
THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

VOL. VIII — NUMBER 4.

ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF UKRAINE



LOWER RIGHT: PREWAR TERRITORY IN 1939 UPPER RIGHT: REORGANIZATION OF UKRAINE AFTER THE WORLD WAR

AUTUMN 1952

\$ 1.25 A COPY

Published by UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

Edited by EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-chief NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY

Associate Editor LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

Artistic Adviser SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY

Published by UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA
with support of Americans of Ukrainian Descent

Subscription: Yearly \$5.00; *Single Copy* \$1.25

Checks payable to: UKRAINIAN CONGRESS COMMITTEE OF AMERICA

Managing Office: THE UKRAINIAN QUARTERLY

50 Church Street, S 252, New York 7, N. Y.

Editorial Address: DR. NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY

250 Franklin Turnpike, Mahwah, New Jersey

Tel: CRagmere 8-3767-M

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

AMEDEO GIANNINI, Italian statesman and author; former ambassador, President of the *Associazione Culturale Italo-Ucraina*, Rome.

JAMES BURNHAM, professor of New York University and political writer. Author of *The Struggle for the World*, *The Coming Defeat of Communism*, *Containment or Liberation* and others.

GREGORY MAKHIV, Ph.D., authority on soil science. Former Professor of Kharkiv University under the Soviets, migrated to the USA. Died 1952.

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY, Ph. D., Professor of Economics at Georgetown University and author. President of *The Ukrainian Congress Committee of America*.

CLARENCE A. MANNING, Professor of Russian and Ukrainian Languages and Literatures at Columbia University. Author of *The Story of Ukraine*, *Ukrainian Literature* and others.

R. PONYATOVSKY (*pseudo*), a Ukrainian scientist associated with the Moscow University for several years under the Bolshevik regime.

VOLODYMYR DE KOROSTOVETZ, LLD, author and lecturer, a British citizen of Ukrainian descent living now in London. Former private secretary to the Minister of Russian (Tsarist) Office of Foreign Affairs. Expert on Russian Empire Affairs, author of *Seed and Harvest* (1930).

V. PANASENKO, veterinarian, associated with the Kharkiv Veterinarian Institute while in Soviet Ukraine. Now in USA.

M. PAVLIUK (*pseudo*), Ukrainian Soviet economist and sociologist. Now in exile in Germany.

THE YALTA AGREEMENT AND AMERICA

Editorial

American foreign policy during the late presidential campaign has been the subject of a heated discussion between the two great American parties. The most bitterly contested point in this Republican-Democratic debate concerned the Yalta Agreement concluded in February, 1945, between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. This agreement really laid the basis for a new world order after the ending of the war and sketched the spheres of influence of the three great powers. The Democrats have maintained that the Yalta Agreement was basically good and corresponded to the then political strength of the three partners. They argued that the Yalta Agreement was not evil but that the fault lay in the fact, that the Bolsheviks treacherously violated the terms of this agreement and in an underhanded manner through the aid of their Communistic hangers-on got control of Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and later of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. There was therefore no need to denounce the Yalta Agreement; it was, however necessary to compel the Bolsheviks to restore its essence.

The Republicans asserted that the Yalta Agreement was evil in itself, for it was won by the Bolsheviks in an underhanded manner through the aid of such "American diplomats" as Alger Hiss, at a time when President Roosevelt was failing physically and lacked the strength to orient himself in such a complex situation. General Eisenhower, the present President-elect, in his campaign called for its denunciation and so did his adviser, the future Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. This point of view was accepted by the New York Times in its Sunday edition of October 19, 1952.

The Yalta Agreement vitally concerns Ukraine and other nations of East-Central Europe, so that we are not indifferent to the attitude which America takes towards it. The agreement consists of three parts: the open agreement, the secret supplement and its practical application in 1945 and thereafter. The open agreement lays the ideological basis for the post-war and post-Hitler world. This part, as we know from the documents published by the State Department¹ was of American author-

¹ *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945*. Department of State, USA Publication 3580. Washington, D. C. 1949, pp. 663-664.

ship. It asserts that in the post-war world there must be established in all countries democratic governments with the approval of the people in accordance with the general principles of the Atlantic Charter and with the Basic Declaration of the then newly founded United Nations. It is literally expressed in these words:

"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States have consulted with each other in the common interest of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declared their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite state of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems. The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and *to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter — the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live — the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those people who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.*

Furthermore in a very important section, the Yalta Agreement specifies how the three partners will help the liberated nations to rebuild their democratic order. They bind themselves to work together in all important steps which concern the establishment of a normal democratic life of these liberated peoples. Finally the Soviets, Great Britain and America declared that:

"By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration of the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind."

It was apparently impossible to secure the new post-war democratic order in the world by more beautiful words.

On the basis of this declaration, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were to become free democratic nations. If the post-war world by the favor of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and above all Stalin was to become just and democratic, it was only natural that an urgent task was to settle the question of the boundaries between the reconstructed Poland and Rumania on the one

hand and the Soviet Union on the other, i. e. between Poland-Rumania and Ukraine-Byelorussia and Lithuania, now Soviet Republics. On the basis of this declaration Stalin had the right to apply the ethnographical principle as the most just in the solution of this question.

And in fact Stalin cleverly relying upon this ethnographical principle did demand the inclusion of Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia and the Wilno area into the USSR for addition to the appropriate republics.

As we know from this already mentioned publication of the American State Department, it had two commissions studying the territorial line of demarcation between Poland and the Soviets from 1943 on, a political and a territorial commission.² The American commission on boundaries between Poland and Soviet Ukraine received the most amazing plans. Both commissions had approximately all the material on both the Polish and the Ukrainian side. They knew the history of the quarrel over Galicia during the Versailles Conference and the years immediately following. The members had definite factual material on the biased character of the last Polish census of the population in 1931. They also discussed five possible plans for drawing the Polish-Ukrainian boundary, not one of which would have been a just solution of the thorny Polish-Ukrainian dispute, since each one was a glaring contradiction of the point of view of the Atlantic Charter and the Basic Declaration of the United Nations.³ The plans dismembered the national territory of the Ukrainian people (and also the Byelorussians) with two thoughts in mind: 1. to give to Poland the greatest possible amount of Western Ukrainian territory (supposedly Polonized on the basis of the falsified official Polish census) and 2. the desire of the American commission not to advance the Soviet border to the Carpathians.

The American members of the commissions paid no attention to the desire of the overwhelming majority of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia which desired neither Polish nor Russian-Bolshevik domination. It was not strange therefore that at the Yalta Conference America could not maintain its position on this question when Stalin advanced the just ethnographical principle and the need for uniting Ukrainian territory which had been split between Poland and Rumania.

Stalin's position was supported by Great Britain which was well acquainted with the question of the Western Ukrainian National Republic of 1918-19 and the ethnic character of these lands. Winston Churchill,

² *Postwar Foreign Policy*, pp. 492-513.

³ An impartial view of the Polish census of 1931 is given by E. M. Kulischer, a staff member of the Library of Congress in "Population Changes behind the Iron Curtain." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Sept. 1950.

the representative of Great Britain, maintained that the whole of Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia and the Wilno area were to be annexed to the appropriate soviet republics, i. e. the USSR, for they were non-Polish territories. Stalin defended the rights of Soviet Ukraine on the same arguments, adding the further proof that the Western Ukrainians in the autumn of 1940 had voted (?) for incorporation in Soviet Ukraine, that this was in accordance with the basic regulation of the Atlantic Charter, that the people of a territory have the right to decide to what state it is to be joined.⁴

Finally President Roosevelt yielded; Stalin seemed "magnanimous" for he promised to make a correction in the Polish-Ukrainian boundary to the advantage of Poland in Galicia, and so at Yalta the present boundary between Poland and Ukraine was established. The Polish premier Mikolajczyk, under a certain pressure from the Western powers, accepted these decisions of the Yalta Conference as to the Polish-Ukrainian boundaries. An agreement was concluded the following year between Poland and Ukraine for the exchange of populations and definitely established the frontiers of Poland and Ukraine as a component part of the USSR.

In 1945 and 1946, there was carried out an exchange of population. There were moved from the Western Ukrainian lands to Poland more than a million Poles, while from Eastern Poland there were taken to Ukraine more than 600,000 Ukrainians whom the Soviet regime settled mostly in the once Polonized areas of Podillya and in Khersonshchyna. From Lviv, the capital of Western Ukraine, the Polish University, the old Ossolinsky Library, the Polish museums and the entire intellectual elite

⁴ The Atlantic Charter in August, 1941 in its second point, says: "They want no territorial changes not in accord with wishes of the inhabitants." The population of the Western Ukrainian lands separated from Poland and joined to Soviet Ukraine should have had the power to express their will freely, which did not happen. Any one who knows the recent past of these lands from the time of World War I and the first years after its ending, knows that the overwhelming majority of the population of these lands — the Ukrainians, on November 1, 1918 expressed their right of self-determination and proclaimed an independent Western Ukrainian National Republic, which three months later on January 22, 1919 united with Ukrainian National Republic of Eastern Ukraine to form one state. Likewise now, the overwhelming majority of the population of Western Ukraine does not wish to be united with Poland but only with a Ukraine free from Communist Russian tyranny. Yet now when the union of the Western Ukrainian lands with the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has been accomplished and the Bolsheviks have destroyed the most active part of the Ukrainian people, there is scarcely a Ukrainian who would desire the dismemberment of the Ukrainian lands even when unity was secured under such tragic conditions. A return to Poland would only create new bloody wars between Poland and Ukraine.

were taken to Wroclaw (Breslau) on the Oder. Even the well-known Lviv monument to Mickiewicz was transferred to the West. Thus the mythological "Polish Lvov" even externally ceased to exist. The Bolsheviks even ended the Polish Roman Catholic Metropolitan See which was founded in Galicia in 1375, i. e. the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church in the Ukrainian lands, the fortress of Polonism in Western Ukraine. Thus Western Ukraine, especially Galicia, has lost even that partial Polish character which it had taken on during six centuries of Polish and Polish-Hapsburg rule. Similarly the ethnical and historical Ukrainian territories Lemkivshchyna, Peremyshl and Kholm lost the Ukrainian population and are now within the borders of Poland.⁵

Another question is contained in the open part of the Yalta Agreement which is of vital interest to Ukraine — its membership in the United Nations as a foundation member of this international institution.

Before the Yalta Conference an allied commission was working in Dumbarton Oaks near Washington to prepare the structural framework for the planned organization of the United Nations. The members of the commission could not agree upon two basic questions: 1. the number of votes that the USSR would have in the United Nations and 2. whether to keep the right of veto in the Security Council of the United Nations which the Bolsheviks insisted upon. These unsettled questions were taken to the Yalta Congerence.⁶

In the beginning the representatives of Stalin insisted that the 16 constituent republics of the USSR should have their representatives in the United Nations, but it was finally agreed that the USSR with Ukraine and Byelorussia as the largest of the constituent republics of the USSR with apparently the greatest rights of autonomy should be the foundation members. It was said in the press at the time that when President Roosevelt asked why Stalin was forcing Ukraine and Byelorussia into the United Nations, the Red dictator answered that he had his own internal problems and wanted to quiet his Ukrainians. Finally on the basis of the decisions of the Yalta Conference, Ukraine and Byelorussia became foundation members of the United Nations.

The Yalta Agreement contained also supplementary decisions which were secret and concerned the Far East and the war with Japan. This secret addition provided that the Soviets would enter the war with Japan not

⁵ See "The Polish-Soviet Exchange of Population", by Joseph B. Schechtman. *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 1949/3. The author gives combined figures concerning Ukrainian and Byelorussian territories.

⁶ An important document on the maintenance of the right of veto by the five great powers in the Security Council is printed in this volume of the American State Department, pp. 664-665.

more than three months after the capitulation of Germany, despite the non-aggression pact between Moscow and Japan. In return the USSR would receive back all the territorial losses of Russia after the Russian-Japanese War of 1905, i. e. southern Sakhalin, the right to the Manchurian railroads and rights in Port Arthur and Dalny (Dairen). Besides this, the USSR was to secure from Japan the Kurile Islands which in the east, like a chain, bar off the Pacific provinces of the USSR. The legality of this secret section is very dubious, for it dealt in part with the sovereignty of China to which Manchuria belonged; Chiang Kai Shek, the head of the Chinese Republic, was not even invited to Yalta. In this situation President Roosevelt bound himself to put pressure upon Chiang Kai Shek to satisfy these decisions at the expense of China. In turn Stalin promised to conclude with nationalist China an agreement of friendship and to turn over to it Manchuria and other Chinese territories recovered from Japan.

There was also formed in Yalta an allied commission which had the duty, besides establishing democratic governments in the countries liberated from the Nazis, of carrying out the ideas of the freedom-loving Introductory Statement accepted on the initiative of America.

It is well known how this allied organ for the bringing back of democratic governments with the will of the people worked in Poland, Bulgaria and Rumania. America and Britain made concession after concession to Moscow. Against the will of the Polish, Bulgarian and Rumanian people there were employed all kinds of coercion which Moscow carried on despite feeble protests by the American and British representatives. Thus through the inertia of America and Britain, communist governments were set up in these three states. The violence over Hungary was carried on later. A russophile government and its sovietophile president Benes helped in making Czechoslovakia a communist republic. Thus contrary to the spirit of the Yalta Agreement, the Soviets created for themselves five communized satellite states and on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement a sixth in Eastern Germany.

By a separate agreement in 1945 between the sovietophile government of Benes and Moscow, Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia) was added to the USSR and placed in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic as a new application of the ethnic principle in the solution of boundary questions.

Carpatho-Ukraine was an unnatural addition to Czechoslovakia after World War I, for it extended Czechoslovakia to the east in defiance of all logical political geography. This was well understood by Thomas G. Masaryk, the first President of Czechoslovakia, and he regarded Carpatho-Ukraine in the boundaries of Czechoslovakia as a Slav deposit which would be returned to the Ukrainian people as the owner of the area when a Ukrainian state arose north of the Carpathians. In the opinion

of the Czech premier Fierlinger, this time had come and Prague handed the territory over to the hands of red Kiev through the Kremlin regime.

We are now facing the important question as to whether America should denounce the Yalta Agreement. What advantages can come from such an act to America, the nations enslaved by the Kremlin and to world pacification?

We are thoroughly convinced that even the prominent Republicans, without thinking of the masses of ordinary adherents of the Republican Party, are not properly informed as to the advantages America would gain by such a denunciation. This matter could not be discussed impartially before the elections, for each party wished to gain the votes of the hundreds of thousands of Americans of Central European origin. Now we can look at the Yalta Agreement more calmly, especially since the party responsible for Russian-American relations since World War II and its failures was defeated at the polls.

Let us begin our analysis of the Yalta Agreement from the end. The public usually *blames the Yalta Agreement for the enslavement by Moscow of the satellite peoples* which the Kremlin forced under communist regimes against their will. This is incorrect. The Yalta Agreement did not impose communist governments on Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. On the contrary it spoke explicitly of democratic governments in accordance with the will of the people. Hence the denunciation of the Yalta Agreement will not even formally bring a better legal situation to the satellite peoples. The cause of their enslavement was the policy of appeasing the Bolsheviks on the part of the Americans and the British and the evil will of the Bolsheviks in the carrying out the Yalta Agreement. The agreement itself in this matter was fair and progressive.

Another question concerns *the secret additions regarding the Far East*. The denunciation of the Yalta Agreement would not bring much profit to America now, when the government in China is already in the hands of Chinese Communists. The present Chinese government, which has the recognition of Great Britain but not of the United States, still actually controls the territory of continental China and by its voluntary agreements with Moscow has confirmed and accepted the decisions of the Yalta Conference.

The secret additions to the Yalta Agreement as regards the Far East had all the marks of illegality, for it disposed of alien property, the property of China without the approval of the Chinese government which was at the time an ally of America, Britain and the USSR.

Besides, we must not forget that the most important parts of this once secret agreement on the Far East have been rejected by the peace treaty between Japan and America and the other democratic states. The

Japanese-American peace treaty does not make a single allusion to the cession to the Soviets of any land that was Japanese territory before the last war. Legally for America southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles are non-Soviet territory though under Soviet occupation, and there is no need to assert this a second time by denouncing the Yalta Agreement.

We now come to the first part of the Yalta Agreement, i. e. the declaration of the basic principles of the post-war world and those decisions, which settled the questions of the Polish-Ukrainian boundaries and the right of Ukraine and Byelorussia to membership in the United Nations.

The ideological declaration of the post-war world, based upon the ideas of the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations is in reality very fine. Unfortunately this declaration on the very day of its signing was the height of naivete on the part of some democracies and the height of cynicism for others: it was the height of the refined perfidy of the Bolsheviks. The democratic powers, America and Britain, asked Stalin to put his signature on a document which demanded full freedom for all peoples, their right to establish freely their own governments, the return of full sovereignty to those peoples who were deprived of their national sovereignty by another aggressor nation. The mistake was that President Roosevelt and Churchill did not know that the government of the Kremlin over a sixth part of the globe was based on violence to the freedom of peoples, on the abolition of their rights to establish their own governments, on the forcible barring of the sovereignty of Ukraine and of dozens of other peoples who in the defence of their national sovereignties against the bloody regime of Stalin had made millions of sacrifices of their best sons and daughters. How could true democrats construe such a document in the same sense as Stalin? ⁷

The establishment of the Polish-Ukrainian border which must be recognized among the terrible experiences of the Ukrainian and Polish population was for the first time in modern history made on a relatively just basis—the consideration of the ethnographical principle with the use of compromise and concessions on both sides. The peace conference in Versailles unfortunately never reached such an objective point of view;

⁷ In 1945 we called attention to the difference between the words and deeds of the participants in the Yalta Conference. See "The Crimean Declaration, Words and Deeds," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. 1, 2. At the time we wrote, "The American acceptance of these Crimean agreements can only disappoint the millions of people who looked to the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms as the foundations of a new and better life. American idealism gave these peoples the courage and hope... during the nightmare of Nazi control and it is unfortunate that anything should arise to question the supreme value of the American spirit of democracy at this time." (pp. 103-104).

that was shown by such a tyrant as Stalin who wanted to give proofs that the Bolsheviks know basically how to study national problems and to solve them justly, when it is to the profit of the USSR for no independent Ukraine or independent Poland took part in this solution. It is the same political technique which the tyrannical regime of the Bolsheviks is successfully applying to the colonies of Asia and Africa and winning the sympathies of the Asiatics and Africans. The objectively just and compromise solution of the old Ukrainian-Polish border quarrel now has the approval of the overwhelming majority of moderate Ukrainians even of the most anti-Communist camps, and among the moderate Poles.

In this compromise the Ukrainians made sacrifices in losing Lemkivshchyna, and the historically Ukrainian lands of Kholmshchyna and Zasyannya with the historic Ukrainian capitals of Peremyshl and Kholm. The Poles as an ethnic minority made sacrifices by renouncing all their six hundred year old cultural and material achievements in the Western Ukrainian lands.

In denouncing the Yalta Agreement would America wish again to revive the Polish-Ukrainian hostility, which is noticeably lessening, and to shatter the Ukrainian-Polish section of the Anti-Bolshevik front to their own injury? There is no longer a "Polish Lvov", for the place of the Poles has been taken in Lviv by Mongols imported from Soviet Asia. In case of a conflict they will certainly not fight for a "Polish Lvov". Would America wish to resettle the Polish minority removed from Ukraine again on the Western Ukrainian lands and bring back the Ukrainian minority from Ukraine to Poland? The idea is nonsensical.

Also America, now the champion of the free world, will not wish by a denunciation of the Yalta Agreement to denounce the membership of Ukraine and Byelorussia in the United Nations. It would scarcely be possible, when more than sixty nations on entering the United Nations ratified the membership of Ukraine and Byelorussia. Now in the United Nations there is in the case of Ukraine the same problem as in the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia that the seat of Ukraine in this institution be occupied by a real Ukrainian according to the will of the Ukrainian people and not by an appointee of Moscow. It is certainly not in the interests of America in its troubles with the Bolsheviks by denouncing the Yalta Agreement to revive the national struggle between the Poles and Ukrainians, the Poles and Byelorussians, the Poles and Lithuanians, the Ukrainians and Czechs, the Ukrainians and Hungarians, the Ukrainians and Rumanians, and thus completely shatter the now relatively steady front of all these nations against the Russian Bolsheviks.

Finally we must look realistically at the present international situation. The denunciation of the Yalta Agreement will not liberate the satellite

nations of Moscow from the Russian Red tyranny; it will not return to Japan Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands; it will not expel the Soviets from Manchuria and Port Arthur without a great World War. Instead, denunciation will promote chaos in the anti-Bolshevik camp of the nations of central and eastern Europe, and will awake anew the imperialistic appetites of Poland, Czecho-slovakia and Hungary, and will chill the feeling of the oppressed nations under the power of Moscow toward America and the democratic world in general.

So the interests of America urge it not to create such situations which can produce confusion and hostility among its best friends, but to conduct a true policy of liberation, to proclaim a Great Charter of Liberty for all the peoples enslaved by Moscow, so that they may know what awaits them and for what they have to struggle against the Kremlin. A policy of liberation carried through justly, logically and broadly will undermine the strength of the Kremlin, strike from its hands the weapon with which it so skilfully operates and will reveal America in the eyes of the whole world as the apostle of a new political gospel of free nations in a free world, free men in free nations. The denunciation of the Yalta Agreement cannot give that to America.

EASY JOB

A conversation between a Bulgarian mother and son.

Mother: "What would you most like to be when you grow up?"

Son: "The editor of the 'Rabotnichesko Delo' (the Bulgarian Communist paper)."

Mother: "Why?"

Son: "Well, nobody seems to work much there."

Mother: "How is that?"

Son: "That's simple. The first page contains telegrams to Stalin and promises to Chervenkov, the second — reports regulations and decrees, the third — attacks on Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, and the fourth — Tass news."

Anyone who does not believe this has only to look through a copy of "Rabotnichesko Delo.")

UKRAINE AS A MEDITERRANEAN POWER

by AMEDEO GIANNINI

The "Mediterranean" states have become a great deal more numerous after the two world conflicts, and their establishment is not yet completed insofar as one can predict their future with reasonable safety. They can be grouped in three categories:

1. *Non-Mediterranean* states which have installed themselves in the Mediterranean Sea for thalassocratic motives. This is the case of Great Britain that has won control directly in the three parts of the Mediterranean Sea: the western (Gibraltar), the central (Malta), and the eastern one (Cyprus).

2. *Also-Mediterranean* states. These would include Spain and France which are at the same time Mediterranean and Atlantic states. To them could be added Morocco which is today associated with the French Union.

3. *Solely-Mediterranean* states. Such are two merely Adriatic states (Yugoslavia and Albania), one Ionian-Aegean (Greece), one between the Aegean Sea and the Black Sea and a gatekeeper of the accesses of the Black Sea (Turkey), four purely on the Black Sea (Bulgaria, Roumania, Ukraine, and Georgia, the last two at the present time a part of the USSR). From the eastern Mediterranean Sea up to Morocco there is a long series of Arabian-Berber states: Syria, Trans-Jordania, Egypt, Lybia, Tunisia, and Algeria (these last two a part of the French Union). Between Trans-Jordania and Egypt the state of Israel has been established. In the center of the Mediterranean Sea, besides the little Principality of Monaco, is Italy. It projects itself as a mole from the Alps, between the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Adriatic Sea, between the Ionian Sea and the Sicillian Sea, almost blocking the center of the Mediterranean Sea, in a system of which the Maltese Islands are a part geographically and demographically.

We refrain from mentioning the Red Sea, although the conception which makes it an appendix of the Mediterranean Sea is not completely outmoded even today, because the general aspect of the problem will not be altered very much by adding two other states to the list of the Arabic ones (Saudi-Arabia and Yemen), and — on the African coast, besides the Anglo-French colonial Somaliland possessions — Eritrea federated to

Ethiopia, and once more a British domain at Aden as gatekeeper of the Red Sea with a control of the Bal-el-Mandeb Strait.

