

Current Concerns

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Responsibility to protect: Introduction and implementation, distrust and misuse

The R2P attempt failed miserably in Libya

by Dr h.c. Hans-Christof von Sponeck*



Hans-Christof
von Sponeck

In a few months, the UN will be 67 years old. Initially, in 1945, there were 51 states that joined as a state community. Currently the UN includes 193 states. Southern Sudan is the youngest member. Quickly the new state has been accept-

ed. Those in power at the moment wanted it that way. Palestine must go on waiting. Membership means acceptance of the UN Charter, which links binding covenants, conventions and other international agreements to a network.¹

UN Charter legislation has been created with the aim of “maintaining global security,” “taking effective collective meas-

* Hans-Christof von Sponeck, former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq and lecturer Zentrum für Konfliktforschung, University Marburg.

“The attempted use of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the case of Libya failed and illustrates why the international R2P distrust has remained so strong.”

ures” and “settling international disputes by peaceful means”.² In many places the UN Charter refers to the “sovereign equality” of all member states. For the purposes of this sovereignty, the UN Charter is undoubtedly the Magna Carta of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).

The political debate in the UN Security Council continues in the direction that national sovereignty sets the limits to international interventions in events abroad. Many states, especially those with complex ethnic structures and large disparities between rich and poor cautiously insist on that approach. As you know, after the years of independence euphoria in the past century, conflicts between the states have more and more given way to internal conflicts in independent states.³ Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it is argued, refers to “international” law only⁴ and only has to do with “international” security. This means that national conflicts remain inter-

nal affairs. The more intra-national conflicts have emerged while inter-state confrontations have decreased, the louder the call for new approaches to the international Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has become.

Beginning of a new world order

Formally, the Cold War came to an end on 20 November 1990, when the Charter of Paris for a New Europe was signed. At the same time the *Warsaw Pact* was dissolved. The risk of a dangerous confrontation between two ideological blocs seemed banished. For the West, particularly the NATO states, that was an opportunity to reorganize their international relations. NATO as an instrument from Cold War times, had to look for a new right to exist.⁵ It was an opportunity of historic significance for the promotion of multilateralism and a culture of peace.

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“Responsibility to Protect” – a theory without history?

ab/km. Tom Koenigs, who is now MP for Alliance ‘90s/The Greens in the German Bundestag and Chairman of the *Committee on Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs*, has been *Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations in Afghanistan* and head of the local *UN Assistance Mission (UNAMA)* in the years 2006 and 2007. He laid down his experiences and reflections from these two years in letters to his family and friends (“Machen wir Frieden oder haben wir Krieg? Auf UN Mission in Afghanistan”, Wagenbach Verlag, 2011).

Genesis of the concept “Responsibility to Protect”

In this book there is a chapter of 13 August 2006, in which he reveals the histo-

ry of the concept “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P or RtP). On this 13 August the former Foreign and also Prime Minister of Australia *Gareth Evans* visited him in Kabul. Evans was substantially involved in the drafting of the “Responsibility to Protect” concept for the 60-year anniversary of the UN summit in 2005. This visit presented the opportunity for Tom Koenigs to make the conceptual and ideological origins of this concept understood.

“How we, the Greens of today, developed into advocates of humanitarian intervention”

Koenigs refers to the book by *Paul Berman* “Power and the Idealists: Or, the Passion of Joschka Fischer, and its Aftermath” (Norton 2006, paperback edition with a foreword by *Richard Holbrooke*).

Berman was the first to describe, “how we, the ‘68 generation, today’s *Greens*, the Frankfurt ‘Spontis’ and I developed from the extreme left into advocates of humanitarian interventions. We thought things through, discussed them and finally made up our minds to support humanitarian interventions. Berman illustrated that by taking the biographies of *Joschka [Fischer]*, *Dany [Cohn-Bendit]* and *Bernard Kouchner* and connected their lives’ journey with the ideas of *André Glucksmann* and *Régis Debray*, who obviously had more influence on us than we thought.” (p. 121) “I remember best the elaborate debates, which I had with Dany at the breakfast table when we were on vacation in Le Gurd in Southern France; he

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had already read all the newspapers and had arrived at the *Gazetta dello Sport*, before we crept out of our tents, myself a bit before the others; then the discussions on the issues of the time, particularly on the development on the Balkans; the pressure of the French philosophers and the entire intellectual public towards an intervention, which was also to include the Kosovo, in order to prevent a second Sarajevo and especially a second Srebrenica." (p. 122)

At that time, Koenigs could not imagine ever interfering with the great world, nor could he imagine that discussions about it would make a difference. "Kohl for ages in the government, the FDP with the monopoly on foreign policy, the *Green Party* in opposition, the majority of the *Greens* being pacifists and supporting non-intervention, particularly non-interference by the Germans. Dany in favor of interference at all levels, perhaps even intervention." (p. 122)

A motion of Cohn-Bendit at the *Greens'* federal assembly in 1997 met with no response. A year later, however, the *Greens* were in office and the debate about intervention or not was up to date. It was now "on the immediate agenda of the Green Party meeting. The debate was held there in place of the whole German society's debate. Meanwhile, a reasonably reliable opinion of the real politicians had developed which was strongly influenced by Joschka and Dany and which was particularly intended to support the foreign minister. Joschka was on probation, new on the diplomatic floor, just like the new government before the international community." (p. 123)

Policy in contradiction to the German constitution

However, what was Joschka Fischer's task (or "passion") to be at this point of development? The German Constitution still says that never again shall war emanate from German soil. As the new minister for foreign affairs, he had sworn to the Constitution. If Tom Koenigs in this context refers only to *Madeleine Albright* who said to Joschka that "it's hard to be green", this is not just a weak explanation: it is a terrific amnesia, the great power politics is reduced to little sensibilities. Even the red-coulour egg thrown at Joschka Fischer became meaningful and promoted the political debate. "We were arguing about the right of the international community to intervention. How much easier it would have been for us if we had already then talked about the obligation to protect human rights. The discussion had not yet advanced enough, though – in our

country, among the *Greens*, with me. At that time, shortly after the end of the Kohl era, the United Nations were still a distant variable of little relevance. It was the red-green government and Joschka who put multilateralism in the center [...]" (p. 124) "We ought to have discussed the issue of human rights, which all nations are primarily obliged to protect. But not only each individual nation, but the international community for any individual citizen, and every single citizen is obliged to

"It required Fischer's, Fücks' and Cohn-Bendit's reference to human rights, the audacious comparison with Auschwitz and the lie of the so-called 'Operation Horseshoe' to turn the formerly pacifist Green Party into a war party."

work alongside others to protect them – first with the help of his nation, then with the international community, and finally against those individual nations, which systematically violate them. This is the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect'." (p. 124)

Amnesia about the reality of the war on the Balkans

With this we have arrived at Berman who has already made fundamental deductions without resorting to the constitution and international law. The entire ill-fated evolution of the war on the Balkans has been forgotten. It has also been forgotten that American generals – secretly and without a declaration of war – have militarily intervened in the war in Yugoslavia on the part of the Croats and Muslim Bosnians since 1994, officially via NATO and especially semi-officially via the *Military Professional Resources Inc.*, in short MPRI, founded in 1987 by retired high US military officers. In his book "Wie der Dschihad nach Europa kam. Gotteskrieger und Geheimdienste auf dem Balkan" (How the Jihad came to Europe. God's warriors and intelligence in the Balkans – NP Buchverlag, first edition 2005) *Jürgen Elsässer* writes that MPRI had "340 former US generals on its index" and that there was "a constant exchange of personnel" between the Pentagon and MPRI. The army dispensed its directors from work "without pay to work for MPRI".

At that time, *Carl Vuono* was head of MPRI. Before that he had been Chief of Staff of the US Army during the invasion of Panama in 1989 and the first war against Iraq in 1991. In his chapter on MPRI's raid on the Balkans, *Elsässer* writes, "One of the first high-profile appearances of MPRI was to support the Croatian army in a major offensive against the Serbs in the Krajina region in early August 1995, which entered the history books as 'Operation Storm'. [...] There had been an

initial request from the Croatian Defense Minister *Gojko Susak* as early as in March 1994. In September 1994 [almost one year prior to the Srebrenica events] MPRI experts concluded a consulting contract with Zagreb to train the army. Another deal was then made in Sarajevo at a meeting of Muslim General *Mehmed Alagic* with DIA chief *Dyke Hayden* and US envoy *Richard Holbrooke*. [...] These de jure private deals were followed by a formal agreement on military cooperation between the Penta-

gon and the Croatian Army in November 1994". (p. 102) Referring to other sources *Elsässer* writes that the result of this "cooperation" were 410 civilians massacred and 200,000 Serbs displaced in the "Operation Storm" – so far the largest displacement of an ethnic group since the Second World War.

Balkan Wars – part of US strategy since the end of the Cold War

Wasn't the US military intervention in the Balkan War anything but the continuation of US policy toward Yugoslavia since 1990? As early as 5 November 1990, the US Congress had passed a law especially meant for Yugoslavia, called the *Foreign Operations Appropriations Law 101-513*. In his book "In unseren Himmeln kreuzt der fremde Gott. Verheimlichte Fakten der Kriege in Ex-Jugoslawien (Kroatien, Bosnien und Kosovo)" (The foreign God cruises in our skies. Concealed facts about the wars in former Yugoslavia [Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo]), *Ahriman-Verlag*, 2001) *Alexander Dorin* quotes *Sara Flounders* about this law, "A section of Law 101-513 suddenly and without previous warning cut off all aid, trade, credits and loans from the US to Yugoslavia within six months. It also ordered separate elections in each of the six republics that make up Yugoslavia, requiring State Department approval of election procedures and results before aid to the separate republics would be resumed. [...] The impact was, as expected, devastating. This law threw the Yugoslav federal government into crisis."¹

Flounders continues, "At the time there was no civil war. No republic had seceded. The US was not engaged in a public dispute with Yugoslavia. The region was not even in the news." And she asks, "What was behind the sweeping legislation directed at Yugoslavia, especially when US

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policy makers themselves predicted that the sudden unraveling of the region would lead to civil war?" Her answer is, "With the collapse of the Soviet Union, US big business was embarking on an aggressive march to reshape all of Europe. Non-aligned Yugoslavia was no longer needed as a buffer state between NATO and the Warsaw Pact."²

German participation in war only with a Red-Green government

Have we forgotten that the Left had to take office in Germany in order to break the Constitution?

