Integrating Security
Preparing for the National Security Threats of the 21st Century

Lawrence Korb, Sean Duggan, and Laura Conley  November 2009
Integrating Security

Preparing for the National Security Threats of the 21st Century

Lawrence Korb, Sean Duggan, and Laura Conley  November 2009
1 Introduction and summary

4 Policy recommendations and implementation strategies

6 Why now?

7 Defining U.S. national security objectives

9 Threats to U.S. national security
   9 Violent extremists
   13 Weak and failing states
   15 Hostile regimes
   19 Rising powers
   25 Energy security
   31 Economic threats

36 The tools to accomplish U.S. national security objectives
   36 Unified national security budget
   38 Diplomacy
   44 Development
   47 Defense
   51 The U.S. intelligence community
   53 The Department of Homeland Security

57 Conclusion

58 Endnotes

61 About the authors and acknowledgements
Introduction and summary

President Barack Obama and his administration face a national security landscape that is greatly different from the one the United States confronted at the end of the previous century. Fragile states, weak governments, extremist non-state actors, hostile nuclear armed regimes, dynamic rising powers, and economic and environmental threats are but some of the most serious challenges facing the new administration. The complex and interconnected nature of these threats means that pursuing U.S. national security objectives will require a strong investment in diplomatic development, homeland security, and intelligence skills to complement our military strength.

The Obama administration understands the need to integrate and coordinate all instruments of American foreign policy to confront these threats. What’s more, the administration has begun to lay the groundwork for this unified effort through strategic planning in three key executive agencies. The first of these efforts is Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s initiative to create a strategic planning guidance for the State Department, the so called Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, or QDDR. The second is the formulation of the administration’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR, a document that defines our military’s force structure and thus shapes its upcoming budget plans. Finally, the Department of Homeland Security is undertaking a similar quadrennial review, the QHSR, to determine how the agency can best execute its responsibilities.

Yet these studies depend on a larger strategic vehicle, the National Security Strategy, or NSS, a document meant to establish a comprehensive foundation for overall U.S. national security policy and provide guidance for specific tactical documents. As retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, the former head of U.S. Central Command, notes, this National Security Strategy document will be “the follow-up to the initial speeches and communication and it will be the authority for our own government structure, all the way down because from the strategy cascades the actions and the organization and the allocation of resources to make that [strategy] happen.”

Congress mandates that every administration issue a yearly NSS, with the first report released within five months of taking office. The Obama administration has clearly missed that deadline. As a result, these tactical planning documents will be coming together over the next several months without a unified strategy to inform them. It would be a grave mistake for the administration to delay too long in issuing this important guidance.
To be sure, Obama and his administration have already articulated some of the key principles of a new National Security Strategy. The president’s speech before the United Nations last September and his speech in Cairo last June are two examples. So, too, are Vice President Joseph Biden’s speech at the Munich Security Conference last February and the President’s inaugural address, in which he declared that “our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.”

The common themes of these addresses are broader engagement with friends and foes alike, a refusal to sacrifice our nation’s values in the name of our security, and a return to American leadership of our vital alliances and international institutions. These themes make clear the Obama administration has no tolerance for its predecessor’s preference for unilateralism and near sole reliance on the military as the primary instrument of national power.

But the array of challenges facing the administration is daunting. Success will depend not only on how well the administration is able to ensure that its policies live up to these stated values, but critically, on how ably the administration can draw on the U.S. government’s full capabilities and tear down the bureaucratic boundaries between actors as diverse as the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Energy, Homeland Security, and Agriculture. A timely, integrated national security strategy is necessary to drive this integration forward.

This document is a blueprint for the form such an NSS should take. The report draws on a large body of recent studies produced by the Center for American Progress as well as original research to layout a progressive agenda for keeping our nation safe and secure. We begin by defining U.S. national security objectives as the need to:

- Protect the people, allies and interests of the United States.
- Uphold and strengthen the norms of a stable international system.

The report then delineates the most serious threats facing the United States today. These challenges include:

- Violent extremists with global reach that aim to harm the United States and other liberal democracies.
- An ever-growing group of weak and failing states that can provide safe harbor for terrorists and destabilize regions.
- Hostile regimes that actively seek weapons of mass destruction.
- Rising powers that are becoming more powerful and assertive in international affairs.
- A growing reliance on foreign fossil fuels that makes our country energy dependent and leads to climate change and environmental degradation.
- A range of economic threats, including underdevelopment and cybercrime.
President George W. Bush confronted many of these same threats during his time in office, but his strategy and tactics were decidedly different. In the introduction to his 2006 National Security Strategy, Bush proclaimed that the United States intended to “shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy.” It was a bold statement that encapsulated the best and worst of American exceptionalism—a sense of duty to improve the world’s condition pitted against an obdurate preference for unilateral action and an exaggerated sense of the capability of U.S. military power to achieve its objectives at a minimal cost.

This approach was used to justify the overmilitarization of U.S. foreign policy, including the unnecessary invasion and occupation of Iraq. It led the Bush administration to relegate the mission in Afghanistan and other vital national security concerns to second-tier status, and allow U.S. diplomatic and development capabilities to atrophy beyond their post-Cold War nadir.

President Barack Obama inherited the wreckage of these failures and has begun to take a fundamentally different approach to the conflicts the Bush administration could not resolve, but more needs to be done in four specific areas:

- The Obama administration is taking too long to issue its first national security strategy. It has failed to meet its legal obligation to produce an NSS within five months of taking office, and it has allowed planning documents such as the QDR, QDDR, and QHSR to move forward without unified strategic guidance.

- The debate over whether to empower State, USAID, and other agencies to take a larger role in U.S. national security is over. But the administration still needs a plan and a budget to strengthen these actors. Strong guidance from the executive branch in the form of a unified national security budget is necessary for the president and Congress to rebalance U.S. defense, development, diplomacy, homeland security, and intelligence capabilities.

- Obama’s challenge is to unify the instruments of national power, as well as undo the damage that the previous administration did to U.S. foreign policy. President Obama faces many of the same threats that George W. Bush confronted—violent extremists, weak and failing states, and hostile regimes. Yet many of Bush’s policies failed to significantly advance U.S. interests, which made already difficult issues more challenging. Iran is the most obvious example of this trend.

- Dealing with the rapidly changing threat environment must be a key part of the administration’s national security strategy. Nontraditional enemies, such as stateless terrorist groups, are challenging our traditional ideas of how to achieve national security, but a new set of challenges is already growing. These include cybercrime, climate change-induced migration and instability, and changes in the international system due to rising and resurgent powers.
Policy recommendations

The United States must integrate all the elements of American military and foreign policy to protect our vital interests, but reject those policies that create more enemies than they eliminate, or undermine international security. By doing so, we can keep our country safe and restore America’s role as a nation whose morality and strength make the world better for all people. Specifically, the United States must continue to reverse the foreign policy legacy of the Bush administration and move forward with new strategies by:

• Fundamentally changing the U.S. response to the threat posed by radical extremists with global reach who aim to harm the United States, its people, allies, and interests.
• Significantly increasing U.S. funding for development programs in weak and failing states.
• Using all diplomatic tools to engage with, rather than isolate hostile regimes.
• Promoting the integration of rising powers into the existing international architecture.
• Reducing America’s energy dependence by investing in renewable energy sources and smart grid technology.
• Moving forward with the Obama administration’s cybersecurity agenda and building institutions to undermine global poverty.

Implementation strategies

Create a unified national security budget

The United States has the capability to confront these threats to global security and stability, but in order to do so most efficiently and effectively we must also address the imbalance between key elements of our national power. A unified national security budget that enables policymakers to more readily make the trade-offs necessary between defense, economic development, and diplomacy is the best vehicle to prepare the U.S. government to confront the threats of the 21st century.

Agency specific guidance

Beyond budgetary considerations, we must also reorganize and reprioritize our diplomatic development, homeland security, and intelligence capabilities, which have not kept pace with our ever-expanding military power. Our central recommendations include:
• Increasing the effectiveness of the State Department by fully staffing overseas Foreign Service Officer positions.
• Revamping the antiquated Foreign Aid Assistance Act in order to provide coherent guidance to the executive branch and to ensure consistency across government agencies.
• Increasing the effectiveness of U.S. development assistance by appointing a new Director for International Development on empowering and strengthening the administrator of USAID to guide all U.S. development programs.
• Resetting and modernizing our overburdened military while ensuring that the Defense Department has the tools and training to counter the most likely threats facing the United States in the 21st century.
• Providing the resources and time to allow the first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review to address the many shortcomings of that relatively new agency.
• Continue to expand transparency and cooperation in the intelligence community.

The United States will be more secure and more successful in international affairs when its critical agencies have the resources to carry out their individual mandates effectively and the political will to coordinate their work and goals.
Why now?

The Center for American Progress over the past five years demonstrated again and again why the threats we detail in this report require the actions we recommend. In 2005, the Center released “Integrated Power: A National Security Strategy for the 21st Century.” At the core of this document was the recognition that the United States was more secure when it integrated all the elements of U.S. national power, rather than using them in isolation from each other.

Building on the foundation of “Integrated Power,” in 2008 the Center launched its “Sustainable Security” project. Sustainable security asserts that American leadership in the 21st century will require a shift from our outdated notion of national security to a more realistic concept of “sustainable security”—that is our security as defined by the contours of a world gone global and shaped by our common humanity. Sustainable Security requires:

- **National security**, or the safety of the United States.
- **Human security**, or the well-being and safety of people.
- **Collective security**, or the shared interests of the entire world.

Now, “Integrating Security” offers a set of policy recommendations to move forward with the ideas outlined in those reports, including the creation of a unified national security budget, and lays out a blueprint for achieving these objectives. These steps together will put the United States on the right path to reverse the failed foreign policies of the Bush administration and meet the national security challenges of the 21st century.
Defining U.S. national security objectives

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global economic crisis continue to place tremendous strains on the U.S. military and economy, and undermine U.S. credibility and popularity around the world. But the United States continues to wield unprecedented global influence and strength despite these setbacks. Our military is unsurpassed. Our economy can fuel opportunity for billions of people at home and abroad. And our traditions of justice and opportunity still have the power to inspire individuals in all cultures to seek a better life for themselves and their children.

Yet Bush-era national security policy did not align with current threats. Today, Americans can analyze the period since the end of the Cold War, and since the attacks of 9/11, and begin to forge a more coherent and balanced understanding of the threats we face and the opportunities we have in order to craft a more effective national security strategy than that of the previous administration. It is a complex picture of diffuse enemies, more dangerous weapons, and a more fluid world.

The greatest immediate dangers to the American people are posed by threats to global security and stability emanating from the three primary forces of fragmentation:

- Violent extremists with global reach that aim to harm the United States and other liberal democracies.
- The ever-growing group of weak and failing states that can provide safe harbor for terrorists and destabilize critical regions.
- Hostile regimes that seek weapons of mass destruction.

But the United States also ignores at its own peril potential challenges to its interests, specifically:

- Rising powers that are becoming more powerful and assertive in international affairs.
- A growing reliance on foreign fossil fuels that makes our country energy dependent and leads to climate change and environmental degradation.
- A range of economic threats, including underdevelopment and cybercrime.

These six challenges must be part of a comprehensive threat assessment. The United States still possesses strong tools to combat these forces of fragmentation in a way that can rein-
force our power and influence. We can marshal all of our dynamic tools—defense, diplomacy, economic development, homeland security and intelligence—to promote American interests and help others find the road to security, prosperity, and freedom. And we can do so while renewing our commitment to lead vital alliances and modernized international institutions to advance our national interests more effectively.

We can only accomplish these goals, however, if we are also willing to reassess the resources we allocate to each of these instruments and make the hard trade-offs necessary to optimize our national security infrastructure. We must cast aside the false divisions that prevail today and unify disparate ideas and actions. We need an integrated national security strategy that reflects the complex realities of the world—rather than a series of actions that are disconnected from each other and disconnected from reality. The primary goals should be to:

• Protect the United States, its people, its allies and its interests by effectively managing international security threats and ensuring global stability. All elements of U.S. national power must be marshaled to defeat current enemies, deter hostile regimes, bolster weak and failing states, prevent conflict by intervening before disasters strike, and undermine the long-term appeal of extremist ideologies.

• Uphold and strengthen the norms of a stable international system by:
  – Enhancing the United States’ power and legitimacy via leadership of vital alliances and modernized international institutions.
  – Fostering global economic prosperity by assisting developing countries in joining the global economy, creating new markets and increasing economic opportunities in the United States and around the world.
  – Giving people around the world the chance to determine their own future, better ensuring stability, and creating new allies and support by promoting the spread of democratic institutions and freedoms.

In the pages that follow this report will demonstrate how these primary goals apply to the six major challenges facing the United States today and then present our implementation strategies to combat each of them.
Violent extremists with global reach still remain the most serious threat to the safety and security of U.S. interests at home and abroad eight years after Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network attacked the United States. These terrorist groups have not carried out their stated goal of attacking the U.S. homeland since 2001, but successful attacks in Indonesia, Madrid, and London, and thwarted attempts in the United States and around the world demonstrate that we cannot dismiss the persistent danger they pose.