Among the exclusively Mediterranean states the two greatest ones assume a particular importance inasmuch as their purpose of life is in the Mediterranean Sea to which they cannot be prohibited without risking their existence. These are Italy and Ukraine that have in common among other things, the characteristic feature of having an abundant and increasing population with a distinct rhythm of a constantly rising increment. But they differ in many other aspects both from a standpoint of territory and natural resources. The Italian territory, unlike the Ukrainian one, is not only limited, one third of it being absorbed by mountains, but its only wealth is its beauty; nevertheless there must live on it a population which is rapidly approaching fifty million. Therefore, Italy is concerned about the closing of her land frontiers (widely violated in the peace treaty in favor of France and Yugoslavia) and about not having in her flanks the two essential territories, the French possession of Corsica and the English one of Malta, while its people overpopulate the Mediterranean coastal regions with their limited capacities of absorbment, and go beyond the Mediterranean Sea where their labor force can find employment. It is scarcely necessary to point out — and this appears evident looking only at the map of the Mediterranean Sea — that whatever the Mediterranean policy may be, it cannot put aside Italy. One of the most stupid errors which vitiate the peace treaty of 1947 is precisely the one of having thought that it would suffice to disarm Italy's sea power in order to be able to make Mediterranean policy without her.

In this picture Ukraine parallels Italy. In considering it, the problem must be isolated.

As long as Ukraine is one of the states of the USSR, its position is simply that of being a marginal state of a complex and complicated empire which fronts on other seas: the Baltic Sea, the enormous oceanic expanse from the Petsamo territory in the north of the Scandinavian Peninsula until the Bering Strait and therefore of the Pacific Ocean, from the Bering Strait until the Japan Sea. For our purpose the function of Ukraine in this imperial system does not concern us, since its position on the Black Sea is not autonomous, being but a number of the Soviet policy in the Mediterranean Sea. It interests us instead to consider Ukraine as an autonomous, independent state such as it had proclaimed itself at the dawn of the fall of the Russian Empire and such as it aspires to become again.

We are considering a state of forty million inhabitants, rapidly approaching fifty million, and easily attaining that number by recovering those several millions of Ukrainians who have been transplanted into the

other territories of the USSR and especially into Siberia. The characteristic features of this state are those of having a great and fertile territory, naturally rich, well endowed with waters, with huge natural resources, which give possibilities of a promising industrial development. Its land frontiers are vast but its sea coast, that dominates the Black Sea from the Danube along all the northern arc to Georgia is not less important, and that arc is well provided with ports, the most important of which is Odesa. The sea becomes the way of access and the lung of Ukraine, destined to become, with independence, a sea power of great importance, since its trade will be carried exclusively on the sea ways. Situated on the extreme limit of the south-eastern Europe, it cannot accomplish its trade by land routes or by way of the Danube. Its agricultural products cannot keep up with the high cost of a long railroad transportation. Assuming that they cannot find a market in the neighboring states, that are competitors because of their agriculture, they must find it a great distance away (e.g. in Italy) whereby they can take advantage of the sea ways with the reduced cost of the maritime transportation. The above refers just as much to subsoil resources and especially to coal. It is enough to point out only such problems in order to understand immediately how important in the Ukrainian life is the freedom of the Mediterranean trade which cannot find any impediment in the master of the Straits. The conventions of Montreux, now in force, do not represent a barrier or an obstacle for trade in peace time; anyway they could easily have been reviewed whenever Turkey knew that on the Black Sea there is no nucleus of an incumbent, threatening imperialism, but only democratic and peaceful states. Ukraine and Georgia showed themselves such when they constituted themselves as independent states with the democratic ordinances after the revolution of 1917. It is scarcely necessary to point out that the revision could be accomplished with a different spirit even for war time conditions, if there disappeared the motive of Russian danger or of its surrogate which made the Turks — and not only the Turks — suspicious even until Montreux. Neither in other respects can we prescind from considering that the control of the Straits, which for centuries has been dominated by either Russian pressure or British counterpressure or vice-versa, is today one of the episodes of the struggle between the Orient and the Occident. In the function of this it has been presented again in the recent controversies in which, for the rest, not even Turkey refused to discuss the adjournment of the Montreux agreements. Turkey rejected only a discussion based on the Soviet proposals to which nobody could agree since they annul the independence of Turkey and belittle its territory.

I do not consider it necessary to stop at the imperative necessity of intensive relations between Italy and Ukraine — determined, putting aside any other reason, by a parallelism of the situations in the Mediterranean Sea. I intend to limit myself to examining the problem in its general and European aspects, and, on the other hand, I deem it necessary to point out that if the establishment of an independent Ukraine were completed, it would become at once one of the essential factors of the new balance in the Mediterranean Sea, Ukraine being one of the four greatest Mediterranean states.

When the journey of destiny of the Mediterranean nations is completed (it can be delayed but not stopped), we shall have a new situation in the Mediterranean Sea. It will be a free sea, with some twenty independent and sovereign states. Along its south-eastern coasts will be spread the Arabic Berber states among which Egypt-Sudan will be predominant, while on the north-eastern coasts will be found the states of middle dimensions and four great states: two in the west (Spain and France) one in the center (Italy), one in the east (Ukraine), the last two of which, being *exclusively* the Mediterranean ones, will become by necessity the most zealous artisans of the freedom of the Mediterranean Sea. The numerous Mediterranean states, exactly by reason of their number and of their purpose in life, will be directed to look for an orderly and peaceable system of living together, of which they will finally become interested guards and therefore the most vigilant and most eager protectors of the stable maintenance of a Mediterranean solidarity.



LENIN'S TOMB IN PILZNO

The Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia were renamed V. I. Lenin Works in December, 1951. In Prague they are saying that the inscription on Baron Skoda's tomb in Pilsen cemetery now reads:

"Here Lies V. I. Lenin (Formerly Baron Skoda)."

THE EAST EUROPEAN STRATEGY

by JAMES BURNHAM

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It has been observed that the Soviet Union is unlike any other political entity. It is a nation or rather empire which issued from the Russian nation and empire, and it is at the same time the principal base of the communist world revolutionary enterprise. This duality is one key to the understanding of Soviet strategy.

The world revolutionary enterprise is conducted by an "apparatus," an elite composed of "professional revolutionaries" and "party activists." This elite is dominated by its Soviet section which also functions as the governing class of Soviet Union. The leadership of the revolution and of the Soviet state are thus identical in fact (though distinguishable in theory), with the consequence that communist world revolutionary policy is ordinarily equivalent in practice to Soviet imperial policy.¹

According to the Leninist-Stalinist conception, the success of the entire world enterprise depends upon the elite. The elite is the essential and deciding instrument of the revolution, and has priority over everything else: arms, territory, money, mass organizations, the forms of official power. In the strategy of the supreme leadership, the first task is *the preservation and strengthening of the elite*.

Preserving and strengthening the elite is a many-sided problem. During the War, its ranks were organizationally disrupted, and ideologically contaminated by too close contact with non-communist ideas and individuals. These weaknesses were energetically taken in hand by the supreme leadership. The frayed organizational threads were re-twisted. Young recruits were carefully selected. Renewed emphasis on theoretical training went along with a series of purges in the arts and

¹ If the first successful communist revolution had been in Germany or Britain instead of Russia, then presumably the German or British section would dominate the elite, the world revolution would have a Teutonic or English instead of a Russian flavor, and official anti-communist theorists would explain that communism is only the latest form of age-old German (or British) imperialism.

sciences. Political orthodoxy was narrowly defined and stringently enforced.

The principal territorial base of the elite is of course the Soviet Union itself, in particular Russia. The task of preserving and strengthening the elite means geographically, therefore, the defense and strengthening of the Soviet Union. The East European and Asian conquests, provided that these can be fully consolidated, offer the chance for the territorial extension of the primary base along with the incorporation of fresh strata in the elite.

The preservation and strengthening of the elite as the principal instrument of world conquest, and the corollary defense and strengthening of the Soviet Union, are together a fixed and continuous principle of the communist enterprise. The present strategic phase, which began in 1944, can be specifically defined as that of *the preparation for the open stage of the third World War*. The objectives of this phase, which has both defensive and offensive elements, may be summarized as follows:

(1) The political, economic and ideological consolidation and strengthening of the entire Eurasian base, in such a manner as to insure its invulnerability to attack (whether in military or political form) and to prepare it for the phase of unlimited war to come.

(2) The weakening and subversion of all territories, nations and institutions which the communists do not control. In the present phase this is done primarily by political means, but also by limited and auxiliary military means when these are appropriate. This second objective is both offensive and defensive. Where a sufficient weakness appears, the communist drive carries through to conquest, and can either add territory to the Soviet imperial domain (as in the case of China) or establish an outpost in the enemy's rear (as in Travancore, Guatemala). Where optimum conditions do not develop, the operations can block effective war preparations by the enemy, establish internal vantage points for intelligence and sabotage, drain his energies and resources, and divert him from any initiative against the main communist base.²

Because it is often overlooked, the diversionary function of many of the communist operations should be stressed. At the end of the War, the enlarged Soviet domain and the Soviet Union itself were in shaky condition. A bold anti-Soviet initiative by the non-communist world, military and political, would probably have resulted in the breakup of the new Soviet Empire and quite possibly in the overthrow of the Soviet regime. Even a mild initiative could have prevented the internal

² In *The Struggle for the World* (John Day Co., 1947) and *The Coming Defeat of Communism* (John Day Co., 1950), I have discussed in some detail the present phase of Soviet strategy.

strengthening of the Empire. Therefore the communist leadership has sought to keep the non-communist nations busy on actions that do not have an appreciable effect inside the Soviet sphere. Though the communist actions in Greece, Iran, Korea, Indochina, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, the Philippines, Guatemala and Berlin are not solely diversionary in intention, they are partly so. Their diversionary purpose has the advantage of being almost certain of success, even if other and more ambitious purposes fail. It should not be forgotten that the money, energies, supplies, manpower and blood that are spent in Korea or Indochina or Greece can never be used for the direct weakening of the Soviet Empire.

It is not only by shooting that diversions are created. When the communists injure the economy of France, Italy, Brazil or the United States, the costs of economic repair are shunted aside from potential employment against the Soviet sphere. In the ideological field also, the communist apparatus fosters what might be called diversionary theories that help keep the opponent's lines of action directed toward targets other than the Soviet base. The theory that communism is a product of bad economic conditions is a good example of such ideological diversion.

Even this brief summary of the present phase of Soviet strategy is enough to show that the policy of containment, whether concentrated on Western Europe or enlarged to cover Asia, is no great bother to the Kremlin. Indeed, the policy of containment is virtually a permanent offer to be diverted at the will of the opponent. All that the communist apparatus has to do is to stir up a little trouble anywhere in the non-Soviet world, or fan trouble already there, and it is assured in advance that non-communist resources will be channeled to that spot. Meanwhile, the communists are guaranteed immunity within their own base. What strategic prospect could be more comfortable?

2.

Let us now approach the strategic problem by raising the question: why has the Soviet Union failed to move on Western Europe during these years since the end of the War?

We know that the Soviet objective is world conquest. The Soviet leaders, believing that the absorption of Western Europe would ease their immediate difficulties and make their final victory inevitable, want to take over Western Europe, and intend to take it over. It therefore follows that they have not done so only because they have felt that they could not, that they lacked the capability.

It is certain that the Soviet leaders have not been (and are not) restrained by the military power available in Western Europe, because this has not been sufficient for them to take seriously. It is equally certain that no action or threat in the Far East has indirectly inhibited a Soviet move into Western Europe. The Kremlin has no reason to be alarmed at Far Eastern developments since 1945.

Three primary factors seem to have led to the Kremlin's negative decision:

First, the superiority of United States production and technology, and thus of the American potential.

Second, American superiority in atomic armament and in the ability to deliver atomic and other weapons of destruction.

Third, internal Soviet difficulties which arise from individual, class and national tensions. The Kremlin has feared and continues to fear that under the strain of general war these tensions might become so acute as to lead not only to military defeat but to the end of the Soviet system. That is why the Soviet leaders have felt it essential, before risking general war, to consolidate the internal regime of their Empire by a campaign of terror, indoctrination, and genocide.

The difficulties which arise out of national tensions have a special and direct strategic significance. Neither the present Soviet Empire nor the pre-1939 Soviet Union is a unified, cohesive national entity. They are aggregates of many separate nations each of which preserves its own individual national character. Within the Soviet Union proper the Russian nation comprises only a half or less of the approximately 200 million population. The other half is made up of Ukrainians (with approximately 35 million — of the same numerical order, that is to say, as France or Italy), Byelorussians ("White Russians"), Georgians, Tatars, Uzbeks, Azerbaijanians, and so on. These nations were originally brought under Moscow's rule by the Russian Czars. To them the communists have added China, Esthonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, East Austria.

All of these nations — those subjugated in the past by the Czars as well as those seized by Stalin — have their own languages, cultures, traditions, religions and histories. As nations, they all hate communism, which is counter to their religions and cultures. All or most of them also hate the rule of imperial Russian Moscow, whether or not communist. These nations are therefore more than a merely potential opposition to the present Soviet government. They exist now, as living historical realities. The Kremlin must, and does, recognize their existence, and takes account of them in day by day policy. The Kremlin

realizes further that so long as these nations continue to exist they will aspire to political self-determination. They wish to be free from domination by an alien nation and culture, and they will act to achieve freedom if circumstances seem to offer them a chance.

General war would probably present such a chance. The first World War did so. At its tempestuous conclusion, all of the nations of Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, Byelorussia and Georgia, declared their independence and fought to break away from the respective empires — German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian — to which they had belonged. The same centrifugal tendencies were evident in the second World War, but were smothered by the combined policies of Stalin, Hitler and the Western powers. Even without general war, Yugoslavia broke away from Moscow's domination. The Kremlin feared, and fears, that in the event of renewed general war she will face a whole series of national revolts.

I have mentioned the fact that the West European (NATO) strategy applies without fundamental modification the experiences of the first two world wars. This archaism proves the old rule that a general staff always plans for the last war. But why should we not permit ourselves to be guided at least in some measure by what has happened *since* 1945? The events of these recent years bear much more directly on the problem of the future than does the record of wars fought under quite different world conditions.

Inasmuch as the Soviet Union would have conquered Western Europe if it could have done so, Western Europe can be considered to have been under attack since 1945, and to have been successfully defended. The defense has been accomplished by the existence of the American productive plant, the American nuclear and strategic air capability, and the internal tensions within the Soviet Empire. These factors have thus proved their effectiveness in action, proved it by results. In spite of the absence of a powerful army on the Continent, they have blocked the Soviet advance westward.

All three of these factors are largely under the control of the United States, if the United States chooses to control them — much more directly under United States control than, at any rate, such matters as the state of mind of India or the military revitalization of Western Europe. The United States is able to maintain, develop and strengthen still further the world's greatest industrial plant. It can maintain and even increase its superiority in the application of scientific technology to weapons and to the means of delivering them to the enemy's base. If it resolves to do so, the United States can also nourish, enlarge, and bring to fruition the Soviet internal tensions.

Because these factors are subject to voluntary control, they can be made to wither as well as to grow. A given domestic policy, for example, can lead to the weakening instead of the development of the American productive plant. The proper application of scientific technology to armament requires more sacrifice of money and talent, and a more flexible and intelligent direction, than may be found or allotted. The exploitation of the internal Soviet tensions is impossible while the policy of containment endures.

Whatever the difficulties, it seems reasonable to seek guidance from the relevant past rather than from the possible future. To the extent that American strategy incorporates the three factors that have been noticed in this section, it is building on the rock of fact rather than on the sand of wishes. In themselves, these factors are not a policy, but they are materials from which the foundation of a policy can be laid.

3.

In Chapters IV and V we reached the conclusion that both the West European and the Asian-American strategies, separately or combined, are inadequate. The critical analyses were not without certain positive results. In the course of argument there emerges the following list of tasks which the United States should seek to carry out:

(1) To prevent the absorption of Western Europe within the Soviet sphere;

(2) To continue the close links with Great Britain and the British Dominions, and the intimate cooperation with British sea and air power;

(3) To prevent the consolidation of Soviet rule in the Far East, notably in China;

(4) To block or at least hold up the communist drive into Southeast Asia and India;

(5) To strengthen the anti-communist nations of the Far East, especially the major nation, Japan;

(6) To guard and strengthen the home front;

(7) To strengthen and complete the military encirclement of the Soviet Empire by properly located air and sea bases.

Unfortunately, an amalgam of all desirable or indispensable objectives does not compose a grand strategy. If so, it would prove very difficult to get agreement. There is not much dispute over what it is desirable for the United States to accomplish by its foreign policy. One faction does not propose something which the other rejects as totally wrong and counter to the national interest. Those who favor a greater Asian emphasis do not want the communists to take over Western Europe, nor would the champions of all-out for NATO rejoice at Soviet

rule in India or Japan. The trouble is that no nation's resources are sufficient for it to be capable of doing all that it would be desirable to do. The strategic issue therefore always concerns priority, stress, timing, concentration. It is not so much what things must be done, as what order to put them in, what relative allocation of forces to make, what is to be rated dominant and what secondary.

Negatively, the United States seeks to remove the threat of Soviet world domination. Positively, the United States favors a world political order within which there would be a reasonable chance for its own citizens and all the peoples of the world to advance socially and economically without the continuous prospect of total war. Neither the West European nor the Asian-American strategy is able to achieve or even appreciably to further this general double objective.

Let us accept as a strategic axiom that first priority will be permanently assigned to the home front. Upon the home front's strength and well-being all else necessarily depends. Granted this axiom, it would seem to be indisputable that a strategy which had Eastern Europe as its geopolitical focus — Europe from the Iron Curtain to the Urals — would best serve American objective. It will be argued that such a focus is impossible. Eastern Europe is controlled by the opponent, so how could there be an East European concentration? If a plan is impossible, what difference does it make whether it is correct? The objection is natural enough. For the moment, let us merely assume that an East European strategy is possible. If possible, its superiority is evident.

To carry out an East European strategy (if it can be carried out) would mean to bring anti-Soviet power to bear within the opponent's base, inside his lines, behind his front if it comes to a definite front, and across his communications. There can be no doubt that such action, or even the serious threat of such action, would have as much greater effect on the opponent than an act on his periphery or altogether out of his orbit.

So far as offensive action is concerned, action designed to weaken and defeat the opponent, an East European concentration is the only strategy that can accomplish anything at all. No matter what happens in the rest of the world, if the opponent remains untouched within Eastern Europe he will be able not merely to maintain himself but to develop his strength. Solidly planted within the Heartland, he can afford ups and downs elsewhere. Even major setbacks in the Far East would not be decisive for him. As both Lenin and Stalin have counseled, he can retreat today the better to advance tomorrow.

Untouched in Eastern Europe, he preserves intact the main body of his elite, upon which everything depends. He can employ secondary forces

for action outside of East Europe. He commits little and therefore even if unsuccessful has little to lose. Through his world apparatus, the political nerve center of which is located within Eastern Europe, he constantly operates within the camp of his enemy, and exploits the rifts, troubles and disturbances that there arise. Separate counter-actions to deal with each incident individually, as any anti-Soviet strategy other than the East European requires, are endless and hopeless, because the source of them all is left immune.

Power brought to bear within the main communist base, even within its outlying sectors, has necessarily the maximum effect. The closer to the brain, the greater the consequence of a given level of force. Even a small event inside the base can lead the opponent to withdraw from a major exterior campaign as a minute electric current applied to a frog's brain compels the massive leg to jerk back. A large-scale interior action can achieve the opponent's overthrow — the liquidation of the Soviet regime — in a manner that is most efficient, least wasteful of life and physical resources, and most promising for a civilized future.

Let it once more be repeated: it is impossible to defeat Soviet communism by either the West European or the Asian-American strategy, or any variant of them. I believe that these strategies cannot even defend Western Europe or non-communist Asia, nor in the long run the United States itself. Even if their defensive ability is granted, it is certain that you cannot defeat Moscow in London, Paris, New Delhi, and Chicago. It is suggested by the spokesmen of containment that we do not desire to defeat Soviet communism. Very well. But it is at least conceivable — even to containers — that the occasion may arise when general shooting will compel us to try to defeat Soviet communism. If so, where will the policy of containment be then? And where will be its attendant West European strategy, with or without its Asian supplement? The outbreak of general war would necessitate an immediate and complete policy revision. It does not seem much of a recommendation for a policy and strategy that they will have to be discarded as soon as the chips are down.

Even if we restrict our outlook to a defensive perspective, the East European strategy is plainly best — if it is possible. In order to defend Western Europe, NATO tries to build up a large land army within that area. There is continuous debate over what the NATO force shall do if the Soviet and satellite armies march West. Can the enemy be held at the Iron Curtain? at the Rhine? at the Channel and the Pyrenees? in Europe at all? Could a flanking redoubt be established in Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein? in south Germany and Austria? No solution looks too promising.

What if anti-Soviet force is developed within Eastern Europe? This would surely be the maximum deterrent to a Soviet move westward: that is to say, it would be the best possible defense for Western Europe. If an attack were nevertheless made, such anti-Soviet force, so located, would be strategically the most effective possible weapon against the enemy. It would lie across the enemy's lines of communication, and extend even into the interior of his arsenals and headquarters. The mere threat of such a force would make the lines insecure, and would demand elaborate counter-measures. Ten men behind would be worth a hundred in front. The ten would indeed be worth several thousand, because if the fight has the appearance of a headon clash between a united "East" (Soviet plus satellite armies) and a united West (inclusive of West Germany), then the battle will itself serve Soviet interests by tightening the links between Moscow and the Soviet imperial provinces. On the other hand, if from the start there are Balts, Poles, Czechs, Ukrainians — and Russians too, fighting *against* the Soviet command, then the effect of the battle will be to loosen the cement of the Soviet system.

I have been referring chiefly to the problem of Western Europe. The offensive and defensive superiority of an East European strategy is also evident in relation to the Middle or Far East and to the Americas. On the one hand, such a strategy alone can defeat or seriously weaken the Soviet state, because only such a strategy is directed against vulnerable points. On the other, an East European strategy, successfully carried out, would compel the Soviet energies to shift from external mischief to the defense of endangered positions at home.

4.

If an East European strategy is desirable, is it also possible? Eastern Europe is Soviet-held. How can anti-Soviet force be brought to bear inside the enemy domain? In order to fight the Soviet power there must be armies. Where in Eastern Europe are anti-Soviet armies to be found?

Experience has already given a partial answer to these questions. During the past several years, United States and allied action has been effective against Soviet pressure to the extent that it has incorporated elements of an East European strategy. The strategic airforce, able to atom bomb Soviet territory, has been a conscious "East European" element. Though it is not a unit that actually exists within Soviet imperial territory, the lines of force of the strategic air arm do reach inside. This has nearly the same strategic meaning as an actual Soviet

location. There is no fundamental difference between an air squadron able to bomb Baku from a base in Britain, Africa or Maine and an artillery battery twenty miles away.

Though it has not yet been organized and guided, the latent force arising from the internal Soviet tensions is a second anti-Soviet element which operates directly from an East European location.

As to armies, there are organized armies in Eastern Europe — many of them. There is, for example, a Polish army that is larger than the army of any West European nation; and there are sizeable Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian armies. Who has decreed that the Polish army now commanded by Marshal Rokossovski must inevitably fight for the Kremlin? It will, if American policy forces it to. But there is not the slightest doubt that the great majority of Poles, including the Poles in Rokossovski's divisions, are still Poles and want to fight not for an imperial tyrant — foreign in nationality, alien in culture and religion — but for a free Poland. This is what they will do, if they are given any sort of chance. The same rule holds for the majority of Czechs, Hungarians, Slovaks, Rumanians and the others.

What if even a tenth of the money and energy that have been flung into the Marshall Plan and NATO had been spent on a campaign to win the allegiance of the captive armies of Eastern Europe? I find no reason to suppose that the anti-Soviet profits from that tenth would have proved inferior to the net gain from all the containment billions.

