Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of the Party System

Executive Summary

The victory of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party in the parliamentary elections on 9 April has important implications for the evolution of the Indonesian party system and its patterns of electoral competition. Most significantly, Yudhoyono’s success was only made possible by an extensive cash program for the poor, suggesting that economic populism may become a constant feature in future elections. But the significant increase of support for Yudhoyono and his party have also raised questions about their long-term prospects in the Indonesian political landscape. Forced to step aside after his (almost certain) second term ends in 2014, Yudhoyono will find it difficult to present an immediate successor. His party lacks credible senior leaders, and his sons will not be able to assume key political positions for at least another decade. Meanwhile, the established parties have a good chance of recovering from their loss in the recent elections, with the new parliamentary threshold likely to drive former splinter parties back into their folds. This concentration process in the party system is set to further stabilise Indonesian democracy, despite ongoing problems in the fields of political corruption and the quality of electoral management.
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The results of the parliamentary elections in Indonesia – which were held across the archipelago on 9 April 2009 – have led to some significant shifts in the country’s party system.1 Most importantly, President Yudhoyono’s reigning Democratic Party (PD, Partai Demokrat) became the single largest party with 20.9 per cent of the votes, almost tripling its 2004 result at the expense of the more established parties. Golkar (the electoral machine of former autocrat Soeharto) lost a third of its 2004 support and dropped to 14.5 per cent, while the vote for ex-President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) fell by about one quarter to 14.0 per cent.

Some of the key Islamic parties fared even worse. The traditionalist2 Muslim-based Party of National Awakening (PKB, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) saw its 2004 result drop by more than half to 4.9 per cent, while the 26-year-old United Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) was reduced to 5.3 per cent support, from 8.1 per cent in 2004. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), whose puritanical Islamic profile has attracted much attention, could add only slightly to its 2004 result and gain 7.9 per cent, despite its much-publicised ambition to obtain at least 20 per cent of the votes. Furthermore, the National Mandate Party (PAN, Partai Amanat Nasional) – a modernist Muslim party – continued its slow but steady electoral decline, achieving 6.0 per cent.

Besides Yudhoyono’s triumphant Democratic Party, only two newcomers could profit from the erosion of support for Indonesia’s established parties, and both are run by retired military officers: The Peoples’ Conscience Party (Hanura), chaired by former military chief and unsuccessful 2004 presidential candidate Wiranto, and the Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra, Gerakan Indonesia Raya) led by Soeharto’s former son-in-law Prabowo Subianto. The parties gained 3.8 and 4.5 per cent respectively, and while this result allowed them to pass the parliamentary threshold of 2.5 per cent, it came as a great disappointment to both ex-generals, who had spent tens of millions of dollars on their campaigns.

This paper will analyse the reasons for PD’s electoral success and its implications for the future architecture of Indonesia’s party system. It will show that Thaksin-style cash hand-outs to the poor were the main reason for PD’s victory, potentially signalling the emergence of new electoral paradigms in Indonesia. In addition, the paper will discuss the prospects of established parties like Golkar and PDIP in the post-2009 party landscape. Focusing on the rise of new generations of leaders in these parties, this paper argues that most key parties are likely to remain fixtures in Indonesian politics, while the future of Yudhoyono’s PD is entirely dependent on the President’s performance in his (almost certain) second term.

PD’s electoral triumph

The success of Yudhoyono’s PD is remarkable for several reasons. To begin with, it marked the first time in post-Soeharto electoral history that a party founded after 1998 had won a plurality in a national legislative ballot. In 1999, PDIP finished first, and in 2004 Golkar did – both creations of Soeharto’s New Order
regime. Second, PD’s victory also constituted the first win of an incumbent government in the democratic polity. Both Habibie and Megawati had witnessed their parties being defeated during their presidencies; Yudhoyono’s, by contrast, recorded a stunning increase in electoral support.

These achievements are all the more notable as they reflect a formidable political comeback for both PD and Yudhoyono. In June 2008, opinion polls had shown PD hopelessly behind its rivals – it scored only 8.7 per cent to PDIP’s 24.2 per cent and Golkar’s 19.7 per cent. At the same time, Megawati had opened a 5 per cent lead over Yudhoyono, with some pollsters even detecting a 10 per cent gap. Political analysts agreed at that time that the electorate was probably growing tired of Yudhoyono’s uninspiring leadership, and that Indonesia might see yet another incumbent voted out of office after just one term.

The dramatic turnaround in Yudhoyono’s electoral fortunes was not due to a sudden change in his political image or personal style. His notorious tendency to procrastination and to moderating debates rather than leading them remained unchanged. Rather, it was the introduction of massive cash programs for the poor that triggered Yudhoyono’s meteoric rise from electoral underdog to almost unassailable frontrunner. Between June 2008 and April 2009, the government spent approximately US$2 billion on compensation payments for increased fuel prices, schooling allowances and micro-credit programs. As a result, Yudhoyono’s popularity skyrocketed from 25 per cent in June 2008 to 50.3 per cent in February 2009, and PD’s support surged to 24.3 per cent in the same time-frame.

Moreover, Yudhoyono was one of the few leaders of a major democracy around the world to benefit from the global economic crisis. The collapse of international oil prices from August 2008 onwards allowed Yudhoyono to cut the cost of domestic fuel several times. Whereas he had previously left it to his ministers to announce unpopular increases in petrol prices in May 2008, this time he staged carefully crafted press conferences, in which he portrayed the price reductions as his personal decision rather than the result of international developments.

The concurrent cash payments and reduced fuel prices were extremely popular in the low-income segments of Indonesian society. While the middle class and businesses complained about the impact of the global financial crisis and inadequate government responses, poorer Indonesians felt that after years of high inflation, costs were now falling. When asked in February 2009 whether their economic burden had become lighter or was still heavy after the government’s cash payments and other pro-poor programs, 58 per cent of respondents felt that their burden had become lighter, with only 24 per cent saying it was still heavy.

Evidently, the cash payments had delivered a miraculous reversal of public opinion on the economic conditions under Yudhoyono’s government. In June 2008, when the economy was growing at rates last seen under Soeharto (more than 6.4 per cent in the second quarter), 58 per cent of Indonesians said that their economic condition was worse than in the year before while only 17 per cent felt that they were better off. By February 2009 – in the midst of an unprecedented global crisis and much reduced economic growth – the trend had
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been completely reversed: now only 31 per cent of Indonesians believed that their economic situation had worsened (a stunning drop of 27 per cent), while 38 per cent of respondents thought that their situation had improved – 21 per cent more than in June 2008.

