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OLIGARCHIC DICTATORSHIP—THE NEW REGIME IN MOSCOW

Editorial

Whether the XX Congress of the Communist Party has become the Thermidor of the Russian Revolution and the end of the period of terror in the Soviets cannot now be said. The historical parallels that every revolution reaches its zenith and then there is a kind of recession of the revolutionary wave would indicate that we now have to do here with softening of the terrorist regime in Moscow. The historical parallelism is a very uncertain method of concluding that the leading role is being played by the process of the rise and fall of the revolutionary moods and not also by the national history, psychology and national ambitions.

A Russian national proverb says that "Moscow is the head of the entire world." The Russian Church took over these ambitions in the form that "Moscow is the Third and last Rome of Christianity and there will be no Fourth." The universal mission of Moscow to be the teacher and the leader of the entire world is well known by many Russian writers of tsarist times; that Orthodoxy, Pan Slavism and now Communism have been tools for the realization of this mission is obviously true. It has not ended yet but in the days of Communism it has been even more emphasized. The position of the Russian people in world Communism is the foundation also of the XX Congress of the All-Union Communist Party in February, 1956. The Congress once again and with more self-confidence asserted that the final victory of Communism over capitalism was certain but that it might not come through violence but by peaceful methods. So the democratic free world is to agree on peaceful coexistence and wait for the time when Moscow will become the capital of the entire Communized world.

Because of this, the XX Congress of the All-Union Communist Party had to introduce definite changes in the organization of the work of the Communist Party of the USSR. The reworking of the program of the Communist Party of the USSR was already decided at the XIX Congress in 1952 even before the death of Stalin. There was even selected a special commission for this revision of the Party Program under the leadership of Stalin. The members were L. Beria, L. Kaganovich, G.

Malenkov, V. Molotov and a few more.¹ The death of Stalin, the liquidation of Beria and the passing of Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov into the background made the revision of the party program unrealistic and the program and tactics of the party were secretly adopted by the collective heirs of Stalin and the XX Congress made it known.

In their attitude toward the non-Russian peoples of the USSR the new leaders of the Kremlin have made certain apparent concessions but these do not basically change the policy of complete russification introduced during the last 25 years under the terror of Stalin.

Ukraine has been the centre of most experimentation. Since the ending of World War II there has been a steady active Ukrainian resistance and it is still not liquidated, as is shown by the official proclamation of the last months.² Beria removed from Ukraine the ruffian L. Melnikov and in his place as First Secretary of the Communist Party came the Ukrainian O. Kyrychenko. The Crimea was added to Ukraine. Dozens of Communists of Ukraine were put by Khrushchev in high positions of the Central government of the USSR and in the leading Party positions in other republics of the USSR.

The russifying yoke that has hung over Ukraine since 1930 has not been liquidated and the Ukrainian people have not been given the power in the frame of Communist culture to show their full national identity and their psychology even to the degree that was possible before 1930. The historical theses of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav show that the collective government of the USSR is still placing a lock on free historical study as it did under Stalin.³ Although the collective government of the Kremlin wishes to free itself from the moral legacy of Stalin, yet in reality it is still continuing its policy of arming the USSR at the cost of the Soviet consumer. Heavy industry has obtained full priority over light industry for the use of the civilian population. The new five year plan for 1955-6 definitely aims for those goals which Stalin set before "to overtake and surpass America in the field of in-

¹ Report by Welles Haugen from Moscow. *New York Times*, Jan. 30, 1956.

² In the article "Behind Khrushchev's 'Coexistence' Offer," Ansel E. Talbert, military expert and columnist for the *New York Herald Tribune* (Feb. 16, 1956) quotes an article "The Motherland Forgives" from the Ukrainian Communist paper *Red Banner*. The government of Soviet Ukraine published an appeal to the members of the Ukrainian resistance to surrender.

³ *Pravda*, Jan. 12, 1954.

dustrialization.”⁴ It is to be noted that this increased industrial production is to go in a large part for an economic struggle with the United States in the field of the underdeveloped peoples, despite the fact that the Soviet citizen must still endure a shortage. This shows that the post-Stalin Kremlin is not thinking of changing the goal of Lenin and stoutly maintains the position that Communism is to rule the world. Prof. Thomas T. Hammond called attention to the danger in the unprecedented rapid growth of Soviet heavy industry and Soviet arms at the last meeting of the American Historical Association.⁵

Krushchev is also experimenting in the collectivization of the village population to turn it into large state farm factories and to change the peasants into factory workers by taking from them the adjacent gardens left for their use, even those gardens that have often saved the peasants from hunger.⁶ We must add that this commassation of the smaller kolkhoz into larger and the taking away the garden plots from the peasants is in fact a radical deepening of the agrarian revolution, the final liquidation of the peasants and their special psychology; and what is more important, the sharpening of the supervision by the regime over the peasants and their political views.

It was not without a well conceived plan that on the eve of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, Khrushchev and Bulganin made their propagandistic Asiatic journey to India, Burma and Afghanistan and that it was almost directly after the peaceful appeals to America and the other states of the free world on the need and possibility of peaceful coexistence. It had as its aim not only the creation of good feeling in the Soviets for the future Congress of the Party but also to show to the Western world the power and self-confidence of the Soviets and thus convince the world that the aim of Communism to dominate the world was serious.

MANIFESTATIONS OF SOVIET STRENGTH

Besides the peaceful declaration on the sincere desire for peaceful coexistence, the Soviet leaders several times before the XX Congress and during it, emphasized the power of the military might of the USSR. In January, Marshal Zhukov, the apparent friend of President Eisenhower,

⁴ *New York Times*, Jan. 21, 1956, the article of Elie Abel. The article of Harry Schwartz in the *New York Times* of Jan. 19, 1956, referring in detail to the five year industrial plan of the USSR asserts that in some products the USSR in 1960 will actually overtake America.

⁵ *New York Times*, Dec. 29, 1955.

⁶ Article of Harry Schwartz in the *N.Y. Times*, Jan. 31, 1956.

in a speech connected with the President's appeal for the liberation of the satellites declared, "We will never give up any areas we have conquered."⁷

In the order of the day on the day of the Soviet Army and Navy, February 23, 1956 he bade the Soviet armed forces: "Vigilantly to watch for intrigues or aggressive forces and tirelessly to strengthen the defense capacity of the homeland."⁸ On the same day at the Congress of the Party, Maksim Saburov declared that the yearly growth of the industrial power of the Soviets was greater than that of America; that in 1960 the Soviets in their production would overtake America. The same day the Soviet physicist Igor Kurchatov stated that in 1960 the Soviet supplies of radio-active materials would amount to 10,000 tons of radium. Some exaggeration cannot be excluded from these statements, but it is an interesting fact that among the most serious propositions of coexistence the Kremlin clique constantly stresses its military power.

A cleared expression has been given by the attacking and often definitely offensive speeches of Bulganin and Khrushchev in Burma and Afghanistan. In Burma Khrushchev attacked the past colonial rule of the British which had hindered the development of the economy and culture of the Burmese and he said: "*Some Europeans think that if the color of a man's skin is black, it gives them the right to exploit your country... But not all Europeans think the same as the colonizers. Our country is both Asian and European and territorially it belongs more to Asia. The Soviet people as Europeans were ashamed of what their fellow Europeans had done in the past. They ruled you and tried to tell you that it was God who sent them to rule you... They made profit while you starved.*"

In the provincial state capital of Taunggyi in Burma after the dinner, Khrushchev asked that the correspondents be admitted into the dining room. Rising he proposed a toast to "*the common people.*" He said that the English were robbing "*the toiling people of their last piece of bread. I can say these things because I am a representative of the toiling classes.*"

*Khrushchev, told that some correspondents present here are dissatisfied said: "Why are they not satisfied? Because I am going to say that the English were sitting here on your necks and were robbing your people. It was done not for the benefit of raising the standard of civilization."*⁹

⁷ *New York Times*, Jan. 30, 1956. C. L. Sulzberger column.

⁸ *New York Times*, Feb. 23, 1956.

⁹ *New York Times*, Dec. 5, 1955.

Such speeches of Bulganin and Khrushchev created wild enthusiasm among the Burmese. Millions of recently liberated peoples from the colonial government of Britain welcomed the Russian Communists as fighters for freedom, prosperity and the decencies of life of the individual and as crusaders of liberation and the independence of the enslaved peoples.¹⁰

Whoever knows their inhuman treatment of millions of individuals, the people in the Soviet concentration camps and the torture chambers of the MVD, whoever knows even in general features the struggle of the Ukrainians, Turkestanians, Lithuanians and the other peoples enslaved by the Kremlin clique, will understand the infinite cynicism in these words of Khrushchev. In repeating these words, they 100 per cent were fostering the colonial regime of red Moscow over the non-Russian peoples. The sacrificial, unselfish and heroic struggle of the peoples for independence mentioned by Khrushchev is being carried on against the regime of red Moscow, especially in Ukraine for the ten years since the end of World War II.

No one understood better the cynicism of these words than Khrushchev, the shatterer of Ukrainian culture, the exploiter of the Ukrainian economy who took the last piece of bread from rich Ukraine while the population was perishing of hunger. Khrushchev and Bulganin had the good fortune that the American and British journalists, whether from ignorance or on the instructions of the "higher policy," did not make use of Soviet colonialism and unmask the false defenders of the Burmese.

THE CREATION OF A CLASS OF RED BOYARS

The XX Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR was far from a Russian Thermidor; it did not close the period of revolution, but on the contrary, reorganized it to suit the needs of the time and the experience of 38 years. The new Communist dictatorship of the USSR was formulated after the destruction of Beria who unhappily tried to take over the boots of Stalin and to continue the individual dictatorship. The 25 year terror of Stalin and the lightning fall of Beria convinced the successors of Stalin that it was better not to risk a fight but to live in agreement and to divide the power among themselves. The greatest authority in the ruling collective group is now that of Mikita Khrushchev. Even before the Congress, Khrushchev tried to build his party and administrative apparatus through his own collaborators in the party in Moscow and in Ukraine. His 12 years of administration in Ukraine gave him the opportunity to build up his staff of partisans, chiefly rus-

¹⁰ *New York Times*, Dec. 10, 1955.

sianized Ukrainian Communists and with them he is now filling important posts in the empire. It is clear that all the district secretaries of the party and state administrative officers, directors of factories and also the high army command are a new class of the widened collective leadership, in its way a new red boyar class of the USSR. This aristocracy class formally still in the name of the dominating Communist doctrine defends its own interests and poses as the Russian ruling class but it hides with difficulty still more strongly the growing Russian nationalism.

The Communist oligarchy of the USSR is in that happy position that almost without exception the whole officer corps of the army and navy consists of party members and the interests of the party oligarchy and the interests of the higher officers of the armed forces are almost identical. If this were not so, a conflict between the army and the party would be inevitable.

The XX Congress adopted a long series of resolutions for the better formation of the Communist party oligarchy. The first of these was an order to examine basically the quality of the party members; not to increase the quantity and enlarge the numbers but to stress the quality of the party members.¹¹ The second resolution was a plan for educating the party elite in a special model academy, where the young people could secure the best possible education and the best training. In referring to this question Mikita Khrushchev, who had begun his life as a community shepherd, and then as a miner in the Donbas, definitely compared this academy for training the Communist elite to the corps of pages or the corps of cadets of the tsarist aristocratic regime.¹²

DEPOSITION OF STALIN

The greatest sensation of the XX Congress was the deposition of Stalin from the pedestal of the Communist genius not only to the role of an ordinary mortal but even the unmasking in him of a megalomaniac, an uneducated individual, tyrant and terrorist who tyrannized over all the members of the present collective leadership of the USSR. The dragging down of Stalin was entrusted to two people — Khrushchev, the secretary of the Party, a Russian, and to the old Armenian Bolshevik Mikoyan. The first approached the subject in general and in the criticism of the second could be heard the note of a member of a non-Russian nation. A special speech condemning Stalin was made by Khrushchev at a strictly closed meeting.

¹¹ *New York Times*, Feb. 26, 1956.

¹² Article of Harry Schwartz in the *New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1956, Anti-Stalinism.

We cannot say how far this unmasking of Stalin had an objective basis; it was needed by the oligarchy of the Party for their political purposes and had to be done, although by the very nature of things the dragging of Stalin down to earth after he had been for 25 years a deified genius, had to evoke complete confusion especially among the young party generation which had been brought up in the absolute cult of the genius of Stalin. The unmasking of Stalin created very bitter repercussions in the Communist parties of the satellite states and among the Communists in the free world.

The degradation of Stalin also produced a stormy reaction in his fatherland, Georgia, where the local Communists were proud of the fact that a Georgian for about 30 years had guided the USSR and raised it into the first ranking power in the world. The Georgian reaction and its suppression by Moscow made it probable that this unmasking of Stalin was the work of Russian nationalists in the Communist leadership although Stalin under the pressure of that same Russian chauvinistic party membership had been compelled despite his Georgian origin to be the foremost russifier of the non-Russian peoples. The fact that the higher military circles supported this defaming of Stalin was probably taken on the initiative of the Marshals led by G. Zhukov to recover the glory taken from them for winning the war and revenge perhaps for Generals Tukhachevsky and Hamarnik.

That Stalin applied absolute terror is true but it is also untrue that Khrushchev was under the full terror of Stalin and was only Stalin's tool during the dealing with the old Bolsheviks and the military. Khrushchev was the most reliable agent of Stalin at this time in his post as First Secretary of the Party of the Communists of Moscow, then the Moscow district and finally as governor general of Ukraine. Without such help of a reliable aide Stalin's position at that time could have been at stake. The adoption by Stalin, a Georgian by birth, of a sharp russifying policy was rather a proof of the opposite and shows that Stalin was a subject of the terror of the Russian chauvinistic circles and only his adoption of the Russian chauvinistic policy helped him to maintain himself in power.

Finally there is the question as to the purpose of this unmasking of the once deified Stalin. As we have said, it was necessary for the foreign policy of the Kremlin. In the entire world Soviet Communism had a very bad reputation and it had become a high wall barring access of the Russian Communists to the Communist Titoists, Trotskists, Social Democrats and every person who was shocked by the terror. The collective leadership of the Soviet Union needed a definite rehabilitation of their reputation before starting a new period of battle for the final victory of

Russian Communism. A second journey of Khrushchev and Bulganin to India and Burma would scarcely have been as successful as the first. There would have been opposition and there was beginning to be talk of the violence to the individual and to whole nations. Khrushchev could not have talked again of the tearing of the last piece of bread by the colonial powers, the lowering of their culture and other similar statements for there were becoming known the artificial famine arranged by Stalin in Ukraine, Katyn, Vynnytsya, the destruction of Ukrainian culture, the struggle of the Ukrainian underground against the new colonialists, the Russian Communists, for national independence. The one way to get rid of this moral ballast was to lay the blame for it exclusively on Stalin.

THE NATIONAL NOTES IN THE FORMULATION OF THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND IN THE DEGRADATION OF STALIN

As we have said, the first who definitely attacked the dictator at the XX Congress was the non-Russian Mikoyan who launched his attack on the falsification of the history of the Communist Party, especially in Ukraine. The chief cause of this was that the history of Communism in Ukraine had been written by Russians. Mikoyan argued that it was very dangerous for the movement especially in its efforts in the USSR, saying: "*I believe that there are Ukrainian historians who will write the history of the birth and development of the Ukrainian Socialist state better than some Moscow historians who took on a job that perhaps they never should have.*"¹³

Mikoyan directed his remarks to the history of Communism as falsified by the historians in Moscow, but also other sectors of the life of the Ukrainian people were falsified by the Muscovites. The statement of Mikoyan on Ukraine and the right of a Ukrainian to write and talk of his country and not of a Russian was revolutionary in the face of previous political, cultural and economic practice in Ukraine under the Soviets.

On the fourth day of the Congress the official historian of the Stalin period, Academician Anna Pankratova, editor of the leading historical journal *Questions of History* (*Voprosy Istorii*) to the real surprise of the historical world condemned the colonial rule of the Tsarist Russian government over the Asian peoples.¹⁴ At the same time a special number of the journal *Party Life* edited for the Congress condemned the glorification of the terrorist tsar Ivan the Terrible and Gen.

¹³ *New York Times*, Feb. 19, 1956.

¹⁴ *New York Times*, Feb. 23, 1956.

Suvorov, individuals highly regarded by Stalin as "builders of a single centralized state of the Russian people."¹⁵ Such heretical views as those of Pankratova and *Party Life* had not been heard in Soviet historiography since the condemnation of the father of Soviet history, the old Bolshevik Prof. Mikhaylo Pokrovsky in 1934.

During the XX Congress there were decrees for the further decentralization of the economic life of the individual national republics. Such measures had been taken before the Congress in Ukraine, but the decentralization of some economic ministries did not bring any more economic independence in the handling of the wealth of Ukraine but only an increase in the responsibility to Moscow for increasing exploitation of Ukraine.¹⁶

Whether after these pious declarations by the XX Congress and for the effect upon public opinion of the world there will be the stopping of further intensive russification in Ukraine and the other non-Russian republics can hardly be expected. The tendency shown at the Congress to rehabilitate the old Bolsheviks should certainly include the rehabilitation of dozens of old Ukrainian Communists and Bolsheviks who fought for Communism and the national, cultural and economic individuality of Ukraine. There are already signs that such will not happen.

A rather pessimistic outlook is inspired by the latest information. W. Ulbrecht, First Secretary of the Communist Party of East Germany brought back from the XX Congress in Moscow a statement, some sort of official review of the Congress which was published in the East German press. We find it very impressive that an important passage in the condemnation of Stalin mirrors the views behind the scenes of the Moscow "collective leadership" as this: "When one is asked by comrades: Does Stalin belong to the classical authors of Marxism," —one can only reply: Doubtless; *after the death of Lenin, Stalin rendered significant service in the building of socialism and in the fight against the hostile grouping of Trotskists, Bukharinities and bourgeois nationalists.*"¹⁷

This would certainly mean in the Communist leading circles that Stalin is still revered for his services in the struggle against "bourgeois nationalism," in Soviet parlance equivalent to patriotism of the non-Russian peoples. Similarly in connection with the disturbances and protests of the Georgians against the degradation of Stalin by the collective leadership, the official organ of the party in Tiflis *Dawn of the East*, urges the Communists of Georgia to struggle against nationalism.¹⁸

¹⁵ *New York Times*, March 12, 1956.

¹⁶ *New York Times*, Feb. 26, 1956.

¹⁷ *New York Times*, March 5, 1956.

¹⁸ *New York Times*, March 21, 1956.

It is interesting to note that neither comrade Ulbrecht nor *Dawn of the East* failed to mention the struggling against the Russian imperialistic chauvinism as was recommended by Lenin and the Bolshevik historian M. Pokrovsky, who considered this the greatest misfortune of Communism in the USSR. There is no doubt the organized collective leadership will not oppose Russian nationalism.

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In connection with these changes in the USSR made at the XX Congress, we can say:

1. For the collective dictatorship in the Kremlin the conquest of the entire world for Communism is still the final goal.
 2. The collective leadership is working toward that goal by more refined and perfected measures.
 3. Peaceful coexistence is only a lulling of the senses of the free world.
 4. The Kremlin is further strengthening its military potential and not excluding the use of force at the proper time.
 5. The collective leadership is a new form of dictatorship of an oligarchy supported by the upper class of the Communist Party and the military, a kind of Red Boyar Class.
 6. The dethroning of Stalin is less a return to the Communism of Lenin than a removal of responsibility from the present collective leadership for the barbarities of the Soviet regime in which the present members of the collective leadership took an active part.
 7. The new collective leadership is now dominated by Russian imperialists and the non-Russian peoples have no reason to hope for any radical changes in the present Soviet national policy.
 8. The free world must still be aware and not interrupt the cold war but on the other hand to isolate the influences of the Kremlin, it must unmask the true face of the present dictatorship in the USSR and condemn it.
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THE WEST NEEDS A NEW POLITICAL STRATEGY

By **DMYTRO ANDRIEVSKY**

The idyl of co-existence between the West and the Soviets lasted a very short time, only the period between the two Geneva Conferences, i. e. from July to November, 1955. The meeting of the Foreign Ministers showed the lack of any hopes for agreement and for settlement of the basic questions of international policy or even the establishment of cultural relations across the iron curtain. The decisive factor was the uncompromising position of Molotov who was carrying out the unchanged policy of Moscow.

