Overview of military capabilities

Je me réjouis du solide résultat obtenu dans l’identification du besoin militaire pour la conduite de
nos opérations, en ligne avec l’approche qualitative de l’objectif global 2010. Cependant, des
lacunes continuent à exister. Il faut que les nouveaux outils que nous développons nous servent à
combler effectivement ces lacunes. Il nous appartiendra de donner toute l’attention et l’impulsion
politique à ce processus.

En ce qui concerne les groupements tactiques, les travaux conceptuels ont progressé. Lors de la
conférence de coordination du 9 novembre, nous avons pu confirmer les offres indicatives pour les
périodes à venir ainsi que les engagements de principe couvrant également nos besoins jusqu’en
2009. Le dernier créneau pour 2007 a été couvert et j’en remercie la Grèce, la Bulgarie, la Roumanie
et Chypre. Enfin, au-delà de 2009 certaines indications initiales ont été données. Dans l’ensemble,
nous avons des engagements fermes pour 18 groupements tactiques.

La vision militaire à long terme est un sujet auquel j’attache une grande importance. C’est une suite
naturelle à la Stratégie européenne de sécurité qui lui donne son cadrage. Je vais donc suivre ces
travaux avec beaucoup d’attention et je note avec plaisir que tous les acteurs compétents sont
impliqués dans cet exercice complexe et essentiel à un développement de capacités adaptés aux
besoins de demain.

Comprehensive Planning

A comprehensive approach in crisis management is a necessity - all the more so in the dynamic
security environment in which we live, where threats are diffuse and complex and defy traditional
ways of operating. More than other actors, the EU has the ability to bridge the world of diplomats,
soldiers and development experts.

We have been developing a coherent and comprehensive EU approach to crises, more through the
conduct of actual operations than by conceptual drafting. Effective action requires a range of
civilian and military tools to address both the causes and consequences of a crisis. It also requires
that these instruments are employed coherently in pursuit of a clear political objective. clearly, a
unity of purpose and effort is required by all EU actors to ensure that this is the case.

We have to think about our structures and whether they satisfy the requirement for being truly
comprehensive and offer the best response to our new challenges. The Heads of state and
government mandated me in Hampton Court to study possible improvements. I will come back with

Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Security Sector Reform is a growing necessity and activity worldwide. The EU is already involved
in supporting SSR through different activities. Of course, many Member States are also involved in
bilateral SSR activities.

Support to SSR may be provided directly as through the EUSEC mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). This relatively small mission has garnered achievements that are
well in excess of its size. It is involved in providing strategic as well as practical advice and
assistance, mainly to the Congolese Defence Ministry and army, with the main objective of
contributing to a successful integration of the Congolese army.

I appreciate that Member States have already given significant support but I urge you to continue to
engage with our very important mission in DRC and, further, to consider identifying and providing
experts in SSR and DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration) and the other financial
and material resources that will be required in future.

Military Operations

 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

I would like to present the main recommendations I have made in the Second Mission Review
Report on Operation ALTHEA, namely:

 EUFOR should retain its current tasks for the coming six months and the force levels should
not be reduced until the outcome of the elections in BiH in October 2006 can be taken into

 To strengthen EU support to the rule of law in BiH and to achieve a greater effect of the
support to the fight against organised crime, the EU Special Representative (EUSR), EUFORand EUPM will deepen their cooperation. The revised mandate of the EUSR, a more pro-active
mandate of the EUPM follow-on mission as well as appropriate structures and resources for this
mission will allow EUFOR to hand over to the EUPM its operational coordinating role and its
task to assist the local law enforcement agencies in operational planning. The transfer of
responsibilities will be a gradual process, as EUPM’s capabilities are building up. EUFOR will
remain engaged providing support when requested by EU actors and BiH authorities. Results of
increased co-operation between EUFOR and EUPM can already be seen on the ground.

 The Operation Commander will conduct pre-planning in order to enable a potential swift
adjustment of EUFOR to the situation on the ground after the October 2006 elections.

Based on the above, I would like to thank Member States for their support to the EU Military
Operation in BiH and to urge the need for continued backing. We must keep EUFOR’s
operational capacity well in sight. I invite all Member States to consider further military or
civilian contributions and extend my thanks to Bulgaria for its decision to deploy a manoeuvre
company for next year.

Taking the opportunity to brief you on the latest Council decisions regarding BiH, I am pleased
to note that this morning the Council welcomed process made by Bosnia and Herzegovina and
authorised the Commission to open negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement.
Symbolically, the launching of these negotiations coincides with the 10th anniversary of the
Dayton Peace Agreement.

The Council has also agreed to strengthen the EUSR’s role in co-ordinating all EU instruments
in BiH, in particular in the area of rule of law. The Council will soon take a decision on the
successor to the current EUSR, Lord Ashdown.

The Council has agreed to establish a follow-on mission to EUPM with a mandate refocussed
on supporting the fight against organised crime in a more proactive way and on implementation
of police reform.

 Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

I touched earlier on the successful initial steps of EUSEC in DRC. Since it was launched last
spring, this relatively small team of 8 advisors has achieved tangible results on the ground and is
widely commended by the international community which is present in DRC for contributing to
the success of the transition process.

As you must be aware, in line with its mandate, EUSEC RD CONGO has identified the
renovation of the chain of payment of the Ministry of Defence as a central issue requiring urgent
attention. As we have seen, the EU has really made a difference even with limited human
resources. Let us keep up our support.


The last month and a half have seen no abatement in violence. During this period, the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has suffered its first combat casualties. There have been
attacks on a camp for internally displaced persons and also across the border in Chad.

Clearly, there is no military solution to the problem in Darfur. Meanwhile, the absence of a
political process is highly detrimental. We need to exert a concerted effort to re-invigorate the
political process, primarily through the EUSR.

More specifically on AMIS, the Mission has a crucial role to play in maintaining a sufficiently
secure environment without which, it is unlikely that there will be a political solution in Darfur.
We are building a strategic partnership with the African Union (AU). Hence, it is our
responsibility to deliver on our commitments to provide personnel, equipment and financial
support. I would like to thank those Member States who have contributed and welcome the key
role played by the Peace Facility. All this support is proving very valuable and we will continue
to depend on you to provide experts for some time to come. We stand ready to enhance our
overall capacity-building effort in the context of our longer-term strategic partnership and to
answer positively to the request of the AU on strategic airlift.

The AU is responsible for addressing some aspects of AMIS’s capability in particular some of
the Command and Control issues that they themselves have identified during the Joint
Assessment mission of March this year.

Ref: S373/05