While most voters were enthusiastic about Yudhoyono’s social welfare initiatives, economists and anti-corruption groups were sceptical. Economic observers and poverty experts doubted that the payments would have any long-term effect on Indonesia’s socio-economic infrastructure, describing the government’s hand-outs as political ‘charity’ rather than an effective anti-poverty measure. In particular, they questioned the non-institutional, short-term nature of the programs, which subtly suggested to the electorate that only Yudhoyono’s re-election would guarantee their continuation. In addition, anti-corruption activists were highly critical of the timing of the payments, accusing the government of using state money to boost its electoral prospects and turning important social issues into a ‘political commodity’.

With the available data providing overwhelming evidence that Yudhoyono’s and PD’s electoral success was largely due to the generously distributed cash assistance, two important conclusions are unavoidable. First, PD’s victory cannot serve as an indication for the quality of its institutional development as a party since 2004. Only 10 months before the election, PD looked set to barely achieve its 2004 result, despite repeated efforts to gain new members and cadres. Thus PD’s level of support is more a reflection of Yudhoyono’s popularity and the performance of his government than the result of organisational success. This insight is crucial when evaluating PD’s chances of developing into a major party in the long term.

Second, Yudhoyono’s ability to swiftly turn his bleak electoral prospects into a sound lead by handing out cash to voters is likely to set the precedent for future election campaigns in Indonesia. Indeed, Yudhoyono’s new pro-poor policies reflect and strengthen a general trend in Asian electoral politics. This new trend is best described as ‘Thaksinomics’ – the concept developed by former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, whose party has won every election since 2001 in a landslide by offering effective anti-poverty programs. Since Thaksin’s successes (notwithstanding his removal in a military coup in 2006), other Asian governments have adopted parts of his economic approach, with India taking the lead and Indonesia apparently following suit.

While Yudhoyono is almost certain to continue the ‘Thaksinisation’ of Indonesian welfare policies in his second term, the risk of his developing the same authoritarian features as his Thai counterpart is remote. Yudhoyono has a much more moderate and restrained political character than the belligerent and temperamental Thaksin, and this is very unlikely to change. Furthermore, Yudhoyono will also be well aware of the disastrous consequences of Thaksin’s political adventurism, and will be very anxious to avoid a similar fate.

The Indonesian president has also distinguished himself from his Thai counterpart by spearheading an extensive anti-corruption campaign, which many observers have cited as another reason for PD’s success. While Thaksin
was accused of tax evasion and nepotism, Yudhoyono has presided over the imprisonment of an unprecedented number of legislators and government officials. In particular, Indonesians were impressed by the arrest of the father-in-law of Yudhoyono’s son in November 2008, which caused public approval of the governments’ anti-corruption fight to rise from 45 per cent in September 2007 to 80 per cent in February 2009.

It is important, however, not to overestimate the importance of anti-corruption issues for the majority of Indonesian voters. Yudhoyono’s image had been clean throughout his term, yet his popularity only began to take off after the introduction of populist economic policies in mid-2008. In an opinion survey conducted by the daily Kompas in March 2009, respondents were asked to name the nation’s most pressing problems at the moment. Of the respondents, 77.8 per cent mentioned social issues ranging from the price of basic goods to unemployment and poverty. Only 5.6 per cent thought that corruption was a crucial matter, suggesting that it was merely a secondary element in PD’s electoral victory.

PD’s future beyond Yudhoyono’s presidency

With PD’s strong showing in the parliamentary elections and Yudhoyono’s high personal approval ratings (in a February 2009 poll, he led Megawati by a margin of 64 to 23 per cent), the president’s re-election appears all but secure. As the presidential election – the first round of which is scheduled for July while a possible run-off would be held in September – is now essentially a formality, public attention has already begun to shift towards Yudhoyono’s political future. The Indonesian constitution does not allow presidents to serve more than two five-year terms, meaning that Yudhoyono will not be able to contest the 2014 elections. Consequently, the ability of Yudhoyono and his party to sustain their political influence in the long term has become the focus of much debate.

Whether PD will be able to entrench itself in Indonesia’s party system beyond Yudhoyono’s presidency is largely dependent on two interrelated factors. First, the performance and popularity of the president over the next five years will determine the chances of his party to remain relevant after Yudhoyono’s departure from office. Should Yudhoyono leave office with similar popularity ratings as he enjoys at the moment, PD will have good prospects of prolonging its existence and success beyond 2014. If, by contrast, Yudhoyono departs with low approval rates, his party is likely to be wiped out in either the 2014 or 2019 elections.

The second factor deciding PD’s future is Yudhoyono’s personal plans for himself, his family and his party after 2014. Obviously, these are to a great extent tied to his performance as president in the next five years. It is difficult to imagine that Yudhoyono would retire from politics in 2014 if he remains highly popular with the electorate. Like most other senior politicians, he would certainly try to remain influential and groom members of his family and inner circle to succeed him in both the presidency and the party leadership.

One possible scenario would see Yudhoyono taking over the PD chairmanship after 2014 (he currently is only the head of its advisory board)
in order to maintain the party as an effective political vehicle. Under his tutelage, younger leaders could be slowly prepared to take over from Yudhoyono in the following years. PD’s biggest problem, however, is a significant generational gap in its leadership: while there are a number of promising young talents, none of the older leaders appears ready to succeed Yudhoyono immediately in 2014. For example, Hadi Utomo, Yudhoyono’s brother-in-law and PD general chairman, is an uncharismatic former colonel whose leadership credentials are openly questioned by many PD officials. Born in 1945, he is also older than Yudhoyono, who will be 65 at the end of his second term.

Most of PD’s younger leaders, on the other hand, would be too junior (both in terms of age and political clout) to be considered for the presidency in 2014. Forty-six year-old Andi Mallarangeng, for example, would need several more years to step out of Yudhoyono’s shadow, where he has been since 2004 as his presidential spokesman and, more recently, a senior leader in PD. He had planned to run for parliament in 2009 in order to sharpen his political profile, but Yudhoyono asked him to withdraw his candidacy.9 Similarly, PD’s key political strategist Anas Urbaningrum (40) is also unlikely to be ready for higher political office in 2014.