On 7 April 2010 *Uwe-Jürgen Ness*, a former member of the *Greens*, wrote in an article for his own website (<http://uweness.eu/gruener-pazifismus.html>): "Only under a Red-Green government the taboo could be broken that there should be no armed combat missions of the Bundeswehr outside NATO area. Had a CDU/CSU-FDP government dared to act like that, they would have met with a storm of indignation. It required Fischer's, *Fücks'* and Cohn-Bendit's reference to human rights, the audacious comparison with Auschwitz and the lie of the so-called 'Operation Horseshoe' to turn the formerly pacifist *Green Party* into a war party."

The German predecessor governments with CDU Chancellor *Helmut Kohl* had been actively involved in the fragmentation of Yugoslavia since the early nineties; however, the giant leap towards a more active German participation in the war in 1999 was only done by the *Schröder/Fischer* government (SPD and *Alliance 90/The Greens*).

Jürgen Elsässer has accurately traced the events in the German Parliament since the change of government in autumn 1998 in his book "Kriegslügen. Der Nato-Angriff auf Jugoslawien" (War lies. The NATO-attack on Yugoslavia. Kai Homilius Verlag, fully revised version 2008, p. 35 ff). He concludes that "The red-green government did not want an alternative to war, but prepared it actively" (p. 35). This kind of participation would not have been possible with the previous government. "The MP *Willy Wimmer* (CDU), who had been Undersecretary at the Hardthöhe [Ministry of Defense] in the 1980s and who had participated in the negotiations for the German reunification with Kohl in 1990, argues that with the Palatinate [Kohl] as chancellor 'there would not have been a German participation in the war of 1999'. The former Russian Prime Minister *Yevgeny Primakov* wrote in his memoirs, Kohl had called the war against Yugoslavia 'the largest historic mistake'. 'If I had still been in office at that time, I would never

have let this happen', he told him." (p. 47f.)

Multiple infringements of law by the red-green government

As early as on 16 April 2000 at the *hearing on the NATO war against Yugoslavia*, *Ralph Hartmann*, a former GDR ambassador to Yugoslavia, summarized what the red-green government had done from a legal point of view³. "Only the Federal Republic of Germany is to blame for having coarsely violated the agreements of the *Charter of the United Nations* and other basic documents of international law, with which the main powers of the anti-Hitler coalition had given their consent to the rebirth of a reunited Germany. In the *Two-Plus-Four Treaty*, which is as significant as a peace treaty, they had solemnly declared 'that only peace will emanate from German soil' and 'the united Germany will never employ any of its weapons except in accordance with its constitution and the Charter of the United Nations'. And it is precisely the Federal Republic of Germany, which more than any other NATO country definitely violated its own constitution, although Article 26 clearly states that as a lesson from the Nazi war of aggression 'acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be made a criminal offense'" (p. 15f)

PR-orders for the war

Have we forgotten the million dollar PR contracts that prepared and accompanied the Balkan Wars? *Jörg Becker* and *Mira Beham* documented them in their book "Operation Balkan: Werbung für Krieg und Tod" (Operation Balkans: promoting war and death, Nomos Verlag, 1st edition 2006). Anyone who studies the carefully compiled tables in the appendix of the book (p. 89ff) will realize the huge amounts of money and the number of activities that were used particularly by US public relations agencies to protect the opponents of Serbia in the years 1991 to 2002. One of these PR agencies, *Ruder Finn*, was particularly proud of their coups, having converted Jewish money and votes to the jihadists' column and mobilized them against Serbia. *Becker/Beham* quote *James Harff* of the PR agency *Ruder Finn*, "That was a tremendous coup. When the Jewish organizations entered the game on the side of the [Muslim] Bosnians we could promptly equate the Serbs with the Nazis in the public mind. [...] We won by targeting the Jewish audience. Almost immediately there was a clear change of language in the press, with the use of words with high emotional content such as ethnic cleansing, con-

centration camps, etc, which evoke images of Nazi Germany and the gas chambers of Auschwitz. No one could go against it without being accused of revisionism. We really batted a thousand in full."⁴

Previously the same *James Harff* had been quoted on his "triumph" to have forced the war with PR, "I must admit, when NATO attacked in 1999, we opened a bottle of champagne". (*Becker/Beham*, p. 24)

Cohn-Bendit, Fischer, Kouchner and Koenigs – hovering at high altitudes, far away from real history

And now back to *Berman*, who is said to have traced the pacifists' conversion into statesmen capable to wage war like nobody else. The entire reality – the deliberate provoking of a Balkan war – does not exist for him: Out of pure "idealism" the troops as members of various power structures landed in Kosovo after the NATO bombings and then welded into one unit. At that time *Berman's* statements hover in the same lofty heights as does the climate debate. The real historical events on the ground are regarded as yesterday's news. This is neuro-linguistic programming: "In case of systematic and grave violations of human rights in one state by the state itself, or if the state does not protect its citizens, if it systematically violates the rights of its citizens, the international community has an obligation to secure this protection in its place and probably also against it. This obligation is not absolute and is not easy. It is tied to the ability to intervene and to achieve the protection, to the consideration of the individual case, to the majority vote of the Security Council and to the explicit and case-related, decided political will of the community." (*Koenigs*, p 124)

The proud quartet on European soil – *Cohn-Bendit* – *Fischer* – *Kouchner* – *Koenigs* – have reached a remarkable milestone. The responsibility to protect has become "common language"; "since 2005, it has been written down in the documents of the UN, and via the Resolution of April 2006 on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts, it has also entered the regulations of the Security Council. *Garth Evans* and of course *Kofi Annan* have a significant share in this discussion and its outcome. The General Assembly could finally agree on a joint and evident text that is linked to the *Charter of the United Nations* and the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and that has become the organization's general policy." (p. 124f) Of course, some is still missing and needs to be reviewed according to the authors' view: the detailed definitions, the military capacity and the political will in the majority of the people. All peanuts?

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Meanwhile, the number of independent states had risen sharply. At the same time a complex political landscape has developed in many of these states. Non-governmental groups tried with both legal and illegal means to influence national processes.⁶ The international response was immediate, in which divergent motives played a role. On the one hand, there were power-political considerations in the NATO world, particularly in the United States. Neoconservative authors of the so-called “Project for a New American Century” (PNAC)⁷ observed with suspicion the national developments in the world and the influence of Russia and China in many areas. Other voices strived for a serious debate about how the international community should respond to the proliferating intra-state crises. “Failing states” and “new wars” became terms that increasingly dominated the political discourse. Nobody could expect a uniform opinion on those developments – not least because over the years distrust had grown strongly in international relations.

When is a state a “failing state”? What is new about the “new wars”? What is legitimate resistance and what is criminal terrorism? Who has the responsibility to protect (R2P)? A result of how hardened the battle lines have become in the debate is the fact that an internationally accepted definition of “terrorism”⁸ has not yet been achieved.

The events of 11 September 2001 and the American response have intensified the debate considerably. International relations not only between the U.S. and the Islamic world, but around the whole globe have been affected and intra-state conflicts have been promoted. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has become a key issue – in politics, in public and academic discourse: After the genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda

and Srebrenica, it is important to prevent the recurrence of such crimes against humanity wherever they might be.

New international protection instruments

For *Kofi Annan*, the UN Secretary General of those years, the lesson of Rwanda was a trigger for the creation of a new international security architecture. Thus, he aimed at both a contemporary definition of the concept of collective security and the associated extended interpretation of Chapter VII, Article 51 of the UN Charter.⁹ In the first years after the founding of the United Nations the focus was on the protection of the state. At the end of the 20th Century, protecting people wherever they live is to be central. In this regard, the United Nations and individual member states had already done important preliminary work. The definition of human rights had been clarified, a new international law to protect people¹⁰ was adopted and in the framework of international cooperation technical assistance programmes for improved governance had been introduced.

In the debate on sovereignty, internal conflicts and Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a major milestone has been set in 2001. On the initiative of the Canadian government, an international Commission on Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was formed which presented its report in December of that year.¹¹ There we find important and up-to-date statements that were of pivotal influence for the further debate on this issue. The Commission stated: i) State sovereignty includes government responsibility, ii) government responsibility means both an external and an internal responsibility, iii) external means responsibility to respect the sovereignty of other countries, iv) internal responsibility means that the dignity and fundamental rights of all segments of the population are respected.¹²

The report contains the basic premise that human rights are more important than national sovereignty. Since this must be so, there must not be any national boundaries in the exercise of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Thus the Commission had broken new ground conceptually and normatively. The previous precondition of national consent to international intervention in domestic areas was declared invalid. The report noted, however, that countries facing the danger of internal threats to human lives had themselves to bear the main responsibility for the restoration of human safety at first.

This report was received with great interest worldwide. The UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, Secretary General *Kofi Annan* and his successor, *Ban Ki-moon* have been intensively dealing with the development of the concept of protection of human safety since 2001. Given the complex challenges of our time, it was also found, no country in the world could deal with this task on its own.¹³ The importance of this point is reflected by the current global economic and financial crises, the social changes, not only in the Arab world, and by the dangers emanating from the weapons of mass destruction and organised crime in the 21st century.¹⁴

UN Secretary General *Kofi Annan* warned the UN Security Council in this regard, that it “is not a stage where national interests should be demonstrated. It (the UNSC) is the governing body of our evolving global security system.”¹⁵ In his message on the occasion of the 24th anniversary of the UN in October of that year, the Secretary-General called for “all states to confirm, at least in words, their responsibility to protect people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”¹⁶ His successor, *Ban Ki-moon*, continued the R2P debate. Three reports¹⁷ are

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The next wars have already been planned

Poor Somalia is likely to be the next victim, where the theory is being tested. It was not in vain – we can hear from Kenya – that *Ms Merkel* had supplied the Kenyan police with military equipment. From this base the best links to some insurgent groups in Somalia are said to exist. Is that part of the “unfinished business” of future wars?