The war in Iraq—which was mistakenly initiated and then prolonged in the name of countering terrorist groups—was and continues to be a distraction from the struggle against violent extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A continued large-scale U.S. presence in that country is also a motivating factor for anti-American sentiment in the region. A responsible military withdrawal from Iraq coupled with continued diplomatic and economic engagement with the country will conserve scarce resources and manpower needed to help combat this threat.

The U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan has significantly reduced violent extremists’ capabilities inside Afghanistan and rendered them less effective than they were even one year ago. Yet it has also had the unintended consequence of pushing Al Qaeda and its many affiliates out of Afghanistan and into a number of ungoverned spaces around the world, particularly neighboring Pakistan. As a result, the group has become increasingly dispersed and by many accounts no longer requires a geographical safe haven to plan and conduct operations around the world.

As a result, a strategy centered around denying violent extremists safe haven in ungoverned spaces around the world, such as Afghanistan, has its limits. Indeed, the 9/11 hijackers did not plot their attacks from the mountains of Afghanistan nor the plains of Somalia but rather from apartments in Hamburg and flight schools in Florida. As former deputy chief of the counterterrorist center at the Central Intelligence Agency, Paul Pillar, notes, “terrorists intent on establishing a haven can choose among several unstable countries besides Afghanistan, and U.S. forces cannot secure them all.”
Indeed, military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have thus far cost the United States over $1 trillion in direct costs, the vast majority of which was borrowed from abroad. They have also claimed more than 5,000 American lives, physically wounded nearly 50,000, and resulted in about 400,000 service members with psychological and cognitive problems. Importantly, these conflicts have also cost tens of thousands of Iraqi and Afghan lives, dealt a significant blow to U.S. credibility and popularity around the world, and put at risk the stability of the greater Middle East region.

Given these realities, it is clear that the most effective long-term strategy to neutralize the threat from violent extremists lies not in the methods employed in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in the much more difficult task of widening the gap between the majority of Muslims around the world and these fringe radical elements. The United States must always retain the right to eliminate imminent threats to our citizens and our interests with military force, but such operations alone are not a prescription for long-term success.

Fortunately, these dangerous radicals are relatively few in number and do not represent the majority of the Islamic world. Islam is caught in an internal war between mainstream Muslims and the force of violent extremists who want to return the Muslim world to what they see as its golden age and rescue it from the so-called “modernizers.”

Recent developments point to a widening gap between average Muslims and reactionary extremists. The intelligence community notes that the trend of public opinion in Muslim-majority countries is turning against these violent extremist groups. And the Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Dennis Blair, remarked in his annual threat assessment before Congress earlier this year that, “Over the last year and a half, [Al Qaeda] has faced significant public criticism from prominent religious leaders and fellow extremists primar-
ily regarding the use of brutal and indiscriminate tactics—particularly those employed by [Al Qaeda] in Iraq and [Al Qaeda] in the Lands of Islamic Maghreb—that have resulted in the deaths of Muslim civilians.”7

Indeed, Al Qaeda and extremist groups like it with global ambitions are finding it increasingly difficult to attract recruits and are less capable of training and inspiring willing fighters, according to government and independent experts monitoring these organizations.8 At the same time, the United States is becoming more effective at improving its image in Muslim majority countries. Approval of U.S. leadership across the Arab world has increased since President Obama’s inauguration. Public opinion of U.S. leadership remains low in some Arab countries, but a recent Gallup poll indicated that others are showing double-digit increases in favorability, including Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia.9 U.S. favorability ratings are also on the rise in Indonesia and European countries with large Muslim minorities such as France, England, Germany, and Spain.10

Moreover, according to Admiral Blair, “A broad array of Muslim countries [are] having success in stemming the rise of extremism and attractiveness of terrorist groups. No major country is at immediate risk of collapse at the hands of extremist, terrorist groups,” but a number of countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan must continue to work hard to repulse such threats and confront those groups that are still growing with ferocity.11

The United States should seek to sustain and support these developments using all the means at its disposal. Now is the time to learn from our past mistakes, capitalize on these developments, and incorporate best practices into a strategy to undermine the radical extremist threat over the long term.

Implementation strategies

Prosecute extremists and terrorist leaders through the criminal justice system. The United States should seek to change the frame of the Bush administration’s “war on terror” from primarily a military campaign to one that also has a law enforcement component. Terrorist leaders and extremist groups gain status and reputation when the United States validates their struggle by labeling and prosecuting its fight against them as a war. Military detention is appropriate for some enemy fighters captured in a combat zone where the U.S. military is engaged in an armed conflict. But terrorists and extremists captured far from any battlefield must be treated like criminals, not warriors, and prosecuted in the criminal justice system. The Obama administration has indicated that it will prosecute a number of detainees currently held at Guantanamo Bay through the criminal justice system. Such prosecutions should be pursued when possible.

Bolster embattled allies while holding them accountable. As a recent RAND report notes, “Instead of relying predominantly on military occupation, the United States must
become more able to bolster the ability of threatened states to win the contest for the 
support of their people.” This support should come in the form of encouraging and build-
ing effective and accountable local government, funding development projects that show 
tangible results to ordinary citizens, supporting moderate educational curriculums and 
schools, training local security forces, and exploiting information power. These steps can 
help our allies develop effective indigenous support for defeating violent extremists with 
global reach.12 But this support cannot ignore human rights abuses. Obama’s Cairo speech, 
in which the president demonstrated clear support for U.S. allies in Muslim majority 
countries without giving those governments a free pass on flagrant abuses of their citizens, 
should serve as a model for the future of U.S. support efforts in the region.

Support partner nations’ de-radicalization programs. The United States and its allies 
must address the religious, socioeconomic, psychological, and emotional roots of terror-
ism. While the results have been mixed, the Saudi Arabian government’s de-radicalization 
program has shown some promising results. The Saudi government “has recently intensi-
fied efforts to fight extremism and to turn public sympathy away from terrorist groups.”13 
They have teamed with prominent clerics who have taken a stand against al Qaeda and 
other groups and incorporated them into a comprehensive rehabilitation program for 
extremists. This program has so far shown a low recidivism rate and spawned similar 
programs in Egypt, Yemen, and Singapore. The United States should seek to support cur-
rent de-radicalization efforts and boost the capacity of states that do not have the means 
of funding such programs themselves—taking into account any lessons learned about 
missteps in these programs in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.

Ensure that our actions line up with our ideals. The United States fought what President 
George W. Bush christened the “war on terror” for over two-and-a-half years before the 
photographs and accounts of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib were leaked to the media. 
Knowledge of these abuses undermined the U.S. struggle against radical extremism more 
than any battlefield loss ever could. The United States has since made great strides in 
ensuring that our actions are in line with our ideals, but more has to be done. President 
Obama should uphold his commitment to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay 
as soon as possible, honor the Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government to 
withdraw all U.S. forces from that country by the end of 2011, and ensure that our service 
members’ and intelligence professionals’ actions are in line with our international and 
domestic law and our own values. As Admiral Michael Mullen notes, “Each time we fail 
to live up to our values or don’t follow up on a promise, we look more and more like the 
arrogant Americans the enemy claims we are.”14

Maintain the capability to conduct targeted strikes against extremist groups abroad 
when host governments are unable or unwilling to do so themselves. The United States 
must be able to conduct military operations against imminent or intractable dangers, but 
these military strikes are not a long-term solution to combating the threat from violent 
extremists. Such strikes should be made with extreme caution and only in cases where 
intelligence and military officials have the highest confidence that they will be able to
eliminate high-level militant leaders whose removal would have the greatest effect on the rest of the network, with minimal collateral damage. The recent operation to attack a top Al Qaeda leader in Somalia typifies this kind of operation.15

Weak and failing states

The Obama administration’s national security agenda will continue to be dominated in the immediate future by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the pursuit of violent extremist groups. But the president’s national security team will also have to manage a host of threats that transcend borders and undermine our collective global security.16 The clearest manifestation of these challenges will come in the form of the numerous weak and failing states around the world.

Weak and failing states—countries with governments that are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens from internal or external threats, to provide basic services, or to respond to their population’s needs17—have long been threats to their own people. But these countries are now also unmistakably threats to the United States and its allies.

These are the states that intentionally yield—or are unable to deny—space for terrorist organizations to take root—many of which seek to harm the United States and its interests around the world, or upset regional balances of power. These countries also lack the mechanisms to stop infectious disease outbreaks, and are often unable or unwilling to interdict the trafficking of arms, people, or drugs.

Approaches to weak and failing states

Policymakers across the political spectrum have argued that the United States has a responsibility to violate state sovereignty in order to prevent large-scale state failures from endangering the well-being of the country, the region, and the world. As our report “Integrated Power” pointed out in 2005:

Increasing focus on these countries since September 11 [has] helped create a growing international consensus that traditional notions of state sovereignty should be set aside when governments cannot or will not protect their own citizens. One of the best ways to protect weak and failing states is to adopt the “responsibility to protect” doctrine—the idea that countries have a right to violate another country’s sovereignty and intervene militarily to prevent genocide and ethnic cleansing.

Yet the choice to intervene—particularly under the responsibility to protect doctrine—is not without risk. Violation of state sovereignty can set a dangerous precedent that other countries can also use to justify interventions. And the intervention itself carries its own risks. It often requires a steep price in U.S. casualties and costs, and positive outcomes are so elusive—especially in the wake of past U.S. failures in Haiti, Somalia, and Iraq—that this course of action has become unpalatable to many.
It is more common to see instances of state fragility such as in Pakistan and Kenya than state collapse. These fragile states, and others like them, teeter on the edge of chaos and are highly susceptible to large-scale emergencies caused by sudden and unexpected shocks to food supplies, a breakdown in political order, violent social-political disputes, or extreme weather conditions.

The sole U.S. response to such threats comes often in the form of emergency relief aid. Yet as the Center noted in our “Price of Prevention” report, “the United States is the world’s leader in reacting to such crises and in most cases provides humanitarian and other assistance more quickly and in greater volume than any other government… [but] our track record lays bare a tendency to disengage once a crisis subsides, and often without addressing the root causes.”

Emergency aid may be necessary to stave off imminent humanitarian disasters, but U.S. assistance should ultimately address the underlying issues of the conflict in order to bring about more sustainable security. Some programs initiated under the George W. Bush administration deserve credit in this area. For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation—created in 2004—provides substantial funding to countries where the leadership governs and rules justly, thus discouraging the emergence of leaders that would sacrifice state health and stability for personal wealth or power. The MCC had awarded major grants to 18 countries as of 2008.

The myriad challenges and opportunities confronting the United States, however, are so diverse that the only way that policymakers can avoid moving from crisis to crisis is to get ahead of the curve, which in turn entails more than just reactive solutions. As “Integrated Power” made clear, “in both practical and moral terms, the dangers posed by these states means the United States must redefine how best to project its power.”

Our ultimate goal is to help transform these weak and failing states into countries that protect their citizens, provide basic services, maintain secure borders, commit to democratic institutions and become more responsible international citizens. In pursuit of this goal, the United States must invest in preventing conflicts and crises, significantly increase its own post-conflict reconstruction capabilities, including those of the military, and implement long-term foreign assistance programs that foster economic growth and help democratic institutions take root.

Implementation strategies

Because many of the necessary steps to address the challenges posed by weak and failing states are most appropriately dealt with using development tools, specific implementation items will be detailed in the Development section of the report below.
Hostile regimes

“Integrated Power” warned in 2005 of the threat from “extreme regimes,” nations that “aspire to join the nuclear weapons club, threaten to destabilize critical regions and often play host to terrorist networks.” The report singled out Iran and North Korea as the two hostile regimes that posed the most significant threat to the United States and its interests.

These two countries pose even greater threats today—a fact that is as much a testament to the intractable nature of these particular regimes as it is to the Bush administration’s failed attempts to deal with them.

North Korea

North Korea’s geographic proximity to China and U.S. allies where American troops are based overseas—such as South Korea and Japan—puts it at the nexus of U.S. strategic planning in North Asia. Moreover, North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapons state, its continued development of ballistic missile technology and the government’s ongoing human rights violations ensure that it will remain a serious challenge to U.S. national security as well as overall stability in the region.

The Bush administration’s approach to dealing with Pyongyang made little headway. Although six-party talks took place periodically during his presidency, his administration proved too inflexible to adhere to a diplomatic agenda that could bring about real progress. In 2005, for example, North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for incentives developed during six-party talks, but the deal collapsed after the Bush administration opted to sanction a bank that housed North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il’s accounts.20

Additionally, Bush rejected the diplomatic groundwork established by his predecessor, President Bill Clinton, by withdrawing the United States from the Agreed Framework in 2002. According to Carlos Pascual, who served as coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State, by choosing to abandon the Agreed Framework with North Korea, the United States “opened the door to North Korea’s becoming a nuclear power.”21

North Korea has now tested two nuclear weapons, and many international observers conclude it is developing more advanced delivery systems, possibly including a ballistic missile with a range of up to 2,400 miles.22 The regime claims to have launched a satellite into orbit during missile tests earlier this year, although U.S. Northern Command refuted this claim, noting that “stage one of the missile fell into the Sea of Japan…the remaining stages along with the payload itself landed in the Pacific Ocean.”23
The Obama administration has begun working with allies in the region as well as China to enforce a ban on arms shipments to and from North Korea and has supported increased sanctions against the country. The president has also communicated the United States’ willingness to accept North Korea as a legitimate member of the international community if it is willing to abandon its nuclear program and plans to send its Special Representative for North Korea Policy, Stephen Bosworth, to Pyongyang. Since the North Koreans abandoned six-party talks in April 2009, however, no progress has been made on dismantling or de-weaponizing the country’s nuclear program.