If Mallarangeng and Urbaningrum are at least a decade away from greater political prominence, Yudhoyono’s sons may require even longer. To be sure, Yudhoyono seems to be very interested in grooming both his sons for political careers. Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono (27) was made a department chair in PD, and his successful candidacy for a seat in parliament was heavily supported by the party and Yudhoyono. His older brother Agus Harimurti (31) has chosen a military career, but is widely seen as the more charismatic of the two Yudhoyono sons. However, as a graduate of the military academy class of 2000, Agus would have to wait another 25 years before reaching the top ranks of the armed forces, and would only retire from the military in 2035.

Given this problem of lacking candidates for Yudhoyono’s immediate succession from within the party and his children, it will be crucial to watch the president’s manoeuvres over the next five years. In particular, it will be interesting to observe how Yudhoyono’s wife, Kristiani Herawati (popularly known as ‘Ani’), positions herself. It can’t be ruled out that Ani will be built up as a successor if Yudhoyono remains popular with the electorate. This ‘Clinton’ model would follow the example of Argentina, where former President Kirchner handed the presidency to his wife in 2007 and became head of the ruling party. Ani Yudhoyono, for her part, played a crucial role in the formation of PD, was a deputy chairwoman until 2005 and has since actively engaged in fundraising for the party.10

Whatever Yudhoyono’s plans are, it is far from certain that PD will become a constant in Indonesia’s party system. Despite its electoral success, the party remains institutionally and ideologically weak. Significantly, this weakness is not only visible in the centre. In the regions, PD is mostly supported by incumbent governors and district heads who hope for better access to central government funds. These bureaucrats and politicians could easily switch to another party if the winds in Jakarta change in the next five years. Ultimately, the fate of PD rests on Yudhoyono’s shoulders.
Golkar: reduced but still relevant

While PD’s rise and the losses of Golkar and PDIP seem to have undermined the strength and future prospects of the established parties, it is too early to count them out. One of the reasons why the established parties may emerge reinvigorated from the most recent elections is a small, but important, change to the electoral laws adopted in 2008: for the first time in Indonesian history, a parliamentary threshold of 2.5 per cent was introduced. This change effectively destroyed the chances of small splinter parties, which had often been created by politicians who felt marginalised in their previous organisations. With this change, the number of parties in the Indonesian parliament immediately dropped from 17 to 9. Most importantly, the threshold will create a disincentive for further spin-offs, strengthening the existing parties as a result.

Table 1: Parties in the 2009 parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2009 (%)</th>
<th>2009 seats</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>+13.4/+91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>-7.1/-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDIP</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>-4.5/-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>+0.6/+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-0.4/-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-2.8/-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-5.7/-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerindra</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>+4.5/+30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanura</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>+3.8/+15</td>
</tr>
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Although two newly created parties did pass the threshold, this is unlikely to convince politicians that it is worth leaving their old parties and founding new ones. Both Prabowo and Wiranto poured tens of millions of dollars into their parties, but the results of Gerindra and Hanura were disproportionately low to that investment. Moreover, 29 parties participating in the elections (which gained a total of 18.2 per cent of the votes) failed to win a seat in the national parliament and suffered considerable financial losses as a result. Consequently, the next five years might see many politicians returning to the established parties, and the 2014 elections are almost certain to be contested by many fewer than the 38 parties that competed in 2009.

Golkar is likely to be one of the main beneficiaries of this institutionally induced concentration in the party system. After 1998, many Golkar politicians left Soeharto’s former electoral machine in order to found their own parties. But because of their exclusion from the 2009 parliament (which would have been the only source of income for most small parties), these former cadres will certainly have a second look at Golkar when planning the next stage of their political careers.

Besides the drastic reduction in the number of smaller parties, there are other reasons why Golkar might be better positioned for the future than its meagre 2009 result suggests. In contrast to PD, Golkar remains institutionally strong, with a network of party-owned provincial and district headquarters across Indonesia (most other parties have to rent their premises). In addition, more than 40 per cent of Indonesia’s 500 district heads are official Golkar cadres, and many more are Golkar politicians who ran for other parties but never relinquished their party membership. This is a much higher percentage than in any other party
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– in PDIP, for example, most of its successful candidates for local government posts are party outsiders.

Furthermore, one of Golkar’s most frequently cited short-term weaknesses is in fact a long-term asset: its lack of charismatic, dominant figures. Much more so than PD or PDIP, Golkar relies on its institutional effectiveness rather than the popularity of its leader. Neither Akbar Tandjung, the chairman between 1998 and 2004, nor Jusuf Kalla, the incumbent, has been a towering figure upon which the party depended for its survival. Quite ironically, Golkar has emerged as one of the most internally competitive parties of the post-Soeharto era, with a large number of high-quality cadres running for leadership positions. Whereas the existence of some other parties seems in doubt if and when their charismatic leaders die or retire, Golkar’s institutional continuity appears to be secured.

Nevertheless, the results of the 2009 elections have clearly sounded the alarm bells for the party faithful. What concerns Golkar leaders most is not so much the drop of its national support from 21.6 to 14.5 per cent; much more worrying for them is the dramatic landslides in their former strongholds, such as South Sulawesi and West Java. In South Sulawesi, the party won 65 per cent in the 1999 elections, then 48 per cent in 2004, and has now dropped to below 30 per cent. Even worse, in West Java Golkar fell behind PD and PDIP. These losses, while largely due to PD’s populist successes, will cause considerable soul-searching in Golkar in the months and years to come.

Much of the internal discussions will focus on whether Kalla’s position as vice-president has damaged the interests of the party. Apparently, voters have credited only Yudhoyono for the achievements of the government, even though Kalla was the main driver behind some of them. At the same time, Kalla’s position made it impossible for Golkar politicians to attack the government for some of its shortcomings. Forced to watch from the margins while Yudhoyono reaped the benefits from the government’s work, and unable to sharpen Golkar’s profile by criticising less popular policies, some party leaders have suggested that Golkar may in fact be better off in opposition. At the time of writing, this debate was in full swing, with several factions fighting over the future course of the party, Golkar’s role in the upcoming presidential elections and more effective forms of cooperation with Yudhoyono in the next government.

Despite these internal conflicts, Golkar can take comfort in two facts that make its further decline unlikely: First, during various periods between 2004 and 2009, the party had been ahead in the opinion polls. In December 2006, it was leading with 21 per cent support, in July 2007 with 20 per cent, and in September 2008 with 19 per cent. It was only after October 2008 that Golkar was left behind by PD’s rise amidst the cash payments to the poor. This signals that Golkar’s drop is not so much a structural phenomenon, but rather a reflection of the rapid escalation in support for PD. This insight will not be lost on Golkar leaders, and they are likely to adjust their policy platform accordingly.