Nor is there any need to restrict our aim to the armies of the nations which have been subjugated since 1945. Within the Soviet armies proper, it is estimated that approximately 40% of the troops are non-Russian in nationality. There are Ukrainian units as large as divisions or even army corps, and smaller units of Byelorussians, Caucasians, and so on. Why do we take for granted that Ukrainian soldiers will fight for Russian communist imperialist Moscow, if they are given a chance to fight for a free and self-determined Ukraine? Neither Czars nor Bolsheviks have ever been able to complete the subjugation of the Moslem peoples of the Caucasus and the southeast.

Even the Russian soldiers should not be written off. Many of them are at heart more Russian patriots and human beings than communist imperialist robots. As men and as Russians they have more to gain from a fight against than for the communist regime, which is in the first instance a tyranny over Russians and Russia.

I wish to give an illustration of how an East European strategy translates itself into specific planning, and how strikingly such planning differs from the application of a West European strategy. This

will be an illustration merely, and I do not intend to argue its practical merits. These could be determined one way or the other only by careful study. Nevertheless, the illustration is not chosen at random. It was devised and proposed, through underground channels, by a military specialist who is at present a general officer of one of the satellite armies.

According to his conception, if unlimited war begins two major actions should be immediately launched by the United States and its associate powers. The first is the massive bombing of the key Soviet military and industrial concentrations. The second is a parachute drop of a special force into a selected locality of Poland. This force would be a combined military-political unit of fairly large size. It would be highly trained — an elite group — and would consist primarily of Poles, with a fair number of Balts, Czechs and Slovaks also, some but relatively few Americans and West Europeans, probably no Germans.

This force would at once proclaim itself a resistance and liberation center, and would call for recruits from the entire region. It would seek to rally whole units from the Polish army, as well as individuals from among the Balts serving in the various Red armies. More generally it would be prepared to accept anyone who was ready to sign up, from Mongols to Russians and Rumanians. It would at once initiate a continuous political and propaganda campaign. At the first plausible moment, it would establish a provisional free Polish government with other provisional governments for the neighboring nations following as quickly as might make sense.

Analogous actions might also be carried out in South-eastern Europe and in the Far East.

Such a plan would require elaborate preparation on both its technical and its political side. After thorough examination it might be found incorrect or not feasible. But is it fantastic, simply not worth considering? From a point of view, hobbled by containment it will undoubtedly seem so. How, one may wonder, would the Kremlin judge it? How would the Kremlin rate a unit of this sort, so situated, as against NATO divisions massed in front of the Red Army at the Elbe or the Rhine?

I do not stress in this context the "Resistance" groups and activities that might be developed in Eastern Europe. Such groups already exist on a restricted scale within at least several of the nations. The skeleton of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which became a formidable anti-Bolshevik as well as anti-Nazi force during the latter part of the War and for a year or two thereafter, still exists in the Ukraine and still carries on limited activities. Partisan groups are also operating in Czechoslo-

vakia, Poland, Rumania, East Germany and perhaps elsewhere. Individual secret "resistants" are to be found throughout the Soviet Empire. The presence of this anti-Soviet Resistance is itself a further demonstration of the realism of an East European strategy.

A Resistance, however, is a special corps composed of a special type of human being. Except in times of major crisis and social turmoil, the active Resistance can never involve directly more than a small percentage of the population. At the same time the effectiveness of a Resistance depends upon its having behind and below it the sympathy, good will and political solidarity of the majority of the local population. Without that, the Resistance cannot solve even its technical problems of survival and combat. If it does not disappear altogether, it tends to degenerate into a handful of paid agents or a mere outlaw gang.

Though the development of a Resistance is certainly one of the measures by which an East European strategy would be carried out, I have wanted to fix attention on a broader problem. Beyond the relatively narrow Resistance framework, the strategy aims toward the great armies already organized in Eastern Europe, and toward entire peoples and nations. I remember when one evening in Stockholm I asked an Esthonian exile leader whether any active Resistance groups were still operating in his homeland. He replied: "The Esthonian nation is the Resistance." He meant, of course, not that the people as a whole were busy at underground activities but that the nation persists under its captivity as a living reality, with a soul, a will to freedom, immune alike to the terror and the seduction of the Kremlin.

An East European strategy cannot be carried through in the military and semi-military spheres alone. Military strategy is dependent in the end on policy. An East European strategy presupposes a general policy which would in decisive respects break with the policy of containment that has prevailed since 1947. This I call *the policy of liberation*.

A policy of liberation would apply in all major spheres: military, economic, psychological, diplomatic, political. It would not be easy or cheap nor could it promise immediate and magical results. It would not require that Western Europe and the Far East should henceforth be left out of account, or even that the bulk of anti-Soviet effort, quantitatively considered should be directly applied to actions affecting Eastern Europe.

What the policy of liberation first and essentially means is a particular focus or perspective. Granted always the axiomatic priority of the home front, it means the view that *the key to the situation* is what happens and what can be made to happen in Eastern Europe, Europe from the Iron Curtain to the Urals. So far as possible, therefore, actions in every sphere (military, psychological, diplomatic, economic) and every

geographical area will be selected and judged in terms of their direct or indirect effect on Eastern Europe. A free Rumanian regiment training and marching under the Rumanian flag, with the immense moral effect which this would have on the captive Rumanian army and nation, will be thought to outbalance an unfavorable editorial in *The New Statesman and Nation* or *Le Monde*. A high staff position for General Wladislaw Anders, which while utilizing his talents and his combat experience of Soviet armies would do him and his nation appropriate honor, will be recognized as worth a Soviet denunciation in the United Nations. Diplomats will be more anxious to attend the celebration of a Lithuanian national holiday than the Soviet Embassy receptions in honor of the Bolshevik Revolution against democracy.

In the remaining chapters of this book I shall examine some of the consequences of the adoption of the policy of liberation with its corollary East European strategy. This examination will be neither complete nor dogmatic. If liberation is to become the policy of the United States and ultimately of the entire free world — and it is not impossible that it will — much labor will be needed to translate it from general idea into detailed reality. Within its fundamental perspective, there is room for differences of opinion, even wide differences, about how it should be carried out. My own answers to many concrete questions may be quite wrong, even if I am right about the problem of general policy. I want only to show how one thinks under the guidance of the policy of liberation, what sort of problems arise, and how some of these may perhaps be solved.



SOVIET GIFT STORE

Entering a State gift shop in Moscow to buy a present for a friend, a Finnish visitor found himself confronted with rows of Stalin busts, all exactly alike. There was nothing else in the shop. Somewhat taken aback, he stood marvelling at the strange sight, when an assistant approached.

"Good morning, sir," — she said politely. — "Have you chosen something you would like?"

UKRAINE IN THE FOURTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN OF THE USSR

By GREGORY MAKHIV

(Posthumous publication)

The fourth or post-war Five-Year Plan of Restoration and Development of the National Economy of the USSR (1946-1950) and also its completion in 1951 — well characterize the economic structure of Ukraine as a part of the USSR and its economic relations with the main state of the Soviet Union, the RSFSR (Russia). Under the fourth five-year plan Ukraine in the field of heavy industry was in 1950 to give yearly: 9.7 million tons of pig-iron, 8.8 million tons of steel, 86.1 million tons of coal and 325,000 tons of petroleum. At the same time its factories were to turn out 5,950 work benches for metal, 25,000 tractors, and 25,000 automobiles. The sugar plants or factories of Ukraine were to produce yearly 1,637,000 tons of sugar and its food industry was to give 245,000 tons of meat, 40,000 tons of oil and 80,000 tons of fish. The sugar production forms 68% of the total production in the USSR, including the production of the new irrigated areas devoted to the sugar beet in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia.

The chemical industry of Ukraine had the task of producing 860,000 tons of superphosphates for agriculture and the potassium mines of Western Ukraine were to furnish 300,000 tons of potassium salts.

When we compare the planned production of Ukraine for 1946-1950 with the total production of the USSR, we see that there has been planned for Ukraine chiefly the development of raw materials, while the manufactures form an insignificant part of the total production of the USSR. Thus of the total production of 19.5 million tons of pig-iron Ukraine produces 9.7 millions. If we take as 100 production of pig-iron in the RSFSR, Ukraine gives 99%, almost the same amount as the RSFSR; production of steel is 56% of the amount produced by the RSFSR. If we compare the manufactures, we see that the share of Ukraine in metal cutting benches is only 20%, of tractors 22% and of automobiles 5.5%. This difference between the production of raw materials and manufactures clearly characterizes the economic structure of Ukraine as a colonial part of the USSR. In delivering to the RSFSR high quality ore in a semi-

fabricated condition (pig-iron) Ukraine receives nothing from the centre, since the number of tractors, ploughs and seeders which the agriculture of Ukraine receives, is less than its production in its own factories. Thus in 1941 the USSR had 450,000 tractors, while Ukraine had only 86,000 or 19% of all the tractors of the USSR. On the other hand the share of Ukraine in the production of tractors was 21%. The development of manufactures which would correspond to the production of metallurgical raw material in a country has a great economic importance for the population which receives for comparatively low prices metallic products of wide usage, and that part of the population that works in the factories acquires technical knowledge in the field of manufacturing. On the other hand the population of Ukraine receives from the centre only a few metallic products of wide use at very high prices and of exceptionally poor quality. The superphosphate factories of Ukraine (Vinnytsya, Odesa, Konstantinivka in the Donbas) give a total production of 860,000 tons, the metallurgical combination of Azovstal in Mariupil gives about 1,000,000 tons of Thomas meal with 16% of phosphoric acid, the potassium mines of Western Ukraine produce around 300,000 tons of potassium products and the factories of Horlivka (Donbas) and Dniprodzherzhynsk produce about 300,000 tons of nitric products. Of this total amount of about 2,500,000 tons of mineral products, Ukrainian agriculture receives each year less than 800,000 tons for sugar beets and flax. These fertilizers Ukraine receives in such proportions (much phosphate, much less nitrates and an insufficient quantity of potassium) that the kolhosps are compelled to use them in amounts and proportions that do not meet the needs of the sugar beet and flax, and the yield of both sugar beet and flax are on a low level.

The expenditures for capital investment in heavy industry of all-Union significance in Ukraine are set in the five-year plan at 49.5 million karbovantsy and for investment in industry under the supervision of the republic at only 5,469 million karbovantsy.

Thus Russia is investing its capital in Ukrainian industry just as formerly the Belgian and French companies invested in commercial enterprises which produced coal and iron ore in tsarist Russia in the same Ukrainian Donbas and Krivy Rih. The Kremlin understands well the colonial character of its economic policy in relation to the national republics and so it considered it necessary to introduce into the plan for 1946-1950 this statement: "27. To increase the role of republic and local industry in the development of basic forms of industry which satisfy the needs of the economy of the republic. To develop broadly in Ukraine the organization and construction of small industrial enterprises and among them to bring into operation in 1946-1950 small coal mines and

cuttings in the Donbas and western districts of Ukraine; to produce 4,600,000 tons of coal, peat briquetting plants for 50,000 tons of briquettes, glass factories with a production of 1.3 million square metres of glass, brick kilns with a production of 900 million bricks, and the preparation of building materials and the food industry. To establish in 1950 the production of manufactures in plants under the jurisdiction of the republic amounting to 9.2 million karbovantsy and local and cooperative industry amounting to 3.1 million karbovantsy. To develop the drying of fruits and vegetables. To take advantage in every way of the lakes and rivers and to organize hatcheries for the fish industry."

So the Kremlin, drawing off the great production of the metallurgical industry, grain and sugar of Ukraine leaves for the economy of the Ukrainian republic "small coal mines, peat-briquetting factories, glass factories and brick kilns and plans to develop the drying of fruits and vegetables."

In demonstrating for propaganda purposes the "assistance of the elder brother" to occupied Galicia, the Kremlin with its usual cynicism writes in article 32 of the plan: "To rebuild Lviv into the great industrial centre of Ukraine: to build an automobile assembly plant, an electric lamp factory, a factory to produce telephone apparatus, a glass factory and a woolen mill." This is really "a great industrial centre" with an electric lamp factory and a woolen mill. The Kremlin did not forget in its five-year plan Carpathian Ukraine; "to give state assistance to the agriculture of the trans-Carpathian district of Ukraine with agricultural machinery, products and credit." The peasants of Ukraine know well the assistance of the Kremlin to agriculture and now the peasants of Carpathian Ukraine have become the next sacrifice to the compulsory collectivization of agriculture. World War II which destroyed all the bases of the USSR for many years increased its material resources. The temporary loss of Ukraine with its heavy industry and the danger of German occupation of a large part of the European territory of the USSR compelled the Kremlin not only to transfer to Siberia industrial enterprises and military plants but to carry on extensive explorations to find new reserves of raw materials for the metallurgical industry, coal and petroleum.

How is it now with the natural resources of the USSR according to the information furnished by the State Plan and the Central Statistical Bureau of the USSR? We can cite these short but exceptionally important factual statements. The importance of new petroleum producing regions in the east has greatly increased. There have been opened new and large petroleum wells and petroleum refineries in the Bashkir ASSR. There are rapidly being developed wells and petroleum refineries in the Kuybyshev district, the Turkmen SSR, the Uzbek SSR, and the Kazakh SSR. There have been discovered new large sources of petroleum in the Tatar ASSR.

The percentage of the part of the eastern districts in the general production of petroleum in the USSR has grown from 12% in 1940 to 44%. The development of coal mining in the Urals, the Kuznetsk basin and the Karaganda basin is being continued. The amount of coal mined in the east of the USSR in 1950 was 2.5 times that of the pre-war period. And especially the securing of coal in the new northern coal region and also in the Pechora basin with its enormous reserves. Also the development of black metallurgy in the eastern regions of the USSR is being continued. The production of pig-iron in the Urals in 1950 was 2.6 times that of 1940, the production of steel was 2.7 times greater and of alloys 2.8 times. In Siberia the production of pig-iron increased 1.2 times, of steel 1.7 times and of alloys 2 times. These reports of the State Plan are not only a case of Soviet propaganda; the fact of the discovery of large deposits of iron ore, coal and petroleum is known from other sources, reports of geological expeditions and articles in technical journals. The fact of the development of many new centres for mining and working metals, coal and petroleum are confirmed by the constant change in the economic relations of Ukraine and Russia in heavy industry. The share of Ukraine in the production of coal in 1940 was 50% of the total production of coal in the USSR, but now it is only 36%. The manufacture of steel in Ukraine in 1940 was 48% of the total production — now it is only 37%.

Thus Ukraine has in an important degree lost that economic importance for Russia which George Kennan in his article "America and the Future of Russia" considered analogous to the economic relationship of Pennsylvania and the U. S. A. It is very obvious that there is neither the political nor economic analogy which Kennan tries to make. The actual state of the development of mining in the eastern regions of Russia shows the complete incorrectness of the assertion of the supposed "poverty" of Russia in natural resources for heavy industry. The undisputed economic strengthening of Russia forces the democratic world to be more critical than before of the idea of the further existence of the "one, indivisible Russia," for this, independent of its political order, will maintain a large economic base for potential aggression.

While in the sphere of heavy industry in the USSR Ukraine is playing the role of a colony which furnishes Russia raw and semi-fabricated materials, the colonial position of Ukraine is not less well shown in agriculture. Under the fourth five-year plan, Ukraine with the Kuban and the Crimea must develop as regions of high-yielding winter wheat, i. e. give a high commercial production of grain. The exporting from Ukraine of the greatest possible amount of grain and sugar instead of a rounded de-

velopment of its agriculture is the characteristic feature of the economic relations between Ukraine and the RSFSR.

The Kremlin has concentrated on raising the total production of grain in Ukraine with Crimea and Kuban. Ukraine in 1940 had this total production of grain:

<i>Crop</i>	<i>Total crop in thousands of metric centners of grain</i>
Winter wheat	82,289
Spring wheat	11,063
Rye	43,881
Barley	45,891
Oats	22,509
Millet	9,841
<i>Total crop</i>	<i>215,474</i>

This is not a great yield for the conditions of Ukraine, since the average yield in 1940 was only 10.7 centners per hectare. But Ukraine has selected high yielding types of all grain crops which can produce, as for example in winter wheat 40 centners per hectare. The cause of the low yields is the lack of fertilizers, the failure to apply methods of rational agricultural technique and the absence of a definite system of fighting diseases and enemies of the grain crops. To raise the general production, the Kremlin is taking the path of broadening the area sown to grain and the stressing of rotation in these crops. In the rotation of the steppe kolhosps grains are to cover not less than 60% of the ground sown.

According to the decrees of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR and the TsK VKP(b) on October 20, 1948, in all radhosps not later than 1949 and in all kolhosps not later than 1950 there must be introduced rotation with fodder grasses with their complete adoption by 1955. By the introduction into the rotation of perennial grasses it was planned to increase the yields of all the crops since the grasses enrich the soil with nitrates and improve its structural condition. At the same time the perennial grasses along with other pasturage crops were to increase the fodder for the increasing number of cattle. The introduction of these grasses into the rotation would give the following proportion on the average: all grains 50%, perennial grasses 20%, technical cultures 10%, pasturage 10%, fallow 10%. According to this plan the rotation of sowings would be:

<i>Sown land</i>	<i>% of the area planted</i>	
	1940	1950
Percentage to crops	86.7	87.3
In this	61.8	57.7
grain crops	9.2	9.2
technical crops	3.9	4.0
vegetables and potatoes	11.8	16.4
all fodder crops	4.6	10.3
with perennial grasses	100.0	100.0
<i>Total</i>		

Under such a plan the production of grain crops in the rotation in 1950 would still be too high for the grass rotation, the share of the technical crops (sugar beet, cotton, sunflower) small and the percentage of fodder crops and especially of perennial grasses too low. On the other hand the increase of the area sown to perennial grasses from 4.6% in 1940 to 10.3% in 1950 would be a certain gain and with the execution of the plan for 1946-1950 in the matter of fodder crops and perennial grasses it should be possible to adopt the grass rotation before 1955. The soviet economists, commenting on this plan, wrote: "In the field of agriculture, the post-war five-year plan is primarily a five-year plan for the general raising of the grain crops, the adoption of a system of progressive scientific agricultural technique, a correct grass rotation, the development of field sowing in dimensions never before seen in history.¹

The kolhosps of Ukraine in 1951 had a grain crop smaller than in 1940 but the Kremlin compelled them to advance 110 million puds more than in 1940. It is intelligible that the extent of this delivery of grain did not contribute to the ardor of the peasants; so to carry it out and collect the greatest possible amount the Kremlin sent to Ukraine and mobilized from the party machinery there 380,000 Communists² to take good care that the government did not lose a single centner. The sending into Ukraine of an entire army of organizers of the grain collection, to which was added over 300,000 Communists — merciless leaders of the kolhosps — again brought the "social relations" of Ukraine to the condition of the time of militant communism (1920-1922) and the compulsory collectivization of 1929-1933.

The grain delivery of 1951 which surpassed in amount that of the more productive 1940 could not fail to free the members of the kolhosps

¹ Demidov S. F. *The Development of Agriculture in the Post-war Five-year Plan*, Gosplanizdat, 1948 Moscow.

² *Pravda*. Sept. 2, 1951.

from their payment in kind for labor days. At the same time by reducing the dimensions or taking completely from the members of the kolhosps their individual plots of land, which do not exceed 0.1 of a hectare, they organized the starving and annihilation of the individual cattle of the members of the kolhosp. The area of 0.1 hectare is now only productive enough "to plant flowers in honor of Stalin," but completely insufficient to raise the amount of garden vegetables necessary for the family during the winter; and the sowing of fodder crops or grass on such an area is out of the question. A member of the kolhosp can now count only on receiving hay or straw for his labor days. On the other hand, he receives grain for his labor days for himself and straw for his cow only from the remains left after all deliveries to the state and his share of the fodder fund for the keeping of the state cattle. The party organizations eagerly take care that these state cattle in the kolhosp be as well cared for as possible in accordance with a long series of orders and regulations. In connection with these, the living conditions of the individual cattle become constantly worse and their productivity diminishes and this causes a gradual liquidation even of this wretched "property" of the members of the kolhosps.

The plan for 1946-1950 planned not only great technical progress in the increase of production in all fields of national economy of the USSR, but brilliant new advances in science to surpass the level of science in non-Communist lands. Let us quote section 3 of the plan: "To secure further technical progress in all branches of the national economy of the USSR as a prerequisite for a great increase in manufacturing and the productivity of labor, for which it is necessary not only to overtake but to surpass in the nearest future the achievements of science beyond the borders of the USSR." A characteristic feature of the planning in the USSR is the fact that in the planning of any project, they at the same time do not create the conditions necessary to carry it out. It is hard to speak of achievements of science, when the majority of scholars, even those with a world reputation, like Academician Vavilov are doing manual labor in concentration camps or have been long ago destroyed physically. There are left Academician T. Lysenko and the young Soviet scholars whose task it is to give a scientific basis for the current projects of the Kremlin. All these projects of the last years which have failed, according to the words of Soviet economists "on scales which history has never seen" — were in reality planned and executed on a very low cultural and scientific level. It is enough to quote one example of the total ruining of a great area of young plantings of oak in the Volga area in 1951. By the method of Academician Lysenko, the oaks were planted in rows and the whole area around them was sown to grain. It is very intelligible that in the dry conditions of the Volga area the young oaks could not meet the

competition of the grain for moisture and all died. The lack of real scholars and of scientific methods characterizes contemporary science in the USSR. By recognizing only the "methods of Michurin," Soviet scholars apply them in all branches of agricultural science, creating not so much scientific accomplishments as poor jokes on science. Thus Prof. Davydov tells:³ "that he applied the methods of Michurin for the hybridization of plants to the rearing of fowl and so when placing in the incubator hen's eggs, he replaced the whites in chicken eggs by the whites of the eggs of ducks or turkeys. This method did not bring any results of hybridization as yet in the words of Prof. Davydov, but the chickens came out surprisingly healthy and grew rapidly. Another experiment of Prof. Davydov is still more interesting. He made a double insemination of the sow with the semen of two males of different breeds and wrote that the pigs were born healthy after this and grew very quickly. That chickens and pigs of these experiments grew rapidly is understandable, for they are fed better than the children in the kolhosps.

These examples clearly show that contemporary Soviet science under the authoritative leadership of Academician Lysenko has been turned into medieval magic. Academician Lysenko has definitely asserted himself that at a session of the Lenin Academy in Moscow in 1951, he made a speech on the scientific discoveries of Olha Lepeshynska and said: "Rye can produce wheat, and various forms of wheat can produce rye. Other forms of wheat can produce barley. Everything depends upon the conditions in which these plants develop."

Soviet practice has fully confirmed Academician Lysenko; all plantings of oaks in the field-protecting belts in the Volga area in 1950 "have produced" weed grass instead of oaks. This clearly shows that in the USSR science is directly connected with practice.

³ Prof. Davydov, S. H. *The Science of Michurin in Cattle Raising*, 1950.



THE MAKING OF A MISSION

By LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

For the past seven months the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America has been deeply engrossed in extensive negotiations with the American Committee For the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia on the vitally important problem of genuine and forceful Ukrainian participation in what has recently been designated as the Coordinating Center For the Anti-Bolshevist Struggle, located in Munich, Germany. During almost this entire period of time it was my privilege as well as burdensome responsibility to undertake these lengthy and involute deliberations which traversed every conceivable aspect of the problem. Needless to say, in the continuous atmosphere of frank and candid discussion it was consistently and sympathetically understood that my general position reflected unflickeringly the ideological groundwork of the Congress Committee which clearly underwrites the unique compatibility of traditional Ukrainian and American interests. The results up to this point, veritably in the making of a mission to Europe, have been salutary and constructive, and in my founded judgment must be soberly and intelligently considered by all who ingenuously nurture uppermost in their hearts and minds the salvation of the Ukrainian nation and its long oppressed people from the pangs of imperialist Soviet destruction.

