The United States of America and the Russian Federation,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Believing that global challenges and threats require new
approaches to interaction across the whole range of their
strategic relations,

Working therefore to forge a new strategic relationship
based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and
cooperat ion,

Desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into
alignment with this new relationship, and endeavoring to
reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons,

Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of July 1, 1968, and to the achievement of the
historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat,

Expressing strong support for on-going global efforts in
non-proliferation,

Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus
to, the step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear
arms while maintaining the safety and security of their
nuclear arsenals, and with a view to expanding this process in
the future, including to a multilateral approach,

Guided by the principle of indivisible security and
convinced that measures for the reduction and limitation of
strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth
in this Treaty will enhance predictability and stability, and
thus the security of both Parties,

Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between
strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that
this interrelationship will become more important as strategic
nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive
arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the
strategic offensive arms of the Parties,

Mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and
SLBMs on strategic stability,

Taking into account the positive effect on the world
situation of the significant, verifiable reduction in nuclear
arsenals at the turn of the 21st century,

Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance
with the obligations under this Treaty, adapted, simplified,
and made less costly in comparison to the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as
the START Treaty,

Recognizing that the START Treaty has been implemented by
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the
Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America,
and that the reduction levels envisaged by the START Treaty
were achieved,

Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to nuclear
disarmament and to strengthening international peace and
security as non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968,

Welcoming the implementation of the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive
arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and
shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty
and its Protocol.

2. Definitions of terms used in this Treaty and its Protocol
are provided in Part One of the Protocol.

Article II

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM
launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM
warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments,
so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and
thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance
with Article I11 of this Treaty, do not exceed:
(a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed
heavy bombers;
(b) 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on
deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed
heavy bombers;
(c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers,
deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and
non-deployed heavy bombers.

2. Each Party shall have the right to determine for itself
the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.

Article III

1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit
provided for in subparagraph l(a) of Article I1 of this
Treaty:
(a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one.
(b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one.
(c) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.

2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit
provided for in subparagraph l(b) of Article I1 of this
Treaty:
(a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be
the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and
on deployed SLBMs.
(b) One nuclear warhead shall be counted for each
deployed heavy bomber.

3. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit
provided for in subparagraph l(c) of Article I1 of this
Treaty:
(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as
one.
(b) Each non-deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted
as one.
(c) Each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as
one.
(d) Each non-deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted
as one.
(e) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.
(f) Each non-deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as
one.

4. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs
and SLBMs:
(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an
assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch
canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that
type -
(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an
assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to
be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
(c) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and
transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a
particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of
that type.
(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain
an ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at
which an ICBM or SLBM is installed in it, until an ICBM or
SLBM has been launched from it, or until an ICBM or SLBM has
been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall
not be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM if it contains a
training model of a missile or has been placed on static
display. Launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a particular
type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs
or SLBMs of a different type.

5. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to
be subject to this Treaty as follows:
(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a
production facility;
(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when the silo door is first
installed and closed;
(d) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
(e) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that
launcher is installed is first launched;
(f) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, when
its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or
building in which components of such a heavy ,bomber are
assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe
is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which
existing bomber airframes are converted to such heavy bomber
airframes.

6. ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy
bombers shall cease to be subject to this Treaty in accordance
with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.
ICBMs or SLBMs of an existing type shall cease to be subject
to this Treaty if all ICBM or SLBM launchers of a type
intended for such ICBMs or SLBMs have been eliminated or
converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to
this Treaty.

7. For the purposes of this Treaty:
(a) A missile of a type developed and tested solely to
intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of
the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to
which the provisions of this Treaty apply.
(b) Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for
nuclear armaments shall be distinguishable from a heavy bomber
equipped for non-nuclear armaments.
(c) Heavy bombers of the same type shall cease to be
subject to this Treaty or to the limitations thereof when the
last heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of that type
is eliminated or converted, as appropriate, to a heavy bomber
equipped for non-nuclear armaments in accordance with Part
Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.

8. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:
(a) Existing types of ICBMs are:
(i) for the United States of America, the Minuteman
11, Minuteman 111, and Peacekeeper;
(ii) for the Russian Federation, the RS-12M, RS-12M2,
RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24.
(b) Existing types of SLBMs are:
(i) for the Russian Federation, the RSM-50, RSM-52,
RSM-54, and RSM-56;
(ii) for the United States of America, the Trident
11.
(c) Existing types of heavy bombers are:
(i) for the United States of America, the B-52G, B-
52H, B-IB, and B-2A;
(ii) for the Russian Federation, the Tu-95MS and Tu-
160.
(d) Existing types of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers
are :
(i) for the Russian Federation, ICBM launchers RS-
12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24; SLBM launchers RSM-50,
RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56;
(ii) for the United States of America, ICBM launchers
Minuteman 11, Minuteman 111, and Peacekeeper; the SLBM
launchers Trident 11.

Article IV

1. Each Party shall base:
(a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases;
(b) deployed heavy bombers only at air bases.

2. Each Party shall install deployed launchers of SLBMs only
on ballistic missile submarines.

3. Each Party shall locate:
(a) non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases,
production facilities, ICBM loading facilities, repair
facilities, storage facilities, conversion or elimination
facilities, training facilities, test ranges, and space launch
facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs shall not be
located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases;
(b) non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at, as
appropriate, submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities,
maintenance facilities, repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs,
storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or
elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, test ranges, space
launch facilities, and production facilities. Prototype ICBMs
and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at
maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases.

4 . Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs as well as nondeployed
mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each
Party shall limit the duration of each transit between
facilities to no more than 30 days.

5. Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at
test ranges.