**Iran**

Iran already exercises significant influence in the volatile Middle East, including in countries of interest to the United States, such as Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories. It could prove to be an even greater menace to its neighbors if it acquires nuclear weapons, a development which would aggravate existing tensions in the region—some of which Iran already uses to its advantage—and potentially spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. If Iran has or does commit itself to build a nuclear weapon, there may only be a short window to stop the regime from completing the process.
Iran has continually undermined international efforts to oversee its nuclear program, including building a secret nuclear facility near the city of Qom and failing to meet its commitments to provide information to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The lack of transparency surrounding Tehran’s nuclear ambitions has heightened the need to address this issue.

The Bush administration’s response to Iran’s growing nuclear ambitions was to continue to isolate the country from the international community. The United States has not had formal diplomatic relations with Iran since 1980, and President Bush refused to enter into direct negotiations about Tehran’s nuclear ambitions (although he allowed Under Secretary of State William Burns to attend talks with Iran and the so-called P5+1 negotiating group—the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany—near the end of his presidency in 2008). Still, President Bush stated that talks could not proceed until Iran abandoned its enrichment program.

These demands that Iran concede the issue over which the two countries would negotiate failed to bear fruit. U.S. intelligence agencies have since concluded that the country has reached a “possible breakout capacity,” meaning that it may have acquired enough uranium to make a nuclear bomb, although Iran appears to have thus far chosen not to do so.25

President Obama had taken a different tack from his predecessor and offered to engage in serious negotiations with Tehran. The first negotiations took place on October 1, 2009 and resulted in limited progress. Iran agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to inspect its recently revealed Qom nuclear facility and to send out of the country some of the uranium it has enriched. However, the final form of the deal was still in question as this report went to print.

**Implementation strategies**

**Use engagement as the first line of defense against hostile regimes.** President Bush’s failure to put in place a serious and sustained diplomatic effort to engage Iran and North Korea allowed those countries to become greater threats to U.S. national security. The Obama administration has taken the right steps toward engaging Iran and is working to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table. These efforts should set a precedent for a lasting, government-wide change in perspective on how we deal with hostile states. Isolating those countries that pose challenges to our interests is not a sign of American strength. Our power comes from our ability to engage these actors—either with partners, or unilaterally, if necessary—and resolve our problems in a way that benefits our security and that of our allies.
Strengthen international and regional mechanisms for controlling extreme regimes.
The United States is not the only country with an interest in resolving the threats posed by North Korea, Iran and other problematic regimes. The United States should continue to work with our allies to find a mutually acceptable resolution to these situations and deter future hostile regimes from following the same path. Specifically:

- The P5 + 1 negotiating group should continue to be our primary resource for dealing with Tehran. Presenting a united front with China and Russia on this issue is a particularly important goal, as Beijing is Tehran's largest trading partner and Moscow is one of the regime's key allies. The United States should also consider how best to involve Iran's neighbors in the negotiating process.

- The six-party talks—consisting of China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the United States, and North Korea—should remain at the forefront of our diplomatic efforts to engage Pyongyang. The Obama administration's willingness to use two-party talks as an impetus to return North Korea to the multilateral negotiating format is a positive development. The Obama administration should gauge the effectiveness of these two-nation talks to determine whether a bilateral dialogue could work in tandem with six-party negotiations, but should not forgo the diplomatic benefits that come from approaching North Korea primarily in a multilateral format.

The United States is strongest when it can bring to bear the united opinion of the international community, and these multilateral talks are a good step in that direction. These negotiating relationships will also be valuable should we need to take more forceful action against these emergent hostile regimes.

Seek to strengthen international legal mechanisms for controlling the behavior of all hostile states. In the case of both Iran and North Korea, the upcoming review conference for the Non-Proliferation Treaty offers a good first opportunity to create international consensus behind the need for stronger enforcement of non-proliferation programs across the globe. The NPT currently allows for the development of peaceful nuclear technology, but does not offer a roadmap for action when a state works to build a weapon under the guise of a lawful program. Multilateral action to resolve this tension would be a significant boon to the U.S. nonproliferation agenda.

Maintain a credible deterrent threat. If the United States and its international allies cannot acceptably resolve the current problems with Iran and North Korea or future threats from other hostile regimes, then the United States should take a posture of extended deterrence toward these regimes. Leaders of hostile regimes whose desire to remain in power overrides all other concerns can be dissuaded from pursuing an extreme agenda with the credible threat of force. Extended deterrence will also serve as a mechanism to dissuade these regimes from transferring nuclear technology to burgeoning hostile regimes or non-state actors. The United States need not ramp up hostilities with Tehran and Pyongyang in order to establish a deterrent threat, but it must communicate the redlines that these countries cannot cross.
Rising powers

All great powers in history eventually see their power and influence wane. Predictions of the United States’ eventual decline are everywhere. Journalist and author Fareed Zakaria, for example, observes that while the United States is busy trying to understand why other countries resent us, the rest of the world “has shifted from anti-Americanism to post-Americanism.” Whether or not these predictions come true, the United States is still the world’s preeminent power, but other countries are developing ever-stronger and more competitive economies and militaries. Current and future administrations must be prepared to maintain the United States’ competitive edge in this changing landscape.

Rising powers may change the structure of the international system in several ways. First, the United States could come to share the burden of global leadership with these prospective great powers. China is most likely to lead this group, but the United States should also plan for potential changes in our relationships with India and Russia, as well as some of the other members of the Group of 20 developed and developing nations. These shifts in the international distribution of power will most likely limit our ability to influence international decisions, but could bring the United States a wealth of sorely needed diplomatic, development, and defense assistance from other states.

Second, the U.N. Security Council, whose permanent membership reflects the post-World War II distribution of power, has already come under increasing pressure from developed and developing nations alike to take on new permanent members and grant them the power that accompanies that status.

The United States’ goal in the face of these long-term challenges must be to preserve a stable international order in order to protect the United States and its people and pursue U.S. interests around the world. The degree to which this will be possible will depend on the way in which other nations use their increased power in the international system, how well the United States is able to adapt to changes in the international community, and the degree to which the United States is able to surround itself with other responsible global powers. As President Obama noted in his speech to the United Nations in September 2009, nations that used to complain about American unilateralism now demand the United States solve the world’s problems with little help.

The growing prominence of countries such as China, India, and Russia is often interpreted as a threat to U.S. interests, but the reality is that they will be—and in many cases already are—indispensable players in confronting global challenges such as climate change, pandemic disease, financial crises, and crushing debt and endemic poverty in some of the world’s poorest nations. Any effort by the United States to address these and other pressing global issues will ultimately require the cooperation of these powers. They must be integrated into the existing international order as their power increases.
China

The United States cannot afford to be mired in an outdated debate over whether Washington and Beijing will cooperate or compete against each other. The reality is that China must be a partner.

China is projected to have world’s largest economy by the early 2020s, and it is already the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide. As the Center for American Progress noted in its 2008 “A Global Imperative” report, “effective solutions to the most pressing problems of our time—global warming, terrorism, pandemic disease, expanding the global middle class, and nuclear nonproliferation—cannot happen without the full participation of the United States and China.”

Our objective should be to work with Beijing “to encourage the emergence of a China that meets its responsibilities both to the international community and to its own people.” This means acknowledging China’s growing power and influence in international relations, while stressing that its continued rise should support existing international norms and a stable international system. China’s comprehensive engagement in almost all existing international organizations signals that it is already embedded in the international system and making strides toward bringing its behavior in compliance with international norms.

The United States should continue to partner with other nations to influence Beijing as necessary and prepare for the most likely paths that China’s development will take, while encouraging China to assume global responsibility and leadership in troubleshooting some of the most pressing international threats. Developing a productive rela-
tionship with China will require greater collaboration, communication, and reassurance from both sides.

At the heart of the collaboration should be climate change, one of the most pressing national security threats to both countries. Beijing and Washington, however, must also continue to work together to rebuild an international financial system that is fair, transparent, and sustainable. As an integral engine of the world economy, China must retool its economy to encourage more balanced growth. And our two nations’ security arrangements require more transparency and communication. The U.S.-China military relationship continues to lag behind the progress made in all other areas of bilateral relations, a problematic reality that can only be addressed through increased dialogue, exchanges, collaboration, and creative problem-solving.

As China assumes a larger role on the world stage, the United States must also press its leaders for improvement on internationally accepted human rights standards, including prohibitions against torture, and its restrictions on press and religious freedom.\(^{31}\) Traditional mechanisms, such as publicly condemning human rights abuses, must be part of the U.S. toolkit to address these issues. We should also be aware of the potential for making progress on human rights in non-traditional ways. CAP Senior Fellow William Schulz points out, for example, that addressing climate change and repairing the damage done by the financial crisis will save lives and reduce the strain on the world’s poor—both surely human rights issues.\(^{32}\)

India

India’s ascendance to a greater international role is “a complicated rise.”\(^{33}\) India is growing rapidly, albeit unevenly. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimated 7.5 percent annual growth in India’s per capita gross domestic economy before the onset of the global economic crisis in 2007.\(^{34}\) But the country still suffers from widespread poverty and malnutrition—42.5 percent of children under five are underweight—and the National Intelligence Council’s “Global Trends 2025” report found that “India faces lingering deficiencies in its domestic infrastructure, skilled labor, and energy production.”\(^{35}\) As New Delhi continues its impressive overall economic growth while expanding and broadening opportunities for health and economic growth for the majority of its population, the United States should be ready to treat it as another significant world power.

The United States’ near-term goal for its relationship with India should be to continue to support the country’s development and, where possible, create opportunities to bring India into a leadership role in the international community. India must play a pivotal role in any global climate change agreement, a universal test ban on nuclear weapons, and should be a prominent and long-term partner in our efforts to stem the growth of extrem-
ist ideologies in Asia and around the world. The tragic attacks in Mumbai last November by members of the extremist group Lashkar-e-Taiba demonstrate that India has a vital interest in any discussions on this topic. The United States should also expand civil society and military exchange programs to connect more closely with India’s vibrant democracy and its increasing military power.

Russia

Russia is well-positioned and eager to reassume a larger role on the world stage. Russia is a member of the Group of 8 industrialized nations, a nuclear power, and has a permanent veto on the UN Security Council. The Russian economy grew at an average of 7 percent annually between the country’s 1998 financial crisis up until the most recent economic slump. And Russian foreign policy is growing more assertive—a trend exemplified by its 2008 invasion of neighboring Georgia. These developments give credence to the idea that Russia is a resurgent global power, albeit a more assertive nation than the United States and the world would like.

Yet it is not certain that Moscow can maintain this level of international independence. The Russian economy is prosperous when energy prices are strong, but its dependence on gas and oil makes it vulnerable to sudden economic shifts. Government corruption is also systemic, members of the press and opposition leaders suffer unacceptable human rights abuses, and Russia’s population is declining so drastically that it will eventually limit the human capital Moscow will need to expand its economy.

The United States’ primary challenge will be to prepare for two very different eventualities—a Russia that becomes a more powerful and potentially more aggressive force in international relations, and a Russia whose economic and demographic crises create a weak and unpredictable international actor. As CAP noted in its 2009 report “After the Reset,” the United States should focus on building on the Obama administration’s initial efforts to engage with Moscow in order to create a stable relationship where progress is possible in areas of mutual interest, such as shelving plans to build missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic, and areas of disagreement are not able to derail the relationship.

U.N. Security Council reform

The United States is likely to come under increasing pressure to change the structure of international organizations to match the changing distribution of international power. Bodies such as the U.N. Security Council are supposed to uphold the norms of the international system and legitimize the actions and doctrine of the powerful states that control them. The United States must be prepared to help decide whether and how these institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and most notably
the Security Council, can better reflect new realities and lead the debate on how they will operate in international politics.

The Security Council is arguably the most exclusive and important of these key international bodies. Over the past 20 years, the Security Council has “authorized more than a dozen peacekeeping missions, imposed sanctions or arms embargoes on ten states, and created several war crimes tribunals to prosecute those responsible for genocide and crimes against humanity, including sitting heads of state.” But the group is still dominated by the five permanent members—the United States, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia—each of which has the power to unilaterally and permanently veto any resolution that comes before the council.

Serious efforts to alter the permanent member and veto provisions began in the 1990s with countries such as India, Germany, Japan, and Brazil vying, thus far unsuccessfully, for spots on an enlarged council. The United States should be at the forefront of opening the door of the Security Council to the world’s emerging powers. Global challenges will increasingly require the assistance of all our allies, and we should welcome states which serve as stable and beneficial regional powers, encourage the council to expand its geographical representation, and push for U.S. strategic partners, such as the European Union, to have a stronger voice on the Security Council.

