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Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey

Fact Sheet

The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced today a set of designations targeting Iran’s nuclear and missile programs – the first set of measures from the United States implementing UNSCR 1929 and building upon the actions mandated by the Security Council. Today’s actions also highlight for the international community Iran’s use of its financial sector, shipping industry and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to carry out and mask its proliferation activities, and respond to the Council’s call for all states to take action to prevent their own financial systems from being abused by Iran.

Pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 – which is aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters thereby isolating them from the U.S. financial and commercial systems – Treasury today designated:

- Post Bank of Iran for providing financial services to, and acting on behalf of, Bank Sepah
- Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) entities and individuals
- The IRGC Air Force and IRGC Missile Command, both of which have ties to Iran’s ballistic missile program
- Rah Sahel and Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering Co. for their ties to previously designated Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters
- Two individuals for their roles in the IRGC
- Two individuals and two entities for their ties to Iran’s WMD programs, including Javedan Mehr Toos, a procurement broker for Kalaye Electric Company
- Five Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) front companies

Treasury also today identified 27 vessels as property blocked because of their connection to IRISL and updated the entries for 71 already-blocked IRISL vessels to identify new names given to these vessels as part of IRISL’s efforts to evade sanctions. To view the complete list of the vessel name changes, visit link.

As a result of today’s designations, all transactions involving any of the designees and any U.S. person are prohibited, and any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen.

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Treasury also today identified 22 entities in the insurance, petroleum and petrochemicals industries determined to be owned or controlled by the Government of Iran by adding them to Appendix A to the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR). The ITR prohibit transactions between U.S. persons and the Government of Iran. These identifications allow U.S. persons and others to identify Iranian Government entities and protect themselves against the risks posed by such entities. To view the complete list, visit link.

Post Bank of Iran

Treasury is today designating Post Bank of Iran for providing financial services to, and acting on behalf of, Bank Sepah. Bank Sepah was designated in January 2007 pursuant to E.O. 13382 for providing financial services to Iran’s missile industry, including two entities linked to Iran’s ballistic missile program, Shahid Bakeri Industries Group and Shahid Hemmat Industries Group. Bank Sepah was subsequently designated by the United Nations in March 2007 under UNSCR 1747.

Since 2007, Bank Sepah has faced severe difficulties in processing international transactions. Prior to the designation of Bank Sepah, Post Bank’s business was nearly entirely conducted within Iran. With Iran’s state-owned banks, facing increasing sanctions, Iran began using Post Bank to facilitate international trade. In fact, Post Bank stepped into the shoes of Bank Sepah, after it was designated by the UN, to carry out Bank Sepah’s transactions and hide its identity. In 2009, Post Bank facilitated business on behalf of Bank Sepah between Iran’s defense industries and overseas beneficiaries.

Post Bank, on behalf of Bank Sepah, has also facilitated millions of dollars worth of business between Hong Kong Electronics and other overseas beneficiaries. Hong Kong Electronics was designated by Treasury in June 2009 under E.O. 13382 for providing support to North Korea’s Tanchon Commercial Bank and its primary weapons dealer, Korea Mining Development Corporation (KOMID). Tanchon, named in the Annex to E.O. 13382 and designated under UNSCR 1718, is a commercial bank based in Pyongyang North Korea, and is the financial arm of KOMID, which is also named in the Annex to E.O. 13382.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Treasury today is targeting the IRGC Air Force and IRGC Missile Command, key elements in the operational deployment of Iran’s ballistic missile capability, and Rah Sahel as well as Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering Co., two subsidiaries of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (KAA), the engineering arm of the IRGC that serves to help the IRGC generate income and fund its operations. KAA owned or controlled by the IRGC and is involved in the construction of streets, highways, tunnels, water conveyance projects, agricultural restoration, and pipelines. KAA was designated by Treasury under E.O. 13382 in October 2007 and most recently under UNSCR 1929. Rah Sahel and Sepanir Oil and Gas Engineering Co. were also sanctioned on June 9, 2010 by the United Nations with the adoption of UNSCR 1929.