Whoever had eyes to see and ears to hear, was not blinded by illusions, and looked at the overall Soviet policy, could have predicted the bankruptcy of the "Spirit of Geneva" even before November. The success of the Bolshevik blackmail of Chancellor Adenauer during his journey in September to Moscow, when the "spirit of Geneva" compelled him to agree to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR, the diversion of the Soviets at the same time in Egypt, to which they offered Czechoslovak arms and which the "spirit of Geneva" ordered them not to consider as gifts of the Soviet dynasts, then the action of the Soviets in the UN in the question of Algeria, and their position on the limitation of armaments, all clearly showed that the Bolsheviks, in changing their tactics from brutality to smiles, were still trying to disintegrate the free world and to conquer it.

The free world, morally demobilized by the "spirit of Geneva," showed its inability to oppose the Bolshevik policy and tactics with its political strategy. It gave the Soviets new possibilities of propaganda, increased their prestige in the eyes of the neutral nations, of the so-called "third force," and also weakened the hopes for liberation and resistance to the regime among the nations enslaved by the Soviets, the satellites of East Central Europe and the Soviet Union. The efforts of the great powers of the Western world to approach the Soviets left a thorough deficit to the West and improved the political credit of the Bolsheviks.

The cause for this last defeat of the West lies in its basic error. Apparently the Western statesmen have not yet understood the nature of the conflict between the Communist East and the free West. The opposition between them has the character of an ideological and religious

war, of which there have been many in history. Every new faith, including Muscovite Bolshevism, is marked by a drive for ideological and territorial expansion. The best example is perhaps the holy wars of the Mohammedan world against the Christianity of the Middle Ages. Bolshevism is no different, for it wants to impose upon the entire world by the power of the sword, or rather the tank, its own Communist faith. Every new faith, no matter how absurd, is usually fanatical to a degree that the old faith is not. We see this difference of psychology in the struggle of communism against capitalism.

We cannot think and speak of co-existence between these two ideological worlds until the expansion of the new faith reaches its limits and its champions understand that they cannot extend it further. We cannot think and speak of peaceful co-existence between the two opponents, while the aggressor does not have the feeling that he has strengthened the territory that he has won. In this case the Soviets are attacking, disseminating by own ideas, propaganda, fifth columns and are trying to dominate the world ideologically and politically. At the same time they see themselves threatened on their own lands of the Soviet Empire both by the propaganda for freedom and the land, sea and air bases of the West which has 195 in the Pacific, 228 in the Atlantic and 11 in the Indian Ocean, in all 434. Under these conditions it will be a long time before the two opponents can come to a peaceful co-existence as it now exists between the Christian and Mohammedan worlds, when the Pope receives in audience the Prime Minister of Turkey.

In Europe the Soviets have no great visions of ideological expansion, while Europe maintains itself politically, economically and united. They have already there passed the peak of their successes through propaganda and they can only hope to maintain their position without advancing further. It is different in Asia and Africa. In those continents the Bolsheviks have favorable soil given by the anti-colonial attitude of the peoples enslaved by the Western great powers. Moscow is now bending its energy there. To a certain degree it has secured China and implanted in it Communism, not without the help of the Western powers. Now the two powers form one block without considering their rivalry in the future over Mongolia, Western Turkestan and Korea.

To widen and strengthen their positions in Asia, the Soviets sent Khrushchev and Bulganin to India, Burma and Afghanistan during the second Geneva Conference. The psychological effect of their propaganda trip has been extraordinary. In their speeches these two Bolshevik officials highly praised Communism and made long-range promises for the liquidation of the remains of colonialism through the industrialization of these lands, and compromised the Western powers,

especially England, which had only recently controlled them. In this way the Bolsheviks showed to the Asiatic peoples and the entire world the ideological and political weakness of their associates in the Geneva Conference and their own superiority.

But this is not the end. The Soviets have opened a broad field for further manoeuvres in world international politics. The admission of 16 new states to the United Nations seriously threatens the previous superiority of the great powers of the West. In the enlarged membership of the UN are nations which have accounts to settle with their former rulers and especially the 28 nations which took part in the African-Asian Conference held in April, 1955 in Bandung can have in some matters common to them a numerical majority. Such questions are not lacking. They can arise in connection with the chronic Arab-Israel dispute, the formation of the Bagdad Pact of the Middle Eastern Asiatic Block and the efforts of the Arabs in North Africa. The Soviets are working to increase the difficulties in this area and even throwing bait to Liberia, so as to secure a new base of operations in Africa. In Europe where the Balkan Alliance has serious troubles because of Greek and Turkish antagonism, they are using their satellite Bulgaria to win Greece from the Alliance.

The Soviets are aided by the disintegration of the old Empires, the mark of our time. Passing over Holland and France which are losing their colonies, let us turn to the British Commonwealth. This, until recently a world empire with possessions on all the continents, has had to recognize the right of its colonies and dominions to separate state existence. Thanks to their political wisdom and tactical skill the British are trying to replace compulsory membership under the British crown with common economic interests but this has its difficulties and does not guarantee the position of the former empire. England is not succeeding in retaining control of Trans-Jordan and it has had to hand over the Suez Canal to Egypt. It is not able to protect India from the influence of Khrushchev and there is a danger that the instability of the popular masses can dominate the political calculations of Prime Minister Nehru, for all the peoples of the world which have reached a certain level of cultural development are dominated by the urge to state sovereignty. They are rejecting the guardianship of foreigners over them and want to be masters of their own fate. Another idea that moves peoples is the effort to unify their national organisms and integrate their national territories. Even such small areas as the island of Cyprus and the Saar wish to join their ancestral group, however economically profitable is their belonging to another country; their aspirations cannot

be checked. Tomorrow the Arab lands of North Africa will want to join all the other Arabs in a national cultural unity.

It does not require much effort for the Soviets to use these national aspirations of the enslaved peoples to weaken the great powers of the West. They are doing it. But in aiding the fall of the Empire, the Soviets at the same time are strengthening the processes which are working against themselves and will infect the Soviet Empire which they have erected on the ruins of the Russian Empire and which is an artificial conglomeration held together by the power of a political regime and not by the idea of Communism.

Not so long ago it seemed as if the deep conflict between the Soviets and the West, and therefore the irreconcilable opposition between Communism and liberalism, would be solved by force. But the discovery and development of atomic weapons more and more excludes this. The atomic and hydrogen bombs threaten the annihilation not only of their possessors, but of all humanity and at least of present civilization. The strength of the two leading powers of the blocs is becoming more and more equal. In this situation neither is sure of or even hopes for military superiority. This almost excludes a third world total war and so a violent solution of the world rivalries. But the effort is not being stopped and will not be. It is only being concentrated further in the political field.

In this new situation which has come about in the ten years since World War II there is need of a completely new political strategy which rests upon the present condition of international relations and corresponds to the present moral and material conditions of human life. The Soviets either have this or they are acting instinctively in accordance with the demands of the time. This explains their constant successes in the international arena. The defeats of the Western powers in this field are a proof that they have not yet found a proper political strategy.

If the nations of the free world want to live, to gain the struggle with the Soviets and not fall victims to Bolshevik expansion and be drawn into the Communist system, they must develop their own political strategy. So as not to be the constant object of the Soviet manoeuvres and not be limited to reaction against the moves of their opponents, the West must plan its own course of action, regain the initiative and pass to the offensive from the defensive. It cannot demobilize either morally or militarily. Although total war may not come, there will be local wars, as recently in Korea or Indo-China. In any case, the one who wishes to conquer must have the strength to support his policy with more than arguments. While contending with the Soviets in politics, economics and propaganda, the West cannot neglect its armaments, while its opponent

is attacking and is intact. The attitude of the Soviets on the limitation of armaments is perhaps the best argument for this statement.

The new political strategy of the West against the Soviets must be directed toward final victory and suited to the opponent and his methods. It must take account of the ideological and religious character of the conflict and the impossibility of compromise. The state of military preparedness inevitably excludes all peaceful co-existence. This does not mean the exclusion of all contacts and conversations with the Soviets. On the contrary the methods of political struggle and propaganda demand these. But conversations with the Soviets are possible and useful only from positions of strength. The example of the Paris Pact and Korea show that the Soviets are able to make political shifts but they only respond to the argument of force. Again contacts of Soviet citizens with the free world, even under the control of the MVD, in one way or another undermine and dislocate morally the Soviet system.

The political strategy of the West must take into account the universal drive in our time of the peoples for sovereignty and national integration. As we have seen, the instinct of self-preservation of national societies with their spirituality and economic interests is a general phenomenon and is playing an essential role in the struggle between the two camps. The idea of the freedom of man, without regard to his race, language or religion, has won the right of citizenship in the Western world. Unfortunately, however, the idea of the freedom of peoples in the practice of the West and the principle of the self-determination of nations is an empty phrase. In their political policy the Western powers must enable the peoples to draw up their own political statutes in international relations and in their state life and arrange their own social and economic regime without foreign control of their freedom, as Moscow is doing with the peoples of the USSR and the satellites.

The political strategy of the West must reckon with the disintegration of the old type of empire founded on conquest. This fact must be accepted as a historical finality and all colonial dependence and the exploitation of technically backward peoples must be rejected. This does not mean that the Western powers have to cause the pulverizing and atomizing of human society. The conditions of contemporary international life, the exchange of economic goods and spiritual values is facilitated by the development of technique, the need for defense against the atomic bomb demands larger political organizations, greater international combinations as a United Europe. But in the formation of these political and economic complexes, freedom must be decisive and the vital interest of the free and competing nations, and not any fictitious solidarity of classes or any historical rights of a ruling nation.

We believe that these three concepts for a new political strategy cover all the basic facts which will determine the outcome of the struggle between the West and the Soviets. These ideas must not remain abstractions but be put into effect. By themselves these ideas are universal and dynamic but to put them into effect, they need human agents. These are the enslaved nations who are fighting for them. For these ideas to become more quickly and fully alive and become the regulator of international relations, they must become the policy of the great powers. In that way the West will secure the alliance and support of the enslaved nations of the entire world and make more powerful the forces opposed to the Soviets. It will strike from the hands of the Soviets its weapon of anticolonialism and escape their sowing of anarchy in international relations.

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Some one may say that in advancing these ideas, we are discovering America, for they all seem covered by the conception of self-determination proclaimed by President Wilson. This is not true; and several examples will show the difference between theory and practice. Let us turn for this to the American policy, since it is the most important factor in the anti-Soviet front. If we look at this critically, we must assert that the American statesmen have been to the present the most rigid and logical in their opposition to the advance of the Soviets. Nevertheless, they as the spokesmen for the greatest power in the world, have the greatest responsibility for the failures of the West, for all the other powers of the free world are compelled to follow the position and line of the United States.

American statesmen have not yet understood that the moving force in the policy of the Soviets is the messianism of Moscow, which regards as its mission to impose its government and its regime on the entire world. Bolshevism is a two-faced Janus with one face the social and economic doctrine of Communism and the other Russian imperialism. Both grow out of Russian reality and those American scholars and statesmen who try artificially to separate Bolshevism from the soil on which it started and grew, are wrong. That soil was the social structure and mentality of the Russian people who through the centuries have practiced the collective ownership of land (the *obshchina*) and also their political tradition woven of Russian despotism and tsarist autocracy. Again the theory of the Third Rome-Moscow and the messianic idea of Slavophilism have laid the base for the conception of the world revolution. We need only give a few instances to detect the two faces of Bolshevism and their indissolvable connection.

The American statesmen, except for a few statements by Secretary Acheson, do not want to see in Bolshevism the old Russian imperialism which holds the Soviet Empire together. In the psychological war against the Soviets, the American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism never alludes to the existence of imperialism and directs all its efforts to combatting Communism as a social and economic system. At the same time Secretary of State Dulles, in making a pact with Marshal Tito, the President of Communist Yugoslavia, shows that Communism without an ideological and political expansion offers no danger to the free world.

In their propaganda, the Bolsheviks emphasize the liberation of the laboring class; the free world must underline the principle of the sovereignty of the nations. When we come to activity along this line, it will become clear that the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Empire are really colonies of Russia, that they are fighting first for their liberation from the supremacy of Moscow and that the national problem is the weakest spot in the position of the Soviets. Bringing this out clearly would dull the edge of the anticolonial campaign of the Bolsheviks against the Western great powers. American propaganda and policy is doing this in a certain degree toward the satellites, but they absolutely do not apply this criterion to the peoples of the USSR. So during the Geneva Conferences and also in the report of the President on the state of the USA at the end of 1955 there is a mention of the liberation of the countries of Central Europe, but not a word about the enslavement of other peoples. Yet to destroy Soviet power it is not enough to tear the satellites from Moscow. That can come only through the disintegration of the Soviet Union which consists of one Russian and 15 non-Russian republics.

Among these 15 republics the Ukrainian SSR by its geopolitical position, the size of its territory, the number of its population and its economic resources is especially important for the Soviet Union and for the struggle against the Soviets. Its legal political position as a Soviet republic and a member of the UN offers a way to reveal the falsity of Soviet policy toward the non-Russian peoples. The Ukrainian people are endeavoring to liberate themselves, as is shown by many facts and the statements of German prisoners from the Soviet camps; it is full of dynamism and has an unbroken will for freedom. According to these reports the Ukrainians are a first-class political force which opposes the regime, while the Russians, if we may judge from their numbers in the concentration camps, are not. This is not exploited by the political strategy of the West. Further, American policy, recogniz-

ing in word the right of Ukraine to self-determination, by depreciating that self-determination during the revolution, denies it in practice.

These facts show very clearly how far the political strategy of the West is from those principles on which it must be based to win the struggle against the Soviets. The publicly proclaimed policy of "liberation" announced in the presidential elections of 1952 in the USA, in three years has made no change for the better in strengthening the anti-Bolshevik forces in Europe. Meanwhile in Asia as the result of the tactics of the Soviets there have been great changes and the rise of a serious threat for the free world. If at the first Afro-Asian Conference, from which the Soviets were absent, it would have been possible to support a resolution condemning Soviet colonialism, it will not be true at the second conference to be held in 1956 and to which the Soviets will be invited, even under the form of Central Asian Soviet republics.

We cannot tell how far the disturbing events of the last years have influenced the position of the struggle against the Soviets. At the first Geneva Conference, President Eisenhower at the demand of Bulganin withdrew a discussion as to the position of the satellites. Some weeks later in his appearance at Miami he returned to this question, and also in his report on the state of the USA, but in both cases the President passed over the question of the peoples of the USSR. Secretary of State Dulles in one speech at the end of 1955 mentioned casually the existence of 16 national republics of the Soviet Union. But these remarks and even the speeches of the leaders for the liberation of enslaved peoples do not help these peoples and the free world and do not harm the Soviets.

In estimating the internal position of the Soviets and their difficulties, we believe that the strength of the Bolsheviks lies in the ideological and political weakness of the West. Only a proper, better thought-out and logically executed political strategy emphasizing the universal right of all peoples to be free and independent, will allow the West to defeat the Soviets. We believe that the responsible leaders of the West must hasten to develop such a strategy. The Soviets have often outdistanced their Western opponents by their tactical zigzags. Now there are signs that they are trying to protect themselves against the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Empire by making concessions to them. These peoples are quite depressed by the moves of the Western statesmen as at the Geneva Conferences but they must not lose their last hopes and confidence in the West as has happened to many nations of Asia.

THE UKRAINIAN AND THE WORLD IRON RESOURCES

(A Note on a new Publication of the Department of Economic Affairs of the UN).

By S. YU. PROTSIUK

Through the cooperation of scholars not directly connected with the UN there have been some interesting and valuable works. Among these we must count the volume on the world reserves of iron ore: *Survey of World Iron Ore Resources, Occurrence, Appraisal and Use. Report of a Committee of Experts Appointed by the Secretary General, U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, 1955.*

This volume has its own history. In the summer of 1949 there was held in Paris a Scientific Conference on the conservation and proper use of natural resources. This conference, called on the initiative of the UN, aroused great interest among the scholars of the different countries; its sessions were serious and the series of papers of well-known specialists reflected their anxiety for the future welfare of humanity. The works of this conference were published in 1949-50 in eight large volumes.¹ At one of the final sessions of this conference there was chosen a special committee of experts who in view of the seriousness of the questions, were to form a permanent group, so to speak, and keep their fingers on the pulse of the problems of natural resources. The chairman of this Committee was the well-known French geologist Fernand Blondel. The Committee at once started preliminary work by correspondence and when this was done, it held two joint sessions, in June, 1953 in New York and in March, 1954 in Geneva. The volume which we are discussing here is the result of these meetings.

The survey of the iron resources of the world (contained in Part II of this volume) is very valuable, for it contains the results of the latest explorations and calculations, material never before published in one place. Thus we learn among other data that the greatest deposits of iron ore are in areas which are either not under the control of the white men of the Western world or are in areas far removed from the

¹ *Proceedings of the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources (UNSCCUR).*

European and North American centres (both politically and economically). According to the present state of geological exploration the largest deposits are in Brazil (Minas Gerasi), 35,000 million tons² and of these hematite ores with an iron content between 60-66%, about 1,250 million tons. Then come the reserves of India; the deposit of Kulta in the Burdwan region in Bengal 2,000 million tons; the beds of Kemangunda and Gangur in the state of Misore, also 2,000 million tons. Then the beds of Kanyamalya in the Salem region in Madras 1,000 million tons and above all the region of Sinsbum and Keonyer in the regions of Bihar and Orissa, 8,000 million tons.

The data on the iron resources of Asia (pp. 265-334) especially on India and China and the Malay Peninsula, Indonesia and Japan are of especial interest to us, since these areas hold a front rank in questions of international relations. The author of this sketch (Sitaram Krishkan, director of the Indian Geological Service) has given a brilliant survey of a little-known field.

The estimates for all other countries are far behind these. The only exceptions may be France and England; the deposits in the region of Ars, Landres-Ottange, Orne, Briey and Anjou are assessed together at 3,000 million tons — the beds of North Staffordshire in England are also vast (approximately 1,300 million tons). In the USSR (without Ukraine) the largest deposits are those of the Kola Peninsula regions of Lake Imandra, Olenogorsk with deposits of 500 million tons and of Maly Khinsan (Far East) also about 500 million tons.

This picture of the distribution of the richest deposits of iron ores shows that such countries as China and India have great possibilities; in the near future we can expect a noticeable growth of a new metallurgical industry in these lands in the world production of pig-iron and steel. But on the other hand even a very rapid increase in this field could hardly satisfy the growing needs of the millions of their own population, when we take into account that the role of iron in the life of these countries will remain not less than it is in the life of the population of the advanced nations of the West.