The prime intention here is to present with logical rigor and clarity the fundamental issues underlying this problem and the governing reasons justifying my conviction that active participation in the Center on the part of the legitimate Ukrainian emigration is not only politically rational but also necessary for the expeditious advancement of the historic Ukrainian cause on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It would scarcely appear presumptuous of me to assert that after these many months of detailed consideration devoted to the problem, my observations and reasoned analysis are born of a close familiarity with the salient facts of the situation, and therefore enjoy some measure of authoritativeness which could hardly be applied to those who have already sought to influence various groups with their baseless notions. From this vantage point it has been plainly evident to me that this vocal but small opposition here to Ukrainian membership in the Center rests on a mass of misinformation, rumor and gross speculation. Strangely enough, some

are even petrified by the prospect of Ukrainian representatives, upright and resolute in their determination to achieve an independent Ukraine, having to cooperate with Russians in the overthrow of the Stalin regime. A few others, whose incessant and protective reiteration of the noble goals of the Ukrainian liberation movement serve ignobly to render the latter platitudinous, haven't even evinced a will to understand the complex factors and their inter-relations in the current situation.

These various motivations and reasons evaporate once the total picture of the subject is portrayed and clearly understood. It requires little political maturity to seize upon an aspect or feature of a complex of events, at that usually of relative minor significance, and distend it beyond reasonable proportions to lay a basis for argumentative and intransigent opposition. This unfortunately has been the case regarding the negative stand assumed in this country by the few alluded to above. The shining mark of political maturity, indeed of human understanding itself, is the integralist perception of all the determining variables and components of a given situation in its entirety. To view the essential factors of a given situation, a prevailing sense of balance and proportion, and a clear vision as to their respective powers of determination concerning the future course of political activity is doubtlessly the hallmark of astute political tactics and leadership. The requirements of this current project demand concentrated effort and application in line with this orientation. As every mature student of political behavior knows, there are no absolutes, only percentages to be determined and acted upon. The percentage of solid benefit resulting from Ukrainian participation in the Center is conspicuously high, and represents an opportunity which only absolutism in thought and attitude can destroy at no slight cost to the movement for an independent Ukraine.

A RECORD OF ADEQUATE CAUSE FOR CRITICISM

A just and enlightened assessment of the concrete results produced to date necessarily presupposes some degree of acquaintance with the serious blunders and obviously inexcusable errors committed by certain representatives of the American Committee in its formative stages of operation. Truly, only by adopting a developmental viewpoint, as against that of a pure logical analysis of the results in vacuo, can one consciously appreciate the marked progress achieved thus far and the undoubted willingness and integrity of the Committee's present executive representatives to amend the mistakes of the past. By this means of contrast and comparison the suspicion and ill-feeling created in the past and still very much operative in the present can be promptly allayed and

substantially reduced to permit the fullest measure of cooperation toward constructive ends satisfactory to all democratic elements concerned. To be sure, no institutional facet conceived by man can be regarded as perfect, but in the present case the impending improvements are of such solid worth in an undertaking that is still evolving in character, that only an illiberal mind can fail to discern their manifest significance.

Now what specifically have been the paramount objects for justified censure and remonstrance on the part of those who with studious intent have followed closely the tortuous course of action pursued by the American Committee in its earlier phase of being? First, the very attitude and disposition of the Committee were unmistakably pro-Russian in nature and disparaging toward the historic interests of the non-Russian nations which by transmission enjoy free witness in the recent non-Russian emigration. In its state of watchful waiting the Congress Committee received reliable, detailed reports of the numerous meetings inspired by the representatives of the American Committee with the leaders of the Ukrainian emigration, and on the basis of this filed information protested strenuously against this displayed demeanor as well as the sordid and self-defeating methods that were employed in a naive attempt to inveigle and buy organized Ukrainian groups into the European counterpart of the American Committee.

The second major cause of widespread criticism and opposition was the unprincipled change in the final portion of the Committee's title from "Peoples of the Soviet Union" to "Peoples of Russia." This unfortunate substitution unquestionably satisfied the imperialist appetites of Russomaniacs, but it also demonstrated the Committee's crass disregard of ethnological truth and pro-Russian bias by adopting a term which is politically venomous to all patriotic non-Russians. From a logical point of view it was patently contradictory for the Committee to presume an espousal of the unqualified principle of national self-determination and simultaneously intitle itself with a designation that connotes only empire and black tyranny. As I emphasized in one of my several communications to Admiral Kirk, a further change of title is indispensable "in order to disallow any intimation of a contextual prejudice for the exercise of the right of national self-determination."

The third object of vital disagreement represented perhaps a desperate projection of the low tactics referred to above when a representative of the American Committee boldly unsheathed his magic political wand and overnight produced six alleged Ukrainian organizations which were supposed to be representative groups eligible for admission into the European counterpart. These organizations, consisting of a handful of opportunistic individuals commonly known as Gulays, the Ukrainian

equivalent of quislings, were in substance no more Ukrainian than the Communist Party in the United States can be considered American. In attacking this outrage the Congress Committee utilized every means possible to impress upon American public opinion the peril of dicking with political fiction in the general area of psychological warfare.

The formalization of these chief objectionable factors in a pamphlet distributed by the Committee under the title "The Free World's Secret Weapon: The Peoples of Russia" served only to intensify and extend the antagonism that already existed here and abroad to the injudicious and errant position and actions of the American Committee. It is not possible here, nor for that matter wholly necessary, to critically examine at length the hotchpotched contents of this pamphlet released for popular consumption and presumed edification. However, a few examples may be cited to substantiate several of the observations made above. The very first sentence in the text reads "The Democratic West owes a great debt of conscience to the peoples of Soviet Union": yet throughout the text one meets with a nonsensical interchange between these peoples and the mythical "peoples of Russia." At another point the reader is ostensibly informed that "We are at last recognizing the most crucial, and most encouraging, fact in the current world equation: the fact that the Russian peoples are overwhelmingly opposed to their dictatorship and, therefore, potentially our best allies." Clearly, for those conversant with the record of underground resistance to the present day this inept statement would ring completely true, perhaps, if one singularizes "peoples." The stubborn fact is that many of the non-Russian peoples have already conclusively established their status as "actually our best allies." Half-truths and untruths abound in numerous other passages, but the choice instance of verbal salmagundi, which I believe all observers of East European politics would relish, is the following quotation from an announcement to the press on the formation of the Committee in 1950: "In this struggle hundreds of thousands of *Russian emigres of every nationality* have already irrevocably demonstrated their resistance to the Soviet regime by fleeing the U.S.S.R."

The fifth source of discord, which in actuality is not paramount for reasons elucidated below, is the recent "Statute of the Coordinating Center for the Antibolshevist Struggle." Chronologically this deserves concise treatment within an appropriate context below in view of the fact that much of the preceding discussion applied to the thoughts and operations of the American Committee as it was constituted in the past. As indicated previously, there is a considerable range of difference between the past and the present regarding the outlook, the sense of fairness, the understanding, and the voiced integrity of the executive

body in the American Committee. In matters of time, inasmuch as the present represents essentially an expanded matrix of the past it is only fair to state that the bases of the current negotiations, rendered possible only by these characteristic changes, were laid in the latter part of Admiral Kirk's ephemeral chairmanship of the Committee.

GROUNDWORK FOR HARMONY AND AGREEMENT

It will be generally agreed that the foregoing account accurately and with factual foundation and supporting evidence presents the major areas of difficulty and controversy that have surrounded the issue of bona fide Ukrainian participation in the now designated center. Keeping these enumerated points steadfastly in mind, it is obviously in order now to set forth systematically and coherently the concrete results achieved as points of understanding which practically form the groundwork for harmony and agreement between the Ukrainian emigration and the representatives of the American Committee in Europe. These points of mutual understanding, as suggested earlier, stand in prominent contrast to the points of dissension created by the blundering activities of the Committee prior to the full assumption of operational control and policy by Admiral Kirk, and represent, therefore, the worthy measure of enlightened outlook that deserves the respectful attention and co-operative inclinations of all responsible Ukrainian leaders in the emigration.

Before we proceed to define these points of understanding and of contrast, we should observe and bear in mind the essentials which unalterably constituted the pivotal basis for discussion and negotiation on the part of the Congress Committee representatives. Putting it another way, what are the basic theses and objectives that had to be safeguarded or striven for and which necessarily conditioned the points of agreement arrived at? Surely one must clearly and distinctly know in premial form what he desires to maintain and to attain in order to arrive intelligently at compatible and consistent points of agreement. These essentials which constantly guided the deliberations of the Congress Committee representatives were the following: (1) the fundamental principles of the Ukrainian liberation movement, (2) the ultimate solidarity of authentic Ukrainian groups, (3) genuine Ukrainian presentations to the people of Ukraine over Radio Liberation (4) non-fictitious Ukrainian preparation of publications, leaflets, newspapers and other weapons of psychological struggle, and (5) the confirmation of Ukrainian leadership among the non-Russian organizations.

Considering briefly each of these fundamentals in order, it can scarcely be over-stressed that the first, philosophical in substance, is basic to all else. The principles of national independence and self-government, which indeed are enshrined in the great American Tradition itself, must at all costs be protected for the free expression of the Ukrainian nation once the imperialist yoke of Moscow is permanently removed. Moreover, the empirically established principle that the organized Ukrainian emigration is the protective agent in the free world of these fundamental principles of the Ukrainian liberation movement must be equally preserved. In no manner should the symbol of the popular Ukrainian will to independence, namely the Ukrainian National Council be tarnished by involvements short of this demonstrated will. In equal degree, neither should the gallantry of the external arms of the Ukrainian underground struggle for national independence, viz. the UHVR and the UPA nor the valuable activity of the many other emigre Ukrainian organizations be similarly blemished. It is with this basic element in view that the Congress Committee respects and upholds the second essential on the ultimate solidarity of authentic Ukrainian emigre groups concerning these fundamental principles, and hopes that it can influence the practical expression of this solidarity along political organizational lines for the attainment of maximum resource against the enemies of Ukrainian national independence.

The third essential is a further practical objective purposed to insure genuine Ukrainian presentations to the people of Ukraine over Radio Liberation and to circumvent the real possibilities of misrepresentations by Gulays or the unimaginative and vapid renditions of the Voice of America. This and the fourth governing essential represent practical opportunities for the production of much tangible good in behalf of the Ukrainian nation, but opportunities for harm as well if permitted to slip into the hands of adventurers. Finally, the fifth essential seeking additional confirmation of Ukrainian leadership among the non-Russian groups possesses a solid prospect of realization in a project where the non-Russian interests deserve to be vigilantly guarded and openly defended. The fact that not all of the non-Russian groups participating in the Center are insufficiently representative cannot be easily discounted.

With this preconceived aggregate of essentials serving as the axis of negotiations for the representatives of the Congress Committee, the results in the form of mutual points of understanding stand in logical comptability and congruity with these fundamental axia, and thus, viewed integrally, rationally justify the membership and active participation of acceptable Ukrainian representatives in the Coordinating Center in Munich. These results deserve careful reading and even re-reading if

the entire picture is to be properly constructed in one's mind. First, there can be no doubt that the attitude of the American Committee toward legitimate non-Russian interests is today a genial, just and understanding one. In the light of the past record there has been an understandable fear and suspicion that the Committee is merely an instrument for the advancement of Great Russian domination. The ground for such fear and suspicion is radically undermined by Admiral Stevens' solemn assurance that his Committee will tolerate no Russian or other form of domination over the activities of the Center. Moreover, the Committee has expressed good will by enlisting the services of a personage whose sympathetic feelings toward the long ignored plight of the non-Russian peoples are irrefragable.

Second in importance is the point of understanding that the name of the American Committee must necessarily be altered to the extent of deleting the misleading and ignominious term "Peoples of Russia" and, as recommended by the Congress Committee discussants on the basis of the reasons expounded in the preceding section, substituting for it "Peoples in the U.S.S.R."

Third, and this is indisputably the quintessence of the entire projected plan for valid Ukrainian participation in the Center, it is mutually agreed and understood that the crucial formula by which this objective can be adequately accomplished is the formation of an *Ad Hoc* Committee consisting of legitimate Ukrainian emigres drawn by selection or election from all the representative Ukrainian organizations and who shall, with formal independent status, become directly involved with the activities of the Center through their dual *Ad Hoc* chairmanship based on the two votes of absolute formal equality with the other non-Russian participants. To understand the overall plan developed by the Congress Committee in strict conformance with the pivotal essentials stated earlier, it is absolutely necessary for the reader to understand the very crux of this plan, which is this *Ad Hoc* Committee formula.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that it is plainly understood by all concerned that in their convenient adoption of this operational principle of *Ad Hoc* activity, the organized Ukrainian groups shall in no manner or degree suffer any compromise or sacrifice of their fundamental political principles aimed at a sovereign and independent Ukrainian state. The determining reason for this is that no legitimate Ukrainian organization *as such* will be participating in the Center. Since the basic policy as laid down by the American Committee explicitly sidesteps the ultimate issue of the political realignment of Eastern Europe, organized Ukrainian groups which are irrevocably committed to the full independence of Ukraine cannot in principle and conscience reduce themselves to the

restricted framework of activity ensuing from this policy. For this limited purpose it logically and necessarily follows that a limited means be adopted, namely the means of the Ukrainian Ad Hoc Committee, formed along the lines demarcated above and by nature independent in status and thus formally self-representative. The superficial argument that in reality this Ad Hoc Committee will be representative of the organized Ukrainian groups obviously ignores the distinctions implied by the Ad Hoc concept. To borrow in part the philosophical principle of analogy, the effect (Ad Hoc Committee) bears only the analogous traits of the cause (Ukrainian Organizations), not its substantial nature.

The composition of the Center is intended to be divided equally between the non-Russians and Russians. The exact plan of organization is experimental, and should it become evident that the organizational framework favors domination by any general group, in the light of the aforementioned assurances there will be adequate cause to clamor for radical changes. Some individuals are horrified by the thought that whereas in the organizational sector of the Center the Russians are allocated twenty votes, as influenced by alleged equal population distribution in the U.S.S.R., the Ukrainians would enjoy only two votes on an equal basis with the other non-Russian participants, in the end totaling a counterbalancing aggregate of twenty. From the logical viewpoint of applied consistency we could easily press for a larger Ukrainian allocation of votes based on the identical criterion of population distribution, but as confirmed believers in the absolute, intrinsic equality of all nations and peoples, whether large or small, it is ideologically mandatory for us to affirm this formal equality for all the non-Russian groups. Sheer political acumen, if taken alone as a prime consideration for unalloyed leadership, dictates this circumvention of the arrogant "Big Brother" complex which prepossesses the Russian political mind everywhere. Moreover, contrary to the further illusions of these politically myopic individuals, this Center is no parliament, nor even a general union of the emigration, nor by any stretch of the imagination a basis for the impression that the real international problems and issues within the Soviet Union will now bear the stamp of a mere "internal" problem. In point of cold fact the Center is an operating agency for psychological warfare activity in which, for strategical and qualitative reasons, the Ukrainian participants will inevitably wield a power scarcely measured by the two formal votes and in which the burden of fair play will rest squarely on Russian shoulders.

Fourth, it is understood, too, that over and above the requirements for standard Radio Liberation programming applicable to all sections of the Center, fertile autonomy of endeavor will be assured each national

group in order to preclude the repetition of the gross blunders made by the Voice of America. In short, Ukrainian news and other material will be managed by the Ukrainian section with originality and initiative of application. Naturally, as point five, in concrete conformity with the formal concept of equality the logical determinant of the scope of operations and personnel in the Ukrainian section is understood to be the proportional base of quantitative populational differences, as demanded by the necessity of appealing to a wide area of over 40 million people. In addition, due to the dominant factor of intimate Ukrainian relations with other broadly representative non-Russian organizations and for natural reasons of consistent practice, it is agreed also that the measure of success realized by this constructive approach to the problem of participation with honor and integrity of contract will be made readily available to these other organized non-Russian groups, including the Balts whose de facto plight is identical with that of the other non-Russian peoples in the Soviet Union.

Finally, within this constructive framework of understanding and agreement, balanced judgment and perspective simply decree that the few objectionable aspects of the recently released statute of the Center do not constitute adequate cause for a refusal to affiliate with the Center under the conditions described above. In such matters there is always the circumstances of unrestrained imputation of meaning stimulated largely by preconceived notions or suspicion and distrust. On the constructive side, as with every document there is latitude for interpretation, and after a careful study of this statute one can easily counter any possible interpretation seemingly favorable to the imperialist Great Russian viewpoint with one favorable to the non-Russian and Ukrainian positions. The crux of the participating Ukrainian position is significantly provided for in a footnote to the statute, wherein it in effect specifies that the contemplated Ad Hoc Committee can consider as a democratic expression of the peoples' will one realized through decisions by national constituent assemblies! The liberty to maintain this position and no other is clearly afforded.

However, in the field of innuendo and suggestion, certain terms and passages in the statute lend to a discriminatory or predeterminative note that deserves correction by alternation or deletion of the former. In the first paragraph, for instance, a contradiction to the American Committee's basic policy exists in the mention of the future "establishment of a democratic state structure." If the non-Russian nations have their say, many democratic state structures will exist, and this is not outruled by the policy of the American Committee. Further, if it is fitting to mention the February Russian revolution, in the name of non-discriminatory

treatment it is equally fitting to make mention of the general non-Russian revolution for independence from 1917 on, or make no mention of either. Also for purpose of truth and non-discrimination, if reference can be made to "participating Russian groups," equal reference should be made of non-Russian groups," and not of "nationality," minority or some other connotation of the "second class citizen" species. The non-Russian groups stem from respective and historic nations, not from foreign-language or nationality entities similar to those in this country. The deciding fact to be borne in mind is that this statute is by no means imprescriptible and fixed. On the contrary, it is subject to necessary change, but to adequately and expeditiously predicate these changes there must be lively spark of national opposition from within. As all political experts worth their salt know, you can't hope to achieve your ends unless you take the means of entering the fray. It requires little political foresight to anticipate necessary changes of discriminatory and contradictory elements such as those noted here.

THE SPIRIT OF THE MISSION

The four members of the mission to Europe are high-ranking officials of the Congress Committee which thereby gives formidable expression to its spirit of cooperation with the American Committee. It is a well balanced and broadly representative delegation consisting of Mr. Dmytro Halychyn, First Vice-President, Mr. Stephen J. Jarema, Executive Director, who was delegated by Mr. Anthony Batiuk, President of the Ukrainian Workingmen's Assn. and Secretary of the UCCA, to represent him in the negotiations because of illness, Mr. Walter Dushnyck, member of the Political Policy Board, and myself. The delegation views its task as a most vital undertaking and is impressed deeply by the fact that Radio Liberation promises to surpass Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America in many wise. It shall freely exchange ideas and reduce to coherent form all issues such as have been treated here pertinent to the end of authentic Ukrainian membership in the Center. It recognizes fully that the two areas of decision in the momentous struggle of this century are the United States and the Soviet Union, and only one will last to reap its harvest. This project of the American Committee, entailing radio, leaflets, newspapers, brochures, cultural and scientific enterprises, and welfare activities to aid new refugees, is vital to the end that the United States will reap the harvest of this decision, the harvest of freedom and independence and self-government for peoples everywhere.

Integrated into this perspective of the delegation is its founded view that the battle now raging here and abroad on the fundamental issue between the imperialist Great Russian position and that of the non-Russians is part and parcel of the coming decision, and therefore necessarily related to this project and this mission. It is not without significance that the general Russian attitude hopefully disfavors the participation of legitimate Ukrainians in the Center. It would be somewhat ironical and not a little tragic for Ukrainians to support this attitude by their recalcitrance. However, it is gratifying and strengthening to the delegation to learn that some individuals and groups who have entertained serious doubts about this mission now assume a brighter outlook. It was comparably pleasant to learn from Admiral Mentz, a member of the American Committee, that undivided support was registered for the mission by the ranking officials of the Ukrainian Workingmen's Association whom he visited in Scranton, Pa. These are encouraging indications of a responsible demeanor and awareness toward a problem of extensive political implications to the cause of Ukrainian independence. With this goal permanently in mind, the Ukrainian Congress Committee is confident in its determination to protect and defend with every measure of resource the fruits of its success by this mission and the basic interests of all Ukrainian organizations abroad.



QUESTION ON SOVIET HEROES

In Warsaw, two men crossed the street against the traffic lights. Immediately they were stopped by a policeman who demanded the payment of a fine. One of the men paid up, but the other asked haughtily:

"Do Heroes of the Soviet Union have to pay fines?"

The policeman sprang to attention, saluted the questioner, and said:

"No, sir. Heroes of the Soviet Union never pay fines."

When they were safely round the corner the first man said:

"You must be crazy. You are no more a Hero of the Soviet Union than I am."

"Agreed," was the answer. "But I only asked him a question — and now we know the truth."

THE KENNANS AND BARANOV

by CLARENCE A. MANNING

Almost from the moment of American independence, the American attitude towards Russia/USSR has been marked by what may be best characterized as wishful thinking. They have failed to use their reason and their keen powers of observation at each succeeding crisis in the relations of the two countries, and it has been only rarely that they have not listened to the voice of supposed Russian friends of America and then been painfully surprised at the reaction that they have aroused by their innocence, and good will.

The latest example of the all too frequent American naivete toward Russia/USSR has been offered by the experiences of Hon. George Kennan, the American ambassador to Moscow. Long heralded as one of the greatest American authorities on Russia and the Soviet Union, he has stood out as the formal architect of a plan for containing the onward march of Russian imperial Communism, while he bitterly opposed any talk of giving independence to the oppressed nations that have been forced under Russian rule. He has authoritatively asserted that Ukraine is as much a part of Russia/USSR as Pennsylvania is of the United States, and completely ignored the spirit of the people and even the geographical position which it holds in regard to the territory of the Great Russians.

When he was appointed to Moscow, it was with the fond belief that he could in some way break through the iron secrecy of the Kremlin and by acts of kindness and of firmness win the good will of the Communist masters and write a new chapter in the mutual relations of the United States and the USSR. Under his short stay, he has seen the American embassy forced out of its advantageous and prominent location and when he ventured to make a few mild remarks on the isolation to which the foreign diplomats were subjected, he was unceremoniously declared *persona non grata* and prevented from returning to his post.

That ends another experiment, another example of a dream without a reality behind it. Perhaps now Mr. Kennan has been shaken in his belief that his method of approach was correct and he can now look at the situation from a broader point of view and can understand why the

oppressed peoples feel as they do. If not, it is high time that the State Department and the various American universities undertake the task.

Yet we can understand the reason for his hopes and his feelings. Another member of the same family with the same name of George Kennan had much the same experience and worked his way to a profound belief that the Russian people wanted to be friends without understanding the essence of the problem. His career too is instructive and in its own way typical.

George Kennan the elder was in his generation an authority on Russia with still broader opportunities for study. As a young man, he had an important post in one of the most fantastic schemes in modern history, the construction of a telegraph from the city of San Francisco to St. Petersburg by way of the Aleutian Islands. For three years he worked and travelled through that section of the northwest Siberian wilderness which is now the site of so many labor camps of death, and which is being developed as a military threat to Alaska and the northwest coast of the American continent. George Kennan knew the country, he knew the natives, and his was no specially conducted tour, for he was brought into contact with the country as it was; he worked with Russian engineers, and knew both the Russian natives, the exiles in Siberia, and the aboriginal population. His writings made him famous.

Then nearly twenty years later, he went again to Russia to study the Russian exile system, and the tale which he brought back and which he set forth in his book and lectures throughout the Anglo-Saxon world evoked a chill of horror which for a while threatened the destruction of the Russian myth. His work became a classic and even a textbook to be read and marked by all those people who felt themselves threatened by the expanding power of Russia.

