The negotiations about the Non-Proliferation Treaty in New York led to debates on Israel’s nuclear posture and on its «deliberate ambiguity». Israel was asked to clearly reveal the nature of its armaments.
To stop keeping its base-hidden bombs away would call forth some diplomatic difficulties but a partial disclosure of the Israeli arsenal would substantially increase its security. In fact, it’s not enough that Israel’s enemies «know» that Israel has the bomb, they must also understand that Israel can use it immediately in case of aggression and swiftly annihilate any country that might attack Israel. It is necessary for the potential aggressors to know that their cities can be immediately wiped out from earth. Under such circumstances, no irrational leader would plan an attack against Israel.
The immediate end of the voluntary ambiguity is not necessary but it could be if Iran gets equipped with nuclear weapons. If an irrational power in Teheran happens to have the bomb, then Israel must take its armament out of the bases.

Washington Times (United States)
Propriété du révérend Sun Myung Moon (Église de l’Unification).

" Israel’s nuclear posture ", by Louis Rene Beres, Washington Times, May 19, 2005.