As regards the Ukrainian deposits, we find in this book stereotyped data, which do not add much to the problem. They are based on the data of 1937, in fact, and there is a vast amount of facts on Ukrainian industry which we can find in various publications. Actually the study of the Ukrainian deposits only began in 1937, and we must assume that they have been continued in detail, so that the data of 1937 cannot be accepted now. Also, the most modern methods of geo-

² We give the so-called potential reserves. For estimation see below.

logical exploration and more than that the development of techniques for smelting low-grade ores (see below) forces us to assume that some important changes in the quantitative balance of Ukraine between 1937 and 1955, have taken place. When we look at the sources quoted, we note with surprise that they have really taken into account only two books: 1. A. Moyseyev: *Geographical and Geological Sketch of the Crimea* and 2. N. Svitalsky, *The Iron Mines of the Kryvy Rih Basin*; both works were printed in Volumes 7 and 8 of the *Reports of the International Geological Congress* which was held in Moscow in 1937. There is no doubt that these are serious works, their authors were well-known Ukrainian geologists, but in a scientific work published in 1955 we would be justified in hoping for corrections and new publications on the subject. Unfortunately this reproach can be made not only to this volume of the UN but to the majority of the Ukrainian emigre publications which aim to explain and discuss the problems of the Ukrainian economy. The difficulty in securing the necessary scientific literature from the USSR is only a partial excuse. It is not easy to procure it but in many libraries of well known scientific centres in the West we can still find many Soviet scientific editions, especially periodicals including the most recent period (1950-55), which deserve the serious consideration of the western authors.

Turning to the concrete data on the Ukrainian reserves of iron ore, we find in this work of the UN: Kryvy Rih — potential reserves 1,600 million tons; Kerch 1,000 million tons. This data is very different from that which is usually given in Soviet and foreign literature. It shows the reserves of Kryvy Rih and Kerch as less than is usually accepted. This among other reasons is due to the fact that the International Commission of Experts accepted certain presuppositions for the general evaluation of the deposits (cf. pp. 169-176). We know that in some countries as Germany there are included in the potential reserves, ore deposits which in other countries are listed as only eventually possible or simply impossible of use (inexploitable). Here the points of view of the economist and mining engineer basically differ in their evaluation of the size of the deposit. Under potential reserves, the figures of which we are giving here, we understand the deposit which can be exploited industrially under conditions of a better and more advanced use of the present technique. The estimate of the deposits of Kryvy Rih and Kerch, given by Prof. Blondel on international standards, is useful in that it is critical of Soviet statistics as we have come to be. In fact another scholar (F. H. Percival) in this volume separates these figures when he considers the structure of the world deposits (Kryvy Rih 2,300 million tons. Kerch 2,726 million tons). On

the basis of these figures it is interesting to note in the question of the size of the Kerch deposits, we find approximately the same figures elsewhere (2,700 million tons); this cannot be said of the figures for the Kryvy Rih basin. Balzak and Feygin³ give the figures 51,300 million tons (usable and not potential deposits), Betekhtin⁴ sets 20,000 million tons (possible deposits of ore with an iron content not less than 40%). We most frequently find the figure of 1,500 million tons of reserves of high-grade ore; this was the calculation of 1938 and confirmed in later works; the precise figures range from 1,142 million tons (Betekhtin ed. 1940) to 1,491.1 million tons.⁵

We would like to insert here that despite a few defects, this volume of the UN is a solid work and presents a critical combination of very many and sometimes detailed data, which can scarcely be found in any other volume. Much of this data and its critical approach makes this volume very valuable.

Still more interesting than these statistics of the ore deposits is the first part of the volume which gives several extraordinarily striking and important facts on the progress of the iron industry in the advanced countries.

Thus Gilbert Montape gives a critical review of the new methods of geological and especially geophysical exploration for the opening of new beds and also the securing of precise data on those that are already being exploited. Montape devotes special attention to the aeromagnetic method of exploration and illustrates his remarks with several detailed cases of the accomplishments of American and especially Canadian exploring practice during the last years. Very interesting for us are the examples of geophysical exploration in the region of Campbellford (northeast Ontario) and in the region of New Quebec on the Labrador Peninsula.

We find very valuable data on the economics of the mining industry in the article by G. P. Munger on the role of the financial costs in the choice of the most appropriate and profitable smelting processes, and of M. Viberg on the dependence of the metallurgical processes on the kind of ores to which they are to be applied, and of J. Sullivan on enrichment of ores. M. Viberg touches a problem which is important for Ukrainian metallurgists and the USSR as a whole. This problem

³ S. S. Balzak, V. F. Vasyutin, Ya. G. Feygin — *Economic Geography of the USSR*. Moscow, 1947.

⁴ A. G. Betekhtin, *Course on the locations of useful mines*, Moscow 1946.

⁵ V. I. Karmazin — *Technical Classification of the Iron Ores of Kryvy Rih*, *Mining Journal* 1949, No. 7, p.p. 29-35; M. A. Pavlov, *Metallurgy of Pig-Iron* 3rd r ed., Vol. I., ed. A. N. SRSR, Moscow, 1948.

now faces the entire world. It is the use of low-grade ores in present metallurgical processes. The use of iron and steel in modern national economy has so increased that it has created the gloomy vision of the exhaustion of the best iron deposits. The danger of such an exhaustion was seen with especial force in the post-war period in such countries as Sweden, Germany, Russia (the Urals), partly the USA, and unfortunately Ukraine. It caused many scientists and expert metallurgists to turn their attention to finding better ways of using low-grade ores. These efforts were concentrated chiefly in two fields: the processes of enrichment (agglomeration) of low grade ores and the methods of the intensification of the blast furnace. In speaking of agglomeration, Viberg stresses the methods used in the new metallurgical plants in Oberhausen, Germany (put into operation in 1951) and also the researches of the Japanese Showi plant in Manchuria. For the intensification of the blast furnace, he describes the study in the use of blast enriched with oxygen (from 30% to 50%).

The author of this article has previously called attention on the pages of Ukrainian journals to the difficulties that appeared with especial sharpness in 1950-55 in the well-known Magnitogorsk complex. (The latest information only confirms more definitely the critical situation in the metallurgical industry of the USSR). Thus F. Voronov, director of the Magnitogorsk complex warns (Cf. *Pravda*, May 16, 1955) that even the newest enriching plants in Magnitogorsk (and these factories were started there in 1947) give an unsuccessful agglomeration of low-grade ores; the iron content reaches only in this process 52-55% and then does not permit the proper use of blast furnaces and in general harms the process of smelting pig-iron. Despite the fact that Voronov and his predecessors as G. Nosov have more than once warned of the tragic situation in Magnitogorsk, Soviet scholars have not yet succeeded in developing satisfactorily a process for the effective enrichment of low-grade ores.

The situation in Ukraine is equally gloomy. It is true that the Ukrainian metallurgists have done more in this field on the basis of the work of the Kamysh-Burun complex, where Kerch ores are agglomerated. But there have recently been critical articles to the effect that the Kerch agglomeration is of low quality and its use in the plants of the Ozivstal and the Donbas is causing great damage in the operation of those factories. It has seemed that the Kryvy Rih ores also need agglomeration for the leaders of the Dnieper metallurgical plants are noticing that the high quality of the Kryvy Rih ores has deteriorated noticeably in the last years and causes bad work in the blast furnaces and even in the Martin plants. Because of this unsatis-

factory state of things it has been decided to build in Kryvy Rih a new large agglomerating plant (officially the Southern Ore-agglomerating Complex); the date for starting this was set for 1952 but after great delay it was only started in 1955. So the great damage to the burning problem of the Kryvy Rih basin was sharply criticized by Ukrainian Metallurgists (A. Chernynenko, N. Vlasov, A. Nyzhehorodov in *Pravda*, May 31, 1955).

To improve the agglomeration, the Soviet Ukrainian scientists are experimenting with new forms of raw materials which can be used in the agglomeration as chalk. Especial success has been made by Academician Mykola Vlasovych Luhovtsov, director of a laboratory for preparing metallurgical raw materials in the Institute of Mining of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.⁶ The results of Luhovtsov's studies in fused agglomeration and the most practicable ways of preparing for blast furnaces the lower grade ores of the Kerch deposits are being taken up by the metallurgical industry in Ukraine. Unfortunately as a result of the years of isolation of science in the USSR, the Ukrainian scientists have had no opportunity to exchange their studies with experts from Western Europe and America who have also made great strides. The research of the factory in Oberhausen, mentioned by Viberg, was perfected by the American I. B. Humphrey who proposed the use of spiral, rotary concentrators. These concentrators are marked by their low power (one and half turns of the ore on the spiral per hour), by their slight use of water and also by the fact that they can be used to agglomerate not only iron but chromite, barite, lead and zinc ores, ilmenite and fine coal. Agglomerating aggregates of this kind were started in the USA in 1954-5.⁷

The way of using a current of air enriched by oxygen has not been properly studied in Ukraine. While the oxygen content in some Western European factories reaches 30-50% (Liege in France) there are used in Ukraine only blowers that give an oxygen content of 25%; even this is done for experimental purposes only in a few factories. The best work in Ukraine has been in the use of oxygen in smelting steel. A. Leskiv, director of the Martin Section in Zaporizhstal knows for example that the use of the blast in a Martin furnace with a mixture of air and oxygen with oxygen 30% makes it possible to increase the production of the standard 185-ton furnace to 250,000 tons of steel a year. Yet the Martin furnaces in Ukraine are far from these records. The first reason is that the mixture of air and oxygen is used in only

⁶ *Journal of the Academy of Sciences UkSSR*, No. 5, 1955, pp. 43-45.

⁷ *Engineering*, London, July 29, 1955, p. 153.

a few factories and that the problem of raising the production of the blast and Martin furnaces especially in the use of low grade ores is complex and connected with other still unsolved problems. The intensified smelting process demands for example the use in the furnace of special high quality fire proof materials (chromo-magnesite) while most of the Ukrainian furnaces have dinas fireproofing, which cannot stand the increased rate of smelting.*

The articles of Sullivan, Munger and Viberg, unfortunately do not give an answer to these problems and do not show satisfactorily how the West European metallurgists are getting out of their unhappy position.

On the whole the UN publication on the iron reserves in the world, deserves especial attention by Ukrainian metallurgists, engineers and scientists generally, for it directs our attention to the basic difficulties with which Ukrainian mining and metallurgical industries are faced. We believe that it is the special duty of those technical Ukrainian scholars who are now outside their country in the advanced lands of Europe and America to follow carefully and study the advances of these lands in improving smelting processes especially in the possibilities of using low-grade iron ores and at the appropriate moment to supplement the research and the accomplishments of workers in the appropriate fields. The resources of Ukraine in iron, although large, are not inexhaustible and the tremendous growth in industry and the needs of the many millions of the population of Ukraine will hasten the moment when the problem of using low-grade ores will be a pressing necessity.

* Production of the special steel in Ukraine, cf. *Bull. of the Society of Ukr. Engineers in America*, Year III, 1952. No. 3(25), p.p. 41-47.

THE RED RUSSIAN REGIME A CONTINUATION OF THE OLD

By WASYL HALICH

Since the chief Soviet leaders, and after them the propaganda machinery, have been crediting themselves with everything that they consider good in the Russian Empire, it may be worthwhile to analyze some of the outstanding aspects of the present regime. To begin with, the men who overthrew the Kerensky government in 1917 were better acquainted with Russia itself than they were with their immediate idol, Karl Marx. They inherited the empire with its complex problems; and after some petty propagandistic experiments, they had to reach to the source of their knowledge, that is, what they had learned in their youth, and start to copy the practices of the tsarist government. This was done often under new names, new offices, but frequently with the aid of Old Regime officials, especially in the army and administrative work. Furthermore, the national economic, legal, linguistic, religious, and other structures that the Reds inherited were deep-rooted and resisted and defied change.

Lenin and his group tried to get into power in 1917 by propaganda, but when this proved inadequate, they resorted to force. Once they achieved this end by force and Machiavellian methods, it was quite natural for them to stay in power by the employment of the same means. Not being satisfied to rule the Russian Empire only, the new rulers in the Kremlin have been trying to overthrow the governments of other peoples, while at home they allow no opposition parties or movements to criticize them and Bolshevism. From the tsarist regime they inherited a secret police system which they have employed under various names and made into the most feared governmental agency in world history. Thus the former Third Section became the Cheka, NKVD, or the present MVD. But regardless of its name, its methods were the same: bloody force. Not infrequently the destructive force of the secret police consumes its own members, the most noted recent victim being Beria himself. The secret police force of the Russian Soviet Empire, no doubt, surpasses the tsarist agency in power, in numerical strength in methods and, of course, the number of victims, which go into the millions.

Both the Old Regime and the Reds tried to impress their people and the outside world with their importance and accomplishments, which often did not harmonize with facts. Such a false facade was not hard to detect, however, even by the uneducated. Too much censorship by the government of Nicholas II motivated Joubert to write a book in 1904 titled: *Russia As It Really Is*.¹ In more recent years, two books have appeared under similar conditions, Dallin's *The Real Soviet Russia*² and Stevens' *This Is Russia — Uncensored*.³

From the Old Regime the Reds learned how the government mistreated its masses, especially the peasants. Catherine II, following Pugachev's insurrection, encouraged the nobles to "Be so good as to call your peasants cattle."⁴ One Russian historian wrote that the peasant was treated much worse than a dog by the Old Regime.⁵ As the "new" rulers grew up under such practices, it was not unusual for them to employ force. They have treated the farmers much worse than live stock; in fact, a peasant has been degraded lower than in the feudal age of Alexander I, the new feudal lord, of course, being the state. The Reds after deceiving a farmer several times, defrauded him of all his belongings and sent him to Siberia, not singly but in large groups, often depopulating regions in Europe to start rural settlements in Asia. Such practices are still going on; and farmers, especially young people from Ukraine, are forced to "volunteer" to become pioneers in the Far East, to take steady employment there and never see their homes again.⁶ For the abuses the rural population receives from the government, the underfed farmer, in Ukraine especially, gives the Kremlin overlord poor work and diminished returns.⁷ The notion or practice of government-sponsored settlements in Siberia is common knowledge. What is not so well known is that it is not only the present regime which singles out the Ukrainians for such projects, but throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Moscow also used them to further her colonial movement.⁸ From the Old Regime the Reds likewise "borrowed" the idea that the land belonged to the government and put it into operation by the use of brutal force.

¹ Carl Joubert, *Russia As It Really Is*, London, 1904.

² David J. Dallin, *The Real Soviet Russia*, New Haven, 1944.

³ Edmund Stevens, *This Is Russia — Uncensored*, New York, 1950.

⁴ Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, p. 250.

⁵ Gregor Alexinsky, *Modern Russia*, p. 87.

⁶ "New Crime of Moscow — Deportation of Ukrainians to Kazakhstan," — *The Ukrainian Bulletin* (New York), Vol. VIII, March 1, 1955, pp. 1 and 5.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁸ M. Mirsky, *Russia*, p. 231.

If Catherine II and her Potemkin were to come back to life, they would readily smile in recognition of their much publicized fraud, — “Potemkin Villages,” duplicated on a very large scale by the Reds. The notion is being carried out in many ways. The most recent sample of a “Potemkin Village” that has been publicized by the Reds and after it the world press is the new “model” village in the Kziltusky region, Kazakhstan.⁹ The obvious original notion of deceiving people is still there, and the persons to be so fooled are both the Soviet subjects and foreigners, especially the satellites.

Another aspect that the Reds have borrowed from Catherine II has been the “Thank you” delegation from the oppressed non-Russian subjects. Catherine received one from Lithuania, while Stalin enlarged upon this field by having his henchmen all over the Soviet Empire send such delegations to Moscow, the obvious reason being to deceive world opinion. On the other hand, as in the Old Regime, so now, no subject or subjects can petition the government against its oppressive practices without endangering themselves.

Next to the disregard for an individual has been disregard for his spiritual rights. Consequently, one has seen religious persecution in the Russian Empire for centuries. The Soviet policy toward religion has fluctuated, swinging like a pendulum between persecution and relaxation. Yet even the Godless Bolsheviks have made the Russian Orthodox Church their official agent in religious matters. It is the same atheistic government that since 1945 has forced five millions of Ukrainian Catholics to Russian Orthodoxy but meanwhile has not allowed the free Ukrainian Orthodox Church to exist. Even Nicholas I and Alexander III were a trifle more tolerant. When the Russian imperial troops invaded Ukrainian Galicia in World War I, they deported Metropolitan Sheptytsky (head of the Ukr. Catholic Church) to Russia; in 1944, when the Reds invaded the same province, they not only deported Metropolitan Slipyi (then head of the Ukr. Catholic Church), but sentenced him to eight years in a slave camp; and when the time expired, re-sentenced him to an additional nine years, presumably because he had sent pastoral letters to the clergy. All the Ukrainian bishops in West Ukraine were exiled or killed by 1945. None of them were accorded the public trials of Mindszenty or the type allotted to Stepanich, because the Reds did not dare to have publicity connected with them.¹⁰

⁹ A picture of it appeared in the American-Ukrainian paper *Svoboda* (Jersey City), Nov. 16, 1954.

¹⁰ Dr. Stercho's lecture, *The Ukrainian Bulletin* (New York), June 1-15, 1955, p. 4.

A Russification policy has been the aim of every form of government for over two hundred years. The Old Regime persecuted the people whose countries it seized if they adhered to their language, customs, tradition, and religion. The recent announcement of the Russian press that henceforth only one nationalism would be tolerated in the Russian (read: Soviet) Empire, namely, Russian nationalism, brought to the surface what was going on secretly. There is often a difference in the method, however. The Old Regime prohibited the publication of Ukrainian books, while the Reds allow the publication but tell you what to write and what to publish. Otherwise a trip to Siberia for slow death or immediate liquidation. The most recent policy of forcing schools in the Ukraine, Lithuania, Hungary, and other satellite states to teach Russian is another evidence of Russification.

As the Russification tempo increases, for quite obvious reason the resistance to it also mounts. Various countries under Russian occupation have no notion of giving up their civilization and surrendering to an enemy standard. They have outlived former enemy persecutions and survived; they hope, pray, and fight for survival now. Because of its size, wealth, and large population, the Russians are very determined to break Ukraine's back of self-determination. For over 300 years the Russian rulers have attempted to bury the independent and democratic Ukrainian spirit. Yet it lives and fights for its freedom. Millions were starved to death in the Ukraine under Stalin and millions deported to Siberia, but the struggle goes on.¹¹ The Ukrainian guerilla forces, though announced as liquidated several times, reappear and continue the fight. Recent paper reports reveal that 1,500 Ukrainian (U.P.A.) soldiers are in the Russian prison at Schtum, near Danzig. Other countries under Russian occupation struggle also for their freedom and are paying a big price. The Katyn forest massacre, the Vinnitsya (Ukraine) massacre with a mass grave of 40,000 civilians, Tatar and Estonian genocide are all samples of twentieth century horrors. The Russians themselves, however, have encouraged indirectly the non-Russian subjects to patriotism by stimulating fervid Muscovite patriotism in recent years.¹² Dr. Smal-Stocki's book, *The Nationality Problem of the Soviet Union*, discusses this topic at greater length.¹³

¹¹ W. Halich, "Ukraine: Russia's Most Violent Headache," *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, Vol. IV, 356 ff.

¹² "Testimony on Genocide of Ukraine" before the U. S. Congress Committee. *The Ukrainian Bulletin* (New York), Vol. VIII, Nos. 2-3.

Harry Best, *The Soviet Experiment*, p. 92. See also "Tension in the Soviet Union," U. S. Govt. Publication (Washington, D. C.), 1951. Chap. V deals with "Minorities".

¹³ Milwaukee, 1952.

Abolition of the death sentence has been an idea often proclaimed by various Russian rulers, beginning with Empress Elizabeth and continuing with Stalin's Constitution of 1936. And yet, regardless of what was in the law books, in practice it was not abolished. Now it stands theoretically abolished, but in reality people are put to death by the government just as if the law did not exist. The old political autocratic theory that the lawmaker can violate his law in Russia still goes on as formerly. Stalin's regime, more than any other, holds the bad record of executing millions for political reasons.¹⁴

Just as the tsarist government prohibited its subjects from traveling abroad, so likewise the Soviet. The Red prohibitions and tight isolation have earned the name of "Iron Curtain." If some person escapes the country, just as in the Old Regime he is followed up by Soviet agents abroad, as revealed in Kravchenko's postscript to the book — *I Chose Freedom*. Often such emigres are kidnapped and returned "home", or murdered on the spot, just as recently the Slovak political exile, Matus Chernak, was killed in Munich. The tsarist government had a passport system for travel at home¹⁵ and so does the Soviet regime.