“The principle of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ must become common language of the United Nations resolutions. It is called ‘Common Language’ in the expert jargon, a formulation that has been agreed upon before and that you can refer to again and again without much further discussion. Last year tried to anchor the human right to water in the documents of the United Nations and I hope others will continue to work on it.” (p. 126). The fact that *Koenigs* refers to the problem of water as a justification for more war mongering and colonizing military interventions before he turns again to his more

comfortable lot in Afghanistan means that the strategic quartet has a few things more in store. ●

¹ Cf Sara Flounders. The Bosnian Tragedy; <http://www.iacenter.org/bosnia/origins.htm>

² see footnote 1

³ Wolfgang Richter, Elmar Schmähling, Eckart Spoo (eds.). *German responsibility for the NATO war against Yugoslavia*. Publication of the International Preparatory Committee for a European Tribunal of the NATO war against Yugoslavia. Anthology, Schkeuditzer book publishing, 2000

⁴ Quotation see <http://www.greens.org/s-r/20/20-24.html>

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worth mentioning here that were presented to the governments and the public by the UN Secretary-General and the UN General Assembly in the years 2009 to 2011.

The debate became wider. It henceforth included not only normative considerations but also structural and operational aspects such as capacity-building for international assistance in the implementation of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), for faster operations for the prevention or suppression of genocide and other crimes against humanity, and the introduction of rapid alert systems.¹⁸ The role of regional and sub-regional organisations was also addressed.¹⁹

Kofi Annan's call for the international community to move away from the limits of state sovereignty not only testifies to the vision of the UN Secretary-General. It once more points to the fact that global political change triggers increasingly innovative responses that are in the interest of the international community and multilateralism. Examples in recent decades are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the issues of "structural adjustment with a human face"²⁰, the improvement of government administration (governance) and the requirement for sustainable development.

If the aim is to create a community of states that in fact thinks "commonly", then collective security has to be an integral part of the way of action. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is thus both an intra- and inter-governmental commitment. This is now widely recognised. However, the resolutions of the UN General Assembly of 2005²¹ are not yet binding and the extended Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has so far not been made a defined part of international law.²²

The theory is called into question

In the spring of 2012 the state of affairs is this: A new concept exists to protect humanity and the international community has accepted it. Proposals to operationalize that knowledge have not yet led to a reform of international law. The argument, Chapter VI and VII, and particularly Article 51 of the UN Charter were sufficient to implement the intra-state collective Responsibility to Protect, has not yet found worldwide acceptance. The United Nations' position is that the question is not "whether" but "when" and "how" the international community should apply the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).²³ Distrust of the introduction of collective Responsibility to Protect has remained and been reinforced after the NATO mission in Libya. The debate continues.

The gap between the inter-state rhetoric on one side and the actual use of

Military alliance NATO-Islamists

The fact that the NATO does not shun the military alliance with Islamists, is evidenced by a report in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung (FAS)* of 24 April. Thus, "members of the regional organization 'al-Kaida in the Islamic Maghreb' fight at the rebels' side." *Ayman al-Zawahiri*, still the No. 2 of the al-Qaeda in April, had called for a war against Gaddafi. (FAS, 24 February 2011). The FAS continues: "According to the regional services, extremists are supposed to have obtained heavy weapons, antitank weapons and Manpads – shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons – produced in Russia from the camps of Libyan security forces. These counterparts to American 'Stinger'," says the FAS, "may be difficult to operate in its modern version, but they are also a potential threat to civil aviation." But this is not the whole story. The following message from RIA Novosti on 1 June 2011 makes quite clear what destabilizing potential arises from the war escalated by NATO for the entire region: "From Algerian security sources Reuters learned that several convoys of trucks loaded with weapons went from Libya to Niger.

From there, the weapons were brought to northern Mali, where there are several al-Qaeda camps. It was only in early May that the authorities of this country reported an influx of anti-aircraft missiles and heavy weapons that were stolen from the military camps in Libya." (<http://de.rian.ru>, 1 June 2011) Here something is brewing up, which provides the US regional command for Africa, Africom, with arguments to finally intervene militarily in Africa.

Source: <http://www.ag-friedensforschung.de/regionen/Libyen/henken2.html>



Ayman al-Zawahiri: the new head of al Qaeda. (Reuters photo)

Irresponsible action by the UN Security Council

"Operation Unified Protector", the R2P mission by 5 of the 28 NATO countries, Qatar, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, is over. It was meant to be about protecting the Libyan population, but aimed at a regime change. The arms embargo affected the government army. The opposition militias were armed with weapons. The government mercenaries were forbidden, and members of special military forces (in civvies) from NATO and other countries were allowed and took part in some of the opposition forces. NATO aircraft fought government forces and supported the resistance. The foreign accounts of the government were frozen, funds flowed to opposition forces from abroad.

NATO sees this differently, and concludes that the United Nations mandate has been complied with in all respects. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon agrees with this assessment: "The NATO military actions have kept strictly to UN Security Council Resolution 1973."²⁶ Such misrepresentations are disturbing and give rise to serious concern.

By authorising member states "to take all necessary means" in the Libyan crisis, the UN Security Council discharged itself from the responsibility to ensure that the resolution conditions were met. Such irresponsible actions by the UN Security Council have so far not been encoun-

power politics on the other was always great. Accordingly the consequences for human safety were disastrous. The experience of the crises in recent decades in the Middle East, Central and South Asia and in Europe clearly shows that protecting the civilian population, despite assertions to the contrary, has always been secondary. The decisive aspects were the internal and external self-interest of individual UN member states. Responsibility to Protect (R2P), as proposed at the UN Earth Summit in 2005, has – Iraq and Libya are good examples – become irresponsibility in the specific case. The attempted use of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the case of Libya failed and illustrates why the international R2P distrust has remained so strong.

In early 2011 the UN Security Council decided that the government in Tripoli did not comply with its responsibility to protect internally and was also a threat to the international community.²⁴ Resolution 1973 was adopted and legitimized international military action. Specifically, the resolution demanded, among other things: i) a flight ban in Libyan air space with the exception of relief flights, ii) the prohibition of foreign troops on Libyan soil, iii) an arms embargo, iv) freezing the assets of the government. In addition, resolution 1973 authorised "all measures taken to" ensure compliance with the ban on flights at national and regional level.²⁵

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tered in the history of the United Nations. London, Paris and Washington, and NATO headquarters in Brussels speak of the "big success" of R2P mission in Libya. If this is meant to mean the removal of Gaddafi's government, there is justification for the claim to success. But that was not the stated goal of resolution 1973. The R2P test in Libya failed miserably. In addition, it should be pointed out that, like in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was only in the course of the military effort that the governments that participated in this undertaking realised what opposition groups in the "National Transitional Council of Libya" were that the Transitional Authority of the country were to be given responsibility to protect.

The failed R2P application in Libya represents a significant setback for the international protection responsibility debate. *The new concept of R2P is not to be used for a long time now. The Syria debate in the UN Security Council on 31 January has made this clear.* The Russian Foreign Minister *Serge Lavrov* said at the 48th Munich Security Conference on 4 February²⁷ that the Russian government fully supports the Arab League initiative for a solution to the conflict in Syria. He also said that "regime change cannot be a matter for the UN Security Council." A few hours later, as the consultations continued for a resolution text on the Syria conflict, the President of the UN Security Council suddenly conducted a vote – a surprise for Russia and China. They reacted to this with anger and vetoed the draft resolution.

In summary, it must be said that the existence of a standard such as the Responsibility to Protect does not imply that this automatically results in a normative application. Distrust will only change to trust if the term "Responsibility to Protect" is connected to the term "accountability". The first step of adding "Responsibility to Protect" in the UN Charter right is still to be done. This will take time. Accountability for international policy-making must be the next target. It may be that vital decisions in the UN Security Council (see Iraq and Libya) will be taken for the consequences of which no one is accountable. •

Source: *International*, 1/2012

- ¹ For example, UN Covenants on Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Women, Children, Torture, Land Mines.
- ² UN Charter, Chapter 1 (I).
- ³ Since the early 50s to mid 90s, the number of internal conflicts increased sharply – see Table "Wars 1946-2002," Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (UN/A59/565, page 17) December 2004.
- ⁴ See United Nations Charter, Chapter V, Article 24 (1).
- ⁵ The historic opportunity that the world's dominant military alliances could be replaced by multilateralism as defined in 1945 by the UN Charter and a culture of peace has been missed.
- ⁶ Examples: Asia – Burma (Karen, Kachin, Shan groups against the central government), South America – Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) against the government), Africa – Mozambique (Frelimo gainst Renamo).
- ⁷ "Project for a New American Century".
- ⁸ In October 2011 the UN General Assembly failed again to adopt a "convention against international terrorism".
- ⁹ UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51 confirms the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense," but points to the requirement that the UN Security Council must be notified immediately of measures taken, and it has the monopoly right to decide whether these measures were justified and hence legalized so that by international law.
- ¹⁰ See footnote 1.

