The highlights of this speech were: Communist Moscow has come to the conclusion that for the time being her plans of a general world revolution are unrealistic, therefore different tactics have been adopted. The tactics consist of a gradual severing of countries of the free world bordering on the USSR and sovietizing them. This is evident in the Baltic area, Finland and Romania. These tactics are very dangerous and Germany must oppose them. But going to war against the USSR Germany must determine with clarity her political objectives in the East, as this will have a bearing on military operations. On this question there are thus far two political conceptions in Germany. Some believe that it will suffice to destroy communism and leave the Russian empire. He, Rosenberg, never accepted this idea and considered any Russian empire a mortal threat to the West, particularly to the Germans because such an empire would very soon attract German technicians and in one generation it would turn against Germany. Moscow lived in the East for a long time, and when it turned West since Peter I, it began hating it immediately and lives in this hatred of the West to this day. Therefore a renewal of a Russian empire must not be permitted, whether it will be with a Tsar, or with some nationalist leader who would take the place of Stalin. A different solution must be adopted. First of all one must not forget that Russia was never a national state, but a state of nationalities, notwithstanding the fact that Russian historiography succeeded in convincing the West that Russia is inhabited by Russians exclusively. This falsehood was accepted by German scholars and carried into the German universities. Any other allegations these professors condemn as "scientifically untenable." In its final effect these professors are ready to concede that this gigantic area is inhabited by tens of tribes. This is

⁸ *Nazi Conspiracy*. Vol. III, p. 692.

a clear attempt to belittle the nationality problem of the USSR and deny the existence of separate nations.

Such statements were being made — continued Rosenberg, at a time when the essence of Russian nationalities policies consisted of depriving non-Russian peoples of their intelligentsia, sending Ukrainians to the Baltic, Caucasians to Siberia, etc. Moscow pursued this policy while proclaiming that Moscow is the third Rome, and there never will be a fourth. Regardless of this policy of Moscow and Petersburg, during the revolution of 1917 non-Russian nations began to reestablish their independent states and separated from Moscow. In this situation the task of German policy should have been to give support to national ambitions of the peoples of the USSR and to erect in the East several state organisms and thus safeguard Germany from a permanent pressure of the Russian imperial giant. In addition to Russia proper, there are four main blocs: Greater Finland, the Baltic lands, Ukraine and the Caucasus.

On the subject of Ukraine, Rosenberg said that the objective of German policy is "liberty of the Ukrainian people," but he added immediately: "In what form and in what area a Ukrainian state will subsequently be able to appear, now is not the time to discuss. But all those who work on problems of the East must try to get reconciled with this and show a favorable attitude to this problem." In accordance with this demand Rosenberg stated further that the reestablishment of a Ukrainian university must be permitted in Kiev, that Ukrainian literature must be widely published, including also those Ukrainian authors who wrote in Russian out of necessity, traditions must be nurtured of the Hetmans Khmelnytsky, Mazepa and Sahaydachny. One must not fear that Ukraine might turn against Germany because she will always remain under the threat of Moscow.

About Russia proper, Rosenberg said the following: "As the fourth Commissariat we finally come to Russia proper, i. e. the area between Petersburg, Moscow and the Urals. Here we must declare that even today we are not enemies of the Russian people... But we must say that we are not starting this fight with a new injustice because it does not seem to us to be divine justice when one Russian people should subjugate all the other peoples. The Russians have oppressed all other peoples without scruples... Our fight for a new partition succeeds thoroughly also in the sense of a national self-determination of peoples... The aim of German policy towards the Russians will be to lead back this original Muscovy to her tradition of turning her face again towards the East..."

Regarding the area of the several Commissariats and their population, they were planned as follows: the Baltic land — 212,000 sq.

miles and 19.3 million people, Ukraine with Kursk, Voronizh, Tambov and Saratov — 424,000 sq. m. and 59.5 million people, the Caucasus — 193,000 sq. m. and 18 million people and Russia proper — 1,120,000 sq. m. and between 50 and 60 million inhabitants. The Baltic land was to be a Protectorate, Ukraine a national state, and the Caucasus a federal state.

Rosenberg finally declared that the German government should make an official statement to all the peoples of the USSR and not merely to the Russians, and declare that the Germans are marching to liberate these nations from Bolshevism. Details of a political program should be reserved for the future.⁹

These were the most important documents prepared by Rosenberg and his associates on the eve of the war. We know that they were never put to a practical test. For this reason emigre Russian researchers are in error when they allege that Rosenberg's conception was "Hitler's political program in Russia" and that hence Hitler could not defeat the Bolsheviks.¹⁰ Hitler would not permit any political concessions either in favor of the Russians or non-Russians and wanted to turn them into slaves, and this was the cause of his defeat.

The question finally arises: how was it possible for such contradictory conceptions to exist in a totalitarian state on the eve of the war in the matter of relations to the peoples of the USSR. An answer to this question would require a separate analysis. Here it is only necessary to remark that, as indicated by documents, there was a period before the war between Germany and the USSR, when even Hitler conceded the possibility of a different policy than the one which he pursued in practice during the war. E. g. in a conversation with the commander-in-chief of the army, General von Brauchitsch, he said on March 25, 1939 that he did not wish to conquer Ukraine, but that "possibly one could establish a Ukrainian state."¹¹

The idea of a possibility of establishment of a Ukrainian state in West Ukraine existed in official German circles at the time of the German-Polish war, in September, 1939 as admitted by Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop.¹² The fact that there were in existence plans for a more favorable policy towards the nations of the USSR is confirmed by General Halder in his diary. He says that at a conference of generals

⁹ IMT Trial, Vol. XXVI, pp. 612-627.

¹⁰ B. Dvinov: *Vlasovskoye dvizheniye v svete dokumentov* (The Vlasov movement in the light of documents). New York, 1950, p. 15.

¹¹ *Nazi Conspiracy*, vol. VIII, p. 84.

¹² *op. cit.* vol. V, p. 768. Karl Heinz Abshagen: "Canaris, Patriot und Weltbuerger," Stuttgart, 1954, pp. 208-209.

of the general staff on July 21, 1940, when the future campaign against the USSR was under discussion, Hitler proposed the following political aims: "Ukrainisches Reich, Baltischer Staatenbund, Weissrussland-Finland . . ." ¹³

Other political plans for the East were also discussed between the head of the Lithuanian government Colonel Kazys Skirpa and a representative of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. Schuette in July, 1941. ¹⁴

All this gave reason for Rosenberg and his associates to assume that German Eastern policy would be the same as proposed by them in the above mentioned memoranda and instructions. Otherwise it would have been senseless to spend time on this work. In reality, however, when the work was being done, Hitler had in the meantime changed his mind about the political aims of the campaign in the East. The German generals found out about this change at a conference with Hitler on March 31, 1941 when the latter declared that the war against the USSR would be ideological, that the task would be to destroy not only Bolshevism, but also the inferior races, that the Germans must conquer territories for their future settlement etc. Therefore he ordered his generals to conduct the war in the East with the utmost brutality. ¹⁵

As far as Rosenberg was concerned personally, he stated that he found out about the change in political aims only on July 16, 1941 at a conference in Hitler's headquarters. ¹⁶ It is significant, however, that in spite of this Rosenberg did not resign his position, which would have been the proper thing to do for a statesman whose program had been rejected.

The question finally remains, why did Hitler change the original political plans, and why did he adopt a program of destroying the nations of the USSR which was certain to bring victory to Stalin. As long as the archives of Moscow are closed to researchers, as well as some archives in the West, it is difficult to give a final opinion on this subject. Without fear of error, only two things can be stated today: First of all, the Kremlin must have known that if Hitler had proposed a program of national independence of nations of the USSR and war only against communism, Germany would certainly have won the war and the USSR would not exist today. Therefore, Moscow must have been most anxious that German

¹³ Gerhard L. Weinberg: "Der deutsche Entschluss zum Angriff auf die Sowjetunion" in *Vierteljahrshette fuer Zeitgeschichte*, 1954, 4 Heft, Okt., p. 308.

¹⁴ *Lithuanian Bulletin*, New York, August-October, 1948, p. 9.

¹⁵ Walter Goerlitz: *Der deutsche Generalstab* Frankfurt a/M., 1950, p. 556.

¹⁶ IMT Trial, vol. XI, pp. 478-481.

policy in the East should be most brutal. It is a fact, e. g. that early in the war communist agents spread rumors that German prisoners were executed by the Bolsheviks. This was clearly intended to produce an even worse treatment of Soviet prisoners by the Germans.

The second is the fact that Germany was an authoritarian state and that all final decisions were made by Hitler. Although he was totally unprepared to handle nationality problems of the USSR he consistently rejected the advice of experts, whom he thoroughly hated. In addition he had some kind of organic fear of Slavic nations, in particular of their biological stamina and for this reason the very thought of destroying them for the good of the German race was very near to him. At one time, in 1943, when his generals turned his attention to the fact that he could not win the war against the USSR without the aid of the latter's nations, he answered that he would proclaim Ukraine's independence immediately, if he knew that it would help Germany, and later he would repudiate it. But he believed that there was a complete divergence of aims between the Germans and Ukrainians and other nations of the USSR and for that reason he refused to make any concessions in their favor.¹⁷

Finally, a serious factor in the change of political plans could have been Hitler's own nature. He changed some of his opinions very frequently. Ribbentrop, mentioned above, who spoke about a possibility of an independent West Ukraine, said also that the best solution of the Polish problem would be the maintenance of some Polish state dependent on Germany with which Germany could conclude a peace. Such a solution, said Ribbentrop, would be most acceptable to Hitler.¹⁸ This was on September 12, 1939, but nevertheless within a few weeks after this Hitler liquidated the Polish state and established in its place the Government General. Under such circumstances, under conditions of uncontrolled dictatorship of one person, even plans which were beneficial to the Germans could go under. To such undoubtedly belonged the plan of reestablishment of independent national states out of the USSR, including Ukraine.

¹⁷ H. Kr. "Zu Hitlers Ostpolitik im Sommer 1943" in *Vierteljahrshefte* 1954 Juli, p. 311.

¹⁸ cf. note 12, *supra*.

THE YALTA CONFERENCE

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

The compilation of the American minutes of the Yalta Conference held at Yalta in the Crimea, USSR, from February 4 to 11, 1945, just ten years ago has been an unusually speedy revelation of the details of an international conference in wartime. Its publication in the *New York Times* of March 17, 1955, was a journalistic feat of no small importance but it was quite within the tradition of the *New York Times* which tries to reproduce official documents and complete texts of addresses usually reserved to purely governmental publications or to technical journals not intended for the average citizen.

The Yalta Conference even prior to the publication of this material has been a subject of deep concern and of political hard feelings. Both major American political parties have sought to profit by the adventures and misadventures of the Conference. It has been claimed and denied that the Conference was a deliberate betrayal of the American and British war objects and efforts have been made to find a scapegoat. The publication of this material has not radically changed the general knowledge of events. It has apparently diminished the importance of the role of Alger Hiss but it has not upset the general impression as to the unfortunate nature of many of the decisions.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Marshal Joseph Stalin met in the company of their leading diplomatic, military, naval and air force aides to make plans for the final victory in World War II in both Europe and Asia and to draw up plans for the organization and launching of the United Nations. It was a crucial moment in world affairs, for the victorious Allied armies in Europe were rapidly approaching each other from the west and the east and it seemed necessary to settle without delay many possible controversial points. Yet the minutes of the Conference reveal the differences not only between the three leaders in their personal attitudes to the problems but also the difference in their positions within the state. As had been the case at Versailles at the end of World War I, the American President spoke as the highest executive authority in the state. The British Prime Minister had a constant eye on his War

Cabinet to which he felt it necessary to pay considerable respect. Stalin as the dictator of the USSR did not feel it necessary to do more than pay lip service to the principles of the Soviet regime and with all of his geniality, he retained a caution and an obstinacy which put his two distinguished colleagues at a marked disadvantage.

Roosevelt and Churchill saw the advantages to the world of maintaining intact in the coming days of peace that unanimity and those friendly feelings that had been so well exploited during the bitter days of the war. They were then ready, wherever possible, to make concessions to satisfy the spirit and the desires of the USSR on many subjects. Stalin with his entire emphasis upon the advancement of his country to world leadership, contented himself with making ever new demands and declining any real concessions to the interests of his companions. In this he was ably assisted by his associates as Molotov and his military advisors, who refused to budge an inch from a previously adopted policy and went over again and again in slightly different words the same arguments and demands.

This was made clear in the very beginning of the negotiations for the holding of a conference. Suggestions that the three leaders meet at some neutral point or in one of the western countries were steadily blocked by the demands of Stalin that the conference take place in the USSR on the excuse of his health and his refusal to sail or fly across potentially dangerous areas. The American Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Harriman, in almost the first of the published telegrams, warned that any suggestion of a flight across such territory would risk a prejudicing of the conference and resentment on the part of Stalin's advisers. As a result all plans for meeting outside of the Black Sea were rigorously opposed by Stalin and in order to preserve that valued unity, both Roosevelt and Churchill yielded and it was the western leaders who saw themselves obliged to fly across neutral or possibly hostile territory into the Black Sea area.

This was a foreshadowing of the general course of the Conference. Roosevelt and Churchill had been far closer to each other than either had been to Stalin but there was revealed a definite effort, especially on the part of President Roosevelt, to give Stalin the impression that the Western leaders were not in any sense joint members of a Western block and they were only too willing to treat him as a third member on equal terms of intimacy and confidence. Certain critics have called this an intrigue of Roosevelt against Churchill but it was probably rather mere playing to allay the suspicions of the Soviet leader and to satisfy Russian sensitiveness and obstinacy.

It is also clear that neither the President nor the Prime Minister fully understood the devious ways of Communism. Wrapped up in their disgust with Hitler and the Nazis, they were willing to forget the negotiations of 1939 when Stalin and Hitler found themselves able to become friends and companions for a brief moment. They chose to forget the Soviet-Finnish War when the League of Nations in a last dying gesture voted to expel the Soviet Union as a warmonger. They believed that Hitler's attack on the USSR in 1941 had shown Stalin the truth and they preferred in the name of democracy and peace and the future good of mankind to overlook all the chicanery that had happened during the years when the three great powers were fighting side by side at a distance. That is the entire story of the Yalta Conference but it remains to look with somewhat more attention at the chief arguments advanced in this "friendly" meeting.

A disproportionate amount of time was spent on the questions of France and Poland. Stalin had an utter contempt for any area into which his troops were not likely to come as "liberators". President Roosevelt distrusted de Gaulle. Prime Minister Churchill realized the importance of France in a future world setup. So he insisted upon a French zone in Germany and French admission to the control machinery and after prolonged discussion on all levels, Stalin gave way as a means of securing further concessions in Poland.

Here the Western leaders again failed to understand. Churchill wanted to aid Poland by restoring to it the ancient Ukrainian city of Lviv and some of the surrounding area that was populated by Ukrainians. Needless to say, Stalin was inflexible. So the discussion shifted to the relations between the Polish government in exile and the so-called Warsaw-Lublin government, the leaders of which could not be reached by telephone even by Stalin and Molotov. It was a pretty piece of stageplay. Stalin played up the fact that 212 Soviet soldiers had been killed or wounded by the "Polish underground" which was Nazi-inspired. He insisted on the inclusion of the phrase "Non-Fascist or Anti-Fascist" in a description of the situation and the parties and he argued with his assistants against almost every personality in the London government in exile.