Likewise the gigantic Soviet bureaucracy is an enlargement on those of the previous governments. In place of royal princes, nobles, and clergy, one finds a new classification of the subjects into the more and the less privileged. To the first category belong the big party leaders, secret police, army officers, industrial experts and those Stakhanovites with superhuman accomplishments; while to the underprivileged belong most of the rest of the people, with varying degrees of differences. There exist several categories of rationing cards.¹⁶ Of the new class slate, Chamberlin's *Soviet Russia*, chapter V, has a good account. The new names cover old practices.

In foreign affairs the new Kremlin rulers have followed a blue print of previous rulers. The leaders of the Bolsheviks were not slow to realize that if they were to stay in power they would have to carry on the old policies and show results or accomplishments. Thus the old Russian tradition of landgrabbing from the weaker neighbors was resumed with great success. Russia's interest in Constantinople, the Balkans, the Slavic countries, Finland and the Baltic states, the Mediterranean, Africa, Turkey, Iran, India, Korea, and China remains as fixed as though the tsars were still in power.¹⁷

¹⁴ Victor Kravchenko refers to "Super-Purge" and tortures. See *I Chose Freedom*, Chap. XVII.

¹⁵ Eugene Chikalenko, *Memoirs* (in Ukr.), pp. 231-232.

¹⁶ Geo. Moorad, *Behind the Iron Curtain*, p. 151.

¹⁷ Vera V. Dean, *Russia: Menace or Promise*, pp. 59-74.

Slogans have changed but methods have not. To obtain their territorial objectives, the tsarist diplomats used such excuses as "protection of fellow Christians," "protection of fellow Slavs," and "protection of the Holy Places and the Orthodox" in Jerusalem. By these excuses pressure was put on the Turkish government, an action which as a rule preceded a war. Before Catherine II started her partitions of Poland, she claimed that her fellow Orthodox had to be protected from Polish and Jesuit persecutions. Following in her footsteps, Stalin started "the liberation of Ukrainians" from Polish persecution. The Reds, however, have covered most of their imperialistic intentions through the use of anti-capitalistic slogans and propaganda. Behind all their zeal for more power is the aim to rule the globe, in other words conquer the world and subject it to Russia.

When Stalin "floored" his agents abroad in 1939 by suddenly becoming a pal and ally of Hitler, it did not surprise the diplomats and students of history. This was reminiscent of Alexander I and his Treaty of Tilsit, when he double-crossed his Western allies and became a pal of Napoleon. And as subsequent events proved, consciously or not, Stalin aped Alexander I into war and nearly had Moscow occupied by Hitler.

Probably no tsar in Moscow or St. Petersburg ever dreamed of ruling so much of Europe as the Reds have gained since 1944-48. Of course, they came to those countries to "liberate" the people from their national governments, but the Soviet sample of liberty, as exemplified by the conduct of the soldiers and that of the NKVD and other administrative agents, proved to be a bitter pill. Without wasting any time, the invaders started the Sovietization and Russification of the small nations. No aspect of life was left untouched by the occupation authorities. Because they consider these nations Russia's "internal" problem, to be solved by her alone, the Kremlin rulers refused to allow discussion of satellite countries at the recent Big Four Geneva meeting. Meanwhile unmerciful exploitation of the occupied countries goes on. Their forests are depleted, their mines exhausted, their farm products carried to Muscovy, and the local population left facing starvation. In addition to this, the young people are demoralized by the encouragement of immorality among them by the Russian rulers.¹⁸

The expression, "As in Moscow . . .," has its long history. What happened in 1478 finds its counterpart in many countries under Soviet occupation. When Ivan III attacked the city-state of Novgorod, negotiations were started by the attacked city leaders to save the city. To some of their proposals Ivan forcefully said things would be here "As in

¹⁸ Leland Stowe, *Sexual License: Key Soviet Strategy*.

Moscow . . ." "There is to be no town bell in Novgorod and no *posadnik* (mayor); all the sovereignty is to be ours." Next year Ivan used a fifth column in Novgorod and destroyed the city. A hundred families were moved wholesale to the Middle Volga. In 1487, fifty leading merchant families were deported from Novgorod and 7,000 of the gentry were exiled to Muscovy. At the same time Moscow families were moved wholesale to Novgorod.¹⁹

Oddly enough, even the recent Muscovite "peace movement" has its precedent in Nicholas II's efforts in connection with the Hague tribunal in 1899 and 1907.²⁰ Then, as to-day, Russia's semi-feudal agrarian economy could not stand the pressure of the cost of armament and this induced the leaders to play at idealism until a more convenient time.²¹ In 1899, Austria planned to modernize her artillery; while in 1955, the Russians became uncomfortable over the American atomic experiments and the West German efforts at rearmament.

The Red politicians are noted for their revolutionary activities in other countries and for their interference in the purely internal affairs of other nations. This characteristic, too, has samples in history. Peter I was much interested in other peoples' business, while Catherine II interfered in Polish affairs before she started annexing the country. One can again refer to Alexander I, to his Holy Alliance of 1814-15 to police Europe and maintain the status quo, a provision which he violated when he started the Greek uprising against Turkey. And then Nicholas I continued the Turkish broil by going into war against her, with Constantinople more of an objective than Greek freedom. Early in 1914, the Russian ambassador in Vienna threatened Austria with war if she allowed its Ukrainian subjects to have a university in Lviv in the Ukrainian province under Austrian rule at the time.²² Most recently, when the communistically inclined government of Guatemala was overthrown, carloads of communist literature were seized and put on display at the National Palace.²³ To bring the illustration nearer home to us, let us take the numerous attempts of the Soviet Government to control the Orthodox Church in the United States in order to have a chance to appoint

¹⁹ Pares, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-87.

²⁰ Count Witte claimed that this peace movement of Nicholas II was originated by him and Muraviev. See Florinsky's *Russia*, Vol. 11, p. 1260.

²¹ Dr. (Gen.) Jim Dan Hill, Pres. of Wis. State College at Superior has a very fine analysis of this topic in his weekly column in *The Evening Telegram* (Superior, Wis.), July 14, 1955.

²² *Svoboda* (Jersey City), Dec. 19, 1952.

²³ *The Evening Telegram* (Superior, Wis.), Dec. 13, 1954.

the high officials, demand obedience, and subject American citizens to unlimited propaganda.

This discussion does not exhaust the field, but within a limited space brings to the reader's attention the fact that the basic Russian practices, notions, policies or aspirations go on regardless of who rules Moscow. And that the chief concern of the world should be not so much Russian communism as Russian imperialism. Russia of 1945-1955 has been very anxious to set various people free from Italian, British, or French rule, while she herself has taken away the freedom of every small nation that she came to liberate. Russia is a colonial regime that preaches peace but inspires or wages imperialistic wars in Korea and French Indo-China, and then makes and breaks the Korean peace truce. Such is the Russian Empire we should watch, watching not what she says but what she does. As long as she does not leave other nations alone and does not give up the notion of world revolution and world domination, she will remain a menace to world peace. Furthermore, unless the Soviet politicians turn about face and respect the treaties they make, other countries will continue to be reluctant to enter into any negotiations with them.²⁴

²⁴ A senate (U. S.) subcommittee released a study recently which "proved that in the 38 short years since the Soviet Union came into existence, its government has broken its word in virtually every country to which it ever gave a signed promise." Editorial in Duluth News-Tribune, July 26, 1955.

THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE MOSCOW POLICY IN AGRICULTURE

By M. MYRONENKO

Editor's Note. — The article by Mr. Myronenko makes clear the catastrophic condition of agricultural production and also the problem of feeding the population of the USSR as a result of the introduction of the kolkhoz system. We must add that the hopes of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party that the Khrushchev plan of ploughing up millions of acres of virgin soil in Kazakhstan and Southern Siberia would furnish a basic solution of the food problem in the USSR this year have not been fulfilled, for an unusually dry season in these areas has completely destroyed the plan. The harvests have been only 10-15% of what had been expected.

On July 1, 1955 the Reuters Agency announced from Ottawa that the Canadian government and the present government of Poland had made an agreement for the sale and export to Poland of 10 million bushels of Canadian wheat. At the same time Reuters announced that 25,000,000 bushels of Canadian wheat were being sold directly to the USSR.

This is significant when we take into account the following facts: Before World War I the territory of the USSR exported yearly some 500 million bushels of grain, chiefly wheat. During the NEP and the early years of collectivization the USSR exported important amounts of grain. On the eve of World War II, it exported millions of puds of grain, wheat and barley to Germany to build up its military grain reserves. Then after World War II the USSR acquired a series of primarily agricultural countries as Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Poland which were important exporters of grain. Even the highly industrialized Czechoslovakia was almost self-sufficient in food, and Eastern Germany, occupied by the Soviet Empire, was the basic source of agricultural products for the whole of Germany.

During the last years the USSR has imported and is still importing considerable quantities of foodstuffs, meat, fats, oils, etc. This to a certain degree is not unexpected, for the fact of the decline in animal husbandry in the USSR has long been half acknowledged by the official Moscow statements and is explained by "the partial failure of the reconstruction period in agriculture on the basis of social collectivization."

The importation of grain is the best visual revelation of the general agricultural crisis of the entire empire and the failure of the Moscow policy on agriculture.

The present condition of the Moscow imperial social and economic policy as a whole and especially its attitude in agriculture is a basic factor in the entire historical development of the empire and an influential factor in its development. The formation of the Russian empire was and is still the result of the military conquest of the regions around the Moscow centre and the Muscovite people as the physical and spiritual promoter of the empire. The Muscovite empire has worked to lower and to destroy the cultural level of the conquered nations and to disintegrate them culturally. The uncompromising struggle of the Ukrainian peasant farmer, an individualist and landowner, with the Muscovite nomad community, the "mir", now transformed in the kolkhoz, is the struggle of two mutually exclusive cultures, the Muscovite culture of a conqueror, a lower and primitive culture, and the Ukrainian culture which is on a higher level.

The culture of the social relationship and the economic activity of each nation is one of the chief, basic causes of its independence and difference from another people. The liquidation of the principles of the social organization and relations and the economic activity of the conquered nation is the liquidation of that nation as an independent human community. Collectivization and socialism became in the hands of Moscow the sharpest and most radical tool in the destruction of the Ukrainian social and economic individualism and in the disintegration of the culture of Ukraine and the other enslaved peoples.

The ruination of the bases of the social organization and economic activity of the enslaved nations and the imposition upon them of the methods of social organization and economic activity of the conquering nation leads to a drop in the economy of the entire empire and a general fall in its production, and the flow of resources from the conquered nations to the metropolitan centre — Muscovy.

During the period of the Soviet regime the empire has accomplished a great deal in its policy of checking and destroying the centrifugal forces of the empire, the enslaved nations, but at the same time it has very severely weakened itself economically as a result of the continuous lowering and narrowing of its productive basis.

But the liberalization of the internal conditions along with an improvement of its economic position is producing also a rebirth of the national cultures of the enslaved nations suppressed in the former period and a rebirth and development in them of their own system of social organization and the increase of phenomena and elements of an economic

development apart from that of the empire and of separation from the empire.

A clear illustration of such economic separation from the empire during a period of political liberalization is furnished by the history of the economic development of Ukraine during the quarter century preceding World War I. This is a very important and interesting subject which should be studied in detail. I will limit myself here to mentioning the fact of the organization and activity of the "Union of Industrialists of the South Russia." This organization took in the area of Ukraine, the Cossack lands and the Crimea and clearly and unmistakably was in opposition to the centralizing and unifying economic policy of the empire and the imperial protective policy for the industry of "central Russia."

Only by taking into account these basic historical trends of the imperial economic policy, especially and chiefly in agriculture, can we correctly understand the present position of the Moscow economic policy especially and chiefly in agriculture on which rests the whole of the economic policy of the empire.

With what economic postulates in agriculture did Moscow enter the present post-war stake of its policy?

Russian statistics¹ show that the average yearly communal harvest of grain during the five years before World War I (1910-1914) was 675.6 million centners or 4.8 centners per individual in the empire. (In 1913 the population of the empire in the frontiers of 1939 was 139,000,000). And on the eve of World War II the average yearly communal harvest of grains was 944.7 million centners, in 1938 944.9 million centners or 5.7 centners per individual (with a population according to the census of 1939 of 170.3 millions). This apparent increase in the total amount of grain harvested per individual is in a certain degree fictitious because the statistical data before World War I was based on the estimate of the so-called "granary harvest," i. e. the amount of the grain ground and carried to elevators while the statistical data of the Soviet period, especially during the five years before World War II was based on an estimate of the so-called "biological" harvest. This estimate of the "biological" harvest, (which the Moscow terminology willingly calls "actual") is made by state commissions through a selected harvesting of several metre sectors in the larger sowings before their harvesting, and the tests of threshing from some metres of the harvested area is credited to all the large areas sown and compiled on the levels of rayon, district republic, and Union dimensions, as the total of the "biological" harvest.

¹ *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1948. Vol. USSR, p. 889.

Malenkov in his report to the Supreme Soviet in August, 1953 said that the "granary harvest" was many times smaller than the "biological". A recognized authority on the economics of the USSR and especially its agriculture, Prof. N. Yasny, estimates that the estimate of the "biological harvest" in the USSR exceeds by 30% the "granary harvest," i. e. the grain actually brought to the elevators. When we take into account the assertion of Malenkov that the "granary harvest" is much smaller than the "biological" and the minimum of 30% set by Prof. Yasny for this increase, the "granary" harvest on the eve of World War II per individual was definitely or approximately 4 centners per individual as compared with 4.8 centners on the eve of World War I. Thus on the eve of World War II the total grain production per individual in the USSR was about 20% less than before World War I.

This was the actual position of the "grain problem" in the USSR on the eve of the World War II. This is one reason why the USSR has ceased to be an exporter of grain between the two World Wars, and ten years after the ending of the Second, is beginning to import grain in tens of millions of puds.

The position of animal husbandry on the eve of World War II was much worse than of grain.

The *Large Soviet Encyclopedia* (BSE)² on p. 927 (edition of 1948) says: "In 1938 the marketable part (state collections, M. M.) of the products of animal husbandry were: of meat 125.4 million puds, milk, 500 million puds, wool 5.4 million puds. In tsarist Russia despite the greater number of head of cattle, the marketable part (market sales, M. M.) was meat 86.7 million puds, milk, 354.4 million puds, and wool 4.4 million puds."

What is the "secret" of these "successes," if there were fewer head of animals, as stated by this source and more "marketable part"?

The answer to this question is given on the same page of the BSE which shows that in the total production in the animal industry the percentage of the "produce" which Moscow practice during the present socialist economy has secured, has changed as follows:

| | 1927-28 End of the NEP Period | 1937 End of the first Collectivized Five Year Plan |
|------|----------------------------------|--|
| Meat | 35.0 | 59.0 |
| Milk | 15.0 | 31.0 |
| Wool | 27.0 | 75.0 |

² *ibid.*, pp. 836-7.

i. e. along with the reduction in the total amount of animal husbandry in agriculture there has gone on an increase in the proportion taken from the producer.

If we apply the proportions for 1927-1928 to 1913-1914 and this is possible because in 1927-1928 the condition of animal husbandry (the number of head) was on the whole approximately that in 1913-1914 and we apply the percentage of "marketable products" for 1937 to the absolute data cited in 1938, which is proper, because the number of head of cattle and total production in these two successive years, underwent no essential changes except an increase or decrease of 1-2% and there were not those catastrophic changes in the condition of animal husbandry in 1938 that had taken place during collectivization, the general survey of the animal industry in the USSR before the First and Second World Wars appears as follows: (In millions of puds)

| Type of Production | 1913-4 | | | 1938 | | |
|--------------------|------------|--------------|------|------------|--------------|------|
| | Tot. Prod. | Trad. Amount | % | Tot. Prod. | Mark. Amount | % |
| Meat | 247.7 | 86.7 | 35.0 | 212.5 | 125.4 | 59.0 |
| Milk | 2362.7 | 354.4 | 15.0 | 1613.0 | 500.0 | 31.0 |
| Wool | 16.3 | 4.4 | 27.0 | 7.2 | 5.4 | 75.0 |

Thus the total production of the animal industry before World War II in comparison with the period before World War I had fallen.

Meat by 35.2 million puds or 14.2%;

Milk by 749.7 million puds or 31.7%;

Wool by 9.1 million puds or 58.1%.

The reduction of the total amount of production in the animal husbandry when compared with the growth of the actual population, or the use of the products of animal husbandry by the population dropped still more, for the population had increased from 139,000,000 to 170,-300,000. This among other things explains that instead of the export in 1913 of 4.7 million puds of cow's butter (4.7 million puds of cow's butter is the equivalent of 130 million puds of milk) the empire at an increasing rate was importing food products of animal husbandry (butter and meat).

This gives us a general picture of the position of the production of animal husbandry on the eve of World War II in comparison with the situation on the eve of World War I.

The war unquestionably much worsened this situation.

The post-war condition of agriculture and the trends of its development are thus characterized by the BSE³: "The increase in sown

³ *ibid.*

areas in the post-war Five Year Plan (1946-1950) will be chiefly secured by the bringing in again of the pre-war sown areas and in a smaller degree by the ploughing of new lands."

M. Saburov⁴ in his report to the XIX Congress of the Communist Party on the directives for the fifth Five Year Plan, including the years 1951-1955 says:

"The basic tasks of the Five Year Plan for rebuilding and developing agriculture in the USSR are in repairing the rayons of the country that had suffered during the war, restoring the pre-war level of industry and agriculture and then in surpassing this level on a broad scale," and also: "In the field of agriculture the pre-war level is much surpassed in productivity and the total harvesting of agricultural crops and also in the products of animal husbandry," i. e. the directives of the Congress confirm the general trend of the policy on agriculture in the first post-war Five Year Plan and the performance of this plan with "a significant surpassing of the pre-war level."

In the directives of this Congress for the second post-war Five Year Plan for agriculture it is said:

"In the field of agriculture the chief task is still the increase of the productivity of all agricultural crops, also the increase of the general head of cattle with the simultaneous increase in their productivity, the increase of the total (general M. M.) and marketable production of agricultural crops and the animal industry by further increasing and developing the general economy of the kolkhozes."

The total harvest of grain crops was to be increased under this Five Year Plan by 40-50%, and the production of wheat was to increase 55-65%. High tempos of increase were also set for the animal husbandry. The total production of meat and fats was to increase in 1955 as compared with 1950 by 80-90%, of milk by 45-50% and of wool 2-5 times.

The resolutions on the trends of policy for the second post-war Five Year Plan were adopted in October, 1952.

The south of Ukraine and the north Caucasus received the task of increasing the productivity of the grain crops by 20-22 centners per hectare, other regions somewhat less but in the range of 15-20 centners.

In the light of actual conditions as they were on the eve of World War II, as we have summarized them above, all these post-war plans were pure, deceptive propaganda and had no bases for their even ap-

⁴M. Saburov. *Report on the Directives of the XIX Congress of the Party of the fifth Five Year Plan for the development of the USSR for 1951-1955*, October 8, 1952. State Publishing House for Political Literature of the UkSSR. Kiev, 1952.

proximate completion, i. e. the task of increasing at the end of the Five Year Plan (by 1955) the total production of grain by 40-50% for when applied to concrete figures this was equivalent to the securing of a total crop of grain, even under the "biological" system of 10.5-11 billions of puds (1 pud — 16.4 kilograms) and the quota for the animal husbandry was still more fantastic.

