The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Reiterating its serious concern over the many reports of the IAEA Director General and resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors related to Iran’s nuclear programme, reported to it by the IAEA Director General, including IAEA Board resolution GOV/2006/14,
Reiterating its serious concern that the IAEA Director General’s report of 27 February 2006 (GOV/2006/15) lists a number of outstanding issues and concerns on Iran’s nuclear programme, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension, and that the IAEA is unable to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,
Reiterating its serious concern over the IAEA Director General’s report of 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) and its findings, including that, after more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern, and that the IAEA is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran,
Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the IAEA Director General’s reports of 8 June 2006 (GOV/2006/38), 31 August 2006 (GOV/2006/53) and 14 November 2006 (GOV/2006/64), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of this resolution have been met,
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions;
2. Decides, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:
(a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and
(b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA;
3. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:
(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6 and B.7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;
(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:
(i) equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;
(ii) low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;
(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer of items covered by 19.A.3 of Category II;
(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 18 below (herein “the Committee”), which could contribute to enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
4. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods and technology:
(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;
(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding;
5. Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the export of which to Iran is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3 (c) or 4 (a) above, States shall ensure that:
(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and
(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and
(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and
(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;
6. Decides that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;
7. Decides that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;
8. Decides that Iran shall provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests to be able to verify the suspension outlined in paragraph 2 and to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports, and calls upon Iran to ratify promptly the Additional Protocol;
9. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above shall not apply where the Committee determines in advance and on a case-by-case basis that such supply, sale, transfer or provision of such items or assistance would clearly not contribute to the development of Iran’s technologies in support of its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and of development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including where such items or assistance are for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes, provided that:
(a) contracts for delivery of such items or assistance include appropriate end-user guarantees; and
(b) Iran has committed not to use such items in proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein “the Annex”), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above;
11. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
12. Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities;
13. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant States:
(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;
(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;
(c) to be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 above, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
(d) to be necessary for activities directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) and have been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;
14. Decides that States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;
15. Decides that the measures in paragraph 12 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that:
(a) the contract is not related to any of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods, technologies, assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 above;
(b) the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 12 above;
and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, ten working days prior to such authorization;
16. Decides that technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes, or where it is necessary for projects directly related to the items specified in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) above, but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that relates to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities set out in paragraph 2 above;
17. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
18. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks:
(a) to seek from all States, in particular those in the region and those producing the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, information regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;
(b) to seek from the secretariat of the IAEA information regarding the actions taken by the IAEA to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 16 of this resolution and whatever further information it may consider useful in this regard;
(c) to examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations of measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 of this resolution;
(d) to consider and decide upon requests for exemptions set out in paragraphs 9, 13 and 15 above;
(e) to determine as may be necessary additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology to be specified for the purpose of paragraph 3 above;
(f) to designate as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 10 and 12 above;
(g) to promulgate guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by this resolution and include in such guidelines a requirement on States to provide information where possible as to why any individuals and/or entities meet the criteria set out in paragraphs 10 and 12 and any relevant identifying information;
(h) to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12 above;
19. Decides that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above;
20. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 above as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
21. Welcomes the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;
22. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all remaining outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA continuing its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;
23. Requests within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
24. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in the light of the report referred to in paragraph 23 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of this resolution as soon as it determines that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 23 above shows that Iran has not complied with this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
25. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Annex A. Entities involved in the nuclear programme
1. Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
2. Mesbah Energy Company (provider for A40 research reactor — Arak)
3. Kala-Electric (aka Kalaye Electric) (provider for PFEP — Natanz)
4. Pars Trash Company (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)
5. Farayand Technique (involved in centrifuge programme, identified in IAEA reports)
6. Defence Industries Organisation (overarching MODAFL-controlled entity, some of whose subordinates have been involved in the centrifuge programme making components, and in the missile programme)
7. 7th of Tir (subordinate of DIO, widely recognized as being directly involved in the nuclear programme)
Annex B. Entities involved in the ballistic missile programme
1. Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
2. Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) (subordinate entity of AIO)
3. Fajr Industrial Group (formerly Instrumentation Factory Plant, subordinate entity of AIO)
Annex C. Persons involved in the nuclear programme
1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development
2. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)
3. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)
4. Ehsan Monajemi, Construction Project Manager, Natanz
5. Jafar Mohammadi, Technical Adviser to the AEOI (in charge of managing the production of valves for centrifuges)
6. Ali Hajinia Leilabadi, Director General of Mesbah Energy Company
7. Lt Gen Mohammad Mehdi Nejad Nouri, Rector of Malek Ashtar University of Defence Technology (chemistry dept, affiliated to MODALF, has conducted experiments on beryllium)
Annex D. Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme
1. Gen Hosein Salimi, Commander of the Air Force, IRGC (Pasdaran)
2. Ahmad Vahid Dastjerdi, Head of the AIO
3. Reza-Gholi Esmaeli, Head of Trade & International Affairs Dept, AIO
4. Bahmanyar Morteza Bahmanyar, Head of Finance & Budget Dept, AIO
Annex E. Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes
1. Maj Gen Yahya Rahim Safavi, Commander, IRGC (Pasdaran)
The President Mr. Al-Nasser (Qatar) (spoke in Arabic): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in which they request to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the consideration without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zarif (Islamic Republic of Iran), took a seat at the Council table; Mr. Matussek (Germany) took the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.