Churchill who was better informed about the situation in Poland and realized the truth of the internal Polish situation questioned Stalin but in the end he had to agree that the Lublin government should be "liberalized" by the admission of some of the London Poles without any firm guarantees as to the holding of free and open democratic elections. Stalin's consistent policy was that it made no difference about

French feelings but the Poles "liberated" by Soviet arms would feel sensitive about a foreign supervision of their elections.

On a lesser scale the same arguments were repeated in the case of Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. Churchill graciously offered to allow Soviet officials in Greece but he also made conditions that would hamper them in their efforts to inflame the Greek situation still more. Neither the principals nor their military staffs got around to solving the problem of American air bases in the Danube valley to assist the "gal-lant" Soviet army in its advance.

The question of liaison of the American, British and Soviet forces was not satisfactorily solved. With the three armies rapidly approaching one another, it was still necessary to coordinate their movements through the Military Mission in Moscow. The Chiefs of Staff could not overcome this obstacle. The Soviets required at least twenty four hours notice of any air-bombing at a time when moments were precious. But the "unity" of the three powers had to be preserved for posterity.

We can say the same thing as to all discussion of the future of Germany and its proposed dismemberment. Stalin was intent upon securing German machinery and a considerable amount of reparations from the future German industry on the ground of the damage to the Soviets. Roosevelt and Churchill tried with some success to check Stalin's most extreme demands but again the Western leaders felt themselves handicapped and to some degree baffled by the calm and patient attitude of the Soviet dictator.

This leads us to another group of subjects which are perhaps of more concern to the Ukrainians. The first one was the problem of the Polish-Ukrainian borders. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill favored the borders of Sept. 1, 1939, leaving the West Ukrainian provinces of former Poland in the south and West White-Ruthenia in the north to Poland; Stalin demanded the borders along the so-called Curzon Line. President Roosevelt had only one concern, that of the 6 million American voters of Polish descent. Churchill appealed to Stalin's generosity but in vain. Stalin defeated both westerners easily: Curzon, argued Stalin, was not Russian but British; therefore he could not defend the rights of Western Ukrainians and it was for him, Stalin, now to do it.

The second problem involving Ukraine was the organization of the United Nations. Stalin and his aides wanted all the Soviet republics to be included and then he limited the number to Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania. He knew that the last would not be included because the United States and to a lesser extent Great Britain had not recognized the Soviet forcible annexation of the Baltic republics. So Lithuania

quietly dropped out of the picture and no one insisted upon the admission or upon giving Lithuania the benefits of the Atlantic Charter.

This left only the question of Ukraine and Byelorussia. The memorandum of the State Department published in the *New York Times*, (p. T. 18) makes it clear that that section of the American government was opposed to the admission of these Soviet republics but that it did not know how to oppose them and admit India. President Roosevelt realized both from his own experience as President and as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under President Wilson that this problem offered many conflicting opinions. The Soviet Union was a union of nations varying in history, language and customs, whereas the British Commonwealth of Nations represented various colonial nations on their way to complete independence under a common Crown and the United States was a union of states sharing a common citizenship, language and ideals, with a single Foreign Minister or Secretary of State.

In the last analysis Stalin again won to maintain the sacred union, and Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted as original members of the United Nations at the meeting in San Francisco.

There can be little doubt that this was an unexpected play of the Soviet leaders, who were well aware of the disastrous situation in which the Western powers had placed themselves in 1918. Even after the Russian Revolution, President Wilson could not reconcile himself to the fact that the Russian Empire was not a compact unity and his ideas found sympathy and support in many sections of the American State Department which has consistently sought for a logical way to hold Russia together for the time when Communism will disappear. President Roosevelt was willing to disregard the question of legitimacy between the Polish government in exile and the Lublin-Warsaw Poles but he did not go further in his analysis of the Soviet situation, for any action would have broken that dream of unity on which both Roosevelt and Churchill laid so much stress.

Another problem which was settled at Yalta concerned the displaced persons and prisoners of war and here the desire for unity of the big three and the humanitarian views of the Western leaders met their greatest defeat. Everyone knew that the Nazis had deported millions of persons from one country to another on a scale rivalling that of the Soviets in the thirties. The Western leaders knew that the Dutch and the French, etc., had no special objection to returning to their old homes, once their countries were liberated from the Nazi yoke. They did not want to know that bad as that yoke was, it was no worse than that imposed by their genial host, Stalin. They knew that the return of these millions would have to be a governmental action

and that the unfortunate individuals liberated by any one of the armies would have to be the responsibility of the liberating forces. This was an ideal situation for the Soviets.

Stalin made no objections to any of the points raised. He and he alone realized that the position of the Western deportees and prisoners of war liberated by the advancing Soviet forces was very different from that of the Soviet refugees and prisoners of war liberated by the Western armies. He and he alone understood that the latter did not want to return and he was determined to secure control of their persons and add them to his supply of slave labor. The easiest way to do this was to be as gracious as possible, to seek in every way to secure admission of Soviet personnel to DP camps and to require the aid of the Western allies in forcing the return of the unfortunates. At the same time by the vastness of the Soviet Union, and by his polite way of respecting the feelings of his associates, he would be able to cause to disappear any number of their refugees and prisoners of war that he desired. No one knows to-day how many Germans, Japanese and others in such manner were lost to the civilized world.

Thus the provisions for the displaced persons and the prisoners of war express the moral conscience of the Western world as it has been developed throughout the centuries. No one thought of adding to them any provision as to the right of a person to prefer not to return home.

The provisions for the entrance of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan show the same ambiguity. Stalin and his military advisers were constantly seeking for new supplies from the United States. The talks between President Roosevelt and Stalin made it clear that the Soviets not only desired the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, but also the return of those rights in the Manchurian railroads that Russia had lost after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. The President was in favor of neutralizing or internationalizing all these rights in the hope of securing the same conditions for Hong-Kong, which he knew the British would hate to accept. Stalin emphasized that without such rewards he would be hard put to it to explain to the "Russian people" why they should fight Japan.

In line with this, Stalin pressed for the rapid withdrawal of all Allied troops from Korea, even before the people were ready for self-government, for further action to keep the French from returning to Indochina and a broadening of the basis of the government of Chiang Kai Shek in China by the appearance in it of newer Communist elements. It was all extremely simple and it sounded so nicely on paper.

The final decisions and the documents published in connection with them were a clever composition of Western idealism and Soviet realism.

Stalin gave way and made concessions only on those points where Soviet purposes could be better served by a show of idealism but where the Soviet dialectics and the principles of Communism would equally profit by a realistic interpretation of the decisions. The Western statesmen yielded at those points where Soviet realism would be better served by a dropping of idealism or a loose statement of the situation. Neither President Roosevelt nor Prime Minister Churchill seem to have grasped the thoroughly monolithic form of Soviet policy which fitted together in various parts of the world Soviet interests into a coherent form which could hamstring the proposed world organization and force it to adopt purposes for which it was not intended.

The publication of these decisions and of the minutes of the entire Conference has not changed vitally the knowledge of the people of the Western world as to the results of the meeting. It has not raised the curtain except as regards the role of certain subordinate figures. It has not resolved the unfavorable impressions which were soon to arise as the Soviets began to carry the decisions into effect. It has not justified the anger of those who called the Yalta conference a betrayal of democracy and the free world nor has it made more certain the position of those who believed that Stalin betrayed and broke the agreements which he had made with President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill.

The minutes clearly show that except for a few brief moments and on relatively minor points neither Roosevelt nor Churchill revealed any appreciation of an understanding of the realities of the Soviet position or of the extent to which Soviet dialectics and Russian chauvinism and pseudo-sensitivity could go in the direction of a ruthless and determined imperialism.

A still greater tragedy ten years later is the fact that far too many of the Western leaders are still entranced with the idea that another meeting of the leaders of the Soviet Union and the free world will in some way undo the mistakes of Yalta and that Bulganin, Khrushchev and Malenkov are in some way more interested in a peaceful co-existence of the two worlds than was Stalin. All evidence to the contrary, the Western world with its devotion to the rights of the individual and the free functioning of government cannot bring itself to the realization that Communism is the enemy and that Stalin, Molotov and their aides were merely scheming to place the nations which they had "liberated" in the same position as they had Ukraine and the other peace-loving democracies which they had overthrown by arms after 1918. To accomplish this they were ready to grant concessions to

Ukraine and the other Soviet republics so as to facilitate the binding of fetters upon other formerly free peoples.

The publication of these minutes justifies the position of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and of all those patriots who fought for freedom not only against the Nazis but against the Communists. They make it abundantly clear that only the destruction of the Russian and Chinese Communist imperialisms and the establishment of free democratic republics in Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic republics, as well as in the so-called satellite states can serve the cause of humanity and that this can only be brought about not by appeasement or containment but by a policy of liberation of the oppressed peoples and the seating of their freely elected representatives in a revamped United Nations devoted to the welfare of mankind. May the time for this come soon!

THE POST-STALIN NATIONALITY POLICY IN UKRAINE

By C. C. GECYS

Among the surprises which the Kremlin rulers have sprung on the world since the death of Stalin has been a new deal in their nationality policy. With his death all allusions to "bourgeois nationalism" and "the great Russian people" stopped abruptly; after the fall of L. Beria they are reappearing in speeches, over the radio, and in the press.

The new nationality policy became plainly and undeniably evident in the middle of June 1953. Certain facts pointed to it earlier, but their full significance as signs of a change in the Party's policy toward the non-Russian nationalities of the U. S. S. R. became apparent only in the light of the June events.

One of these facts was the appointment of new ministers for interior affairs in a number of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union. The dismissed Russians returned to the Russian S. F. S. R. and were replaced by national Communists.

Another fact pointing toward the new deal in nationality policy was the abolition of the regions (oblasts) in all three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The division of the territories of the Baltic states into regions was introduced as late as April 1953 and regarded by all experts as a sign of an intensifying russification and integration with the Russian S. F. S. R.

There is no doubt that the abolition of the regions was a concession to the national republics and a weakening of russification.

With all possible clarity, the new national policy of the U. S. S. R. appeared in June 1953 at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. According to *Izvestiya*¹ "the plenary session stated that the administration of the western regions by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. had been unsatisfactory. The plenary session noted that in their practical work, the Central Committee's Bureau and the Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, comrade L.G. Melnikov had admitted *distortion* of the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy

¹ June 13, 1953.—Italics used in quotations in this article are mine.

of our Party, which expressed itself *in the vicious practice of sending persons from the regions of the Ukrainian S.S.R. to leading positions in the western regions of the Ukraine as well as in the introduction of the Russian language as the language of instruction in the West-Ukrainian institutes of higher education.*"

The plenary session did not confine itself to criticism only, but "dismissed comrade L.G. Melnikov from the post of First Secretary and excluded him from the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party *for not having secured leadership, for having admitted gross mistakes in the selection of cadres and the implementation of the nationality policy of the Party.*"

A few days later a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party discussed the same problems as the Ukrainian Communists. Again there were noted "*serious mistakes and failures*" in the work of the Council of Ministers and Communist Party organs and above all in "*the distorted implementation of the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy of our Party which expressed itself particularly in the weak training and promotion of national cadres for leadership in Party, Soviet and economic work.* The plenary session admitted the necessity of resolutely correcting mistakes and pointed out concrete measures for the intensification of the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy to improve the training and extensive promotion of national Lithuanian cadres to leadership in Party, Soviet and economic organs"²

The same changes were made in Latvia at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party.

The almost simultaneous appearance and identical formulation of these announcements leaves no doubt that they marked the inauguration of a new phase in the nationality policy of the Soviet Union for no one can believe that the Communist Parties in the different national republics pursued a policy of their own, not dictated by Moscow.

There was even admitted a policy of "inflaming national hostilities," "serious mistakes and failures," the guilt of many high Party and government personalities in displaying "great Russian chauvinism," and the fact that "some members of our society still display disrespect toward the culture, language, and customs of other peoples of our country."³

II

The change of the Soviet government policy toward the Ukrainians was also demonstrated in the lengthy and grandiose celebration of the

² *Izvestiya*, June 18, 1953.

³ Cf. *Izvestiya*, June 13, 1953; *The New York Times*, June 14 and 26, 1953.

three hundredth anniversary of Ukrainian-Russian unity, the signing of the Treaty of Pereyaslav on January 18, 1654, between Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich.

The celebration of the jubilee was announced on December 9, 1953. In the first five months of 1954, the following carefully elaborated semi-official and official events took place:

January 12th.—The Executive Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union published the so-called *Theses on the Three Hundredth Anniversary of the Unification of Ukraine and Russia*.⁴

February 19th.—The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on the "Transfer of the Crimean region from the R.S.F.S.R. to the Ukrainian S.S.R."

April 12th.—The jubilee meeting of the Soviet Academy of Sciences held in Moscow.

May 18th.—The festival meeting of the Secretariat of the Union of Soviet Composers held in Moscow.

May 23rd.—The soccer game between crack Ukrainian and Moscow teams in Dynamo Stadium at Moscow.

May 23rd.—The publication of the decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. awarding the Order of Lenin to the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the city of Kiev.

May 23rd.—The military parade in Kiev.

May 27th.—The jubilee session of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R.

May 29th.—The jubilee session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

May 30th.—The military parade in Moscow's Red Square.

The decision to detach the Crimea⁵ from the R.S.F.S.R. was announced as designed to assist the "strengthening of brotherly ties between the Ukrainian and Russian people." M. E. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., in his speech stated that "it had been decided to transfer the Crimea to Ukraine because of close economic connections and territorial proximity." On this occasion, the Soviet propaganda apparatus tried to persuade the Ukrainian people that, "Ukraine is now one of the greatest countries in Europe, and plays its merited role in the international scene (i.e., *in the*

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ The Crimean Autonomous S.S.R. was liquidated on February 23, 1944 (the decree, incidentally, was not actually promulgated until June 26, 1946), and its population, the Tatars, deported from the Crimea to Central Asia and the northern areas of the U.S.S.R. for alleged collaboration with Nazi-German occupational authorities (Cf. C. C. Gecys, "Equality of Rights of the Soviet Nationalities," *The Russian Review*, April 1953, pp. 108-9).

United Nations). . . The Ukrainian people has achieved a flowering of its strength, the development of its government, its economy and its culture, and the unification of its territory into a single Ukrainian Soviet socialist state."⁶

The speeches of high ranking Communists abounded in references to "the inviolable friendship of the two great Slavic peoples," and to Ukrainians as being a "glorious nation," a "brotherly nation," and a "great nation."⁷

Of no little account were the drawings, paintings and even poetry in the popular magazines. Innumerable sketches and photographs showed Ukrainians and Russians shaking hands and walking arm in arm; mothers blessing their Ukrainian and Russian sons in expectation of great feats to be accomplished jointly; Ukrainian and Russian soldiers saving the Soviet fatherland by united efforts during World War Two.

Taking these Kremlin gifts and flattering words at their face value, it appears to be a political concession to Ukrainian national pride and a symbol of Russian willingness to support a strengthened Ukraine.

III

On the other hand, the *Theses* abound in bald combinations of arbitrary assumptions, unsupported assertions, half-truths, deliberate misstatements, and official contradictions of the U.S.S.R. leadership.