The *Questions of Economics* for May, 1955 mentions directly the fantastic character of the post-war Five Year Plans and in its leading article, "To improve decisively scientific work in the sector of the economy of agriculture." It comments on the resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in January of this year which set new tasks: "To increase the total harvest of grain by 1960 not less than ten billion puds yearly." This resolution sets the goal for 1960 at less than the second post-war Five Year Plan for 1955. But before the new task for 1960 the agricultural policy of Moscow during the last years has undergone cardinal changes, since we can confirm the giving up by Moscow of its general bases of its policy in agriculture, which had previously underlain all Five Year Plans, especially the two after the War.

After the death of Stalin, at the suggestion of Malenkov, the September plenum of the Central Committee in 1953 made some changes important in principle in the agricultural policy of Moscow. In September, 1953 it was already possible to summarize the execution of the third year of the second post-war Five Year Plan. These summaries gave pitiable results and revealed such "gaps" between reality and the fantastic statements of the plans that it was impossible to hide them any longer. To correct the situation and secure some kind of execution of the plans, Malenkov drew up a scheme, shaped in the resolutions of the September 1953 plenum of the Central Committee containing a number of devices for the alleviation of the material and legal position of the kolkhoz workers and material stimulation of their work in the kolkhozes so as to win their interest in increasing the kolkhoz production. Politically this was a capitulation to the antikolkhoz opposition of the peasants and an effort to effect a compromise with them through concessions. These lay in the change of the previous income approach to the individual plots of the different workers in the kolkhoz to a land system, some reduction in taxes, a raising of the prices for the products taken by the state, etc. The concessions offered were sufficient to alleviate somewhat the social and legal position of the kolkhoznyk and he used them for still greater avoidance of kolkhoz work but these concessions were totally insufficient to increase the interest of the kolkhoznyk in the kolkhoz production and to fulfill the plans.

It was impossible to proceed further by increasing the terror on the kolkhozyk to compel him to work more productively, for all devices of terror had been reviewed and used. So nothing more could be gained from them. For example *The Communist*, a theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in May of this year, contained an article by M. Barsukov, secretary of the party organization of the Stalin kolkhoz in the Vorontsov Aleksandrivsky rayon in Stavropol region from which we learn that there had been set in this kolkhoz a minimum for the number of labor days which the kolkhozyk had to work during the year, for men 300 labor days, for women 220. This makes clear that the minimum of obligation exceeded the capacity of the people to serve them. So the concessions of Malenkov, to secure positive results, should have been developed on a broader scale into a system of reforms and the working out of a system which would strengthen the productive initiative of the kolkhozyk, i. e. a revision of the bases of the kolkhoz system. Such attempts were made on a broad scale in the kolkhozes in the first years after the war, when the kolkhozyks individually, by families or by small groups were allowed to have for their work in the kolkhoz a part of the production of that piece of land which they worked. Later these attempts were stopped because they "upset the principle of the kolkhoz system."

Another way was to strengthen the repression of the kolkhozyks but this had been exhausted and could not and cannot bring any results. From this hopeless blind alley in the kolkhoz system and the catastrophic position of agricultural production, four months after the "concessions" of Malenkov to the kolkhozyks, the January plenum of the Central Committee (in 1954) on the suggestion of N. Khrushchev found a "way out" by forming a grandiose plan to "use the virgin soils and fallow lands in the East-Siberia and Kazakhstan." This plan provided in 2-3 years for the cultivating of 30-32 million hectares of new fertile soil for the growing of grain. The area planned under this scheme for sowing surpassed the sown area of all of Ukraine and was almost a quarter of the cultivated land of the empire. The object of this plan was to maintain in the old sown area the (insufficient) production in its existing kolkhoz structure and to raise through an increase in the sown area the total grain production and thus to get out of the unpleasant situation without making further concessions to the kolkhozyks, for these would have led to a removal of the bases of the kolkhoz system and by not sharpening the repression of the kolkhozyks, for the possible limits of repression and terror against them had been passed and no hope could be laid upon going further in this line.

All possible material and human resources for "cultivating these virgin soils and fallow lands" were taken from the old rayons of agriculture and the current machine production. This reduced the possibilities of increase in the production of the old agricultural areas.

A risk was taken in the use of these virgin soils and fallow lands. The results of the first year were very poor, far worse than were expected. In the beginning of 1955 a program was started for a far-reaching change in the structure of agriculture in the old rayons. In these through a reduction in the areas devoted to the "less valuable grain crops — rye, barley, oats and buckwheat," the reduction in the sowing of food grasses and the ploughing under certain grasses, the area devoted to corn was increased to 28 million hectares, i. e. more than 5 times the amount previously allotted to this crop. The single motive for this reconstruction was declared to be in the discussion of the resolutions of the Central Committee "doubling of the corn crop per hectare in comparison with the grain crops."

The plan of plowing up the virgin soils and fallow lands and the plan of the corn reconstruction in the agricultural parts of the old rayons are desperate efforts to find a solution before the catastrophe of the whole collective system of agriculture. The final results of the short-lived economic adventures will be evident in a few years. The seriousness of the situation is shown by the information in the beginning of this article on the purchase by Moscow and Warsaw of Canadian wheat. In the immediate future these purchases and the import of grain into the USSR will indicate the growing intensity of the crisis.

THE SWEDISH-UKRAINIAN TREATIES OF ALLIANCE 1708-1709

By BORYS KRUPNYTSKY

Editor's Remarks: From the beginning of the Ukrainian struggle for independence under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1648), powerful Sweden, an adversary of Poland as well as of Muscovy, was the most natural ally of Ukraine. It is not strange therefore that Ivan Mazepa, the ruler of Ukraine during the Northern War, in liberating Ukraine from Muscovite domination made a treaty of alliance with Sweden and invited Charles XII to Ukraine. The document of the treaty disappeared after the Poltava defeat and the problem of a Ukrainian-Swedish agreement (1708-1709) became a disputable matter among the historians. Dr. B. Krupnytsky an expert on the Mazepa period endeavors in this article to elucidate this obscure problem.

Our knowledge of the treaties of alliance between the Swedes and Mazepa rests chiefly on uncertain and unclear sources. We feel very keenly the lack of the documentary sources which certainly existed in the state expeditionary archives of Charles XII and Mazepa and which disappeared almost without a trace during the military operations in Ukraine in 1708-1709.

SWEDISH-FRENCH SOURCES OF TREATIES

The first source known to us which gives comparatively the best material for the Swedish-Ukrainian treaties (and also the treaties with the Poles) is the anonymous account of the Battle of Poltava which was first printed in 1740 as a supplement to the well-known work of Adlerfeld¹.

The Swedish scholar Hallendorf reprinted this under the title *Charles XII and Ukraine*² and K. Tiander called attention to this second edition but he did it uncritically and it is impossible to make any use of his short summary of the source, for we cannot know the differences between the first edition of the younger Adlerfeld and the second of Hallendorf. The author only says: "Adlerfeld introduces into this

¹ Adlerfeld, *Histoire militaire de Charles XII, Roi de Suède*, Amsterdam, 1740, IV.

² C. Hallendorf, *Karl XII in Ukraina*. En karolins beraettelse, Stockholm, 1915. K. Tiander, *Charles XII in Ukraine*, "Nashe Mynule," Kiev 1918, Part I., pp. 66-73.

work in a free translation in French extracts from this manuscript'. In reality these are not extracts but a French reworking of the anonymous account.

A comparison of the first and second editions shows us certain important facts. The manuscript found by Hallendorf in the Upsala University Library (written in Swedish) is most probably the first source, although its author has not been identified. Therefore any one who wishes to study the anonymous account, must first use the edition of Hallendorf or, if he takes as his basis the French translation of younger Adlerfeld, he must keep his eye on the Swedish printed edition to be sure of his facts.

We are struck by the fact that the account in the Swedish manuscript is considerably shorter, simpler and clearer than the redaction in French by the younger Adlerfeld. The latter is not only very free but it has many different changes, additions and explanations which have been introduced into the text of the account.

For example, the anonymous Swedish account says that Mazepa during the expected stay of Charles XII in the winter quarters in the Siversk region was obligated to collect the entire Kozak army and bring to its aid the Bilhorod Kozaks and the Don Cossacks indicating the dissatisfaction of all these allies of Mazepa with the Russian stern regime (*hvilka alla voro missnoegde med Ryssarnars straenga regering*, p. 4). Adlerfeld rewrites this passage showing that the Kozaks were very dissatisfied at the tyrannical government of the Russians and then adds that the cause of this dissatisfaction was the abrogation by the Tsar of their privileges: "*qui étoient tous fort mécontents du gouvernement tyrannique des Russes, le Czar leur ayant ôté peu à peu tous leurs Privilèges*" (p. 9.).

In another passage Adlerfeld's translation shows a quite broad and entirely free interpretation. On page 6 of the edition of Hallendorf appears the following: "A definite day was set on which the army leader Mazepa was to reveal this secret (the alliance of Charles XII and Stanislaw Leszczyński) to his colonels ("*En viss dag blef och faststaeld som faeltherren Mazeppa skulle upstaECKa denna hemlighet foer sine oefverstar*"). The younger Adlerfeld says: "Then a certain day was fixed on which Mazepa was to reveal the conditions to his Colonels, to lead them to consent voluntarily by showing to them the undoubted advantages which they would receive, in recovering their ancient liberty, of which the Russians had left them only the shadow (On fixa ensuite un certain jour auquel Mazeppa devoit faire part de toutes ces conditions à ses Colonels, pour les porter d'y consentir volontairement, en leur représentant les avantages indubitables qu'ils alloient en tirer, en re-

couvrant leur ancienne liberté, dont les Russes ne leur laissoient plus que l'ombre" (p. 14).

We could cite many more of these free interpretations in Adlerfeld; it is sufficient however, if we mention only those passages of the anonymous account which concern our subject. On the question of the alliance of Mazepa with Charles XII and Stanislaw Leszczynski, there are some important differences between the Swedish and French versions.

M. Andrusyak in his work on the *Relations of Mazepa and Stanislaw Leszczynski and Charles XII*² follows essentially the French text and so he speaks of two treaties concluded between the representatives of Mazepa and Charles XII and Stanislaw in Smorhony in the beginning of 1708; the first is exclusively of a military character between the allies, the second between Mazepa and Poland contains in addition to items of a military character also clauses on the political future of Ukraine.⁴

In reality the anonymous account in the edition of Hallendorf, i. e. the primary source, mentions only one alliance. In the Swedish text we have two stages in the treaty: in the first there are enumerated the conditions of the Alliance of a military character (Foerbundzvilkoren) which are given without any division into separate articles as in Adlerfeld and contain the military plans and in part the military obligations; the handing over to Charles XII of the Siversk area and its fortresses, the securing by Mazepa of allies, in addition to the entire Kozak army of his own, the Bilhorod Kozaks, the Don Cossacks, and Kalmyks, the aid to be given by Mazepa with all his forces in case of a direct movement of Charles XII against Moscow, the delivery of food for the Swedish army from the Hetman state, the territory of Free Settlements and the explanation of the military perspectives, if the Allies succeeded in driving the Tsar to the North of Moscow and the Volga River, the strategic role of Stanislaw and the Swedish corps of General Krassau. In the general attack the Polish Royal Army was to direct its course against Kiev and the Lithuanian on Smolensk. Finally the military task of General Lubeker, who was to occupy Ingermanland, the Novgorod and Pskov areas — in case of necessity, with the garrisons of Riga and Revel.⁵

The second step is the actual treaty between Charles XII, Stanislaw and Mazepa. Here we must point out the basic difference between the

² *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka*, Lviv, 1933, Vol. 152, V. I., pp. 47-8.

⁴ In his article: "A remark on Mazepa and his contemporaries" (*Dilo*, Lviv, 1932, No. 215). M. Andrusyak says more definitely, following Kostomarov: the first alliance was between Mazepa and Charles XII and the second between Mazepa and Stanislaw.

⁵ Hallendorf, *ibid.*, pp. 4-6.

French and Swedish texts: in the first the alliance is given as an alliance between Poland and Mazepa (L'Alliance conclue entre la Pologne et Mazepa, p. 13); in the second as an alliance between Charles XII, Stanislaw and Mazepa (Foerbundet emellan konung Carl den 12, konung Stanislaus och faeltherren Mazepa hade ingaett).

The first clauses of the treaty give briefly the conditions of the alliance, with the exception of the military perspectives on the penetration of Muscovy, the strategic missions of Stanislaw and also of Generals Krassau and Lubeker. These also repeat again the military obligations of Mazepa himself. The last clause of the French text adds something new. This is the political obligations of Mazepa: the whole of Ukraine, including the regions of Siversk, Chernyhiv, Kiev, Smolensk were to be returned to Poland as a hereditary principality on the same conditions as the Courland, Polotsk and Vitebsk provinces.⁶

The second important difference is this: we find in the French text the statement that Mazepa proposed these articles which we have characterized as the conditions of the alliance (Les articles que Mazepa fit présenter au Roi de Suède, pour en obtenir l'amitié et la protection, étoient les suivants). At the same time the anonymous account published by Hallendorf does not mention this proposal. This account says: "The conditions of the alliance were: (Foerbundzwilkoren woro efterfoeljande) — that is all.

UKRAINIAN SOURCE OF TREATY

Let us turn now to the third source: the treaty of alliance between Mazepa and Charles XII, as it is given by Mazepa's successor, Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, in his well known *Déduction des Droits de l'Ukraine*.⁷

M. Andrusyak thinks that the treaty mentioned in this source is identical with the one concluded in the spring of 1709 in Budyshchi Velyki by Mazepa and by the Zaporozhians and Mazepa.⁸

But the question is not so simple. In my opinion out of the six clauses of the treaty there are only two which are concrete, i. e. which

⁶ How can we explain this important difference between the French and Swedish texts? We can assume that this French edition published in 1740 in Amsterdam could be influenced by King Stanislaw Leszczyński, the father-in-law of King Louis XV and Prince of Lorraine. As a permanent candidate for the Polish crown by giving this version of the Treaty with Charles XII and Mazepa, he might be trying to secure the support of public opinion in Poland by apparent attempts to bring Ukraine back to Poland (*Editor*).

⁷ I. Borshchak. *The Deduction of the Rights of Ukraine*. "Stara Ukrayina," Lviv, I-II, pp. 5-9. The actual treaty of Mazepa and Charles XII, is on pp. 6-7.

⁸ M. Andrusyak. *The Relations of Mazepa and Stanislaw Leszczyński*, — *Zapysky NTS*, Vol. 151/I, pp. 57-58.

go beyond generalizations to the real obligations of the allies — the first and the sixth. The four other points formulate the idea of the complete independence of Ukraine, the idea which Hetman Orlyk followed consistently in his entire *Déduction*. This states that B. Khmelnytsky had founded “an independent principality” (Une Principaute indépendante).

In the opinion of P. Orlyk the Treaty of Pereyaslav was a limited alliance between Moscow and Ukraine and this was the strongest argument and proof of the sovereignty of Ukraine. To support this, he cites his own knowledge of the treaties which he made during his own Hetmanate.⁹ To emphasize these traditions of Ukrainian independence, Orlyk introduces the clauses of the treaty of alliance between Charles XII and Mazepa and bases them, so to speak on the examples of the past and present, i. e. his own treaties from the time of Bender, so as to convince the world more strongly of the need for the existence of an independent Ukraine.

So in these four points of the treaty of alliance between Mazepa and Charles XII, Ukraine appears as a fully equal partner of the Swedish King. It is not an alliance in the form of a protectorate but the alliance of two fully independent states; the Swedish King is not even to assume the coat of arms and title of the Prince of Ukraine (p. 5.); Mazepa, the lawful prince of Ukraine, can be in no way disturbed in the control of this principality and after his death all his freedoms still remain in Ukraine (literally “the estates of Ukraine”, p. 4), the prince and the estates of Ukraine are guaranteed control over all parts of Ukraine and the areas attached to it; (p. 3); the division of the former territory of Muscovy will be made on the basis of military rights; each will hold what he conquers, except territory which formerly belonged to the Ruthenian (Rus') people and is now to return to the Ukrainian principality (p. 2).¹⁰

⁹ The Prut Treaty according to Orlyk calls Ukraine the ally of the Sultan and his treaty with the Tatar Khan uses the same terms.

¹⁰ *Déduction des Droits de l'Ukraine, ibid.*

P. 5: No innovation will be made in what has been previously observed as to the coat of arms and title of the Prince of Ukraine. His Royal Majesty will never assume this title and these arms. (L'on n'innovera rien à ce qui a été observé jusques à présent au sujet des Armes et du Titre de Prince de l'Ukraine. S. M. R. ne pourra jamais s'arroger ce Titre ni les Armes).

P. 4: Ivan Mazepa legitimate Prince of Ukraine will not be disturbed in any way in the possession of this Principality. After his death which it is hoped will not occur for a long time the liberty will be preserved for the Estates of Ukraine in accordance with their rights and ancient laws. (Jean Mazepa Prince légitime de l'Ukraine ne sera pas troublé en aucune manière dans la Possession...

This is not a point but a new affirmation of the tendency for the full sovereignty of Ukraine and its value as an equal partner of the Swedes. These clauses correspond to the ideological efforts of Orlyk at a certain period of his activity in Bendery. Of course they may be the product of the author of the *Déduction* himself.

The first serious point deals with the sending of supporting troops to Ukraine. It is so phrased that Charles XII had obligated himself to send aid at once, if it was needed and if the prince and the estates asked for it. These supporting troops were to be under the command of Swedish generals but during their operations in Ukraine their general command would be under the Hetman and his representatives.¹¹ The aid would continue as long as Ukraine needed them. Although this point is formulated in general terms, its real gist is approximately this: Charles XII promises to send quickly to Ukraine supporting troops, if only Mazepa, in need of help, appeals to him for it.

Let us come now to the second actual point, the sixth. This says that for greater security of this treaty and of Ukraine, the Prince and the Estates will hand over to his Royal Majesty for the entire emergency certain fortresses. The remark about successors would indicate that the obligations of the Swedes to Ukraine were not limited to Mazepa but continued to his successor. For the Swedes this would be Orlyk himself.

We must now speak about the speedy aid. This would mean that Ukraine as an ally of Sweden had the right to this assistance, if conditions became critical, not only during the lifetime of Mazepa but

Après sa mort qu'on espère qui n'arrivera pas de longtemps la liberté sera conservée aux Etats de l'Ukraine conformément à leurs Droits et Ancienes Lois).

P. 3: The prince and the Estates of Ukraine will be kept and maintained in virtue of the Law which they have previously enjoyed in the whole area of Ukraine and the areas attached to it. (Le Prince et les Etats de l'Ukraine seront conservés et maintenus en vertu du Droit dont ils ont joui jusqu'à présent dans toute l'étendue de la Principauté et des parties qui y sont annexés).

P. 2: Everything that is conquered on the old domain of Muscovy will belong by the law of arms to the one who becomes master of it, but all that will be found to have been formerly belonging to the Ruthenian people will be returned to the principality of Ukraine. (Tout ce qui sera conquis sur l'ancien Domaine de la Moscovie appartiendra par le Droit des Armes à celui qui s'en rendra maître, mais tout ce qu'on découvrira avoir été autrefois au peuple Ruthene sera remis et conservé à la Principauté de l'Ukraine).

¹¹ His Royal Majesty promises to defend Ukraine and the parts of the territories of the Kozaks annexed to it and for this purpose will send Auxiliary Troops without any delay when the necessity will demand it and when it will be sought by the Prince and the Estates. These troops on entering the country will be under the command of the Swedish generals but while they are employed there His Majesty will entrust the leadership to the Prince and his successors to

the regime of his successor, and in case of war would include some cities as Starodub, Mhlyn, Baturyn, Poltava and Hadyach.¹²

Let us assume for a moment that the treaty introduced by Orlyk into the *Déduction* was actually made in Velyki Budyshchi. It is then unintelligible why there was need to speak of the handing over of the fortresses in the entire Left Bank Ukraine to the Swedes when the actual situation was that Charles XII and Mazepa held only a small area west of Poltava and the line of the Vorskla and the Zaporozhians at the Sich controlled the territory southeast of the Vorskla.