The President (spoke in Arabic): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.
Members of the Council have before them document S/2006/1010, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
I wish to draw members’ attention to three letters addressed to the President of the Security Council from the representative of France, contained in documents S/2006/521, S/2006/814 and S/2006/815. I also wish to draw members’ attention to a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, contained in document S/2006/985.
In addition, I wish to draw members’ attention to the relevant reports of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, including those reports dated 27 February, 28 April and 31 August 2006, contained in documents S/2006/150, S/2006/270 and S/2006/702, respectively.
It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.
Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation will support the draft resolution before us relating to Iran’s nuclear programme. We will do so because we believe that the draft, the outcome of lengthy and complex consultations, focuses on the affirmation of measures that Iran must take in order to produce confidence in its nuclear programme, formulated by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In other words, the main thrust of the draft resolution we are to adopt today is the support of the Security Council, through its authority, of the Agency’s activities in that area.
It is crucial that the restrictions being introduced on cooperation with Iran apply to those areas that are the cause of the IAEA’s concern. In that regard, we firmly believe that cooperation with Iran in areas and using resources that are not restricted by the draft resolution shall not be subject to the draft resolution’s restrictions.
We believe that some of the draft resolution’s wording could have been made clearer.
We are convinced that ways effectively to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem are to be found exclusively in the political, diplomatic and legal framework. In that context, it is important that the measures provided for in the draft resolution be taken in accordance with Article 41 of the United Nations Charter and commit no use of force. In strengthening the global non-proliferation regime for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to seek the establishment of solid regional and international security and stability.
Russia views the draft resolution as a serious message to Iran regarding the need to cooperate more actively and more openly with the IAEA to resolve the remaining concerns and questions relating to its nuclear programme. The parameters for the required cooperation have been set forth in the resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and supported by the Security Council.
The draft resolution clearly reaffirms that, if Iran suspends all activities relating to the enrichment and chemical reprocessing of uranium, the measures spelled out in the draft resolution will be suspended. That will make it possible to launch the negotiating process in the interests of a solid political settlement of the Iranian nuclear problem. The proposals that have been transmitted to the Iranian Government on behalf of the “six” remain valid.
We hope that Iran will correctly and most earnestly consider the contents of the draft resolution and take the measures necessary to redress the situation. Constructive steps by Tehran to comply with the draft resolution will make it possible to mitigate the urgency of the questions relating to Iran’s nuclear programme.
Mr. Wolff (United States of America): Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability constitutes a grave threat and demands a clear statement from this Council. Today we are placing Iran in the small category of States under Security Council sanctions and sending it an unambiguous message that there are serious repercussions to its continued disregard of its obligations and defiance of this body.
Nearly four months ago, the Council sent an unequivocal message to Iran that it must take the steps required by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including fully verifiable and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, research and development. That step was taken to convince Iran to relent from its confrontational course; consider the offer of a negotiated solution by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia and China on 1 June 2006; and avoid further Security Council action. Regrettably, Iran continues to defy the international community by its continued enrichment activities, its refusal to comply with its obligations under Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), and the requests of the IAEA.
Today’s Chapter VII draft resolution requires Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, and to stop work on all heavy water-related projects, including construction of a heavy water research reactor. That suspension is subject to IAEA verification; a report from the IAEA Director General on the status of the suspension is due to the Council within 60 days. Iran is also required to provide the IAEA the access it needs to verify suspension and resolve outstanding issues. Finally, the IAEA calls on Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol.
In order to persuade Iran to take these steps, the draft resolution imposes sanctions on elements of the Iranian regime involved in dangerous proliferation activities. It decides that Member States shall not engage in trade with Iran in three key nuclear areas — enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water projects — and it prohibits Member States from engaging in any trade with Iran that could contribute to its development of a nuclear weapon delivery system. Similarly, the draft resolution prohibits Iran from exporting a range of proliferation-sensitive technologies or related equipment.
This draft resolution prohibits any technical or financial assistance related to the transfer or use of the prohibited items to other countries; it requires States to freeze the assets of identified individuals and entities involved in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems, and calls on States not to allow international travel by these individuals. The IAEA is also required to stop providing technical cooperation for such activities.
The United States expects that Iran and all other United Nations Member States will immediately act under their Charter obligations to implement the requirements of this draft resolution.
This will be the second Security Council resolution under Chapter VII on Iran in response to that country’s efforts to obtain a nuclear weapons capability, reflecting the gravity of this situation and the determination of the Council. We hope this draft resolution will convince Iran that the best way to ensure its security and end its international isolation is to abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons and take steps needed to restore international confidence. In this draft resolution the Council has clearly affirmed its intention to review Iran’s actions based on the IAEA report and to adopt further measures if Iran has not complied fully with its obligations.