6. Training launchers may be located only at ICBM bases,
training facilities, and test ranges. The number of silo
training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo
launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM
specified for that ICBM base.

7. Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to
no more than ten.

8. Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at heavy
bomber flight test centers. Non-deployed heavy bombers other
than test heavy bombers shall be located only at repair
facilities or production facilities for heavy bombers.

9. Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint basing
of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy
bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise
agreed by the Parties.

10. Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at
eliminated facilities except during their movement through
such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such
facilities.

11. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not
be based outside the national territory of each Party. The
obligations provided for in this paragraph shall not affect
the Parties’ rights in accordance with generally recognized
principles and rules of international law relating to the
passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to
visits of submarines to ports of third States. Heavy bombers
may be temporarily located outside the national territory,
notification of which shall be provided in accordance with
Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.

Article V

1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization
and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried
out.

2. When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic
offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to
raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for
consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

3. Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM
launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense
interceptors therein. Each Party further shall not convert
and shall not use launchers of missile defense interceptors
for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision
shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to
signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense
interceptors therein.

Article VI

1. Conversion, elimination, or other means for removal from
accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities
shall be carried out in accordance with Part Three of the
Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Notifications related to conversion, elimination, or other
means for removal from accountability shall be provided in
accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this
Treaty.

3. Verification of conversion or elimination in accordance
with this Treaty shall be carried out by:
(a) national technical means of verification in
accordance with Article X of this Treaty; and
(b) inspection activities as provided for in Article XI
of this Treaty.

Article VII

1. A database pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty
shall be created in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the
Protocol to this Treaty. Categories of data for this database
are set forth in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Each Party shall notify the other Party about changes in
data and shall provide other notifications in a manner
provided for in Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.

3. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in
order to provide and receive notifications, unless otherwise
provided for in this Treaty.

4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a
voluntary basis, in addition to the notifications specified in
paragraph 2 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to
ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed
under this Treaty.

5. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework
of the Bilateral Consultative Commission on releasing to the
public data and information obtained during the implementation
of this Treaty. The Parties shall have the right to release
to the public such data and information following agreement
thereon within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative
Commission. Each Party shall have the right to release to the
public data related to its respective strategic offensive
arms.

6. Geographic coordinates relating to data provided for in
Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, unique identifiers,
site diagrams of facilities provided by the Parties pursuant
to this Treaty, as well as coastlines and waters diagrams
provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty shall not be
released to the public unless otherwise agreed by the Parties
within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

7. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the aggregate
numbers of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy
bombers; the aggregate numbers of warheads on deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed
heavy bombers; and the aggregate numbers of deployed and nondeployed
ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM
launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, may be
released to the public by the Parties.

Article VIII

In those cases in which one of the Parties determines that
its actions may lead to ambiguous situations, that Party shall
take measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of
this Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness, and
predictability concerning the reduction and limitation of
strategic offensive arms. Such measures may include, among
other things, providing information in advance on activities
of that Party associated with deployment or increased
readiness of strategic offensive arms, to preclude the
possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the other
Party. This information shall be provided through diplomatic
or other channels.

Article IX

By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information
on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be exchanged on a parity
basis. The Parties shall agree on the amount of exchange of
such telemetric information.

Article X

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance
with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes:
(a) to use national technical means of verification at
its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized
principles of international law;
(b) not to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with
this Article; and
(c) not to use concealment measures that impede
verification, by national technical means of verification, of
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. The obligation not to use concealment measures includes
the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including
measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM
launchers, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their
launchers during testing. The obligation not to use
concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment
practices at ICBM bases or to the use of environmental
shelters for strategic offen’sive arms.

Article XI

1. For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared
data on strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and
ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of
this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct
inspection activities in accordance with this Article and Part
Five of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at
ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases. The purpose of
such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared
data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed
strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty; the number of
warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and the
number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers.
Such inspections shall hereinafter be referred to as Type One
inspections.

3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at
facilities listed in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol
to this Treaty. The purpose of such inspections shall be to
confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers, types,
and technical characteristics of non-deployed strategic
offensive arms subject to this Treaty and to confirm that
strategic offensive arms have been converted or eliminated.
In addition, each Party shall have the right to conduct
inspections at formerly declared facilities, which are
provided for in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, to
confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes
inconsistent with this Treaty.
The inspections provided for in this paragraph shall
hereinafter be referred to as Type Two inspections.

4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right to
participate in exhibitions conducted by the other Party. The
purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate
distinguishing features and to confirm technical
characteristics of new types, and to demonstrate the results
of conversion of the first item of each type of strategic
offensive arms subject to this Treaty.

Article XII

To promote the objectives and implementation of the
provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the
Bilateral Consultative Commission, the authority and
procedures for the operation of which are set forth in Part
Six of the Protocol to this Treaty.

Article XIII

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty,
each Party shall not assume any international obligations or
undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The
Parties shall not transfer strategic offensive arms subject to
this Treaty to third parties. The Parties shall hold
consultations within the framework of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission in order to resolve any ambiguities
that may arise in this regard. This provision shall not apply
to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the
area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of
signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.

Article XIV

1. This Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral
part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance
with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty
shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of
instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless it
is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the
reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. If
either Party raises the issue of extension of this Treaty, the
Parties shall jointly consider the matter. If the Parties
decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period
of no more than five years unless it is superseded earlier by
a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of
strategic offensive arms.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty,
have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give
notice of its decision to the other Party. Such notice shall
contain a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying
Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
This Treaty shall terminate three months from the date of
receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice,
unless the notice specifies a later date.

4. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty shall
supersede the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of
May 24, 2002, which shall terminate as of that date.

titre documents joints


PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS


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