Yet there was one note that ran through the whole book. It was the belief that the abuses of tsarism were the abuses of a system which was alien to the genius of the Russian people. It offered the Americans a justification for their support of anti-tsarist activities of the revolutionists and it blinded them to the essential teachings of such men as Leo Tolstoy and Maxim Gorky, who made clear, each in his own way, the fundamental antithesis between the American and Russian ways of life and thought. It cast a halo over much that would otherwise have been unpalatable to the conceptions of the west and it created that mood which culminated in 1917 with the American refusal to understand the Russian program, and thus indirectly aided in the Bolshevik seizure of power and the bringing on of World War II with all its dire results and its grim menace for the future.

Again it was the same wishful thinking, the inability to see that the Russian system was the outgrowth of that mode of life which had been developed in the early days of Moscow and produced such characters as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. The Russian Provisional Government was as much bound by this Russian reaction as were the tsars or the white generals but they used the American unwillingness to face the realities of the situation, and talked glibly until the Communist government had taken over and left them stranded. They are still exploiting the same American mistake and so are the remains of the monarchist factions and Joseph Stalin himself.

The attitude of the elder Kennan was perhaps determined by a sentimental outlook upon the world and a belief that the ideals that had been evolved by Western Europe would of themselves inevitably triumph by the force of their own power. It lacked the clear thinking of Rudyard Kipling, who was expressing from his experiences in India his conviction that there was in Russian Asia a dynamic power which boded ill, whether under the tsars or not.

Yet, if they had history, not the history of Russia but of North America, they would have seen in their own backyard a revelation of the Russian methods and character by a man who at least superficially and perhaps in reality could be called the only Russian-American, Alexander Baranov who for over a quarter of a century maintained Russian power on the American continent practically by his own efforts and with his own resources. He was no sentimentalist except perhaps in his love for Alaska and his dreams of its future, but from the day he landed from an unseaworthy ship on Kodiak Islands in 1790 until he was summarily dismissed from his post and forced from his beloved land in 1819, to die at sea off Java on his return journey to St. Petersburg, he had worked and slaved with a typical Muscovite stubbornness for a strong policy of expansion. Nevertheless there were traits in his character that had raised him above the commonplace and created a real niche for his work.

What kind of a man was this? He was no courtier. He was none of the things over which the Kennans had sentimentalized but he was also a practical individual who had carved out in the name of the tsar an almost independent domain which he governed in a truly autocratic way. Who was he?

He was an ordinary Russian trader, one of that tough breed that had extended Russian power to the Pacific Ocean and wanted to push it further. His education was limited. His confidence was boundless and his vision immense. He was also singularly unprejudiced. It made him

a rare combination and it was fortunate for Russian self-esteem that they found such a man for the post.

With all of his intense Russian patriotism, it did not take Baranov long to realize that he could only maintain the Russian power by getting along with the American sea captains. It was they who taught him navigation and freed him from dependence upon the inefficient Russian sailors of the north Pacific. It was they who taught him to build ships and to sail them. It was they who brought in food and sold it for furs despite the Russian laws against such procedure. It was they who escorted his Aleut hunters on their long voyages for sea otters from Kodiak and Sitka to the coast of California. It was they who were his sole support in many a difficult situation and it was they who under the pusillanimous program of his successors brought prominently forward the need for the Monroe Doctrine and led finally to the collapse of Russian power in the New World.

These same American sailors realized the nature and the character of his iron rule. They had no illusions that he was not a man of the people. They knew the way in which he drove hard bargains, in which he coerced the Aleuts and tried to overawe the Tlingits and the other Alaskan tribes, but unconsciously he won their respect and many a sea captain was willing for a good price to enter his service for a period of years.

It was not only a financial service and an exploitation of opportunities. Located in his lonely abode first at Kodiak and then at Sitka, Baranov was not ashamed to admit his need of them. Those years when thanks to the War of 1812, American voyages to the north Pacific area fell off, Baranov was lonely and out of sorts. For years he was bothered by his dependence upon them and by the lawless character of his connections with them, but as one after another of the men selected to receive him perished from shipwreck or disease before they reached their post, he became reconciled and considered himself more and more of a native of Alaska instead of an agent of St. Petersburg.

He never became fully aware of the logic of his own position and he constantly dreamed that he could make himself the master of the Pacific coast as far as San Francisco, that he could raise the Russian flag over the Hawaiian Islands, but even in these dreams he was still conscious as no other of the Russians in Alaska was, of his need and friendship for the Americans.

He was a simple and elemental figure who lacked the world-embracing ambitions of his only distinguished Russian visitor, Nicholas Rezanov whom he fired with a desire to seize California from the Spanish. Rezanov, a courtier in the tradition of Catherine's expansion-

ism had come to Alaska, all prepared to remove him for inefficiency but he stayed and was conquered. He was enraged at Baranov's friendship with the Americans and before even a few months had passed, he was buying himself an American ship to go to California to secure food. There he fell in love with a daughter of the Spanish commandant of San Francisco and dashed home to secure her hand and country but he was never to do either, for exhausted by his wild journey across Siberia in winter, he fell from his horse and was killed.

Rezanov was in a hurry. He wanted to seize everything for Russia at one fell swoop, to fan the ill will between the United States and Great Britain, and to be the master of the coast. That might have been Baranov's notion when he first went to Alaska. Still he grew and became more tolerant of his neighbors. It is significant of this change in his attitude that when he heard of the first arrival of Lewis and Clark on the Pacific coast and the later settlement of Astoria at the mouth of the Columbia River, he opened direct relations with them, even though he did not like the representative of John Jacob Astor and was willing to enter into a definite agreement with them for the supply of his colony. It is significant again that when he sent his one trusted Russian assistant Kuskov to establish a settlement in California near San Francisco, he did not think of trying to eliminate the American settlement, even though it ended his hopes of securing the entire Pacific seacoast.

Baranov received honor after honor from the tsar. A simple and uneducated trapper, he was made a Collegiate Councillor of the Empire and ranked with high Russian officials. It did not end his disputes with those officials and the navy officers who were sent out and finally secured his replacement and shipped him out of the country much to the sorrow even of the natives over whom he had lorded and whom he had exploited mercilessly.

In a real sense Baranov grew into Alaska and his ties became greater with each year. It was partially because of circumstances. He had two children by a Kenai girl whom he married years later after the death of his wife in Russia. Both children, a boy and a girl, returned to Russia after his death and both passed away almost within a year. He had no personal ties with the homeland and his only friends were among the Americans.

He had few Russians in his entourage. At one time after the destruction of Sitka by the Tlingits, the number was reduced to less than 60 and even later many years later, at the final liquidation of the Russian settlement in California Fort Ross, that post was held by only 40 Russians. He seemed not to care and for those Russians who were with him, he had no confidence or friendship. He ruled them with a rod of

iron and granted them no concessions except that to which they were accustomed — absolute obedience in all things. The song which he composed for his little force with which he set out to recapture Sitka was filled with exactly the same expressions as those which Ivan the Terrible and the early invaders of Siberia had used as they fought their way across Asia to the Pacific and covered the territory in less than fifty years.

His American friends knew it but they took him as he was and did their best to understand him and they did it successfully. The Russians feared and obeyed him and woe to those who failed to mark his imperious commands. They were punished mercilessly and he kept his unruly band in order. Without an army, he forced half of them to be sober each night and to stand under arms in case of Indian attack. The other half he allowed to revel as they would, and the stories of his men are on par with those told of the great Muscovite rulers and autocrats.

Baranov was not a man to be idealized or romanticized. He was too stern, too much of a tyrant and autocrat for that. He did win and deserve the respect of men that knew him and could have the courage and the strength to stand up and face him, to trade with him, to drink with him, and if need be, to fight him to a finish. He was the opposite of that type of sentimentalized Russian liberal whom we find glorified in American thought of all times and ages and we can only wonder how that supposed type originated, for after the death of Baranov, it was those same supposed liberals who secured orders barring the American ships from the north Pacific, while they schemed and plotted to get control of Haiti and covered their schemes with eloquent correspondence with Americans, who knew them only by their writings and their slogans, for the Russian American Company became inextricably linked with the Decembrist revolt, and the failure of that carried down the Company and gave a breathing spell to the Americans on the Pacific coast.

It is the same to-day as it was then. Baranov was an exceptional figure with his strength and weakness, his breadth of vision and his stubborn ignorance, his broadmindedness and his Muscovite bigotry. The passing of his influence meant the ending of the hope of an understanding in the north Pacific, and at the very time when George Kennan was penning his pleas for a proper evaluation of the Russian people, steps were pushed to seal off the Siberian coast from the American traders and whalers. James Monroe and John Quincy Adams knew it and so did the sea captains and they adopted a firm policy, despite the relative weakness of the United States at the time. Later it seemed to the Russians a good idea to get rid of Alaska in the hope of creating more ill will between the United States and Great Britain.

To-day it is the Communist regime that is desperately striving to separate and disintegrate the Western world. It is continuing that policy of expansion which only hesitated whether in the eighteenth century to devour Sweden, Poland or Turkey first and which rested its ability to operate on its control of Ukraine. To-day as never before since the United States appeared as a free actor in the arena of international politics there is evident a strong feeling of unrest behind the iron curtain, as the oppressed nations, both those which succumbed in 1918-1920 and those which were conquered after 1938, try to recover some vestige of their human rights.

Yet to-day we still hear the same siren voices that we must do nothing to hurt the feelings of the Russian people, for they and they alone can hope to overthrow Stalin and restore the old monolithic Russia. They are amply seconded by American sentimentalists and dreamers, who refuse to face the realities of the present situation and go out of their way to present excuses and to deny what is happening, and they receive from the Russians only fresh insults and fresh humiliations, if they dare to express a single word of the truth, no matter how courteously it is spoken.

For one Baranov there are a dozen Kerenskys and Stalins who are intent only on the aggrandizement of Russia/USSR and we may well ask ourselves the question when we look at Baranov as to the motives that inspired him. Was it a real understanding of a broader idea or was it the realization that he had been abandoned by the people who should have supported him? That he changed during his own lifetime in Alaska is very evident but would he have done so, had he received the men and the supplies that he so sorely needed?

Yet with it all we can only recognize that his relations with his own people were exactly the same as they were from the beginning, that they were marked by a constant tyranny, a perpetual sense of the need for domination. His whole career is a striking example of his fundamental character, of that character which has driven the oppressed peoples to look with longing toward the free nations of the West, to want those privileges of which they have been deprived under the iron hand of Moscow. With the situation as it stands to-day, it is far wiser for the United States and the West to open their eyes to the possibilities in the future, to give up that wishful thinking which nearly cost the United States the entire Pacific coast, and which in 1939 and later led to the return to Soviet slavery of millions of people who had escaped and which to-day is threatening to involve all of Europe and of Asia under Russian Communist slavery. It is not a question to-day of pleading for a truer understanding of the sentimentalized Russian. It is a

question of preparing a new democratic world order, in which all peoples can have those equal rights that seemed so strange to the Russians of a century ago and of to-day.

The ignorance of the past is no excuse for the blindness of the present and there is no vested right to wrong. The military danger from the east that now is returning to menace Alaska can be met by arms, but those arms can be multiplied many times in power by a recognition of the truth, and now that the situation in the north Pacific is so completely reversed, it is the duty of the United States not to maintain the old course but to chart a new one and that new course can only be to remove the menace by extending help and support to all those peoples within and without the Soviet Union who are seeking to be free and to bring them through their own representatives into a free association of the free nations of the world.



A COMPOSER INSPIRED

Dimitry Shostakovich, Soviet composer and Laureate of the Stalin Prize, has been inspired to write a new opera from reading the draft directives for the forthcoming 19th Party Congress.

Moscow Radio, reporting this on 22nd September, quoted Shostakovich as saying: "... I see before me, as though on a moving picture screen, the buildings of new factories, gigantic hydro-electric stations, beautiful architectural ensembles of new apartment houses, palaces of culture, schools and theatres. It is natural that we Soviet masters of art should endeavour to reflect in the theatre and the films, to immortalise in marble and bronze, to sing in opera and symphony, in song and oratorio, the magnificent exploits of the Soviets."

Shostakovich, who in 1948-1949 had to be reprimanded several times for his "deviation" from Marxist-Leninist principles, now appears to be "toeing the line" most satisfactorily.

MODERN SCIENCE IN THE SERVICE OF THE NKVD

by R. PONYATOVSKY

The entire thinking and reading world was always aghast at the incredible confessions unboomed by the defendants at the numerous political show-trials in the Soviet Union. The defendants not only confessed to everything brought in the incriminating charges against them, not only elaborated on the details of these charges, but what is more amazing, they competed in incriminating themselves as ardently as they could. Their conduct at the mock-trials invariably created the impression upon the Soviet public and the representatives of the foreign press, present at these trials, that they were the prosecutors and not the defendants. Foreign correspondents and jurists the world over could not and have not surmised how and by what methods the Bolshevik magistrates had managed to extort such confessions from the defendants. Some pro-Bolshevik writers and representatives of the foreign press, carried away by Bolshevism, hailed with enthusiasm the "absolute justice" of the Bolshevik court which, in their opinion, appeared very much like a political dispute between the judge and prosecutor on the one hand, and the defendants on the other.

But even today hardly anybody in the world is quite aware of what is going on behind these interrogations, particularly those, at which confessions are extracted from the *top-notch* defendants.

The nature of the interrogations is based upon the work for many years of one of the most renowned world psycho-physiologists Academician Ivan Petrovich PAVLOV. It is of the greatest interest to acquaint oneself with the personality of this man. Pavlov graduated in natural sciences from the Physico-Mathematical Faculty of the University at St. Petersburg (now Leningrad). He also studied and graduated from the Medico-Surgical Military Academy in St. Petersburg. Thus as a biologist-physician, he devoted his entire life to studies of the physiology and psycho-physiology of man. During the Tsarist regime he was considered, by his political convictions, a liberal for having criticized the Tsarist policy for its weakness leading the Russian Empire into decline. After the revolution this great Russian patriot, at first, harbored great hatred against the Bolshevist regime for its precepts of "self-determination to the point of secession from the Empire" for the non-Russian peo-

ples inhabiting the countries under Moscow's rule. This he viewed detrimental for Russia's greatness. He could not forgive the Bolsheviks for the disgrace and the "decline of his great Fatherland" until they resumed and revived the Tsarist policy of a great Russian Empire, and strengthened the Soviet Union as a powerful state of the Russian people. Only after the Bolsheviks firmly began to pursue such policies did Pavlov change his attitude, and abruptly, from that of hostility toward the Bolsheviks to one of absolute loyalty to them. He then wholly devoted himself and his science to a still greater strengthening of the concept of a Greater Russian Empire.

To him the organs of the NKVD (Soviet secret police) were the guardians of the revolution who fought the "internal enemy" personified in the non-Russian peoples, the Union Republics, which were set up by the Bolsheviks when the former were weakened as a result of the war and their struggle for independence. Pavlov believed that only through the NKVD could the former grandeur and power of Russia be restored to the present USSR. Herein was the reason why the accomplishments of his psycho-physiological experiments were turned over for permanent and practical use in interrogations, to the NKVD.

From here stems the reluctance on his part to impart the secret of his attainments to his foreign colleagues despite the fact that he was highly revered and respected by them and referred to as "princeps physiologorum mundi," although his works were not known to them in detail. Pavlov's entire science remains veiled by insinuations of third rate importance (already known to the whole world even without his experiments) not only to the physiologists abroad, but the broad medical workers in the USSR.

Hence Pavlov's reluctance as well as that of the Bolshevik government to permit foreigners into his laboratories in KOLTUSHY; hence the reluctance to permit any of Pavlov's pupils to travel abroad and conduct scientific or experimental works based on Pavlov's methods, despite repeated requests from many sides.

From an implacable enemy of the USSR, Pavlov turned into a great Bolshevik patriot who at the World Congress of physiologists in 1935 clearly declared that he was proud to be a citizen of the greatest cultural country — the Soviet Union, which with its whole being was striving for peace and progress.

To date it remains unknown whether it was Pavlov himself or his students and assistants who gave his scientific accomplishments to the NKVD with or without his consent.

Just what is the nature of Pavlov's methods applied by the NKVD at interrogations conducted only when "top-level" persons are involved?

Together all these principal methods referring to the so-called "Pavlov's nervism" can be divided into 5 groups:

- 1) the influence upon the physiology of the brain and regulation of its activities;
- 2) influence and regulation of the will-acts;
- 3) influence and regulation of psychical activities;
- 4) influence and regulation of the nerve-heart activities;
- 5) influence upon the psychological secretion by influencing the digestive glands and nutrition.

All this acting in overlapping or simultaneous combinations evokes the desired reactions of a man which actually constitute the so-higher nervous activity (conditioned reflexes) which in turn is the result of physical and physiological methods applied.

Yet long before the revolution — in 1904 — Pavlov was awarded the Nobel Prize in physiology for his work on the digestive glands. Already at that time his detailed work on the negative influence of the toxins and stomach juices upon the psycho-physiology of the ganglions was not sufficiently illuminated in published works, although he was aware of this fact. This is the first "chronic trauma" which was artificially produced in physiology of the nervous system. Anyone, having the opportunity to observe persons who starved for a considerable length of time or were very much undernourished, knows that even after a certain time they are still pursued by an inferiority complex. This physical inferiority complex is the first rung on the ladder of Pavlov's nervism. The further steps to be undertaken are:

- 1) to ascertain the ganglions that regulate psychic acts, 2) the ganglions that regulate the will of a person, 3) the ganglions that regulate the physiology of the brain and its activities through food and the digestive process in the stomach, 4) the ganglions that regulate the neuro-heart activities; and finally 5) to create the conditions that influence the psychological secretion.

Thus, the consequences of a short period of 1 or 2 days of hunger are that the stomach juices accumulate and poison the organism. The starved man is given food which the stomach digests with a far greater release of energy than would be needed if the man were not hungry. This increases even more the poisoning of the nervous system. Thus was the "chronic trauma" obtained in the psycho-nervous system. Now the influence is detoured to the appropriate ganglions with the help of various physical means: extraordinary bright electric lamps (white, red, ultra-violet, etc.) in a chamber provided with mirrors all over; on the walls and the ceiling. After this the person is seated on a square chair

with the coccyx resting on one corner. This procedure lasts several hours.

All these experiments with the man have invariably the result of breaking the will power of resistance in the man. Having achieved this through the "convey system of interrogation" and the ascertainment of the appropriate ganglions, the prisoner is now subjected to methods acting upon his physical structure which make him repeat and memorize what he is being told. This is something akin to a long-lasting hypnotic effect which can be obtained through a proper withdrawal of food, by administering certain substances destined to poison certain nerves and the brain by toxins, and through physical methods such as glare, temperature, vibration of strong sounds and tunes, alternating intensity of electricity, etc.

As a result of all these methods, tried on a prisoner, and his reaction to them, the will of resistance is broken and moreover, it is completely subjugated to the will of the examining magistrates-experimentators. In addition to this the prisoner is overcome with the desire to alleviate his sufferings by incriminating himself and repenting; he indulges in self-accusations to the point exceeding the minimum bounds of self-preservation. After such "softening" experiments of "chronic psycho-nervous trauma," the defendant is brought before the court where he performs the will of his investigators, he becomes their medium. . .

When these methods of "Pavlov's nervism" were worked out and tested in Koltushy and after they acquired a distinct system, they were used and applied in practice by his assistants and officers of the NKVD. Inasmuch as these new means of interrogations require higher intelligence on the part of the investigators (the previous methods of physical violence: beatings, torture, required only force and rudeness) and a certain degree of practical preparations, the BUTYRKA PRISON in Moscow had to be converted into a laboratory and training center where future investigators and NKVD-ists were trained by physician-assistants of the Pavlov Institute in Koltushy. Here the new methods based on Pavlov's higher nervous system were tried out on prisoners. The prison "Guinea pigs" underwent the horrible experiments conducted by their student-investigators, but they had to be restored to their normal condition, in order to be used anew for subsequent experiments. Therefore, the conditions and food in the Butyrka prison were on a par with those at recreation centers. The prisoners were given work at work-shops, which they chose themselves, they could play soccer, music, indulge in arts, painting, etc., which of course aroused the anxiety of other prisoners to get to Butyrka.

Foreigners, particularly pro-Communists, wrote laudatory articles on the extremely high humane treatment of the jurisprudence in the Soviet Union, where a prison is rather a corrective institution than a penitentiary. But no foreigner ever asked to be allowed to visit other than the Butyrka prison, for instance, the Taganka prison. For the convenience of the student-investigators, a wonderful large building was erected just outside the prison walls for their accomodation. It was directly connected with the prison grounds through a gate cut in the wall which was open to them at all times.

It would be very naive to think that these students could cover the enormous work needed to be accomplished throughout the whole of the USSR. There were too many departments and sub-departments of the NKVD for the limited number of students. They were to be used only in very important cases loudly advertised. Simple cases had to be without this sort of investigations, which were too expensive to be carried out on a large scale. And so the scientific achievements from the hands of Soviet patriots were handed over to the most relentless of all regimes — the Soviet organs of the Secret Police.



SHAGGY DETECTIVE STORY

Every time a certain Moscow citizen passed an investigating official of the Soviet Secret Service, whether morning, noon or night he would greet him with: "Good-evening, Comrade Investigator." After a time the official enquired: "Why do you always say 'good evening' to me, whatever time of day it is?"

"Ah, Comrade Investigator," the man replied humbly, "it is because, whenever I see you, everything goes black in front of me."

RUSSIA OF PAST AND PRESENT

By VOLODYMYR DE KOROSTOVETZ, London

"Russia is the Continent and Europe its Peninsula"
TOLSTOY

To understand the situation in Eastern Europe we must realize how heavily the Russian past weighs upon the present; that Russia is not a country but a Continent, inhabited by 48 peoples differing in tradition, history and geographical conditions, in language and religion — all welded together under one absolute, totalitarian regime; in the past that of the Tsars and now that of the Soviets.

A "totalitarian" regime, whether Tsarist or Soviet, Fascist or Nazi, or that of the pre-war Mikados, is one where the individual as such counts for nothing. He is merely a cog in the vast Government apparatus. The State is the end and the individual is only a means to this end.

It is here that we find a thread of continuity running from Tsarist Russia to Soviet Russia, for even the very structure of power is identical. Under the Tsars this was roughly speaking as follows: At the head of Russia was the "God" anointed head of the country — the Tsar. He was supported by the nobility, the army and the almighty *Okhrana* (secret police) which held the power of life and death over every citizen; then came the masses who were in fact if not in name, serfs.

Now all is different and yet how similar it is. Under the Soviets the head is the (lately proclaimed) "God" anointed leader of the Russian people — Stalin, and this in spite of his being an open communist and atheist — Stalin is supported by the nobility, the communist party. This consists of a small percentage of the population, but for all intents and purposes it is an "aristocracy of the people" with greater rights than any nobility the world has ever known.

Just as under the Tsars, the privileged groups are the Army and the dreaded NKVD, now called the MVD. The difference between the *Okhrana* of the Tsars and the MVD of the Soviets is one of number and cruelty. According to the secret archives of the Tsars published by the Soviets there were between 60 to 70 thousand members of the *Okhrana* for the whole of Tsarist Russia, whereas the present membership of the MVD runs into the millions. There is hardly a family who has not one member

attached to it, with the duty of reporting on all movements of his own family and if he does not do this, he and his family are liquidated. In fact, under the Tsars the masses were serfs whilst under the Bolsheviks they are slaves.

For the success of a totalitarian regime there is necessary an *absolute isolation of the population from the rest of the world both within and without the country*. To achieve this under the Tsar the population (not the privileged classes) were tied to their place of work and residence. The peasantry in the North or Russia proper never owned land as private property, but a form of commune existed known as the "Mir". This was run by the elderman (Starosta) who was appointed by the head of the local Tsarist Police. Every five or seven years the land was allocated to the peasants according, as it was termed in the Tsarist laws, "to the number of souls in that Commune."

