The Security Council,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, and its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006, and reaffirming their provisions,
Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,
Recalling its serious concern over the reports of the IAEA Director General as set out in its resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006),
Recalling the latest report by the IAEA Director General (GOV/2007/8) of 22 February 2007 and deploring that, as indicated therein, Iran has failed to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006),
Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative to seek a negotiated solution,
Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,
Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,
Recalling the requirement on States to join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council,
Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);
2. Calls upon all States also to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of that resolution;
3. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution and resolution 1737 (2006), including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;
4. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annex I to this resolution;
5. Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;
6. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms to Iran, and in the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilizing accumulation of arms;
7. Calls upon all States and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes;
8. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;
9. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;
10. Welcomes the continuous affirmation of the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this resolution, which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), and acknowledges with appreciation that this offer to Iran remains on the table, for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;
11. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA, which is internationally recognized as having authority for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its Statute, to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;
12. Requests within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;
13. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:
(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;
(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;
(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1737 (2006) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) (aka Ammunition Industries Group) (AMIG controls 7th of Tir, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in Iran’s centrifuge programme. AMIG is in turn owned and controlled by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
2. Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran’s (AEOI) Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities. AEOI is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
3. Kavoshyar Company (Subsidiary company of AEOI, which has sought glass fibres, vacuum chamber furnaces and laboratory equipment for Iran’s nuclear programme)
4. Parchin Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO, which produces ammunition, explosives, as well as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)
5. Karaj Nuclear Research Centre (Part of AEOI’s research division)
6. Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates within AEOI and has transferred funds on behalf of AEOI to entities associated with Iran’s nuclear programme)
7. Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence Missile Industry Group) (Production and development of cruise missiles. Responsible for naval missiles including cruise missiles)
8. Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International (Bank Sepah provides support for the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates, including Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
9. Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO, which has purchased equipment on AIO’s behalf for the missile programme)
10. Ya Mahdi Industries Group (subordinate to AIO, which is involved in international purchases of missile equipment)
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps entities
1. Qods Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), parachutes, para-gliders, para-motors, etc. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has boasted of using these products as part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)
2. Pars Aviation Services Company (Maintains various aircraft including MI-171, used by IRGC Air Force)
3. Sho’a’ Aviation (Produces micro-lights which IRGC has claimed it is using as part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)
Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities
1. Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics, working closely with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, designated below)
2. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi (Senior MODAFL scientist and former head of the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to interview him about the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but Iran has refused)
3. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)
4. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center, which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)
5. Mohsen Hojati (Head of Fajr Industrial Group, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
6. Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (Head of SBIG, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)
7. Naser Maleki (Head of SHIG, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Naser Maleki is also a MODAFL official overseeing work on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile programme. The Shahab-3 is Iran’s long range ballistic missile currently in service)
8. Ahmad Derakhshandeh (Chairman and Managing Director of Bank Sepah, which provides support for the AIO and subordinates, including SHIG and SBIG, both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps key persons
1. Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie (Deputy Commander of IRGC)
2. Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff)
3. Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi (Commander of IRGC Ground Forces)
4. Rear Admiral Morteza Safari (Commander of IRGC Navy)
5. Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Commander of Bassij resistance force)
6. Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani (Commander of Qods force)
7. General Zolqadr (IRGC officer, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs)
Elements of a long-term agreement
Our goal is to develop relations and cooperation with Iran, based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. We propose a fresh start in the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement with Iran. Such an agreement would be deposited with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and endorsed in a Security Council resolution.
To create the right conditions for negotiations,
• Reaffirm Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter, NPT), and in this context reaffirm our support for the development by Iran of a civil nuclear energy programme.
• Commit to support actively the building of new light water reactors in Iran through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and NPT.
• Agree to suspend discussion of Iran’s nuclear programme in the Security Council upon the resumption of negotiations.
• Commit to addressing all of the outstanding concerns of IAEA through full cooperation with IAEA.
• Suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by IAEA, as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Security Council, and commit to continue this during these negotiations.
• Resume the implementation of the Additional Protocol.
Areas of future cooperation to be covered in negotiations on a long-term agreement
We will take the following steps:
Iran’s rights to nuclear energy
• Reaffirm Iran’s inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of NPT, and cooperate with Iran in the development by Iran of a civil nuclear power programme.
• Negotiate and implement a Euratom/Iran nuclear cooperation agreement.
Light water reactors
• Actively support the building of new light water power reactors in Iran through international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA statute and NPT, using state-of-the-art technology, including by authorizing the transfer of necessary goods and the provision of advanced technology to make its power reactors safe against earthquakes.
• Provide cooperation with the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste through appropriate arrangements.
Research and development in nuclear energy
• Provide a substantive package of research and development cooperation, including possible provision of light water research reactors, notably in the fields of radioisotope production, basic research and nuclear applications in medicine and agriculture.
• Give legally binding, multilayered fuel assurances to Iran, based on:
◦ Participation as a partner in an international facility in Russia to provide enrichment services for a reliable supply of fuel to Iran’s nuclear reactors. Subject to negotiations, such a facility could enrich all uranium hexaflouride (UF6) produced in Iran.
◦ Establishment on commercial terms of a buffer stock to hold a reserve of up to five years’ supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to Iran, with the participation and under supervision of IAEA.
◦ Development with IAEA of a standing multilateral mechanism for reliable access to nuclear fuel, based on ideas to be considered at the next meeting of the Board of Governors.
Review of moratorium
The long-term agreement would, with regard to common efforts to build international confidence, contain a clause for review of the agreement in all its aspects, to follow:
• Confirmation by IAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns reported by it, including those activities which could have a military nuclear dimension, have been resolved;
• Confirmation that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in Iran and that international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s civil nuclear programme has been restored.
2. Political and economic
Regional security cooperation
Support for a new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional security issues.
International trade and investment
Improving Iran’s access to the international economy, markets and capital, through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization and to create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with Iran (including a trade and economic cooperation agreement with the European Union). Steps would be taken to improve access to key goods and technology.
Civil aviation cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on United States and European manufacturers in regard to the export of civil aircraft to Iran, thereby widening the prospect of Iran renewing its fleet of civil airliners.
Establishment of a long-term energy partnership between Iran and the European Union and other willing partners, with concrete and practical applications.
Support for the modernization of Iran’s telecommunication infrastructure and advanced Internet provision, including by possible removal of relevant United States and other export restrictions.
High technology cooperation
Cooperation in fields of high technology and other areas to be agreed upon.
Support for agricultural development in Iran, including possible access to United States and European agricultural products, technology and farm equipment.
The President, Mr. Kumalo (South Africa): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran in which they request to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council’s agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the consideration of the item without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mottaki (Islamic Republic of Iran) took a seat at the Council table; Mr. Matussek (Germany) took the seat reserved for him at the side of the Council Chamber.
The President: The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.
Members of the Council have before them document S/2007/170, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2007/100, which contains the note by the President of the Security Council transmitting the report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
I shall first call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements before the voting.