Second, Golkar has been able to attract remarkable numbers of young, well-educated professionals into its ranks. Much more so than PD and PDIP, the party has recruited university
graduates and political activists to run for it in elections. By doing so, Golkar has strengthened its already significant component of younger leaders in parliament and executive institutions. For instance, the Golkar caucus in the 2009 parliament will feature political newcomers such as Jeffrie Geovanie. Born in 1967, Geovanie is concurrently a businessman, an activist of the modernist Muslim organisation Muhammadiyah and the head of a respected think tank, The Indonesian Institute.

With smaller parties disappearing, Golkar deeply entrenched in local governments, and its regeneration progressing more smoothly that that of other parties, Golkar is unlikely to fade from the Indonesian party landscape anytime soon. However, it needs to – and almost certainly will – study closely the reasons for PD’s remarkable success in 2009, even if that means changing the party’s previous fixation on economic growth as the main measure of effective development.

**PDIP: in search of a dynastic solution**

Like PD (but in contrast to Golkar), PDIP faces the pressing problem of identifying candidates for a dynastic succession in the party leadership. Most observers are convinced that the secular-nationalist PDIP can only survive if the Soekarno family remains engaged in leading the party. They argue that Megawati has been such a dominant figure in PDIP for the last 15 years that any leader without her explicit blessing and support from behind the scenes would find it impossible to hold the party together. Megawati clearly shares that view. Accordingly, she has made her husband Taufik Kiemas the chair of PDIP’s advisory board and her daughter Puan Maharani a deputy chairwoman, expecting that the latter will be able to fill her shoes in the future.

But not everybody in PDIP is enthusiastic about this prospect. Thirty-six year-old Puan is not only seen as too young and inexperienced, but she is also widely believed to have inherited some of the more unfavourable character traits of her mother. Appearing distant, cold and easily agitated, she has frequently refused media interviews and has looked uncomfortable when mixing with crowds. One of the few longer interviews she has given was for the high-society magazine *Indonesia Tatler* read only by Jakarta’s super-rich. It was this perceived aloofness and elitism that cost Megawati the presidency in 2004, and it is also partly to blame for PDIP’s further decline in the 2009 elections.

Party sources say that Puti Guntur Soekarnoputri, the daughter of Megawati’s brother Guntur, would be a much better choice to chair PDIP in the future. Puti (37) is viewed as a more charismatic and politically talented figure than her cousin Puan. Puti’s father Guntur – revered by many in PDIP as Soekarno’s natural successor – had always been the focus of much speculation as far as a possible political career was concerned, but he had decided not to pursue that option. Instead, Megawati had stepped up and filled the vacancy. With both Puan and Puti winning seats in the 2009 parliament, PDIP politicians are certain to closely watch (and compare) the performances of the two young women in the legislature.

But whoever will emerge as the winner in the unavoidable dynastic struggle in the Soekarno
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Family, PDIP is confronted with the task of finding a transitional leader who could manage the party until the new generation of Soekarno offspring can take over. Like PD, PDIP suffers from a generational gap: while some politicians born in the 1960s and 1970s are gradually rising through the ranks, there are very few senior leaders who could take Megawati’s place if she chose to step down from the party leadership. To some extent, this is due to Megawati’s expulsion of a league of former loyalists from PDIP in the last ten years. After their departure, Megawati has surrounded herself more with faceless party administrators rather than with critical and politically creative minds.

There are only very few exceptions, and most of them are active in parliament rather than in running the party. For example, Andreas Pareira, 45 years old and the holder of a German doctorate in political science, has been an astute legislator on the defence and foreign relations commission. Similarly, Ganjar Pranowo (41), who is seen as a rising star in the party, has been widely praised for his role in inter-party negotiations over various difficult bills. Finally, PDIP also has recruited Budiman Sudjatmiko (39), who had been imprisoned under Soeharto for his leftist political activism. While all of them are likely to hold senior positions in the party in the future, they are not part of Megawati’s inner circle and thus are currently unable to determine the party’s course and personnel.

Besides Megawati, Taufik Kiemas and Puan, the single most influential figure in PDIP at the moment is secretary-general Pramono Anung Wibowo (46). Trained as a geologist, he made a fortune in the mining industry before entering politics in 1998. But despite his intelligence, wealth and good connections, he is unlikely to emerge as Megawati’s long-term successor. He lacks an independent power base in the party, and would not be able to mobilise PDIP’s lower-class, nationalist constituency in the way that Megawati can. However, it is conceivable for Pramono to be appointed acting chairman if Megawati decides to step back from the day-to-day management of the party and lead the advisory board instead. This would provide the next generation of Soekarno’s family with the time it needs to prepare for the leadership.

Despite its internal problems and the disappointing result in the elections, PDIP is certain to remain an influential party as long as Megawati stays engaged and/or organises her succession properly. Like Golkar, PDIP will profit from the concentration in the party system, with some of the nationalist splinter parties likely to return to the party’s fold. It is also important to note that the party has existed in various forms since 1973, and that it defines itself as the successor to Soekarno’s Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia), which in its heyday in the mid-1950s attracted 22.3 per cent of the votes. Hence the party has deep historical roots, distinguishing it from key parties in other Asian democracies. In the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea, for example, parties often disappear once their leaders leave the stage.

PDIP’s institutional and historical rootedness as well as the militancy of many of its loyal supporters also set it apart from Yudhoyono’s PD. While PDIP has fought three election campaigns since 1999, both as a government and an opposition party, and has emerged as one of the three largest party every time, PD
still needs to prove that it can have success without its leaders being in government. Arguably, PD’s members and functionaries are much more opportunistic than PDIP’s core cadres, who would perceive defection to a different party as a sacrilege. Writing obituaries for PDIP at this time is premature.

The Islamic parties: down but not out

One of the most discussed results of the April elections has been the decline in support for Islamic parties. From 38.1 per cent in 2004, their share of the votes has dropped to 27.8 per cent in 2009 – the lowest ever achieved by Islamic parties in a democratic election in Indonesia. Many observers have interpreted this phenomenon as a clear indication of a significant electoral shift benefiting the secular parties at the expense of the Islamic ones. But a closer look at the internal dynamics of individual Islamic parties suggests that their poor results are mostly the consequence of intra-party conflict or institutional stagnation rather than a reflection of general frustration in the electorate with political Islam.