Under the Soviets the peasant population lives and works in a commune called the *Sovkhoz* or *Kolkhoz* (Soviet or Collective farm). The head of the local communist party cell, appointed by the head of the local MVD is the chief of this collective. The peasants dare not leave the collective and if they should do so, the penalty is exile five years or more. The head of the collective has the sole right of imposing these penalties which are also imposed in cases where the delivery in kind does not reach the amount demanded by the State. The peasants may not move freely. If they want to go to town they must, in order to secure a railway ticket, show a special permit of the local MVD. Disobedience is punished by five years or more of penal servitude. Free intercourse between the communities being forbidden, isolation inside the land is created.

Isolation from without is twofold: against ideas and material contacts. Humanitarian ideas are not allowed to enter the realm as such ideas would undermine the totalitarian regime in its basic essence, but technical knowledge is allowed to come from the West — the more the better. For centuries past the East European continent has faced great invasions from the East and the South. But the Russia of Peter the Great, the contemporary of Queen Anne of England, had also to face invaders from Poland and Sweden. In order to resist successfully, Peter I took advisers from the West, but only on technical subjects and they had to forget humanitarianism as they knew it in the West. Settling in Russia for good, they became "more Russian than the Russians themselves."

There was a conscious and determined effort to shut out of Russia any ideas other than technical knowledge, not only by Peter the Great but by all subsequent Emperors of the Romanov dynasty.

In a talk with Lenin soon after he came to power, I asked him about isolation. "Yes, most certainly" he said "and full isolation from the

poisonous influences of the West. The Tsars fell, not because they were not liberal enough, but because during three centuries of their rule, they had become soft. We Bolsheviks will never commit the same fault, nay, crime I should say." Lenin also repeated, "Yes, complete and absolute isolation from the poisonous West." "For how long," I asked. — "Until" came his answer, "the population of the USSR is immune from Western poison. This means, until the population is 100 per cent communist and communism and its collectivism becomes not only a creed and belief, but an actual program to be carried out during the lifetime of one or two generations."

Hence the Iron Curtain, created and cultivated by the Tsars and carried on still more drastically and 'totally' by Lenin and Stalin.

This isolation against ideas must, in order to be successful, be followed by *economic isolation*, as with economic relations other influences enter too.

On the eve of World War I, Tsar Nicholas II ordered his Minister of Commerce and Trade, Kriganovsky, to organize a Five Year Plan, under which all commerce, industry, agriculture, waterways, transport and manpower should be administered and directed from one centre. World War I and the Revolution caused the plan to be abandoned, but under it between 3,000 and 4,000 kilometres of new railways were built in the Russian Empire.

After the Soviets came to power they embarked on their Five Year Plan and took this same Kriganovsky plan as a basis and altered it to fit in with their communist ideas of collectivization and confiscation of all property. They cancelled all debts, foreign and domestic and wiped out mortgages. Manpower was mobilized on an unprecedented scale by the introduction of convict and conscript labor for the whole population of the USSR. In this way the threads of continuity from the Tsarist regime to the Soviet regime ran on.

Another condition necessary for the success of a totalitarian state is *the destruction of the middle class*. Under the Tsarist regime the middle class was a vague heterogenous body of intelligentsia (more nihilistic and loud talking than constructive). It consisted of professors, a few scientists, lower civil servants, merchants, tradesmen, lower clergy, a few high school and college students, each going his own way, critical of the ruling classes, imbued with an inferiority complex and only very weakly represented in the Duma or Parliament. These middle classes never had any understanding or contact with the peasants and workmen who were educated and trained to obey the Tsarist totalitarian orders.

So in 1917-1918, when the Russian intelligentsia acquired power, the Kerensky government had neither unity of purpose, nor experience to

guide firmly the unleashed forces of revolution. The mob soon found leaders such as Lenin and his group who threw out slogans to "rob the robbers" and "take possession of all that could be taken by force." Murder and chaos resulted. Having acquired power in this way, Lenin set up again a totalitarian rule, understood and accepted throughout the centuries by the mass of the Great Russians. The Soviets soon disposed of the middle class by mass exile and complete annihilation. If, under the Tsarist regime the middle classes were not encouraged to exist, they were completely destroyed by the Soviet regime, and their place was taken by the so-called "Specialists" — Government officials of the Five Year Soviet Plan — tools in the hands of the Soviet Government and the dreaded MVD.

The next condition imperative for the success of a totalitarian regime is the *deification of the leaders*.

Under the Tsars it was accepted that the Tsars were God. By dismissing God and the Church and replacing them with Communism, a void was created and, as nature does not tolerate this, God had to be superceded by some other sort of Deity. Hence the glorification of Stalin. The whole totalitarian apparatus, schools, press, radio, meetings, etc. works day and night to glorify, to deify, Stalin. They not only deify the memory of Lenin, but they go further and declare that the first Bolsheviks in Russian history were Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. Ivan the Terrible, the Tsar of Moscow (a contemporary of Queen Elizabeth of England) annexed large neighboring territories. In this he was assisted by his powerful nobility. As soon as he felt himself strong enough, he decided to dispose of them and in the usual Asiatic despotic way had nearly two thousand of them beheaded overnight, thereby liquidating their power and turning the rest into docile civil servants.

The other "first Bolshevik" Peter the Great is considered such because of his annexation of immense territory including Ukraine. In this he was assisted by the mighty Orthodox Church. Having used the Church for his own end, Peter the Great felt strong enough to rid himself of it and he accomplished this by dismissing the Patriarch in Moscow and proclaiming himself to be the "God anointed Head of the Greek Orthodox Church." He turned the church into a docile civil body, composed of servile bishops and he nominated a civil servant the Procurator of the Holy Synod to turn the Church into a government department to rule the population.

Another common policy of the Russian totalitarian regimes is the *giving of concessions to the people when the rulers feel weak and the retracting of them when they feel strong again*. So, at the conclusion of the Crimean War, Tsar Alexander the Second, granted far-reaching concessions to the people. In 1861 he liberated the serfs from the land-

owners who 'possessed' them. He gave them plots of land from the property of landowners. He introduced a very liberal Code of Laws with permanent judges and a jury system. He introduced a kind of self-government by elected bodies called *Zemstvos*, which supervised the education of the people, which hitherto had been in the hands of the reactionary ignorant Clergy. The *Zemstvas* also had charge of building of roads and the Health Service which had been practically non-existent before these reforms.

When Alexander the Third, his son, ascended the throne the regime felt strong again. The reforms were not actually cancelled, but their operation was reduced to a minimum.

Another instance came when Nicholas II, the son of Alexander the Third, suffered defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, with unrest and revolution as a consequence. He was forced to grant a "Constitution" and a Parliament. When the Tsarist police quelled the revolution and the Tsar felt himself strong again, he did not dismiss the DUMA entirely but he introduced laws and administrative decrees which deprived the Duma of any influence.

Lenin adopted the same policy when he tried the collectivization of the peasants, and the whole of Ukraine — the granary of Europe — revolted. In order to break the resistance of the peasants, Lenin exiled, murdered and annihilated about one and a half million of the richest peasants, classifying them as Kulaks. Even this did not break the resistance and so Lenin introduced deliberate starvation in the Ukraine — starvation in "the black soil belt," the richest grain country in the world. In one year over four million people were starved to death, yet the resistance continued. Fearing the complete breakdown of food supplies for North Russia — most of which came from the Ukraine — Lenin gave concessions. He introduced the so-called NEP, and gave a certain amount of freedom to free trade.

This brought about a certain amount of peace. Therefore, and here comes the old method when they felt themselves strong again, the Soviets cancelled out the NEP altogether, and the so-called NEP-men were killed or sent into exile.

Again, when during the first period of World War II, Hitler's armies inflicted staggering defeat on the Red armies, Stalin, had to give the people concessions. Hence came into existence the so-called "New National Policy" and the "New Religious Policy". It made no difference that for over thirty years the Soviets had proclaimed religion to be "opium for the people", organized anti-God movements, killed and exiled thousands of priests, turned churches into anti-God Museums. Suddenly Stalin proclaimed the restoration of the patriarchal See in Moscow and ap-

pointed his stooge Alexis to that post. Two Archbishops were appointed to assist him, Macarius and Nicholas. Further, Stalin ordered the re-opening of 36 churches in Moscow. In these churches, the first prayer in the service is for the "God anointed leader of the Russian people, **S t a l i n**!"

The wording of this prayer is identical with that of the prayers for the Tsars in former days. When however, Hitler suffered defeat and victory was Stalin's, the Bolsheviks did not exactly revert to their old policy but they allowed no more new churches to be open.

The "New National Policy" also came into being at that time. Stalin solemnly proclaimed that the Red Army was no longer the Army of the World Revolution but a National Army, protecting the Russian Fatherland. The "anthem" of Bolshevik Russia — The Third International — was changed to a patriotic Anthem. The officers of the Red Army were issued gold epaulets, similar to those worn under the Tsars. For thirty years it had been sufficient for such shoulder stripes to be found in a house for the man to be exiled to Siberia, or shot.

For over 200 years the Tsars proclaimed it their sacred duty to achieve the *unification of all Slav nations* under the leadership of Tsarist Russia. Hence the constant wars of Russia in the Balkans. Also it was proclaimed to be Russia's sacred duty to hoist the Russian cross over Hagia Sophia in Constantinople.

Stalin's Pan-Slav Congress proclaimed the very same aims as Tsarist Russia. When Stalin won the victory over Hitler he formed overnight a new body in place of the Pan-Slav Congress, *the Cominform*, which is the second edition of the Comintern. *Sic transit gloria mundi!* All the members of the former Pan-Slav Congress immediately transferred themselves to this new body.

And now to the *question of nationalities* — both Tsarist and Soviet.

Under the Tsars the annexations, as a result of wars of aggression, always followed the same pattern. The territory annexed was proclaimed a 'District' (local Government), as all other parts of Tsarist Russia was controlled by a Governor and his police assisted by the Nobility, the Army and the Okhrana. All nationals were to be russified. Maps were changed accordingly, historic names disappeared. Ukraine disappeared on the official maps and became known as 'Little Russia.' Poland, after the third partition of 1793 disappeared from the map and was known as the 'Vistula areas' (the Vistula is the river running through the centre of Poland. The countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became the Baltic Areas and subjected to the same pattern of Russian rule. The local languages were prohibited and all had to be Russian.

During the World War II Stalin made manifold concessions to the non-Russian nationalities, but as soon as he felt himself strong again, he

ordered the purging of all "bourgeois nationalists in Ukraine, Byelorussia, Caucasus and Turkestan. He issued a simple decree and completely eliminated so-called "Independent Soviet Socialist National Republics," i.e. the Tartars of the Crimea, the Inguish of North West Caucasus and the Volga Germans, and the population of these republics were to be deported and scattered throughout the USSR within six months. Six months later he received a report that his orders had been carried out one hundred per cent.

Concerning the national cultures — the first stage had been "national in form" but the second stage was "communist in essence". The first stage was for the purpose of inveigling the nationalities to join the Soviet Union. Once they were enrolled in the Union, Stalin then proceeded with the customary totalitarian rigor to the second stage, i. e. "communist in essence," with the ultimate aim of building a world-wide Union of Soviet States with their central direction in Moscow. Evidently all that is Russian is socialistic and communistic.

Thus we must recognize the similarity of the methods of the Tsars and Soviets. We must realize the menace that it offers to European christian civilization and all its values. If we wish to save this, the Western people must become militant democrats and militant christians for only thus will it become possible to build a decent future world to check the growth of Russian totalitarian influence and to work for the perfecting of a true, human life upon this earth.



A young Bulgarian Communist is spending a day in the country, and, crossing a field of grain, he asks an old farmer:

"Tell me, old man, why is the corn so bent?"

"Because, my son, it must rest before the long journey it has to make."

A HORSE DISEASE AS A POLITICAL FACTOR IN UKRAINE

by V. PANASENKO

1. APPEARANCE OF THE DISEASE. — ITS DISTINGUISHING MARKS AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE

In 1931 a hitherto unknown disease appeared among horses in the Kamenents — Podilsk' District. It started in the Satanivsky Area of that district, gradually spread throughout the country, and finally (in 1938) penetrated as far as Kuban and the Caucasus. The nature of the disease could not be understood in the beginning and it was for a number of years referred to as "NZ," i.e., the unknown disease.

The first symptom was an intense swelling of the horse's lips followed by the formation of cracks in the lips and a bloody exudation from these cracks. A more thorough examination disclosed a swelling of the nasal and oral mucous membranes. Slimy matter resembling that exuded in glanders was often discharged from the nose. An autopsy of horses which died as a result of the affliction disclosed that the esophagus, the stomach, and quite particularly the intestines were severely affected; there were ulceration and bruising of the walls of these organs. The kidneys were severely affected and eliminated blood.

The horses afflicted by the disease invariably died within 2—3 weeks and some of them died in 1—2 days. Recovery was extremely rare. According to a statement made by N. Khrushchev, Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, at a meeting held in Kiev in December, 1938 in order to discuss "NZ," more than 30,000 horses perished in Ukraine during the period 1931-1938.

The first outbreak of the disease coincided with the transfer of agriculture in Ukraine to the kolkhoz system. There was every indication that a strong poison had acted on the system of the sick horses. The disease initially appeared in a region adjacent to a "hostile capitalist country" (Poland). This suggested to the authorities that saboteurs who spread a poison were at work. Later, when the disease became better known, it was claimed that saboteurs spread spores of the causative factor. In any event, the NKVD started to hunt saboteurs and sent thousands of peasants, agricultural scientists, and veterinarians to concentra-

tion camps in the north and in Siberia. It is not known how many people were executed as a result of the outbreak of this equine disease. In July 1943, the Germans uncovered at Vynnytsya a common grave containing 10,000 corpses of people executed by the NKVD. 95% of these people were peasants, barefooted and partly dressed in clothes made of home-spun linen. An essential part of them perished in connection with this horse-disease.

In view of the fact that the disease continued to spread notwithstanding the punitive measures, scientific expeditions to study it were finally sent by the Soviet government from Kiev, Kharkiv and Moscow.

2. THE CAUSE OF THE DISEASE

The cause of the disease was discovered quite accidentally. Besides producing a toxicosis in horses, the causative factor also affected the skin of humans exposed to it, and produced a rash on the skin under the arms and between the legs. Peasants who carted straw and sat on it were affected and acquired a strong swelling of the genitals. The causative factor, which was isolated from the skin of people infected with it, and grown in a pure culture, turned out to be *Stachybotrys alternans* Bonord, a fungus which hitherto was known only as a harmless saprophyte breeding on cellulose: old paper, books, etc. Pure cultures of *S. alternans* forms in a nutrient agar medium shallow, black, velvety colonies with a weakly developed aerial mycelium. Some strains have a well-developed aerial mycelium that interweaves, forming bundles which resemble rhizoids and lend to the colonies an ash-gray color. On straw the fungus forms a sooty black, powdery film. The conidiophores are brownish-black, with warty walls, and are sympodially branched. The dimensions are 45 — 80x3.5 — 4 μ . At the tips of the branches there are 5—7 reverse egg-shaped or mace-shaped sterigmata, 8 — 12 x 4 — 5 μ . The conidia, which are repeatedly formed by the sterigmata, are combined into little heads (in a moist chamber, the heads contain up to 40 conidia, while in a dry chamber the number per head is only 7 — 10). The conidia are either elliptic or elongated and egg-shaped, warty, and black (7 — 14 x 5 — 7.5 μ). The substrate mycelium is very fine (only 1 — 1.5 μ in diameter) and colorless.

3. BIOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CAUSATIVE FACTOR

The author of this communication participated in the work of one of the scientific expeditions (Kamenets — Podil'sk) after the causative factor had been identified. He studied the ecology of *S. alternans*. Mycological literature lists numerous substrates on which this fungus grows.

The author found it many times on cotton grown in Ukraine and Azerbaijan. *S. alternans* decomposer is a vigorous of cellulose and can be grown on artificial media in which pure cellulose represents the only source of carbon.

What were the causes for this sudden mass propagation of *S. alternans* on straw in the Western Ukraine? Many members of the expedition looked with skepticism upon the theory of sabotage, but it was impossible to argue against this theory, because the Soviet government had decreed that the spores of the fungus were spread by "enemies." Under natural conditions *S. alternans* grows on the straw of wheat, rye, oats, and barley, — rarely on pea straw, and very seldom on clover hay. It never occurs on the stems of living plants, but grows profusely on the remnants of harvests. When it propagates on straw, it colors the latter black.

When a horse eats as little as one pound of straw infected with this fungus, it perishes. Some of the experimental horses used by the expedition in Kaments — Podil'sk refused to eat straw infected with *S. alternans*. They suffered from intense hunger and gnawed the mangers and wooden pillars, but did not touch the straw. Apparently they found the flavor of the straw repellent, or possibly it burned their mouths.

The infected straw has no harmful effect on horned cattle. The expedition at Kamenets — Podil'sk fed a bullock with infected straw during a period of over 3 months. The bullock remained perfectly healthy and did not even lose any weight. Sheep also ate the straw without any apparent ill effect. Only horses proved to be sensitive.

4. THE EFFECT OF NATURAL AND AGRICULTURAL CONDITIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FUNGUS

The climatic conditions prevailing in Western Ukraine proved to be very favorable for the development of the fungus. As our laboratory investigations have demonstrated, the development of *S. alternans* shows the following dependence on temperature and humidity:

Temperature: Minimum 2 — 3°C; Optimum 25 — 27°C; Maximum 37 — 40°C;

Relative humidity: Minimum 93 — 95 %; Optimum 99 — 100%.

The high relative humidity required by the fungus exists during the second half of the summer and during the autumn in the Kaments — Podil'sk District, where there are heavy dews, fog, and frequent light rains during this season and these bring the relative humidity of the air to 100%. The fact that the disease appeared in Ukraine after the introduction of kolkhozes is explained by the fact that harvesting under kolkhoz management is done by combines which leave large quantities of

straw lying in the fields. Because of the shortage of manual labor at harvest time, the straw is not collected into stalks for some time and consequently is exposed to the action of the atmospheric moisture, and thus forms favorable substrate for the development of *S. alternans*, the spores of which occur on old straw remaining in the fields and on stubble. On being stalked, the moist straw heats up, with the result that the development of the fungus proceeds more intensely. Accumulations of infected straw gradually develop in the stalks and can be recognized by their black color. A very effective toxin is formed in the straw. This toxin can be easily extracted with ether, alcohol, acetone, or dichlorethane. When a drop of the extract is placed on the skin of a rabbit, a strong burn results.

Although the expedition had collected extensive experimental material, nothing on the subject was published at that time in the Soviet press, but a few years later articles were published by M. Salinov and K. Vertinski.¹

The spores of *S. alternans* are sufficiently resistant to survive environmental conditions. A temperature of 120°C kills them in 1 hour when they are dry and 85°C is lethal to them within 30 minutes in water. In the interior of manure heaps the spores lose their ability to grow within 1 month, but they are preserved on the surface of the manure. The spores of *S. alternans* likewise do not perish in the intestines of horses.

Strains of *S. alternans* which are either toxic or non-toxic occur in nature. These strains do not differ from each other morphologically. Among the toxic strains there are differences in the degree of toxicity.

The members of the expedition were very much interested in the question as to whether toxic strains of *S. alternans* occurred in Western Europe and had produced the disease among horses there. According to Professor Sinev, similar outbreaks of equine disease occurred in Hungary in the middle of the nineteenth century and were described in the literature.

In 1944, while working at the Landwirtschaftliche Forschungszentrale (Agricultural Research Center) at Halbturn near Vienna, Austria, I noticed that heaps of old blackened straw were lying around during the summer in the peasants' fields. I was able to obtain a culture of *S. alternans* from specimens of this straw without any difficulty. I was also able to demonstrate that this culture was just as toxic to horses as cultures of the Ukrainian strain. When an extract was rubbed three times into the lips of a horse, the lips swelled and cracks discharging the characteristic exudate appeared on them.

¹ *Sovietakaya Veterinariya*, 1940 p. 53-56, 61-68.

The absence of the equine disease in Austria is explained by the fact that the peasants do not feed any of the black straw to livestock. Another reason for the absence of the poisoning among horses is the entirely different system of agricultural economy.

The absence of the human disease is due to the higher hygienic standards prevalent among Austrian peasants as compared with Soviet Ukrainian peasants.

To sum up, the equine toxicosis which occurred in Ukraine and has been described above is a result of the climatic peculiarities of Western Ukraine and, what is particularly important, of the kolkhoz system of agriculture rather than of any acts of sabotage, as asserted by the Soviet government. It took many human lives before this horse disease in Soviet Ukraine was scientifically explored. The kolkhoz system brought about conditions for this horse disease; the bestiality of the Soviet administration, however, found victims in thousands of executed Ukrainian peasants suspected of political sabotage.



ANOTHER STAKHANOVITE COW

Following the example of East German and Latvian cows, "Zorka," a Bulgarian cow, has stepped into the limelight. During the recent Soviet-Bulgarian friendship week she gave record milk yields "in honour of Stalin," according to the Bulgarian Communist newspaper "Rabotnicheskoe Delo."

Her farmer-owner was quoted by the paper as saying: "Thanks to Soviet methods, I have succeeded in getting 32 litres of milk a day from my cow Zorka, and that figure is increasing hourly."

THE MODERN NATIONALISM OF THE RUSSIANS

by M. PAVLIUK

The modern Muscovite Russian nationalism is a new phenomenon and it often seems to contradict the often expressed opinion before World War I that the masses of the Muscovite (Great Russian) people were less nationalistic than was the population of any of the other great empires of the world. That is strikingly different to-day.

The revolution of 1917 brought to the Russians the idea of internationalism and this idea fell upon good soil. 1917 was most conducive to the spreading and deepening of the international idea among the masses of the Russians. The people believed that class solidarity would destroy all frontiers and so they turned all their energy to the class struggle in a confused thought that this could not turn out to their disadvantage.

But 1918 and the civil war proved to the Russians that the ideas of a world revolution and of internationalism had met with defeat and the Muscovite Russian people saw themselves confronted with the threat of losing all that part of their territory which was settled by non-Russians. There arose the threat of hunger and this became real in Russian territory, when the grain-rich Ukraine and also the other wheat-producing lands to its east split away. In those years of war the Russians made cardinal changes in their understanding of their national interests. The loud communist and internationalistic propaganda of the Soviet government could not silence the great development of an appreciation of their own interests which now powerfully stirred the whole Russian people to the depths. The real, unfavorable situation, their personal interests were far more powerful than any propaganda. So, at the moment when the old nationalistically inclined ruling groups of tsarist Russia were discredited by the revolution, psychologically isolated and confined within the ranks of the white army, the modern nationalism of the Russians sank its roots deep into the broad masses of the peasants, workmen and citizens.

Thus arose the modern nationalism of the Russians, unformed but strong in its mass character and supported by important economic facts. During the civil war the 65 millions of the Great Russians were con-

fronted with the burning, immediate problem whether to take the side of the national white counter-revolution or the side of the Soviet government. As is known, they chose the latter.

More than 30 years have passed since this new nationalism began to develop. During this period it has passed the long trail of its development in the extraordinarily unique and at times stormy conditions of Soviet reality. Without touching all phases of this process, we will try to give a brief characterization of it at approximately the period of the beginning of World War II under relatively peaceful conditions.

We must emphasize these features:

1. The nationalism of the Muscovite Russians, both at its beginning and before World War II has been based upon the fact that the popular masses have been fully aware of the constant danger of losing their southern and southeastern colonies, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Turkestan, with 65 millions of population and the chief industrial centres, the oil deposits and 50% of the grain of the entire Union.

Although Moscow was able during the civil war to conquer the independence movement in these regions, yet the development of the understanding by the peoples of Ukraine, the Caucasus and Turkestan of their own national interests has quickly and steadily grown and has embraced wider and wider sections of the popular masses.

The gap between the Muscovite Russians and the peoples of these colonies, which was opened during the civil war has deepened and widened for the people of these colonies, have ever more painfully felt how alien and hostile to them has been the Soviet social and economic system, applied by force in their lands.