Mr. Al-Nasser (Qatar) (spoke in Arabic): The State of Qatar believes that Iran has the right to nuclear energy research and production for peaceful purposes. That is an inalienable right of Iran under articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that no one can deny. We do not doubt Iran’s genuine intentions as regards the peaceful purposes of its nuclear programme.
We are deeply saddened that the Security Council is being forced to impose new sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran. We do not view sanctions as an appropriate means of pressure. On the contrary, sanctions can sometimes complicate matters and, in our opinion, signal another failure at diplomatic efforts. Continued pressure does not help to build confidence, which is already lost between the two parties; rather, it can sometimes have serious consequences, given the already volatile situation in that region of the world. The dead end that has been reached in the negotiations between the countries concerned and Iran makes it necessary for us to seek new prospects and to explore all possible means that could pave the way to a peaceful solution to this impasse through diplomatic means.
The State of Qatar is keen to see all States adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We believe that to be a bedrock principle from which we cannot deviate. Even as we voted against resolution 1696 (2006), we were absolutely clear that we were not expressing an opinion opposed to that principle; rather, we wanted to allow Iran more time to study the offer put to it by the group of six countries. We look forward to seeing specific proposals from both parties that can contribute to revitalizing the prospects for a diplomatic solution.
Addressing non-proliferation issues, which is the basis for the positive vote to be cast by the State of Qatar, should not be done selectively. We do not see the Council dealing with those issues with different criteria. In our view, the Council is required to follow the same approach towards countries that do not comply with their obligations under the NPT, as well as towards those that do not respect it in the first place. That is why we introduced a clear and direct proposal regarding the draft resolution on the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. We regret that the sponsors of that draft resolution did not take that proposal on board.
Mr. Gayama (Congo) (spoke in French): Allow me to explain the vote that my delegation will cast shortly in connection with the very sensitive issue of compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Since it began its term on the Council, Congo has understood that the unity of the Security Council is essential to give the necessary authority to the messages it sends to the entire international community or to individual Member States. It was with that concern in mind that Congo participated constructively in the debates that took place prior to this meeting on this issue. The decision we are about to take is of particular importance.
Congo believes that this is basically and only about ensuring compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It is important to keep in mind that the NPT is based on three pillars that must be equally observed. The first is non-proliferation, which is the subject of this meeting. The second is nuclear disarmament, which would send a strong message as to the genuine desire of nuclear Powers to firmly commit themselves to the path of confidence-building measures. And the third is the inalienable right of signatory States to develop and have access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Congo reaffirms its commitment to the full implementation of the Treaty and the need to respect the right of every State party — including the Islamic Republic of Iran — to use civil nuclear energy and to develop the capacity to produce it.
However, we understand that the main problem in this case is the lack of trust in the strictly peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, that programme has been outside the scope of any controls for almost 20 years. Congo believes that the solution to this crisis is to be found through dialogue and negotiation, without any threats to use force. It is for that reason that Congo urges the continuation of negotiations within the existing framework or in another context.
The vote we will cast shortly should therefore not be interpreted as an expression of any sort of hostility or punitive measure. The role of the Security Council is not to become an instrument of coercion. Through its vote, Congo would like to signal the steps that Iran should take, which should include the suspension of its uranium enrichment programme. That would not be a sign on weakness, but rather a reassuring gesture allowing the rebuilding of confidence in order to find a peaceful and lasting solution. Congo therefore urges Iran — a country with which we have normal relations — to heed our call and to opt for dialogue and cooperation.
Mr. Jenie (Indonesia): Indonesia is of the view that the purpose of the draft resolution is not to punish the Government or people of Iran, but to be a vehicle for persuading the Iranian Government to comply with previous resolutions of the Council and resolve outstanding issues with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It must therefore be clear that the draft resolution is not a final, irrevocable position, but a reversible one.
The draft resolution provides for suspension of the implementation measure consequent upon two related conditions. Those involve Iran taking action to suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, that action to be verified by the IAEA, a compliance that would then set the stage for negotiations that should be in good faith and aimed at reaching an early and mutually acceptable outcome. We understand that the parties are in total agreement to that approach. It is also of great significance that the measures specified in Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) would also be terminated following the determination that Iran has complied with its obligations.
Should Iran feel it to be necessary to move ahead towards a negotiated solution, the draft resolution provides that opportunity in accordance with the proposals made in June 2006, which are still on the table and serve as the basis for operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution. We therefore enjoin the Government of Iran to keep that door open, because through it lies a comprehensive negotiated agreement based on mutual respect and international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
The delegation of Indonesia notes that the draft resolution has accommodated some of the concerns of my Government and that several of our amendments were taken on board. Those include the reference to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction that firmly notes that we are concerned about the problem of non-proliferation in general and in the region in particular. We believe that the establishment of zones free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is a critical measure towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The establishment of such zones, including in the Middle East, will contribute to strengthening regional and global peace and security.
One paragraph concerns the need for all State parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to comply fully with all of their obligations under the Treaty. Our understanding of the paragraph is that the three pillars of the NPT should be pursued in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. We have consistently expressed our view that not only should we emphasize the non-proliferation obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States, but we must also require nuclear-weapon States to comply fully with their nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty. The article expressly states that
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
It is our conviction that in the end, the only guarantee for eliminating the fear caused by the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. All concerned parties are called upon, in the interest of an early and mutually acceptable diplomatic outcome, to negotiate in good faith.
Finally, I wish to stress that the solution to the issue of Iran should in no way affect or change the inalienable rights of all parties to the NPT, including Iran, to develop and research the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, in accordance with the Treaty. That remains an inalienable right of all State parties to the Treaty that should always be respected.
With that understanding, my delegation will vote in favour of the resolution.
The President: I should like to make a statement in explanation of vote in my national capacity, as the representative of South Africa.
South Africa will vote in favour of the resolution before the Council today. Although far from ideal, it is a consequence of concern about the need to build international confidence in Iran’s nuclear programme.
South Africa approached the resolution on its merits and with the perspective of a country that is not party to any dispute or conflict. The Council is well aware that South Africa is fully committed to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and is therefore a strong advocate against both the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Inevitably, we are against the development of nuclear weapons by Iran, or any other country, for that matter. Our position is informed by our own national experience as the only country, to have voluntarily dismantled its nuclear weapons and related programmes.
In that regard, South Africa acts on the basis of principle and in full support of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), where we are an active member of the Board of Governors. We work consistently to promote consensus within the IAEA.
While South Africa recognizes that the Security Council may be called upon to impose coercive measures such as sanctions, we believe those measures should be utilized with great caution and only to support the resumption of political dialogue and negotiations to achieve a peaceful solution. South Africa’s interventions in the Council have therefore focused on trying to de-escalate tensions, promote dialogue to establish confidence in the nuclear programme of Iran and ensure that the IAEA inspectors remain on the ground in Iran and that Iran remains part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
South Africa has always been very clear, as a matter of principle, that the Security Council must remain within its mandate of addressing threats to international peace and security. If the sponsors of the resolution were convinced that the Iranian programme was a threat to international peace, then the Security Council should have been asked to take a decision on a draft that would have concentrated on that, and not to act as if the Iranian Government itself posed a threat to international peace and security.