- ¹¹ See "The R2P: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)", IDRC, Ottawa, December 2001.
- ¹² ICISS, page 8.
- ¹³ See also: i) "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the UN High Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change," A/59/565, December 2004, ii) 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, A/Res/60/1, October 2005.
- ¹⁴ See: A/59/565, December 2004.
- ¹⁵ See *Washington Post*, 11 December 2006 interview with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.
- ¹⁶ Translation by the author.
- ¹⁷ See: i) Ban Ki-moon: "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" (2009), ii) A/64/864: "Early Warning Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect" (July 17, 2010), iii) A / 65/877 & S/2011/393, "The Role of Regional and subregional arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" (June 28, 2011).
- ¹⁸ In two reports on the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan points to the failure of early warning systems (S/1999/1257 – 16 December 1999) and (A/54/549 – November 15, 1999).
- ¹⁹ Since 2004 there has been a consultant post for Genocide Prevention, in 2008, a second consultant post for conceptual, political and institutional development for the Responsibility to Protect was created.
- ²⁰ For the World Bank an economically-oriented structural adjustment of national economies would be sufficient. UNICEF pointed out the great damage which such a policy had caused in all developing countries and insisted that only a structural adjustment justified by the inclusion of the needs of people was acceptable (UNICEF, "structural adjustment with a human face").
- ²¹ See World Summit Outcome, A/Res/60 (1), 24 October 2005.
- ²² Edward C. Luck, UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on the responsibility to protect does not agree. See "United Nations" 2/2008: "The responsible sovereign, and the responsibility to protect. On the way from a concept to standard."
- ²³ Basic facts about the United Nations (2011), page 63
- ²⁴ See S/Res/1973 (2011), 17 March 2011, page 1
- ²⁵ See S/Res/1973 (2011), page 3, para 8; see S/Res/688 (1991).
- ²⁶ NATO Secretary General's Annual report 2011, page 8
- ²⁷ The author was present at the security conference (3 to 5 February 2012) as an observer.

(Translation *Current Concerns*)

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Kosovo – the war of the '68er

by Richard Holbrooke

cc. The following text is the preface to the English paperback edition of Berman's "Power and the Idealists: Or, the Passion of Joschka Fischer, and its Aftermath." The English hardcover edition does not contain this preface; in the same way it is missing in the German edition. It shows how Cohn-Bendit, Kouchner, Fischer and Koenigs are again brought into position and presented as new role models and shining lights for "another, bipartisan consensus for an enlightened Atlantic foreign policy."

During my college years one of the books we all read was Edmund Wilson's "To the Finland Station: A Study in the Writing and Acting of History". I never forgot it. Wilson was a great writer- and literary critic, and his book was beautifully written. But his book excited me mostly because it described something unusual and extremely important: the relationship of philosophical ideas – and practical events – the savage intersection where theories and personalities meet and sometimes end up changing the world, for better or for worse. Wilson described this intersection by recounting the history of socialism. He described the rise of various theories about history and economics. And he showed how Lenin and a small number of other people came along and put those ideas (altered, of course, to fit circumstances) to use in the Bolshevik Revolution, and thereby changed world history-disastrously, in that instance, as Wilson ultimately recognized.

Paul Berman is a writer in Edmund Wilson's tradition. In "Power and the Idealists", Berman's theme, too, is the intersection of ideas and events. In some ways "Power and the Idealists" is a continuation of Wilson's classic book – a story of the political left and its evolution and its effect on world events. Berman begins with the left-wing radicals from the period half a century after Lenin's revolution – the years around 1968. A lot of us today think we know everything we need to know about 1968. In the one-line summary of history so popular in the modern media, 1968 was a crazy time. Sex, drugs, and rock'n roll created a wild, irresponsible group of self-indulgent, authority-defying, flag-burning, New Left anarchists who threatened our very values, our Way of Life. This one-line summary of 1968 has energized rightwing politics ever since. Many people today still cannot abide political leaders from the Center-left who, when they were young, stood anywhere near the rebellious atmosphere of that period. We have seen this in the right-wing opposition to figures like John Kerry and Bill Clinton, neither of whom was especially radical when he was young. And we have seen something very similar in



One of the innumerable civilian targets of the Nato's "humanitarian intervention" in Serbia in 1999: the hospital for pulmonary diseases in Surdulica, which also harbored refugees. (picture ma)

Europe, where some people on the political right will never forgive political leaders like Joschka Fischer and Daniel Cohn-Bendit who were, in fact, quite radical in their youth. The memories and myths and sometimes the misrepresentations that came out of 1968 created a fault line in American and European political life, and the fault line has aroused enmities and resentments that will last as long as the '68ers are around.

The painting covering Cohn-Bendits' International

Well, some of those myths and memories cannot be denied. The stunning events of 1968 really happened – the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the assassinations of Martin Luther King jr., and Robert E. Kennedy, the sometimes peaceful and sometimes destructive political demonstrations in Paris and New York and Chicago, the razor-thin victory of Richard Nixon over Hubert Humphrey, the rage that led some ultra-leftists to join the murderous Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany two years later and led other people who should have known better to entertain some very Old Left delusions about Fidel Castro, the PLO, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and other gods that failed. For both those who indulged (in any, or every, sense of the word) and those who did not (or say they did not), the era imprinted them for the rest of their lives.

Yet there was another legacy from 1968, which many people have failed to recognize. The events of that period led some of the participants in the New Left to argue with one another about what had happened, and the arguments produced an intellectual ferment, especially in Europe. In the years that followed, some of those

veterans of the New Left became thoughtful about the disasters of their own movement – about the left-wing disasters that Edmund Wilson had begun to notice long ago in "To the Finland Station". Some of those veterans of the European New Left, the old '68ers, sifted through their own beliefs, trying to separate the moral concerns that might have been valid from the left-wing dogmas that had turned out to be destructive and false. They began to look at world events with fresh eyes. Some moved beyond their original visceral anti-Americanism. To the astonishment of many, some of those European veterans of 1968 achieved political respectability, too, as the years went by, and their new ideas began to have an impact on the world of politics and policy. A lot of attention has been paid to modern movements of the right, such as the neoconservatives. But some of the veterans of the New Left, especially in Europe, produced their own approach to world politics, a post-Cold War way of thinking, and this new way of thinking eventually permeated the policy process – even though very few "decisionmakers" in the United States and other countries have fully understood these new ideas or have even been aware that new ideas were coming into existence, or where they came from.

A turn from some of the traditional left-wing and anti-American dogmas

Paul Berman has followed all this like no one else on either side of the Atlantic, and, as a veteran himself of '68, has understood how important was the ferment among some of the European '68ers. Now

"Kosovo – the war of the 68er ..."

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he has done something quite remarkable: out of the many internal disputes within the left (Old, New, and divided), he has found a pattern and a story line that is compelling and important. He has identified the roots of an important development in post-Cold War thinking: a turn, among a small but influential group of the '68ers, away from some of the traditional left-wing and anti-American dogmas of the past in favor of a new kind of liberal antitotalitarianism. Berman told part of this story in his book "A Tale of Two Utopias: The Political Journey of the Generation of 1968" (published in 1996), which focused on the American Left, though in that book he gave some attention to Europe, as well. Now he has reached across the Atlantic to examine some of the European '68ers and their foreign policy ideas in full detail. He has described the origins and nature of the new thinking about world affairs. He has shown the powerful influence of this new thinking on attitudes and politics from Cambodia and Vietnam to the East Bloc revolutions of 1989 and the Balkan wars of the nineteen-nineties. And he has brought the story forward into the age of Iraq.

It takes some kind of determination and skill (including archival skill, in fact, for most of his sources are unknown in the United States) to excavate these precincts. But Berman is fully up to the task. By recounting the history of a handful of people from the European '68ers, he has painted a huge canvas. He has shown how these people helped generate a postmodern approach to international affairs. His book can help policy-makers, who usually live in a hermetically sealed world of their own, to understand the origins and nature of some of their own ideas. His book could help build a broader, bipartisan consensus for an enlightened Atlantic foreign policy. Everybody knows that, on the political right, foreign-policy "realists" in the tradition of *Henry Kissinger* and the first president *Bush* have engaged in a battle for many years with the strange group of neo-cons and right-wing Wilsonians that gathered around the second president *Bush*. Berman shows that a parallel battle has been taking place all along on the left side of the political spectrum. He even shows some of the influence of the European left-wing debate in the United States, not just recently but from a period long before neoconservatism became a significant political current. One of the most striking anecdotes in his book is his account of *Joan Baez* in the nineteen-seventies among the earliest people on the left side of American politics to recognize that if she had opposed the American involve-

ment in Vietnam, she also had to oppose the totalitarian behavior of the North Vietnamese after they took over. Baez was roundly denounced for doing this by many of her early antiwar compatriots. But history has shown that she was right, and universal principles were on her side.

Three of the personalities in Berman's story stand out: three men (they happen to be men), each with his own fascinating history, each of whom has contributed in a different way to the development of the new ideas. Collectively their histories illuminate the larger story:

Joschka Fischer – an idealist?

Joschka Fischer, who has run the gauntlet from beating up a German policeman at an ultra-left rally in 1973, as shown in some dramatic photographs, to wearing three-piece suits as Germany's foreign minister during the period that extended from the Kosovo War to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. (When, as American ambassador to Germany in 1993, I first met Fischer, he was wearing a kind of transitional uniform consisting of a blue-jeans suit and a checkered shirt with an odd sort of tie; the three-piece suits came later, and does Berman have fun with them!) Fischer, who became Germany's most popular politician, could not have succeeded politically in the United States, given his ultra-left-wing past and those terrible photographs from long ago. But there he was at the turn of the twenty-first century, pushing his country into support of the *Clinton* administration's actions in Kosovo, then a few years later confronting *Donald Rumsfeld*, George W. Bush's secretary of defense, in a public conference just before the war in Iraq. This took place in February 2003 in a Munich hotel ballroom, and, by chance, I was seated for a while almost directly between the two men, Fischer and Rumsfeld. That was the famous conference in which Fischer, switching from German to English, told Rumsfeld to his face, "Excuse me, I'm not convinced. This is my problem. I cannot go to the public and say, 'Oh well, let's go to war because there are reasons' and so on, and I don't believe in them." Berman captures the full import of that dramatic confrontation, which was broadcast live on German television and riveted Germany – a confrontation that even received a bit of attention in the United States, especially because, as Berman shows, Rush Limbaugh took the occasion to launch one of his demagogic right-wing radio attacks.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit becomes "Mr Europe"

Daniel Cohn-Bendit, "Danny the Red" himself, the leader of the French student uprising of 1968 but legally a German citizen, a man with friends all over Europe,

whose passage through subsequent history shows an admirable consistency of beliefs and a highly self-aware sense of what can be accomplished in public life. In Berman's accounting Cohn-Bendit tends to play the role of wise, ironic commentator on the events that he has lived through.