Among the many new Soviet doctrines *with the official imprimatur* on the interpretation of Ukrainian history are the following:

1. The Russians, not the Ukrainians, were the people who inhabited Kievan Rus and later gave rise to the three major Slavic peoples of the present Soviet Union:

The Russian, Ukrainian and White Ruthenian peoples descend from the common root of the old Russian nation which created the old Russian state and Kievan Rus.⁸

2. The Ukrainian decision, ratified on January 18, 1654, to unite with Tsarist Russia was made voluntarily to save the Ukrainians from annihilation at the hands of Polish and Turkish invaders. The union of Ukraine with the U.S.S.R. was also due to the Ukrainian "voluntary" desire for such union.

⁶ T. Tikhonorov and A. Likholat, "Trekhsotletie Vossoedineniya Ukrainy s Rossi" ("Three Hundred Years of Unity between the Ukraine and Russia"), *Kommunist*, January 1954, No. 1, p. 52; *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Literary Gazette), June 1, 1954. Cf. *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the U.S.S.R.*, Muenchen, June 1954, p. 28.

⁷ *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 25, 1954; *Bulletin*, June 1954, p. 28.

⁸ *Kommunist*, January 1954, No.1, p. 52. Cf. *Ibid.*, May 1954 No. 7, p. 16, and *Pravda*, January 12, 1954.

3. The "progressive" role of Tsarist expansion into the border regions around Russia has been justified:

The Russian (Tsarist) state played a tremendous role in the fate of the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and other peoples of our (i. e., *Soviet Union*) country.⁹

4. The "union of 1654 was the greatest progressive step for these two brotherly people."¹⁰ To this statement it was not hard to apply a parallel Soviet line of political nature:

... thanks to this friendship with the Russians, the Ukrainian people like the other peoples of the U.S.S.R. have protected their freedom and independence.¹¹

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. has even forgotten to check what was written about the Pereyaslav Act seventeen years ago by their "teacher" and "father"—Stalin. The *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*¹² states plainly: "It (i.e., *Pereyaslav Treaty*) laid the legal foundations for the Russian colonial domination of Ukraine." The latest edition¹³ makes an identical statement: "Ukraine became the vassal of the Moscow Tsars." The Central Committee has explained neither why 130 years after the Treaty of Pereyaslav, Ukraine lost the last traces of her separate statehood, nor why in 1783 Moscow was able to formally establish serfdom in Ukraine.

The Kremlin's canonization of the subjugation and enslavement of the Ukrainian nation by the Tsars did not dare point to the identical situation of Ukraine in the Soviet Union today, but went on to heap derision and scorn upon men who revolted against Tsarist Russia, such as Hetman Ivan Mazepa, those who fought for the democratic Ukrainian National Republic, the Central Rada, Hetman Skoropadsky, Petlyura, et al.

The transfer of the Crimea was, according to the interpretation of the highest Party and government officials, a *gift* of the "elder brother" Russia to the "younger brother"—Ukraine. It took them exactly eight years to discover¹⁴ that "the Crimea forms a natural extension of the southern Ukrainian steppes" and Crimean economy is closely linked with the economy of Ukraine. Actually, these factors have always existed. No hint has been made why Crimea with a very small Ukrainian minority has been transferred to Ukraine, whereas the Ukrainian majority in

⁹ *Pravda*, January 12, 1954.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* Cf. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, June 1, 1954.

¹¹ *Pravda*, January 12, 1954.

¹² *Bolshaya Sovietskaya Entsiklopediya*, 1935, LIX, p. 818.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1947, LV, p. 880.

¹⁴ See f. 6.

a quite extensive territory, running along the line Maikop—Stavropol—Elista—Shakhty—Kursk—Pinske—Beresta, is still in the “elder brother’s — (R.S.F.S.R.) — grasp.

The actual political significance of “Ukrainian unification,” however, is zero, since the Crimea belongs to Ukraine and the Ukraine to the U.S.S.R. It makes absolutely no difference to the owner in which of his many pockets he is accustomed to carry his valuables.

IV

The official addresses, exchanged in May 1954 between the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., with corresponding institutions of the R.S.F.S.R. and the Ukrainian S.S.R.¹⁵ and the following editorial articles in the *Kommunist*¹⁶ indicate a return to the Stalin nationality policy. This was a retreat from a position taken in the spring of 1953. The 1953-54 plans for giving the Ukrainian people some share in the leading role, at present held exclusively by the Russians, were ignored. The postwar glorification of the Russians and their primacy in any possible field were reasserted:

The Russian people who have earned the recognition of all Soviet people stand at the head of the fraternal family of peoples.¹⁷

The Ukrainian people were reminded that they owe their success in economic, cultural and political development to the aid of the Russian people:

*The Ukrainian people will always praise the Party and the Russian people, who have made possible the complete unification of the Ukrainian people. . .*¹⁸

The Ukrainian people, it is asserted, have always loved and glorified the Russian people and “will continue to do so.”¹⁹ Whereas much was made in the first five months of 1954 of the wholesome influence of the Russian and Ukrainian cultures, the influence of the Russian on the Ukrainian is now being stressed again:

The progressive Russian culture has been exerting a beneficial influence on the development of all Ukrainian culture.²⁰

¹⁵ *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, May 25, and June 1, 1954 Cf. N. Podgorny, “Sovietskaya Ukraina v Bratskoi Sem’e Narodov SSSR.” (“The Soviet Ukraine in the Fraternal Family of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R.”), *Kommunist*, May 1954, No. 8, pp. 12-16.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, May 1954, No. 8 and June 1954, No. 9.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, May 1954, No. 8, p. 20

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26, Cf. A. Rummyantsev, “Ekonomicheskoe Stroitelstvo Russkogo i Ukrainskogo Narodov” (“Economic Structure of the Russian and Ukrainian Peoples”), *Ibid.*, May 1954, No. 7, pp. 16-32.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, May 1954, No. 8, p. 26.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

The adjectives previously applied to Ukrainians as a whole and as a nation, like "great people," "great nation," "brotherly nation," "glorious nation" have lost their meaning, and the Ukrainians are once again degraded to the "younger brother" category.

V

Many were anxious to see if the new deal in the Soviet nationality policy would bring any change in the status of Ukrainian art and literature, i. e., more creative freedom, free expression in lyricism, and so on.

From the official attitude toward writers and literature it is evident that no concessions to the freedom of Ukrainian art and literature are to be granted at the present time. Party control and restrictions are presented as indispensable and quite normal as they were under Stalin's regime:

Art and literature belong to the people (*i.e., to the Party*) . . . , which wisely and attentively *directs* the *writers*. Our literature gets its strength and inspiration *in conscious service to the people and the policy of Party and government*.²¹

For Soviet art and literature only *socialist realism* and *Soviet patriotism* are acceptable. Writers must strive primarily to create a positive hero, who whether he exists in actuality or not, can be held up as an example for Soviet people. Soviet socialist cultural and educational policy strives to anesthetize the Ukrainians and make of them a new "Soviet man,"²² who is to be anational. A country of people without any national individuality, would not be a nation in our sense of that term.

The Kremlin's return to harsh Party dictatorship over literature has been a blow to those who were permitted to call for more intellectual freedom late last year and early this year.

VI

Did a change of Soviet nationality policy really take place, and if so to what extent and direction?

For those who believed that Stalin's successors had adopted a more *liberal national policy* it is worthwhile to read an article on "*The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*," prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute and officially authorized for publication on September

²¹ "Za Dalneishy Pod'em Sovietskoi Literatury" ("For the further Progress of Soviet Literature"), *Ibid.*, May 1954, No. 8. p. 23. Cf. *Ibid.*, June 1954, No. 9, pp.13, 17-8.

²² *Ibid.*, March 1954, No. 4, p. 9. Cf. *Bolshaya Sovietskaya Entsyklopediya*, 1953, XXII, p. 242.

9, 1953.²³ It discloses how empty this hope was and emphasizes: (a) the intimate connection between Party, government and people; (b) the principle of intolerance in all that concerns the program; (c) the impossibility of disobeying the principles of Marxism-Leninism, "*which further were worked out by Stalin, the great continuer of Lenin's cause,*" and (d) the continuation of Stalin principles on national policy.

Thus the ideological and theoretical principles we call Stalinism remained unchanged. The ultimate objectives in the Soviet nationality policy remain *the same* under the present collective authoritarian leadership as they were in the Stalin era. It would be a mistake to exaggerate the significance of events and to see in them a thorough modification of Communist ideology and a granting of political, economic or cultural concessions. There is no evidence that the pertinent Articles of Constitution of the U.S.S.R. have been amended or legislation changed by the omnipotent Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

It is true that the Kremlin oligarchy is displaying striking flexibility and manoeuvrability in domestic and foreign affairs. At many points they have broken sharply and decisively with the sterile and rigid tactics of Stalin.

Their aims have been: (a) to strengthen the prestige and authority of the Ukrainian Communist Party; (b) to secure a certain amount of goodwill among the populace of the Ukraine; (c) to convince foreign countries of the Soviet Union's desire and anxiety to promote freedom and independence; and (d) to russify ethnic groups within the U.S.S.R.

The idea of "training, promoting and keeping national cadres of the Communist Party in the respective constituent republics" was dictated by the needs of a new situation right after Stalin's death. In any event, it is better to see national Communists being blamed by their countrymen for their mistakes and failures than commissioned Russian Communists. Sureness of such tactics, based on psychological factors, entirely justifies their new Party line:

It is the sacred duty of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ever to strengthen the friendship among peoples—the foundation of the unconquered power of the socialist multi-national state.²⁴

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 243. See editorial articles on Soviet national policy: "I. V. Stalin — Veliky Prodolzhatel Dela Lenina" ("I. V. Stalin — The Great Continuer of Lenin's Work"); *Kommunist, March* 1954, No. 4, pp. 3-11, and "Nerushimoye Edinenie Partii, Pravitelstva i Naroda" ("Unchangeable Unity among Party, Government and People"), *Ibid.*, February 1954, No. 3, pp. 3-9. Cf. A. Matyushkin's article "Velikaya Sila Idei Lenina o Druzbe Narodov" ("Lenin's Idea - a Great Force for Friendship of Peoples"), *Ibid.*, April 1954, No. 6, pp. 45-59.

²⁴ *Kommunist, March* 1954, No. 4, p. 9.

Having long fostered national independence in colonial countries, the Kremlin has found it necessary to demonstrate the existence of the Ukrainian S. S. R. within the U. S. S. R. Ukraine, being a United Nations member and representing the largest minority group in the Soviet Union, was selected for display when the celebration of the tercentennial of the unification of Ukraine and Russia was held. Similar preparations are being made to commemorate the 160th anniversary of the annexation of Lithuania in 1795.

The broad Ukrainian masses *did not profit* by the modification of Soviet tactics. They have, rather, encountered a new device for russification.

On April 8, 1954, the Central Migration Administration of the Ukrainian Ministry of Agriculture announced a "voluntary" migration of Ukrainians to the Maritime and Khabarovsk territories, the Sakhalin, Kamchatka, lower Amur, Khabarovsk, Magadan, Murmansk, Kaliningrad, Kuibyshev and Simferopol regions, the Jewish Autonomous Region and the Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaijan republics.²⁵

Such mass migration although it is called "voluntary" has its elements of coercion: "It is one's duty in the service of the great Soviet fatherland." The meaning of the word *duty* is very well known to Ukrainians. In the Soviet Union a duty which is a "matter of honor," or "honorable," or "sacred and inviolable" is always enforced with sanctions to the benefit of the collectivity over that of the individual.

This new camouflaged policy is reminiscent of the Soviet regime's call during the NEP period for "voluntary agricultural cooperative associations for jointly working the land," which by 1930 proved to be forced collectivization. So now we can look forward to a wave of deportations to the virgin lands for *Soviet political and strategic considerations*.

The Soviets hope that in a new land the Ukrainians will of necessity mingle with other peoples and that their interests will become those of their new land.

This policy of a "voluntary" migration of the Ukrainian and other ethnic groups to remote regions of the Soviet Union is closely connected with the existence of nationalist opposition in all its forms both within the Soviet Union and abroad.²⁶ This seems to be of great concern to the collective leadership of the U.S.S.R.:

The *Party* organizations in western regions must raise their vigilance even higher in the struggle against the 'residue' of the Union of Ukrainian

²⁵ *Bulletin*, June 1954, p. 18; cf. *Kommunist*, May 1954, No. 8, p. 3, and *The New York Times*, September 13 and October 18, 1954.

²⁶ *Pravda*, May 23, 1954.

Nationalists, who must not be allowed to infiltrate into kolkhozes, enterprises or schools, there to carry on their hostile activities. The primary requirement of all Party organizations is to exercise the greatest possible vigilance.²⁷

The strong national movement toward Ukrainian independence has not died out for a moment since the "voluntary" joining of the U.S.S.R. And so Moscow says:

The bourgeois nationalists, *Mensheviks and various traitors* have often tried to sow hostility among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. . . . in view of the unconditional hostility of the capitalist states toward the Soviet states the completely isolated existence of . . . any . . . national unit is unthinkable from the military point of view as well as from the economic.²⁸

The policy of "voluntary" migration aims to convince the Ukrainian peasant with national traditions that he had better decide to resettle rather than perish in a concentration camp.

The Post-Stalin nationality policy in the Ukraine might be summarized as follows:

1. The new tactics in no way signify a change in Soviet nationality policy; on the contrary, they confirm once again the prevailing Russian neo-nationalism, which started and flourished in the Stalin era.

2. The recognition of the rights of Ukraine as a "great nation," the underlining of the importance of the Ukrainian S.S.R. as a highly developed country and one of the largest in Europe, the unctuous speeches of the Party and government leaders on Ukrainian "sovereignty," "happiness" and cultural development—all are part of the campaign against Ukraine.

²⁷. *Bulletin*, June 1954, p. 27.

²⁸. *Ibid.*, April 1954, p. 29, and June 1954, p. 27.

THE RETURN FROM KOLYMA

By PETRO KOLYMSKY

STALIN THROWS SAND IN THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE

At the end of 1938, the terroristic machine of Communism was working so swiftly that in the next one and a half or two years, it would have put more than half of the citizens of the USSR behind prison bars. The man, who for three years in a row had stimulated and speeded up its movement, now stopped before a menace to himself and the existence of his dictatorial regime. He had first to slow down and greatly check the course of that terroristic regime. His first act was to remove N. Yezhov from his post as Narkom (People's Commissar) of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

The press, which had played a special role in the development and growth of the terror, sharply changed its policy and began to look for criminal intentions in the machinery of the NKVD itself. Immediately after the removal of N. Yezhov, articles in the press began to speak of "enemies of the people" in the machinery of the NKVD. In November and December, 1938, the case of the Moldavian NKVD was discussed in the press of Ukraine. My family sent me to Kolyma clippings from the newspapers which included accusations against the machinery of the NKVD. They said that "enemies of the people had wormed their way into the organs of the NKVD and were there carrying on their damaging work." All that the NKVD had done by the orders of Stalin, now recoiled on their own heads as a self-initiated, harmful act.

The papers wrote the real truth that the NKVD had arrested innocent people and by incredible tortures and abuse had compelled them to make unjust confessions of belonging to non-existent organizations and then had condemned them to punishment and exile in concentration camps.