To begin with, the traditionalist Muslim party PKB has been crippled by infighting and fragmentation since 2001, when its patron Abdurrahman Wahid was ousted as Indonesia’s fourth president. Since then, Wahid (who chairs PKB’s powerful advisory board) has fired three chairmen of the party, invariably accusing them of disloyalty towards him. After the first two of these dismissals, groups of formerly staunch PKB supporters left the party, leading to a decline in its electoral support. However, Wahid’s third attempt to fire a PKB chairman – his own nephew Muhaimin Iskandar – was overturned by the courts, and Wahid was marginalised from the party as a result. He subsequently campaigned against PKB, asking his supporters to vote for PDIP or Gerindra instead.

Wahid’s destructive leadership in PKB has undermined the otherwise formidable electoral strength of traditionalist Muslims, who have historically been organised in the mass organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, Revival of the Islamic Scholars). PKB was founded in 1998 as NU’s political wing, with its leaders hoping to repeat the strong performance of NU in the 1955 and 1971 elections when it was still an independent party. At that time, NU received 18 per cent support, but under Wahid, its successor PKB only obtained 12.6 per cent of the votes in the first post-Soeharto elections in 1999. After more internal splits, this dropped to 10.6 per cent in 2004 and – eventually – 4.9 per cent in 2009.

Evidently, PKB’s decline is much less an effect of NU’s eroding socio-political influence than of Wahid’s erratic manoeuvres. It was Wahid’s removal of Alwi Shihab as PKB chair in 2004, for instance, that motivated many of the senior NU clerics, or kiai, to desert PKB and establish their own party. While that party failed to pass the electoral threshold in 2009, it cut off almost two per cent from PKB’s traditional voting block, particularly in its stronghold East Java. Many of those who remained in PKB, on the other hand, rejected Wahid’s appointment of his unpopular 35-year old daughter Yenny as PKB secretary-general in 2007. Unhappy with Wahid’s apparent choice for his succession, they either turned their backs on PKB or supported legal action against Wahid and his daughter in the courts.
There is no reason, however, why PKB should not be restored to being one of Indonesia’s largest parties in the future – if Wahid leaves the scene, that is. Wahid is in poor health, and speculation about his succession has been rampant for years. Wahid’s premature attempt to promote his daughter as PKB’s future leader has created much resentment against her both in the PKB elite and at the grass roots, and has effectively ruled her out as a contender for Wahid’s succession after his death. A more likely scenario would be an NU-appointed caretaker, with current NU chair Hasyim Muzadi possibly interested in the job himself. Under his protection, Muhaimin Iskandar – now only 42 years old – could remain general chairman and slowly grow out of Wahid’s shadow.

PPP, the only Muslim party allowed to operate under Soeharto, has also been marred by internal conflict. The chair of the supervisory board, Bachtiair Chamsyah, and PPP’s general chairman, Suryadharma Ali, have long fallen out, and currently lead an open war over the party’s future course. Both men are still ministers in Yudhoyono’s cabinet, but Suryadharma has publicly favoured Prabowo Subianto as PPP’s presidential candidate. As a result, Bachtiair implied during the campaign that his supporters were not obliged to vote for PPP. The party’s decline from 8.1 per cent in 2004 to 5.3 per cent this year has triggered further tensions, with both camps accusing each other of being responsible for PPP’s poor showing.

But PPP also suffers from two more fundamental problems. First, as a party that appeals to both traditionalist and modernist Muslims, PPP has found it hard to compete with parties that offer more specific platforms for both constituencies. On the one hand, PKB and other NU-based splinter parties have programs and principles particularly designed for traditionalist Muslims in rural Java. On the other hand, PKS has absorbed many modernist voters interested in a more political role for Islam. PPP is thus constantly challenged to address (at least) two constituencies at the same time, with the result that neither side feels effectively represented by PPP.

PPP’s second institutional problem is its failure to regenerate. While PPP replaced many of its ageing national leaders at its last congress in 2007, the party’s provincial and districts chapters have seen only very small numbers of young, promising leaders emerging. Moreover, many of PPP’s national figures lack the charisma and political clout to leave an impression on voters. One of the few exceptions has been Lukman Hakim Syaifuddin, born in 1962 and now the head of PPP’s caucus in parliament. While widely respected for his expertise in legislative issues, his efforts alone have been insufficient to raise PPP’s electoral profile substantially.

PAN, founded by former Muhammadiyah chairman Amien Rais but since 2005 led by the politically inexperienced entrepreneur Sutrisno Bachir, also faces difficulties with its strategic orientation and the recruitment of new cadres. At the beginning of his term, Bachir dissociated PAN from Muhammadiyah in order to open the party for new voters, but this move drove many of its core supporters away and led to the creation of a new Muhammadiyah-based party (which eventually failed to clear the parliamentary threshold). In order to arrest PAN’s decline, Bachir developed a new
strategy. He invited numerous television celebrities to run for PAN in the elections. These hugely popular stars were primarily responsible for PAN’s support declining much less sharply in the 2009 elections than surveys had predicted.17

The only Islamic party that gained votes in the 2009 elections was PKS. However, given the party’s ambition to become one of the largest players in Indonesian politics, its increase of only 0.6 per cent over the 2004 result must be seen as a disappointment. In 2004, PKS quintupled its 1999 result, fuelling the belief among party followers that another major expansion was not only possible, but certain. With three ministers in the Yudhoyono government, PKS officials were convinced that the party now had the necessary experience, connections and resources to grow from a medium-sized party for urban Muslims into a mass party that could, in the longer term, lead the country.

But PKS’ stagnation cannot serve as evidence for the general decline of political Islam in Indonesia. Rather, PKS is currently undergoing an unavoidable transformation from an activist avant-garde party into an established element of Indonesia’s party system. In 2004, the electoral success of PKS had been based on its reputation as an anti-establishment party, which promised a new, cleaner form of politics. With only a few members in the national and local legislatures, this was not too difficult to do. By contrast, after 2004 PKS had more than 1000 legislators across Indonesia, some of whom turned out to be just as vulnerable to the temptations of public office as their colleagues from Golkar and PDIP. Much to the latter’s pleasure, newspaper reports soon focused on PKS politicians involved in corruption cases or caught in questionable massage parlours.18

PKS’s involvement in government also made it much more difficult to portray itself as a party of outsiders committed to total reform. In addition to its cabinet seats, PKS-supported candidates held the governorships of West Java and North Sumatra, and the party controlled several districts as well. It was in these areas that PKS recorded its most disappointing results. With voters realising that a PKS-led government does not automatically lead to visible change, the enthusiasm for PKS’ unique political image and platform began to decline. In that, PKS followed the pattern of many other anti-establishment parties: from the Green movement in Europe to radical parties on the left and the right. Most such newcomers find their rise halted when reaching their political saturation point after two or three elections.