South Africa proposed a number of constructive amendments to the draft resolution. Our purpose was to assist the Security Council to find language for a new resolution that matched the stated objectives of the sponsors that the resolution would be “proportionate, incremental and reversible”.
We remain deeply disappointed that not all our proposals were accommodated. The resolution does, however, correctly acknowledge that there is a need to respect the right of all countries, including Iran, to exploit the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, subject to appropriate safeguards. We are particularly pleased with the fact that the resolution now reaffirms the need of all States parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations, which corresponds to our view that the twin obligations of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation require our equal attention. After all, there is no basis for arguing that weapons of mass destruction are safe in some hands and not in others.
We note that the IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However, we share the concern of the IAEA Director General that the Agency continues to be unable “to reconstruct fully the history of Iran’s nuclear programme and some of its components” because the necessary level of transparency and cooperation have not been provided by Iran.
Like other members of the Council, South Africa sought to engage in the negotiation process in its national capacity, mindful of the duty bestowed on all Council members to contribute towards a peaceful and negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear stand-off, which is an issue that affects the entire international community — indeed, humanity as a whole.
The 15 members of the Security Council will take a difficult decision, and after today’s vote a great deal of work still lies ahead if the international community hopes to prevent heightened tensions from spiralling out of control, to the detriment of all. A path needs to be urgently found back to negotiations, restraint and compromise on all sides. South Africa therefore hopes that the latest offer by Iran to resume negotiations will lead to concrete results.
South Africa urges Iran to provide the necessary assistance and cooperation to the Agency in its efforts to resolve the outstanding issues as soon as possible, since that will make a substantial contribution to building confidence in Iran’s nuclear programme. It is imperative that confidence be established in Iran’s nuclear programme for peaceful purposes.
Every effort must be made to resume dialogue and enter into meaningful negotiations to find a sustainable long-term solution to this matter, since no one will win through a process of confrontation that could lead to disastrous consequences in a highly volatile region.
We hope, therefore, that support for this draft resolution will not be perceived as an obstacle to future negotiations. It is in that spirit that we will vote in favour of the draft resolution.
I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.
A vote was taken by show of hands.
Belgium, China, Congo, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Panama, Peru, Qatar, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America
The President: There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1747 (2007).
I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.
Sir Emyr Jones Parry (United Kingdom): I would like to begin by reading out the text of a statement that has been agreed by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with the support of the High Representative of the European Union. The statement reads as follows:
“The unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 1747 (2007) reflects the international community’s profound concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme. We deplore Iran’s failure to comply with the earlier resolutions of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and we call upon Iran once again to comply fully with all its international obligations.
“We are committed to seeking a negotiated solution that would address the international community’s concerns. The purpose of negotiations would be to reach a comprehensive agreement with Iran, based on mutual respect, that would re-establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and would open the way to improving relations and developing wider cooperation between Iran and all our countries.
“We recognize Iran’s rights under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations. In that respect, future arrangements, modalities and timing will be dealt with in negotiations.
“Full transparency and cooperation by Iran with the International Atomic Energy Agency is essential in order to address outstanding concerns. We reiterate our full support for the Agency and its staff.
“We stand by our suspension-for-suspension proposal. That means that for the duration of negotiations — which would take place within an agreed time frame, extendable by mutual agreement — Iran would maintain an Agency-verified suspension, as required by Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) and, now, resolution 1747 (2007). Security Council discussion of Iran’s nuclear programme would also be suspended, as would the implementation of the measures adopted under the relevant Council resolutions.
“We reconfirm that the proposals we presented to Iran in June 2006 stay on the table. They include cooperation with Iran on civil nuclear energy, legally binding guarantees on the supply of nuclear fuel and wider political, security and economic cooperation. Those proposals remain on the table.
“We urge Iran to take this opportunity to engage with us all to find a negotiated way forward. Our proposals would bring far-reaching benefits to Iran and to the region, and they provide a means to address the international community’s concerns while taking account of Iran’s legitimate interests.
“In a region that has known too much instability and violence, let us find an agreed way forward that builds confidence and promotes peace and mutual respect. In that spirit, we propose further talks with the Islamic Republic of Iran to see if a mutually acceptable way can be found to open negotiations.”
That concludes the statement on behalf of the six Foreign Ministers. I should like now to make some remarks in my national capacity.
It is just short of a year since the Security Council first took action on the Iranian nuclear issue, following the referral of the issue to the Council by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Our concern throughout has been twofold: to promote prospects for a negotiated solution, on which suspension of enrichment by Iran depends; and, secondly, to reinforce the role of the Agency, as our resolution today again does.
Those concerns led to the elaboration of a detailed offer of long-term cooperation from the six nations whose Ministers’ statement I have just read. But those Ministers also agreed to seek further Security Council action on Iran should our demands not be met.
Iran’s continuing defiance prompted the adoption of resolution 1696 (2006) in July 2006, setting the framework for the Council’s actions, including a binding Chapter VII decision that Iran should suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. Despite that, Iran ignored the Council.
That led in turn to further Council action. On 23 December, the Security Council adopted — as today, by unanimity — resolution 1737 (2006), reaffirming the mandatory requirement that Iran suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and clarifying that Iran must also suspend construction of the heavy-water research reactor at Arak. It also introduced a number of measures aimed at restricting Iran’s development of sensitive nuclear technologies and its development of ballistic missiles that could deliver them.
Those measures were an incremental and proportionate response to Iran’s continued failure to comply with the requirements of resolution 1696 (2006), aimed at persuading Iran that its interests were best served by putting in place the conditions necessary for discussions to seek a negotiated resolution of the issue.
As requested in resolution 1737 (2006), the Director General of the Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, reported on 22 February that Iran had continued to pursue these sensitive technologies in defiance of its obligations under international law. This situation was a backdrop to the intensive and constructive deliberations that have led to this resolution unanimously adopted today.
By adopting this resolution, we have continued our incremental and proportionate approach, increasing gradually the pressure on Iran to address the concerns shared across the international community. We have strengthened the restrictions on individuals closely associated with Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities and with its ballistic missile programme. We have prohibited arms sales from Iran and urge vigilance over the supply of heavy weapons to Iran. We have also urged restraint in making finance available to the Government of Iran.
I should clarify that the United Kingdom’s undertaking and understanding that the new resolution does not introduce any changes to the provisions in paragraph 15 of resolution 1737 (2006). The asset freeze, therefore, does not prevent a person or entity designated in the annexes to resolution 1737 (2006) and to this resolution from making payments due under a contract entered into force before that person or entity was listed in cases covered by paragraph 15.
This resolution, building upon resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006), sends a unanimous and unambiguous signal to the Government and people of Iran. To both, we say that we prefer and are committed to the path of cooperation. But we say, also, that the path of proliferation by Iran is not one that the international community can accept. We want Iran to make the right choice — cooperation with the international community, which requires the removal of any doubt that Iran could develop nuclear weapons. The resolve of the Council is clear. Iran must make its choice.