To deceive the people, in addition to these inspired trials of the machinery of the NKVD, the government set up an institute of members of the NKVD in the districts with full powers to busy themselves with reviewing the appeals of the persons arrested or of their families. But as it was soon seen, this was only a great sham and in fact the NKVD continued to carry on its terror, although on a smaller scale. It tried at all costs to justify the actions of the investigating machinery of the NKVD of

the previous period. When articles on the "branding" of the NKVD appeared in the press, the families who were at liberty, began in the name of persons arrested, to appeal for a review of their cases. In their petitions to the effect that the NKVD had applied tortures in the examinations and had compelled the prisoners to confess uncommitted crimes, these new guardians of justice considered this a slander on the NKVD and threatened them with arrest. Just as it had been prior to 1939, so in 1939 came the assertion that "the NKVD was not mistaken."

When relatives presented appeals in the name of the prisoners, they were summoned and shown the signatures of the prisoners written in their own hand under their confessions. The investigators of the new offices of the NKVD brutally attacked the relatives and accused them of hiding the true "enemies of the people." In this they relied upon isolated cases of releasing prisoners from confinement. With the passage of time and the approach of war, the number of those released began to grow noticeably and finally included those who, for various reasons, had an unfinished case and yet were in the prisons.

MY CONSTANT PROTEST AGAINST UNFOUNDED ACCUSATIONS

From the first day of my stay in a concentration camp, I began to protest against my illegal and unfounded condemnation and I demanded a review of my case. During 1938-9 I wrote 19 appeals to various institutions in Kiev and Moscow. My family typed 100 copies of my statements and constantly kept sending them to various bureaus and to highly placed persons. All these statements and appeals piled up in the NKVD UkSSR and formed a mountain of papers which even the NKVD could hardly get through. The investigator, Babichev, handled my case. In answer to my wife's request for a re-examination of my case, he answered that "a man who is really innocent, has long ago been released." As a proof, he cited the case of Nikitin who had been liberated from the Birobidzhan concentration camp in July, 1938.

Persons at liberty crossed the threshold of the NKVD in fear and trembling and most of the appeals were taken to safer places, where there were fewer chances of the arrest of the petitioner. Such places were the offices of the army and republic procurators and the presidium of the Central Executive Committee of Ukraine. While in the concentration camp, I had no clear picture of the situation in Ukraine in 1938 and I asked my wife to go to Moscow to the office of the procurator of the USSR, A. Vyshinsky.

In 1938 my wife received from Stuchek, the procurator of the Kiev military district, three refusals saying: "There is no reason to review the case of your husband." My wife wrote to me of this but even then

I still continued to make appeals. One of them, directed to the head of the Central Executive Committee of Ukraine, was given to the pardon section, which informed my wife that I had not asked for liberation but merely for amnesty. In a second declaration to that section, I wrote that "I had committed no crime and would not ask pardon from them."

In the concentration camp where life hung upon a hair, I did not try to win trust and justify myself by acting like a slave. I worked like all the other prisoners and never thought of "atoning" for my faults (which I had not committed) by hard prison work. Perhaps my conduct was influenced by the support and real help of my family, especially my sister-in-law, who at the risk of her own liberty and perhaps her life, wrote me encouraging letters.

THE DEPARTURE FROM KOLYMA

On August 28, 1939, I was ordered to take my belongings and report to the command post of Nyzhni Khatynakh. I had nothing to pick up, for I had only what was on my back. The overseer of the camp, himself a prisoner but condemned for theft, told me that he had personally seen a telegram with instructions to take me to Kiev at the disposal of the NKVD. He was from Kiev and gave me the address of his parents whom I was to contact upon my release from prison. An armed guard accompanied me to the central command post. After two hours my name was called and I was asked whether I knew how to lay water pipes. I answered that I had never done it and that I had been brought here to be returned to Ukraine. The rascal smiled and told me that I would see Ukraine just as I would see my own ears. Instead of Ukraine, I was sent to a forest squad to cut wood.

I worked in this forest squad until September 6th and then was sent back to Stan-Khatynakh. For no reason whatsoever I was placed for five days in the brig (kartser), although I worked in the woods like the other prisoners. After leaving the brig, I was again sent back to Nyzhni Khatynakh. Every one in the camp thought that I was well on the way back to Ukraine and were much surprised to see me returned, among them the overseer of the camp. He promised to find out the cause of my detention and two days later told me: "The third section of the gold mine of Stan-Khatynakh asked Moscow by telegram if I had been really summoned to Kiev for a review of my case."

The camp NKVD had my personal record which made me appear a dangerous political prisoner. They also had my record in Kolyma which showed that I could not be bent on the NKVD anvil. Violence toward myself and more so toward the other prisoners I answered with a sharp protest which had not escaped the ears of the NKVD. For this reason the third

section could not conceive of my return for a review of my case. The journey itself from Kolyma, even if a prisoner was not released, was a great joy to a man. Just like the hundreds of thousands of the prisoners in Kolyma, I wanted to leave as soon as possible this cold waste. In the depths of my soul, however, I did not believe such a miracle possible. So I quietly accepted my fate and without fear continued to do the hard work of a prisoner. On September 15, 1939 I received three packages from my wife and I had to find some way of keeping them for the winter. The overseer of the camp agreed to help me.

On September 17, 1939 at 11 A.M. I was again taken from my work in the mine and ordered to the camp. The overseer met me at the gate and told me that this time I would certainly be taken to Kiev. My joy knew no bounds. Most of the articles that I had received in the packages I distributed to the sick prisoners in the hospital. An NKVD man took me to the main administration building. This time I was called quickly and sent to the transfer point of the mine administration, where I found five prisoners in the same position as I. The following day we were officially told that we were leaving the Kolyma camp and could take from our account the money which our families had sent us. The money had been lying there for years but they had never given it to us or told us that it was there. Remembering the journey on the steamboat to Kolyma, I did not want to take the money with me, and I asked the authorities to return it to my wife in Kiev. At the moment when I gave these instructions I completely forgot that it would greatly disturb her, for money sent was returned only in the event of the death of a prisoner.

On the third day we six prisoners were placed in an open truck and sent to the city of Magadan. The summits of the mountains along our way were already covered with snow. The temperature was 10—0°F. at night and 15-20° F. during the day. We were attired in our summer prison clothes and practically froze. A shelter had been made of a blanket for the two NKVD men who accompanied us but we prisoners were not allowed to get under it. During the two days of travel we huddled together and so kept from becoming frostbitten and frozen. When we reached the seashore, we found warm autumn weather in Magadan, and until we boarded the steamship we sunned ourselves well.

October 1, 1939 we were loaded at Nagayevo on a steamer. There were on board 52 prisoners, and more than 2,000 persons who had finished their term of imprisonment and had been working for some years "at hired labor," waiting for their turn to leave Kolyma. The trip was very good in comparison with our passage to Kolyma. In the hold, where previously some 1,000 men were packed, there were only 52 of us. Every day we were permitted to go twice to the upper deck. In the Sea of

Okhotsk a bad storm raged for two days and both the prisoners and the guards became seasick. On leaving the Sea of Okhotsk, the weather became quiet and it was very pleasant to be even for a short time on the upper deck, from which we could see the limitless expanse of the ocean dotted with white sailed boats of the Japanese fishing fleet.

On the 8th day of our journey, we reached the Golden Horn harbor at Vladivostok and there disembarked. Every one felt happy that it was a reality and not a dream that we had left Kolyma.

THE CAMP OF VLADIVOSTOK AND THE TRANSFER PRISONS OF THE SIBERIAN RAILROAD

In 40-50 minutes after we had landed, two trucks picked up the prisoners and took us to the transfer point on another river. In August, 1938 there had been about 30,000 men in this camp, but in October, 1939 there were only about 2,000. These were the protracted remaining cases awaiting investigations.

In part of the camp there were many persons who were free and had either returned from Kolyma or were going to Kolyma for "voluntary" work for wages. In 1938, however, there were almost none of this type in the camp. The falling off of prisoners had caused the increase of "voluntary" employment of workers in Kolyma. While being taken from Khatynakh to Magadan, we passed dozens of cars going from Magadan deep into Kolyma, carrying the families of these "voluntary" workers. At one of the halts, these people told us that by a mutual understanding they were going to work with the NKVD economic organization Dalstroy. Unfortunate men! Their lives would differ little from that of the prisoners.

Life in the transfer camp was better and easier than in 1938. All the prisoners had a place in the barracks. When it rained they did not get drenched outdoors, as in the preceding year, and the food was better. Among the prisoners destined to the camps in Kolyma, there were many who had been condemned by the military commission of the supreme court to long term sentences in isolation camps. Many were former high ranking army officers as revealed by their cloaks. Some were bold and daring persons who bitterly attacked Stalin and his stooges. They publicly avered that there was still no order in the country and would not be while "the dregs of human society" ruled, for they regarded nothing prohibited or sacred.

At the end of October, all the prisoners whose cases were under review were photographed and fingerprinted. The following day part of us were sent to the railroad station. We were placed, 7 men in a compartment of a Stolypin prison car. Beside the prisoners from Kolyma some

prisoners from the Vladivostok prison were put in the car. Our car was attached to a train going to Irkutsk. The journey of several thousand kilometres lasted 6 days. Unlike life in the transfer camp, we were fed very poorly on the train. Each of us received 400 gr. of bread and 100 gr. of fish per day. At Irkutsk we were taken to a transfer prison. In spite of the fact that we were being brought from camps under heavy guard, we were thoroughly searched before being admitted into the prison. All our things were looked over, all seams were felt and all the openings of our bodies were inspected. It was only after this that we were allowed to dress and go to a cell. Similar search was made, when they took us from the prison.

In the cities where the course of the train ended, we were taken to transfer prisons. When we reached Krasnoyarsk, we were taken to a prison but under a system unlike that in Irkutsk. We were not searched at all. In the next prison at Novosibirsk, our group was broken up and taken in different directions, and so we waited here more than a week. During this time new groups of prisoners kept coming and going. Among them was a group of officers of the Special Far Eastern Army commanded by Blyukher. All belonged to the higher ranks and had once worn lozenges on their epaulets. Now as prisoners they were being taken to Moscow at the orders of the NKVD USSR.

From Novosibirsk the Ukrainian group was taken via Zlatoust—Samara—Syzran and unloaded at the Syzran transfer prison. There we met a group of prisoners from the Vorkuta and Ukht-Pechora camps, who were also being taken for a review of their cases. We learned from them about the regime in these camps. It was the same as in Kolyma — unendurable heavy work without a single day of rest, cold, hunger (and unlike Kolyma, a lack of clothing) and a high mortality among the prisoners. From Syzran we were sent to Kharkiv and from Kharkiv I landed in the investigating prison in Kiev on November 29, 1939.

THE HOPES OF THE PRISONERS EN ROUTE

All the Kolyma prisoners were certain that if they had been brought from there some 7,000-13,000 kilometres, it was because they were to be released. This hope was partially dispelled in Vladivostok by Khomenko, a Ukrainian brought from the island of Sakhalin and put in our car. Khomenko had come from the Nizhin region of Chernihiv district where he was born and lived until the terrible period of collectivization. In 1931 he, like millions of others, was declared a kurkul and the authorities by force tried to send him and his family north. With the help of a relative, who worked at the railroad station in Nizhin, Khomenko left all of his

property and fled with his family to the Far East to Vladivostok. In 1935 Khomenko under a contract went to work in an oil plant under a Japanese concession on the island of Sakhalin, and moved there with his family. When he was arrested in 1938, he was charged with having burned in 1934 his property in the Chernihiv district. In answer to this, Khomenko proved that he had fled from Ukraine in 1931 and had not returned and could have done nothing from a distance of 10,000 kilometres. He offered to prove from the records of his employment that during the 7 years of his stay in the Far East he had never been absent a single day. At the end of 1938 he was sent from the island of Sakhalin to Chernihiv. There he was imprisoned for 3 months and then without explanation returned to the island of Sakhalin. In 1939 he was once again taken to Chernihiv from the island of Sakhalin and the 30,000 kilometres of his transportation back and forth was without results. But the hope still lingered in our hearts and "perhaps"?

In the Syzran prison this "perhaps" began to totter. We met a prisoner from Kiev who in November, 1938 had been brought back from Kolyma to Kiev. His case was reviewed and he was given 5 years instead of 10 and his place of imprisonment was changed from Kolyma to Karaganda. Every one hoped for new and better conditions in the country. Upon crossing the Volga River we saw railroad stations crowded with military equipment. The western part of the USSR was on a military basis. The prisoners drew hope from this. However, in the Kharkiv prison, we lost hope for release. We met prisoners on their way from Kiev to Kazakhstan. Among them was an important scholar of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Director of the Institute of Physics, Professor Goldman. He was a baptized Jew. He had been accused of membership in a Ukrainian nationalist organization and been given 5 years in Alma-Ata. Upon such meetings we lost all hope of release thinking that only a miracle could free us from imprisonment. In this mood I crossed for the second time the threshold of the Kiev prison. Here reviewing of my case began.

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE OF UKRAINIAN LIFE

I. UKRAINE — BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

LIFE IN WESTERN UKRAINE UNDER THE SOVIETS

The *ABN—Correspondence*, the official organ of the Anti-Bolshevist Bloc of Nations, for February, 1955, contains a description of life in Western Ukraine on the basis of letters, which the organization has received from the area by the underground.

It is well known that Western Ukraine was only recently the area of the most intense anti-Bolshevist activity directed by the Ukrainian Underground. The description of the life there dates chiefly from 1953-1954.

The Peasants, until recently the main support of the revolutionary movement, have been placed almost entirely in kolkhozes. To reconcile them with their new position, the Bolsheviks have placed over the kolkhozes former serious farmers, who by their reasonable measures are removing the causes of friction. There are differences in the earnings of the workers in the kolkhozes, the authorities and especially the members of the Motor-Tractor Stations and the members of the Underground use these for counter-Bolshevik agitation.

The Workers. Many of the peasants who were unwilling to enter the kolkhozes have gone to the cities as workmen but in the pay of the workers there is a great difference between the worker in the mines the "qualified" workers and the "ordinary" workers. Dissatisfaction is now spreading.

The Intelligentsia. The Bolsheviks have succeeded in attracting these to their side, because after the death of Stalin, they began to remove the Russians from the official offices and the intellectual posts of Western Ukraine and fill these positions with local Ukrainians. Declarations of loyalty and condemnations of their former nationalistic errors are now very frequent in the press of Western Ukraine. The greatest cause of the breaking of the spirit of the intelligentsia and the weakening of the position of the Ukrainian Underground has been the Western, and especially the American, unclear policy toward Ukraine. The propaganda of the American radio stations has no influence in Ukraine, for all are convinced that there will be no war and so it is necessary to become reconciled with life as it is.

The Youth. The Bolsheviks have succeeded in winning over many young people who have been mobilized in the Komsomol; especially since they have given these young people access to the schools and government offices, the post-office, the railroads and other posts that were not available under Poland.

The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. Although the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church formally does not exist, since after the arrest of the entire episcopate, Western Ukraine formally became a part of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Greek Catholic Church still exists and its clergy are working illegally to support the faith and morale of the population. The Soviet government frequently winks

at this, for the entire attention of Moscow is directed toward securing the good will of the population of Western Ukraine.

The *Underground Movement*. As a result of all these factors the Underground Movement in Western Ukraine has been greatly weakened; the ranks of its members have been thinned by enforced deportation and still more through the realistic policy of the Bolshevik government, which is trying to secure the good will of the population by political and economical concessions on the one hand and thanks to the unclear policy of the Western states toward Ukraine on the other. As a result the tactics of the Underground have changed basically and its actions now are chiefly anti-Soviet propaganda.