We look forward to Iran’s full, unconditional and immediate compliance with this draft resolution. Iran’s cooperation would pave the way for a negotiated solution. We hope that the Iranian leadership comes to understand that the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability makes it less, not more, secure.
In conclusion, this draft resolution provides an important basis for action. It compels all United Nations Member States to take all measures necessary to deny Iran equipment, technology, technical assistance and financial assistance that would contribute to Iran’s enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water or nuclear-weapon delivery programmes. It is clear on this and not open to interpretation. We will insist on absolute adherence to its requirements.
But adoption of this draft resolution is only a first step. In the coming weeks, we will work with the sanctions committee to ensure that this draft resolution is as effective as possible. We will also take steps under United States law to ensure that we have put in place appropriate measures against individuals and entities involved in the Iranian nuclear programme, and we will call on every other country to urgently follow suit.
Finally, if necessary, we will not hesitate to return to this body for further action if Iran fails to take steps to comply.
I thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council for your efforts in helping secure this draft resolution.
The President (spoke in Arabic): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Qatar.
The State of Qatar is eager for all States to comply with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). That is a matter of principle to which we are committed because we believe in the important role of the Treaty in saving humanity from destruction — and the threat of destruction will persist as long as nuclear weapons exist on Earth. For that reason, we have tirelessly appealed for a Middle East region free from all weapons of mass destruction. We have also called on nuclear-weapon States to submit their facilities to the inspection regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Further, we have never ceased our call upon States possessing nuclear stockpiles to work towards dismantling those stockpiles. Moreover, my country has supported all United Nations resolutions calling for such measures.
The State of Qatar believes that commitment to the Treaty, within the framework of the IAEA, which is the international forum for the sharing of nuclear information and technology among developed and developing countries, can encourage the safe use of nuclear technologies, help build confidence among States and promote understanding among nations.
The State of Qatar considers that Iran has the right to undertake research on nuclear technology and to use that technology and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. No one can invoke articles I and II of the NPT to take away that right. But atomic concepts designed for destruction have given rise to advanced technologies that can be turned to peaceful purposes, provided that standards for safety, including the safety of nuclear reactors, are in place. Such standards would avert accidents. Great benefits can come of cooperation with the IAEA in this sphere, because the Agency is a centre for exchanging information and for establishing guidelines.
With respect to this difficult issue, Qatar has no suspicions concerning the sincerity of Iran’s intentions as regards the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. But we must not risk the potential benefits of cooperation with the IAEA in guaranteeing nuclear safety, particularly since this draft resolution would impede delivery of equipment necessary for the Iranian nuclear programme, which could have dangerous repercussions for the nuclear safety issue. That is why we appeal once again to our sisterly neighbour Iran and urge it to respond to this draft resolution. We know that the draft resolution is tough, but we are confident that there is wide scope for diplomatic cooperation, given that Iran has expressed readiness to continue to permit inspection activities under IAEA safeguards, including settling outstanding questions, so long as the issue remains within the IAEA’s purview, in conformity with Iran’s letter dated 27 April 2006 addressed to the Director General of the IAEA.
The Council’s draft resolution also states that the measures to be enforced would be suspended to provide an opportunity for negotiations. These are issues that can be overcome, so long as we act in good faith. Iran can use its wisdom to address the situation with the rationality that is required. Our vote is prompted by our concerns over the safety of Iranian nuclear facilities.
Finally, we hope that the Council will stand united in the search for a peaceful settlement and that it will use such a settlement to limit nuclear proliferation in other regions, in accordance with existing resolutions, in particular with respect to the Middle East region, and especially with respect to Israel, which has recently made statements concerning its nuclear deterrence capability.
For all those reasons, the State of Qatar will vote in favour of the draft resolution.
I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.
I now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/2006/1010.
A vote was taken by show of hands.
Argentina, China, Congo, Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Peru, Qatar, Russian Federation, Slovakia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America
The President (spoke in Arabic): There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1737 (2006).
I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.
Sir Emyr Jones Parry (United Kingdom): On 31 July, the Security Council adopted resolution 1696 (2006) which made mandatory the suspension required by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in Iran. The Council called upon Iran, without further delay, to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors to act in accordance with the provision of the Additional Protocol and to implement all transparency measures as the IAEA may request.
The resolution set a deadline of 31 August for Iranian compliance. Iran’s response was to step up its sensitive activities and offer to export the technologies it developed to other countries. The IAEA reported in November that Iran continued to provide insufficient transparency to help the Agency resolved outstanding issues and remove uncertainties.
In sum, Iran has simply thumbed its nose at the Council and defied international law. Bearing in mind the Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in this regard taking with utmost seriousness the threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Council unequivocally expressed its intention in resolution 1696 (2006) to adopt measures under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations in the event of Iranian non-compliance.
And that is what we have done today. We have adopted resolution 1737 (2006) under Chapter VII of the Charter, and in this we reiterate and expand the Council’s mandatory suspension of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive activities. We have also established an embargo aimed at preventing Iran from importing the items and material that will sustain its proliferation-sensitive activities.