The IRGC maintains significant political and economic power in Iran. It has ties to companies controlling billions of dollars in business and construction projects and it is a growing presence in Iran’s financial and commercial sectors. The IRGC has numerous economic interests related to defense production, construction, and the oil industry.

The IRGC was designated by the State Departmentunder E.O. 13382 in October 2007 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in proliferation-related activities. The IRGC has been outspoken in its willingness to facilitate the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMD. The IRGC has broad links to Iran’s ballistic missile programs and is one of the primary regime organizations tied to developing and testing the Shahab-3 missile.

Treasury is also designating today the following individuals for their roles in the IRGC:

- Mohammad Ali Jafari has been the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC since September 2007.
- Mohammad Reza Naqdi has served as head of the IRGC’s Basij Resistance Force since October 2009. Naqdi was sanctioned by the United Nations in March 2008 under UNSCR 1803 for being the former Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of the State Anti-Smuggling Headquarters. The U.N. described him as being involved in efforts to evade the sanctions previously imposed under UNSCRs 1737 and 1747.

Entities and Individuals with Ties to Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs

Javedan Mehr Toos, an entity that serves as a procurement broker for Kalaye Electric Company, is being designated today for providing services to, and acting on behalf of, Kalaye Electric Company.

Kalaye Electric Company was designated by Treasury in February 2007, also pursuant to E.O. 13382, for being owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the main organization in Iran for research and development activities in the field of nuclear technology, including Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program and experimental laser enrichment of uranium program. AEOI, which reports directly to Iran’s president and manages Iran’s overall nuclear program, was identified in the Annex to E.O. 13382 and sanctioned by the United Nations under UNSCR 1737. Kalaye Electric Company is linked to Iran’s centrifuge research and development efforts. Both organizations are listed in the Annex to UN Security Council Resolution 1737 because of their involvement in Iran’s nuclear program.

Since 2009, Javedan Mehr Toos, located in Tehran, has been sought out by Kalaye Electric Company to obtain a variety of nuclear-related equipment on the international market, including magnets which can be used in centrifuges. In early 2010, Javedan Mehr Toos procured specialized valves and vacuum gauges that could ultimately be used for Iran’s uranium enrichment program.

Treasury also designated today the following individuals and entity for their ties to Iran’s nuclear and WMD programs:

- Javad Karimi Sabet has been linked to AEOI since at least 2006, serving as the head of Novin Energy Company (Novin). Novin was designated by Treasury in January 2006 under E.O. 13382 for being owned or controlled by the AEOI, and was sanctioned by the United Nations in March 2007 under UNSCR 1747.
- Ahmad Vahidi serves as Iran’s Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), a position he has held since September 2009. Prior to that, he served as Iran’s Deputy Defense Minister and held positions with the IRGC-Qods Force. MODAFL has ultimate authority over Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) and Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO), both of which have been designated under E.O. 13382.
- The Naval Defense Missile Industry Group (aka Cruise Missile Industry Group or CMIG) is owned or controlled by the AIO. The AIO is the overall manager and coordinator of Iran’s missile program and oversees all of Iran’s missile industries. CMIG was sanctioned by the United Nations in March 2007 under UNSCR 1747 for being involved in the development and production of cruise missiles, as well as being responsible for naval missiles.

Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)

Treasury took further action today against the network of Iran’s national maritime carrier, IRISL, by designating five front companies aiding IRISL in evading sanctions, identified 27 new vessels as blocked property due to their connection to IRISL, and updating the entries for 71 already-blocked IRISL vessels to identify new names given to them in order to evade sanctions.

Treasury designated IRISL in September 2008 pursuant to Executive Order 13382 for providing logistical services to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). MODAFL has authority over the AIO, the arm of the Iranian military that oversees Iran’s ballistic missile program, and has used IRISL to conceal the true destination of shipments of military-related goods destined for MODAFL.