To be sure, PKS did little to counter the growing impression that it was no longer a reformist party exclusively focused on clean governance, anti-corruption measures and Islamic values. In October 2008, it launched a media campaign that praised Soeharto as a ‘national hero’, hoping to moderate PKS’ Islamic image in the eyes of Indonesian mainstream voters. While some welcomed the PKS campaign as an expression of its willingness to renounce elements of its Islamic agenda, others were horrified at what they saw as a purely opportunistic manoeuvre. Whatever its impact may have been, the pro-Soeharto move made it impossible for PKS to run on the same ‘ethical politics’ platform that had been so successful in 2004.
Nevertheless, the slowing down of PKS’ growth shouldn’t detract from the fact that it is now Indonesia’s largest Islamic party. It also has a good chance of attracting more supporters from those Muslim parties that failed at the electoral threshold, or from the established parties that are likely to continue their decline, such as PPP or PAN. The Crescent Star Party (PBB, Partai Bulan Bintang), for example, an ultra-modernist Islamic party represented in Yudhoyono’s cabinet, was wiped out at the national level in the April polls. If the party disintegrates – which is likely – its members and voters will have to find a new political home. PKS, as Indonesia’s only Muslim party with a solid and relatively conflict-free organisation, is certainly one of the better options for such political ‘refugees’.

The newcomers: disappointed generals

In recent years, some observers have identified a process of ‘Philippinisation’ in Indonesian party politics, i.e. the emergence of parties run by powerful individuals for the sole purpose of serving as their electoral vehicles. These parties have neither social roots nor a strong programmatic appeal; they are exclusively tailored to the needs and strategic calculations of their leaders. In the Philippines (and also in Thailand and South Korea), such parties often vanish as quickly as they were founded – when their leaders step down from public office, the parties become redundant.

For many reasons, Indonesia does not fit into this ‘Philippine’ model. Most parties are rooted in religio-political milieus, and although some of them are dependent on the charisma of their patrons, they still have cultural, social and ideological characteristics that distinguish them from their rivals. In addition, many parties have been entrenched in the party system for decades – Golkar since the 1960s, PDIP since the 1970s (and via its predecessor PNI even since the 1950s), PKB (via NU) since 1952, and PPP since 1973. Even ‘new’ creations like PAN and PKS are now 11 years old, well above the average life expectancy of parties in the Philippines, Thailand or South Korea.

What analysts mean, then, by the ‘Philippinisation’ of Indonesian parties is the electoral significance of PD and, in the most recent ballot, Gerindra and Hanura. All three parties were established to facilitate the presidential candidates of their founders, and they have been able to break into traditional electoral constituencies despite their lack of clear socio-ideological profiles. But there is much evidence to suggest that the examples of PD, Gerindra and Hanura will not set a new dominant trend in Indonesian party politics. If anything, the current experiences of Gerindra and Hanura will discourage other political strongmen from creating their own parties.

When founding their parties, both Prabowo and Wiranto believed that their previous presidential ambitions had been sabotaged by the existing political parties, most notably by Golkar. Accordingly, they had convinced themselves that if only they could control their own organisations, the door to the palace would be wide open to them. From scratch, they built up nationwide political networks, pouring millions of dollars into infrastructure, salaries, vehicles, media campaigns and constituency programs. But when the votes were counted, the results were dispiriting: Gerindra had 4.5 per cent support, and Hanura...
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only 3.8 per cent. This was a far cry from what both ex-generals had expected.

Neither Prabowo nor Wiranto had launched their campaigns in order to head two of the smallest caucuses in parliament; their declared goal was nothing less than the presidency. Hence it is doubtful that both men will maintain high levels of funding for their respective parties. Wiranto, in particular, will have to think twice whether another run in 2014 is viable. He would be 67 by then, older than any other Indonesian president when taking office. And after two failed presidential candidacies and his personal wealth much reduced, there are few untested political options left for him.

Prabowo, who would be ‘only’ 63 in 2014, may try a fresh run in five years time, but the costs of such a decision would be tremendous. According to most accounts, Prabowo has spent a significant amount of his capital on his 2009 campaign; sustaining the party over the next five years and then pouring more money into another costly campaign may be more than even a well-off figure such as Prabowo can afford. After all, the fact that his very pricey campaign in 2009 only convinced 4.5 per cent of Indonesians to vote for his party does not give him much hope that he would do much better in 2014.

The miscalculation that both Prabowo and Wiranto made in their respective campaigns was to believe that an effective political party would boost their low popularity rates. In this, they thought that they could simply copy Yudhoyono’s successful bid for the presidency in 2004. However, they overlooked the fact that Yudhoyono was already popular before he activated PD as his electoral vehicle. Indeed, Yudhoyono only decided to put resources into PD after he was convinced that his personal popularity numbers were high enough for him to win. Arguably, Yudhoyono in 2004 did not need PD to become president; it was his carefully crafted media image that guaranteed his victory. By contrast, Prabowo and Wiranto started from much lower popularity bases, and even the most dynamic party apparatuses could do little to lift them.

With Gerindra and Hanura’s mediocre showing in 2009, the emergence of more personalistic, Philippine-style parties in the coming years is unlikely. The parliamentary threshold and a new requirement that allows only parties with 20 per cent of the seats or 25 per cent of the votes to nominate presidential candidates are set to further reduce the incentive to build up purely personal electoral vehicles.

Against this background, it appears evident now that Yudhoyono’s emergence in 2004 was a political exception rather than a signal for the ‘Philippinisation’ of the Indonesian party system and the decline of its established, socially rooted parties. Yudhoyono embodies a unique amalgamation of the contradictory hopes and expectations that Indonesian voters have placed in their president: polite but tough, consistent but ready to compromise, rational but populist. No other presidential contender has so far been able to offer anything similar.

If there are traces of Philippine-style politics, they can be found in the increasing participation of actors, models and other celebrity in electoral politics. But while the recent elections have witnessed some spectacular successes of television idols (in one
case, no less than Taufik Kiemas came second to a TV actress nominated by his own party), fundamental differences between the Philippines and Indonesia remain. In the Philippines, an action movie star triumphed in 1998 with the largest winning margin in the post-Marcos era, and a news anchor became vice-president in 2004 with the largest recorded plurality. Similarly, five of 24 Philippine senators were media stars in 1998, reflecting the intensity of what observers have called the ‘celebritification’ of elections in the Philippines.22

In Indonesia, by contrast, the highest office so far obtained by a TV celebrity is that of deputy governor (in West Java), and party elites seem determined to deny their famous colleagues more powerful positions. For the time being, it appears that the ‘Philippinisation’ of Indonesian politics remains an unfulfilled dream of Jakarta’s many ex-generals and starlets.