CONCENTRATION CAMPS IN UKRAINE

In 1954 many persons—Germans, English, Spaniards, etc.—were released through one act of amnesty or another and returned to their homelands from the USSR. There they published accounts of the Soviet concentration camps.

It is reported that new camps have been set up in the Moscow area, and there are also various reports of the erection of concentration camps in Ukraine. Prior to the last war there were hardly any of these (the I.T.L.) in Ukraine; there were in the chief towns in the Donbas only the so-called reformatory colonies (I.K.T.) for delinquents and criminals. Some of the internees, especially the Spanish, who returned from Ukraine in 1954 reported that there were now concentration camps at Kharkiv, Stalino, and Voroshilovhrad, along the South Ukrainian and North Crimean Canals and also in Odesa. The prisoners in the Ukrainian concentration camps are forced to work not only in the mines (in the Donbas) or in factories (in Kharkiv) but also on the land.

THE BOLSHEVIKS ACKNOWLEDGE THE ACTIVITY OF THE UKRAINIAN UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT

In the October-November, 1954 number, the Moscow journal *The Friendship of the Nations* published a review of the book of Yuri Smolych, *Enemies of Mankind and their Servants*. This review contains the following passage: "By using the evidence adduced in the public trials of members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Lviv, Stryj, Drohobych and Chortkiv, Yuri Smolych shows his Soviet readers the bestial character of one of these rogues, namely Roman Stakhur, who hit the noble Yaroslav Halan a blow on the head with a hatchet and killed him."

This is probably the first time that the Soviet press has mentioned the name of the man who killed in Lviv Yaroslav Halan, a Communist writer and a traitor to the Ukrainian people. It is also the first time that it has mentioned the fact that many members of the OUN were sentenced not only by military and secret courts but also by public courts.

A SECOND ELDER BROTHER TO THE USSR

Before the death of Stalin the hegemony of the Russian people was evident in every sector of the life of the USSR. After the death of Stalin the collective dictatorship in the Kremlin became convinced that the Russian people by itself,

since it formed the minority of the population of the USSR (about 46%), were too few to control the empire as a whole. So in the two years since the Ceremonies of Pereyaslav (January, 1954) in honor of the 300th Anniversary of the union of Ukraine to Moscow, they have spread the official theory that Russia and Ukraine are the two leading nations of the USSR. This theory has been actually put into practice by Nikita S. Khrushchev, the former governor for Stalin in Ukraine. While he was in power in Ukraine he succeeded in developing hundreds of Russified Communist Ukrainians and he is now putting these in prominent positions in Moscow and the other republics of the USSR. Thus there have appeared in Moscow as ministers or vice-ministers of the federal government such well-known Communists of the younger generation as V. A. Kucherenko, L. R. Korniyets, P. L. Shupyk, V. F. Harbuziv, K. I. Koval, A. S. Pavlenko, I. T. Skydanenko, N. A. Dyhay, I. I. Nosenko, L. R. Ryzhenko, and many others. The secretary of the Communist Party in Ukraine and the present viceroy of Ukraine, A. I. Kyrychenko, is directly instituting in Moscow the supreme collective dictatorship.

Among the 11 Marshals of the Red Army promoted since the fall of Malenkov four are Ukrainians (Hrechko, Yeremenko, Moskalenko, and Rudenko). Ukrainian Communists are also being appointed to the highest posts in the Union republics, especially in Asia.

By this action the present heads of the USSR wish to achieve three objects; 1. they want to bind the constantly revolting Ukraine to Moscow more closely by the fiction that the Ukrainians are a nation of the same rank in the USSR as the Russians; 2. Khrushchev is strengthening his own position with his partisans loyal to him from the time when he was General Secretary in Ukraine; 3. Moscow is trying to turn the hatred of the non-Russian peoples partially also against the Ukrainians and thus break the solid anti-Russian front of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR.

Practically this is no advantage to the Ukrainian people, for these careerists of Ukrainian origin are mostly Russified individuals who will carry on the Russification of Ukraine better than the native Russian can.

THE KIEV DEMONSTRATIONS

In addition to their political, cultural and economic favors, Red Moscow during the last two years had not spared Ukraine words and shows. The Head of the All-Union Supreme Soviet, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, came from Moscow in April, 1955 to attend the meeting of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. This session elected the poet Pavlo Tychyna, a master of the Ukrainian word who had been ruined by Moscow, the Head of Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. It elected D. Korotchenko, Head of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and N. Kalchenko, Head of the Ukrainian Soviet of Ministers; the last two were brought up under the Soviet system.

Voroshilov came to Kiev to decorate with the order of Lenin the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and the city of Kiev. At both celebrations he delivered addresses, emphasizing the phrase so popular since the Pereyaslav celebrations about the "inseparable friendship" of Ukraine and Russia and praising the endurance of Kiev.

A RUINED TALENT

On March 20, literary Kiev celebrated very magnificently the 60th birthday of the poet Maksym Rylsky and the 45th anniversary of his literary career. Prof. Stepan Kryzhanivsky delivered an address on the literary work of Rylsky; Pavlo Tychyna and A. Malyshko for the Ukrainians, and for the Russians V. Katajev, greeted the poet. Yuri Smolych read the order of Moscow conferring upon the poet the Order of Lenin.

M. Rylsky did not win this high reward from Red Moscow for his poetical work to help the Ukrainian people but because like Pavlo Tychyna, he had allowed the ruination of his talent and had begun to write peans in honor of the occupant of Ukraine. The true poets of Ukraine are now in the grave; the 20th anniversary of their destruction was recently commemorated in a special number of our journal. (Vol. X. No. 4).

A NEW DRAMATIC PRODUCTION

A dramatization of the story of Olha Kobyljanska *Sunday Morning I Collected Herbs*, is being prepared for presentation in the Chernivtsi, Olha Kobyljanska dramatic theatre. The author of this is V. Vasilko, a People's Artist of the USSR.

A NEW DICTIONARY

The Language Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR has announced that the second volume of the Ukrainian-Russian Dictionary is ready for the press. These are to contain the words of the Ukrainian literary language from Z to N inclusive (in the Ukrainian alphabet) and also their Russian equivalents.

UKRAINIAN COMPOSERS ARE IDLE

"*Radyanska Ukraina*," No. 74 contains a long article by P. Kozytsky, Head of the Union of Soviet Composers of Ukraine, in which he complains of the weak creative powers of the Ukrainian composers.

"Although the overture of Yu. Meytus, dedicated to the 300th Anniversary of the union of Ukraine and Russia, was enthusiastically received by the participants at the plenum, in general the Ukrainian authors were insufficiently represented. This is the result of the weakening of the respect of our composers for symphonic music. Actually during the last years such composers as L. Revutsky, A. Shtoharenko, A. Svechnykov, A. Filipenko, V. Nakhbiv, M. Kolessa and others have written nothing.

"This is a very bitter sign. It shows especially the mistakes in the organizational and educational work of the administration of the Union of Soviet Composers of Ukraine."

The cause of this weak productivity of the Ukrainian composers is not in a poor organization but in the lack of freedom for artistic creation in Ukraine under the Russian Communist occupation.

LYSENKO'S OPERA, TARAS BULBA

In connection with the Kiev ceremonies connected with the visit of K. Voroshilov, Head of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to Kiev on March 29, 1955, the Kiev T. Shevchenko theatre of opera and ballet presented for the first time the opera *Taras Bulba*, the work of Mykola V. Lysenko, the classical Ukrainian composer. It is to be noted that this opera, because of its patriotic character, lay in the musical archives for decades and this is the first time that it has been allowed upon the stage.

THE SUGAR OF UKRAINE

In the new plants for increasing the Soviet food supply, it has been decided to make Ukraine the chief source of sugar for the USSR. Previously Ukraine has produced 2/3 of all the sugar of the Soviet Union. This production is to be increased by the construction of new sugar refineries in Western Ukraine. 11 sugar refineries are being built in the district of Lviv, Ternopil, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv, Chernivtsi and Khmelnytsky (Podillya) and they will be in operation with the new season (the autumn of 1955).

THE PRODUCTION OF CORN IN UKRAINE

N. Khrushchev has chosen Ukraine as the chief area for the growing of corn for the feeding of meat animals on the American pattern. Radio Kiev is constantly broadcasting appeals and instructions to the kolkhozes of Ukraine how to grow corn.

THE DONBAS DOES NOT SUBSCRIBE

There has never been any doubt that the placing of heavy industry in the first category of importance in the general economy of the USSR would have a hard effect upon the shoulders and arms of the Ukrainian workers, and especially the miners. It was not necessary to wait long to have this confirmed. *Pravda* in its leading article "We must increase more rapidly the amount of heavy industry," delivered a sharp criticism on a long series of factories and ministries responsible for them for not putting into execution and not completing plans and presented them with new and still greater demands. It sharply criticized the Ministry of Black Metals of the USSR, the Ministries of Construction of Factories, of Metallurgical and Chemical Industry, the Ministry of the Lumber Industry and especially the Ministry of Coalmining of Ukraine, which had recently been created during the broad decentralization of the economic institutions of the USSR.

THE COLONIZATION OF THE CRIMEA

In addition to the action commenced by N. Khrushchev for moving from Ukraine and the other republics of the USSR thousands of young Communist men and women to virgin lands in Asia, where millions of acres of new land are

to be ploughed up for grain growing, there is being carried on, according to the reports of the *Pravda Ukrainy* a parallel action to resettle agricultural laborers from the overpopulated regions of Ukraine in the Crimea and the southern districts of Ukraine on the Black Sea, which are more sparsely populated. New villages are being built in the Crimea for the settled members of the kolhosps. During the last years more than 150 settlements have been started in the Crimea. 2,000 dwellings were built in the last year for the resettled members of the kolhosps.

II. IN THE WORLD — OUTSIDE UKRAINE

RESEARCH GROUP TO STUDY UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE

"Make use of every opportunity to represent with dignity Ukrainian culture and science before the world. Be untiring in popularizing its achievements." (From an appeal of the Homeland to Ukrainians abroad).

Carrying out instructions of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council (UHVR) in Ukraine, a Research Group was established in December, 1952 by the Foreign Representation of UHVR with the object of filling at least some gaps which exist in this field. It is composed of experts, people of different political convictions, or non-partisans. Thus far the following works have been completed or are nearing completion within the plans of this Research Group:

Vasyl Barka: "Tychyyna's lyricism in relation to modern trends in Ukrainian literature, part I."

Bohdan Halaichuk: "Ukraine in International Law."

Petro Holubenko: "Sketches from the history of Ukrainian-Russian cultural relations."

Yuriy Lavrynenko (Dyvnych): "History of modern Ukrainian political movements."

Kost Kononenko: "Economic characteristics of Ukraine and Ukrainian-Russian economic relations."

Vasyl Mudry: "Ukrainian political thought in West Ukraine between two World Wars."

Myroslav Prokop: "Ukraine in World War II."

Timofiy Sosnovy: "Famine as a tool of politics." (Famine in Ukraine 1932-33)

Lev Shankovsky: "History of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)."

Roman Olesnicki: is the translator of the above works into English. Completed translations of the works of Sosnovy, Kononenko and Lavrynenko.

Bohdan Czajkiwsky: is in charge of chronology and documentation of current events in Ukraine and the Group's archives and library.

The following scholars have taken part in editing and reviewing some of the above works: Professors Olexander Ohloblyn, Yuriy G. Serech, M. Vasylyv, Yu. Boyko and editor I. Majstrenko.

The address of the Research Group is: *Prolog Associates*, 700 West End Ave. New York 25, N.Y.

A JEWISH PATRIOT ON THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY

Dr. Stella Krenzbach in the *Washington Times* published her experiences in Western Ukraine under the Nazis and Communists. Stella Krenzbach, now the

senior secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, describes her life as a young girl among the Ukrainians and then her secret life under the Nazis in the home of Olya, the daughter of a Ukrainian Catholic priest, who hid her. Finally Dr. Krenzbach went with Olya into the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, where she met many Jewish doctors and nurses in the underground hospitals of the Army. Olya perished in a battle with the Bolsheviks in Ukraine but Stella succeeded fortunately in getting into the free world with a detachment of Ukrainian insurgents. Dr. Krenzbach appealed to her compatriots in the whole world to have a better understanding of the Ukrainian Struggle for Liberation and to take a more favorable position toward the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to which she owed the saving of her life.

THE VETERANS OF THE UKRAINIAN RIFLEMEN OF THE SICH CELEBRATE THEIR 40TH ANNIVERSARY

At the end of March, 1955 the veterans of the first Ukrainian army of modern times, the Ukrainski Sichovi Strilci, celebrated the 40th anniversary of their entrance into the battle against Russia during World War I in 1915. The Ukrainski Sichovi Strilci were a corps of volunteers of Ukrainian nationality in the Austro-Hungarian army with the definite mission of fighting against Russia for the liberation of the Ukrainian people from the rule of Russia. This corps in 1918 became later the nucleus of the army of the Ukrainian National Republic.

The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, formed of political emigres from Ukraine under Russia, cooperated politically with this corps. The seat of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine was in Vienna.

DMYTRO ANDRIEVSKY ON RADIO MUNICH

Engineer Dmytro Andrievsky, Executive Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian National Rada, broadcast on Radio Munich on April 5 a talk on "The Soviets and Ukraine." The author gave general information on Ukraine and stressed its struggle for independence, its war against Red Moscow and the conditions of life under the Soviets. Mentioning the events of World War II, he acknowledged that the Ukrainians had hoped for German support in their struggle for liberation but that the policy of Hitler had ruined these hopes and aroused great opposition against the Germans which proved fatal to Germany as the war went on.

A UKRAINIAN CENTRAL ORGANIZATION IN HOLLAND

There was held in Utrecht a General Gathering of the Central Organization of the Ukrainians in Holland, which brought together all the Ukrainians in Holland. In starting this organization much help was given by Reverend Yakiv Peridon, Dutch by birth. Recently a Ukrainian Catholic priest in Paris, M. Bryk, became the new president of the organization.

THE UKRAINIANS IN AUSTRALIA CELEBRATE UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

On the initiative of a special committee which included representatives of all the Ukrainian organizations in Australia, a celebration of Ukrainian statehood was held in Sydney. Representatives of the Australian government and public

circles took part in the celebration along with delegations of other national groups. Mr. Poninsky represented the United Council of the Emigres of Australia and Mr. Sinclair, director of the Department of Education, spoke for the Labor Party. The chief address was by the Australian Minister of Supply, Howard Beal who had once been in charge of immigration. In his address the Minister announced that there were now more than 15,000 Ukrainians in Australia, that the government recognized the value of the group and sought their cooperation in developing the new Australian national culture. He ended his remarks with these words: "I hope that your country will again be a free and independent state and to all who decide to remain in our country I wish happiness and prosperity."

THE UNION OF UKRAINIAN WOMEN IN AUSTRALIA

From the beginning of the Ukrainian immigration into Australia, the care of Ukrainian women has been under the Union of Ukrainian Women which was later renamed the Society of Ukrainian Women of Australia (SUA) headed by Mrs. Irena Pelenska, a one time vice president of the World Federation of Ukrainian Women (Philadelphia, USA). Its organ is the monthly *Woman's Page* in the *Free Thought* published in Sydney. The SUA is divided into state sections which exist in 4 states and the federated district. The states of the SUA are divided into branches with a larger or smaller number of members.