Still more surprising is the mention of Baturyn which no longer existed, for it had been totally ruined. Again Starodub and Mhlyn as fortresses were important only at the beginning of the Swedish operations in Ukraine; the first strategic move of Charles XII in the Siversk area was the order to the advance guard under the command of Lagerkrone to occupy Mhlyn and Pohep.¹³

In summing up what we have said, we assume that the treaty included by Orlyk in the *Déduction* could rather have been made before the entrance or at the moment of the entrance of Swedes into Ukraine. Then there is meaning to those clauses which we have called concrete; the promise to send a supporting army to Ukraine. Under this may be meant either that of Stanislaw along with Krassau or a supporting detachment from the main Swedish army, mentioned in the first mission of the emissary Bystrycky. There was to be the handing over of some fortresses including Starodub, Mhlyn, and Baturyn and this makes sense, a thing it would not do in Velyki Budyshchi.

If we accept the first and sixth clauses, the supporting army and the handing over of the fortresses, it would be most simple to suppose

whom it will continue as long as they have need of those troops to which His Royal Majesty will give the pay and the Kozaks will furnish the food and bread.

(S. M. R. s'engage à défendre l'Ukraine et les parties du Pais des Cosaques qui y sont annexés et pour cet effet des Troupes Auxiliaires sans aucun délai lorsque la nécessité l'exigera et lorsque elle en sera recherchée par le Prince et les Etats. Ces Troupes en entrant dans le Pais, seront sous le Commandement des Généreaux Suédois mais tandis qu'Elles y seront employées S. M. en confiera la direction au Prince et à ses successeurs à qui elle sera conservée aussi longtemps qu'ils auront besoin de ces troupes auxquelles S. M. R. donnera la Solde et les Cosaques fourniront la Pain et les Vivres). [*Déduction des Droits de l'Ukraine, ibid.*]

¹² P. 6: Pour plus grande sureté par rapport à ce Traité qu'à l'Ukraine le Prince et les Etats remettront à S. M. R. pour autant de temps que cette guerre et le peril dureront quelques de leurs Places à scavoir, Starodube, Mline, Batyrin, Poltava, Hadiasz [*Déduction*].

¹³ A. Stille. *Taget mot Ryssland 1707-1709, Karl XII till 200 ars dagen av hands dod.* Stockholm 1918, pp. 298-299.

that the treaty introduced by Orlyk was made in Smorhony or Radoshkovychi, i. e. identify it with the treaty of the anonymous account mentioned at the beginning. There are undoubtedly some slight similarities. Both emphasize that the Swedes were to hold fortresses in Ukraine; according to the anonymous account in the Siversk area (and also in Bryansk); according to the *Déduction*, it is true, in the entire territory of the Hetman State. The auxiliary army of the *Déduction* could be compared with the royal army of Stanislaw which according to the anonymous account was to invade Muscovy via Kiev, i. e. through the Hetman's territory and thus assist Mazepa.

But comparisons of this kind seem to me very problematical, since there are important differences between the two sources: in the anonymous account in the edition of Hallendorf there is mention of a treaty of alliance between Charles XII, Stanislaw and Mazepa, in the *Déduction* only of a treaty between Charles XII and Mazepa.¹⁴

But the greatest obstacle in assigning the treaty to Smorhony or Radoshkovychi is not the clauses of the treaty in the *Déduction* but the introduction by Pylyp Orlyk who expressly links the conclusion of the treaty with the arrival of the Swedish King in aid of Ukraine (Car le Roy de Suède ayant paru au secours de l'Ukraine opprimé... p. 6.). This brings up the idea as to whether the treaty did not take shape either earlier or even at the time of the appearance of Charles XII in Ukraine; then there would be sense in the handing over of the fortresses to the Swedes and even a supporting army which was quickly to secure the Hetman and his capital, which has left a trace in the account of the first mission of Bystrytsky.¹⁵

We can be sure of only one thing: both treaties of the anonymous account and the *Déduction* are in a way made up. The first rests on the basis of various statements, hints, etc. many of which we do not know, although undoubtedly the data is true; the second too much supports the thesis (needed by Orlyk) of the complete sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, to recognize it as a real document ("some points") of an actual existing treaty.¹⁶

There was undoubtedly an agreement between the participants or more truly there was an actual alliance. Negotiations were carried on at

¹⁴ Of course the text in the *Déduction* gives only "certain articles of the treaty" and we might assume that Orlyk simply omitted the clauses referring to Poland.

¹⁵ B. Krupnytsky. *Mazepa and the Swedes in 1708*. "Pratsi Ukrayinskoho Naukovoho Instytutu," Warsaw, 1938, Vol. 47, pp. 5-6.

the various stages of the Ukrainian-Polish-Swedish relations and we find their results in both the anonymous account and the *Déduction*, but it is hard to decide if there was ever a formal alliance.

We are on much firmer ground when we come to the allied dealings between Charles XII, Mazepa and the Zaporozhians April 8, 1709 in Velyki Budyshchi. The account of Nordberg of these developments deserves confidence not only because he was a witness, but also because there was nothing to hide from any one. Everything was open and above board.

We have two documents. One is the treaty based upon a letter (*Leur Traité, Le Traité fut mis par écrit*) between Mazepa and the Hetman's Kozaks and the Zaporozhians under Hordiyenko.¹⁷ Both promised steadily (*mutuellement*) to aid each other and to act together (*d'agir d'un commun accord*). Mazepa because of illness took the oath in his quarters and Hordiyenko and the Zaporozhians in the local church.

The second document — also written (*un Ecrit*) is the treaty of alliance between Charles XII, Mazepa and the Zaporozhians. According to Nordberg the authors of this treaty, consisting of four articles, were the Zaporozhians (*les Zaporoviens dressèrent un Ecrit*). Mazepa offered this to Charles XII and quickly received the royal approval (*Confirmation*). This shows that the treaty had the form of the proposals of the Zaporozhian Army and the confirmation by Charles.

As for the contents of this treaty, the gist of which is given by Nordberg in the King's Confirmation, it consisted of general clauses and possibly some of a local character. The general clauses were: the King received Mazepa and Hordiyenko with their armies under his protection and he bound himself not to conclude peace or an armistice with the Tsar without at least their inclusion — and always with the condition that Ukraine and the Zaporozhians were to be completely liberated

¹⁶ A letter of the Swedish Secretary Cederhielm to his brother dated November 10, 1708 from Opushna, two miles from Baturyn, Ukraine — mentions the Don Cossacks (as the anonymous account) and the Tatars (in the anonymous account — Kolmyks) as possible allies who would follow the example of Mazepa. There is mention also of the approach of the Kozaks to Poland, but not in such an affirmative form as in the anonymous account: "There was a proposal — (*Nuhade man foerslag...*) to make such conditions that both sides (Poland and Ukraine) could find satisfaction in them". So Cederhielm asserts that negotiations were carried on and there was even a chance of uniting the two countries but nothing more. (*Ch. Cederhielms bref till sin broder Germund, 1707-1772 Karol. Krigares Daboecker, Lund 1912, VI, 157*).

¹⁷ Nordberg. *Histoire de Charles XII, Roi de Suède. A la Hage 1744, II, 289.*

from the domination of Moscow and were forever to enjoy the privileges which they had had from immemorial times.

The local clauses deal chiefly with the relations of the Swedes to the population. Obviously these were questions which were very important for Charles XII.¹⁸

This is one proof of its existence but in a brief and quite un-expressive form; the Zaporozhians were to swear in Budyshchi to be loyal and constant and not to lay down their arms while the war continued and while they were not free from the Muscovites and to have their earlier liberties which the King promised to help them secure.¹⁹

As regards content, the Budyshchi treaty as compared with the *Déduction* shows a new step in Swedish-Ukrainian relations; there is a new factor not mentioned in the *Déduction*, the Zaporozhian Army. This treaty wholly corresponds in a long series of clauses to the burning Swedish needs of the moment, the quiet conduct of the population, their furnishing of food to the Swedes, etc. and these are not mentioned in the *Déduction*.

We notice that in the Budyshchi treaty (as in the *Déduction*) there is no mention of the Poles while in the anonymous account King Stanislaw even for Ukraine plays an important role.

D. Doroshenko has had an interesting idea as to this. In comparing the views of M. Andrusyak on the proof of the existence of a treaty of Mazepa with King Stanislaw with the evidence of the various participants of the events, he, in order to remove the contradictions, assumes that "at the beginning Mazepa, in carrying on negotiations with King Stanislaw, possibly had in mind a federation with Poland (or offered to Stanislaw a prospect of such a federation). But later, when the weakness of Stanislaw became obvious and instead of a small Polish-Swedish army, Charles XII himself entered Ukraine with his main force, his idea of a federation with Poland disappeared and he made an agreement with Charles for the full independence of Ukraine under the 'protection' of the Swedish King."²⁰

The situation during the stay of the Swedes in Ukraine basically changed; Charles XII was there with his main army and there was no question of supporting troops. It is clear Mazepa had ceased to need to

¹⁸ Cederhielm mentions this treaty. (*Cederhielm bref*, p. 172).

¹⁹ The treaty of alliance says "The Humble Memorial of the Zaporozhian Army to his holy Royal Majesty of Sweden of April 22, 1709. Cf. M. Voznyak: *The Bender Commission on the Death of Mazepa*. "Pratsi Ukrayinskoho Naukovoho Instytutu." Warsaw, 1938, Vol. 46, p. 115.

²⁰ D. Doroshenko. *Mazepa in historical literature and life*. "Pratsi Ukrayinskoho Naukovoho Instytutu." Warsaw, 1938. Vol. 46, (Mazepa Volume I, pp. 3-34).

consider a union with Poland. This was seen after the death of Mazepa. When his successor, P. Orlyk, after his campaign in Right Bank Ukraine in 1711 when Charles XII because of the partisans of Stanislaw among the Poles and Potocki, who commanded the Polish army in Bendery, began to feel pressure from them to recognize the rights of King Stanislaw in Right Bank Ukraine. Orlyk, who in the constitution of 1710 had proclaimed the independence of Ukraine (true — of the Left Bank), under the protectorate of the Swedish King and with his confirmation—refused.²¹

Finally we may say that the Budyshchi treaty undeniably is somehow connected with the treaties of the Bendery period after the Poltava defeat. There are the same persons: on one side Charles XII as the ally and protector of Ukraine, on the other Pylyp Orlyk as Hetman of Ukraine with the remains of the Hetman's Kozaks and the Lower Zaporozhian Army under Hordiyenko. In Budyshchi the treaty was made between Mazepa, the Hetman's Kozaks and the Zaporozhians and they promised to remain together. In Bendery we have the "*Pacta et Constitutiones Legum Libertatumque Exercitus Zaporoviensis*" (Pacts and Institutions of the Law and Liberties of the Zaporozhian Army) completely worked out by Orlyk.

This constitution is much longer than the Budyshchi treaty but we can still admit that it has its roots in it. Instead of the special clauses which were proposed to Charles XII in Velyki Budyshchi and received his confirmation, the King in Bendery placed his confirmation on these *Pacta et Institutiones*. But it is interesting that the term "confirmation" is used in both cases.²²

Again the general clauses of the Budyshchi treaty are found in the documents of the Bendery period. One which concerned the permanent duration of the privileges of Ukraine and Zaporozhzhya was taken over into the *Pacta et Institutiones* and is found also in the Confirmation. A second clause that Charles XII would not lay down his arms until all Ukraine was liberated from Muscovite rule and made safe in peace treaties was included also in a special diploma: "*Diploma Assecuratorium pro Duce et Exercitu Zaporoviensi.*"

²¹ B. Krupnytsky. *Hetman Pylyp Orlyk (1672-1742)*. "Pratsi Ukrainskoho Naukovoho Instytutu." Warsaw 1938, Vol. 42, p. 62, et al.

²² In Bendery there was a special document — *Confirmatio horum Pactorum a Rege Sueciae*. Cf. *Correspondence of Orlyk and others*. "Chteniya Imp. Obsch. Istor. i Drev. Ros." Moscow 1847, I, 17, 19.

HERDER AND THE SLAVS

(On the 150-th anniversary of Herder's death, 1803-1953)*

By JOHN P. SYDORUK

Summary of a paper read at the 10th Annual Meeting of the American Ass'n of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages at Roosevelt University, Chicago, Ill., on Dec. 28, 1953.

There are some Slavic scholars eager to minimize Herder's influence upon the awakening of the Slavic self-confidence, because of the constant hostility between Germans and Slavs. Lednicki's chapter on Pan-Slavism begins with Thucydides' thoughts on the unity and eventual power of the controversial Scythians, whom he regards as Slavs.¹ All take as a forerunner of Slavic cooperation the Croat Catholic priest Yuray Krizhanich, who, in 1659, went to Moscow to the "tsar of his race," and deplored the domination of Slavic life by German and Greek influences. For his progressive thoughts he was sent by Tsar Alexis for 15 years to Siberia, whence he later escaped.

But it was really Herder who contributed most to the awakening of the self-confidence of the Slavs, chiefly those in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1804), a German poet, philosopher, teacher, and pastor, was the pupil of Kant at Koenigsberg and a teacher of Goethe at Strassburg; he was one of the most versatile writers of his time and an authority of international scope, who wrote more than 30 volumes on different subjects.

Under the influence of Rousseau, he began already in Livonia (Latvia), which was under Russian control, to think about radical reforms of social life and the educational system. Because of his progressive ideas and some personal conflicts, he had to leave Riga, where he was a pastor and teacher and then visited Holland, England, and France.

At the time of his journey to France, he first shaped his idea of the genesis of primitive poetry and of the gradual evolution of humanity. Herder taught that "a people, and especially a non-civilized one, has nothing dearer than the language of their fathers. Its whole spiritual

¹ W. Lednicki, "Panslavism," chapt. XII, p. 809. *European Ideologies*, ed. by F. Gross, New York, 1948.

wealth of tradition, history, religion, and all fullness of life, all its heart and soul, live in it. To deprive such a people of its language, or to minimize it, means to deprive it of its own immortal possession, transmitted from parents to children.”² Herder started also the taste for popular poetry and folklore. He believed that as Homer was greater because of his naturalness than Vergil, so the poetry of the more undeveloped peoples was better than that of the courts and highly cultured society. (“Natur — und Kunstpoesie”). Herder and the German romanticists, under the influence of Rousseau, emphasized the advantage of village communities over an industrial society, and praised primitive folk songs, natural, genuine poetry (Bible, Homer, Ossian), folk culture (myths, ballads, proverbs, dances, customs), art, religion, the legal system, political and economic organization as true manifestations of the national individualism of a “Volksgeist” — people’s spirit.³

Herder wrote chiefly about Slavs in “Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769”. There he criticized Western culture, its enlightenment, and its deism (a belief in a personal God who exerts no influence on men or on the world He has created), which — he believed — would bring all civilization to ruin. On his journey, his thoughts were busy with school and political reforms in Riga and Livonia, and ultimately in Russia itself.

Herder’s interest in Russia began at the end of the Seven Year’s War (1756-1763), during the Russian occupation of East Prussia, where Herder was born at Mohrunen, in 1744, and reared by a poor family in a village atmosphere. Nature contributed much to his sensitive, poetical, and philosophical mind, which was possessed by learning, ambition, plans, and dreams. At that time a Prussian surgeon in the Russian service, Johann Christian Schwartz-Erla, took him to Koenigsberg and wanted to take him to St. Petersburg. Herder’s opinions of Russia were a mixture of realism and idealism. His first poem was a song “An den grossen Koenig Cyrus,” where he praised Tsar Peter III for bringing peace to the imprisoned Israelites (i.e. the East Prussians).

In Riga, Herder learned more about Russian history and Russian problems, and then he planned first an epic, and later a biography of Peter the Great, because he admired his reforms and zeal to Europeanize Russia “in spite of all his barbarities and bacchanalias.”

Herder also had a great enthusiasm for Catherine II, for her plan of a new codification of Russian law, and her calling of a national convention from all parts of Russia for that purpose in 1767. He dreamed

² H. Kohn, *Panslavism: Its History and Ideology*, (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1953), p. 2.

³ J. P. Sydoruk, *Ideology of Cyrillo-Methodians and Its Origin*; (Slavistica, No. XIX), Winnipeg-Chicago, 1954, p. 41.

of becoming a second Montesquieu, advising the great Tsarista — hence his “Russian patriotism.” Everywhere Herder was concerned with the peaceful expansion of culture and civilization.

“What a view there would be of those regions from the Northwest, (Livland) — wrote young Herder in his “Reise-Journal” of 1769 — if once the spirit of culture were spread there. *One day Ukraine will become a new Greece*: the beautiful climate of this country, the gay mood of its people, their musical talent their fertile soil, etc... will one time awake; from so many small wild tribes, such as, too, the Greeks once were, there will arise a cultured nation; and her boundaries will reach the Black Sea, and from there the wide world. Hungary, and a part of Poland and of Russia would become receivers of this new culture. From the Northwest this spirit would spread over Europe, which is lying in sleep, and the same spirit of progress would be useful, too, for all of Europe. ‘Das alles liegt vor, das muss einmal geschehen!’ ”⁴

A. Gillies says about Herder’s remarks: “The picturesque career of Hetman Mazepa and his Kozaks had evidently struck Herder’s imagination and given rise to romantic speculations. A new nation, he declared, would arise in the East that would re-awaken Europe and banish the somnolence into which deistic toleration had let it slide.”⁵

Herder thought that a new culture could emerge in Ukraine from its native foundation. His speculation was in full accord with his theory about the dependence of human development on nature. Because the climate and soil of Ukraine afforded many possibilities for the development of the culture of its inhabitants, Herder was confident that his theories could be fulfilled. But he overlooked the fatal fact that Ukraine did not have the natural borders which Greece possessed. And so that freedom so important for cultural development, was lacking too.

Russia, for Herder, was a living object of a growing civilization and therefore she had a future. He considered the West already mature, and therefore he could not expect too much from it.

Herder emphasized honor as an important factor in human development. He said: “Honor will not allow one to humiliate himself by base flattery. The Russian makes himself humble in his flattery, but this is only false flattery, in order to win your confidence, and later to rule over you as a despot.”⁶ Herder hoped for the best even when speaking about Russian idleness: “Her idleness is not as bad as people think. It was present (in the nature) of all nations, and sleep is necessary for awakening.”⁷

⁴ J. G. Herder, *Journal meiner Reise im Jahre 1769*, ed. by A. Gillies. Oxford, 1947, p. 61.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. XXVII.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

But the most important statement about all Slavs we find in his masterpiece, "Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit," (Riga-Leipzig, 1791, book 16, chapter 4, "Slavische Voelker," page 667-70), where he said in 1784 about the Slavs:

"They were charitable and hospitable to excess, lovers of pastoral freedom but submissive and obedient, enemies of robbery and plundering. All this did not preserve them from oppression; on the contrary it contributed to it. For as they were never ambitious for sovereignty, had among them no hereditary princes addicted to war, and thought little of paying tribute, so they could but enjoy their lands in peace; many nations, chiefly of German origin, injuriously oppressed them. Already under Charlemagne oppressive wars were carried on, the object of which was evidently commercial advantages, though the Christian religion was their pretext... What the Franks began, the Saxons completed: in whole provinces the Slavs were extirpated, or made bondsmen, and their lands divided among bishops and nobles. North Germans ruined their commerce on the Baltic; the Danes brought their Vineta to a melancholy end; and their remains in Germany were reduced to that state to which the Peruvians were subjected by the Spaniards... Unfortunately their situation brought them near to the Germans on the one side, and on the other left them exposed in the East to the attacks of the Tartars, from whom, particularly from the Mongols, they had much to suffer and endure.