Indonesia’s multi-party system: stable but dynamic

While the 2009 parliamentary elections have led to some significant changes in the strength of the various parties, the party system as such has remained remarkably stable. Six out of the nine parties who won seats in parliament had already participated in the 1999 elections; one had been founded in 2001; and only two were newcomers. Eighty-four per cent of voters in 2009 supported one of the parties that had run in 2004, with 73.5 per cent backing established large or medium-sized parties. Thus despite a reduction in the support for parties that had already existed before 1998, the movement of voters from one party to another is still largely occurring within the ‘club’ of established political actors.

Voter turnout has also declined only slightly, in line with the experience of other young, consolidating democracies. At 71 per cent, turnout was 13 per cent lower than at the legislative ballot in 2004, but only three per cent below the figures recorded during the second round of presidential elections in the same year. This decline is mostly a reflection of the fact that after the initial post-authoritarian enthusiasm in 1999, elections have now become a routine in Indonesia. Since 2005, Indonesians have also voted in direct gubernatorial and district-level elections, with some voters going to the polls eight times in a five-year cycle.23 In these local elections, average turnout has been 69 per cent, a healthy number by international standards.

These figures – and corresponding opinion surveys – show that support for multi-party democracy in Indonesia remains high. No key socio-political group is currently lobbying for an alternative political system, and despite occasional nostalgia for Soeharto, the broader population seems satisfied with the electoral powers invested in it by the post-1998 reforms. This should not be taken for granted. Indonesia’s only other experiment with democracy collapsed in the late 1950s after only seven years. Entering its twelfth year in May 2009, Indonesia’s incumbent democratic polity shows no sign of imminent crisis or degeneration. Given that predictions for Indonesia made in 1998 included territorial disintegration and certain relapse to military rule, this longevity of democracy is an achievement in itself.
But this does not mean that Indonesia’s democratic consolidation is proceeding smoothly. The recent elections have highlighted – and to some extent aggravated – existing deficiencies in Indonesia’s democratic institutions and procedures. These shortcomings relate to the effectiveness of political parties and the legislature, the quality of elections, the increasing ‘commercialisation’ of politics, and the continuing fight against corruption.

First of all, despite general support for multi-party democracy, Indonesians are profoundly dissatisfied with the performance of political parties and, more specifically, their representatives in the legislature. This apparent paradox should not be surprising as even in consolidated democracies, parties and politicians invariably rank among the least trusted and respected institutions and professions. In a Gallup poll in December 2006, for instance, US respondents rated only car salesmen lower than members of Congress in terms of their ethics and honesty. In a similar poll taken in Australia in 2005, only 15 per cent of respondents thought that members of federal parliament had high ethical standards, once again beating only car salesmen to gain the second-lowest ranking.

While obviously a global phenomenon, the unpopularity of the political class in Indonesia should be a source of concern. The country’s political system is still vulnerable, having emerged only recently from four decades of authoritarianism. Indonesian democracy will have a much better chance of becoming the only game in town in the long term if political parties and their functionaries can at least mitigate strong public perceptions that they are corrupt, self-absorbed and ineffective. Although some younger politicians have credibly taken up the fight against the bad reputation of their profession, many more have to do the same in order to moderate society’s deeply entrenched resentment.

Second, the quality of the 2009 elections has been lower than that of the 1999 and 2004 ballots, with serious deficiencies in the voter registration process triggering doubts about the fairness and competitiveness of Indonesia’s electoral democracy. One of the main reasons for the difference in quality has been the gradually declining engagement of foreign donors in the elections. In 1999, Western governments provided about US$100 million to the Indonesian government in electoral support, and in 2004 US$85.4 million. In 2009, aid agencies have reduced their support to US$15 million, leading to a visible decline in the professionalism of electoral management.

It is crucial to emphasise, however, that irregularities in the elections were only rarely related to attempts of vote rigging. Rather, they were the result of poorly prepared voter lists, lack of experienced staff at all levels of the Election Commission (KPU, Komisi Pemilihan Umum), ageing technical equipment and the unavailability of funds for voter registration at the grass roots. It is very unlikely that the overall will of the voters was severely distorted by these weaknesses in electoral organisation; pre-election opinion surveys had forecast a result very similar to the eventual outcome, and at least four respected pollsters published quick counts on election night that came very close to the KPU’s official figures.
Even if Indonesia is far from being an example of a weak electoral democracy in which incumbents stay in power by manipulating ballots, improving the quality of election management must be high on the country’s agenda for the next five years. The main challenge for Indonesia in this regard is achieving computer-based registration of its citizens, which would allow for regular updating of the voter lists. As long as voter registration is still being done manually, it will remain impossible to trace the movements of more than 170 million eligible voters across the archipelago. Especially in the cities, where voters often move from one boarding-house to the next in a matter of months, turnout has been low. Clearly, giving more Indonesians the chance to vote would go a long way to further stabilise multi-party democracy.

The third factor with the potential to slow down and obstruct democratic consolidation is the increasing commercialisation of politics. ‘Money politics’ is an Indonesian buzz word, mostly describing the way politicians hand out material gifts to voters to earn their support. But in recent years, politics has become much more expensive and complicated than that: parties and candidates have to hire pollsters and consultants, run costly advertising campaigns and satisfy the escalating demands of their constituencies. In order to obtain the money to cover such campaign expenses, politicians have to ‘borrow’ money from financial sponsors. Obviously, these donors expect to be rewarded with political and economic favours if their protégé is elected.

In many ways, the 2009 elections have increased the dependence of parties and nominees on their financial backers. Due to the introduction of a proportional system with a fully open party list, candidates from the same party were forced for the first time to compete against each other for a seat in parliament by trying to achieve the largest number of personal votes. Under previous electoral systems, central party boards decided who represented them in parliament, creating disincentives for candidates with guaranteed seats to campaign at the grass roots. This time, however, thousands of nominees have taken on large liabilities in order to fund their campaigns. As a result, many of them will enter parliament with significant debts and be under pressure to pay them off quickly.