The section of the SUA in Canberra has organized a Ukrainian evening school under Lidiya Petrushevska. Thanks to the help of the Ukrainian Catholic priest, Rev. Dr. Dyachyshyn, the school is held in a local Australian Catholic school building.

THE CONVENTION OF UKRAINIAN SCHOLARS IN PARIS

The headquarters of Ukrainian free scholarship at present is the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Sarcelles near Paris. Here are the Central Administration and the European Branch of this oldest and most deserving Ukrainian scientific society.

The General Assembly of this scientific centre was held on March 27, 1955 in Sarcelles. The out-going administration gave a report of its broad scientific and publishing activity, especially on the work of publishing the second part of the *Ukrainian Encyclopedia*.

The business meeting was followed by a scientific conference with lectures by Prof. Dr. Ilko Borshchak, Prof. Mykola Hlobenko and Docent Eng. Dr. Petro Zeleny. From the written reports of the outgoing administration of the European Branch of the SSS, we learn that in the last year three members had died. Three new active members were elected, Prof. Dr. Amedeo Giannini, Dr. Enrico Insabato and Prof. Leo Manino, six ordinary members were elected. At the end of February, the European Branch had 43 active members (31 Ukrainian and 12 foreign); 47 ordinary members and adjunct members 52 (including 30 in science and 22 in law).

The soul of this scientific centre is Prof. Volodymyr Kubyovych a Ukrainian geographer. The following new administration was elected: President: Prof. V. Kubyovych; Vice-President: Prof. Ol. Shulhyn; Secretary: Dr. V. Yaniv.

THE PARTICIPATION OF UKRAINIAN STUDENTS OF NOMENCLATURE
IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS IN SALAMANCA, SPAIN.

In the middle of April, the 5th International Congress of Nomenclature (Onomastics) was held in Salamanca, Spain. The congress opened in the ancient hall of the Salamanca University on April 12 in the presence of about 250 representatives and guests from 25 countries.

Ukrainian scholars were represented by Prof. Ya. Rudnytsky of the University of Manitoba, Canada, Dr. H. Nakonechna of the University of Munich, Germany, and Eng. A. Kyshka of the Centre of Eastern Studies in Madrid, Spain.

Prof. Rudnytsky gave two reports; one in English on "The formation of new placenames in Canada" and the other in Spanish on "The Spanish Names in the Ukrainian Version of Don Juan."

SAINT SOPHIA

The Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences in the USA has published a monumental work on Saint Sophia, the Kiev Cathedral from the beginning of the XI century. The author of this monumental work is M. Povstenko, a student of old Ukrainian architecture and art. Hundreds of artistic illustrations show the appearance of this great masterpiece of Ukrainian Byzantine architecture, paintings and mosaics from the first half of the XI century. The building of the Cathedral was finished in 1037 under Yaroslav the Wise.

HISTORY OF THE UKRAINIAN THEATRE.

The history of the Ukrainian Theatre has been prepared by that excellent authority B. Revutsky under the title *Five Great Actors of the Ukrainian Stage*. The book was printed in Paris.

BOOK REVIEWS

A COMPLETE UKRAINIAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, by C. H. Andrusyshen and J. N. Krett, assisted by Helen Virginia Andrusyshen. University of Saskatchewan. Saskatoon 1955. Pages 1165

Slavic studies will be extensively assisted by "A Complete Ukrainian-English Dictionary", compiled by C. H. Andrusyshen, and published recently by the University of Saskatchewan.

This one-volume publication amasses in its 1163 pages some 95,000 words with their derivatives and their equivalents in English. In addition, it contains about 35,000 idiomatic, popular, and proverbial phrases, neologisms, and dialectical expressions of regional literature. Almost the whole of the Ukrainian lexical material contained in belletristic, scholarly and journalistic literature has been accumulated, arranged according to the Ukrainian alphabet, and translated into English. Each entry, consisting of the Ukrainian basic word with its derivatives and its English equivalent (or equivalents) is marked according to the system of symbols explained in the introduction. The introduction itself is of considerable importance in this dictionary. It gives an excellent account of the grammatical structure of Ukrainian, and explains the difference between the two Ukrainian orthographies at present in use: the one, accepted by the Conference of Ukrainian Grammarians and Philologists at Kharkiv in 1923, and still adhered to by the Ukrainian émigrés; and the other, superseding the former and made compulsory in the Ukraine in 1946, by decree of the Department of Education of Ukrainian S.S.R., the latter being strongly influenced by Russian. In this introduction it is explained that this dictionary is based on the earlier orthography, and that, by various symbols, it takes the later one into account.

In the main body of his work the compiler gives the basic entries in bold-face type, and the words obtained from them. The accents and diacritical marks of the Ukrainian words are applied properly and sufficiently. The more difficult words have well-chosen, illustrative quotations. These are given freely but without any reference to the sources. Regional and dialectal expressions are included, but obsolete words and colloquialism are rare. Following the Ukrainian words there are abbreviations for parts of speech, inflections, and applications. The English equivalents are clear, correct and adequate. Synonyms, but not antonyms, are included. The orthography of the English words is based on that of the American College Dictionary.

* * *

Altogether this is a fine piece of work, and unique in its way, first real academic Ukrainian-English dictionary. It is the largest Ukrainian-English dictionary, and the most comprehensive one. The compiling of it must have been like the tilling of virgin land by the pioneer. The difficulties have perhaps resulted in a few shortcomings. Some words are not arranged strictly alphabetically; for example, ABORIGEN is preceded by ABORT; AVTOKEFALIA is followed by AVTOHRAF. Furthermore, it is not clear on what basis a limited selection of biographical and

geographical names was made. The name of the Hetman Mazepa is included; the name of the Hetman Khmelnytskyi is excluded, although the latter is at least equal in importance to the former, both of them being well-known in history and literature. The strictly technological terminology is not sufficiently represented. It might have been better to get some of the sixty collections of specialized Ukrainian nomenclature of which the compiler has a list (Cf. Foreword) and to include a larger selection of technical terms, instead of leaving them to be put in a possible second edition.

In spite of these shortcomings, and some typographical errors and omissions, this dictionary is a great aid for the understanding of Ukrainian texts, and for their translation into English. Slavic departments will benefit by this valuable addition to their lexicography. A similar dictionary, published in Kiev in 1951 (in the new orthography) has only about 60,000 entries.

By his work, the compiler has proved that he is not merely "a useful drudge," as Samuel Johnson defines the lexicographer. Dr. Andrusyshen has established himself as a good scholar and he has enhanced the reputation of the Slavic Department of the University of Saskatchewan.

University of Saskatchewan Library.

ROMAN GRODZICKY, Ph. D.

Henryk Paszkiewicz. *THE ORIGIN OF RUSSIA*. New York, Philosophical Library. 1954. Pp. XII + 556.

The distinguished Polish emigre historian, Henryk Paszkiewicz, has in this bulky volume made the latest attempt to interpret or reinterpret the various sources which throw light upon the important but rather moot question of the origin of Kievan Rus'. We cannot help but admire the author's erudition and his seemingly inexhaustible knowledge of the history of the whole of medieval Eastern Europe. Only a specialist can appreciate the work which went into the compilation of a bibliography of more than 2000 titles, many of them to-day inaccessible, including many recent Polish and Czech works; to be sure there are some omissions but the bibliography (pp. 470-519) is in itself a contribution to Eastern European historiography. For years to come it will hold its value as a guide for students interested in this field.

Prof. Paszkiewicz has made a commendable — and mostly successful — effort to challenge the views of various Soviet Russian scholars as well as "scholars" maintaining that the development of the Rus' state (the author wisely abstains from calling it the Russian state) was and had to be an entirely autochthonous movement, that the founders of the Rus' state were indigenous Slavs belonging to some mythical "old Russian" (*drevnerusskaya*) nation. It is obvious that these views of Russian archeologists and historians, quoting copiously from Marx and Stalin and little from ancient sources, deserve criticism. It is not less obvious that the author himself goes to the opposite extreme when by ingenious and not always correct interpretations of the sources, he attempts to show that the Slav element had almost no influence on the foundation and development of the Kievan state, that its role in history was entirely passive and that the term 'Rus' primarily had a religious connotation. When we compare the works of the contemporary Soviet Russian historical school with that of Prof. Paszkiewicz, we must come to the inevitable conclusion that we are still as far as ever from a real solution of that question already debated for centuries "Whence came the Rus Land?"

Since the author's views are on the whole very close to the classic Normanist point of view expressed by V. Thomsen in 1877 and recently restated by F. Dvornik (*The Making of Central and Eastern Europe*, 1949, although Prof. Dvornik emphasized the role of the Slavic elements in Rus'), we will not discuss Prof. Paszkiewicz's views on special points. We will mention only those that deviate from the commonly accepted opinions.

Prof. Paszkiewicz lays stress upon the literal interpretation of the *Chronicle* of Nestor. He cites passages which purport to prove that the western borders of Rus' were along the Rivers Styr and the upper Boh, but he fails to mention that the *I Novgorod Chronicle* (1149) states that the town of Volodymyr in west Volyn was in Rus' territory or that Roman Mstyslavych (1198-1205), Prince of Galicia was the ruler (autocrat) of the whole of Rus'. He tries to show that the Western Ukrainian tribes (he considers them to have been the Buzhians and the Croats) were actually of Polish origin. He is here even less convincing for he cites twice a document of Henry IV for the Prague bishop (1086) but this gives no basis for his statement that the area west of the Styr belonged in the tenth century to Poland. Historical geography disproves this. The Norse period according to him did not end until the coming of the Tatars into Eastern Europe. He believes the primary use of the word Rus' was in religious connections (here he follows consciously or unconsciously the thesis of some representatives of the Kryvychy wing of the Byelorussian intelligentsia, recently reviewed by J. Stankevich in his *Brief Survey of the History of Kryvia*, 1951). Nevertheless he neglects to say that from the first line of the *Chronicle* of Nestor there appears again and again a political coloring in the term the Rus' Country (*Ruskaya Zemlya*) or a state created by the Rus' people. The *Chronicle* stresses the Rus' patriotism of the Galician ruler Vasylo of Terebovlya at the end of the 11 and beginning of the 12 century.

Since the author believes that there never was a Rus' state created by the political genius of the Ukrainian Slavs, there could be no Rus' nationality and no Rus' Slavic culture. So he concludes that the *Tale of Ihor's Raid* of the twelfth century which shows the true Ukrainian spirit must be a forgery. While this reviewer admires the author's skill and ingenuity in handling his sources, his bold courage in constructing new hypotheses and his capacity for independent thinking, he cannot agree with all these theses that he has mentioned for they lack scientific documentation.

Prof. Paszkiewicz has displayed also great interest in the method of the formation of the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian peoples. He very ingeniously argues that the Lyakhs created the first Polish state in the basin of the middle of Vistula. He connects the term *Lenzaninói* by which Constantine Porphyrogenitus called some Ukrainian tribe or tribes with the Lyakhs and considers this a proof that the Western Ukrainian population was originally Polish. He does not seem to know the article of A. Sobolevsky in *Izv. ORYS*, XXXI, 1926. This gives some pertinent remarks. However the author's effort to show that the Poles in the tenth century extended as far east as they did in the pre-1939 Eastern areas of the Polish Republic seems to have been adopted to agree with the present policy of the Polish exiles. The modern Russians, in the opinion of Prof. Paszkiewicz are descendants of the Finnish Meri tribe, which was once strong and numerous; this is certainly one of the best parts of the book but it would be dangerous to forget that among the modern Russians are

also the descendants of the purely Slavic Novgorodians (Slovines), the Vyatichi (later the Ryazanians) and the Radymychi. Thus it cannot merely be stated that the Russians are slavized Finns.

Prof. Paszkiewicz says few kind words on Ukrainian history (as a matter of fact, he never did — cf. his *Polityka Ruska Kazimierza Wielkiego*, *Rozprawy Historyczne*. 1925). He denies the right of the present day Ukrainians to any part of the Rus' political heritage, although he himself states that some separate nation, different from the Russians, would have come into being anyway on the territory of present day Ukraine. Prof. Paszkiewicz accuses Hrushevsky of having committed an error when he used the term Rus'-Ukraine in his ten volume history of Ukraine. But the number of scholars, who, in the opinion of Prof. Paszkiewicz, have made "mistakes" on some point or another is really impressive.

On the whole, so far as study of the sources of early Rus' history are concerned, the author has succeeded in adding a number of interesting but highly doubtful hypotheses to the vast number already existing. Chacun à son gout; but so far as this reviewer is concerned, the two sections of lasting value are Part III, the History of Lithuania through 1386 and the impressive bibliography, hardly the main parts of the book.

P. HRYCAK

DOCUMENTA PONTIFICUM ROMANORUM HISTORIAM UCRAINAE ILLUSTRANTIA. Vol. II. (1700-1953), Roma, 1954.

This second volume of a series of which we reviewed Vol. I in our journal (Vol. X, No. 3) covers the period from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the present time. It commences with the documents of Pope Clement XI (1700-1721). This was a very important period in the relations of the Ukrainian Church and Rome. After the subjugation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by the Patriarchate of Moscow (1686) the sympathies of the Ukrainian people turned toward Rome. Galicia, that old stronghold of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, with its two dioceses, Lviv and Peremyshl and the famous Stauropygian Brotherhood, accepted the supremacy of the Papacy and they were followed by the last Orthodox diocese of Lutsk.

These developments took place during a stormy period in Ukrainian life. The uprising of Hetman Mazepa against Russia, the catastrophe of Poltava and the formation of the first Ukrainian political emigration could not leave the Church disinterested in national affairs. The 31 documents of Pope Clement XI show the lively interest of the Vatican in the Ukrainian situation.

The papal interest in Ukraine became very marked again during the pontificate of Benedict XIV (1740-1758). This was also a critical period in the life of the Ukrainian Catholic Church because of the strong interference of the Warsaw Russian ambassador in church affairs of Poland in favor of the weakened Orthodoxy. The internal quarrels of the secular and monastic clergy led to the preparation of 54 documents by this Pope.

The partitions of Poland and the attack of the Russian government upon the Ukrainian-Byelorussian Catholic Church during the periods of Clement XIV and Pius VI gave the Vatican the opportunity to defend the persecuted Church. The 54 documents of Pope Pius VI (1775-1799) throw much light upon this era.

In the nineteenth century, the Vatican was again occupied with Ukrainian questions, especially during the papacy of Pius IX (60 documents). Then the Ukrainian developments in the first part of the twentieth century again showed the great interest of the Vatican on behalf of Eastern Catholicism in Ukraine.

As in the case of Volume I, there is a thorough scientific treatment of the material in Volume II and this gives the publication its value as a primary historical source.

N. CHUBATY

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM, 1939-1945. By John A. Armstrong. New York, Columbia University Press, 1955. 322 pp.

Those who pride themselves on their knowledge of Eastern European affairs, are due for some surprise. There has been a book written and published on Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945. It is a history of the Ukrainian Nationalism during the Second World War and we can say that it is a book that few professional experts would ever dare to write. The theme has always been considered too difficult and too controversial for a scholarly research. The one who dared to deal with a whole range of profoundly difficult problems — was Dr. John A. Armstrong of Wisconsin University in Madison.