Since being designated, IRISL has increasingly relied upon a series of front companies and has engaged in deceptive behavior – such as falsifying shipping documents and renaming ships – to assist it in overcoming the impact of sanctions and increased scrutiny of its behavior. IRISL has also been involved in Iranian attempts to transfer arms-related material. Iran is prohibited from exporting arms and related material by UNSCR 1747.

IRISL established the front company, Hafiz Darya Shipping Company (HDS Lines), in 2009, to conduct its containerized shipping operations under the HDS Lines brand name. HDS has retained some IRISL officers as corporate members. In late 2009, HDS Lines assumed IRISL’s containerized shipping operations and established shipping routes nearly identical to those formerly operated by IRISL.

Similarly, IRISL created Soroush Sarzamin Asatir Ship Management Company, also designated today, which has assumed IRISL’s ship management functions in the wake of sanctions against IRISL. Like HDS Lines, it also shares corporate officers with IRISL.

Safiran Payam Darya (SAPID) Shipping Co., also designated today, was created by IRISL in April 2009 to take control of several ships previously directly owned by IRISL and to handle IRISL’s former bulk and general cargo operations. SAPID’s directors and/or shareholders are five members of IRISL’s Board of Directors: Mohammad Hossein Dajmar, IRISL’s Managing Director; Gholamhossein Golpavar, IRISL’s Commercial Director; Mohammad Mehdi Rasekh; Masoud Nik Nafs; and Mohammad Sadegh Mofateh. Dajmar serves as SAPID’s Chairman, and Nik Nafs serves as its Vice-Chairman. Golparvar serves as SAPID’s Managing Director, while Rasekh and Mofateh serve as SAPID directors.

Two Hong Kong-based companies affiliated with IRISL, Seibow Limited and Seibow Logistics are also being designated today.

Today’s designations of IRISL front companies and identification of new and renamed IRISL-affiliated vessels also reinforce UNSCR 1803, which among other things, calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national legal authorities and consistent with international law, cargoes to and from Iran, aircraft and vessels, at their seaports and airports, including their ports, owned or operated by IRISL, "provided there is reasonable grounds to believe that the vessel is transporting goods prohibited" under UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803.

Identifying Information

- HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING CO. A.K.A. HDS LINES; HAFIZ DARYA SHIPPING LINES COMPANY Location: No 60. Ehteshamiyeh Square 7th Neyestan Street Pasdaran Avenue Tehran, Iran IMO Number: 5878431

- SOROUSH SARZAMIN ASATIR SHIP MANAGEMENT COMPANY Location: No. 5 Shabnam Alley Golzar Street Fajr Street Shahid Motahari Avenue Tehran 193651, Iran Location: P.O. Box 19365-1114 Tehran, Iran IMO Number: 5466371

- SAFIRAN PAYAM DARYA SHIPPING COMPANY AKA SAPID SHIPPING CO Official Address: No. 3, 8th Narenjestan Street, Artesh Boulevard, Farmaniyah Avenue, Tehran, Iran Alt. Address: No. 33, 8th Narenjestan Street Artesh Boulevard, Aghdasieh, Tehran, Iran Office Address: P.O. Box 1963116 Tehran, Iran Web Page: www.sapidshpg.com E-mail: [email protected]

- SEIBOW LIMITED Location: Room 803 8/F Futura Plaza 111 How Kimg St Kwun Tong, Kowloon Hong Kong Incorporation No.: 926320

- SEIBOW LOGISTICS LIMITED Location: Room 803 8/F Futura Plaza 111 How Kimg St Kwun Tong, Kowloon Hong Kong Incorporation No.: 1218675

Iranian Transactions Regulations

INSURANCE

1. BIMEH IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED (A.K.A. BIUK): Bimeh Iran Insurance Company (U.K.) Limited is a London-based entity that is owned or controlled (99%) by Iran Insurance Company.
2. IRAN INSURANCE COMPANY (A.K.A. BIMEH IRAN): Iran Insurance Company is a parastatal that is wholly-owned by the Government of Iran.