Mr. De La Sablière (France) (spoke in French): France welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 1747 (2007). As was unequivocally demonstrated in the last report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has failed to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities, nor has it suspended its heavy water activities, including the construction of a heavy water reactor at Arak. Nor has Iran resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the optional protocol. Thus, Iran has ignored the resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors and the demands and decisions contained in Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006). As is affirmed in resolution 1737 (2006), however, these measures are essential to build confidence.
The international community is concerned about the proliferation questions raised by the Iranian nuclear programme. It is worrying that after several years of investigation the International Atomic Energy Agency is still unable to provide the international community with the assurances it requires with respect to the strictly peaceful nature of this programme. Essential questions, including questions that may have possible military nuclear implications in the very words of the reports submitted by the Director General of the IAEA, remain unanswered.
Nobody in this Council wishes to deny Iran its rights or to prevent the Iranian people from benefiting from nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. All States parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as long as they meet the non-proliferation obligations derived from articles I, II and III of the NPT. What the international community asks of Iran is that it fulfil these non-proliferation obligations. It is unacceptable that the Iranian authorities find pretexts to shirk their commitments made under the NPT.
By adopting resolution 1737 (2006), the Security Council clearly indicated that it would suspend the sanctions put in place if Iran reverted to the complete suspension of all its enrichment and reprocessing activities. It also warned Iran, however, that it would take further measures, should Iran persist in its refusal to meet the demands of the international community.
The last report of the Director General of the IAEA clearly showed that the Iranian leaders did not make the choice that the international community had hoped for. In the circumstances, the Security Council had no choice but to act.
The measures that the Security Council has adopted today are proportionate to Iran’s actions. They are reversible. They are in line with the approach of progressively increasing the pressure applied by the Council for more than a year, in order to persuade the Iranian leaders to return to the conditions for negotiation and to restrict the development of the sensitive programmes undertaken.
The additional measures that the Council has just adopted target a series of entities and individuals involved in Iran’s proliferation programmes. They also target individuals and entities linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which plays a disturbing role in Iran’s ongoing development of sensitive nuclear and ballistic activities. They also address the Bank Sepah, which was involved in the funding activities linked to Iran’s ballistic programme. The resolution also provides for an embargo on arms sales and transfers from Iran. It calls on all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in their transfers of conventional weapons to this country and not to enter into any new financial assistance to the Iranian Government in the form of subsidized loans or commitments for grants, in particular. This appeal also applies to international financial organizations.
These measures have been established in order to exert effective pressure on the Iranian authorities, while seeking to penalize the Iranian people as little as possible. The new resolution does not introduce — and on this point, I am also expressing the position held by the Federal Republic of Germany — any change in the provisions contained in paragraph 15 of resolution 1737 (2006). The asset freeze, therefore, does not prevent a person or an entity designated in the annexes to Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) and to this resolution from making payments due under a contract that entered into force before that person or entity was listed in cases covered by paragraph 15 of resolution 1737 (2006).
As I said to this Council on 23 December last, and as was affirmed by the President of the French Republic, Iran has a choice between meeting the demands of the international community and facing growing isolation.
There is another path available to the Iranian leaders that is different from the one on which they have embarked: the path of negotiation, in good faith, in the context of a discussion on the basis of the proposals submitted to Iran by the group of six countries last June. Those proposals are substantial and highly advantageous for Iran. They recognize Iran’s inalienable right to benefit from nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. They offer cooperation to develop peaceful nuclear energy in Iran and to shape a new relationship with that country.
That offer remains on the table. France and its partners in the group of six countries are sincere in their desire to reach a negotiated solution with Iran. That readiness was recalled, on behalf of the ministers of our six countries, by the Ambassador of the United Kingdom immediately following the adoption of the resolution. We hope that the Iranian leaders will heed the call and that we will be able to return as soon as possible to a path leading to a settlement that respects the interests and concerns of all. That would be beneficial for the Iranian people and would help to preserve the integrity of the international non-proliferation regime, which is a fundamental element of our multilateral security framework.
Mr. Wolff (United States of America): The United States is pleased that the Security Council has once again unanimously taken action against what is clearly a grave threat to international peace and security. The Iranian leadership’s continued defiance of the Council in failing to comply with resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006) requires that we uphold our responsibilities defined in the Charter of this esteemed body and take necessary action. While we hope that Iran responds to this resolution by complying with its international legal obligations, the United States is fully prepared to support additional measures in 60 days should Iran choose another course.
We are here today because of the decisions of Iran’s leadership. Their actions include more than 20 years of deception of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A nuclear programme has been hidden from the international community, in violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a programme that slowly and incompletely is emerging from the shadows, only because of the efforts of international inspectors and outside groups.
Let me quote from paragraph 29 of the IAEA Director General’s most recent report summing up the basic problem:
“given the existence in Iran of activities undeclared to the Agency for 20 years, it is necessary for Iran to enable the Agency, through maximum cooperation and transparency, to fully reconstruct the history of Iran’s nuclear programme. Without such cooperation and transparency, the Agency will not be able to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme.” (S/2007/100, annex, enclosure)
The unanimous adoption today of resolution 1747 (2007) sends a clear and unambiguous message to Iran: the regime’s continued pursuit of a nuclear-weapons capability, in violation of its treaty obligations as well as its obligations as a State Member of the United Nations, will only further isolate Iran and make it less, not more, secure.
In the light of that history, it is not only appropriate, but the responsibility of the Security Council, to act. And we have done so in a careful and deliberate manner. In July of last year, we adopted resolution 1696 (2006), which demanded that Iran verifiably suspend all its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and cooperate fully with the steps required by the International Atomic Energy Agency. That resolution was ignored by Iran. Resolution 1737 (2006), adopted unanimously last December, took appropriate action against the regime in the light of the failure by Iran’s leadership to comply with the decisions of the Council. It, too, was ignored by Iran. Instead, Iran has expanded its enrichment activities and continued construction of the heavy-water research reactor at Arak, while scaling back even further its cooperation with the IAEA.
Iran called the Council’s decisions invalid and an extralegal act, and vowed that the new resolution would not be an obstacle in the way of Iran’s nuclear progress. Sadly, Iran continues to defy the will of the international community, the decisions of this Council and its obligations under international law. For that reason it is entirely appropriate and necessary that we have adopted stronger measures to persuade the regime to make its country more secure by abandoning its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Should Iran choose a different path, this resolution makes clear that we are prepared and willing to adopt additional measures. Indeed, in the face of Iran’s continued defiance, the United States expects that the Council will continue to incrementally increase pressure on the Iranian Government.
Let me be clear, though, to the Iranian people: these measures that we are adopting today are in no way meant to punish the civilian population of Iran. Resolution 1747 (2007) is properly tailored to target Iranian institutions and officials that support Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes. It forbids Iran to provide any arms to anyone, anywhere, and calls on all nations not to export to Iran any major arms. The world has benefited greatly from the rich, vibrant culture that the people of Iran have to offer. My own country is proud to be home to hundreds of thousands citizens and residents of Iranian origin, and we are fortunate to benefit from their many contributions to our society.