There is no doubt that this author deserves credit for honesty and forthrightness with which he approached his bold enterprise. He confesses himself that when he embarked on this enterprise, he felt somewhat uneasy. He says that without encouragement by Prof. Philip E. Mosely, Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, he would scarcely have undertaken his study. And the study itself reminded of exploring a far off planet; the sources were scarce, widely scattered and mostly unknown.

It is our opinion that the nature of "Things Ukrainian" is really no secret if you read Ukrainian and take the trouble to compare and collate enough Ukrainian sources. Yet there has thus far no major attempt been made, either by Ukrainian or non-Ukrainian scholars, to analyze Ukrainian Nationalism. Attempting to find out the facts and report them as they actually were, the author had to take full advantage of many varieties of evidence, and not only to limit himself to written sources. From this point of view Mr. Armstrong has been brilliantly successful. He has provided invaluable background material to tell the story of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945. In this respect his book is a result of thorough research based on original investigation in which the author showed not only an indefatigable energy, but also a good judgement. The extent of the author's exhaustive research can be measured by the fact that he was able to find out 81 various unpublished documents concerning Ukrainian affairs (chiefly German), consult immense published material (contemporary and memoir e.g. the author read through 312 articles in the contemporary Ukrainian press) which presented information on Ukrainian national, cultural, religious and economic activities during the last war, and to interview the participants of the events which took place in Ukraine more than 10 years ago. In selecting the persons for his interviews (14 Germans, 9 Russians and "Rusophiles," and 50 Ukrainians), in planning his interviews and in exacting information on all sides of controversial issues from his "victims," the author was not only persistent, but also orderly, and at least got to the point from which he could see in all directions of his truly difficult research.

Again and again, in his book, Mr. Armstrong gives evidence of careful and thoughtful study which, by no means, was an easy one. For instance: Most of the German documentary material listed in the book has been published in International Military Tribunal, *Trial of the Major War Criminals* (42 vols.; Nuremberg, 1947-49), and *Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10* (14 vols.; Nuremberg 1946-49), and *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (8 vols., and supplementary volumes; Washington, 1946-1948). However, the author states that a large majority of the documents concerning Ukrainian affairs were not printed in these series. The sections dealing with Ukrainian nationalism were frequently omitted even from the documents printed because, as author says, "these passages were not considered relevant to the judicial proceedings." Consequently, the documents included into study and cited in the body of it, are originals, or photostats or mimeographed copies of the originals which had to be found out at nine various collections. We believe the author that it was quite a hard job.

The book by Mr. Armstrong is a serious effort to present the turbulent story of Ukrainian Nationalism during the last war. The author divided his book into twelve chapters: (1) Emergence of Nationalism, (2) The Ukrainians and the Polish Catastrophe, (3) Retrenchment and Revolt, (4) The Opening of the Ukraine, (5) Repression and Reichskommissariat, (6) From Underground to Resistance, (7) Salvage Efforts, (8) Nationalism and the Church, (9) Channels of Nationalist Activity, (10) Nationalism and the East Ukrainian Social Structure. (11) Geographical Variations of Nationalism, (12) Perspectives. Appendix, Bibliography and Index follow the chapters. The first three chapters are rather an examination of the nationalists as people and their environment as well as a thorough study of their conflicts in 1940. In the next six chapters the author defines and analyzes the activities of various Nationalist Groups in Ukraine after the outbreak of Nazi-Soviet war in 1941. In the last three chapters the author examines Ukrainian Nationalism in regard to East Ukrainian social structure and geographical variations and tries to answer the question whether Ukrainian Nationalism possessed the potentiality of arousing the emotion of "Common man" in Eastern Ukraine (as to Western Ukraine the author has no doubts). The author concludes: "Ukrainian Nationalism was the only dynamic anti-Communist movement which was able to carry on extensive propaganda in the East Ukraine under German occupation. It possessed a body of devoted followers to serve as its organizers; it was capable of arousing enthusiasm and exacting sacrifices. Lack of experience and judgement cost its adherents dearly. The movement proved, however, to be flexible enough to adapt its program to the demands for social measures which the Soviet experience had instilled in the East Ukrainian population. It attracted a large proportion of the intellectuals and technicians who comprised the only group capable of reorganizing life after the Soviet evacuation, but it was unable to penetrate the mass of the population to any great extent. The galvanizing force was present; the cadres which might have transmitted it were half-formed; but the essential mass remained uncommitted" (pp. 287-288).

The writer of this review can take serious issues with Mr. Armstrong at many points. However, perhaps the most interesting result of the author's extensive research is his negative conclusion in regard to "commitment of essential masses." We cannot accept the author's conclusion and we think that all his book but proves to the contrary. Knowing the scholarly objectivity of the author we hope that sometimes the author himself will come to the only logical synthese of his re-

search work and will be able to revise an ostensibly previously arrived at verdict.

That such a book about Ukrainian Nationalism could be written and published today augurs well for Ukrainian Nationalists, however. That it contains errors is not at all surprising. There are some factual errors in the book, but surprisingly not many. For instance: Paul Skoropadsky was not a descendant of Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky, but of his brother (p. 11). Stephen Bandera was not a "peasant-born chief of the terrorist group" (p. 55), but a leader of an Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (krai-leader), soon of a Greek-Catholic priest. His two brothers perished in the Nazi concentration camp of Auschwitz. Lopatynsky (nom de guerre of Volodymyr Tymchyi) was killed in 1941 while returning from Cracow to Ukraine under the Soviet occupation and could not participate in the Act of June 30, 1941 (p. 86). Mykola Lebed was never a chief of the "Sluzba Bespeky (SB) and had not "forged it years previously" (p. 157) as he was a Polish prisoner since his extradition by Nazi Germany in 1934. Vasyl Turkovsky and Mykola Arsenych (killed in Ukraine, in 1947) were "SB" chiefs. There were considerable OUN-B and OUN-M activities in Kiev after the arrests of 1941-42. Olena Teliha edited "Litavry" and not "Litvary." Ternopol was never "the second largest petroleum production center under German control" (p. 152) and there were no petroleum quells around this city. Such a center was Drohobych. Koch's officials killed in Rovno in broad daylight fell victims of an attempt made by Nikolai Ivanovich Kuznietsov — one of the leading members of Medvedev's terrorist-diversionist partisan group (cf. Medvedev, *Sil'nye Dukhom*, (p. 293 ff). Kuznetsov left brief-case with the personal identification card of a Ukrainian Nationalist on the spot of the attempt (cf. Medvedev, op. cit. p. 293) with the intention to provoke German reprisals against the Ukrainian Nationalists. He succeeded; the Nazis shot in reprisal 500 Ukrainian political prisoners in Rovno (cf. "Volyn," No. 83 from Oct. 24, 1943). Another prominent member of Medvedev's group — A. A. Lukin, was not simple "Soviet partisan", (p. 145) but a Lieutenant-Colonel on the Soviet General Staff and representative of All-Partisan Staff in Moscow in negotiations with Otaman Bulba-Borovets (Cf. Medvedev, op cit, p. 82 ff). Kuznetsov fell later into the hands of the UPA (Lebed, UPA, p. 70, Medvedev, op. cit. p. 489). Apparently, the author did not read either Medvedev's "Silnye Dukhom," or Vershigora's "Liudi z Chistoiu Sovistiu." (Cf. Bibliography, p. 307 and 309) which however, are important sources for his theme. The author overlooks the Soviet sources as well as the Ukrainian underground sources. Many sources of possible information remained unexplored by the author. For instance: To present the activities of the Ukrainian Nationalist underground groups in Ukraine, it was imperatively necessary, we think, to compare and collate the underground directives, instructions, reports, ideological and programmatical expositions and apologetics as well as the Ukrainian underground publications (periodical and unperiodical) from that period. It was also necessary to interview more East-Ukrainians, especially those who had participated in the Ukrainian nationalist underground. It is only one person of this sort among the author's informants.

There are also good reasons for questioning the author's interpretation of some important points. It may perhaps be sound to emphasize that major events, such as the rise and growth of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) are treated briefly, or are mentioned only as background for the controversies among various nationalist groups which had raged so fiercely around its beginnings. However, the author's lengthy attempt to solve "puzzles" (p. 155) in connection with those

controversies is not to my mind satisfactorily resolved. Attempting to solve puzzles, the author missed to show a detailed and vivid picture of the UPA's struggle against both the German invaders and Red partisans. Moreover, the author is disappointingly vague on the specifics of this underground army which dared to challenge both powers struggling for Ukraine.

Despite all these shortcomings, the book of Mr. Armstrong is a brilliant book. It is readable despite the fact that it is packed with detail. It is courageous and informative, though in some ways controversial. An important book that will have to be reckoned with by all serious students of Eastern European affairs and, especially, by the students of Ukraine — both Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian.

Philadelphia

LEV SHANKOVSKY

“GUIDE TO UKRAINIAN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS, PROFESSIONALS AND BUSINESS”, Ed. by Dr. W. Weresh, New York, N. Y. 1955, Carpathian Star Publishing Co., 336 pp. \$3.00.

This book, recently off the press, is the first attempt of a kind of “Who’s Who” on Ukrainians in the United States. Calling it a “Who’s Who” may be a misnomer at the outset, the publishers not intending it to be any sort of “Blue Book” nor “Almanac de Gotha” there being no such thing as an Ukrainian aristocracy.

For what it purports to be, i.e. a guide compressed into a pocket-size volume containing general information on Ukraine and Ukrainians, the publication seems to fill a real need. Information of Ukraine and Ukrainians both behind the Iron Curtain and in the free world is quite exhaustive and written by competent authors. Particularly gratifying are the listings of Ukrainian organizations and institutions in the U.S., such as: religious, educational, scientific, cultural, artistic and political.

Americans who wish to get acquainted with the background and interests of their neighbors of Ukrainian descent will find many worthwhile features in this volume: in addition to information mentioned above, it contains a complete catalog of Ukrainian newspapers, periodicals and publications in the U.S. written by a profound scholar of Ukrainian journalism and bibliography, Professor Volodymyr Doroshenko.

The personalities section, while not by far complete, seems to offer hope of improvement in subsequent editions. There is also room for improvement in the area of technical execution of the book (errata, etc.).

Taken from the standpoint of practical value to actual and potential researchers of Ukrainian matters, and its value to libraries, analysts and advertisers, the publishers have made a good attempt to fill a bibliographical gap and are to be commended for venturing into this new field.

Young Americans of Ukrainian descent will find a lot of information assembled in this book for which they would otherwise have to go through entire libraries, and much of it is of such nature which will make them proud of their Ukrainian heritage and contribution to the cultural life of the United States.

N. CH.

I SURVIVED, told by Godfrey Lias. The John Day Company, New York, 1954, pp. 255.

This reviewer has read countless works describing the experiences of different types of people in the slave world of Russian Communism, but this particular

work, produced by Godfrey Lias and the victim known as Pepi, is really unsurpassed for its almost unbelievable account of events, vividness of description, internal consistency and general reliability. In many ways it is a fascinating and interest-sustaining narration of the concrete experiences of Pepi, an Austrian captured at Stalingrad on January 30, 1943 and freed ten years later. The message that the victim addresses to the free world is a familiar one, pity for the millions of sufferers in the USSR.

It is very doubtful that Pepi could have endured his amazing experience without a knowledge of both the Russian and Ukrainian languages which he acquired in Austria. Many passages in the work indicate that he rapidly acquired an understanding of the political complexities of the USSR which also contributed to his personal salvation in many rather tight and delicate situations. His account of the German defeat on the Eastern Front is a sound and accurate one, adding further confirmation to what has generally been known in responsible circles for some time. One reads, "... the roots of the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the Russian front lay very much deeper than the snow of Stalingrad... I had seen with dismay the treatment meted out to the local inhabitants of the territory occupied by the Wehrmacht in the course of its advance across the Ukraine. Almost everywhere, when the German troops arrived, the inhabitants had welcomed them as liberators... I had talked to hundreds of prisoners, and watched the eagerness with which they begged to be allowed to join a Liberation Army to fight their oppressors... And then both of us had noticed the change after the Ukraine was made a German colony with Rosenberg as a kind of viceroy instead of being declared independent, as all the German agents had been instructed to promise it would be right up to the time of the capture of Kiev." (p. 24).

The reader gains many valuable insights into Russian Communist institutions as he follows Pepi from Stalingrad to the prison camp at Yelabuga, then in escape to Kuibishev and into the Red Army. The predominance of bribes and commercial dealings at the bazaars, not to mention general material conditions of existence on the collectives and in cities, cannot but leave a deep impression upon the average reader. Pepi's experiences were shared in great part by two associates, Franz and Toni, the latter being with him almost to the very end of his imprisonment in the USSR. Freedom seemed to be at hand when the Red Army entered Germany and the opportunity was seized by Pepi to "desert" into the free area. By strange fate, his return to prison labor in the USSR did not result from desertion but arbitrary seizure in the town of Burg where Ditty, his female companion of happier days, lived. The rest of the story recounts events that are in part tragic, dramatic and instructive. At times it appears more like fiction, but the reader is nowhere allowed to escape from the reality of it all. This work furnishes concrete and live expression to the sordid existence of millions of slaves that most of us come to understand only in general terms.

Georgetown University

LEV. E. DOBRIANSKY

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"CAN WE EVER HAVE PEACE WITH THE RUSSIANS?", by Herbert Hoover. This Week Magazine, New York, February 6, 1955.

In answer to a question posed on the chances of ever attaining to peaceful relations with the Russians, Mr. Hoover cautiously points out that in reality it is never impossible to witness his eventuation, and sets forth certain general facts and specific tests that leave the reader with the clear impression of its improbability. The general facts make up Moscow's long record of aggression, punctuated by 34 years of broken treaties, the enslavement of 15 once-free countries in the last 15 years, its fixed and taught aims at world conquest, and its official denial of God and natural law. As a matter of fact, if our celebrated statesman were more informed and appreciatively understanding of the first wave of Russian Communist imperialism, which reduced the formerly independent non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union to colonies, he certainly would have extended this record of aggression to 37 years, with many more broken treaties and enslaved nations. Senator George recently observed in an address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors that "We, of course, know that Russia is still actuated with the old Russian imperialism, plus the Communistic ideologies of the 1917 Revolution" (The N. Y. Times, April 25, 1955). It is this imperialism that ignites the spread of Communism as early as 1920.

The four tests of an initial display of Moscow's faith and sincerity regarding peace are listed by the ex-President as follows: signing of the Austrian treaty, mutual contribution to the unification of a truly free Germany, free elections in the satellite countries, and cessation of conspiratorial activity in the free world. His concluding sentence — "With such 'peaceful co-operation' they would help extend good will on earth — at least for awhile" — obviously suggests that the satisfaction of these four tests would not in itself insure peace. In connection with this, one of the lurking illusions on durable peace is the notion that a retreat by Moscow to its 1938 boundaries would be a conclusive act in behalf of world peace. Unless it were confronted by some grave crisis, Moscow could scarcely entertain this thought in the light of economic developments in Eastern Europe. It is thus unlikely that it would consider the third test on free elections in the sense that Mr. Hoover advances it. Moreover, one should bear in mind that so long as the empire of nations known as the U.S.S.R. is in existence, the threat to world peace will always remain.

"WHO 'COLLABORATED' WITH RUSSIA?", by Paul Willen. The Antioch Review, Yellow Springs, Ohio, Fall 1954.