Bernard Kouchner having the credit of trust as medical doctor

Bernard Kouchner, the charismatic French doctor who was also deeply involved in the 1968 demonstrations and even lent his car to Danny the Red at a crucial moment in the drama. Kouchner was originally a young member of the Old Left. But he found that the reality of such hell-holes as Biafra and Cambodia defied the easy anti-Americanism of the Old Left, and of the New Left, and of a great many French intellectuals. This restless, brilliant doctor saw that if he wanted to change the world, he had to abandon his original ideas and attack equally crimes and totalitarianism of the left and the right. Co-founding *Doctors Without Borders*, relentlessly pushing humanitarianism with a political face-or was it politics with a humanitarian face? – Kouchner played an immense role in shaping a new view of intervention in the internal affairs of other nations. As early as 1988, Kouchner, together with some colleagues, drew up a United Nations General Assembly resolution asserting *the right to intervene in another country in case of some dreadful emergency*.

Astonishingly, this passed the General Assembly "the very first expression," as Berman points out, "of a victim's right to be represented by someone other than his own government." General Assembly resolutions carry little weight in the real world, but this one launched a movement that would end with Kouchner asserting something he called the "droit d'ingérence" – the "right to intervene." By the mid-nineteen-nineties, after the horrible lessons of Rwanda and Bosnia, many nations, including ultimately the United States and the members of the European Union, began to find reasons to accept this new formulation and apply it to Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), where enormous numbers of people needed to be rescued. Since policy-makers tend to be oblivious to the origins of new ideas, almost no one in Washington and few in Brussels realized that the intellectual roots of intervention in the Balkans came from a doctor, who at that moment was serving as the French Minister of Health. Still fewer of those people knew anything at all about the philosophers who had influenced the doctor. Finally, in an almost accidental twist of fate, Kouchner was called upon to implement his own theories: he was appointed by Kofi Annan as the UN Secretary-General's

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Special Representative for Kosovo, the war that Berman calls the '68ers' War.

Berman mentions in his account that I became a warm friend of Kouchner's. This is true. I visited Kouchner during his reign in Kosovo. I was the American ambassador to the UN in those days, and I thought he was doing a terrific job – despite endless second-guessing by mid-level bureaucrats back at UN headquarters in New York. He remains a dear friend, and continues to fight for his beliefs. In French opinion polls, he always ranks as one of the two or three most popular public figures. But because he, refuses to be an orthodox figure—he is sometimes called a French member of the "American left" – his own Socialist Party still sees him as a maverick.

Ideas have consequences – even in the post-ideological age in which we are said to live. Political leaders and high appointed officials are driven by intellectual forces that they can only dimly sense, but which shape their responses to specific events. The end of ideology, like the so-called "end of history" that Berman discussed in his earlier book, *A Tale of Two Utopias*, can be much overrated.

Berman is a passionate believer in liberal democracy and the power of ideas. For him, liberal democracy is a never-ending project that has always aroused opposition and must always be defended, must always be examined and questioned and strengthened. To the scorn that many suspicious Americans may feel for an approach to history that takes seriously the utterances of obscure French *philosophes*, Berman would reply: ideas do matter, although they may take years to attain acceptance. And to theorists and thinkers who live only in the world of academic debate or scholarly journals, Berman also says: events matter; they affect ideas just as much as ideas affect events. Events, in fact, can turn a good cause into a bad one, and leave intellectuals trapped on the wrong side of history. This happened; as Berman shows and as Edmund Wilson showed long before him, with the Old Left, which believed in Marxism and Communism long after events had destroyed any conceivable rationale they may have once had.

Has something similar happened to the new kind of liberal antitotalitarianism whose origins and development Berman has chronicled? Have good new ideas led to bad results – in Iraq, above all? One of the most intriguing aspects of *Power and the Idealists* is Berman's account of a debate about this very question among some of the European '68ers themselves – among precisely the people who had pioneered the new ideas. Iraq presented a quandary to the people whom Berman describes. Every one of

Offshoots of the '68 discussion in Switzerland?

zf. For years, the German Greens have not been an issue in Switzerland, because here ecological questions are addressed realistically. The snappy-gappy view and the resulting – partly history-falsifying – "tableau" of the '68 club of Cohn-Bendit, Fischer, Kouchner and Koenigs, as Berman sketches it, seems to leave an impression. Thus the new BDP national councillor Martin Landolt, President-Elect of the BDP in Switzerland, declares when asked about his political role model as follows:

"Susanne Brunner: "I once read somewhere that you were intrigued by the "Kennedy clan", or that it was a role model for you."

Martin Landolt: "This was the first biography I have read in my life, at the age of 14. At that time there were such "SJW-booklets" (Schweizerisches Jugendschriftenwerk – Swiss Youth literature institution) there I read the biography of John F. Kennedy or I had to give a talk at school. He is not my political role model, I would say, but he is one of the politicians, of whom I admire certain qualities. In the case of Kennedy surely his charisma, his power of persuasion, but there are others, Joschka Fischer, for example, whom I actually consider to be an extremely courageous politician, an Angela Merkel, who is extremely persevering; these are some different qualities I

admire in politicians, but I can not say I have one single political role model."

The new co-president of the Green Party of Switzerland remains fairly differentiated in regard of Joschka Fischer as a role model:

Regula Rytz: "Joschka Fischer is a very important person, too. But I just think what Joschka Fischer does is partly a bit questionable, all the support of the large pipeline projects for example. Well, I think he played a very important role, he also had to answer for some cases in foreign policy, where there have been major quarrels, such as the entire war in Yugoslavia ..."

Susanne Brunner: "Kosovo ... for example ..."

Regula Rytz: "... exactly, there was the question: Intervening or how do you intervene? And there, it is quite clear that I rely on preventive peace policy, of course. Well, it is very important to me not just to let it happen that it can get that far. That is why I have always been strongly in favour of really restricting the arms exports from Switzerland and of no longer exporting the weapons to where they later can lead to conflicts and where afterwards one would have to intervene again. Anyway, in this matter I also had had different attitudes."

Source: Radio DRS, 17 and 23 April 2012

(Translation Current Concerns)

those people detested the arch totalitarian Saddam Hussein. Every one of those people looked forward to Saddams overthrow at least someday, if not right away. None of those '68ers loved the George W. Bush administration, and most of them were revolted by it. The Bush administration, in the understated words of the Polish '68er *Adam Michnik*, was "not their cup of tea." Even so, some of the '68ers hoped that the American-led intervention in Iraq would turn out to be a good thing, and in 2003 they gave their support to the intervention, begrudgingly in most cases. These veterans of the New Left hoped that, in spite of the unattractive qualities of the Bush administration, intervention in Iraq would end up resembling the intervention in the Balkans – a humanitarian policy with humanitarian results. They hoped that more people in Europe, instead of fewer people, would come to the aid of the intervention and of the Iraqis themselves.

Then again, some of the other '68ers in Europe predicted dire consequences from the start. They opposed the intervention outright, in some cases because they instinctively feared the incompetence of the Bush administration, in some cases for additional reasons, as well. The European '68ers argued with one another in a friendly and respectful way about these questions, but, as Berman shows, they argued very earnestly, too. Today the dire predictions have turned out to be all-too-true. The horrible, incompetent execution of Ameri-

can policy in Iraq has proved once again a cardinal rule of any policy: a policy badly carried out becomes a bad policy. This time the bad policy ended up catastrophic. Might it have been possible to work out an alternative, superior policy, as Bernard Kouchner wanted to do – an entirely different approach to bringing Saddams monstrous dictatorship to an end? As Berman's book ends, the veterans of the European New Left, having succeeded in changing the rules for intervention through their arguments over the decades and their efforts in the Balkans during the nineteen-nineties, found themselves, like everyone else, up against a terrible reality in Iraq – a reality so desperate that it threatened to discredit the noble ideas that had led some of these veterans of the New Left, though not all of them, to support the original intervention.

So the intellectual debate will go on, with events in Iraq and Afghanistan and many other places playing a major role. I hope Paul Berman will return to these issues, to carry forward the story yet again, and to show how, at the savage intersection of history, ideas and events meet to form a new reality. "I am a critic and not a philosopher," Berman wrote in "A Tale of Two Utopias" But he is a bit too modest. Intellectual history of this caliber can help shape political philosophy. In the future we are going to face many new humanitarian and international crises, as

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Claim to world domination: War against Yugoslavia as a prime example From reality ...

by Ralph Hartmann

“There are some words that are rarely used, at least in the statements of governments. This includes power, authority and influence. That was different at times in which the ministers of defense were still called ministers of war. But even if I don’t like to talk about my private life, yet it does exist. And even if countries do not like to talk about their intimate considerations, yet power, authority and influence do play their unchanged role, in a ponderous, moving, and often decisive way. Not considering or even denying that, will analyze the situation and the development incorrectly and arrive at misjudgements.”¹

During the NATO war against Yugoslavia there were plenty of such objectives of power politics, “considerations” in abundance that were associated with “power, authority and influence”. It was, among other things, the aim of the NATO to definitely annihilate Yugoslavia, to promote the eastern extension of the pact, to continue to drive back the Russian influence in the Balkans and to complete its encirclement. There are many reasons for the fact that it was just Yugoslavia – during the cold war so much courted by the West – that was targeted by the NATO after the political turning point at the end of the 80s and at the beginning of the 90s. They have been elaborated in detail elsewhere.² Here I want to call to mind only four assessments that alone are quite sufficient to get an idea of some of the motives of West German and NATO-Yugoslav policy.