We hope for a different dynamic with Iran. As President Bush has stated,
“Iran now has an opportunity to make its choice. I would hope they would make the choice that most of the free world wants them to make, which is there is no need to have a weapons programme; there is no need to isolate your people. It is not in your interest to do so. And should they agree to verifiably suspend their enrichment, the United States will be at the table with our partners.”
The decisions of the Iranian leadership, however, required the Council to act. It is our solemn responsibility to take measures which will not only halt the development of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, but encourage the leadership of Iran to choose a different path, which will benefit the entire Iranian nation — including its Government-professed aspiration for nuclear energy.
With respect to the measures adopted today, we would also like to note our understanding that the new resolution does not introduce any changes to the provisions contained in paragraph 15 of resolution 1737 (2006). The asset freeze, therefore, does not prevent a person or entity designated in the annexes to resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007) from making payments due under a contract entered into before that person or entity was listed in those cases covered by paragraph 15.
The Iranian leadership has claimed that this Council seeks to deprive Iran of its right to peaceful nuclear energy — and we may hear that again today. That is simply not true. The six Governments, including my own, that have been trying in vain to get to negotiations with the Iranians over the past year recognize Iran’s right to peaceful, civil nuclear energy in conformity with all articles and obligations of the NPT. In fact, the generous proposal put on the table by the six parties last June — an offer that remains on the table today — includes assistance in the construction of civilian light-water nuclear power plants. These plants would generate electricity for the people of Iran but be of no use to Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. Many other Governments around the world, including some represented on this Council, enjoy national civilian nuclear energy programmes without any difficulties, demonstrating that there is no incompatibility between a country’s right to a peaceful nuclear energy programme and its non-proliferation obligations.
Iran’s rejection of this offer sends a deeply troubling signal to the entire international community. Nonetheless, my Government also associates itself with the statement read by the United Kingdom reaffirming our offer and willingness to resolve this issue through negotiations.
The current path chosen by Iran’s leadership poses a direct challenge to the very principles on which the United Nations was founded. Iran’s leadership openly proclaims that the Council is “illegal” and that its resolutions are “torn pieces of paper”. Iran’s Supreme Leader has pledged that Iran would undertake “illegal acts” if the Council proceeded with the adoption of this resolution. Article 2 of the Charter makes clear that all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. Calls by Iran’s leaders to have Israel, a State Member of the United Nations, “wiped off the map” stand in stark contrast to everything for which this body stands. That contrast is amplified by Iran’s continued well-known role as one of the world’s leading State sponsors of terrorism.
The United Nations was born from the ashes and horrific events of the Second World War and the Holocaust. Sadly, we have seen attempts by Iran’s President to question the undeniable tragedies that unfolded during that period. That is why it was so significant that the General Assembly established a formal day of remembrance of the Holocaust, in addition to its adoption by consensus of a resolution rejecting denials of the Holocaust. To forget the past, or, even worse, to attempt to rewrite it is to invite it to be repeated, and we cannot allow that to happen.
In a few moments, we will hear from the Iranian delegation. In the past, we have heard Iranian representatives profess Iran’s peaceful intentions, claim — incorrectly — violations of Iran’s rights, argue about so-called double standards, and raise other false claims designed to distract the international community and world opinion from the issue at hand — that is, Iran’s non-compliance with its obligations. We hope that the Iranian delegation’s presence here reflects its Government’s understanding of the weight that should be attached to the decisions of the Council and the binding obligations that Iran has a Member of the Organization under Article 25 of the Charter to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. We look forward to their response and hope that their message is one that the Council and the entire international community can embrace. Anything less would signal continued disregard and disdain for the body to which they are here to speak.
In closing, let me reiterate that the United States remains firmly committed to finding a peaceful and diplomatic solution to resolve what we all feel is a grave threat to international peace and security. While we regret the need for this resolution, our vote here today shows that the Council can and will act accordingly when countries violate their international obligations. We look forward to Iran’s full compliance with this resolution, which would signal its willingness to engage in constructive negotiations over the future of its nuclear programme. Such negotiations, if successfully completed, will have profound and tangible benefits for Iran, and, most importantly, for the Iranian people.
Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia voted in favour of the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council. The text was the outcome of the collective efforts of all the members of the Security Council and the concrete result of intensive consultations and complicated compromises. We are pleased to note that the intensive process of working on the text, in which the views expressed and proposals made by members of the Council were taken on board, has led to a text that is much more balanced and coherent in terms of the goals it sets out to achieve, compared to the initial draft.
The restrictions introduced by the resolution on cooperation with Iran, like those contained in the provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), are aimed at eliminating the concerns that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) still has on the Iranian nuclear programme. These restrictions are in no way aimed at punishing Iran. The Council’s decision has sent an unequivocal message to Tehran on the need for full cooperation with the IAEA and the Security Council. At the same time, the content of resolution 1747 (2007) is unambiguous in that the door to negotiations with Iran remains open.
Of key significance in that context is the provision contained in the resolution stating that if Iran suspends all its activities related to the enrichment and reprocessing of uranium during the negotiations period, the implementation of the measures imposed by the Security Council also will be suspended. Furthermore, the text of the resolution clearly sets out the possibility of revoking these measures.
Another very important point: these measures, just as in resolution 1737 (2006), have been imposed in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter and consequently preclude the possibility of the use of force. One of the provisions of the resolution stipulates that any further steps taken by the Security Council, if necessary, will also be exclusively peaceful ones. We remain convinced that the effective resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem can be achieved only through political and diplomatic efforts.
We deem of great significance the fact that the new resolution does not in any way alter the provisions of paragraph 15 of resolution 1737 (2006). The freezing of financial activities will therefore not prevent payments from being made by the natural or legal persons listed in the annexes to resolution 1737 (2006) or in the resolution just adopted, payments under contracts entered into before the aforementioned persons were included on the list on the grounds outlined in paragraph 15 of resolution 1737 (2006). In other words, the activities authorized by the Security Council in the area of trade and economic cooperation can continue.
Russia initiated and fully supports the statement made by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the group of six countries, which is being made public in parallel with the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007) and was read out today on behalf of the group of six by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom.
It is clear that the way the situation develops in future will depend largely on Iran’s actions. We hope that the Government of Iran will take into account the unanimous adoption of resolution 1747 (2007), carefully analyse the positive content of the statement made by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the six countries, and, ultimately, choose fully to cooperate with the IAEA, through a dialogue based on mutual respect, on any other outstanding issues. Such a constructive approach by the Iranian Government would make it possible for us to put any unresolved problems behind us and create a situation in which the attitude taken towards Iran in its development of a peaceful nuclear programme would be the same as towards any other State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Russia will continue to contribute to achieving that aim in the interests of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and strengthening regional and international security.
Mr. Wang Guangya (China) (spoke in Chinese): China has consistently supported the safeguarding of the international nuclear non-proliferation mechanism and opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We do not wish to see fresh turbulence in the Middle East. We are in favour of a peaceful solution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme through political and diplomatic efforts and negotiations.