In addition to taking steps to inhibit Iran’s proliferation-sensitive activities, the Council has introduced a set of measures intended to persuade Iran to stop pursuing activities of concern. This resolution underlines the seriousness of the situation, including the international community’s lack of confidence about the direction of Iran’s policies.
But, importantly, the door is not closed for Iran. The United Kingdom, France and Germany, with the European Union High Representative, Javier Solana, have led negotiations with Iran. We remain committed to seeking a diplomatic, negotiated solution with Iran, based on cooperation. A new relationship between the European Union and Iran is on the table, but it must be with an Iran which eschews nuclear weapons.
In resolution 1737 (2006), the Council makes clear that Iran’s suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities will permit negotiations to resume and intensify, this time with the United States, Russia and China engaged alongside France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
For this reason, in the pursuit of a negotiated agreement to resolve the situation, it is vital that all States implement the resolution as fully and comprehensively as possible. This means taking immediate action, including by adopting the necessary legislation to pave the way for rapid and robust implementation. Without that, we cannot expect the Council to be able to meet its objectives.
In the event that Iran does not change course, the Council has committed itself in this resolution to the adoption of further measures. Iran, therefore, faces a choice. The vote today illustrates the gravity of that choice and the seriousness with which we, as a Council, view Iran’s behaviour.
We hope Iran will heed the decision of the Council and return to negotiation to resolve the nuclear dossier. This, in turn, would open the way for the European Union and Iran to develop a new and wider relationship to our mutual benefit and to the benefit of international peace and security.
Mr. De La Sablière (France) (spoke in French): France welcomes the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of today’s resolution taking measures with regard to Iran under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
This resolution, adopted on the basis of a draft presented by Germany, the United Kingdom and France, confirms the mandatory nature of the suspension of sensitive activities in the nuclear field, which are of concern to the international community, because they do not have a credible civilian application in Iran today. These include enrichment, reprocessing, the manufacture of heavy water and the construction in Arak of a reactor moderated by heavy water capable of producing plutonium of military grade quality.
The resolution also allows the international community to make sure that Iran will not benefit from external contributions, under any form whatsoever, for its sensitive nuclear activities, as well as for its missile programmes. The export by Iran of sensitive technology is also prohibited, as are services, including financial services, surrounding sensitive transactions to or from Iran. The travel of those with operational involvement in the programmes will be restricted, and their assets outside of Iran will be frozen, as will the entities involved in sensitive programmes on behalf of which they operate. These measures will also apply immediately to some 20 persons and entities directly listed in the Annex to the resolution. Lastly, the resolution reinforces the powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its verification work.
The aim of these measures, which is recalled in the preamble to the resolution, is to invite Iran to conform to its commitments within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the demands of the Security Council and the IAEA, to persuade it to conform to resolution 1696 (2006) and to stop the development of its sensitive technology supporting its nuclear and missile programmes.
These sanctions are proportionate and reversible. The Security Council states, without ambiguity, that if Iran re-establishes the suspension of all its enrichment and reprocessing activities, including research and development, the measures that the Council has just adopted will be suspended. If it conforms to all provisions of resolution 1696 (2006) and 1733 (2006), as well as those of the resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors, these sanctions will be lifted; but if it persists on its current path, there will be other measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII.
This resolution sends out a clear message on the part of the international community to Iran, which is now facing a strategic choice, which was recalled by President Jacques Chirac on 12 December: cooperation with the international community or growing isolation. We hope that Tehran will choose dialogue and that it will take decisions that will allow for a resumption of negotiations based on resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1733 (2006). France, with its partners, remains ready for this at all times.
Mr. Oshima (Japan): It is a matter of great regret that the Council has been compelled to act in this Chamber on another resolution regarding Iran’s nuclear issue only five months after adopting resolution 1696 (2006). Over the course of this year, we have had intensive discussions on the Iranian nuclear issue in the Council as concerted international efforts continued for the purpose of seeking a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of this problem by the States concerned, including my own. These efforts, however, have failed to produce positive results.
In defiance of resolution 1696 (2006), Iran has refused to take any steps required of it to comply with the measures set out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Security Council, including the suspension of enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities. On the contrary, the situation has worsened, with Iran’s expansion of its enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities.
Japan attaches great importance to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as an issue that can affect its own national peace and security and that of the international community. Proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, along with their means of delivery, is a clear and present global challenge posing a great threat and must be handled with firm determination. It is our strong belief that, in order to counter such a threat, actual or potential, the international community must act appropriately, resolutely and in a timely manner wherever it occurs, be it in the Middle East, North-East Asia or elsewhere in the world. We believe that Iran’s case, where it has failed to comply with the requirements set out by the IAEA and the Security Council, must be dealt with based on the basis of a principled stand.