PETROLEUM, PETROCHEMICALS & ASSOCIATED ENTITIES

1. MSP KALA NAFT CO. TEHRAN (A.K.A. KALA NAFT CO SSK; A.K.A. KALA NAFT COMPANY LTD; A.K.A. KALA NAFT TEHRAN; A.K.A. KALA NAFT TEHRAN COMPANY; A.K.A. KALAYEH NAFT CO; A.K.A. M.S.P.-KALA; A.K.A. MANUFACTURING SUPPORT & PROCUREMENT CO.-KALA NAFT; A.K.A. MANUFACTURING SUPPORT AND PROCUREMENT (M.S.P.) KALA NAFT CO. TEHRAN; A.K.A. MANUFACTURING, SUPPORT AND PROCUREMENT KALA NAFT COMPANY; A.K.A. MSP KALA NAFT TEHRAN COMPANY; A.K.A. MSP KALANAFT; A.K.A. MSP-KALANAFT COMPANY; A.K.A. SHERKAT SAHAMI KHASS KALA NAFT; A.K.A. SHERKAT SAHAMI KHASS POSHTIBANI VA TEHIYEH KALAYE NAFT TEHRAN; A.K.A. SHERKATE POSHTIBANI SAKHT VA TAHEIH KALAIE NAFTE): MSP Kala Naft Co. Tehran is a Tehran-based entity that is responsible, along with other entities, for procurement on behalf of the National Iranian Oil Company ("NIOC"), which is an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran. MSP Kala Naft Co. Tehran is wholly-owned by NIOC. In 2007, MSP Kala Naft Co. Tehran was listed by the Japanese government as an entity of concern for biological, chemical, and nuclear weapon proliferation. On November 26, 2008, NIOC was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

2. KALA LIMITED (A.K.A. KALA NAFT LONDON LTD): Kala Limited is the London-based procurement arm for MSP Kala Naft Co. Tehran, an entity that is wholly-owned by NIOC. On November 26, 2008, NIOC was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

3. KALA PENSION TRUST LIMITED: Kala Pension Trust Limited, is a London-based entity that is wholly-owned by Kala Limited; it is an investment arm for Kala Naft, the procurement arm of NIOC. On November 26, 2008, NIOC was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

4. NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY PTE LTD: National Iranian Oil Company PTE Ltd is a Singapore-based entity that is wholly-owned by NIOC. On November 26, 2008, NIOC was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

5. IRANIAN OIL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED (A.K.A IOC UK LTD): London-based Iranian Oil Company (U.K.) Limited is an entity that is wholly-owned by Naftiran Intertrade Co Ltd. (NICO). Iranian Oil Company (U.K.) Limited is fully-funded and supported by NICO. On November 26, 2008, NICO, a subsidiary of NIOC, was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

6. NIOC INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (LONDON) LIMITED: NIOC International Affairs (London) Limited is a London-based entity that is wholly-owned by NIOC. On November 26, 2008, NIOC was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

7. NAFTIRAN TRADING SERVICES CO. (NTS) LIMITED: Naftiran Trading Services Co. (NTS) Limited is a London-based entity that is wholly-owned by NICO. On November 26, 2008, NICO, a subsidiary of NIOC, was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

8. NICO ENGINEERING LIMITED: NICO Engineering Limited is a Jersey-registered entity that is wholly-owned by NICO. On November 26, 2008, NICO, a subsidiary of NIOC, was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

9. NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY (A.K.A. NPC): The National Petrochemical Company (NPC) is a subsidiary of the Iranian Petroleum Ministry and is wholly-owned by the Government of Iran. It is responsible for the development and operation of Iran’s petrochemical sector and is the second-largest producer and exporter of petrochemicals in the Middle East.