A Security Council that is more representative of the world’s populations “can help prod countries to action and give much-needed legitimacy to our policies.” The United States must ensure, however, that any states receiving permanent member status or veto power are prepared to actively enforce the Security Council’s decisions and are able to serve as fair arbiters of international crises.

Implementation strategies

**Acknowledge China’s growing power in the international system and work to bring China into a constructive leadership role on international priorities.** The Center for American Progress has identified six areas where this effort should begin: climate change and energy security; balanced and sustainable global growth; enhanced security in the Asia-Pacific region; China’s military modernization; stability in the Taiwan Strait; and governance and individual rights. These priorities will quickly come to dominate the U.S.-China agenda.

The upcoming U.N. climate change negotiations in Copenhagen this December offer an early opportunity for the United States to engage on a key element of this strategy. China is beginning to move ahead with impressive developments in clean-energy technology. Beijing has set a goal of reducing “the amount of energy consumed per unit of gross domestic product by 20 percent below 2005 levels by 2010.” The upcoming negotiations will be contentious, and China is likely to refuse binding emissions standards. It will be
up to U.S. climate negotiators to both reaffirm China’s central role in creating a finished agreement and to provide a persuasive argument for why China’s cooperation will aid its economic and strategic goals more significantly than its current approach to the issue.

**Support the positive growth of India and Russia in order to ensure that these countries remain stable powers that are prepared to share the burden of global leadership.** President Obama’s recent summit with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and the Obama administration’s commitment to resetting relations with that country are a welcome and necessary change from the ad hoc, overly personal and frequently contentious relationship between presidents Bush and Putin. The United States can build on this positive start by sponsoring Russia’s greater integration into international institutions, beginning with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and steadily increasing U.S.-Russia cooperation through energy and climate change negotiations, more substantial civil society and technical exchanges, and cooperation in the Arctic and other regions.42

The United States must be prepared, however, to employ containment and deterrence strategies if Russia’s trajectory does not lead to positive integration with the international community.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent visit to India set the tone for a more substantive relationship between Washington and New Delhi, including a broad strategic dialogue between Clinton and her Indian counterpart, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna. The United States should use this platform to bring India closer to U.S. goals on climate change and nuclear non-proliferation and increase U.S. technical assistance for India’s developing economy, particularly its agricultural sector. According to U.S. AID, India feeds “17 percent of the world’s population on only 3 percent of the world’s arable land.”43

**Grow diplomatic ties with regional powers that can influence their neighbors’ decision-making.** It is a mistake to continue treating growing regional powershouses, such as Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and others as secondary global powers.44 Engaging with them will create responsible regional stakeholders with strong ties to the United States, potentially allowing us to reduce our footprint and responsibilities in some areas of the world.

The global economic crisis has elevated the G-20 group of developed and developing economies to new international prominence, and the United States should use this venue to cement its ties to growing economies and empower them to have greater role in international decisions. As the Center for American Progress argued in “The Case for Leadership,” earlier this year, the United States should work to institutionalize the G-20—adding a limited permanent staff and developing a well-defined mission—in order to more effectively deal with global economic and financial questions.45 The Obama administration should make this a priority in the wake of the recent G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh.
Explore expanding the U.N. Security Council’s permanent membership to acknowledge the new distribution of world power and draw in allies who are willing to support the Council’s resolutions with diplomatic, development, and military capabilities if necessary. It is not practical at this time to expand the Security Council’s veto structure to new members because that would likely create more deadlock than constructive action. But the United States should be the strongest voice in favor of adding greater geographical diversity to the council. The immediate short-term goal should be to open discussions about adding one permanent seat each for Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and North Africa and the Middle East. The United States should also establish a process and criteria for reviewing future additions on a case-by-case basis.

Energy security

The term “energy security” once referred almost exclusively to ensuring American access to cheap, abundant sources of energy. This remains a vital U.S. national security priority. But taking stock of how our energy policy affects our national security now requires an understanding of the full strategic, diplomatic, economic, and environmental consequences of our choices. America’s reliance on imported fossil fuels instead of clean, domestic sources of energy has long been costly to our economy, our environment, and our national security—and will become even more so if we fail to act now. While there has been some notable progress under the Obama administration and in the 111th Congress, both the administration and lawmakers should move quickly to reverse this dependence and correct years of underinvestment in order to fund and scale up clean-energy technologies.

Concrete steps in this direction will reinvigorate the U.S. economy—which is the backbone of any long-term national defense capability—give the United States more flexibility in its relations with oil producing anti-American regimes, further increase our military’s competitive advantage, and mitigate the effects of global climate change.

Economic issues

Energy insecurity erodes the United States’ ability to control our economic destiny. Our dependence on foreign oil substantially increases our foreign trade deficit and exposes the U.S. economy to the extreme volatility endemic to the petroleum markets.

The United States spent $357 billion on foreign oil in 2008 alone, and more than $8 trillion importing oil over the past 30 years. In fact, America’s reliance on foreign oil continues to expand. The United States imported 35 percent of its oil in 1973, and by 2007 that proportion had jumped to 58 percent.
Reliance on oil leaves America’s economy subject to extreme volatility in oil prices. From January 2008 to July 2008, for instance, the average monthly national gasoline prices rose by 33.5 percent, before dropping by 58.5 percent in December 2008 and then rising again by 34.3 percent to $2.266 per gallon in May 2009. These swings have a significant impact on American families and the economy. Consumer data shows that Americans will delay buying a car after such extraordinarily high energy-price volatility, families spend less money on buying or upgrading their homes during energy price swings, and businesses cut their investment spending during large price swings.

Our future economic health depends on energy-price predictability and large-scale development and distribution of clean-energy technologies. Therefore, it would be a disastrous mistake to allow the clean-energy sector to remain underfunded. Moreover, clean energy has the ancillary benefit of creating broad-based economic growth, employing workers ranging from manufacturing laborers to engineers.

Right now, we are lagging behind other countries—among them China—in the development of this vital sector of our economy. Despite common perceptions to the contrary, China ranked second in the world behind Germany in 2007 in terms of the absolute dollar amount invested in renewable energy, according to the Climate Group. These investments have placed China among the world leaders in solar, wind, electric vehicle, rail, and grid technologies.

There has been some recent progress during the 111th Congress: The American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, passed the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009. In combination with the $787 billion economic stimulus legislation, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act enacted earlier this year, it would create a net of 1.7 million clean-energy jobs. The Senate is deliberating companion legislation. The Obama administration’s plan for tougher fuel economy standards for U.S. vehicles unveiled in September is another important step.

But if the United States does not do more, then we will be playing catch-up for years to come. China is already reportedly investing up to $660 billion over the next decade in clean energy and research, Japan is aiming for a 20-fold expansion in installed solar by 2020, and the European Union has committed to having 20 percent of its total energy coming from renewable sources by 2020. Since clean-energy investment and jobs could form the essential backbone for our economic growth, and by extension, our national defense, we need to create the incentives and opportunities for this industry to grow.

Strategic and diplomatic issues

America is beholden to fossil fuels, particularly oil for our transportation sector and coal for domestic electricity production. Even President Bush, a former oil man, acknowledged that, “America is addicted to oil.” And nearly 40 percent of our oil imports come from
potentially hostile or unstable regimes that do not share our values, while 92 percent of the world’s conventional oil reserves are in these nations.57

Case in point: Venezuela’s leader, Hugo Chávez, whose country provides 12.9 percent of America’s oil, is outspokenly anti-American. Chávez has threatened to cut off supplies to the United States, saying in a radio interview, “If you end up freezing [Venezuelan assets] and it harms us, we’re going to harm you.”58 Even buying oil from allies such as Saudi Arabia, which provides 15.8 percent of America’s oil, hampers our leverage when combating human rights abuses and trying to promote democracy. Finally, no matter where American supplies come from—friendly or not—U.S. consumption increases demand for oil on the world market, pushing up prices and profits for unsavory regimes such as Iran and Angola.

Military readiness and domestic safety issues

The Department of Defense is the nation’s single largest energy user, consuming over 300,000 barrels of oil per day at a cost of $20 billion in fiscal year 2008. Skyrocketing oil prices in 2008 led to a more than 50 percent increase in oil costs for fiscal year 2007.59 These staggering costs place a burden on our defense budget, and our fuel demands put the lives of American military personnel at risk.

In Afghanistan, fuel and water make up 70 percent of the tonnage carried by overland convoys, which often require U.S. military escorts. Greater fuel efficiency would reduce the fuel load that convoys need to carry, making them shorter, more agile, and less vulnerable to ambush and attacks. Here, greater efficiency can mean saving lives.

The Department of Defense should go beyond its recent efforts to reform its procurement strategies to make them more cost-effective and carbon-light. It should also continue its historic role as an incubator for new technologies and help to develop innovations that increase fuel-efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Specifically, the Defense Department should harness its massive research-and-development capabilities to help scale up new technologies such as electric vehicles and durable solar panels.

The Defense Department should also lead calls for a new domestic electric grid. Domestic military bases rely on America’s outdated, overburdened, and vulnerable grid structure for electricity. We saw the potential dangers of the current structure in August 2003, when 50 million people across the Northeast suddenly lost power, causing utilities and communications infrastructure to shut down. This outage cost an estimated $7 billion to $10 billion—which began when a falling tree limb caused a power outage at a key Ohio transformer.60
Smart-grid necessity

A truly national clean-energy smart grid must consist of two distinct components: an interstate transmission "sustainable transmission grid" that will transport clean utility-scale renewable energy long distances to market, and a digital "smart distribution grid" to deliver this electricity efficiently to local consumers. The absence of a national grid that seamlessly integrates these two components is one of the biggest impediments to large-scale deployment of low-carbon electricity.61

The current structure also leaves the grid open to terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Either could cause extended power outages, which would inflict extensive economic damage and hamper our nation’s ability to conduct its overseas military operations or respond to a natural disaster at home. A smart grid would harden our defenses against attack and make the grid more resilient.

Just as the interstate highway system was essential to our national security in the 1950s, an updated, more reliable and efficient grid is essential for the 21st century. Enhancing our electricity infrastructure with smart-grid technology will support our nation’s economic, energy security, reliability, and environmental goals.

Security consequences of climate change

There is a growing consensus among military leaders, policymakers, and analysts that climate change—a product of our reliance on fossil-fuels to produce energy—will pose increased security risks going forward.

The effects of climate change—such as more frequent and severe droughts, floods, heat waves, and a rising sea level, mass migration, and pandemic disease—will act as a "threat multiplier," exacerbating ethnic and regional conflicts around the world as existing conditions get worse for some of the world's most vulnerable people. The numbers are staggering:

- Tens of millions of people from low-lying countries such as Bangladesh and the Maldives could be forced to migrate by rising sea levels.
- Forty percent of the world’s population will be living in countries experiencing significant water shortages by 2050.62
- According to a recent report by the United Nations, up to 200 million climate migrants can be expected by 2050.63
These will not be isolated problems. According to the Center for Naval Analysis, “Unlike most conventional security threats that involve a single entity acting in specific ways and points in time, climate change has the potential to result in multiple chronic conditions, occurring globally within the same time frame.” Europe will be especially vulnerable to migrations from North Africa, Turkey, and increasingly, sub-Saharan Africa. Dealing with the effect of increased migration will lessen our allies’ capacity to help us manage global crises related to climate change.

The United States will meanwhile face tremendous pressure to contribute to humanitarian crises around the globe. Many of those nations will suffer extensive damage from rising sea levels. And, as we saw with Hurricane Katrina, parts of the American coastal South are particularly vulnerable to high-intensity hurricanes.

Too much water will be the problem for the coastal American South, but not enough water will be the issue for the American Southwest. Many parts of that region are already seeing the effects of decreased rainfall through lower crop yields and dwindling rivers.

Changes in climate will impose huge economic costs. Climate change will cost the United States about $1.9 trillion per year by 2100—almost 2 percent of our projected GDP—due to greater damages from hurricanes, significant real estate losses, increased energy-sector costs, and diminishing water supplies. According to the U.S. Global Change Research Program, the costs of climate change will drastically intensify over the next few decades if we don’t take action soon: “Impacts are expected to become increasingly severe for more people and places as the amount of warming increases.” The massive costs of dealing with climate change will put a huge strain on our economic and military infrastructure, hampering our capacity to deal with crises at home and abroad.

Implementation strategies

**Increase U.S. energy security and independence.** The United States needs to make a serious commitment to energy independence, which will require significant increases in domestic energy production. This commitment must go beyond the shortsighted “drill, baby, drill” mentality. Because the amount of oil in proven U.S. reserves has steadily deceased since the late 1970s, even if we drilled and produced all of the U.S. oil, reserves would be exhausted in only about four years. Increasing our energy security will require a strong national commitment to domestic clean-energy production and increased efficiency. Clearly, oil is not a domestically stable energy source.

The United States is in an ideal position to move in a new direction on energy security and independence and it is critical that we do so. Building a national smart grid and investing in renewable energy production—particularly wind, solar, geothermal, and

The effects of climate change will act as a “threat multiplier,” exacerbating ethnic and regional conflicts around the world.
second-generation biofuels like those made from algae and plant waste—are key actions needed to move the United States toward a more enduring and responsible state of energy security.