Developments related to Iran’s nuclear programme are currently a source of concern. China respects and recognizes Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, we are also disappointed that the Iranian side has failed to respond positively to the requests of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Security Council. Under these circumstances, we support the Security Council’s taking of further, appropriate actions aimed at urging the Iranian side to suspend enrichment-related activities in order to bring the process back onto the negotiation track.
At the same time, China believes that any measure taken should aim at safeguarding the international non-proliferation mechanism and at maintaining international and regional peace and stability. Actions taken by the Security Council should be appropriate, incremental and proportionate. They should help enhance diplomatic efforts rather than aggravate conflicts and lead to confrontation. Given that the resolution that has just been adopted basically reflected the views of China that I have just expressed, we voted in favour of it.
It needs to be pointed out that the purpose of the new resolution is not to punish Iran but to urge it to return to negotiations and reactivate diplomatic efforts. The relevant sanctions measures should neither harm the Iranian people nor affect normal economic, trade and financial exchanges between Iran and other countries. The new resolution does not introduce any change to the exemption provisions contained in paragraph 15 of resolution 1737 (2006). The assets freeze therefore does not prevent a person or entity designated in the annexes to resolution 1737 (2006) and this new resolution from making payments due under contracts entered into before that person or entity was listed in cases covered by paragraph 15.
The new resolution and the sanctions measures in resolution 1737 (2006) are all reversible. If Iran suspends its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and complies with the relevant resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Security Council, the Security Council shall suspend, and even terminate, the sanctions measures.
It is impossible to resolve the issue fundamentally by imposing sanctions and pressure only. Diplomatic talks remain the best option. That is also the common understanding of the international community. A solution to the Iranian nuclear issue requires all-around diplomatic efforts, especially diplomatic efforts outside the Security Council. We wish to call upon all the parties concerned to adopt a highly responsible and constructive attitude, keep calm, practice restraint and refrain from any actions that may lead to deterioration or the escalation of tensions. At the same time, we should bear in mind the following principles in seeking solutions to the Iran nuclear issue.
First, in handling the Iran nuclear issue, safeguarding international non-proliferation mechanisms and maintaining international and regional peace and stability remain the premise and ultimate objective. No actions should deviate from that goal.
Secondly, it is essential to keep the process on the path of dialogue and negotiation and to insist on seeking a peaceful solution through political and diplomatic efforts. It is therefore particularly important to reinforce diplomatic efforts outside the Security Council.
Thirdly, we should firmly safeguard the international non-proliferation mechanism. The IAEA remains the main framework for solving the Iran nuclear issue. Its authority and role should therefore be safeguarded and strengthened.
Fourthly, it is necessary to handle, in a balanced manner, the relations between the peaceful use of nuclear energy and non-proliferation. The international community should recognize Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Iran also has the obligation to accept effective supervision by the IAEA and to resolve outstanding issues through cooperation with the IAEA, so as to prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and establish international confidence in that regard.
Fifthly, all the parties concerned should act on the basis of equality and mutual respect, strengthen dialogue and communication, increase trust, reduce doubts and remove each other’s concerns, so as to create the necessary atmosphere and conditions for the settlement of this issue.
Sixthly, the current urgent task for all the parties is to show full flexibility and creatively seek to resume negotiations. The June 2006 proposal put forward by the six countries is still on the table. The time-out proposal by IAEA Director General ElBaradei and the establishment of a mechanism for talks that includes Iran also deserve our consideration.
China is ready to work with other parties to continue to play its due role for a comprehensive and peaceful solution to the Iran nuclear issue.
Mr. Arias (Panama) (spoke in Spanish): Panama understands its participation in the Security Council to be a fiduciary responsibility to the Members and organizations of the United Nations to promote international peace and security. In that context, Panama is pleased that the Security Council was able to act unanimously in sending a message of clear concern to the people and Government of Iran as regards their nuclear programme.
Nevertheless, whenever the Council adopts a resolution to impose sanctions, that clearly is a failure of the political process. Panama therefore calls upon all parties to launch as soon as possible a negotiations process aimed at resolving the conflict that prompted the Security Council to act today. Panama has taken note of the fact that all parties have acknowledged that Iran has a right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and that like all other parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons it also has an obligation to prevent the same.
Panama therefore understands that all that is lacking is determination and good faith in order to understand and share the concern of the international community.
Mr. Matulay (Slovakia): As a country producing and using nuclear energy to produce electricity, Slovakia supports the right of every country to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Based on its strict adherence to the NPT and to the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), my Government would never support any action that would infringe upon that inalienable right of States.
However, we are fully convinced that the international community is right to ask for guarantees as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The fact is that we still do not have those assurances. The IAEA remains unable to make further progress in its efforts to fully verify the past development of Iran’s nuclear programme and certain aspects of its scope and nature. We urge Iran to provide maximum cooperation and transparency to the IAEA and to all partners concerned to solve all outstanding issues and restore confidence about its nuclear programme.
For nearly four years, the IAEA has been investigating Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities. As a result of its findings, in September 2005 the IAEA Board of Governors found that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT safeguards agreement constituted non-compliance in the context of the Agency’s statute. In February 2006, the Board of Governors, meeting in extraordinary session, requested the IAEA Director General to report Iran’s dossier to the Security Council.
The Security Council acted on this serious matter by passing legally binding resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2007) and 1747 (2007) — the latter having been adopted unanimously today. Slovakia supported them all because they are proportionate, incremental and targeted responses to Iran’s continued failure to comply with international requirements as originally expressed by the IAEA Board of Governors.
Slovakia reaffirms its continuous support for efforts to find a negotiated long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We fully share the view that every diplomatic effort must be explored and exhausted to achieve that goal. A proposal for a long-term comprehensive agreement presented to Iran last June is still on the table, and the door to negotiations remains open. We believe that it offers Iran the chance to reach a negotiated agreement based on cooperation. In that respect, we welcome the new ministerial declaration of the E3 + 3 that has been issued today and presented by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom.
In view of the above and our desire for a comprehensive and peaceful solution to this issue my delegation calls upon the Iranian leadership to comply with Security Council requirements and resume negotiations on terms acceptable to the international community.
Finally, my country has great respect for the nation of Iran, its rich history and ancient culture. We therefore hope that Iran will seize the opportunity to choose the right path towards a comprehensive long-term solution to its nuclear programme that will result in peaceful nuclear cooperation and positive development of relations with the entire international community in the future.
Mr. Verbeke (Belgium) (spoke in French): Belgium voted in favour of resolution 1747 (2007) and welcomes its unanimous adoption. Belgium regrets that Iran has not met the requirements of the Security Council by suspending its uranium-enrichment activities as well as its work on all heavy-water-related projects. Belgium deplores the lack of cooperation and transparency on the part of Iran that led the International Atomic Energy Agency to conclude, on 22 January, that it was not in a position to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme.
The new resolution serves to demonstrate the resolve of the international community to monitor the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and also reaffirms its desire to create the framework within which to search for a negotiated solution.
In that regard, Belgium launches a strong appeal to Iran to pay due heed to the offer made to it in June 2006, in order to implement a long-term and lasting agreement.