The first was called “Position Paper”, it was developed in May 1991 in the Federal Foreign Office, at that time led by *Hans-Dietrich Genscher*, and “position” became the conflict between Croatia and Slovenia on the one hand and Serbia on the other hand, referring to the future of the Yugoslav multinational state: “It’s all about a struggle of market economy against centralized command economy, of democratic pluralism against single-party dictatorship, of the rule of law against military repression.”³ It goes without saying that in the Federal Foreign Office Serbia was considered as a bastion of “centralized command economy,” of “one-party dictatorship” and of “military repression”, because the Socialist Party there, in contrast to the two northern republics, had gained acceptance in democratic elections, absolutely refused to abandon its self-administration and advocated the preservation of the Yugoslav Federation. “Command economy”, “one-party dictatorship”, “repression” were the key words the Europe-

“All defecting republics are committed to the capitalist way, while the population of the republics remaining with Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), despite massive US financial support for the opposition, have supported Socialist candidates, also in 1993. The hatred of the West is not only caused by the socialist election, but also by the resistance of the Serbs against the new world order.”

an socialist countries – with the exception of Yugoslavia – had been labeled with, in the system conflict; now, after the fall of real socialism in Europe, these knockout arguments were used against Serbia and the rest of Yugoslavia, which representative of the extinct countries were declared lepers. [...]

Political Affairs wrote: “All defecting republics are committed to the capitalist way, while the population of the republics remaining with Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), despite massive US financial support for the opposition, have supported Socialist candidates, also in 1993. The hatred of the West is not only caused by the socialist election, but also by the resistance of the Serbs against the new world order.”⁴ [...]

In his much-cited book “The Grand Chessboard” *Zbigniew Brzezinski* wrote in all plainness: “The collapse of its rival left the United States in a unique position. It became simultaneously the first and the only truly global power.”⁵ And on 30 October 1998 – shortly after the *Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement* – *Madeleine Albright* explained: “Almost during my whole life America has played a leading role in the international system. And today, this influence of the American leadership is more perceptible than ever from the streets of Sarajevo up to the villages in the Near East, from the classrooms in Central America up to the courtrooms of The Hague.”⁶

The war against Yugoslavia was intended to be a prime example for the way how this claim to world domination is to be enforced, if necessary. It wasn’t exactly that, *but still after the war*, *NATO Supreme Commander Wesley Clark* explained that the war against Yugoslavia was “a very decisive precedent for the coming century”.⁷ [...]

Missiles were flying against Belgrade, against Nis, Kragujevac, Pristina, but even more distant, more eastern areas were targeted by the NATO and the US strategists, and among them the Central Asian region and the Caspian Basin, which, according to *Zbigniew Brzezinski*,

ki, “[...] contain reserves of natural gas and oil that dwarf those of Kuwait, the Gulf of Mexico, or the North Sea.”⁸ Here – *Brzezinski* – “It follows that America’s primary interest is to help ensure that no single power (read: Russia), comes to control this geopolitical space and that the global community (read: the United States and with it the NATO, which, as in Kosovo for example, so heavily like to pose for “international” or “world community”) has unhindered financial and economic access to it.”⁹

This was even more clearly expressed by *David Tucker*, the then vice-director in the Office of the Secretary of State in the US Department of Defense. Even before the ‘Kosovo war’, he wrote that for the US there was only one region, absolutely worth fighting for. This was “the area of the Persian Gulf in the north up to the Caspian Sea and in the east up to Central Asia”.¹⁰

Understandably enough, Russia did not remain inactive when facing these considerations, especially as, simultaneously with the war against Yugoslavia and the adoption of the new NATO strategy, they have by now been followed by concrete action, the gradual encroachment of the Pact into the oil-rich countries, formerly belonging to the Soviet Union and the planning of oil routes bypassing Russia State territory. Moscow feels seriously threatened by this development and due to the aggression in the Balkans this sense of threat has grown. It was not incidentally that in the period after the aggression Foreign Minister *Igor Ivanov* combined his criticism of the strategy of the West in Kosovo with severe warnings against an expansionist policy in the Caucasus. He repeatedly explained that Moscow “would firmly oppose all attempts to force Russia out of the Caucasus. In the Caspian region and in the Caucasus an obvious struggle for zones of influence was taking place. America was trying to force Russia and Iran out of the region, which, especially

"Claim to the world domination: ..."

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for these two countries, was of vital importance."¹¹

... to the neurolinguistic RtP program

The "big-headed" of the German Federal Republic had stepped up to war with the noble goal of preventing a humanitarian disaster on the Balkans. And as this desire was so unselfish and noble, so convincing and plausible, it was put through to the public over and over again and nearly always in the same manner. In his book "We are not allowed to look away", Defense Minister *Rudolf Scharping* remembers that the German Chancellor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and he were of the same opinion: "At any time we made it clear that the military measures had a political and a humanitarian goal."¹³ Commonly united in this spirit, they did not become tired of converting the war of aggression into a humanitarian disaster prevention action.

Before the assault, of 23rd March, Scharping explained in the *ARD-Tages-themen* (a newsemission of a German broadcasting corporation), "the political goal was unchanged to break the spiral of violence and to prevent a humanitarian disaster". Simultaneously with the assault, the European Council in Berlin adopted an explanation, in which the heads of state and government of the aggressing states conveyed the following message to the attacked state: Aggression must not pay off. An aggressor must know that he has to pay a high price. That is the lesson of the 20th century.¹⁴ Elaborating the draft for this grotesque document the Foreign Office, the functionaries of Joseph Fischer had not missed out to formulate, „at the threshold to 21st century Europe must not tolerate a humanitarian disaster in its center."¹⁵

[...] In their answer to a brief parliamentary enquiry of the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) parliamentary group in the Bundestag on 11th October 1999 they affirmed [the Federal Government]: "During 79 days the NATO has conducted air strikes against the BRJ with the strategic goal of preventing a humanitarian disaster ..."¹⁶

The fact that prevention of a "humanitarian disaster" and "protection of the human rights" were pretexts and besides most transparent ones, was clear to all politically half-way educated people a long time before the first rocket impact against Yugoslavia had taken place. Why should just those, who in decades had promoted or at least tolerated humanitarian disasters and violations of human rights of the severest kind, from Viet Nam to Kurdistan, suddenly have become passionate advocates of humanity

Military leaders spoke for themselves, for example the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Army, *Anatoly Kvashnin*, who said that "the aggression of NATO against Yugoslavia has fundamentally changed the

military and political situation in Europe [...]. Now there are no guarantees that the NATO doesn't take its scenario against Yugoslavia as a basis for actions against any other countries, including Russia."¹²

and civil rights, in such a way that they did not even shrink back-from the open breach of the UN-Charter? Down to the present day none of the noble warriors for human rights answered this simple question; neither in the case of Yugoslavia, nor in preceding cases of interference into the internal affairs of other states, contrary to international law. Concurrently, *Wolfgang Richter*, chairman of the *Society for Civil Rights and Human Dignity (GBM)*, therefore stated in his contribution to the preparation of the *International European Tribunal over the NATO war against Yugoslavia* according to an analysis of the western policy of intervention after 1945 as well as the US claims on "practice of a world human right constabulary", "that the justification for the human right interventionism of the USA and NATO during the wars, for example against Iraq and against Yugoslavia, was no coincidental and only temporary moment of their present policy, but the principal item of their effort to endow their political action with the higher authority of 'legitimacy'."¹⁷

Critics of the war repetitively pointed to the fact that the declaration of wanting to prevent a "humanitarian disaster" by a war, to protect human rights by militarily organized mass murder showed a perversion of thinking. As captivating this diagnosis may be, in the long run it attributes to the responsible persons noble, even if finally perverted, thus only wrongly used, motives for their aggression. *In truth, the rhetoric of human rights only served the justification for the legalization of war, also in the case of terror bombing against Yugoslavia.* "Who would want to take a stance against human rights and the subsequent policy?", asked *Wolf-Dieter Narr, Roland Roth* und *Klaus Vack* in their "Pazifistisch menschenrechtlichen Streitschrift" (Pacifistic human rights pamphlet) of December 1999 and then continued: "One can fill, tie up or leave open the human right charm bag just as desired. Human rights are well suited for humans to project their hope on them. An actually good thing. Therefore it is not necessary to examine thoroughly whether those who offer the human rights and the matters for which they are to be used, are legally and morally correct and correspond to the human rights order. Just as morals can be subverted most cunningly and with great moral effort, is done in the same way with human rights. This is what we call double moral standards or double human rights."¹⁸

Excerpt of: Hartmann, Ralph. *Die glorreichen Sieger. Die Wende in Belgrad und die wundersame Ehrenrettung deutscher Angriffskrieger*. Berlin 2001. ISBN 3-320-02003-X. page 180ff. (The change in Belgrade and the wonderful honourable retrieval of the German attacking warriors).

¹ Egon Bahr. *Selbstbestimmung der Völker und Schutz für Minderheiten*, Rede am 26. März 1999 bei Potsdamer Frühjahrsgesprächen (Egon Bahr: Self-determination of peoples and protection of minorities, Speech at Potsdamer Talks on 26th March 1999)

² see Ralph Hartmann. *Die ehrlichen Makler* (The honest dealers), p. 183-203

³ Citation of: *Die Zeit*, 8.3.1996, p. 13

⁴ *Political Affairs*, 7/1993

⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski. *The Grand Chessboard*, New York 1997, p. 10

⁶ Citation of UZ, 2.4.1999

⁷ *Berliner Zeitung*, 12.7.1999

⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski. *The Grand Chessboard*, New York, 1997, p. 125

⁹ *ibidem*, p. 148

¹⁰ Citation in Wolfgang Gehrcke. *Wie zwei Züge, die aufeinander zu rasen* (like two trains running toward each-other), in: *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 16.2.2000

¹¹ *Der Tagesspiegel*, 1.12.1999

¹² Citation in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16.11.1999

¹³ Rudolf Scharping. *Wir dürfen nicht wegsehen*. p. 80 (We are not allowed to look away)


¹⁴ Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Nr. 30/1999, p. 331

¹⁵ *ibidem*.

¹⁶ 14. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 14/1788, p. 2

¹⁷ Wolfgang Richter. *Der Jugoslawienkrieg und die Menschenrechte*, in: *Die deutsche Verantwortung für den Nato-Krieg gegen Jugoslawien* (The war of Yugoslavia and human rights, in: The German responsibility for the Nato-war against Yugoslavia). p. 43.