**Adopt reductions in global warming pollution.** The United States must join other nations in reducing its global warming pollution. The American Clean Energy Security Act would accomplish this goal, and the Senate must follow the House’s lead and pass climate change legislation. The United States should also lead the world in working toward a global treaty that helps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change meeting in Copenhagen in December will provide an important opportunity for developing a framework for such a treaty. Any treaty should assist developing nations with dealing with the effects of climate change and implementing clean-energy technologies, while recognizing that no country can be allowed to abrogate its responsibility to be a responsible steward of the global environment.
Have the Department of Defense play an integral role in reducing U.S. oil dependence. The Department of Defense should work to increase its fuel efficiency and reduce its “carbon footprint.” It should also serve as an innovative testing ground for clean-energy technologies that can be scaled up to help the larger economy become cleaner and more efficient while creating good jobs at home. Implementing these strategies will help to ensure America’s energy security.

Economic threats

Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair noted in his first annual threat assessment before the Senate Intelligence Committee in February 2009 that “The primary near-term security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications.”69

Indeed, there is a long list of national security threats that stem from economic factors. Endemic poverty and underdevelopment are consistently cited as conditions that create space for extremist ideologies and transnational crime to flourish. Weak government institutions are unable to provide the support to reverse these crippling conditions. Advances in new technology allow for cyber attacks that can be targeted at the United States and global financial structures. And extraordinary events, such as the global economic crisis, can quickly induce and exacerbate insecurity.

The United States’ challenge is to recognize cases where lack of economic development may reasonably be expected to influence the balance between peace and conflict and intervene where conflict may reasonably be expected to threaten U.S. security. Addressing these threats will require the concerted and coordinated efforts of a diverse group of actors, including the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as significant coordination with international partners and allies.

As with combating traditional security challenges, combating economic-based security threats requires ensuring that each stakeholder is operating most effectively and coordinating their actions across the spectrum of government operations. This is even more necessary now because the global economic crisis has weakened our existing financial architecture and is likely to significantly contravene global economic progress by trapping an additional estimated 53 million people in poverty.70

Economic development

The relationship between global economic hardship and threats to U.S. national security is not well understood. Common wisdom holds that poverty and underdevelopment can foster social and political instability and create space for criminal behavior or extrem-
ist ideologies to flourish, but this cause and effect relationship is neither consistent nor predictable. Yet while poverty, underdevelopment, and a lack of economic opportunity alone may not be sufficient, they can certainly play a key role in promoting the emergence of international threats.

Countries where uneducated and idle youth make up a large percentage of the population—a phenomenon termed a youth bulge—are found to pose acute security challenges. Population Action International reported in 2007 that “during the 1990s, countries with a very young [age] structure were three times more likely to experience civil conflict than countries with a mature age structure.” Civil conflict further weakens the ability of a country to prevent non-state extremist organizations from operating within its borders.

In countries such as these, the United States must provide long-term, preventative, sustainable development assistance. This requires careful, strategic planning and coordination across U.S. government actors. This will be one of the most critical factors to its success. As the Center for American Progress noted in its recent “National Strategy for Global Development,” “foreign assistance tools, instruments, and resources are now spread across 24 government agencies, offices, and departments, and are neither centrally coordinated nor guided by clear goals or a national strategy.”

The time for preventative development assistance has passed in some cases. In Afghanistan, for example, U.S. casualties are mounting and additional U.S. forces are being sent to stabilize the country. But creating sustainable security in the country will still require the
United States to give immediate and sufficient attention to economic priorities. Oxfam International has calculated that the United States spends $100 million per day on security in Afghanistan, but the contributions of all international aid donors, including the United States, total only $7 million per day.\textsuperscript{73}

The disparity has a significant impact. After eight years of U.S.-led involvement in that country about 40 percent of the Afghan population now lives below the poverty line. Approximately 1.6 million Afghans rely on opium production to make a living.\textsuperscript{74} The country has become the world’s largest supplier of opium. Opium cultivation declined in 2008, but the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime notes that the drug is still “a major source of revenue for criminal groups and terrorists”\textsuperscript{75} and is also a major source of livelihood for many Afghan farmers with few alternatives.

U.S. General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, has remarked that many members of the Taliban “have a tremendous interest in trying to reintegrate into Afghan society,” but they would need jobs and basic government services in order to do so.\textsuperscript{76} Significantly increasing targeted economic assistance while ensuring that a greater proportion of aid dollars are funneled through the Afghan government to create a sustainable economy for Afghanistan’s people could be a boon to stability efforts in the country.

In this way, the United States and its allies can work toward achieving their own national security interests by providing alternative livelihoods for Afghanistan’s farmers, thus undermining the opium economy and helping the Afghan government create secure jobs for reconcilable members of the Taliban.

Cybersecurity threats

In addition to working to eliminate security threats which may arise from conditions overseas, the United States must be vigilant to reduce our economic vulnerability at home. In this technologically interconnected world, our economy is vulnerable to cyber attacks. President Obama gave a major address on this emerging threat in May 2009 and remarked that “American’s economic prosperity in the 21st century will depend on cybersecurity.”\textsuperscript{77} Our defenses must be ready to deal with attacks from domestic and international sources, including from foreign governments.

We are already beginning to get a picture of the damage that a large-scale cyber attack could have on our economic infrastructure. The Federal Bureau of Investigation warned in January 2009 that cyber attacks are the biggest national security threat facing the United States other than “a weapon of mass destruction or a bomb in one of our major cities.”\textsuperscript{78}
The United States and South Korea experienced a wave of “distributed denial of service attacks” in July 2009 that originated from an international source. This round of attacks was relatively minor, but South Korea’s Information Security Agency reported that it “successfully disrupted the country’s online banking system, although customers’ money was protected this time around.”79 In the United States, the attack targeted federal government and private websites, such as the Federal Aviation Administration, and the New York Stock Exchange.80 More and more of our financial business is being conducted online, and a large-scale attack could paralyze our economy.

Extraordinary events: The global economic crisis

Today’s global economic crisis poses a significant threat to the United States because it exacerbates global inequalities and creates the potential for political and economic instability in countries of strategic interest to the United States. The Overseas Development Institute noted in 2008 that economic decline can negatively affect trade prices, lead to a decline in remittances and foreign direct investment, and shrink aid and development budgets.81

Without the economic support that these factors provide, developing countries may find it harder to meet their obligations to their people, and individuals may find it more difficult to support themselves and their families. As noted earlier, it is in these environments in which populations may become susceptible to recruitment into crime and illegal activities. The United States cannot reasonably expect to anticipate every global economic crisis, but it can engage in long-term capacity building projects to help countries weather such crises in the future.

Implementation strategies

Provide the U.S. Agency for International Development with the resources necessary to increase U.S. capacity to provide long-term technical assistance for government and economic institution building. A strong economy that provides opportunities for people at all levels of society will ultimately promote a safe country. And institutions are the main channel through which a government can plan, manage and implement policies to provide more and better economic opportunities for its people, reduce poverty, and promote long-term development. Building capacity for institutions in developing countries that can provide social protections—such as health care and pensions—should be one of the United States’ top priorities. As CAP noted in its 2009 report “Institutions Matter,” the International Labor Organization has calculated that “a basic package [of social protections] is affordable in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia and can have a significant impact in reducing poverty and vulnerability.”82
The United States should launch an aggressive effort to train and maintain technical experts to assist low-income countries wishing to establish basic benefit packages for their populations. These institution-building efforts will certainly require an increased USAID workforce and a budget increase, but the prospect of improving long-term economic stability in at-risk countries more than justifies the investment. There will be no one-size-fits-all benefit package for countries around the world, but a strong commitment of U.S. personnel and support is the first step toward progress in confronting the security challenges posed to the United States by underdevelopment.

**Increase funding for international organizations with the technical expertise to make the most impact.** The United States should also provide resources to strengthen the institutional capacity of international organizations such as the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the United Nations Development Program. These organizations have a great deal of experience working in countries that are particularly susceptible to dramatic shocks in the global economy and are best positioned to provide technical assistance to them.

**Construct a robust cyber security capability within the U.S. government and partner with private companies to review industry security standards.** The Obama administration has already committed itself to supporting an improved cyber security policy for the U.S. government, but this effort requires strong leadership. The president must move quickly to follow through on his promises to appoint a cyber security coordinator at the White House and give that person wide authority to coordinate cyber policy among cabinet agencies and departments, as well as between the government and the private businesses that serve it. We should also expand international cooperation to monitor cyber attacks and provide incentives for America’s best and brightest to enter cyber security fields.
The tools to accomplish U.S. national security objectives

It should be clear from this analysis that an effective national security strategy must marshal all elements of U.S. national power and, importantly, must find a way to integrate them into an organized and effective system for protecting the United States and its people, interests, and allies and upholding the stability of the international system. The following sections will outline the administrative overhauls that are necessary to employ the potent tools at the United States’ disposal more effectively. This section will also examine the necessary steps to ensure that these diverse tools work more cohesively.

Unified national security budget

The overwhelming majority of our nation’s security expenditures are spent on offensive military resources—often to the detriment of defensive tools such as homeland security and preventative tools such as diplomacy, intelligence and economic development assistance. As a group of retired three- and four-star generals recently noted in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Our military mission has continued to expand as funding for the State Department and development agencies has been inadequate to the tasks they have been asked to perform. They have been forced to make do, with fewer personnel, more responsibility, but without the resources to match their assignments.”

Indeed, the ratio of funding for military resources as compared to non-military and international engagement widened in FY 2009 to the largest in the modern era, according to some estimates. Approximately 18 times as many resources were allocated to military spending in that fiscal year as compared to non-military aspects of national security, and the FY 2010 budget request allocated 87 percent of our security spending to military needs.

The rhetorical support for changing this balance already exists. In fact, the goal of reorienting national security spending has entered the realm of conventional wisdom. The foreign policy establishments representing defense, diplomacy, and economic development have all converged during the past two years to support a rebalancing of security spending.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been one of the biggest advocates of reorienting the nation’s budget. In a speech to the National Defense University in 2007, Gates noted that “funding for non-military programs has increased since 2001, but it remains disproportionately small relative to what we spend on the military and to the importance of such capabilities. There is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security.”

Turning rhetoric into reality has proven far more complicated. There have been some steps in the right direction since Secretary Gates’ 2007 speech, particularly under the Obama administration. The Defense Department’s FY 2010 defense budget scaled back or eliminated a number of unnecessary weapons programs—although a number of these initiatives were later reinserted by Congress—and funding for the U.S. Agency for International Development received a $450 million boost in the administration’s 2010 budget along with a 16 percent increase in personnel.

Yet these adjustments are more tactical than strategic and are not part of a larger comprehensive effort to reorient the entire national security budget. In this sense, the FY 2010 budget has made a down-payment on the promise to rebalance the nation’s national security resources but has hardly lived up to it. The Obama administration must implement more administrative and structural changes in order to more forcefully and permanently narrow the disparity between military and non-military security tools.

In order to confront the myriad national security challenges outlined in this report and take full advantage of the tools available to increase U.S. national security, the Obama administration must begin a significant reorientation of our nation’s national security spending. Such a process will involve maintaining our country’s conventional military dominance but also reinvesting in other tools of U.S. national power that are vital to 21st century missions.

Critical to this effort is the need to create a unified national security budget that would enable policymakers to more readily recognize and evaluate the difficult trade-offs between the offensive (military forces), defensive (homeland security), and preventative (non-military international engagement, including diplomacy, nonproliferation, foreign aid, peacekeeping intelligence, and contributions to international organizations) aspects of American national power. Currently, no single official document links strategy and resources for U.S. security, which makes it difficult to establish priorities, identify redundancies and inefficiencies, and make trade-offs among the various tools in the nation’s national security portfolio.

Now is the time for the administration to rethink and rebalance the nation’s national security budget to more accurately match resources and attention to our stated objectives.

Approximately 18 times as many resources were allocated to military spending in FY 2009 as compared to non-military aspects of national security.
Implementation strategies

Create a unified national security budget for fiscal year 2011 and mandate its development every fiscal year. A unified national security budget, or UNSB, could strengthen the links between strategies and funding and eliminate waste. A UNSB, produced jointly by the National Security Council and Office of Management and Budget, would identify top-down security priorities within budgetary constraints. A UNSB “would start with the administration’s overarching strategy; articulate a prioritized list of critical missions; and identify the major federal programs, infrastructure, and budget plan required to implement the strategy successfully.”

Submit the defense appropriations bill and foreign operations bill concurrently to Congress. Ensuring that policymakers are most readily able to make the cross-agency trade-offs to create an optimal balance between civilian and military national security tools will require the defense appropriations bill and the foreign operations appropriations bill to be submitted concurrently to Congress.

Create a “Unified Security Funding Analysis” in the Office of Management and Budget’s Analytical Perspectives document. This analysis would bring together funding for offense, defense, and prevention measures in one place and clearly delineate them “to facilitate congressional consideration of overall security priorities among these categories.”