The wheel of changing Time, however, revolves without ceasing; and as these nations inhabit for the most part the finest country of Europe, if it were completely cultivated and its trade opened; it is impossible to think other than that sometime in Europe the legislation and policy must and will promote more and more diligence and calm exchange between the people instead of a military spirit; so you will be also, so deeply submerged now, once an industrious and happy people (Slavs) finally awake from your long indolent sleep, shake off your chains, use as your property your beautiful regions from the Adriatic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains, from the Don to the Moldau, and celebrate on them their ancient festivals of peaceful trade and industry."

And then Herder adds:

It is hoped your time will come, too, and the finest regions in which you live will be snatched away from your robber-oppressors, and it will become a garden of humanity, a field of quiet, intensive diligence."⁸

Shortly, in his opinion the Slavs would contribute considerably, so that the peoples would be led to humanity.

Of course, we could not now agree with everything in his statement, especially about the "peacefulness" of the Slavs which all Slavic historians took as a beloved attribute of their nations. The history of Russia and of Poland too, in a measure contradicts him.

At any rate, Herder's contribution was highly valuable to the development of Slavic self-realization and self-confidence, and I would like merely to repeat Kohn's opinion about Herder's influence:

⁸ K. Bittner *Die Beurteilung der russischen Politik im VR Jahrhundert durch J. G. Herder*, in "Im Geiste Herders," ed. by E. Keyser, Kitzingen a. Main, 1953, p. 63.

"He gave the Slavs the consciousness of a unity based upon the community of high morality and glorious destiny. He proclaimed the Slavs the coming leaders of Europe... He admired and collected their folklore and folksongs, and admonished their few intellectuals to develop the native tongues instead of abandoning them for German and French. These words of the great German writer were balm for the often-hurt pride of the Slavic intellectuals. Their civilizations, backward in the eyes of Europe, were praised and extolled by one who had been the teacher of Goethe."⁹

A year before his death, Herder wrote in the 3rd volume of "Adrastea" (1802), that it would be better for Russia and Europe if Peter the Great had moved his capital to Azov on the Don, instead of to Petersburg. Then Russia would be more useful and peaceful and would combine Europe and Asia with the Black Sea and Mediterranean.¹⁰ However, Herder contradicted himself, when he admired Peter the Great's forcible civilization of Russia, and at the same time advocated an organic cultural development of every nation.¹¹

Nevertheless, Slavs should always gratefully remember Herder as their great teacher, inspirer and enlightener. His noble spirit we find in the ideology of the Ukrainian Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius as well.¹²

⁹ E. Kohn, *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

¹⁰ K. Bittner, *Op. cit.*, p. 68.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹² J. P. Sydoruk, *Op. cit.*, p. 40 ff.

THE DISCOVERY AND THE TRIAL OF THE UNION FOR THE LIBERATION OF UKRAINE

By VASYL PLYUSHCH

The extension of the activity of the Spilka Ukrainskoyi Molodi (SUM) and the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU) with its youth branches throughout almost the whole of Ukraine could not fail to attract the attention of the Soviet machinery to the work of these organizations. In 1928 came the first signs that the organs of the GPU were watching their activity. The organs of the Soviet secret police and the leadership of the Communist Party began to make every effort to place their agents within the movement. This was not an easy task for the GPU, while the SVU-SUM remained organized as cells of five.

When the organizations adopted a team system and increased their membership, their penetration by the GPU became easier. It is hard to say how far this infiltration by the GPU went.

In the spring of 1929 there were mass arrests in all parts of Ukraine and the investigation continued throughout the year. From March 9 to April 19, 1930 the Supreme Court of the UkSSR considered the case of 45 members of the SVU. The trial was held in the great hall of the State Opera in Kharkiv. The Soviet government made every effort to utilize this trial for propaganda purposes.

In the opinion of the highest Soviet officials, it was intended to compromise the Ukrainian liberation movement, to reveal its workers as "restorers of the land-owning capitalistic system, foreign agents and spies," as well as to compromise the activity of the Ukrainian national governments in 1917-21.

The progress of the trial was broadcasted; the hall was filled with representatives of Communist centres, activists of factories and institutions. Admission was by special permits and the opera house was surrounded by units of the GPU. There were on display in the foyer and the corridors of the theatre various documents to compromise the Ukrainian attempts at liberation.

The court was carefully chosen by the Politbiuro of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine (CCKPbU) on motion of the People's Commissar of Justice, Porayko, and was confirmed by a special resolution of the Party authorities. It was so formed

that "revolutionists" and "Ukrainian Communists" were trying Ukrainian "counter-revolutionists," "spies," "traitors" and "interventionists." The presiding judge was a former member of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionists (SR's), the Communist Antin Prykhodko, and the members were: Havrylo Odynets (a former member of the Ukrainian party of SR's, a former active worker of the government of the Ukrainian National Republic, and member of the Central Committee of the "poor peasants," Korobenko, a workman of the Kiev Arsenal, a centre of the Communist movement in Kiev even during the time of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), Prof. Sokoyansky, a delegate of the Scientific-Technical Section of the All-Ukrainian Soviet of Professional Associations (VUR), Prof. Vovk, a workman Mukha and a peasant woman Korzhenkova. The state and community prosecutors were as carefully chosen. They were: the Vice Commissar of Justice and the senior assistant of the General Procurator of the UkSSR, Pavlo Mykhaylyk, the Vice Procurator of the Supreme Court, Akhmatov, the procurator of the People's Commissariat of Justice, Yakymyshyn, and the procurator of the Circuit Court in Kiev, Bystryukov.

The community prosecutors were: Panas Lyubchenko (former Ukrainian SR, then a Borotbist, finally a Communist), Sokolovsky, Professor of the Agricultural Institute, and the writer Slisarenko from the organization of Soviet Writers of Ukraine. Kravchuk, professor of Mathematics, was to appear as a community prosecutor from the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN) but he explained that he could not take part in the trial, for he was very sick.

The defenders were members of the College of Defenders: Ratner, Vynohradsky, Vilkomyrsky, Idelevych, Obukhivsky, Rivlin, Yurovytsky, Shats, Voznesenska, Pukhtynsky, Hrozdynsky, Kovalivska and Potapov.

The accused were:

1. Academician *Serhiy Yefremov*, 53, a prominent Ukrainian scholar and historian of literature who had taken part in Ukrainian public life since the end of the 19th century, had been editor of the daily *Rada*, and the ideologist and theoretician of the Ukrainian Party of Radical Democrats, the ideologist and head of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist-Federalists (UPSF), one of the organizers of VUAN, its former Vice-President and head of the BUD and SVU.

2. *Volodymyr Chekhivsky*, 54, member of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party of Social Democrats (UPSD), former Prime Minister of the government of the UNR and a well-known church leader.

3. *Volodymyr Durdukivsky*, 55, a well-known Ukrainian pedagogue, director of the First Shevchenko Gymnasium, a former member of the UPSF.

4. *Yosyf Hermayze*, 37, professor of the Kiev Institute of Popular Education, former prominent member of the Central Committee of UPSF, in charge of the Cabinet of Marxism in the VUAN.

5. *Andriy Nikovsky* 44, prominent Ukrainian journalist and writer, former member of the Central Committee of UPSF, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of the UNR.

6. *Lyudmyla Starytska-Chernyakhivska*, 60, a well-known writer and translator, an active Ukrainian social worker in pre-revolutionary times, and former member of the UPSF.

7. *Oleksander Chernyakhivsky*, 60, professor of History in the Kiev Medical Institute, a prominent Ukrainian scientific and social worker, member of the UPSF.

8. *Mykola Pavlyushkov*, 26, student of the Kiev University (INO), one of the organizers of the SUM, head of the SUM.

9. *Borys Matushevsky*, 22, student of the Kiev INO, one of the organizers and directors of SUM.

10. *Volodymyr Udovenko*, 49, professor of Hygiene in the Kiev Medical Institute, a prominent scholar and civic worker, a scientific collaborator of VUAN.

11. *Mykhaylo Slabchenko*, 47, academician, professor of the Odesa INO, a prominent Ukrainian scholar, former member of the USDP.

12. *Oleksander Hrebenetsky*, 55, a well-known teacher, collaborator of VUAN, former member of the UPSF.

13. *Vsevolod Hantsov*, 37, a well-known Ukrainian philologist, collaborator with VUAN, former member of the UPSF.

14. *Vasyl Doha*, 44, professor of the Kiev INO, scientific collaborator of VUAN, former member of the USDP.

15. *Hryhoriy Ivanytsya*, 38, a well-known Ukrainian philologist, professor of the Kiev INO, scientific collaborator of VUAN, author of many text-books, former member of the USDP.

16. *Hryhoriy Holoskevych*, 45, a well-known Ukrainian linguist, editor of a dictionary of the Ukrainian living language, scientific collaborator of VUAN, former member of the Central Rada, former member of the UPSF.

17. *Konstantyn Shylo*, 53, in charge of the editorial section of the State Publishing House, scientific collaborator of VUAN, former member of the USDP.

18. *Hryhoriy Kholodny*, 44, director of the Institute of the Ukrainian Scientific Language (UINM) of VUAN, professor of the Kiev INO, former member of the UPSF.

19. *Mykhaylo Ivchenko*, 47, prominent writer, director of the writers' group of the SVU, former member of the UPSR.

20. *Volodymyr Pidhayetsky*, 41, professor of the Kiev Medical Institute, scientific collaborator with VUAN, former member of the Central Rada, former member of the USDRP.

21. *Volodymyr Shchepotayev*, 50, professor of the Poltava INO, former member of the UPSF.

22. *Valentyn Otamanovsky*, 37, prominent Ukrainian public worker, Director of the Vinnytsya branch of the National Library of Ukraine.

23. *Mykola Kudrytsky*, 46, senior assistant of the Kiev Medical Institute, scientific collaborator of the VUAN, former member of the USDP.

24. *Arkadi Barbar*, 50, a well-known Ukrainian therapist, lecturer at the Kiev Medical Institute, former member of the USDP.

25. *Yuriy Trezvytsky*, 49, teacher, former member of the UPSF.

26. *Nina Tokarivska*, 41, a teacher, former member of the UPSD.

27. *Andriy Zalisky*, 44, teacher, former member of the UPSF.

28. *Mykola Bily*, 32, teacher.

29. *Lyubov Bidnova*, 48, teacher.

30. *Mykola Kryvenyuk*, 59, a well-known biologist, scientific collaborator of VUAN, former member of the USDP.

31. *Volodymyr Strashkevych*, 54, scientific collaborator of VUAN, former member of the USDP.

32. *Vadym Sharko*, 47, professor of mathematics.

33. *Konstantyn Turkalo*, 37, chemical engineer, former member of the Central Rada.

34. *Avksentiy Bolozovych*, 43, a well-known Ukrainian cooperative worker, lecturer at the Cooperative Institute, former member of the UPSR.

35. *Maksym Botvynsky*, 50, a well-known Ukrainian cooperative worker, former member of the UPSR.

36. *Zynoviy Marhulis*, 50, member of the College of Defenders, scientific collaborator with VUAN, former member of the UPSF.

37. *Konstantyn Tovkach*, 47, member of the Poltava College of Defenders, former member of the UPSF.

38. *Petro Blyznyuk*, 49, cooperative worker.

39. *Petro Yefremov*, 46, professor of the Dnipropetrovske INO, former member of the UPSF.

40. *Mykola Lahuta*, 34, professor of the INO in Mykolayiv, former member of the UPSR.

41. *Yosyp Karpovych*, 43, lecturer in a school in Chernihiv, former member of the UPSF.

42. *Taras Slabchenko*, 25, teacher in Odesa.

43. *Kyrylo Panchenko-Chalenko*, 42, teacher in Odesa.

44. *Viktor Dubrovsky*, 50, in charge of the publishing division of the Sugar Trust.

45. *Mykola Chekhivsky*, 53, priest of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.

All were accused under articles: 54 (2), 54 (3), 54 (4), 54 (8), 54 (11) of the Criminal Code of the UkSSR (counter-revolution, diversion, espionage). Although the investigation in the case of the SVU-SUM was carried on by the well known methods of the GPU with the application of physical and moral torture, the majority of the accused bore themselves well at the trial. All the efforts of the prosecution to show that the SVU-SUM were anti-popular organizations and agencies of other states, had no success. On the contrary, the trial showed to the Ukrainian population and to foreigners the unbreakable will of the Ukrainian people in their struggle for liberty and independent existence as a state.

On April 17, 1930, the trial ended. The court adjourned to decide the fate of the accused. All Ukraine waited for the verdict. On April 19, the verdict was pronounced on 13 of the accused: *Serhiy Yefremov*, *Volodymyr Chekhivsky*, *Durdukivsky*, *Hermayze*, *Nikovsky*, *Starytska-Chernyakhivska*, *Hrebenetsky*, *Chernyakhivsky*, *Hantsov*, *Pavlyushkov*, *Barbar* and *Udoenko*. These were condemned to death but the court decided not to carry this out and replaced it with 8-10 years imprisonment.

The rest of the accused were sentenced to prison from 2 to 5 years. 9 defendants received a conditional sentence.

All the condemned lost their civic rights and their positions. For almost all the condemned this "mild" sentence was equivalent to death but in a terrible form, for it was slow. Of all those condemned, we know only one who remained alive and is now in the emigration in the USA. All the others died in camps, isolators or on their release.

But the public trial of March 9-April 19 was only a part of the action to destroy the movement of the SVU-SUM.

In all the cities of Ukraine the prisons were filled with Ukrainian intellectuals, peasants and workers, and especially the Ukrainian youth who were suspected of belonging to the SVU and SUM. The wave of arrests continued long after the trial. The majority of those arrested were, without trial or by the sentence of the so called *tryka* of the GPU, sent for long years to the worst camps in the north. Hundreds of trains carried to Siberia and North Russia the finest flower of Ukraine.

The shattering of the SVU-SUM in 1920-30 and especially the trial of part of the leaders of the movement, did not and could not destroy the ideas of the SVU and still more the idea of the liberation of the Ukrainian people from occupation.

First, with all the efforts of the Soviet government, despite the mass arrests which swept in not only members of the SVU-SUM but also thousands of persons who were not connected by any organizational ties with

these groups, the Soviets did not succeed in arresting all the members of the SVU-SUM or even all the leading workers.

As we have mentioned, a certain part of the members of the SVU-SUM did not adopt the team system but maintained the old form of cells of five not connected with one another or with the centre. Secondly, we must remember that the strength and success of the movement of the SVU did not rest upon its organizational accomplishments, the formation of a net of centres, but in the fact that it permeated with its ideas the most diverse strata of the Ukrainian population, from the poor peasants and workers to even members of the KP(b)U, and aroused in the broad masses of the Ukrainian population a will to resist.

So during the liquidation of the SVU-SUM the Soviet government, the Communist Party and the organs of the GPU faced the extraordinarily hard task of fighting with a practically unseizable foe. The struggle was not against the hundreds and thousands of the members of the SVU, who could, through provocation, be proved to be members of an underground organization, but against the entire Ukrainian people. The mass arrests which were made in 1929-30 and continued to 1941 and partially since then, had and have as their mission the destruction of all suspected so-called "nationalistic elements." In the cities arrests were made solely because the person used the Ukrainian language.

But it was impossible to arrest on this pretext the entire Ukrainian peasantry who knew no other language than Ukrainian. These mass arrests carried out by the GPU and later the NKVD were really the best proof of the power of the movement and the helplessness of the government to struggle with the anti-Moscow and anti-Soviet moods of the population of Ukraine.

Despite the shattering of the SVU-SUM in 1930, it did not cease its work. This is shown by a number of facts as the number of uprisings in Ukraine in 1930-2, the outburst against collectivization, the active part of the members of the SVU-SUM in the various anti-Soviet organizations in the years 1932-41, the work of members of the SVU-SUM during the German occupation and their role in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

The role of the SVU-SUM in the struggle of the Ukrainian people against the Moscow occupant is extraordinarily great. Their activity showed the will of the Ukrainian people to independent existence, the unconquerable character of the Ukrainian work for independence, and the vigor of their efforts for it.

Another important factor was that the SVU-SUM showed that in moments of more bitter struggle, the Ukrainian people became a solid wall against efforts to enslave them and rejected at those times all professional, class or party differences. The SVU-SUM entered the history of

the Ukrainian movement for liberation as organizations which were created and which fought and conquered under the banner of the unity of the Ukrainian nation, the banner of struggle for the eternal ideals of humanity, the Christian ideas of opposition to materialism and atheism, for the slogans of the eternity and unconquerability of the human spirit.

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State Duma the government began sharp political repressions against all nationally conscious Ukrainians. Shcherbakivsky was again arrested and by administrative order was condemned to exile in the Narym region of Siberia.

Thanks to friends in Petersburg, he succeeded in obtaining a change of the sentence and instead of Siberia he was ordered to leave the country. He went to Galicia and there developed the broad field of a research scholar in archeology and art, thanks to the protection of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky. His stay for many years in Western Ukraine and frequent journeys to the Western lands of Europe, Italy, Switzerland and Germany, formed his character as a Pan-Ukrainian with a definite spiritual orientation toward Western Europe. In 1911 he returned to Eastern Ukraine and began to work in the Kievan Archeological Museum under its director, A. Khvoyka, an archeologist of Czech origin and a well-known investigator of the Trypillian culture. Shcherbakivsky's studies on this Trypillian culture of Ukraine became the starting point for his further archeological and ethnological studies in the next decades. He began eagerly to excavate the burial mounds of Ukraine. During the six years before 1917 he opened about 600 graves of the Ukrainian Paleolithic, the Trypillian culture and the old Ukrainian Princely Period.

With the outbreak of the Revolution he took part in the political rebirth of Ukraine as a declared supporter of independence and an advocate of the separation of Ukraine from Russia. Yet his basic occupation was science. He took part in organizing the university in Poltava and became its professor of archeology. The stormy years of the Ukrainian-Bolshevik War he spent in Ukraine, trying not to leave his native land as long as it was possible to stay; in 1922 he did settle in Prague, where he accepted the post of professor in the Ukrainian Free University.

With the Ukrainian Free University in Prague he moved in 1944 to Munich and he stayed in its service the rest of his life and served as Rector and Dean of the Philosophical Faculty several times.

On the basis of his own scientific research, V. Shcherbakivsky has taken the position that from Trypillian times, i. e. about 2,000 B. C. to the present, Ukrainian culture has been entirely distinct from Russian culture which had a wholly different prehistoric and historic basis.

This idea he expressed in his chief work, *The Formation of the Ukrainian Nation*. In addition to this, he is the author of works in ethnology, *The Ukrainian House*, in the history of art, *Ukrainian Art* and in archeology. His scientific output is striking not only for the great number of titles but also for their scientific value.

N. CHUBATY

HISTORY AND DIPLOMACY

(Remarks on the address of George Kennan at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington, D. C.).

HISTORICUS

This year the meeting of the American Historical Association had several sessions on contemporary subjects. The morning session on December 29, aroused the most interest and required the largest auditorium for the vital problem, *History and Diplomacy*.

The chairman was Joseph E. Johnson of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. On the subject *History and Diplomacy* the diplomatic side was represented by George Kennan of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton. The position of the historian was set forth by Prof. Raymond F. Sontag of the University of California.

There is no doubt that the central point of attraction in this session was the address of George Kennan, former Chairman of the Commission for Policy Planning in the State Department and the author of the well known American political doctrine, the Containment Policy, during the Democratic administration.