The new resolution reflects the unanimous resolve expressed by the Security Council, as stated in resolution 1737 (2006) and reaffirmed in the current resolution, to take appropriate additional measures since Iran has ignored the requirements of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency. We attach particular importance to the principles of proportionality and reversibility that are provided for within the resolution. Those principles reflect the resolve of the Council, while indicating to Iran that another path remains open.
Mr. Effah-Apenteng (Ghana): Ghana has joined the consensus on Security Council resolution 1747 (2007) because we believe in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Although the resolution that has just been adopted imposes sanctions on Iran, we are heartened by the fact that it leaves the door open to negotiations and that the stipulated measures are reversible. We continue to believe and hope that there will be a diplomatic solution to the protracted negotiations on the Iranian nuclear programme.
Finally, my delegation wishes to use the occasion to appeal to all States to live up to their international obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: non-proliferation, the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament. We recognize the sensitivity of the issue. However, I hope the Council will pay attention to the issue of selectivity — which has been raised by some of our colleagues during the course of the debate — if the international community is to succeed in checking the spread of and eliminating weapons of mass destruction.
The President: It is now my honour to give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Manouchehr Motaki, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On behalf of the Security Council, I extend to him a warm welcome and invite him to take the floor.
Mr. Motaki (Islamic Republic of Iran) (spoke in Persian; English text provided by the delegation): This is the fourth time in the last 12 months that, in an unwarranted move orchestrated by a few of its permanent members, the Security Council is being abused to take an unlawful, unnecessary and unjustifiable action against the peaceful nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which presents no threat to international peace and security and therefore falls outside the Council’s Charter-based mandate.
As we have stressed time and again, Iran’s nuclear programme is completely peaceful. We have expressed our readiness, taken unprecedented steps and offered several serious proposals to address and allay any possible concern in that regard. Indeed, there has been no doubt on our part from the beginning, nor should there be any on the part of the Council, that all the schemes of the sponsors of the resolution are dictated by narrow national considerations and are aimed at depriving the Iranian people of their inalienable rights, rather than emanating from any so-called proliferation concerns.
In order to give this scheme a semblance of international legitimacy, its initiators first manipulated the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and — as they acknowledged themselves — coerced some of its members to vote against Iran on the Board, and then have taken advantage of their substantial economic and political power to pressure and manipulate the Security Council to adopt three unwarranted resolutions within 8 months.
Undoubtedly, those resolutions cannot indicate universal acceptance, particularly when the heads of State of the nearly two thirds of the States Members of the United Nations that also belong to the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) supported Iran’s position as recently as September 2006 and expressed concern about the policies pursued within the Security Council. Those resolutions do not even reflect the views of the Council’s own 15 members, since most of them were not thoroughly informed about — let alone engaged in — the discussions held in secret meetings where only a few parties, among them non-Council members, made decisions for the entire Council.
This is not the first time that the Security Council has asked Iran to relinquish its rights. When Saddam Hussein invaded Iran 27 years ago, the Council waited seven days so that Iraq could occupy 30,000 square kilometres of Iranian territory. Then it unanimously adopted resolution 479 (1980). That unanimously adopted resolution asked the two sides to stop the hostilities, without asking the aggressor to withdraw. That is, the Council — at that time as well — effectively asked Iran to suspend some of its rights, in that case, its right to approximately 30,000 square kilometres of its territory.
As expected, the aggressor dutifully complied. But imagine what would have happened if Iran had complied. If we had, we would still be begging the Council’s then-sweetheart, President Saddam Hussein, to return our territory. We did not agree to suspend our right to our territory. We resisted eight years of carnage and use of chemical weapons, coupled with pressure from the Council and sanctions from its permanent members.
In the course of the war, the United States joined the United Kingdom, Germany, France and the Soviet Union, along with other Western countries, in providing Saddam with military hardware and intelligence and even with the material for chemical and biological weapons. For several years, and despite mounting evidence and United Nations reports, the Security Council was prevented from dealing with Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian civilians and military personnel.
I am confident that today, most of the permanent members of the Council do not even want to remember that travesty of justice, the Charter and international law, let alone blame Iran for non-compliance with resolution 479 (1980). I am also confident that they do not want to remember that when the Iranian people nationalized their oil industry, they attempted to impose a resolution on the Council condemning Iran for threatening peace and security. But they cannot force international public opinion to forget that, and the Iranian people will certainly never forget it.
Who among you does not know — and rest assured, international public opinion does know — that for more than a month, two members of the Council, with full and prior knowledge of the Zionist regime’s intention to commit aggression against Lebanon, prevented any decision in this Council, the Rome Conference, and any initiatives to put an end to that regime’s atrocities? You in the Council could not even adopt an appropriate position vis-à-vis the bombing of United Nations facilities in Lebanon, which caused the death of your own representatives.
The Security Council should be held accountable not only for its unlawful actions and decisions, but indeed for its repeated failures to act against threats to international peace and security.
As an organ of an international Organization created by States, the Security Council is bound by law, and Member States have every right to insist that the Council keep within the powers that they accorded it under the Charter of the United Nations. The Security Council must exercise those powers consistently with the purposes and principles of the Charter. Equally, the measures it takes must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and with other international law. Members of the Security Council do not have the right to undermine the Council’s credibility.
There is every reason to assert that the Security Council’s consideration of the Iranian peaceful nuclear programme has no legal basis, since the referral of the case to the Council and then the adoption of resolutions fail to meet the minimum standards of legality. Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities cannot, by any stretch of law, fact or logic, be characterized as a threat to peace. Rather, certain members of the Security Council decided to hijack the case from the IAEA, the principal specialized technical organ in charge of the issue, and to politicize it.
How can Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme be considered in the Security Council while Iran has carried out all its obligations and cooperated to the fullest extent possible, far more than it is obliged to do in accordance with its treaty obligations, namely those under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Safeguards Agreement? Is it not simply because the IAEA could not find any diversion from lawful and peaceful purposes? How could one expect the IAEA to prove a negative fact?
In order to achieve the politically motivated and unlawful goal of depriving Iran of its inalienable right to nuclear technology, attempts have been made to manufacture evidence. According to a recent report in an American newspaper, “most United States intelligence shared with the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency has proved inaccurate and none has led to significant discoveries inside Iran”. The same news article also quotes a senior IAEA official as saying “since 2002, pretty much all the intelligence that’s come to us has proved to be wrong”.
However, in order to enable the IAEA to reach this conclusion, Iran had to implement transparency measures outside all IAEA safeguards and protocols and allow the IAEA inspectors to make over 20 visits to its sensitive military sites which had no connection whatsoever with its nuclear programme.
Would any member of this Council agree to do likewise? Are the permanent members of this Council even prepared to inform the international public of the number of centrifuges they own? In fact, over the last four years, the IAEA has conducted more than 2,100 person-days of scrutiny of all Iranian nuclear facilities. All reports by the IAEA since November 2003 until now have been indicative of the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. The Agency confirmed in 2003, and has maintained since then, that to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities were related to a nuclear weapons programme.