Create a Select Committee on National Security and International Affairs in both houses of Congress. Spending and other decisions on offensive, defensive, and preventive security tools are controlled by separate committees in Congress that rarely consult with each other. “A Select Committee on National Security and International Affairs could examine our overall security needs, and the best balance of available tools to achieve them. And it could be tasked with recommending possible changes in the committee structure that could build this kind of examination into the budget process.”

Diplomacy

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced earlier this year that the State Department would undertake for the first time a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, or QDDR. This review, modeled on the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review, will lay out the tasks, methods, and resources necessary for the State Department to accomplish its expanded mission. The QDR is intended to outline the military policies necessary to accomplish the broad goals of the president’s National Security Strategy, and so too must the QDDR if the State Department is to regain its proper role in U.S. national security efforts.
This new initiative is well timed. The aftermath of the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan ably demonstrated the need for a more coherent and aggressive U.S. diplomatic policy. The Bush administration launched two military efforts to overthrow two governments without adequately resourcing our troops, diplomats, or development professionals to deal with the aftermath of the regime change.

Indeed, it is often forgotten that in the build-up to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the State Department compiled a comprehensive plan to fill in the governance void that was to be created after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. State’s plan convened “seventeen working groups, designed systematically to cover what would be needed to rebuild the political and economic infrastructure of the country.” Unfortunately, this effort was summarily ignored by the Bush White House, which saw the militarization of U.S. foreign policy as the answer.

Iraq is but the largest and most conspicuous example of the military’s increasing role in civil affairs and governance efforts. The Department of Defense, with its enormous budget, personnel base, and independent lift and security capacity, has also been forced to fill the void in places such as Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa. Post-conflict security environments may not permit the operations of diplomats or development specialists in the immediate term. But our fighting men and women should not be asked to take on these challenges in the long-term in addition to their other responsibilities.

The Department of State’s capacity (or lack thereof) is largely to blame. In 2007, counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen concluded that there were more military musicians employed by the Defense Department than Foreign Service corps staff members at the State Department. This decline in our diplomatic capacity has continued despite the fact that violence in Iraq and Afghanistan will not subside without a political solution.

As General Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, recently noted in his counterinsurgency guidance, “An insurgency cannot be defeated by attrition.” Rather, success will mean winning the support and trust of the people. This is fundamentally impossible without a sufficient number of experienced diplomatic and development professionals.

Role of the Foreign Service

“Masterful diplomacy is nothing other than getting what you want without having to resort to the use of force,” CAP noted in its 2005 report “Integrated Power.” Indeed, our strongest assets are those elements of national power that allow us to circumvent the necessity of armed response—contrary to the opinion of many who see our military capabilities as the only source of our strength.
Masterful diplomacy should guide the creation of the upcoming QDDR. The United States must maintain a robust capacity to defend our nation, our allies, and our interests from attack, but the State Department should be the first line of defense to avert and contain crises as well as maintain a sufficient engagement capacity with friends and enemies alike.

Diplomacy is critical to understanding what our allies and adversaries think and plan, and to intuitional how they will implement their own national priorities alone or in concert with other states. The Defense Department should be commended for its efforts to adopt more people-centric, culturally attuned methods of conducting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but this is the State Department’s *modus operandi*. Its expertise is vital to preventing conflict, conducting successful negotiations between opposing parties, and helping guide the governments and institutions that stabilize weak and failing states. The State Department’s country- and region-specific knowledge is also of value in those rare cases in which military intervention is a necessary option.

The connection that diplomacy establishes with other cultures should be the linchpin in our efforts to deal with hostile regimes. The previous administration refused to employ diplomatic tools in dealing with Iran, instead declaring that blocking the regime’s ability to negotiate with the United States was a sign of strength and the best option to adjust its behavior. This strategy not only failed to slow down Iran’s nuclear enrichment program; it also denied our diplomatic professionals an opportunity to engage directly with, and thus gauge the intentions of, their Iranian counterparts.

The State Department also should be the key interpreter for U.S. actions toward other international actors. When U.S. actions cause concern in other countries, it should be our diplomatic professionals’ job to explain their utility to the global community. These career professionals should also be first with the truth when we make a mistake. U.S. obfuscation of civilian deaths from airstrikes in Afghanistan, for example, is a prime example of how failure to quickly acknowledge our actions provides our enemies with leverage to mischaracterize our intentions.

The U.S. military is working to become a leader on this strategy, but our diplomats should not be left behind. These public diplomacy tasks have not been given sufficient attention under past administrations and we must rebuild a robust capacity.

This broad mandate requires the U.S. Congress to fully resource the State Department’s Foreign Service and policy teams, and be willing to work with Secretary Clinton and her team on new initiatives to restore State’s position as the lead agency on U.S. foreign policy issues. The United States has marshaled the resources to add 92,000 troops above pre-September 11 levels since the onset of military action in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Secretary of Defense Gates recently approved another temporary increase of 22,000 troops for the Army. The State Department has meanwhile struggled to maintain a Foreign Service Officer corps of adequate size.
Former Secretary of State Colin Powell added 1,000 new State Department positions during his tenure, and the FY 2010 foreign operations bill passed by the House of Representatives includes funding to increase the size of the State Department and USAID staff by over 1,000 members. Yet our diplomatic shortfall, which dates back to the end of the Cold War, requires a much more substantial investment.

Limiting the size and depth of our foreign service constrains our ability to be an effective actor abroad. In July 2009, eight former secretaries of state from both parties—Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger, Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell, and Condoleezza Rice—wrote an op-ed directed to Congress decrying the shortage of funding for development and diplomacy capabilities. They noted that “30 percent of [State Department] positions that require foreign language skills are filled by officers without them,” and “nearly 20 percent of regular positions in embassies and in the State Department are unfilled.” A 2008 report by the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center called the understaffing of our foreign affairs corps “a human capital crisis,” and correctly noted that “the status quo cannot continue without serious damage to our vital interests.”

The failure of our overseas diplomatic efforts has been exacerbated by staff needs in Iraq and Afghanistan and the decline in our international standing as a result of these engagements. The American Academy of Diplomacy and the Stimson Center noted that that State Department needs an additional 2,400 staff for “core diplomatic work, emerging policy challenges, public diplomacy, and critical training needs.”

Not surprisingly, this lack of diplomatic capability resulted in eight years of declining world approval for the United States during the Bush administration, a trend that was particularly disheartening among close allies such as Germany and Turkey. But world approval of the United States has ticked upward markedly since the election of President Obama. The Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2009 concluded that “confidence in Barack Obama’s foreign policy judgments stands behind a resurgent U.S. image in many countries.”

Still, there is significant ground to be gained in countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and Argentina, where favorability ratings remain, in some cases significantly, below 40 percent. An expanded diplomatic corps is our first and best option to boost these numbers as well as maintain the gains made by President Obama’s election.

Implementation strategies

**Fill all open Foreign Service Officer positions overseas.** The Foreign Service has specialized needs, and we should expect training new diplomats to be an exacting and time-consuming process. Yet we cannot afford to shortchange our diplomatic corps as we increase the size of our military to meet current demands. The Obama administration should ask
Congress to provide funds to allow the State Department to fill its overseas Foreign Service Officer vacancies just as it has provided substantial funds to increase the size of the Army and Marines. This will allow the State Department to aggressively recruit qualified candidates, including offering bonuses for candidates that possess critical skills. This process should also include an evaluation of efficiency and best practices in training new officers.

Provide adequate funds for the State Department to maintain significant capacity in areas of probable future conflict. We expect our armed forces to develop the capabilities and infrastructure for probable future conflicts. Our expectations for the State Department should be the same. The State Department’s inability to fill positions with employees who meet the language requirements of their jobs indicates that this is not being done to a sufficient degree. The administration should commit to work with Secretary Clinton and her team to identify areas where future needs are likely to exceed normal rates—such as Arab, Farsi, Chinese and Korean linguists—and provide incentives for experienced and new employees to build their skills in these areas—even if they are not currently assigned to those regions of the world.

Today, 39 percent of Foreign Service officers assigned to language-designated positions did not meet both the foreign language speaking and reading proficiency requirements for their positions.105 Our Foreign Service cannot maintain a credible capability to represent U.S. interests and safeguard U.S. national security if we are unable to prepare our diplomats to function effectively in critical regions such as the Middle East. Building a reserve capacity of language skills and regional and cultural understanding will allow us to respond quickly and effectively to the challenges we face around the world.

Create a Junior Foreign Service Officer Training Corps. Some of the State Department’s largest gaps in critical capabilities are the result of a lack of adequately trained personnel to fill its mission requirements. The State Department should take advantage of the sagging economy to recruit a new wave of Junior Foreign Service Officers that would sign-up for a minimum of 5 to 10 years. This new Junior Foreign Service Training Corps will provide language and cultural immersion to willing, capable, and qualified young men and women who are committed to a career in the Foreign Service. In turn, the department and the country will benefit from the investment they have made in these young peoples’ acquired expertise for decades to come.

Recognize and plan for the fact that civilian diplomatic and development professionals do not have the capacity to manage post-conflict environments in the short term. The traditional division of labor between the military and the civilian instruments of national power is blurring. Majors and colonels who have trained to command tank battalions are also tasked with commanding the affairs of a small town or province in Afghanistan or Iraq. Ideally, civilian specialists and reconstruction teams would be the first units into postconflict environments to lead so-called phase IV, or stability operations in the wake of major conflict.
In reality, however, there are situations in which the military is the only U.S. organization able to operate effectively in such environments due to their enormous budget, personnel base, and independent lift and security capacity. This means we must accept that the military will take the lead in phase IV operations in the short-term. Yet this also means that we must launch a serious effort to build-up civilian capacity for these missions. As articulated by General Anthony Zinni, civilian agencies can and should plug in with their military counterparts in order to provide expertise and a smooth transition to civilian authority once a permissive security environment allows for such a changeover. The State Department and the Defense Department should conduct regular simulation exercises in order to facilitate a smooth transition.

**Synchronize the areas of responsibilities of the Departments of Defense and State.**
Our Foreign Service professionals are working alongside military men and women in uniform in critical areas around the world everyday. Yet often the military commander responsible for a certain area may not have the same area of responsibility as his or her State Department counterpart. For instance, the director of near eastern affairs at the State Department has responsibility for Libya, Algeria, and Morocco. But these critical areas are under the purview of the newly created Africa Command, which is responsible for all the countries in the continent save Egypt. Such dissimilarities create confusion and overlap that hamper bureaucratic efficiency.

**Provide better coordination for U.S. public diplomacy work.** Our ability to communicate U.S. objectives to countries around the world is supported by our public diplomacy efforts. These programs include communications initiatives such as the Voice of America, exchange efforts such as the Fulbright fellowships, and direct work by the State Department’s public diplomacy officers. The U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication guides public diplomacy in the State Department. The State Department must have a clear plan for meeting the U.S. government’s overall strategic communication objectives just as the new Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review will outline the strategies and tools that our diplomats should use to meet the goals of the President’s National Security Strategy.

The Government Accountability Office noted earlier this year that it has repeatedly recommended that State develop an agency-wide plan “to integrate its diverse public diplomacy activities and direct them towards common objectives,” but the department has thus far not followed this recommendation. In order to ensure that our embassies around the world are presenting a unified vision of U.S. values and policies, the Obama administration should make this agency-wide strategy its top public diplomacy priority.

The Obama administration should also work to create region-specific comprehensive strategies, which draw from the State Department’s overall objectives. This work should recognize not only diversity between regions, but also within them, and incorporate the need to work with immigrant communities which may shape opinion in their home countries.
Development

U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the central role of development assistance in U.S. foreign policy. The United States has historically under-resourced foreign aid in comparison to military power. President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have sought to elevate development so that it is a core pillar of U.S. power, and for good reason. In an increasingly interdependent world, the United States has a compelling and enduring interest in a concerted foreign assistance program that “help[s] the world’s poor improve their lives [and supports] the emergence of capable and responsible states in the developing world.”

Role of U.S. development

A focused U.S. development campaign is in the interest of U.S. national security. The United States’ security and prosperity is inextricably linked to the well-being of people around the world. As recent history demonstrates, human insecurity—the lack of well-being and safety of a people—“feeds on itself, laying the groundwork for conflict and the extreme vulnerability that causes people to fall over the economic edge when weather, wars, or world market prices disrupt their fragile subsistence economies.” These environments have the potential to breed extremist movements that may seek to harm the United States, its people, its allies, and its interests.

Rising standards of living in developing or developed countries also create new markets for goods and services produced in the United States. Such conditions reinforce a virtuous cycle of shared prosperity.

The history of U.S. foreign assistance shows that a failure to address underlying sources of conflict through effective development intervention can result in great human and financial expenditures when responding to the outbreak of crises. The United States is a world leader in the provision of humanitarian development and assistance and has a vested interest in ensuring that our aid dollars have the maximum effect, particularly in this time of global economic downturn.

Yet this critical policy tool is often misused. A close examination of U.S. aid to countries as diverse as Pakistan and Afghanistan, Liberia, and Sudan reveals that U.S. aid often flows in reaction to crises rather than to prevent crises before they occur. As a result, our foreign assistance policy is reactive rather than proactive.