In many ways this article is most engaging to the reader and doubtlessly quite embarrassing to the personalities and objects dealt with. The writer, a graduate of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, digs up for his material the war-

time statements and works of public leaders, writers, commentators and others on our Soviet ally and raises the question that forms the title of his presentation. He attempts to demonstrate that except for organs and representatives of the extreme right and left, the mass of public opinion makers in this country stimulated pro-Soviet thought and sentiment which he basically explains away in terms of the war fever and psychosis that was perhaps necessarily developed to maintain the unity of the allied powers. He concludes with a reference to George Kennan on the note that political realism should supplant slogans and emotion expressions in the fighting of a war, though qualifying this with some allowance for what may be an unavoidable accompaniment of war.

The nation-wide polls that he refers to, allegedly showing that by 1944 almost a third of the American people came to hold a favorable view of the Soviet system, are subject to serious question, as our experience with many polls well justifies. One can take a dim view also with regard to his assertion that only seven per cent of the American people foresaw, as he puts it, an aggressive "Russia," in the postwar period. His implication that an impressive part of the American population accounted in thought and sentiment for much of the pro-Soviet atmosphere then remains to be proven, especially when the tight information and propaganda controls of that period are recalled. However, even if one were to grant this, the responsibility for the fanfare of naivete and self-degrading behavior at the time can be placed on those manning the controls. Also, insufficient account is taken of the heavy communist infiltration that took place in areas of public information during the period, which in turn establishes grounds for a justified indictment against those in public positions governing these areas.

Passion and emotional thinking are inevitable psychological conditions in any war but, a point which the writer fails to stress, this doesn't mean that we necessarily must plunge into all sorts of excesses and crude distortions of thought which conspicuously characterized our propaganda in the last war. Not only was the communist influence at work in many quarters of government but also the element of ignorance regarding the Soviet Union played a major role, not even affording the opportunity for reason to be overwhelmed by blind passion. Indeed, some evidences in the present are sufficient to substantiate the latter point which goes far in explaining the erratic statements of the many Americans quoted in the article.

Walter Winchell, for example, is quoted to have said in 1944 that the "fear of Russia" is a "bogy." Statements by Herbert Hoover, James Reston, General MacArthur, James Farley, Harrison Salisbury, Sumner Welles, General Eisenhower and others are reproduced and to a greater or lesser degree reflect a naivete in the matter. Magazines such as *Collier's*, *The Saturday Evening Post*, *Life*, *Reader's Digest*, *The Rotarian*, the *National Geographic Magazine* also manifested their varying degrees of ignorance on the issue. Writing in the *Geographic Magazine*, Eddy Gilmore, whose knowledge of the Soviet Union is found wanting even today, contributed this drivel on the supposed common characteristics of the American and Russian people: "I don't mean the way we comb our hair or wear our clothes, but the way we work and play and fight. Our impulses. Our emotions. Our loves and hates. Our violences and our greatnesses."

On viewing the Soviet Union in its proper and true light, the author completely overlooks the organizations of millions of Americans of East European background which even during the war carried on an educational campaign on the

imperialist, aggressive and criminal character of our ally in arms. With these purposes at that precarious time our publication was established — to fight pro-Soviet hysteria and ignorance on the Soviet Union. Moreover, as concerns George Kennan, the writer is almost completely off base in his comments. The slogans he treats here were born of ignorance, communist influence and war fever. The “slogans” that Kennan’s supposed political realism disaccommodates are moral and political ideas whose values are anchored in long human experience and history.

“THE KOREAN DILEMMA: BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN,” by Syngman Rhee. *Korean Survey*, Washington, D. C., December 1954.

The courageous president of the Republic of Korea furnishes a clear, lucid analysis of world problems, especially those of Asia, that millions of Americans could easily agree with. His visit to this country apparently was both pleasant and instructive for, as he admits, “I feel my personal ties with America are stronger than ever. I am not so sure my ideas are equally well understood.” The familiar theme is one of strong, uncompromising leadership on the part of the United States in the mortal struggle against Communism. His thought is well taken when he soundly observes that “As a result of compromising for a brief and precarious peace, the United States may not even have a chance to fight for freedom and democracy.” His apprehensions over a resurging Japan are well founded in argument and Korea’s past experience. “The United States must be warned that in a choice between Japanese hegemony or the threat of Communism, the peoples of Asia see little difference.”

It is unfortunate that Mr. Rhee evinces little comprehension of the colonial empire in the form of the Soviet Union itself. His remarks on colonialism would by far be more effective. It is true, as he says, the old colonialism in Asia has lost its hold and that the Soviet Union threatens to build another. But he is very much in error when he implies that the Soviet Union enters upon the scene as a subject similar to the previous imperialist powers of Europe. The erroneous statement “But one aggressive nation — the Soviet Union — is stronger and more dangerous than ever” conveys this. Plainly, the Soviet Union is no more a nation than the British Empire was. The eminent Korean patriot is perfectly correct in insisting that we understand the issues and problems of the Asiatic nations in order to defeat Communism, but to achieve this objective it is equally necessary to understand the colonial empire of the Soviet Union, which he erringly identifies as “Russia,” and the captive non-Russian nations within it, whose fundamental problems are in a way not dissimilar to those of the Republic of Korea.

“EASTERN EUROPEAN FEDERATION, A STUDY IN THE CONFLICTING NATIONAL AIMS AND PLANS OF THE EXILE GROUPS,” By Elizabeth K. Valkienier, *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Colorado, January 1955.

An attempt is made here to present a cogent review of the plans formulated by exiles for the future organization of their respective countries. The region that apparently is of exclusive interest to the author is what by standard classification is known largely as Central Europe, embracing Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary and parts of Yugoslavia. Thus it is not so much the subject of East European federation that the writer is treating here, despite the misleading title of her article, but of Central European federation in the main.

Considered among other things is the plan of Intermarium, largely a Polish conception to preserve the western borders of present-day Poland and to recover Western Ukraine and western White Ruthenia. This version is favored by both Polish and Czecho-Slovak imperialists. Another plan advances a Danubian Federation sought by Hungarian partisans. The author is correct in informing the reader of the difficulties confronting the realization of such plans from the side of the Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Croats, Rumanians, White Ruthenians and Ukrainians.

Mention is also made of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations seeking the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the liberation of all nations, including the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union. Why the writer repeats the slander originated by American Communists and their fellow travelers that the ABN is a "gathering of the remnants of the national committees that had operated under Alfred Rosenberg" is a puzzle. Had she investigated this matter some, her honest intellectual bearings would have brought her to an entirely different conclusion.

"MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY GEN. DAVID SARNOFF FOR CONDUCTING WORLDWIDE POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST COMMUNISM," as introduced by Mr. Johnson of Texas. The Congressional Record, Washington, D. C., May 11, 1955.

The value of General Sarnoff's excellently written memorandum is to be found not so much in its well organized and meaningful content as in its timing, when again the free world is being misled by Moscow's propoganda on "peaceful co-existence" and various diplomatic overtures designed to demonstrate its peaceful intentions. For a great deal of the content has been worked over by certain political analysts, congressional committees and anti-Communist groups in this country. If one reads James Burnham's "Containment or Liberation," he will come across almost all the ideas incorporated in this memorandum which was submitted to the President for study. The "Summary Report" of the House Committee on Communist Aggression contains them as well. The Liberation Conference held in Washington over a year ago proposed all the basics found in this memo. Despite these facts, however, if the memo accomplishes its purpose, namely to coordinate all our propoganda activities under centralized direction for a full-fledged and worldwide political offensive against Communism, then the crowning achievements to years of thought and effort on the part of numerous individuals and groups espousing the policy of liberation, will resound to the shining credit of General Sarnoff.

The author of the much publicized memorandum repeats many of the perceived truths that one can find in the works of those mentioned above. His very first sentence — "Our best and surest way to prevent a hot war is to win the cold war" — has been put in other words frequently. His points on comparative Soviet expenditures on propoganda, on infiltration and subversion, treacherous diplomacy, on the vulnerability of the enemy, and on various means and ways by which we can bring political warfare to the terrain of the enemy's empire have been dwelled upon extensively and in compact systematic form in much of the literature on the subject. Illuminating, however, are his observations on the use of radio receivers and phonographs in pushing this warfare across the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

Unfortunately, the General is evidently short on his knowledge and understanding of the Soviet Union which he repeatedly identifies with "Russia." In one place he states, "Not a single country today under Communist rule was conquered

by outright military assault. Russia itself fell to the Bolsheviks through a political coup, after other parties had overthrown the old regime." This, of course, is inaccurate. If the General were familiar with East European history in the period following the first world war, he doubtlessly would not have made this statement. Trotsky's Red hordes did militarily conquer the independent non-Russian countries of Ukraine, Georgia and others. In another place, we read, "that Hitler's psychological blunders, in insulting and alienating the Russian peoples, helped save the Stalin regime from destruction by its own subjects." An observation of this sort, at this late stage of our established information on what transpired in Ukraine and in the Caucasus during the last war, which the General could easily have obtained from the Pentagon or read in many German testimonies, does not reflect well on his empirical understanding of the most important areas of the world situation. There is no such thing as "Russian peoples" in the first instance. Secondly, the general fact is that the millions who sought the independence of their respective homelands were Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians etc. who would be likewise insulted by the General's reference to them as "Russian peoples."

Finally, there are evident shortcomings in his philosophico-historical understanding of the Communist issues. He states, "We must realize that world communism is not a tool in the hands of Russia — Russia is a tool in the hands of world communism . . . This provides opportunities for appeals to Russian patriotism." This naive statement clearly indicates that the writer is unacquainted with the best scholarly works on the subject and would be hard put to explain the ready acceptance of Communism by the majority of the Russian people in 1917, which their previous sociologic conditions well accommodated, or the Russification programs of so-called world Communism, or the idolatry of the Russian nation over all others by the Communist leaders, and a host of other manifestations of Russian racism and imperialism. This commentator has no doubt that a careful reading of the facts on these matters by General Sarnoff would lead him to dispense with this notion of appealing to Russian patriotism that has fitted in so well with the imperialist advances of Communism. Also, he would find himself devoid of facts in any challenge to demonstrate genocide being perpetrated upon the Russian people or any mass opposition by the people to the regime. This is not to say that we shouldn't appeal to them, but the grounds of appeal must be by far more realistic than what the General suggests.

L. E. D.

REMARKS: In the Book Reviews section of our Journal, Vol. XI. No. 1. in the review of Prof. Hans Kohn on the book "*The Mind of Modern Russia*" the author's name was misspelled. We apologize for this error. — (Ed.)

Publications Received

- A Complete Ukrainian-English Dictionary*, by C. H. Andrusyshen and J. N. Krett, assisted Helen Virginia Andrusyshen. University of Saskatchewan, 1955. Pag. 1163.
- The Cathedral of St. Sophia in Kiev*, by Olexa Powstenko. New York, 1954. Pag. 466, 336 illustrations.
- Istoria Ukrainskoi Litwratyry*. Instytut Literatry im. T. Shevchenka. Acad. of Sciences. Vol. I. Kiev, 1954.
- The Origin of Russia*, by Henryk Paszkewich. Philosophical Library. New York, 1954.
- Unia Brzeska w Swietle Wspolczesnych Swiadectw Greckich*, by Oscar Halecki. Rome, 1954.
- Aeronautical Sciences and Aviation in USSR*. Bibliography by Bertha Kucherov. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 1954/55.
- Documentation Juridique Etrangere*. Vol. VI, No. 12, Vol VII, No. I. Bruxelles.
- East-West Tension in the Light of Psychology*, Proceedings of the Scientific Conference. Ed. by V. Yaniv and L. Zeise. Munich, 1954.
- Istoria Ukrainy*, by Dmytro Doroshenko. Vol. II. Bulava Publishing. New York, 1954.
- Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas, Isar-Verlag*. Vol. II, No. 3. Vol. III, No. I. Munich, 1954/55.
- Ucrania Libre*. Vol. V, No. 7. Buenos Aires, 1955.
- Lesya Ukrainka and Don Juan*, by C. A. Manning. New York, 1955.
- Brief Outline of Ukrainian History*, by Joseph Bilovus. Detroit, 1955.
- American Historical Review*. Vol. CX, No. 3. April, 1955. Washington, D.C.
- The Catholic Historical Review*. April, 1955, Washington, D. C.
- Thought*. Fordham University Quarterly. Spring, 1955. New York.
- Political Science Quarterly*. Vol. LXX, No. I. March, 1955. New York.
- Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Sciences*. March, May, 1955. Philadelphia.
- Italian Affairs*. Vol. IV, No. I. Roma, 1955.
- Ucraina. Trimestrale, di Cultura e di Attualita*. Vol. II, No. I. Roma, 1955.
- The Ukrainian Review*. No. 2. London, 1955.
- Geistliche Welt*. Vierteljahresschrift fuer Kultur und Geisteswissenschaften. Munich, 1954.
- Euntes Docete*. Vol. VIII, No. I. Roma, 1955.
- Obnovan*. Vol. I, No. I. Winnipeg, 1955.
- V. Oboroni Viry*. I. Toronto, 1955. St. Volodymyr Brotherhood.
- Bulletin of the Institute for Study of the USSR*. Munich. Vol. II, No. 2, 3. 1955
- Kultura*. 1955/3, 4. Paris, 1955.
- Viestnik Instituta*. 1954/56. Munich.
- Redeemer's Voice*. April, 1955. Yorkton, Canada.
- Kyiv*. 1955. No. 2. Philadelphia.
- Vyzvolny Shakh*. 1955. No. 2, 3. London.
- Vistnyk*. 1955, No. 4. New York.
- Salesianum. Rivista Trimestrale*. Vol. VIII, No. I. Torino, 1955.
- Ukrainoznavastvo v Shkoli*, by C. Kysilevsky. New York, 1955.
- V. Nedilu Rano Zilya Kopala*, by O. Kobylanska. Buenos Aires, 1954.
- V. Posbukakh Pravdy*, by Oleksa Andrienko. Buenos Aires, 1954.

UKRAINIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA

(in Ukrainian)

In three volumes, 1230 pages with many illustrations, diagrams, geographical maps and colored pictures.

The price of three volumes:

Half-linen covers	\$45.00
Linen covers	\$48.60
Plastic covers	\$49.50
Half-leather covers	\$51.00
Leather covers	\$63.00

Mail your orders and checks to:

"MOLODE ZYTTYA"

12001 Lumpkin Avenue

Detroit 12, Mich.

U K R A I N E

In Vergangenheit Und Gegenwart

A quarterly publication in the German language on Ukrainian affairs and German-Ukrainian relations.

A cultural, economic and political journal.

Published Quarterly.—Price \$2.00 per year.

"UKRAINA"

Rumfordstrasse, 19
MUNICH, GERMANY

UCRAINIA LIBRE

(FREE UKRAINE)

A quarterly publication in the Spanish language on Ukrainian affairs and Ukrainian relations with the peoples of the Spanish speaking world.

A cultural, economic and political journal.

UCRANIA LIBRE

DEFENDS the right of the Ukrainian people and other enslaved peoples in the Soviet Union to independent Governments;

PRESENTS information on contemporary events in Ukraine and the Eastern European countries, as well as on Ukrainian culture, religion and economic affairs in the past and present;

HELPS better mutual relations between democratic World and democratic Ukraine.

Published Quarterly. Price \$2.00 Per Year.

Publishers Address:

UCRANIA LIBRE
Soler 5039
Buenos Aires, Argentina