The Russians understand well that in case of a military conflict they are able to lose these colonies definitely. Their own selfish interest and their constant fear of being expelled from these lands has compelled them to maintain their national unity, to create a national solidarity and to support their Soviet regime.

2. The great danger of the falling apart of the Soviet Union has conditioned the mass character of the national consciousness. This threat is felt not only by certain levels of Russians, the ruling classes, as in tsarist Russia but by the population as a whole, even by the dwellers in the remote regions of the northern forests. It is impossible not to notice that the most nationalistically inclined group are the non-party officials who are the best oriented in the political situation and also most closely connected economically with the Soviet system. Then come the workmen and peasants.

It would be a great mistake to assume that the leading circles of the Russian NKVD and the members of the Communist Party stand

stubbornly on the anti-national Soviet position, as they declare. Whether they are aware of it or not, voluntarily or not, yet living in the surroundings of the nationalistically directed Russian masses, they inevitably pass under the psychological pressure of their intense feeling for their national interests and inevitably the vast majority (but not all) are saturated with Russian nationalism.

3. The mass character of Russian nationalism shows the elementary nature of this movement (for the massiveness of an idea and movement is always elemental) and gives it especial strength. Its elemental character often conditions its incomplete realization of its real character as a movement or moods. The essence of a movement or moods for its adherents can not be fully clear or even fully unclear. This, among other reasons, has definite sense under the conditions of a police regime, where the masses are compelled to declare themselves as fighters for Communism or internationalism.

The Soviet government in critical moments carries on an open nationalistic propaganda as during the civil war or World War II. There is no doubt that it also knows the mass character, the depth and power of this Russian nationalism and expects in case of need to use it for its own interests.

4. The modern Muscovite Russian nationalism arose during the time of social revolution under conditions of a bitter class struggle between the masses of a low cultural level, which at the time showed wonderful savagery. The Communist Party and the Soviet government for many years have been preaching terror and hate for their enemies. There has been spread among the Muscovites a materialistic point of view and the almost complete absence of the humane influences of religion have not favored the ennoblement of Muscovite Russian nationalism.

All these factors working together for a long period have developed Muscovite Russian nationalism in the spirit of totalitarian methods of repression and impoverishment.

The national minorities or "enemies of the people" found no sympathy from the Muscovite Russians during the famine of 1933 nor in the gloomy years of dekurkulizing or in the annihilation of the "enemies of the people." Even now, the Russians are not concerned with the mass exiles of the Ukrainians, the Tatars and certain Caucasian peoples from their native lands — an unprecedented tragedy of totally innocent peoples. On the contrary; the Russians praise the acts of the Soviet government in this direction, for in their opinion, they are the enemies of the Muscovite Russian people.

It is interesting to compare in this aspect the Muscovite nationalism with the nationalism of National Socialist Germany. It is characteristic

that the nationalism of tsarist Russia and the nationalism of the Germany of the Kaisers which were both under the ideological influences of the intelligentsia, the bourgeoisie and the clergy of those lands were, as we now see, comparatively humane, although in their own time they did not satisfy many. When in both lands the nationalism fell under the influence of the laboring and peasant masses, it took in both countries extraordinarily savage forms, although it came under the influence of different ideologies and each went its own way. This development, which we just mention, is of special importance.

A characterization of Russian nationalism would be incomplete, even with the above remarks, if we did not notice its relations to some features of the policy and social composition of the Soviet Union.

The policy of the Soviet government toward the national minorities not only does not contradict Russian nationalism, but it has surpassed all its hopes and dreams. While the Russian tsars for many centuries strove to russify some 5% of the national minorities and those chiefly from the upper classes of the population, the Soviet government has extraordinarily broadened the knowledge of the Russian language among the other peoples of the Union.

While the tsarist regime in the question of the assimilation of the national minorities with the Russians achieved very little on a percentage basis, the Soviet government in the 20 years of its existence has completely assimilated with the Muscovites the small peoples scattered in small islands among the Russian masses. As for the Russian colonies, which under the Soviet constitution are called independent republics, and have millions of inhabitants, (Ukraine itself has 35 millions), in beginning the so called "new course of national policy" the Soviet government is carrying out a total, broad systematic russification and assimilation by methods which never even occurred to the most fanatical russifiers of the tsardom. Every method is employed: the mass destruction of the intelligentsia of the national minorities, the compulsory mass exile of the Ukrainians and other disobedient peoples from their own lands and their scattering on the broad expanses of Siberia, the gradual but systematic destruction of the national cultures of the colonies by a reduction of the number of schools in their own native speech, the compulsory use of Russian as a language of conversation and business, in the army, in all factories, on the railroad, in 90% of the institutions, the fusion with Russian, the sending around of Russian exhibitions, films and the modern Russian popular songs.

The social and economic Soviet system in Muscovy has evoked an unconcealed opposition. This in plain words is the chief point for definite conflicts. During 20 years there have arisen such conflicts now and

again. In 1921 under the pressure of the Russian masses, Lenin was compelled to give up the enforcement of the policy of Communism and to introduce the NEP. Before 1930 the sabotage of the workmen and peasants compelled Stalin to give up his attempts to introduce the Communist system and to proclaim the slogan "Down with equalizing."

The very collectivization of agriculture as a result of the stubborn sabotage of the villagers ended with a compromise. But, even though after the compromise, the sabotage of the peasants was diminished, it still is continuing but in a hidden, less open form.

Muscovite Russian nationalism finds useful to itself the internationalist propaganda, both among the peoples of the Union and on the foreign forum. Therefore, in the Union this propaganda and the corresponding degrees are disintegrating the national consciousness of the national minorities. It not only does not harm the Muscovite Russian nationalism but, on the other hand, it facilitates the assimilation of the other nationalities of the Union with the Muscovite Russians. In the capitalistic countries the same propaganda is weakening their national consciousness and, in union with the propaganda of Communism, is fostering the development of "fifth columns."

The terror in those parts of the Union inhabited by Muscovite Russians was always much weaker than in the colonies. The attitude of the Muscovites toward the terror is of a double nature. They have no definite attitude toward it. For themselves the Muscovites would be gladly rid of it. For the colonies, in their opinion a firm hand is necessary. For themselves the Muscovite Russians would be glad to have a democratic order. In the colonies they realize it would bring catastrophic consequences. All remember the period of the Provisional Government when through this democracy there began the movement toward independence.

This indecision in the attitude toward democracy was reflected in the Vlasov movement where there was a strong tendency to seek as a base the program not of the February but of the October Revolution.

At the end of this analysis of the modern nationalism of the Muscovite Russians, as it was on the eve of World War II, we must call attention to the fact that the old Russian nationalism was usually connected with tsarist officials, military men, clergy, and the Russian intelligentsia. This view is so widespread and rooted in the ideas of many that when the modern nationalism appeared in the old workman's party, in the dirty tunic, in the red sickle, steel helmet, along with the party or comsomol ticket, it was not recognized and in these phenomena people saw only fighters for socialism and communism. Here we have a visible example of the fact that doctrinarianism in politics and economics under

the conditions of a police regime can produce a mass movement contrary to the doctrine.

The modern nationalism of the Muscovite Russians is a new form of the nationalism of tsarist Russia, undisputably corrected and enlarged but in any case no finer but much worse than its predecessor.

We have noticed and briefly characterized some important features of this new Russian nationalism at the time of the beginning of World War II and under peacetime conditions.

War came and brought to Muscovite nationalism the decisive question how to preserve the unity of Soviet Russia and how to increase it, if possible.

The Russians accepted with satisfaction their first successes; the almost peaceful occupation of the Baltic area, Western Byelorussia and Ukraine and Bessarabia. The nationalism of the Muscovites along with the Kremlin felt itself winning in the diplomatic game and waited for further successes from the bloody clash between the nations of the axis and the democratic countries.

The defeat of the Red Army in 1941 and the domination of the Germans on the lands of the Soviet Union divided the nationalism of the Muscovites into two currents. The overwhelming majority of the Muscovite Russians, receiving moral and later material support from the great democratic countries, continued to cooperate with the Soviet government. A smaller part, chiefly among elements with a sharply anti-Communist point of view, decided that the war would result in the ending of the Soviet government.

At the end of the war, when all saw that the defeat of Germany was inevitable, the Muscovite nationalists succeeded in grouping in the so-called Vlasov movement and in acquiring a certain mass character. At the time all were convinced that after the bloody and destructive war both totalitarian regimes had to perish. This conviction united the Russians outside the USSR around Vlasov. Unexpectedly after the capitulation of Germany the international relations took such a shape that not only the followers of Vlasov but many of the other anti-Communists of other nations received from the Soviets a crushing blow. The Soviet government acquired a tremendous influence and actually extended its power in one form or another over half of Western Europe.

Thus the anti-Communist movement of the Russians was annihilated and discredited by the Soviet government. As a result of this extraordinary success, Muscovite Russian nationalism lost an important number of convinced anti-Communists. The unbelievable successes of the policy of the Kremlin threw those who had formerly cooperated with

the Soviet government into a full union of Muscovite Russian nationalism with the monolithic Moscow Soviet people.

Now there has been lost for many years the possibility of driving a wedge between the Communist Party of the Russians and Muscovite Russian nationalism. Besides, the anti-Communist movement of Vlasov compromised itself in the eyes of the Russian masses while the policy of the Kremlin and its adherents gave great profits to Russia. Unity is necessary to hold the newly acquired colonies under their control and Muscovite Russian nationalism has gone elementally and in masses for this unity.

We must see what will be the outcome. It is now 30 years since Muscovite Russian nationalism from fear of losing its colonies for the first time fully became aware of its own national interests. The Russian state extended its frontiers and influence over half of Western Europe and the masses of China, and yet the Muscovite Russians have not lost their fear of the possibility that their empire will fall apart. On the contrary, this fear has been many times intensified for beside their old colonies, Ukraine, the Caucasus, Turkestan, they have acquired a long series of other colonial dependencies in different degrees. All these peoples now subjected to the Kremlin number more than 100 million people and they are the Achilles' heel of the Soviet state and Muscovite Russian nationalism. That is the dynamite which frightens the Russians, lest sooner or later it explode.



FREE CHOICE

Two workers in Prague were discussing Lenin's views on freedom to choose one's own job.

The first said: "In Czechoslovakia nowadays we have no freedom of choice." The second replied: "What do you mean by 'no freedom'? You don't understand simple language. In our country today we can choose between going to work cheerfully and of our own free will in the mines, or going to work in the mines compulsorily."

BOOK REVIEWS

A. A. *Sidorov*. OLD RUSSIAN BOOK ENGRAVING. Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Moscow, 1951. pp. 296.

The great work of A. Sidorov, one of the most prominent contemporary students of printing and engraving, deals with the beginnings of book engraving in eastern Europe, and the largest section deals with engraving in Moscow at the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th centuries. The work is more of a compilation than a piece of original research, as the author suggests on p. 15. We must admit that the general survey is in a great degree marked by scientific objectivity, although in certain passages and in the consideration of certain questions it surprises the reader by its wordiness and its propagandistic and unfounded assertions.

In his survey of bibliography the author in the section on "Soviet Study of Engraving" says that after the well-known works of Rovinsky and Stasov (end of the 19th century) Russian science as a whole had produced no important works which could greatly enrich the entire subject. So also in Soviet times the works of Bush, Hollerbakh, Pakul and Shelgunov "do not give for our subject anything new". Sidorov further writes: "The new began, but... in Ukraine. In Kiev the journal "Bibliographical News" and the Ukrainian Scientific Institute of the Lovers of Books (UNIK) became the centre of a very intensive study of the whole early Ukrainian book and engraving practice (of the 16th and 17th cent.) The works of Prof. S. Maslov and Prof. P. Popov, who published valuable material from Ukrainian engravings, also V. Romanovsky, I. Ohienko, M. Makarenko, V. Sichynsky and M. Holubets, although they have a series of false statements, have still enriched us with a very real (factual) knowledge of a long series of special problems in book engraving." We will make the correction that the authors cited by Sidorov as I. Ohienko, V. Sichynsky and W. Holubets never lived under the Soviets but they worked and published their works in Lviv, in former Poland or further abroad.

In comparing the Ukrainian and Muscovite engraving, Sidorov decides:

"Engraving as a means of illustrating books, did not find in Russia an especial development. Muscovite engraving is sharply contrasted in this point to Ukrainian engraving which by unwearied work, even at a very early period, created many suites, a whole series of illustrations, among which some are mediocre but also very interesting (pp. 24-25). In general the author affirms that engraving in Moscow in the 17th century was significantly less developed than in Ukraine and he pictures only four examples of Muscovite engraving.

The author declares that "Soviet science has developed a high regard for the national cultures of our brother republics." But reality says something different. We will pass over this statement which could be refuted by volumes of facts with the remark that the Ukrainian Scientific Institute of the Lovers of Books in Kiev which Sidorov praises so highly was founded under the Soviet government but was liquidated by it in 1932 and its most prominent scholars were exiled or executed. Now in Kiev there is no research work done on books, printing or en-

graving for it is regarded as a "nationalist diversion." In the same way Sidorov instead of convincing the reading by facts and proofs that Prof. M. Makarenko in Kiev was wrong in his conclusions "combats" him with this argument: "M. Makarenko, taking the position of Ukrainian nationalism, clearly endeavors to depreciate Muscovite school of engraving" (p. 14). As is well known, this distinguished professor because of his protest against the ruination of the Monastery of St. Michael in Kiev which dated from the beginning of the 12th century, was exiled and died in exile in Kazan in 1935. In return the same nationalism but this time in Moscow permits the author to omit entirely facts, documentary conclusions and theories unpleasant to Moscow. Thus for example, he completely omits the writing of Giles Fletcher: *Of the Russe Common Wealth*... commonly called the Emperor of Moskovia (London, 1581), where it is said that the first printing press in Moscow (founded by I. Fedorov and P. Mstislavets) was brought from Poland with the permission of the tsar... But the Muscovite people burned it, at the inspiration of the Muscovite clergy. This act has figured in all works of Russian historians and has been confirmed by other records and facts.

Sidorov devotes a great amount of space to the problem of the first engraving (of St. Luke) in the Muscovite and Ukrainian editions of the 60's—70's of the 16th century. He especially contradicts the work of V. Sichynsky, who showed in 1923 that the frame of this engraving in both Moscow and Lviv was copied from an engraving of the Nuremberg engraver Erhard Shoene, a pupil of the celebrated Duerer and that the signature under Lviv engraving of St. Luke was to be read Lavrenty Fylypovych, a painter and engraver well known in Lviv in the second half of the 16th century. Sidorov cannot contradict this fact but by all kinds of speculative hypothesis and details tries to weaken and devalue what he calls "the German theory" (which has been accepted by many Russian and Ukrainian authors). Sidorov simply states that "the whole theory of copying" is "unacceptable" for us and adds that the Muscovite engraving is the result of "the creative process." If we accept the view of Sidorov "the creativeness" was indeed very photographic and as doubtful as other Russian "discoveries."

In the same way Sidorov does not reject the proofs of V. Sichynsky as to the authorship of the engraving of the Lviv print of 1574 that there was indeed a Ukrainian engraver in Lviv Lavrenty Fylypovych, although he tries to weaken the importance of the documents about this Ukrainian engraver which are known from a lawsuit of the 16th century. (The researches of I. Krypyakevych and M. Holubets). As a background for this fact that the engraver Lavrenty Fylypovych was the maker of the engravings of the Lviv printer I. Fedorovych, Sidorov writes:

"The Ukrainian historian Sichynsky and Ohienko see in this introduction the fact that Fedorovych did not consider himself a sufficiently qualified artist (engraver). They especially do not wish that Fedorovych could teach Hrune (another engraver) engraving."

As to the origin of the printer himself I. Fedorovych, who was called Fedorov in Moscow, Sidorov does not notice the problem of the coat of arms of the printer and does not mention the special study of this by the well-known heraldic scholar V. Lukomsky who has shown that this coat of arms "Ragoza" is a well-known coat of arms of a Byelorussian-Ukrainian family and that from this family came two Kievan Metropolitans Misail (1474-1477) and Mikhail (1589-1599), the latter of whom was a contemporary of the printer I. Fedorovych. (See *I. Fedorov First Printer, Moscow 1935, p. 167*).

For the reader of the free Western world it seems incredible that a scholar should use such cheap and wordy methods in polemics. Instead of giving proofs

and facts to confirm his views and conclusions, he "combats" his opponents by charges of foreign "intrigue" or that "it is not fitting" or by smearing his opponents as belonging to a certain national conception which at the moment is being persecuted by police methods.

A number of such scholarly unworthy cases stain and devalue this great work of A. Sidorov which could otherwise be considered one of the most valuable works in the field of the history of printing and engraving in eastern Europe.

V. S. SICHYNSKY

THE ELECTION TO THE RUSSIAN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF 1917.

By Oliver Henry Radkey, Fellow on Slavic Studies, Hoover Institute 1947-1948. Cambridge 1950. Harvard University Press. (Harvard Historical Monographs XXI).

The election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in the fall and winter of 1917 is regarded by the author as "the one real election in the experience of the Russian people — real, that is, in the sense that it was a fundamentally free election, contested by definitely organized and sharply divergent parties, on the basis of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage." As is known, the effects of this election, organized against all customary Russian political traditions, were shortlived. The Russian Bolshevik party, second in strength and in minority, simply dissolved the democratic Constituent Assembly by force after a single session on January 5, 1918 (Jan. 18 according to the new calendar) thus turning the tide of Russian history back to its traditionally undemocratic channel.

Mr. Radkey has made a detailed study of all available electoral statistics, especially from the two principal sources: the work of N. V. Sviatitski, and the Soviet archives of the October Revolution. He has compared them and in many cases made important additions or corrections. On the basis of this material he has given a clear picture of the political and national circumstances in the Russian Empire just before its collapse, and its new restoration this time by the Bolsheviks.

The Constitutional Democrats sustained a "dreadful beating" in the Russian camp, and the main fight took place within the revolutionary camp of the Socialists. The principal institutions of Old Russia, the monarchy and church, revealed their weakness along with the lack of a strong national Russian consciousness. "The weakness of Great Russian nationalism, — writes Mr. Radkey, — contrasts markedly with the spirit of lesser ethnic groups (with this term the author indicates the non-Russian peoples of the Russian Empire — S. H.), now released from the restraints imposed by tsarism and asserting their separate identity — often, it would seem, with more vigor than validity. The five million votes obtained in the clear by various Ukrainian lists constitute an impressive showing from any point of view, and must be augmented by at least another half million votes as the Ukrainian share of the joint lists agreed with other parties. However one may estimate the strength of Ukrainian separatism, no one can deny that Little Russian (sic!—no such group was known to take part in the election — S. H.) particularism had real force behind it."

The statistics quoted by the author are of extreme interest as they can help us to determine the main power responsible for Bolshevism. Mr. Radkey's statement that the Bolsheviks could muster only one fourth of the electorate under their banner is only relatively true. If we subtract from the 703 elected deputies 81 Ukrainians and 77 other non-Russians who voted not only anti-Bolshevik but

anti-Russian as well, we find the internal Russian front with 377 Russian deputies against 168 Russian Bolsheviks, — this means that the proportion of Russian Bolsheviks is far greater. More important still is the fact that the Bolshevik strength was centered in the very brain of the Russian Empire, where the intellectual, political and economic life was concentrated. In the city of Petrograd the Bolsheviks received 424,000 votes from the total of 942,000 (229,000 out of 462,000 in the Province of Petrograd). In the city of Moscow from the total of 746,000 votes 366,000 were red, (in Moscow Province 377,000 out of 597,000 were red). These numbers show that about one half of the Russians in the two cities and their provinces voted red, and that the Bolshevik party was the strongest in comparison with a dozen or so other scattered Russian parties. In Tver and Vladimir in central Russia the Bolsheviks gained even more than 50% of the votes. Having the bolshevized brain on their side, the quantitative differences in other parts of Russia had only a secondary meaning for the Bolsheviks. Only in the non-Russian territories were they compelled to conduct a true war: this was the fact in Ukraine, where the Bolsheviks secured only a miserable amount of votes. Having the Bolshevized brain on their side, the quantitative differences in clearly show how the heart of Russia was won over to the criminal Soviet regime, and why the term "Russian Bolshevism" means exactly what it is.

Mr. Radkey might say that it is not the aim of the statistician to draw such conclusions. If so, where does his contradictory position in Ukrainian and other non-Russian matters come in? On the one hand the author agrees that after the 7:2 Ukrainian victory in Ukraine "it is simply not possible to contend that the Ukrainian movement was a weak and artificial thing, concocted by a group of hypernationalistic intellectuals", while on the other hand and on the same page, he endeavors to convince the American reader that the "Little Russian (sic!) peasantry followed the lead of the intellectuals," which, however, does not mean "that they desired the independent statehood" and that "Little Russian particularism is not necessarily identical with Ukrainian separatism." The historical facts show how unfair Mr. Radkey is. It was the Ukrainian Army composed of peasants with a small percent of peasant-born intellectuals that built the Ukrainian Independent State, and defended it for almost four years against the Red (also the White) Russians. The author mentions in the preface that Prof. Karpovich (now of Harvard University) read his book and made "suggestions and corrections" in it. He certainly did not do it to the detriment of Russian interests. But why did not the author seek advice from a Ukrainian on Ukrainian matters if only for the sake of scientific truth?

This book will be of interest to those who wish to understand the real beginnings of Russian Bolshevism, as well as of special use to those who plan to begin the future liberation of Ukraine with plebiscites and other such ventures. The study of this book may spare them many a bump on their disillusioned heads.

S. HORDYNSKY

Peter A. Struve. *SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF RUSSIA*. Paris, 1952. pp. 386.

Peter B. Struve, a distinguished Russian historian and statesman, died in the emigration in Paris in 1944. It is unfortunate that he did not live to complete this work which has now been published from his notes in an incomplete form, for it shows him to have been a historian — of high merit as well as an excellent synthesizer of Russian history.

As this book was written abroad, the author often compares the past of Russia with its present and he has come to the conclusion that the Bolshevik revolution in Russia has its roots deep in the past of the Russian people. "The roots of the Russian revolution," he says in the preface, — "are deeply imbedded in certain basic facts and processes of Russian history." ... "The roots of the Russian revolution are planted in the terrible backwardness of Russia and its socialist revolution in the 20th century is a grandiose reaction of the local forces" (pp. 6-7).

It is important that while many Russian historians want to see in the Communist revolution in Russia a Western influence which passed from lands of highly developed industry to an agrarian country and produced such a revolution in an undeveloped Russia, Struve on the contrary believes that "*the Bolshevik revolution and the Bolshevik rule is a social and political reaction of the egalitarian depths against the century-long social and economic Europeanization of Russia*" (p. 19). This is the reason why the Kremlin has completely turned against the entire Western world and is trying to activate the social and economic forces by emphasizing the real and factitious creative possibilities of the Russian people.

Struve, like the majority of Russian historians of the old school, in time and territory identifies the history of Russia with that of the Ukrainian and Bvelorussian peoples, even though he emphasizes many historical facts which produce the logical conclusion that we are dealing not with one history but with the histories of at least three and possibly four peoples.

He emphasizes the close union "of the oldest Kievan period of the history of Russia" with the west in contradiction to the Muscovite period which stood close to Asia and he does not notice that the Kievan state with its centre at Kiev in the south near the Black Sea had been for centuries in close contact with Hellenic culture and that this had brought the character of the Ukrainian people close to Western culture which was based upon the classical Greek pattern. The author stresses the freedom-loving attitude of ancient Kiev which in the very beginning of the Moscow state was lacking in the Suzdal principality of the 12th century and he forgets that Kievan Rus-Ukraine was essentially a Slavic country, while the principality of Suzdal had a greatly mixed population ethnically.

He also finds in the Suzdal of the 12th century that type of administration of subordinate lands which was later applied by the tsars to Novgorod the Great and the other conquered territories (as now by Stalin). He lays especial stress upon the Suzdal-Moscow practice of resettling entire tribes after their conquest.