Furthermore, short-sighted political considerations too often trump more strategically considered development objectives when choosing where to send scarce foreign assistance funds. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in Pakistan. The bulk of the nearly $12 billion that the United States has invested in Pakistan since 2001 “has not
been directed to Pakistan’s underlying fault lines, but to specific short-term counterterrorism objectives.111 Many of these billions of dollars have been directed toward military equipment and weapons procurement that have nothing to do with battling the extremist militants that threaten both Pakistan and the United States.

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, only 10 percent of overall U.S. funding to Pakistan from 2001 to 2007 was devoted to development.112 The Congressional Research Service recently noted that this figure has gone up slightly, but still less than one-third of overall U.S. funding to Pakistan since 2001 has been allocated for non-security-related programs such as humanitarian relief and development assistance.113

The result of this reactive stance is that our myopic aid policies and programs often do not have the strategic impact that they should. We are missing opportunities to invest in the institution building, economic development, and civil-society engagement that can bolster the growth of democracy and create sustainable security.114 The cost of this pattern of reaction is substantial in terms of human lives, taxpayer dollars, and local and regional stability. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 was co-sponsored by Senator John Kerry (D-MA), Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), and Representative Howard Berman (D-CA), and was passed by Congress in September. It will provide $1.5 billion in nonmilitary aid to Pakistan each year for five years and could help to reverse this trend.

**State of U.S. development policy**

The United States has neither a global development policy nor a global development strategy. Recent White House,115 State Department,116 and congressional initiatives to integrate and coordinate the many tools of U.S. development,117 are an indication that the U.S. foreign assistance architecture is in a state of disarray. This condition ensures that the U.S. approach to development suffers from duplication and inefficiencies and is more *ad hoc* than strategic.

A brief review of the history of the improvised nature of U.S. foreign aid serves to illustrate how decades worth of legislation and executive orders have created a completely disjointed system. The legislation governing foreign aid was originally written in 1961, and has since been amended to include 33 goals, 247 directives, and 75 priorities. More than half of all aid programs as of 2007 were administered by agencies other than the U.S. Agency for International Development—one of the foremost U.S. agency for development programming. Instead, our “development funding is arrayed across more than 20 government agencies, departments and initiatives each with its own goals, priorities, and procedures.”118

This lack of coordination and coherence leads to inefficiencies in the management of taxpayer funds and fosters policy incoherence. All too often over the past eight years, the Defense Department has had to fill the vacuum left by other U.S. agencies. The
Department of Defense’s share of the development budget, for example, soared from 5.6 percent in 2002 to 21.7 percent—or $5.5 billion—in 2005 because of its lead role in Iraq and Afghanistan and because it is the only government agency with the budget and the manpower to fill the gap.119

This ad hoc military assistance may seem preferable to no U.S. development assistance at all, but allowing the U.S. military to become the face of American development policy is ill-advised. The hazard becomes clear when it appears to our partners abroad that our sole interest in development and human security lies, as the Center for American Progress noted in 2008, “in the frame of our national security and, in particular, the war on terrorism—and not, as it should be, in the context of our shared commitment to the global common good.”120

We must reverse this pattern of crisis-driven investment and overmilitarization of U.S. development strategy. The U.S. government must prioritize, integrate, and coordinate our development policies and programs.

**Implementation strategies**

Appoint a Director for International Development or empower and strengthen the director of USAID to represent the development function in policy deliberations. It is far more difficult to manage all tools of global development that are currently spread out across the executive branch because there is no single official in charge of crisis prevention, response, or management.121 Congress should authorize the appointment of a single official responsible for coordinating the myriad of development activities across the U.S. government. This official should take responsibility for a National Strategy for Global Development to ensure coherence and coordination across agencies.

Revamp the Foreign Assistance Act. The National Strategy for Global Development should develop a plan to overhaul the Foreign Aid Assistance Act—the legislative underpinning of U.S. foreign assistance operations—to ensure consistency across government agencies. Recent momentum in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs is a step in the right direction.122

Coordinate development tools within the U.S. government. The Obama administration should conduct an interagency inventory of the development and crisis response tools spread across the federal government, coordinate these tools, and lay the groundwork for reorganization and reforms to achieve coherence. Representatives of all agencies involved in development should form an interagency policy committee within the National Security Council to coordinate all their future activities once the review is complete.
It is encouraging that the State Department has initiated a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review to examine, among other things, whole of government approaches to development. The review must involve more than just agencies traditionally associated with development such as USAID and State, and include the Department of Defense and the Department of the Treasury, which possesses many of the government’s less well known development tools.

**Codify the prevention mandate.** The Obama administration should focus on enhancing the capacity of U.S. agencies to implement structural mechanisms to help prevent crises before they erupt, improve crisis response and management to mitigate the expansion or escalation of a given crisis, and prevent the reoccurrence of crises to avert a country’s relapse into crisis once it has been stabilized.

**Address resource and staff shortages.** Today the number of U.S. development professionals has declined to one-tenth the number employed at the height of the Vietnam War. The Obama administration has given USAID a small shot in the arm in the form of a $450 million boost in its fiscal year 2010 budget, which is a 35 percent increase over the previous year’s budget. USAID’s FY2010 budget also includes an additional 350 personnel—a 16 percent increase over today’s numbers. The Obama administration should continue to increase this investment to ensure that there are three times the current number of USAID Foreign Service Officers by 2012. The administration should also request funds to provide incentives to attract individuals with expertise in critical areas such as health and conflict management.

**Defense**

Military force can be an effective tool of statecraft, whether it is used to defeat our enemies or deter them from attacking the United States, our allies, and our interests. The Bush administration made the military the primary tool of U.S. foreign policy. It tasked our soldiers, sailors, airmen and women, and Marines with conducting and coordinating the majority of U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan—the two foci of the administration’s foreign policy efforts. But operations in both of those countries have proven that military force has a limited role.

Our military forces in Afghanistan were able to route the Taliban regime that gave succor to international terrorists, but were unable to maintain the peace after President Bush shifted U.S. attention and resources to Iraq. Our military in Iraq was able to topple Saddam Hussein, but the campaign was undertaken with an insufficient number of troops to contain the campaign of violence that followed the overthrow of the Ba’athist government. Both of these botched operations ultimately undermined our national security and strained our military almost to the breaking point.
As President Obama reviews U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and oversees the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011, he should also take a careful look at the proper role of the military in foreign policy and the steps the United States needs to take in order to revitalize our overburdened force and prepare DOD to work most efficiently and effectively.

Role of the armed forces

The use of military force is sometimes necessary, particularly against nations and non-state actors that pose an immediate, non-negotiable threat to the United States and its interests. Yet other elements in the U.S. foreign policy tool kit can help to deter potential adversaries and decrease the number of cases in which the use of force is the only viable option. This perspective takes into account the serious consequences of committing American lives to military operations overseas and the limitations on military action as a tool for winning the peace.

President George W. Bush declared when he launched U.S. operations in Iraq that the United States was assisting Iraq in developing a “united, stable, and free country.” Yet our military intervention into that country opened Iraq’s borders for the first time to Al Qaeda, paved the way for Iran’s growing (and destabilizing) influence in the region, and provided the impetus for brutal sectarian warfare. The deployment of nearly 30,000 additional American troops into Iraq in 2007, bringing the total to nearly 170,000, was aimed at creating a secure environment in which sectarian actors could reconcile their differences. But these conflicts continue to plague the country today. The contributions of our fighting men and women in Iraq are unquestionably heroic, but the results of our actions in that country demonstrate clearly that we should have used a higher threshold for the use military force. Our overwhelming conventional military superiority provides us with the capacity to undertake major contingency operations overseas when necessary, but we should not forget that “we must also use traditional strategic doctrines such as containment and deterrence.” These doctrines require a strong force, but recognize that limiting the application of that force may ultimately provide the greatest benefit for U.S. national security.

The United States will have to outline the military’s role within the spectrum of national security tools and decide how to structure our forces to best confront the operations for which we are likely to need them. U.S. engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have required a stronger than anticipated contribution from diplomatic and development professionals and a rethinking of the way U.S. military forces operate.

The military’s guiding principles for force structure before the September 11 attacks suggested that the United States should be capable of simultaneously conducting two major, geographically distinct regional wars. Yet our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the challenges inherent to this concept. The United States has engaged in
major combat operations in both countries, but our fighting men and women have also been asked to conduct intensive counterinsurgency operations against non-state actors—the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and others—who cannot be defeated by conventional military tactics. These operations require a significant commitment to boots on the ground and close interaction with local communities.

The United States needs to build a force that operates in coordination with diplomatic and development professionals and is ready to confront the most likely near-term conflicts, such as unconventional threats. The challenge is to do so within a finite budget and without abandoning the skills needed to meet the conventional threats that dominated our national security agenda during the 20th century.

State of the armed forces

The military must develop a more substantial capacity for confronting unconventional foes, including non-state terrorist groups and insurgencies. But the rise of states such as China and Russia reminds us that we cannot forgo the expertise we have acquired in fighting conventional conflicts. We must pursue productive alliances with these states, but these growing relationships cannot eclipse the need to plan for future contingencies. Our national security is most assured when we are able to anticipate threats before they emerge.

Unconventional and conventional foes require us to provide our troops with a diverse toolkit. Counterinsurgency operations make heavy demands on manpower as U.S. forces are tasked with building trust with the people they defend, not merely engaging the enemy in firefights. This requires us to maintain a robust force of soldiers and Marines who are trained for ground combat and can take on the grinding work of conducting repeated door-to-door operations in both urban and remote locations.

It also requires the United States to move beyond its reliance on winning by virtue of our technological superiority. The unmanned drones that have become symbols of our current engagements in Southwest Asia can be critical parts of our reconnaissance and surveillance efforts, but they have also led to a number of highly publicized civilian casualties that can ultimately undermine the mission. As General Stanley McChrystal, the commanding general of U.S. and NATO forces in Iraq, notes, "if civilians die in a firefight, it does not matter who shot them—we still failed to protect them from harm." We must ensure that technology always complements, rather than detracts from, our mission.

Our ability to carry out counterinsurgency operations and other non-conventional missions is dependent upon the health of our armed forces. Our fighting men and women have acquired priceless experience in counterinsurgency techniques in Iraq and Afghanistan, and our military leadership has responded to those engagements by reshaping military doctrine and field manuals to reflect current thinking. But we have been able to do so only at extraordinary cost to the men and women who have borne the burden of conducting these campaigns.
We will be ill-equipped for any future contingencies of this kind until we can heal our injured armed forces and put in place better mechanisms to ensure that the same stress will not be placed on future service members. This process must include an assessment of when and how members of our development and diplomatic corps can more successfully and appropriately contribute to the counterinsurgency operations.

Unconventional battles require a strong commitment of manpower and the judicious use of military technology, while conventional conflicts require us to depend more heavily on our superior armor, technology, and lethality. Equipment such as the M1A1 Abrams tank, fighter jets, attack helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles should allow us to successfully confront conventional foes. But this technology carries a high price, as reflected in the enormous growth in the Defense Department’s acquisition costs since September 11. The prevalence of unconventional conflicts requires that these expenditures be carefully justified and controlled.

We cannot fail to spend the money needed to keep our country safe, but we must have a nuanced understanding of how that security is achieved. We must find a way to equip our armed forces with the weapons and technology they need to keep us safe without undermining our ability to provide a prosperous society and effective government services to all of our people. We must have reasonable expectations for keeping the defense budget under control. That means giving preference to the needs associated with unconventional operations, while funding a hedge capability for conventional warfare.

**Implementation strategies**

**Keep the defense budget flat over the next four years, adjusting only for inflation.** U.S. defense spending in fiscal year 2009 was larger than at any time since the end of World War II in inflation-adjusted dollars. Elevated spending during military operations is expected and necessary, but our defense budget has eclipsed the amount spent on defense by all other countries in the world combined. This out-of-control spending will limit our ability to succeed as we attempt to rebalance our national security priorities to give a greater role to development, diplomacy, homeland security, and intelligence and more effectively accomplish our goals around the world.

The Center for American Progress in 2008 released “Building a Military for the 21st Century,” our blueprint for defense reform. The report identifies $38.6 billion in savings over the next four years that would allow the baseline defense budget to remain level in real terms. These cuts include ending production of the MV-22 Osprey and substituting for cheaper helicopters, canceling unproven missile defense programs, and cancelling the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program.
Give priority to unconventional conflicts in military training and acquisition, while maintaining a hedge capability for conventional warfare. We should not forgo our expertise in conventional war, but current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have made clear the need for more substantial unconventional capabilities. We must provide our troops with the training necessary for these operations and structure our force to best confront them. “Building a Military for the 21st Century” recommends sustaining the increased size of the ground forces and expanding the number of maneuver enhancement brigades, which are capable of carrying out both support and counterinsurgency missions. Both of these measures will increase our ability to provide the right skills for today’s engagements.

**Convene an interagency team to coordinate between the goals of the QDR and QDDR.** The State Department’s new QDDR and the Defense Department’s 2010 QDR will be critical in interpreting President Obama’s overall national security vision. The Departments of Defense and State should work together to identify the overlaps in these strategic planning documents, as well as points of friction between the plans. This will encourage the growth of a whole of government approach to meeting the national security objectives set forth by the administration. A small interagency team should perform an initial analysis on these points and make recommendations to the administration before the release of the FY 2011 budget. This recommendation is dependent on the timely release of the president’s own national security strategy, which should be the guiding document for both reviews.

