Further to our letter dated 16 February 2022 (S/2022/122), as well as numerous previous communications on the implementation of paragraph 3 of annex B to Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), I have the honour to once again reiterate the position of the Russian Federation on this issue in connection with the letter dated 24 May 2022 from the representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations (S/2022/415).

We note with deep regret that our European counterparts continue to level misleading accusations against the Islamic Republic of Iran in the context of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), while we have already underlined the faulty logic behind such accusations in previous letters.

None of the existing international instruments and mechanisms, including the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, either directly or implicitly prohibit Iran from developing missile and space programmes.

Our European colleagues purposefully misuse the criteria prescribed in the Missile Technology Control Regime, which is an informal political understanding between 35 States on export-control issues. The category I parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime annex are a mere reference tool for exporting States and have never been intended to be used in the context of resolution 2231 (2015), nor the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including to ascertain whether or not specific ballistic missiles are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

We have to stress that the assertion that category I systems are recognized through “long-standing international consensus” as being “the systems of most concern” is a deliberate misstatement. The Missile Technology Control Regime guiding principles clearly state that the category I systems are the “items of greatest sensitivity”, which is a substantially different meaning.

The reference to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in the context of the Missile Technology Control Regime is also completely irrelevant since this resolution – a mechanism designed for cooperation, rather than coercion – has never been intended to restrict Iran’s missile programme.

Russia attaches utmost importance to the Missile Technology Control Regime and is committed to the full implementation of its relevant obligations. Therefore, we are firmly opposed to the attempts of our European counterparts to distort the nature and scope of this regime and to misuse it as an instrument to restrict the development of space capabilities by other countries.

We have to once again recall that paragraph 7 (a) of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) stipulates that resolution 1929 (2010) in its entirety, including paragraph 9, which prohibited Iran from undertaking “any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons”, has been terminated. However, even at times when this resolution was in force, the Panel of Experts’ assumptions gained no consolidated support, either in the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) or in the Security Council.

In addition, the claims in the above-mentioned letter that the defensive needs of Iran are “self-proclaimed” deprive this Member State of its legitimate right to self-defence and violate the principle of common and indivisible security enshrined in the outcome documents of the review conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, adopted by consensus.

It is deeply regrettable that our European counterparts continue to promote unsubstantiated anti-Iranian claims in contradiction with the spirit of the negotiations in Vienna and the very logic of multilateral efforts to facilitate the full restoration of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Meanwhile, despite the fact that the integrity of the “nuclear deal” had been challenged by irresponsible and destructive actions of other Member States, Iran has exercised restraint, demonstrated determination to uphold the non-proliferation regime and expressed willingness to retain the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Since no viable information to the contrary has ever been provided to the Security Council, the Russian Federation continues to proceed from its previous assessment that Iran is respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

We would be grateful for the circulation of the present letter as a document of the Security Council and its full and thorough reflection in the upcoming report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

Vasily Nebenzya