¹⁸ Wolf-Dieter Narr/Roland Roth/Klaus Vack. *Wider kriegerische Menschenrechte*. (Against belligerent human rights) p. 53



ISBN 3-320-02003-X

Israel: Getting back to decisions without hysteria

“I think the Iranian leadership is composed of very rational people.”

Is the IDF Chief joining the anti-Netanyahu camp over Iran?

by Anshel Pfeffer

As *Amos Harel* notes today in his interview of the IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General *Benny Gantz* has been careful in all of his public appearances when referring to the Iranian nuclear threat and the possibility of an Israeli military strike. That being said, it is hard to ignore the fact that some of the things Gantz said in the interview are almost clashing with recent statements of his ultimate boss, Prime Minister *Benjamin Netanyahu*.

Most significantly Gantz said that: “The pressure is starting to bear fruit. Both on the diplomatic level and on the level of the general sanctions.”

Which is hard to reconcile with Netanyahu’s recent criticism of the P5+1 talks with the Iranians in which according to him they were given a five-week “freebie.”

Unlike Netanyahu who devoted his Holocaust Remembrance Day speech last week to comparing the Iranian threat with the German mass-murder of six million Jews, Gantz is trying hard to ratchet down the rhetoric.

Asked whether 2012 is also decisive for Iran, Gantz shies from the term. “Clearly, the more the Iranians progress the worse the situation is. This is a critical year, but not necessarily ‘go, no-go.’ The problem

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Israel’s former Shin Bet chief:

“I have no confidence in Netanyahu, Barak”

by Barak Ravid

Yuval Diskin accuses Israel’s leaders of misleading the public on Iran, says they are making decisions “based on messianic feelings.”

Former Shin Bet chief *Yuval Diskin* expressed harsh criticism of Prime Minister *Benjamin Netanyahu* and Defense Minister *Ehud Barak* on Friday in a meeting with residents of the city of Kfar Sava, saying the pair is not worthy of leading the country.

“My major problem is that I have no faith in the current leadership, which must lead us in an event on the scale of war with Iran or a regional war,” Diskin told the “Majdi Forum,” a group of local residents that meets to discuss political issues.

“I don’t believe in either the prime minister or the defense minister. I don’t believe in a leadership that makes decisions based on messianic feelings,” he added.

Diskin deemed Barak and Netanyahu “two messianics – the one from Akirov or the Assuta project and the other from Gaza Street or Caesarea,” he said, referring to the two politicians’ places of residence.

“Believe me, I have observed them from up close... They are not people who I, on a personal level, trust to lead Israel to an event on that scale and carry it off. These are not people who I would want to have holding the wheel in such an event,” Diskin said.

“They are misleading the public on the Iran issue. They tell the public that if Israel acts, Iran won’t have a nuclear bomb. This is misleading. Actually, many experts say that an Israeli attack would accelerate the Iranian nuclear race,” said the former security chief.

In March, former Mossad chief *Meir Dagan* also spoke out publicly against a military option on Iran, telling CBS’ 60 Minutes that an Israeli attack would have “devastating” consequences for Israel, and would in any case be unlikely to put an end to the Iranian nuclear program.

Regarding relations between Israeli Jews and other groups, Diskin said, “Over the past 10-15 years Israel has become more and more racist. All of the studies point to this. This is racism toward Arabs and toward foreigners, and we are also becoming a more belligerent society.”

Diskin also said he believed another political assassination, like that of *Yitzhak Rabin* in 1995 by a Jewish extremist, could occur in the future. “Today there are extremist Jews, not just in the territories but also inside the Green Line, dozens of them who, in a situation in which settlements are evacuated... would be willing to take up arms against their Jewish brothers.” •

Source: www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israel-s-former-shin-bet-chief-i-have-no-confidence-in-netanyahu-barak-1.426908

In another article the “International Herald Tribune” points out that Israel has every reason to thoroughly reconsider the development of its relationship with its neighbors.

“Moreover, the Sinai Peninsula has become a source of enormous concern for Israel, with the prime minister, *Benjamin Netanyahu*, calling it a “kind of Wild West” this week and the foreign minister, *Avigdor Lieberman*, saying Israel should consider massing more troops along that border because Egypt had become an even greater concern than Iran.”

“A senior Israeli official said an anti-Israeli and pro-Islamist direction in Egypt was clear, being mostly a matter of time, and that there was little Israel could do to change

that course. Similar arguments have been made here in the past few years about Turkey, once a friend of Israel and now one of its leading critics.”

“Both Egypt and Turkey have never given up – neither in exchange for gas nor for military equipment – their desire to convince Israel to conduct its policy in a manner that would enable them to maintain relations with it, without undermining their relationship with their citizens and with the countries of the region,” he wrote. “Israel, which considered these relations a seal of approval for continuing its policy in the territories, lived with the illusion that the money index would solve everything.”

Source: *International Herald Tribune* 26 April 2012

“Kosovo – the war of the 68er ...”

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we already see in Darfur and the Republic of Georgia and other places around the world. We are going to have to find the proper balance between prudence, on one hand, and effective, calibrated involvement in the international arena on the other. We are going

to have to ask ourselves difficult questions about matters of principle and matters of practicality, and Paul Berman’s illuminating history of people and of ideas will help us ask these questions and search for answers.

Richard Holbrooke New York City January 2007

Source: Preface by Richard Holbrooke in the book “Power and the Idealists: Or, the passion of Josch-

ka Fischer, and its Aftermath” by Paul Berman, paperback, Norton 2007, ISBN: 978-0-393-33021-2

¹ In his most important oeuvre “To the Finland Station” published in 1940, Wilson described the history of European socialism from the first study by Jules Michelet on Giambattista Vico to the arrival of Lenin’s at the Finland Station in St. Petersburg in 1917 leading to the Bolshevik Revolution.

Russia's military exercises for possible US attack on Iran

With a large-scaled military exercise Russia wants to prepare for a possible attack by Israel and the US on Iran. According to the "Nesawissimaja Gaseta" from Monday, the Strategic Command-and-Staff Exercise (SCSE) "Caucasus 2012" will take place in September in southern Russia, but also in the Caucasus states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Armenia.

As Russia's Defense Ministry in Moscow announced, this year's exercise will be on a larger scale than in former years and will take account of the security realities. According to the newspaper, the exercises and combat missions will be focused on possible conflicts in the region of the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus, especially on a possible war of the United States and other countries against Iran.

Russia regularly performs maneuvers in the Caucasus. Thanks to the exercise "Caucasus 2008", which took place from 16 July to 2 August at the borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia could have the upper hand in the war with Georgia, however with unacceptable losses.

At this year's maneuver for the first time not only the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Strategic Rocket Forces will participate, but also the Russian Secret Service FSB, the Interior Ministry, the Federal Protective Service and all other security structures.

Moreover, all methods of the so-called networked warfare (the use of electronic

and satellite observation, drones and precision weapons) will be tested as well as new automated warfare systems.

Nikolai Makarov, the Chief of the General Staff, had announced this during a meeting with foreign military attachés last December. According to official information, two dozen upgraded command vehicles with the Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) have already arrived in the North Caucasus. Moreover, nearly all helicopters and combat planes, which are stationed in the region, as well as artillery and air defense forces have GLONASS navigation devices.

In addition, the troops with "Barnaul-T" got a new automated air defense guidance system. This system, which controls the airspace above southern Russia and the whole South Caucasus, is especially important for the Russian military base in Armenia, which is separated from the rest of the troops.

Anatoly Tsyganok, head of the Military Forecasting Center, said that the preparations for the maneuver had already begun due to the military tensions in the Persian Gulf.

If an Iran War would break out, several post-Soviet states in the South Caucasus could be involved. In order to ensure the ability to act for his military contingents abroad, especially in Armenia, the General Staff would evidently conceive of preemptive operations to organize the supply for the troops under critical circumstances, said the expert.

On Sunday *Igor Gorbul*, the spokesman of the Southern Military District, had announced, that the Russian military pipeliners would already exercise the installation of fuel pipelines.

Military pipeliners only exist in the Russian army. In an exercise in June 2011 a strand was installed from North Ossetia to South Ossetia via the Caucasus which was 75 kilometers long.

Even *Leonid Ivashov*, president of the Moscow Academy of Geopolitical Problems, links the exercise with the specific military and political situation in the Caucasus, "where Russia has specific geopolitical interests". "The maneuvers are organized to protect these interests."

The situation at the southern borders and especially the threat of an Iran War seem to generate deep concern in the Russian military commanders.

Source: *Ria Novosti*, 16.1.2012, <http://de.rian.ru/politics/20120116/262467833.html>
(Translation *Current Concerns*)

"Is the IDF Chief ..."

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doesn't necessarily stop on December 31, 2012. We're in a period when something must happen: Either Iran takes its nuclear program to a civilian footing only or the world, perhaps we too, will have to do something. We're closer to the end of the discussions than the middle."

"If they have a bomb, we are the only country in the world that someone calls for its destruction and also builds devices with which to bomb us. But despair not. We are a temperate state. The State of Israel is the strongest in the region and will remain so. Decisions can and must be made carefully, out of historic responsibility but without hysteria."

Not that the general is suddenly becoming a pacifist. He is serious about comparing the IDF for a possible strike making it clear that "the military option is the last chronologically but the first in terms

of its credibility. If it's not credible it has no meaning. We are preparing for it in a credible manner. That's my job, as a military man." But his assessment of the Iranian leadership lacks the urgency you often hear from Netanyahu and Ehud Barak.

"The program is too vulnerable, in Iran's view. If the supreme religious leader Ayatollah *Ali Khamenei* wants, he will advance it to the acquisition of a nuclear bomb, but the decision must first be taken. It will happen if Khamenei judges that he is invulnerable to a response. I believe he would be making an enormous mistake, and I don't think he will want to go the extra mile. I think the Iranian leadership is composed of very rational people. But I agree that such a capability, in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists who at particular moments could make different calculations, is dangerous."