10. IRAN PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY (A.K.A. Petrochemical Commercial Company; A.K.A. Sherkate Basargani Petrochemie (Sahami Khass); A.K.A. Sherkate Bazargani Petrchemie; A.K.A. IPCC; A.K.A. PCC): Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NPC.

11. NPC INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (A.K.A. N P C International Ltd; A.K.A. NPC International Company;): NPC International Limited is a London-based entity that is wholly-owned and controlled by NPC.

12. INTRA CHEM TRADING GMBH (A.K.A. Intra-chem Trading Co. (GMBH)): Intra Chem Trading GmbH is a Hamburg-based that is wholly-owned by Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company.

13. PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY INTERNATIONAL LIMITED (A.K.A. Petrochemical Commercial Company International Ltd; A.K.A. Petrochemical Trading Company Limited; A.K.A. PCCI): The Petrochemical Commercial Company International Limited is a Jersey-based entity that is wholly-owned by NPC.

14. P.C.C. (SINGAPORE) PRIVATE LIMITED (A.K.A. P.C.C. Singapore Branch A.K.A. PCC Singapore Pte Ltd): P.C.C. (Singapore) Private Limited is a Singapore-based entity that is wholly-owned by Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company

15. PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY FZE (A.K.A. PCC FZE): The Petrochemical Commercial Company FZE is a Dubai-based entity that is wholly-owned by the Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company.

16. PETROCHEMICAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY (U.K.) LIMITED (A.K.A. PCC (UK); A.K.A. PCC UK; A.K.A. PCC UK LTD): The Petrochemical Commercial Company (U.K.) Limited is a London-based and wholly-owned subsidiary of the Iran Petrochemical Commercial Company.

17. PETROIRAN DEVELOPMENT COMPANY (PEDCO) LIMITED (A.K.A. Petro Iran Development Company; A.K.A. PEDCO): Petroiran Development Company (Pedco) Limited is a Jersey-registered entity that is wholly-owned by NICO. On November 26, 2008, NICO, a subsidiary of NIOC, was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

18. PETROPARS LTD. (A.K.A. Petropars Limited; A.K.A. PPL): Petropars Ltd. is an entity that is wholly-owned by NICO. On November 26, 2008, NICO, a subsidiary of NIOC, was identified by OFAC as an entity that is owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.

19. PETROPARS INTERNATIONAL FZE (A.K.A. PPI FZE): Petropars International FZE is a Dubai-based entity that is wholly-owned by Petropars Ltd.

20. PETROPARS UK LIMITED: Petropars UK Limited is a London-based entity that is wholly-owned by Petropars Ltd.

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner Remarks on Designations Targeting Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs

Over the past year and a half, President Obama has pursued a broad, international strategy to address deep concerns over Iran’s nuclear program.

A critical step in that strategy came last week, when the UN Security Council adopted the toughest sanctions ever imposed on the Iranian government.

Today, the United States is taking our first steps to implement and build on that resolution.

We are adding to our list of sanctioned entities a number of institutions and individuals who are helping Iran to fund nuclear and missile programs and to evade international sanctions.

Our actions today are designed to deter other governments and foreign financial institutions from dealing with these entities and thereby supporting Iran’s illicit activities.

Let me briefly describe each of these actions.

First, we are designating Iran’s Post Bank for its support of proliferation activities. This brings the number of Iranian-owned banks on our list to 16.

Second, we are adding five front companies and more than ninety ship names that Iran’s national maritime carrier has been using to try and evade sanctions.

Third, we are adding two individuals and four entities that are part of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, which plays a key role in Iran’s missile programs and support for terrorism.

Fourth, we are adding two individuals and two entities that are actively involved in Iran’s nuclear or missile programs.

And finally, we are identifying 22 petroleum, energy and insurance companies – located inside and outside Iran – that are owned or controlled by the Iranian government.

Shortly, Stuart Levey, Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, will provide you with more details on these actions.

Stuart has been the chief architect of our strategy to impose growing financial costs on Iran for its continued defiance and he has played a major leadership role on this issue internationally.