At the same time, the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy by all States is also important and must be fully respected and protected. Iran has that right, just as much as any other country. We hope and expect that, in the exercise of that right, Iran will fully comply with its international obligations and give its utmost cooperation to the IAEA so that it will be able to enjoy fully the fruits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Because of the importance of non-proliferation, and taking into account the measured approach in the text, Japan voted in favour of the resolution. However, this resolution does not mean the end of the negotiations on the issue. The resolution keeps the door open for negotiations with Iran and explicitly mentions the reversibility of the measures that it introduces.
Japan enjoys the right to the peaceful of use of nuclear energy to the fullest in full compliance with its international obligations. We are a country that traditionally has enjoyed good, important relations with Iran. In adopting this resolution, we earnestly hope and appeal to Iran that it will seek to resolve this issue at the earliest possible time through diplomatic negotiations in full respect of its international obligations. That ought not to be impossible. To that end, Japan will continue to contribute to the efforts to resolve the issue through bilateral negotiations with Iran and other diplomatic channels.
Mr. Wang Guangya (China) (spoke in Chinese): Since the beginning of this year, Iran’s nuclear issue has attracted more and more attention in the world. Regrettably and disappointingly, Iran has yet to respond positively to the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Security Council and show flexibility on the suspension of enrichment-related activities.
After issuing a presidential statement (S/PRST/2005/15) in March and adopting resolution 1696 (2006) in July on Iran’s nuclear issue, the Security Council has today adopted another resolution, aiming at safeguarding the international nuclear non-proliferation mechanism, reinforcing the IAEA’s authority and role, and promoting diplomatic efforts to seek peaceful solutions to Iran’s nuclear issue. The Chinese delegation has therefore voted in favour of the draft resolution before us.
China wishes to emphasize that sanctions are not the end, but are a means to urge Iran to resume negotiations. The sanction measures adopted by the Security Council this time are limited and reversible, and they target proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. There are also explicit provisions indicating that if Iran suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, complies with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and meets the requirements of the IAEA, the Security Council would suspend and even terminate the sanction measures.
The Security Council cannot handle Iran’s nuclear issue single-handedly. The IAEA remains the principal mechanism for dealing with this issue. Dialogue and negotiations are the fundamental, indeed the only, way out. The solution to Iran’s nuclear issue requires all-around diplomatic efforts.
Diplomatic efforts outside the Security Council in particular should be strengthened. The resolution welcomes the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to a negotiated solution to this issue, and encourages Iran to engage with those six countries’ proposals for a long-term comprehensive agreement. Such an accord would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. All these aspects would be conducive to reactivating a new round of diplomatic efforts.
All along, China has supported safeguarding the international nuclear non-proliferation mechanism and opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We do not wish to see new turbulence in the Middle East. We are in favour of a peaceful solution to Iran’s nuclear issue through political and diplomatic efforts and negotiations.
Under the current circumstances, we wish to call upon all the parties concerned to adopt a highly responsible and constructive attitude, remain calm, practice restraint, and refrain from taking any steps that would harm diplomatic efforts and lead to a deterioration of the situation. At the same time, we hope that the parties will seek to resume negotiations in a creative and forward-looking manner and continue to spare no effort in seeking to enhance diplomatic endeavours in favour of the comprehensive and peaceful solution of Iran’s nuclear issue.
China is ready to continue to work jointly with all the parties concerned and contribute to maintaining international and regional peace and stability, safeguarding and consolidating the international non-proliferation mechanism, and resolving Iran’s nuclear issue through political and diplomatic efforts.
Mr. Manongi (United Republic of Tanzania): The United Republic of Tanzania voted in favour of the resolution we have just adopted. We voted thus while regretting the fruitless outcome of the diplomatic efforts made to engage the Islamic Republic of Iran and ensure its pursuit of the peaceful uses of nuclear activities. We have stated on many occasions that, as a matter of principle, the United Republic of Tanzania is opposed to the development or possession of nuclear weapons by any party, including our traditional friends.
We are therefore opposed to nuclear proliferation and strongly support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the non-proliferation regime it establishes under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), of which we are a member. We expect all IAEA members, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to uphold the obligations set forth in the Treaty.
The United Republic of Tanzania firmly believes in the right of the people of Iran to civilian nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The current resolution does not in any way seek to constrain that right. It should be made clear, however, that any such programme has to be subjected to a verifiable inspection regime and the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In our view, the provisions of the resolution should also not constrain other legal and commercial transactions that have no bearing on non-proliferation.
The United Republic of Tanzania had hoped all along that the relevant parties would utilize available avenues to resolve the highly sensitive Iranian nuclear issue peacefully through negotiations. We place faith in the capacity of the parties to build on the positive aspects of the dialogue and to return to the negotiations under mutually acceptable terms. Unfortunately, progress has been painfully slow due to the uncompromising positions pursued by both sides. Despite tremendous efforts to overcome the differences, the situation has remained deadlocked, mainly over the issue of enrichment and reprocessing activities as a condition for further negotiations. We believe that this issue can still be overcome by the negotiators.
The United Republic of Tanzania voted in favour of the resolution because we believe that the impasse is reversible if good political will prevails among all the parties involved in the discussions. The resolution is to be taken as a signal and a call to revisit the issue at the earliest opportunity.