Like the present Soviet historians, Struve emphasizes the actually non-existent unity of Rus from the Black to the White Seas in the earliest centuries of history of old Rus, although he brings forward many facts which cast doubts upon his statements.

He has trouble not only with the Ukrainian south but also with the Russian north in the case of Novgorod the Great. In his opinion Novgorod formed a national unity with Moscow in the 13-14 centuries, although all historical facts show that the people of Novgorod were a separate non-Russian people and were assimilated with Moscow only through methods of resettlement and rigid and merciless administration.

Struve has also some interesting ideas on the treatment of the Polovtsy by the old Rus-Ukraine and of the Tatars by Moscow and by these ideas he tries to explain why Kiev was overthrown by the steppe horde and Moscow survived.

He also pays a great deal of attention to the attitude of the Tatars toward the culture of Moscow and toward the Orthodox Church. From the first years

of their rule of the Moscow lands, the Tatars treated the Orthodox Church with a certain respect. The clergy were not even enrolled in the list of taxpaying persons. The Orthodox Church used this privileged position of the clergy to aid in strengthening the government of the Grand Prince and in the emancipation from the Tatar regime. The role of the Church in the Moscow state was closely connected with the rule of the state and the Church was constantly at the service of the government of the Grand Prince.

Starting with the national unity of Kievan Rus, Struve tries to find the causes for the rise of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian nationalities. He greatly simplifies this question for he finds the one cause to be the Polish control of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian territories. This is a definite over-simplification for we know that the Polish rule did not produce the cooperation of the two cultures but rather a cultural struggle which was marked by the Ukrainian and Byelorussian rejection of everything Polish. On the other hand, he omits other factors as the division of old Rus into three nationalities, i. e. the different ethnic composition of the population, and the different cultural influences from prehistoric times which created the different world outlooks of the Ukrainians and the Muscovites.

He discusses at length the reasons why Moscow and not one of the other principalities as Tver or Ryazan became the leader of the lands of the Russian people. To argue this he brings forward not only arguments of an economic or social nature, but he stresses especially the sense of the Moscow princes in relying upon the Church and with its aid in gaining the dominant position over all the Muscovite territories.

Besides these problems which are fundamental in the growth of the Muscovite tsardom the author pays attention to the growth of the Moscow system of the serfdom of the peasants and he gives his own ideas on the question of feudalism in the old Kievan state. These questions continually interested the historians of eastern Europe before the revolution and they do still more now as a result of the great social changes produced by the Bolshevik revolution.

Although this book of Struve's supports the old imperialistic theory of the history of eastern Europe, which erroneously saw in the empire of the tsars a single nation, the deep historical analysis of the author and his keen synthesis of history gives the reader many new ideas as to the history of that eastern Europe which Struve persistently calls by the name of Russia.

NICHOLAS CHUBATY.

Clarence A. Manning. *THE FORGOTTEN REPUBLICS*. New York, Philosophical Library, 1952. Pp. 264.

The Baltic Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia form the subject of this latest book of Professor Manning. We must be astonished how in the space of 264 pages the author has been able to give most important facts on the history of the Baltic from the most ancient times to the present, on the language and literature of the Baltic peoples, the social and economic question connected with the area and especially the policy of these states and their neighbors. It well justifies the statement that the author has skilfully learned the art "of saying a great deal in a few words."

The western world at the end of World War I looked at the question of the Baltic through the eyes of German and Russian scholars and statesmen, and more rarely through those of Swedes or Poles, and most rarely through those of

the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians themselves. The securing of independence for the peoples after World War I and the subsequent rapid flowering of their own science and culture brought the Baltic problems before a broad public forum in their real and direct lighting. Of the literature of the subject listed by Professor Manning, half is the product of Baltic authors. This book by the American scholar has been written from the point of view of the Baltic peoples and it is thereby valuable for the reader. The author has carried out this point of view consistently by giving the native geographical names of rivers and cities and the names of historic figures in Lithuanian, Latvian or Estonian and not in the Russian, German or Polish forms. (Nemunas and not Niemen or Nieman, Vilnius and not Wilno or Wilna, Tartu and not Dorpat, etc. and likewise Grand Prince Jogaila and not Jagiello, Radvilas and not Radziwill, Gediminas, Algirdas, Kiestutis and not Gedymin, Olgierd and Kiejstut, etc.). Other authors should adopt this practice and not use alien geographical and historical names introduced by conquerors and unused by the native population.

The long-continued, bitter, stubborn and also unequal struggle of the Baltic peoples against invaders from the West (the crusaders, and later the Germans) and from the East (the old white Moscow, and now the red) fills the entire history of the Baltic. The characteristic and unique relations with Sweden and Poland, which were also not profitable for the local peoples, exhaust the history of the Baltic, not only the history of external relations but also the social and national influences on the internal life.

In reading carefully this extraordinarily interesting book, we find a few passages which might show the work was written hurriedly. In the first place much too little is said about the nearest neighbors of the Lithuanians, the Byelorussians, and their mutual relationship in the remote and recent past. In the section on the thirties in the 20th century, there is a detailed account of Estonian developments, while there is only a general picture of the same period in Latvia and Lithuania. The author treats politely the incident on the Polish-Lithuanian border in March 1938 without trying to decide whether it was a case of Polish provocation or an accidental act, although the entire world had and has its definite idea about this „incident“ which led to the exchange of ministers and not ambassadors as is said on p. 204. In the enumeration of the cultural achievements of the Baltic peoples during the two decades of their independence, he might have added the preparation and introduction of the native Latvian civil code in 1937. Latvia was the one state which arose after World War I that succeeded in working out before World War II its own civil code which was on a high level from a juridical point of view. Naturally it is no longer in force, for it has been replaced by the civil code of the RSFSR. In mentioning the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR approved in 1940, it might have been said that it foresaw on a limited scale and temporarily the possibility of small private industrial enterprises and comparatively large agricultural divisions under private use, whereas the Constitutions of the UkSSR and of the Byelorussian SSR when extended to the territories annexed to the Soviet Union at the expense of Poland foresaw no deviations from the Constitutions in force in the territory of the USSR.

This work of Professor Manning is valuable for the Ukrainians. He frequently mentions Ukraine in the historical section (the Kievan state, the Galician-Volynian state, the unions of Krevo, Horodlo and Lublin, the revolt of Khmelnytsky, Vyhovskiy and Mazepa. In the history of the 19th century, he refers to the sad episode of the Valuev edict of 1876, which imposed through the tsarist government the same unendurable yoke upon the Baltic peoples as it did upon the Ukrainians.

Again in dealing with the most recent periods and speaking of the armed opposition of the Baltic peoples to the Bolsheviks, he mentions the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

In the book we read that the union of the Baltic states to the USSR has not yet been recognized by the American government. Ministers of the national governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia still function in Washington.

The position of Ukraine and the Ukrainians in the past and present is very similar to that of the Baltic peoples. For that reason the Ukrainians follow with keen interest the appearance of every book which has the purpose of aiding the attempts to liberate their friends, the Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians. The volume of Professor Manning is such a work.

YURI FEDYNSKY

N. N. Nikolayev. *THE EASTERN RITE*. Paris, YMCA Press, 1950, pp. 335.

This book is the work of the legal adviser of Dionysy, Metropolitan of the Orthodox Church in Poland, who was expelled from the territory of the Polish State for his excessively pro-Russian position in ecclesiastical questions which the Polish government was trying to arrange by the setting up of an Autocephalous Polish Orthodox Church, in which it could have perhaps the decisive voice. Nikolayev was against this autocephalous movement and tried to maintain the unity of the Orthodox of Poland with the Patriarchate of Moscow.

The book of Nikolayev is mainly devoted to the relations between the Catholic Church, especially the Vatican and the Catholic mission in Russia. Although he devotes the greatest space to the most recent aspects of Catholic-Orthodox relationships in the USSR, Poland and Rome, he gives a long survey of Catholic-Orthodox relations in eastern Europe, although he does so in a prejudiced manner. He shows a great knowledge of the facts of ancient and modern history, although his arguments support the exclusive Russian point of view.

For example, he constantly identifies the interests of Catholicism in the east with the national interests of Poland. This was the interpretation given by the old Russian historians to the Union at Brest of the Ukrainian Church with Rome and to the other examples of Catholic-Orthodox relations. In fact this was not true and the interests most frequently clashed.

In coming to the modern phases of Catholic-Orthodox relations between the two World Wars, he tells with unusual consciousness the facts of the Catholic-Orthodox relations in Rome, Poland and the USSR. He knows thoroughly the position of the Ukrainian Catholics in this question, especially the role of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, whom he mentions favorably. He has carried his account of the Catholic-Orthodox contacts in Eastern Europe down to the creation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in 1942 and the new occupation by the Bolsheviks of the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia.

Although his book is obviously partisan, yet it gives very valuable information on the church question. This material, if scattered in the daily press of the period 1918-1944, would surely have been lost. By incorporating it in one volume, Nikolayev has done a great service to Church history. The future student of this period will have the collected material of these stormy years, even though he may not agree with the position of the author.

HISTORICUS

SOVIET COMMUNISM OR RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

(Symposium at the Notre Dame University)

The Committee on International Relations of the University of Notre Dame organized December 11, 1952 its second Symposium which dealt with the theme: *Who is the Enemy — Soviet Communism or Russian Imperialism*. Prof. N. S. Timasheff of Fordham University read the address on the theme *The Difference between Tsarist and Soviet Policies*; Dr. Michael Pap associated with the Committee spoke on *The Ukrainian Problem*.

Richard E. Pipes of the Russian Centre at Harvard treated the problem *The Moslems and the Soviet Union*; Wiktor Weintraub also of Harvard spoke on the topic of *Soviet Cultural Imperialism in Poland*. The last address by Prof. Frederick Barghoorn *Nationalism in the Soviet Union* completed this heavy program of a one day session at the Symposium.

Discussions were directed partially by the President of the University Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., and partially by Prof. Waldemar Gurian, director of the Notre Dame Committee of International Relations.

The Symposium was attended by several prominent guest historians and experts in political sciences from Chicago, New York and Notre Dame. The auditorium was filled to capacity by students of the University, who with great interest listened to the addresses and discussions. Representing the Ukrainian Shevchenko Society in USA were Prof. Roman Smal-Stocky of Marquette University and Dr. Nicholas Chubaty, Editor of the *Ukrainian Quarterly*; both made almost supplementary addresses touching upon the historical and political background of the Symposium's main question.

The Notre Dame Symposium demonstrated that the Russian Imperialism is the main enemy of the free world. It exploits the universal appeal of communism to the common masses of the world in order to achieve its own purposes — the Russian domination over the whole world.

Almost all speakers broached the different viewpoints in the situation of Ukraine in the Soviet Union emphasizing the importance of Ukraine in the new post-Soviet order of Eastern Europe.

The technical and scholarly arrangement of the Symposium was in the hands of the very active Professor W. Gurian, the Editor of the *The Review of Politics*, a journal which under his direction became one of the finest university journals of this character.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

"MR. PRESIDENT," by William Hillman. From the Personal Diaries, Private Letters etc. of Harry S. Truman, 1952, New York.

Several recent and exceedingly illuminating comments and reflections of President Truman on the nature of the mortal danger threatening America and the free world demonstrate the keen perceptiveness and insight with which he has grasped the problem, in addition to the breadth of his historical understanding. From his diaries, letters and other sources of material one gathers the following impressive observations derived from a felicitous combination of knowledge and wisdom. For example, on page 82 of this interesting compilation, he declares that "When you try to conquer other people or extend yourself over vast areas you cannot win in the long run. Take some recent history. Hitler wanted to control the whole of Europe, just as Napoleon did... When Hitler went to Russia, he showed he didn't know his history well enough... If he hadn't invaded, he might have won something, perhaps, because the Ukrainians and the White Russians wanted to join Hitler, but he treated them like dogs and slaves. He looked on them as an inferior people. And he paid for that. The Russians today foolishly think that we are imperialistic and want to conquer their land. The very opposite is true. They are the imperialists."

At another point he observes that "There are three forces at work in the world today. There is Russian imperialism—and it isn't much different from the Czarist imperialism... Then there is the international Communist conspiracy, which Russian imperialism uses to inflame resurgent fanatical nationalisms ((pp. 83-84)." A significant comment is that "I have several histories of Russia—not one of which has been satisfactory. Most of them are based on ideas that were formed before the man started his book and are not based on facts (p. 232)." Within their contexts these excerpts evince a warm appreciation of the struggle for independence and self-government carried on by such non-Russian nations as the Ukrainian and Byelorussian, and it is hoped that the President-elect possesses a similar appreciation and perception with respect to East Europe.

"NTS — THE RUSSIAN SOLIDARIST MOVEMENT," by the External Research Staff. Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, December 10, 1951, Washington, D. C.

The undisputed fantasies of the Russian NTS have long been disclosed in the pages of this journal, but it is always refreshing to review sources of confirmation such as this external research paper manifestly represents. The unnamed author of this analysis is unquestionably well versed in matters pertaining to the *fata morgana* of this small group. In tracing the origins and development of the Russian Solidarist movement he clearly demonstrates its imitation of Mussolini's Italian model of corporatism. In the Russian emigration apparently the "only

group with which lasting ties were established was the Russian Fascist Union . . .," a like unto like proposition for the NTS. The role of the NTS in the plans of German intelligence during the last war is minutely described, and affirms further the natural affinity of this totalitarian group to fascist ideology. With the imminence of German defeat the NTS is portrayed in one of its characteristic antics for, as the author explains, "NTS began to claim that it had contacts with the British—a claim which, like so many others from NTS, was shown to be nothing more than bluff."

It is most significant that this supposedly tremendous and gigantic organization consists of "no more than some 400 members." For its appeal to defectors and Soviet emigres it is equally significant that at present "only one single postwar deserter is known to be an NTS member, and one other is a fellow-traveler of NTS." As some ridiculously naive magazines in America can well profit by, the writer emphasizes that "Such Allied organizations as have tried to capitalize on the NTS claims for widespread contacts with recent defectors—be it governmental agencies or other interview projects—have come to realize that NTS cannot produce the promised bodies." The author pulls no punches when he bluntly asserts that the NTS, "without regard for facts . . . , has claimed for itself a variety of underground activities in the USSR" . . . , and it scarcely speaks well for the publications involved to learn that "NTS representatives publish extravagant 'reports' in such varied publications as the Christian Science Monitor, Reader's Digest, and A. F. of L. Federationalist." The imperialistic, anti-Semitic, and fascist positions of this loud but politically buffoonish group are articulately described.

"THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CAUCASIAN REPUBLICS," an editorial. *The Caucasus*, organ of independent national thought, May, 1952, Munich, Germany.

This important publication of the Caucasian peoples, issued monthly in English, Turkish and Russian, contains authoritative articles and comments that provide an excellent background to readers unfamiliar with the historic struggles of these several non-Russian nations for national independence. This past May Caucasians everywhere celebrated the thirty-fourth anniversary of the independence of the Caucasian Republics for, as is accurately pointed out here, in "May 1918, to the thunderclaps of war and revolution, North Caucasus (on the 11th), Georgia (26th), Azerbaidjan and Armenia (28th) proclaimed their independence and began a new life." However, although enjoying the democratic support of their respective peoples through due electoral processes and participating in the peace conference in Paris, these Republics succumbed before the imperialist hordes of Russia and a new tyranny was initiated under the deceptive cloak of Communism. The past thirty-one years of undying resistance to Russian Bolshevik domination serve as eloquent testimony to the inextricable position of these non-Russian nations on the issue of national independence.

The editorial takes to task the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, then headed by Admiral Kirk, "for ignoring the will and the history of the non-Russian peoples" by supporting "a nebulous formula for the future organization of the 'peoples of Russia'." The arguments propounded are sound and historically justified. More, they have served to demonstrate the fact that the non-Russian peoples are not to be pressured by money, power or any other means at the cost of their basic principles.

"THE SOVIET DRIVE FOR WORLD DOMINATION OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE," by Roman Smal-Stocky. Proceedings of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, Vol. 1, New York-Paris, 1952.

These proceedings of the philological section in the world-renown Shevchenko Scientific Society represent a solid contribution to scholarship in the science of philology. The publication itself is superlative in quality, and contains papers dealing with a rich variety of philological subject matter largely pertinent to the Ukrainian language. One of these papers presented by a leading Slavistics scholar treats systematically of the bases of the Soviet drive for world domination of the Russian language. Taking the article by Prof. M. Kammari, "An Outstanding contribution to the Science of Marxism" as the defining basis of the current party line in the nationality and linguistics fields, the writer masterfully dissects this latest output of Soviet rationalization by which "Russian Communism attempts to hide the really crushing defeat of its own nationality and language policy, which ended with the revocation of Marr's linguistic theory in June, 1950." His analysis of the political ramifications of this entire phenomenon is salutary and convincing.

"CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL EUROPE" a survey. The Christian Democratic Union of Central-Europe, 1952, New York.

The diverse background and developments of the various Christian Democratic parties in Central and East Europe are presented in succinct and instructive form in this brochure, issued by this united organization of exiled Christian Democrats. It is actually a compilation of short but compact articles written by the respective leaders of each of the countries represented with evident expertness and command of subject matter. As stressed by Magr. Joseph Kozi Horvath, the chairman of the Union, the group has a two-fold aim: "(1) Liberation of the countries and peoples behind the Iron Curtain from the yoke of Moscow and communism, and (2) Laying the foundations of the future political, economic and social life of the liberated countries and peoples in the spirit of the basic principles of Christian Democracy." These aims are beyond question of doubt constructive in nature and acceptable to all right-thinking individuals.

The one vital question that arises concerns the scope of application of these principles. When it is asserted that only "respect for and enforcement of these God-given rights will enable this area, squeezed in between the seas of German and Russian peoples, to be a brotherly community of sovereign nations within a hoped-for United Europe," is it understood that Ukraine, the largest non-Russian nation in Central and East Europe, and other non-Russian nations in the southern periphery of the Soviet Union will be given the opportunity to attain to national independence and sovereignty as an indispensable pre-condition to a general reconstruction of Europe along federal or confederal lines?

"THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH OF ETHNIC PROBLEMS," a report. Slovak Newsletter, October 1952, Middletown, Pa.

This past August a three-day meeting in Merano, Italy by members of this Institute which was fostered by the Italian Ministry of Education and in which the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is keenly interested. The chairman of this conference was J. E. Lazoraitis of Lithuania, and in attendance were several

Italian and German diplomats. One of the concrete results of the meeting was the formation of a committee to study the issue of nationalities. Representing Ukraine on the committee is Dr. Fedoronzuk. Others represented include Poland, Bohemia, Slovakia, Byelorussia, Slovenia, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia and Italy. From all reports this Institute is deemed to be quite promising.

"VOYAGE TO FREEDOM," a true story in popular form. Lithuanian American Information Center, 1952, New York.

Capitalization on the practical advantages of comic strip outlay, this exceptionally well done narration of real adventure, experienced by three young Lithuanian seafarers in their escape from Russian Communist tyranny, is novel and poignant. The chances are that the whole moral of the story will be more impressively conveyed through this means than that of mere literary prose. It is veritably an excellent model for others to follow.

"A FORMER SOVIET CITIZEN SPEAKS," interview report no. 4 Office of Intelligence Research, August 1, 1952, Department of State, Washington, D. C.

The former Soviet citizen who speaks for this report in a series of interviews is by nationality a Ukrainian who in 1945 volunteered for repatriation to the Soviet Union and was inducted into the Soviet Army, only to have defected later because, in addition to other causal factors, he had come into contact with the higher standard of living in the West. This is an extremely interesting and enlightening interview covering the range of subject matter of the man-made famine of 1931-1933, the mistreatment and suspicion with which he met upon his repatriation, the idiocy of German brutality toward Western Ukrainians during the war, and the resistance of Ukrainians generally to the Soviet regime. He avers that if the Americans came today the "Ukrainians would raise them on their shoulders... They want their independence more now than ever." According to him, "Bandera partisan units are still operating and committing minor acts of sabotage as blowing up bridges and murdering Communist officials." These are the observations of a Ukrainian who in contrast to hundreds of thousands of others volunteered for repatriation.

"THE KREMLIN SPEAKS," publication 4264. Department of State, October 1951, Washington, D. C.

As part of the European and British Commonwealth series, this release contains leading excerpts from statements made by the governing officials of the Soviet Union regarding world aims, Soviet plans, techniques and ethics, and individual freedom and international cooperation. For the general reader many of these excerpts are self-explanatory and conclusive. However, it is apparent that inadequate treatment is given to those containing references to the basic nationalities question in the Soviet Union. For instance, an excerpt of Stalin's speech in 1922, as reported by Pravda and which rested on the world-divided-into-two-camp thesis, reads as follows: "In the camp of capitalism we have imperialists, war, national entity, oppression, colonial slavery, and supernationalism. In the camp of Soviets, the camp of socialism, on the contrary, we have mutual confidence, national equality, and the peaceful co-existence and fraternal collaboration of people." Instead of driving hard into this patently false position and demonstra-

ting with only a few determining general facts that a reversal of this double-talk or Soviet dialectics brings us to the kernel of truth, it is quietly and meekly asserted, "Thus the Soviets artificially and dogmatically divided the world into two irreconcilable parts . . ." Very illuminating to say the least, but not for the purpose of effective countervailing propaganda, especially when the truth is our most potent ally.

SLAVISTICA.

Five years ago, on August 19, 1947, in Augsburg, Germany an Institute of Slavistics of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences was established to commemorate the memory of the famous Ukrainian scholar and academician Stephen Smal-Stocky, who died 10 years before.

The Institute is publishing its proceedings "*Slavistica*" as a series of non-periodical publications relating to Slavic languages, literatures, cultures, ethnography, archeology etc., with special attention given to the problems of the Eastern Slavic world. The editor-in-chief is Prof. J. B. Rudnycky of Manitoba University.

Till now there appeared 17 issues as: W. Kirkconnell, *Common English Loanwords in E. European Languages*, Winnipeg 1952; G. W. Simpson, *The names: Rus, Russia, Ukraine and their historical background*, W. 1951; R. Smal-Stocky, *The Origin of the word "Rus"*, W. 1949; V. Chaplenko, *The language of "Slovo o Polku Ihorevi,"* W. 1950; L. Sydoruk, *The Problem of the Ukrainian White-Ruthenian Lingual Boundary*, Augsburg 1948; V. J. Kaye-Kysilevsky, *Slavic Groups in Canada*, Winnipeg 1951; J. B. Rudnycky, *Slavica Canadiana* A. D. 1951, W. 1952 and others.

All these works are valuable contributions to American Slavistics.

SOVIET DIFFICULTIES IN UKRAINE, by Michael Pap, *The Review of Politics*. Vol. 14, No 2. Notre Dame.

Simultaneously the American historical-political literature got two works on Ukraine: the fundamental work by John Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution* and a treatise on *Soviet Difficulties in Ukraine*, by Michael Pap. Dr. Pap's work treats the period following the Ukrainian Revolution, the period of Soviet regime in Ukraine.

After the Communization of Ukraine the first step which deeply disappointed the Ukrainian communists was the appointing in 1921 of officers for the Communist Party of Ukraine by Moscow. The convention of the Ukrainian Communist Party simply decided to send the appointed officers back to Moscow.

Shortly, however, (1922) the Soviet Union was established and the pressure of Moscow became tighter. After the trial of the League for Liberation of Ukraine (1930) an open persecution of Ukrainian political and cultural life began. But inspite of the iron fist of Postyshev, the Moscow governor of Ukraine, the revolutionary nationalist movement developed widely. For the Ukrainian communists as Khyvylovy, Skrypnyk, Lyubchenko there was no exist but suicide.

World War II did not improve the Ukrainian Moscow relations; Ukraine became a country behind the Iron Curtain with continuous purges of anti-Communist elements.

Pap's work is based on the first hand Ukrainian and Russian materials which skillfully were exploited by the author. This topic is almost by-passed in American historical literature.

L. E. D.