The 2009 elections intensified another form of ‘money politics’: as explained earlier, President Yudhoyono used billions of dollars from the state budget for populist cash-for-the-poor programs, which undoubtedly played a large role in his victory. His success (and especially the fact that he was able to turn around his electoral fortunes so rapidly) will certainly encourage other politicians to use similar methods in the future. The ‘Thaksinisation’ of electoral politics in Indonesia – at least as far as populist spending practices are concerned – appears to be a logical consequence of Yudhoyono’s stunning triumph.

Finally, Indonesia’s protracted struggle with corruption continues to undermine democratic consolidation. Despite SBY’s courageous battle against corrupt state officials and legislators, Indonesia remains one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Obviously, political reform will remain fragmentary as long as most actors in parliaments, government agencies, state enterprises and the private sector still carry out their business based on pay-to-play
principles. As many new legislators start their term with campaign sponsors breathing down their necks, the fate of Indonesia’s anti-corruption drive is uncertain at best.

Conclusion: a new Yudhoyono dynasty?

Indonesia’s parliamentary elections in April 2009 have set important historical and political precedents for the country’s future patterns of electoral competition. For the first time since 1998, an incumbent president’s party has won an election, and for the first time, a post-Soeharto government used massive cash-for-the-poor programs to boost its electoral prospects. These two novelties are very likely to encourage Indonesia’s political actors to revisit their platforms and adopt more populist electoral strategies for 2014.

The triumph of PD and Yudhoyono’s almost certain victory in the upcoming presidential polls have also raised questions about the long-term plans of the president for himself, his family and his party. Yudhoyono clearly supports his sons’ decisions to pursue political and military careers, suggesting that he at least considers the possibility of establishing a new political dynasty. But whether Yudhoyono will succeed in firmly anchoring PD and his family in Indonesia’s political landscape is far from clear. PD remains institutionally weak, lacks a generation of middle-aged figures who could act as transitional leaders in 2014, and continues to rely entirely on Yudhoyono’s performance in office to survive as an organisation.

The uncertainty over Yudhoyono’s and PD’s long-term prospects favours the established parties, which despite their significant losses in the April polls have a good chance of regaining ground in the next few years. In addition to PD’s institutional deficiencies, the older parties are also likely to benefit from the concentration process in the party system triggered by the newly applied parliamentary threshold. This process is set to further stabilise Indonesia’s party system, which already is much more institutionalised and socially rooted than its counterparts in other Asian democracies.

Despite generally healthy political indicators (stable party system, satisfactory voter turnout, high levels of support for democracy), Indonesia still faces serious challenges on its way to more transparent, clean and effective governance. Societal resentment towards Indonesia’s political elite is increasing, while the quality of electoral management has been in decline. In addition, the dependence of elected officials on external financial sponsors has reached alarming levels, threatening to undercut the important achievements of the anti-corruption campaign so far. If Indonesia wants to further consolidate its young and thriving democracy, these issues will have to be addressed sooner rather than later.
ANALYSIS

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NOTES
1 The author would like to thank Greg Fealy, Ed Aspinall and Ken Ward for their useful comments and insights on earlier drafts of this report.
2 Analysts have typically distinguished between two broad currents in Indonesian Islam: the traditionalist stream, which allows for Islam to be influenced by elements of local culture (mostly Javanese spiritual beliefs); and the modernists, who oppose religious practices and teachings not based on strict Islamic prescriptions.
3 All opinion survey figures in this paper are based on Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, Parties and candidates in the run-up to the 2009 Indonesian national elections. Jakarta, Lembaga Survei Indonesia, February 2009.
5 Fifteen trillion Rupiah (US$1.4 billion) were directly paid out as cash allowances, but more was spent through various anti-poverty programs and credit schemes. Also, the government increased the operational funds for schools by 50 per cent in 2009, channelling an additional 4.1 trillion Rupiah (US$380 million) to schools in order to reduce the fees they usually charge to parents.
6 Prius Priambudi, Antara BLT dan BLM, Kabar Indonesia, 8 July 2008.
7 George Wehrfritz, A leader who looms: the pundits laughed at Thaksin but his economic populism is spreading Asia, even as he leaves. Newsweek, 23 August 2008.
10 Ani’s role in promoting Yudhoyono’s military career was also crucial. Ani is the daughter of former military academy commander Sarwo Edhi Wibowo. By marrying Ani, the then unknown Yudhoyono became a member of the family of one of Indonesia’s most respected generals.
11 In previous post-Soeharto elections, only a so-called ‘electoral threshold’ was applied. In theory, this meant that parties that didn’t reach a certain percentage of the votes (in 2004, three per cent) had to dissolve themselves. In practice, however, most parties simply changed their names and continued to compete in elections.
12 Between October 2008 and February 2009, Prabowo spent 46.7 billion Rupiah (US$4.3 million) on media advertisements alone. This was before the actual campaign had started, and did not include any other organisational costs. See Iklan Politik: Gerindra Terbesar Belanja Sosialisasi. Lampung Post, 13 February 2009.
14 See the interview, in English, on Tatler’s website: http://www.indonesiatabler.com/people.php?id=2997 &people_id=.
15 One widely held view within PDIP is that while Puti has inherited Soekarno’s political character, Puan’s personality is closer to that of her father Taufik Kiemas.
17 As a result of its heavy concentration on celebrities, Bachir proudly announced that PAN now stood for ‘Partai Artis Nasional’, or ‘National Party of Celebrities’. See Sejumlah Artis Gabung ke PAN. Kompas, 29 May 2008.
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20 In South Korea, most parties dissolve themselves after three years. See Bruce Klingner, *South Korea's mercurial political landscape*. Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 12 September, 2007.

21 While PD was officially founded in 2001, Yudhoyono had kept a distance from – and provided very little financial support for – the party. Only after his resignation from the Megawati cabinet in March 2004 did he increase his public engagement with PD.


23 These elections are: one parliamentary election at the national level, two rounds of presidential elections, one direct election for district head (with the possibility of a run-off), one direct gubernatorial election (also with the chance of a second round), and one election for the position of village head.


26 Marcus Mietzner, Political opinion polling in post-authoritarian Indonesia: catalyst or obstacle to democratic consolidation. *Bijdragen tot the Taal-Land en Volkenkunde* 165 (2) 2009.

27 This system was the result of a decision by the Constitutional Court in December 2008, which had annulled the mechanism by which seats were to be allocated to candidates with the highest rankings on party lists if no nominee achieved 30 per cent of an electoral quota. Based on this court ruling, seats were given to the nominees with the highest number of votes, regardless of their position on the list.
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