Mr. Mayoral (Argentina) (spoke in Spanish): At the outset, I should like to state that Argentina voted in favour of resolution 1737 (2006), just adopted, because the resolution reaffirms the inalienable right enjoyed by all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons under articles I and II of the Treaty to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.
At the same time, on behalf of my Government, I express our confidence that the Government of Iran will in the future pursue its nuclear programme exclusively for peaceful purposes, following the parameters established by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Moreover, on a different point, we note our satisfaction that the resolution was adopted unanimously and under article 41 of the United Nations Charter. In other words, there is no possibility under resolution 1737 (2006) of recourse to the use of force.
We would point out that the peaceful settlement of international conflicts should be the United Nations main objective. To that end, its principal aim should be to maintain international peace and security, and that is Argentina’s understanding in this instance. We therefore issue a new call to all parties involved to resume dialogue in order to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
Mr. Zarif (Islamic Republic of Iran): Today is a sad day for the non-proliferation regime. Only a few days ago, the Prime Minister of the Israeli regime boasted about his regime’s nuclear weapons, but instead of even raising an eyebrow, let alone addressing that serious threat to international peace and security and to the non-proliferation regime, the Security Council is imposing sanctions on a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that, unlike Israel, has never attacked or threatened to use force against any Member of the United Nations; has categorically rejected the development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons on ideological and strategic grounds; was prepared to provide guarantees that it would never withdraw from the NPT; has placed all its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); fully implemented the Additional Protocol for over two years, and stated its readiness to resume its implementation; allowed over 2,000 person days of IAEA scrutiny of all its related and unrelated facilities, resulting in repeated statements by the Agency on the absence of any evidence of diversion; voluntarily suspended its lawful enrichment activities for over two years, as verified by the IAEA, in order to build confidence and provide ample opportunity to find a mutually acceptable solution, if that ever were the intention of its negotiating partners; presented various far-reaching proposals to ensure permanent non-diversion; and has consistently called for time-bound and unconditional negotiations to find a mutually acceptable solution — a call that was repeated yesterday by the Iranian Foreign Minister.
The same Governments that have pushed this Council to take groundless punitive measures against Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme have systematically prevented the Council from taking any action to nudge the Israeli regime towards submitting itself to the rules governing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. By so doing, they have provided it with wide latitude and even encouragement to indulge freely in the clandestine development and unlawful possession of nuclear weapons, and even in public boasting about them with impunity.
As I pointed out in my letter of 20 December 2006 addressed to you, Mr. President, it is indisputable that nuclear weapons in the hands of an Israeli regime with an unparalleled record of non-compliance with Security Council resolutions — if that is the criteria that is being applied today — and a long and dark catalogue of crimes and atrocities, such as occupation, aggression, militarism, State terrorism, crimes against humanity and even apartheid, pose a uniquely grave threat to regional and international peace and security. The reversal of the hypocritical policy of strategic ambiguity followed by the Israeli regime has removed any excuse — if there ever were any — for continued inaction by the Council in the face of that actual threat to international peace and security.
The reaction of the Security Council to the Israeli regime’s unlawful possession of nuclear weapons will show whether the Council is even considering to act — as it is obliged to do under Article 24 of the Charter — on behalf of the members of the international community that have made their views on that issue abundantly clear, or whether it is merely a tool in the toolbox of a few of its permanent members, which only misuse it to fix their foreign policy problems and to serve their short-sighted perceived interests.
With such tendencies, it is not at all surprising that a nation is being punished for exercising its inalienable rights, primarily at the behest of a dangerous regime with aggression and war crimes as its signature brand of behaviour, which is apparently being rewarded today for having clandestinely developed and unlawfully possessed nuclear weapons. Does anyone expect that to enhance the credibility of the Council or to strengthen the authority of the NPT?
Put into perspective, today’s resolution can only remind the Iranian people of the historic injustices that this Security Council has done to them over the past six decades. It is reminiscent of the attempt made in the Council to punish the Iranian people for their nationalization of their oil industry, claimed to present a threat to peace. It is also a reminder of the Council’s indifference in the face of a military coup, organized by two of its permanent members, which restored the dictatorship. It refreshes the memory of the Iranian people of the time when the Council did not consider the massive invasion of Iran by the former Iraqi regime as a threat to international peace and security, and refused to even call on the invading army to withdraw from Iranian territory. It brings back the horrors of the long years when this Council turned a blind eye to the extensive and brutal use of chemical weapons against Iranian civilians and soldiers and, by so doing, made itself responsible for the tens of thousands of Iranians who continue to suffer and perish as a result of chemical weapons whose components, incidentally, came from certain countries permanently seated in this Council. We do not need to go far to find those victims. Only last month, I lost one of my brightest colleagues in the mission, Mahdi Vahidi, to cancer caused by those very chemical weapons. He was only 39 years old.
I dealt with the pretexts used for the involvement of the Security Council in Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme in my statement before the Council on 30 July. I will not repeat them today. Allow me to simply make a few points.