In the coming weeks, we will continue to increase the financial pressure on Iran.

We will continue to target Iran’s support for terrorist organizations.

We will continue to focus on Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.

And we will continue to expose Iran’s efforts to evade international sanctions.

Now, to be truly effective in ending Iran’s proliferation activities and Iran’s support for terrorism, we need to have in place a concerted, international approach.

This is not something the United States can do alone.

We need other countries to move with us.

So alongside our efforts to build international support for new sanctions, we have been working behind the scenes, building international support among finance ministers, for additional actions to prevent abuse of the global financial system by Iran.

We expect to see additional actions announced by other governments soon.

The types of steps we are taking today have been remarkably effective.

When major international institutions find out they’re actually working with a company that supports Iran’s nuclear or missile programs, they realize it’s not worth the risk.

They cut off their business.

And over the years, this has made a major difference in limiting Iran’s ability to use the global financial system to pursue illicit activities.

We have made important progress. But we cannot stop. Iran will never cease looking for new ways to evade our sanctions. So our efforts must be ongoing and unrelenting.

We will keep working to intensify financial pressure on Iran.

Thank you.

Let me now turn it over to Stuart.

Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey Remarks on Designations Targeting Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs

As Secretary Geithner said, we are taking a series of steps today to impose additional consequences on Iran for its continuing failure to meet its international obligations.

First, we are sanctioning an additional Iranian bank, Post Bank. At one time, Post Bank’s business was conducted almost entirely within Iran. But when some of Iran’s largest banks were exposed for financing proliferation, Iran began to use Post Bank to facilitate international trade. In fact, Post Bank stepped into the shoes of Bank Sepah, which is under UN sanctions, to carry out Bank Sepah’s transactions and hide its identity. International banks that would never deal with Bank Sepah have been handling these transactions that they think are really for Post Bank.

Second, we are taking action against Iran’s national maritime carrier, IRISL. Since we sanctioned IRISL in 2008, it has desperately attempted to evade those sanctions, setting up new front companies, renaming and even repainting vessels to hide their true ownership. Despite its deceptive maneuvers, IRISL has had to struggle to obtain insurance and other services.

Third, we are taking further action against the IRGC, or Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. The IRGC plays a key role in Iran’s missile program and support for terrorism and it has taken over broad portions of the Iranian economy, to the detriment of the Iranian people. With today’s designations, we have now sanctioned 26 entities and individuals connected to the IRGC, and we will continue to do so. No IRGC entity should have any place in the world’s legitimate financial system.

Fourth, we are sanctioning two individuals and two entities for proliferation, including a key broker used by Iran to procure a variety of nuclear-related equipment.

Finally, we are identifying 22 petroleum, energy, and insurance companies owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, including 17 located outside Iran and many that are not easily identifiable as Iranian. Americans have long been forbidden to do business with Iranian entities. Companies around the world are increasingly deciding not to do business with the government of Iran because of its illicit conduct and because, as President Obama said last week, it is a government "that brutally suppressed dissent and murdered the innocent." The UN has also highlighted proliferation concerns surrounding Iran’s energy sector, and all companies must be conscious of the implications of any trade they conduct with Iran’s energy companies.

We know that officials in Iran have been anxious about this new round of sanctions. If the Iranian Government holds true to form, it will scramble to identify "work-arounds" – hiding behind front companies, doctoring wire transfers, falsifying shipping documents. We will continue to expose this deception thereby reinforcing the very reasons why the private sector is increasingly shunning Iran.

We will also work to ensure international sanctions are enforced. In this regard, the State Department has dedicated a senior official, Bob Einhorn, to ensure that we accomplish this in cooperation with our friends and partners around the world. We are fortunate to have someone of Bob’s stature and experience working on this issue.

The overall result of these efforts is that Iran’s choice will become increasingly clear – to choose the path offered by President Obama and the international community or to remain on a course that leads to further isolation.