On several occasions, the Agency concluded that all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities. As recently as February 2007, the IAEA Director General stated in his report (S/2007/100, annex, enclosure) that “pursuant to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran has been providing the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and facilities, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with such material and facilities”. The same report also indicates that “the Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran”. The Director General also indicated to the Board of Governors on 5 March 2007 that the Agency has seen no “industrial capacity to produce weapon-usable nuclear material, which is an important consideration in assessing the risk”.
It is very unfortunate that the Security Council, under the manifest pressure of a few of its permanent members, persists in trying to deprive a nation of its “inalienable right” to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, while that nation has met, and continues to honour, its international obligations. The Security Council’s decision to try to coerce Iran into suspension of its peaceful nuclear programme is a gross violation of Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations and contradicts the Iranian people’s right to development and right to education.
While Member States have agreed, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter, the Security Council cannot pressure countries into submitting either to its decisions taken in bad faith or to its demands negating the fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
Likewise, as the International Court of Justice held in its 1971 Advisory Opinion, Member States are required to comply with its decisions only if they are in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Does the Charter authorize the Security Council to require States Members of the United Nations to give up their basic rights emanating from treaties? To do that would violate established principles of international treaty law and the principle set forth in the Preamble to the Charter, namely, to establish conditions under which justice and respect for treaty obligations are to be maintained.
Who could deny that depriving a whole nation of higher education in specific fields and of the benefits of nuclear technology for humanitarian and civil uses is contrary to the basic right of all people to education and development? Is not that an alarmingly discriminatory approach vis-à-vis knowledge and development? How could an organ of the United Nations, established to maintain peace and security, be manipulated by certain States not only to act contrary to the fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter, but also to aggravate an issue that could be easily resolved into an international crisis? However, it is evident that such an approach will strengthen the resolve of developing countries to expedite their independence-seeking efforts and attain even greater scientific and technological achievements.
Although those who voted in favour of the resolution just adopted concerning Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme did not even bother to listen to my country’s positions and explanations before the vote, I would like to highlight a number of elements of that resolution for the record and for the awakened global public opinion.
First, by establishing sanctions, the resolution is punishing a country that, according to the IAEA, has never diverted its nuclear programme. The resolution punishes a country that has been a committed party to the NPT, with all of its nuclear facilities monitored by IAEA inspectors and their cameras. The resolution imposes sanctions on a country that has fulfilled all of its commitments under the NPT and the IAEA safeguards, and demands nothing more than its inalienable rights under the Treaty. Could there be any better way to undermine an important multilateral instrument that deals directly with international peace and security? Is not this action by the Security Council, in and of itself, a grave threat to international peace and security?
Secondly, the resolution clearly departs from the stated claims of its sponsors. By targeting my country’s defence, economic and educational institutions, it is pursuing objectives far beyond Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme. The sanctions provided for in the resolution are clearly targeting an independent, proud and tireless nation with thousands of years of culture and civilization. What can the harming of hundreds of thousands of depositors in Bank Sepah, which has an 80-year history in Iran, mean other than a confrontation with ordinary Iranians?
Thirdly, the resolution has been adopted at a time when not only have all rational proposals and initiatives to return to a negotiated solution been neglected, but also certain countries have not even allowed such proposals to be presented. Iran has always been ready for time-bound and unconditional negotiations aimed at finding a mutually acceptable solution. Iran has done its best to achieve that objective and has presented numerous proposals to provide necessary assurances about the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. In the past several weeks, other proposals have been advanced, each of which could have provided an opportunity to break the current stalemate and to lead to a rational and just resolution. The only interpretation that can be made of the rush to adopt this resolution and prevent negotiations is that there are ulterior motives on the part of the sponsors and a lack of political will to find solutions.
Finally, the resolution has been adopted against Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme even as the major nuclear powers continue to flout the persistent demand of the international community for nuclear disarmament and instead jeopardize international peace and security by developing new generations of those weapons and threatening to use them.
Does the adoption of the resolution strengthen international peace and security? Does it enhance the credibility of important international mechanisms such as the NPT, the IAEA and even this very Council? Does it increase the confidence of countries and developing nations that they can attain their rights through these mechanisms and instruments? Does it increase trust in multilateral mechanisms? Does it decrease unilateralist tendencies? Certainly the answer to all of those questions is “No”. The only outcome of the resolution is that freedom-loving people and Governments throughout the world will gain confidence that they cannot rely on multilateral institutions to attain their legitimate rights.
Because of the unlawful and unjust approach of the Security Council, its resolutions have so far failed to lead to a settlement of the issue. Those resolutions, and the certainty of some permanent members that they can get them adopted one way or another, are, and always have been, a part of the problem and an impediment to finding a real and mutually acceptable solution. That is why Iran continues to insist on the imperative of stopping this practice, which will only exacerbate the situation and will erode the authority and undermine the credibility of the Council.
It has been clear from the outset that there are only two alternatives in dealing with Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme: cooperation and interaction, or confrontation and conflict. The Islamic Republic of Iran, confident of the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, has always insisted on the first alternative. Iran does not seek confrontation, nor does it want anything beyond its inalienable rights. I can assure the Council that pressure and intimidation will not change Iranian policy. If certain countries have pinned their hopes on the possibility that repeated resolutions would weaken the resolve of the great Iranian nation, they should not doubt that they have once again faced a catastrophic intelligence and analytical failure vis-à-vis the Iranian people’s Islamic revolution.
Probably at no other time in Iran’s history have its entire people been so solidly behind a national demand. Just as the Iranian nation paid a heavy price for the nationalization of its oil industry and its eight years of sacred defence, we realize that we must now be prepared to pay the price for our dignity and our independence. But the world must know — and it does — that even the harshest political and economic sanctions or other threats are far too weak to coerce the Iranian nation into retreating from its legal and legitimate demands.
If you are seeking to sanction and block the wealth and capabilities of the Iranian nation, particularly with respect to our national heroes mentioned in the resolution, then I will tell you what our main assets are: faith in God, seeking justice, and resisting threats and intimidation. Can this resolution block these valuable assets? Were eight years of an imposed war — a war that was designed by certain permanent members and implemented through an endless supply of weapons and petrodollars, missiles, Mirage and Super Etandard aircraft, intelligence support and promises from the former United States Secretary of Defence — able to confiscate these great assets?
The Iranian nation, following its esteemed leader, advises you not to undermine the dignity of the United Nations and of the IAEA. We invite you to return to the correct path of negotiation, on the basis of truth and justice. The only way forward is to abandon unwise preconditions and return to the negotiating table in good faith. Suspension is neither an option nor a solution.
The great Iranian people, guided by Islamic teachings and values, are a peace-loving and civilized nation. It is a fact that our people have never had any role in crimes against humanity such as the ones committed during the last two world wars, the genocides that have taken place in various parts of the world, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedies, the Viet Nam war, the crimes perpetrated during the war in the Balkans, or the atrocious crimes that are being systematically committed against the Palestinian people. Iran has not started any war in the past 200 years. We have even been the victim of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction during the eight-year war imposed on us. We call for peace, stability and the well-being of all peoples throughout the world, especially in our own region. We have always endeavoured to play a constructive and effective role as a responsible member of the international community.
The President: There are no further speakers on my list.
The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council will remain seized of the matter.