The bringing of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme to the Council by a few of its permanent members, particularly the United States, is not aimed at seeking, nor will it help to find, a solution or at encouraging negotiations. Even their stated objective is not to achieve that. Their stated objective has always been to use the Council as an instrument of pressure and intimidation to compel Iran to abandon its rights. Knowing their bright recent history, we can all assume what the unstated objective has been. Allow me to provide just two examples of the stated objective.
An informal paper entitled “Options for Addressing Iran’s Nuclear Programme at the United Nations Security Council”, circulated by the United States mission in October 2004 — exactly when the United States three European Union (EU) allies were ostensibly engaged in negotiations with Iran — states:
“The United States has long believed that Iran’s nuclear activities must be reported to the United Nations Security Council … The United Nations Security Council has the legal authority to require Iran to stop its enrichment programme.”
That was the intention. As to our negotiating partners, the Political Director of the British Foreign Office, in a letter dated 16 March 2006 addressed to his counterparts in France, Germany and the United States, revealed the more conniving British plan:
“We may also need to remove one of the Iranian arguments that the suspension called for is ‘voluntary’. We could do [that] by making the voluntary suspension a mandatory requirement to the Security Council.”
The letter gets even more interesting as we read on:
“I agreed to circulate a short paper which we might use as a sort of speaking note with the Russians and Chinese. Implicit in the paper is a recognition that we are not going to bring the Russians and Chinese to accept significant sanctions over the coming months, certainly not without further efforts to bring the Iranians around … In return for the Russians and Chinese agreeing to [a Chapter VII resolution], we would then want to put together a package that could be presented to the Iranians as a new proposal.”
Now we see what motivated the presentation of the infamous package of incentives presented to Iran on 6 June 2006, and now we see why the United States and its EU three partners never even took the trouble to study various Iranian proposals. They were from the very beginning bent on abusing this Council and the threat of referral and sanctions as an instrument of pressure to compel Iran to abandon the exercise of its NPT-guaranteed right to peaceful nuclear technology. It is now an open secret that their sole objective in the negotiations has always been to impose and then prolong and perpetuate the suspension of Iran’s rights, in line with their arbitrary and fluctuating red lines. Finding solutions has never even been among the objectives.
Suspension is not a solution. It is at best a temporary — one might call it a stop-gap — measure to allow time to find a real solution. Such a suspension was in place for over two years and, contrary to the excuse that the proponents of the resolution have presented here and there, the IAEA repeatedly verified that Iran fully suspended what it had agreed to suspend in each and every report from November 2003 to February 2006. So, we had a suspension for two years and on-and-off negotiations for three. The question is: What has been done during those three years to find an agreement?
Have the EU three or the United States presented any proposal on what measures — short of outright revision of the NPT — would remove their so-called proliferation concerns? Having failed to do so, did they ever consider the far-reaching proposals that were offered by Iran in Paris on 23 March, 2005, which the EU three negotiators initially considered to contain positive elements? Did they ever propose how those positive elements could be enhanced or how the points of divergence could be bridged? Or did they, after consultations with a certain absent party, come back and simply say “It is not good enough. Continue to suspend”? Did they even bother to read our proposal of 18 July 2005, which suggested:
“Allow the Agency to develop an optimized arrangement on numbers, monitoring mechanism and other specifics for an initial limited operation at Natanz, which would address our needs and allay [their] concerns”?
Did they ponder the far-reaching non-proliferation potential of the proposal by the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in his address to the General Assembly on 17 September 2005? Let me refresh the memory of Council members. On that occasion, he said,
“in order to provide the greatest degree of transparency, the Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to engage in serious partnerships with the private and public sectors of other countries in the implementation of a uranium enrichment programme in Iran”. (A/60/PV.10, p. 8)
Did they respond to the concrete proposal by the Iranian Foreign Minster at the Conference on Disarmament on 30 March 2006? Allow me to quote what he said.
“In our view, one option to resolve the issue could be the establishment of regional consortia on fuel cycle development with the participation of regional countries . . . Of course, countries outside the region may also participate in such regional arrangements . . . The facility would also be jointly owned by the sharing countries, and the work could be divided based on the expertise of the participants.” (CD/PV.1015, pp. 6-7)
Were these suggestions not an exact replica of the main proposal of the IAEA experts on multinational approaches to nuclear fuel cycle activities published on 22 February 2005? For those members who may have not seen the report, it suggests
“promoting voluntary conversion of existing facilities to [multilateral nuclear approaches (MNAs)], and pursuing them as confidence-building measures, with the participation of NPT non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States, and non-NPT States . . . [and] creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, multinational, and in particular regional, MNAs for new facilities based on joint ownership, drawing rights or co-management for front-end and back-end nuclear facilities, such as uranium enrichment”.
Did the Iranian readiness to implement these ideas almost verbatim not present a unique opportunity to create a global model to strengthen the NPT and remove concerns about fuel cycle activities based on the recommendation of the best international experts brought together by the IAEA for this exact purpose? Was any other country with similar technology prepared to be as flexible as Iran? Did the United States and its European allies seriously consider our detailed reply of 22 August 2006, which, unlike their practice, provided a point-by-point reply to their 6 June package and made genuine proposals to address its shortcomings? All I know is that they even refused to refer to it in the present resolution.