---

**The U.S. intelligence community**

During the Bush presidency, the U.S. intelligence community suffered a significant, public loss in credibility. The 9/11 Commission Report pointed out that “most of the intelligence community recognized in the summer of 2001 that the number and severity of threat reports were unprecedented.” Yet despite multiple warnings that Osama bin Laden was planning a large scale attack, analysts failed to correctly identify and prevent the 9/11 plot. A lack of adequate communication and coordination between foreign and domestic-focused intelligence agencies—as well as within domestic intelligence organizations—contributed significantly to this failure.

This blow to the credibility of the intelligence community was compounded by problems with its work in the ramp-up to the invasion and occupation of Iraq. The 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, which President Bush used as evidence to justify the U.S. invasion, was deeply flawed. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported in July 2004 that “most of the major key judgments” of the document were “either overstated, or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting.” These unsupported or overstated claims included information on Iraq’s alleged nuclear program and chemical and biological weapons capacity.
The intelligence community also was brought into the public spotlight by the Central Intelligence Agency’s role in carrying out the Bush administration’s extraordinary rendition program, under which detainees were sent to other countries where they were tortured and held in captivity for years without charge, and for the National Security Agency’s illegal wiretaps of U.S. citizens in the name of combating terrorism. These efforts threw into sharp relief the tension between the need to facilitate the intelligence community’s efforts to protect U.S. national security and the imperative to respect human and constitutional rights, the values for which our country stands.

The way forward

Some of the shortcomings of the intelligence community revealed after 9/11 have been addressed. The Bush administration—notably under pressure from both parties in Congress—reorganized the community under a new Director of National Intelligence, who was given the task of overseeing and coordinating the United States’ 16 disparate intelligence agencies. The Obama administration closed the CIA’s secret overseas prisons —although it did not repudiate the practice of rendition—and unequivocally mandated that no arm of the U.S. government would practice torture.

Yet as the United States confronts the threats posed by extremist groups, hostile regimes, and rising powers, the necessity for accurate, timely intelligence has become more critical than ever. The Obama administration must be prepared to constantly review, adapt and oversee this critical tool of national security in order to improve its effectiveness and ensure that it conforms to our values. To do this it must take the following steps.

First, the Obama administration should create more unified intelligence centers like the National Counterterrorism Center. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, for example, reduced separate silos in the Pentagon by giving combatant commanders rather than service chiefs the operational control over deployed military forces. This move was intended to ensure that military operations would not be obstructed by interservice barriers, and would instead be run by a person whose sole focus was to coordinate operations in a well-defined area of responsibility. The National Counterterrorism Center brings the same coordination to the intelligence community’s counterterrorism work and reduces the inter-agency communication failures that contributed to the September 11 intelligence breakdown.131

While intelligence work may not lend itself to regional centers in exactly the same way that the Pentagon’s operations do, the Obama administration should adapt this model to further improve coordination among our intelligence professionals. It should specifically work with the intelligence community to develop centers to coordinate intelligence on emerging and future threats. Agency-specific bureaucracy on these threats may be less well-established, and thus easier to reshape, and such a center can help to slowly institutionalize a unified intelligence mindset as future threats become present dangers.
Second, the administration should make a public commitment to greater openness in the intelligence budget. Based on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the Director of National Intelligence is now legally obligated to reveal the total, or topline spending for the National Intelligence Program, which for FY 2010 will total $75 billion. However, no subsidiary information is released to indicate, even in broad strokes, how money is distributed between agencies and varieties of intelligence work. In addition, the President is still allowed to waive the release of even the NIP’s topline number if it poses a threat to national security.

The need to classify certain portions of the intelligence budget is understandable and appropriate. But without allowing some scrutiny into the distribution of funds among projects and agencies, even basic public oversight is impossible. For example, keeping the budget secret denies the public the ability to determine whether the intelligence community is receiving the resources needed to adequately balance work on future and current threats. The Obama administration should determine how more information can be shared in a way that does not threaten U.S. national security interests (the Public Interest Declassification Board would be a good venue for this analysis) and how the intelligence budget can be factored into a unified national security budget.

Finally, the Obama administration should recognize and promote the linkages between the intelligence community and other elements of U.S. national power. Specifically, it should make the case to Congress and the American people that fully funding our diplomatic and development agencies—including giving these actors the staff needed to fulfill their missions—is also an investment in improving intelligence gathering.

Foreign Service and USAID officers who work on the ground around the world are in an excellent position to gather open-source intelligence, that is, information which is available from unclassified sources such as newspapers, television, and observation. These officers often work in areas where intelligence professionals are not present and thus may be the first to realize that a security threat to the United States is emerging. Continuing to underfund these valuable agencies only hampers our ability to gather the intelligence needed to safeguard our national security.

The Department of Homeland Security

Seven years after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the agency still faces a number of significant challenges in fulfilling its mission of more ably protecting the United States homeland. Despite extensive efforts by the department and a number of needed budgetary augmentations, reforms, and reviews by the Obama administration, the numerous agencies and sub-agencies that were reorganized to form DHS still need to organize and adapt to meet today’s security challenges.
In order to accelerate and unify security policy making inside the White House, the Obama administration has merged the staffs of the Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council. Additionally, the administration increased DHS’s FY2010 budget by over 5 percent over FY2009 on top of $3.5 billion that was allocated to the department in the economic stimulus bill enacted earlier this year. These are all welcome steps, but DHS’s main challenges are more bureaucratic than budgetary.

In order to address some of these challenges, DHS is currently conducting the first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, or QHSR. This congressionally mandated, top-to-bottom review of homeland security will guide the Department for the next four years and inform the nation’s homeland security policies, programs, and missions. Like the QDR and QDDR, the QHSR is well underway; the review’s dialogue series began in August and the final report is due no later than December 31, 2009.

The QDR and QDDR are important documents but their agency roles are relatively established. But the QHSR is needed to clarify some of the basic tenets of this comparatively new agency. In this sense, completion of the QHSR before the administration’s overall National Security Strategy sets its vision for the department’s role in the architecture of the U.S. government will not cause the same problems that doing the QDR and QDDR before the NSS will.

Yet there are a number of critical areas that the QHSR should address. In September 2008, DHS’s Homeland Security Advisory Council identified “key challenges” facing the Department in the areas of:

- Interagency information sharing and coordination.
- Congressional oversight.
- Employee training and education.
- Research, development, procurement and acquisition.
- Disaster response.
- Risk management and communications.
- Long-term financial and political program sustainability.

This range of challenges suggests that key areas that QHSR should review.

**Interagency information sharing and coordination.** In order to confront the complex security challenges inherent in defending the homeland, DHS must undertake significant efforts to build horizontal relationships with other federal agencies while at the same time using a bottom-up approach to build vertical relationships with local, state and international entities. Developing working relationships with the private sector—in whose hands rests 85 percent of our nation’s critical nation infrastructure—is also essential.
Congressional oversight. Right now, 86 congressional committees or subcommittees oversee DHS’s activities. The Obama administration should implement the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation to streamline homeland security processes so that it can reduce the number of committees and issues for which DHS must answer to Congress. Striking an effective balance between the legislative and executive branches will ensure adequate oversight over DHS activities while also providing the department itself with enough leeway to carry out its mission efficiently and effectively.

Employee training and education. Building an effective corps of homeland security professionals will require an education program which takes into account the wide range of skills needed throughout DHS, from law to emergency response to communications. In addition, all homeland security professionals should be trained to think creatively, question assumptions and put themselves in the enemies’ shoes. Toward this end, the Obama administration should support drives to integrate the curricula of all homeland security programs, expand leadership training and support the creation of a Homeland Security Academy program, modeled on the military’s war colleges.

Research, development, procurement and acquisition. DHS should work toward establishing a competent, experienced acquisition staff, along with a department-wide acquisition strategy and management process. These initiatives should include efforts towards better engagement with the private sector and a concerted effort to use the standards-settings role of DHS to create economies of scale.

Disaster response. Despite some efforts to reform the national disaster response capability, there’s still much work that needs to be done. Priorities for reform should include increasing our medical and the surge capacity of our emergency medical services, finding ways to monitor in real time our relief resources, and standardizing and strengthening our emergency communications capacity. In addition, DHS should implement the National Incident Management System and the National Response Framework across all federal agencies. Finally, DHS should think about recovery right along with all the other core functions of disaster relief, prevention and management, before the next crisis occurs.

Risk management and communications. Risks to the security of the homeland are constantly evolving. DHS should institute a risk-management approach to security, one that pairs resources, makes decisions, and communicates threats in proportion with current risks. Part of creating this system means consolidating the different risk-management programs across all of DHS’s agencies to ensure consistency. In addition, security threats must also be communicated clearly to the American people so citizens are aware of the real threats they face and can avoid overreaction when disaster strikes. A better system of communication would include an improved color-coded homeland security system. It would also include better disaster communications to provide adequate warnings, clear instructions and continual updates with pertinent information to those in harm’s way.
Long-term financial sustainability. Ensuring adequate financial support for long-term security needs, especially in this time of tight budgets, will continue to challenge DHS. A key role for the DHS Secretary will be to make the case for continued funding, especially for protection against security threats that will require immediate preparation but whose consequences are far off. For those threats, it is essential that homeland security leaders and the administration work to inspire a sense of urgency and vigilance in the American public toward ensuring the protection of our nation.
Conclusion

The events of the past four years since the Center published the first edition of “Integrated Power” have demonstrated the necessity of adopting this strategy if the country is to deal efficiently and effectively with the national security challenges it faces. In his successful campaign for the presidency and in his actions and speeches since taking office, President Obama has incorporated many of the concepts of Integrated Power. As a result, no longer will the United States wage unilateral, preventive war; or rely almost exclusively on military power to advance its interests; or fail to fund the development and diplomacy portions of the budget adequately.

But it is important that the new administration formulate and publish its own national security strategy. While the Defense, State, and Homeland Security Departments are doing their own Quadrennial Reviews, they will not be as coherent and integrated without a new NSS. Nor will the Congress be able to make its budgetary decisions as rationally without such a strategy. In fact, that is why the Congress mandated that a new administration must release a NSS within five months after taking office and update it annually.

The failure of the Bush administration to follow that law (it released only two versions in eight years) contributed to its and the country’s failure to implement a coherent, effective national security strategy. The Obama administration would be wise not to make the same mistake.
Endnotes


7 Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” pg. 3.


11 Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” p. 4.


30 Center for American Progress, “A Global Imperative,” pg. 3.


34 “Economic survey of India 2007: India’s key challenges to sustaining high growth,” OECD, October 9, 2007, available at: http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3343,en_2649_34571_19431864_1_1_1_1,00.html.


About the authors

Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and a senior advisor to the Center for Defense Information. Prior to joining American Progress, he was a senior fellow and director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. From July 1998 to October 2002, he was council vice president, director of studies, and holder of the Maurice Greenberg Chair. Dr. Korb served as assistant secretary of defense (manpower, reserve affairs, installations, and logistics) from 1981 through 1985. In that position, he administered about 70 percent of the defense budget. For his service in that position, he was awarded the Department of Defense’s medal for Distinguished Public Service. Mr. Korb served on active duty for four years as Naval Flight Officer, and retired from the Naval Reserve with the rank of captain.

Sean Duggan is a Research Associate for national security at the Center for American Progress. He works primarily on military affairs and other related U.S. foreign policy and international security issues. Duggan’s work has been featured in The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, International Herald Tribune, and The Boston Globe. He has also been published in The New Republic, The Nation, the Johns Hopkins University’s Transatlantic Relations Journal, and Political Science and Politics Magazine. Sean’s first book, Serving America’s Veterans, which he co-authored with his colleagues at the Center, was published in August 2009.

Laura Conley is a Special Assistant for National Security and International Policy. In this position she focuses primarily on military and defense issues. She graduated from Wesleyan University with high honors in government and a certificate in international relations. Her work has appeared in the Boston Globe, The Baltimore Sun, and The American Interest, among other publications.

Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge the advice and assistance of our colleagues on the National Security Team at CAP, who took the time to review and comment on this document. In particular, we are thankful for the guidance of Rudy deLeon, Brian Katulis, Moran Banai, Michael Werz, Caroline Wadhams, Ken Gude, Samuel Charap, Winny Chen, Peter Juul, Natalie Ondiak, and Andrew Sweet. We also received much-appreciated advice from our colleagues on the economic policy and energy teams, in particular Sabina Dewan, Michael Ettlinger, Andrew Light, and Dan Weiss. The authors also acknowledge the key research assistance of our interns, Milton Wilkins and Jacob Stokes.

We are also grateful for the help we received on this document from our editorial team at CAP, particularly Ed Paisley, and our art department.

All errors are the authors’ alone.
The Center for American Progress is a nonpartisan research and educational institute dedicated to promoting a strong, just and free America that ensures opportunity for all. We believe that Americans are bound together by a common commitment to these values and we aspire to ensure that our national policies reflect these values. We work to find progressive and pragmatic solutions to significant domestic and international problems and develop policy proposals that foster a government that is “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”