Source: *Haaretz*, 25 April 2012

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Editor: Erika Vögeli

Address: Current Concerns,

P.O. Box, CH-8044 Zurich

Phone: +41 (0)44 350 65 50

Fax: +41 (0)44 350 65 51

E-Mail: CurrentConcerns@zeit-fragen.ch

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The new Animal Disease Act TSG, wolf in sheep's clothing?

Individual responsibility instead of government-decreed forced medication for our animals: Support the referendum!

On 16 March the national council adopted the new National Animal Disease Act, TSG. Hence, there is nothing to stop compulsory vaccination, forced medication and coercive measures for animals. To prevent this pharmaceutical-industry-friendly legislation, a referendum must be called for which in case it is successful (50,000 signatures within 100 days) will lead to a popular vote. This means the people can then vote on the question whether the law should be introduced or not. Many farmers have greatest concerns that again inadequately examined vaccines from the EU will be adopted and that their animals will become weak and sick due to that and other coercive actions – like the bluetongue vaccination some years ago. The new law raises questions for pet owners as well, because this group will be also affected by the new TSG. This law is binding to *all* animal owners. So it is possible that it is required by law that an animal (e.g. dog or cat) is given a drug or even euthanized. With the new TSG the animal owners' personal responsibility, freedom of choice as well as competence gained by experience will be severely limited. This must be the wrong way: the sometimes massive damages after the bluetongue vaccination and the necessity of massive doses of antibiotics in industrial animal husbandry have been a prove of that.

Argumentary against Animal Disease Act TSG:

– Concentration of power at federal level

Due to the revised version the federal government quite unnecessarily gets much more responsibilities, which were delegated by international institutions via state contracts such as WHO. This includes for example the operation of vaccine banks (vaccine on storage). Who wants to dispose of stores at the owner's expense? After the vaccines are being purchased, or if action is required mandatorily by "superior" offices, there is great risk that the pressure on animal owners will increase massively.

– Transparency

Nowadays absolute transparency is a must! However, especially with regard to vaccinations this has yet to be established!

– Proof of necessity (Art. 1/2)

Whatever the FVO and the Federal Council declares to be a disease, it must be based on generally accepted scientific evidence. Vaccines and drugs may only be applied if they are admitted according to drug and food law and controlled independently by means of placebo-based double-blind studies. Critics of vaccination must be included in the decision.

– Damage

Damages caused by ordered enforcement operations must be reimbursed completely (Article 32). Adverse event reports must be made mandatory; they must be taken seriously and investigated independently. The Animal Health Fund may not be misused for vaccinations.

– Genetically modified organisms (GMOs)

The European Court of Justice ruled in September 2011 that GMO contaminated honey must be destroyed. GMOs are banned in Switzerland (see GM moratorium in Switzerland, election poll 2011: Yes to GMO-free production, SAG: GM wheat was a failure). Many of the newer vaccines are produced by genetic engineering. The potentiality of forced vaccinations is probably the most prominent part of the revised TSC. Critics of vaccinations are not persons who refuse vaccinations. But many animal owners and farmers have made negative experiences. There is always a natural way, this experience must be strengthened and granted. There is no firm evidence that vaccinations actually protect. The TSG undermines the right to decide and it distorts the facts, this must not be accepted. The individual and free self-determination, the right to decide, is a guaranteed human right and as such may not be infringed.

Relevant articles of the Law on Epizootic Diseases (LFE) modified on March, 16th 2012

Art. 10

(8): "[...] free of charge help by the animal owner in measures of control. That means the animal owner can be forced to help against his will."

Art.26

Anulled! The right to object against orders of the responsible authority according to article 25 was cancelled.

Art. 27

Immuno-biological products: "The Federal Council determines conditions under which products can be offered or sold as far as they serve to protection or treatment of epizootic diseases (the term epizootic disease replaces animal disease; the editors), [...]."

Art. 31a

"The Federal Council can provide that for programmes of prevention [...] the animal owners will be charged fees of the [...]."

Art. 32

(1) "The Federal Council rules in which cases [...] losses of animals are not compensated."

Art. 42

- f "The federal government can procure vaccines against epizootic diseases [...]."
- g "The federal government can run vaccine banks."

Art.53b

(1)International cooperation: "The Federal Council can conclude treaties under international law (also with non-EU states) [...] in the field of animal health."

Art. 56a

(1) "Who brings animals of the species of cows, sheep, goats or pigs to slaughter has to pay a tax for every animal"

Art. 56a

(3)"The federal government uses the income of the taxes for the control of epizootic diseases."

Art. 57

(2b)Tightening of Art. 10: Regulation of the measures of control

Conclusion

- More power for the Federal Council based on international programmes to carry out vaccinations and other meas-

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"The new Animal Disease Act ..."

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- ures by force, eventually several per year?
- Penalties for non-vaccinators are increased, obligation to free help in measures, possibilities of objection are reduced.
- The whole prevention of epidemics will be a huge administrative, logistic and also much more cost-intensive effort which has to be covered by partly new taxes for the animal owners and by the taxpayers' money. The consequence is that we have to finance the Pharma- and vaccine-industry and the bureaucracy instead of the social and cooperative idea (epizootic disease insurance) for the mitigating of cases of hardship?
- The aspects of natural selection and natural immunisation are omitted entirely. Thousands of years men and animals lived together, and all of a sudden this shall no longer be possible? Shall breeding failures be corrected with vaccinations whereby the populations become weaker and weaker? According to the experience of many farmers for example this is still noticeable years after the bluetongue vaccination.
- The bluetongue vaccination has caused a lot of damage, nearly all were ignored while non-vaccinated animals had no or only little symptoms (a mild flu). Also in the range of domestic animals (pets) damages after vaccination are known.
- All vaccines – especially the adjuvants – contain toxins which according to

toxicology can cause precisely defined illnesses and discomfort. The combination of active agents nobody can really assess, either.

- The production of vaccines is only feasible with genetically modified organisms. What is forbidden for food products may not be used in vaccines and drugs.
- Its use in vaccines is more than questionable because it is not possible to assess the range of effects.
- 1992 the foot-and-mouth-vaccination was forbidden after the verification of the facts showed clearly that it didn't bring any benefit but instead massive costs and side-effects.

We need a healthy soil, healthy plants, healthy food and a good lifestyle, then animals and humans will be healthy, as well. Until the 90ties Switzerland was known for its good vaccines produced by its own Berna company. This quality has been lost, since the vaccines have been obtained by the EU. An even further-reaching integration into the EU fixed by law is definitely out of the question.

Resumé

As in the Law on Epidemics also in the revised Law on Epizootic diseases compulsory vaccination – for working animals as well as for pet animals – is to be made possible and so anchored by law.

All who eat animal products also "enjoy" the ingredients of the vaccines and other drugs. Nobody knows exactly, what can be triggered by a vaccina-

tion or a drug. It affects all of us for whom healthy animals are a concern, because we have a moral and ethical responsibility!

Further information

Information on the web-site www.TSG-Referendum.ch are continually updated. Until the 5th of July the collection of signatures for the referendum goes on (status of April, 2nd). After a successful collection of signatures the referendum text will be presented to the people in about one and a half years. Up to then the information about this concern has to be spread as broadly as possible in the public. We are glad to send you this flyer or give a presentation on site. Don't hesitate to contact us! Certainly we need the appropriate financial resources to be able to succeed with the referendum campaign.

In every case: Thank you very much for your support. Please subscribe for the newsletter of the network "Impfentscheid" (decision on vaccination, the translator) www.impfentscheid.ch to be informed regularly and up-to-date.

Thank you very much.

Your TSG-referendum-committee

Further complementary information you get at: TSG-referendum, Rosshag 1, 9470 Buchs, Tel: +41 81 633 12 26, www.tsg-referendum.ch, www.blauzungenimpfung.ch account-connections: Postkonto 85-298434-3, IBAN: CH08 0900 0000 8529 8434 3, BIC PO-FICHBEXXX
(Translation Current Concerns)

Self-responsibility instead of state decreed compulsory medication for our animals**No to the Council's strive for omnipotence: The cantonal veterinary authorities know the situation within their area of competence well and provide specific counselling**

This law is affecting not only the farmers but all animal and pet owners, as well!

(Among others) the following issues shall be anchored in the new law on epizootic diseases:

- Without compensation and against their will animal owners can be forced to aid at disease control measures ordered by authorities without payment.
- Animal owners no longer have the right of objection against certain decrees of the authorities.
- Federal council can demand new taxes from animal owners to pay for certain programs resulting from the law on epizootic disease.
- Federal Council will rule, when it will not compensate for the loss of animals, caused by administrative orders.
- Federal Council will set the conditions for supplying and selling immuno-biological products (vaccines).
- Federal Government can order vaccines against epizootic diseases.

- Federal Government can operate a bank of vaccines.
- Federal Council can conclude published contracts (also with non-EU-states) concerning animal health.
- Everyone who is moving animals (bovine-, sheep-, goat- or pig-livestock) to the slaughters has to pay new federal fees for every animal.
- Federal Government is using the profit out of those fees for epizootic disease prevention.
- The Bvet (Federal Office of Animal Health Service) supports epizootic disease prevention and can carry out screening- and monitoring-programs.

Conclusion

The whole issue is going to be a major financial and logistic effort, financed by animal owners and taxpayers. Health support by natural means is totally missing. Private knowledge and experience of the animal owners are undermined

and interfered with. Between the lines it is clearly apparent, that vaccination shall be implemented and animals damaged by vaccination will be euthanized and destroyed. (The latter has already happened.)

This will please the pharmacy- and vaccination-industry and their investors, but it does not please us nor our animals. The path to pharmaceutical field studies, which means trying out of test-vaccines on living populations will be expanded and totally uncontrollable. Something similar is planned with humans by the new Law on Epidemics (June 2012 in the Council of States). You can help with your signature to reject this fatal error.

Please inform yourself on www.TSG-Referendum.ch and help us collecting further signatures.

Thank you very much!

(Translation Current Concerns)