Did they discuss the offer of an international consortium which was presented by Iran in the course of the September and October 2006 negotiations in Vienna and Berlin and was initially considered very promising, leading to public statements of progress after those meetings — a prognosis that was rapidly and astonishingly reversed even before the ministerial meeting of the five-plus-one?
Many other similar questions may be asked. But the answer to all of them will be the same, because what the United States, and apparently the EU-3 — in spite of what they told us during the negotiations — wanted, and the only outcome that they were and are ready to accept from these so-called negotiations, was — and still is — that Iran should “make a binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities”, as it is phrased in package proposed by the EU 3, of August 2005.
We are here because we did not accept that unlawful demand, which, as many here already know, would not have been their last demand. At the same time, we were prepared to go to any length to allay their so-called proliferation concerns, in spite of the fact that we all know that these are no more than sheer unfounded and self-serving excuses. Indeed, old-hand proliferators and suppliers of chemical weapons and nuclear weapon technology can hardly have proliferation concerns.
The sponsors tell you that they do not trust our intentions. But the problem is that their “intentionometer” has a rather abysmal record of chronic malfunction. Suffice it to say that the former United States Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates, in testimony before Congress in March 1992, claimed that Iran was trying to acquire a nuclear weapons capability and added that this goal was unlikely to be achieved before the year 2000 — seven years ago. Later, in November of the same year, a draft National Intelligence Estimate by the same Central Intelligence Agency concluded that Iran was making progress on a nuclear arms programme and could develop a nuclear weapon by 2000 — seven years ago. Now, the same intelligence establishment is saying, not before 2015.
Accusing Iran of having “the intention” of acquiring nuclear weapons has, since the early 1980s, been a tool used to deprive Iran of any nuclear technology, even a light water reactor or fuel for the American-built research reactor. I wonder which “Iranian intention” or which “proliferation concern” has prompted the main proponents of today’s resolution to prevent Iran, for the past 27 years, from even acquiring civilian aircraft — or even spare parts for the civilian aircraft they sold to Iran, thereby jeopardizing the lives and safety of Iranian civilians, whom they hypocritically try to court these days — and, I might add, to no avail.
As IAEA Director General ElBaradei recently said,
“A lot of what you see about Iran right now is assessment of intentions ... But one of the lessons we learned from Iraq is that we really need to be very, very careful coming to conclusions, because these issues make the difference between war and peace”.
As we are talking about intentions, while the main proponents of the resolution may have self-servingly claimed that they doubt ours, they themselves have said and done plenty so that no body in Iran or elsewhere in the world could have any illusions about theirs: one need only read the recent dangerously divisive statement by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Or take a look at the 23 August report by the staff of the Intelligence Committee of the United States House of Representatives on Iran’s nuclear programme. That report was so dangerously misleading and so illustrative of the extent to which some war-mongers are prepared to go that it compelled the IAEA to officially dispute its allegations against Iran. In its letter, the IAEA called parts of the report “outrageous and dishonest” and containing “incorrect and misleading assertions”, and it offered evidence to refute the report’s central claims. The Agency stressed that the report even seriously distorted IAEA findings on Iran’s nuclear activities.
Let me conclude by reiterating that the Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believes that the days of weapons of mass murder have long passed, that these inhumane instruments of indiscriminate slaughter have not brought about internal stability or external security for anyone and that they will not be able to do so in the future.
Unlike some who despise the NPT and international law in general, we have a high stake in preserving, fully implementing, strengthening and universalizing the NPT. Today’s decision does exactly the opposite; That should be no surprise because it was championed by a non-member of the NPT, coupled with its main benefactor, which made no secret of its contempt for this and other disarmament instruments. None of us has forgotten last year’s World Summit when even the word “disarmament” was removed by the famous “red pen”.
By the same token, we believe that the days of bullying, pressure and intimidation by some nuclear weapon holders are long gone. We are told that we need to build confidence. Indeed, we all do in this tumultuous world. But confidence can only be built through respect for and the non-discriminatory application of the law. Those are the only objective criteria. Anything else would be to accept the whims of the powerful. International law and international treaties cannot be the subject of arbitrary, fluctuating and self-serving reinterpretations, readjustments or red lines even if they are connivingly imposed through resolutions. Such a precedent is dangerous for everyone.
The Security Council would go a long way in addressing its own confidence deficit by truly acting on behalf of the United Nations membership, as mandated by Article 24 of the Charter. Nearly two thirds of them are members of the Non-Aligned Movement or the Organization of Islamic Conference which, at the summit level, have reaffirmed that “States’ choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and its fuel cycle policies must be respected”, and have “expressed concern over ... threats and pressures on Iran by certain circles to renounce its inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”. They have also clarified where the real threat to international peace and security does in fact lie, by, again at the summit level, “expressing grave concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States”.
That is the real issue that States Members of the United Nations expected the Security Council to be seized of.
The President (spoke in Arabic): The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.