For this reason the person of George Kennan has been for years highly controversial in the American political world. George Kennan still has admirers who highly value his political judgement and consider him the greatest authority on the Soviet problem in the United States. But there are others who do not have such a high regard for his political ability and reject him on the ground that his Containment Policy as applied to the USSR wasted the very valuable period of American predominance over the Soviet Union and only gave the time for red Moscow to grow into a power which can now really menace America.

The author of these lines as a modern historian went to this session so as to obtain firsthand material from the lips of Kennan himself and to form an unprejudiced view of his political doctrine and its objective worth.

It was the objective of not only this author but of most of the listeners present, who almost filled the great hall. They hoped to learn from the scholarly diplomat his synthesis of the current history and his view of the great contemporary movements which are connected with the constant crises and political explosions now taking place throughout

the world. These are not rarely putting American diplomacy in difficult situations — Korea, Vietnam, Tunis, Morocco, Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, the Arab world, Cyprus, and the Soviet Union with Stalin on a pedestal and after the deposition of Stalin from the pedestal of being the genius of the USSR.

Unfortunately we heard nothing of the sort. Mr. Kennan declared himself absolute defender of peace and a total adversary of any war. He noted that the triumph of communism in Russia was a product of World War I. The Soviet Union's recent advancement in power came about as a result of World War II.

It seems to us that this is an oversimplification of far not so simple problems. The natural result of World War I was the downfall of the obsolete empires of Austro-Hungary, Russia and of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the liberation of their dependent peoples. This natural progressive liberation process was disturbed in the territory of Tsarist Russia by British-French intervention who had the moral support of the United States. The weakening of these democratic movements by western intervention was helpful for Russian communism in the domination of Eurasian territory of the former Tsarist empire.

Pertinent to the advancement of the Soviet Union to power after World War II, the planners of post-war American foreign policy are to be credited with this achievement, because both World Wars immensely weakened the centre of the Russian empire.

George Kennan gave also a very fine description of the tasks and troubles of an American diplomat, who has to represent a great sovereign nation, its aspirations and interests. He stressed the difficulties which the domestic party struggles impose upon a diplomat.

On listening to the address of George Kennan you had the impression that you were listening not to an American diplomat of the post-Stalin era but a diplomat of the period of Victoria and Franz Joseph with all the forms and manners of the diplomatic procedure of that age, a formalistic and legalistic diplomat.

I, as an American citizen, whose children have the sacred duty to protect their American fatherland, was shocked and really frightened that the planning of American foreign policy could be entrusted to such a colorless chief of political planning without any political vision, who had no comprehension of the powerful revolutionary movement which is now dominating the world. Under such a leadership how can America, for instance, combat the highly undiplomatic agitational journey of the red Prime Minister Bulganin and the leader of the Russian Communists Khrushchev to India and Burma? I had the impression that the speaker found it hard to understand that there are in the world besides the legal

and sovereign governments also illegal powers which to-morrow will become legal governments and that these illegal governments regularly are emerging victorious and giving a direction to current history.

The diplomacy of the Kremlin understands these movements, is using them for the good of the Kremlin and is turning them not only against the old powers but also against America. An American diplomat has not only to paralyze them but to turn them against red Russia.

Toward the end of the session George Kennan gave a positive proof that all the questions which are setting the course for the historical current of modern humanity are for him really a *terra incognita*. At 11.55 A.M. when the discussion was scheduled to end, Prof. Karpovich the well-known Russian democrat, patriot and defender of the untouchability of the Russian empire put a question to him. This was: in the idea of the speaker, could America now plan for a longer political goal toward the Soviets? Chairman Johnson announced that there could be only one answer before the closing of the morning session. The answer given by George Kennan was unusually revealing. He stated that he could not say whether it was possible to set a long range goal for dealing with the Soviets. Such was his Containment Policy. The now popular Liberation Policy, if it were applied, would create on the terrain of Russia a situation beyond control, a real "honky-tonky" from which America could not escape.

It is obvious that such an answer favoring Russian colonial domination over more than one hundred million non-Russians, was unusually pleasing to the questioner and only the closing of the discussion by the Chairman prevented the asking of George Kennan one more question on this problem. So we venture to ask it now: Does Mr. Kennan consider the efforts of the peoples enslaved by red Moscow to secure liberation a mere "honky-tonky?" If he looks so unseriously at the struggle for liberation of the old cultural people of Armenia, Georgia, Byelorussia, Turkestan, Ukraine and the others under the rule of Russia, how can he understand what is now going on in the Near and Far East, in north Africa and even in primitive central Africa? Is a diplomat of the type of George Kennan able now to combat Soviet diplomacy successfully?

If at present America, the nation which created the ideals expressed in our Declaration of Independence, the doctrine of the self-determination of nations and the finest working democracy internally in the world, is now losing on the diplomatic front to red Moscow, historically and actually the most tyrannical government of humanity, it is only because among American diplomats there are too many like George Kennan.

LIBERATION OF THE KOLYMA PRISONER

By PETRO KOLYMSKY

This article is the conclusion of the memoirs of Petro Kolymsky, a prisoner in the Kolyma Soviet gold-mines. For editorial and technical reasons we were able to include it only now in this issue. For foregoing section see Vol. XI, No. 2. — *Editor.*

My family and relatives had saved me in Kolyma from death by starvation and scurvy. They had a great deal to do with my return from Kolyma to Kiev; therefore, I wanted to get in touch with them immediately upon reaching Kiev. From the transient camp in Vladivostok, I wrote my wife that I was being sent to Kiev for a review of my case. I could not communicate with her during the trip for the convoy forbade it. So, when we reached the railroad station in Kiev and were being transferred to an automobile, I repeated aloud several times my wife's address. However, the people around were strangers and no one understood my intention. I was kept only one night in the prison of the NKVD UkSSR on 33 Korolenko Street. The next day I was taken to the special section of the Lukyanivska Prison. Since I had had the occasion to see how people who had been brought from Kolyma were again sent to slave camps, I involuntarily started at every rattle of the doors in the corridors. The first days and weeks I kept thinking that the authorities were coming to release me.

On December 4, 1939 the investigator called me for the first time. He asked me about life in the concentration camps and if I were glad that I had returned to Kiev. I told him the entire truth about the camps and emphasized that it was incomparably better to be in prison than in the sharp winds of the camps. The prison regime was different in 1939 from that in 1937. A prisoner could sit down, lie down and even sleep, when he wished. In the concentration camp, on fulfilling the norm of work by 50%, he received 400 gr. of bread and water for 16 hours of work in the mine, while in prison he received 600 gr. of bread and soup twice daily, even while not working physically. Besides, there was considerable free time in the prison and it was possible to do some reading, whereas in the camp there was no free time, no books or newspapers.

CONTACT WITH MY FAMILY

At this interview the investigator handed me a letter from my wife who had learned the day after my arrival in Kiev that I was in the

Lukyanivska prison. He asked me about my wife's sister. When my wife received my letter from Vladivostok in which I wrote of being taken to Kiev, she informed her sister, who quickly came to Kiev. Each day she visited the Lukyanivska prison inquiring if I had arrived. On December 1, 1939 she was told I was in the prison and assigned to a definite investigator.

She quickly went to the NKVD and from the headquarters talked by telephone with the investigator. She demanded permission to send me articles and a letter. The investigator answered that I was still not in Kiev, and she replied that this was false, for I was in Kiev in the Lukyanivska prison. At her insistant requests the investigator gave her permission to send me articles and a letter through himself. He gave me permission to read the letter from my family and to write an answer. This was my first and last letter. During the following nine months of my stay in prison, my family could not write to me or I to them. The investigator, however, allowed them to send me articles and money.

THE REVIEW OF MY CASE

At the end of December, 1939 the investigator called me and began to go over the case again. During the investigation in 1937 there had been only the protocol of the personal arraignment and an extract from the testimony of E. The investigator gave me at once for my information a larger extract from the papers which I had not seen in regard to my case. Beside the confessions of E. there were in these extracts the confessions of M. and H. and protocols of the questioning of six persons in 1939. In glancing over the material, I saw that E. in 1939 had listed 18 names, among which many were known to me.

The forced confessions of M. and H. had been secured by the investigation after my departure for Kolyma. Obviously the NKVD had been dissatisfied with the disclosures and even after my condemnation by the local *trojka*, they added the testimony of M. and H. to my case. In his statements H. asserted that E. had told him that he had enrolled me in the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization. In the confession of M. it was stated that H. had told him that E. had enrolled me in the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization. In the protocol of 1939 written by the investigator Kozachenko, I saw erasures and corrections of my assertions that had been made by the investigator in the absence of myself and E.

The six persons, who had been questioned by the NKVD in 1939 were research workers of the scientific research institute and of the scientific sector of the Commissariat of Agriculture of Ukraine. They all gave good reports of me in this vein: we do not know that P. K. is a member

of any counter-revolutionary organization, but we know him as a young scientific worker with a future. After familiarizing me with all the material evidence, the investigator began to question me.

The charges of 1937 were repeated to me, that the investigation had at its disposal evidence which showed me a member of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization, and for that reason they had brought me the 13,000 kilometers from Kolyma to Kiev.

To continue the investigation, he insisted that the statute for the review of a case demanded the writing out of a new protocol of the confession. After these explanations I agreed to make a statement. I categorically denied the charges brought against me and denied everything connected with them for I had belonged to no organization and did not know of its existence. I had asserted then and repeated now the same thing, even though far from the range of the influence of the NKVD. From conversations with thousands of prisoners in the camps, I had become convinced that there were no such organizations and that they were a fantastic creation of the NKVD.

Upon the conclusion of the review of my case, I refused to sign articles 200 and 201 but asked for the requestioning of E., M. and H., whose statements in 1937 and 1938 had served as the basis for my arrest and condemnation. I was convinced that their statements had been forced from them and that they now might give contradictory testimony. The investigator called the chief of the section of investigations and drew up a protocol that I was refusing to sign the articles of the investigation. This resulted in my being sent back to the prison.

MY TWO HUNGER STRIKES

After I reached the Lukyanivska prison, I was put in a single room where I established contact with the neighboring rooms by tapping on the stone wall. My neighbor learned the nature of my case and warned me that despite the fact that I had not signed the protocol of the questioning, the NKVD could send my case to Moscow for consideration and review by the OSO and in this connection I would be required to undergo a medical examination.

Five or six days after this warning, two women physicians entered my cell. They told me that they were examining all the prisoners. Being previously warned, I refused to be examined and asked them to leave the room at once. They argued with me and were unwilling to leave. Then I went to the "parasha" and categorically told them to get out or I would empty it on them. They saw that they could gain nothing by trickery and left the room. This occurred on January 11, 1940.

After this I was disturbed by the thought that they might write a false medical certificate and send my case to Moscow to the OSO. I looked for ways to remedy this. On January 13, 1940 I told the warden that I was going on a hunger strike. He told me that it was necessary to send to the chief of the prison a special written statement and set forth reasons for this hunger strike. He supplied me with paper and a pencil.

I had in my room enough food sent to me by my family, but I decided neither to eat nor to drink. After the first two days I felt the hunger, but I remained lying on the cot and this reduced the physical feeling of hunger. The third day I ceased to feel it, but I began to have a terrible thirst for water. On the fifth day it was difficult to walk around the room. I probably was watched and so at the end of the fifth day I was taken before the chief of the section of investigations of the NKVD UkSSR where there were present also my investigator and the procurator Stuchen of the Kiev military district. The procurator carried on the entire conversation with me. He asked me why I was refusing to eat. I answered him that I considered the investigation of my case unfinished until the NKVD again questioned those persons who gave evidence against me in 1937-1938. The procurator stated that this was impossible. I, however, did not agree with him and demanded that they be questioned again. He then told me that there were things that physically could not be repeated. I asked that he tell me whether these testators had been shot or died in the camps. After this declaration, the procurator began to shout at me not to prolong the investigation. In the end I announced that I would not give up the hunger strike until they questioned E., M. and H. This entire episode was witnessed by an escort. When he took me away and led me along the corridor, he angrily whispered: "as if they didn't know that they have arrested millions of completely innocent people." It is possible that some one in his family had been arrested.

Returning to my room, I found another prisoner there, a Jew, Melamed. He had been two years in the prison and knew its system well. Noticing my condition, he told me to stop my hunger strike, for beside losing my health and perhaps my life, I had gained nothing.

A week and a half after the ending of my hunger strike, I was called to the chief of the prison, Yakushev. I had barely crossed the threshold, when he attacked me with brutal insults for refusing the medical examination. I told him that I was "protecting my innocence." Then he gave the guard an order to take me from his room. I was put in the cellar in a "dog house." After twenty minutes there, I saw the chief of the prison in the corridor with six guards. The chief ordered me to come into the corridor and go with him to the medical department.

In the office of the chief physician of the prison I was told to undress or I would be undressed by force. I categorically refused to take off my clothes. Then the chief of the prison gave the order to undress me by force. I did not restrain myself and yelled: "Begin, you heroes of Yezhov." The chief began to threaten that he would charge me with counter-revolutionary propaganda. I answered him that he could do with me what he wished. I was stripped by force and given a medical examination.

Sitting in the prison without being further called to the investigator, I became extraordinarily unnerved by this prolongation and on March 7, 1940, I began a second hunger strike. This time I ate nothing but I drank water and this markedly helped my hunger. That same day the chief of the section of investigations informed me that of the three persons whom I had insisted upon having questioned, they could ask only H. but he was too far away and it would require a great deal of time. I continued to demand that all three be questioned, and upon being told that this could not be done I decided to continue my hunger strike. (When I was set free, I learned that E. and M. had been shot). The next day I was taken to the prison hospital.

LONG AWAITED FREEDOM

They tried to feed me artificially through a rubber tube but I could not stand it, and so for the second time I gave up the hunger strike. On the third day I was taken from the hospital to a large cell, where there were 23 persons. In comparison with the single room, this was a much more cheerful existence. Beside groups of prisoners arrested in 1937-1938, there were new ones from Western Ukraine. There were also some Polish officers from the Starobelsk and Katyn camps. Among the intelligentsia from Western Ukraine and Poland many knew German well. I decided to use my free time in perfecting my German and so I talked with those who knew it well. For a basic study of the language, I needed a book containing grammatical rules. I wrote to the chief of the prison a request to allow me to get such a book from the library and a German dictionary, and if there were none, to allow my wife to bring me one from home. I was not refused but the books were not brought, just as other prisoners' requests were not fulfilled.

Once, when we were taken to the general hall, six of us prisoners refused to leave the room until the chief of the prison did us the favor of hearing our requests. The jailor called the guard in the section who promised that the chief of the prison would call us. He warned me that my case might end badly and that they could start another prison case,

for my name figured in one of the lists of prison personnel as an open example of "an enemy of the people". I knew that I was not breaking the basic rules of the prison order and so I paid little attention to his warning.

After some time the chief of the prison, Yakushev, called the six of us and spoke with each one separately. In talking with me, he told me that the book list in the library was not formed by the chief of the prison but by the higher sections of the NKVD. Delivery of books by one's family could be allowed only by the investigator. It was hard for me, deprived of liberty and all rights, to struggle with the established system and so I submitted to the will of God — "what was to be, I could not escape." I sat patiently in the prison the whole summer of 1940 and waited for results.

In the second half of August, 1940, I suffered severe rheumatic pains. My legs to the knees swelled up and I could walk around the room and on the place of exercise only with difficulty. On August 26, at 8 P.M. the guard in the corridor ordered me to get ready for questioning. I was glad to obey this call, for I was hoping to learn about the state of my case. I walked with difficulty to the "black crow," which took me to 33 Korolenko Street. I was taken before a new investigator. He indicated a place for me and I sat down. After three or four minutes of silence, he turned to me and said: (for the first time in three years I was called Comrade Kolymsky) "Your case has been reviewed, you have been declared innocent and are being freed from confinement." At that moment I stood up automatically and asked if I could leave (33 Korolenko Street) for home. The investigator smiled and warned me that I would still spend the night in the prison. I slowly began to come to myself and though I was standing on my two feet I felt no pain. The psychic upheaval, produced by the word "freedom" had killed any physical feeling of pain in my legs.

I was taken from the investigator and in the usual way transferred to the Lukyanivska prison, but I was not put in a cell. I slept that night on a sofa in the special section bureau. The guard in this section, whom I knew well, congratulated me on my release and promised at 7 A.M. to take me to the chief section, from which I could go home. Actually at 7 A.M. he brought my clothing from the cell and took me to the chief section where a guard met me and took me to a cellar. In the cellar we walked through a long corridor and finally reached the door of a room into which I was pushed.

Despite the fact that the sun was shining outside, it was completely dark in the room. On looking around, I saw a little square in a wall near the ceiling through which very little light was coming in. It was a window

but instead of glass there was a thick iron grill with small holes 1-2 millimetres in size. When I began to move, I felt that the room was damp and there was an incredible odor of filth. On closer examination I saw that the whole floor was covered with human excrement. There was a stool near the door and I sat down on it.

In three years of prison life I had never landed in such a room. I began to think that the whole story of my release (the tale of the investigator) was false and that before sending me to a convoy, they wanted to punish me for opposing the prison authorities. This idea did not leave me and grew with every hour. One, two, five, seven, eleven hours passed and no one came near me. In the corridor there was dead silence; no one was walking along it. After several hours, I began to beat with my fists on the door and shout but no one answered.

After losing hope of getting out alive from this stinking hole, I heard steps in the distance and they sounded louder and closer. A guard opened the door and asked me to go with him. He took me to a second story room, the room of the chief of the prison. On the walls the clock showed it was 7 P.M. They had kept me in that filthy place 12 hours. Without a greeting or a single word, the chief of the prison handed me a paper, which said that my case had been reviewed and that I was released from prison. Along with the paper, he gave me 20 kopecks for trolley fare.

After I had gone 50-100 steps from the prison gate, I was surrounded by women who began to ask whether I had seen their husbands "there." I asked them where "there" was and they answered, in the prison. I told them I had no connection with the prison. But it was hard to fool these women. They well recognized people who were "free" and those coming from prison. So as not to attract the attention of people in the trolley and on the street, I went into the first barber shop and asked them to shave me. Since I had no money, I promised to pay them the next day. This probably was not the first request, for they shaved me free, without a single word.

Aboard the trolley, none asked me where I had been. On reaching the Duma Square, I had to walk along the Institute Street past the NKVD UkSSR, where I had been held and questioned in 1937. In walking past these buildings, I was seized with a terrible fear.

Reaching the house I lived in, I crossed the threshold of the room and found my wife and son dressed to go to the NKVD, to bring me some food. I had so changed that they at first did not recognize me. But when they heard my voice, they knew me and rushed to me. We were again boundlessly happy, for we were all together at home.

VASYL MASIUTYN

(Obituary)

On December 15, 1955, Vasył Masyutyn (Masiutyn), one of the leading contemporary Ukrainian artists, died in Berlin, Germany, at the age of 71. He was born in Riga, Latvia, on Jan. 29, 1884. His father was of old Ukrainian Kozak stock; his mother was German. He lived almost all of his life outside Ukraine. His parents wanted him to have a military career in the Russian Imperial Army and he finished an artillery school, but soon gave it up and became an artist engraver. The imagination of the young artist led him toward the creation of symbolic and fantastic creatures as in the contemporary art of the German Franz Stuck, but he strove more toward the grotesque, not without the influence of Goya. In 1920 the Engraving Department of the Rumyantsev Museum in St. Petersburg organized a one man show of his engravings which were highly praised by the critics, and at the same time remarked that "his artistic spirit, his characters and entourage, are entirely non-Russian." In 1921 Masyutyn emigrated to Berlin and worked there as an illustrator with the best German publishing houses. Here he published a manual of engraving and lithography, and later an important study in German on the English engraver Thomas Bewick, with 109 illustrations. He had close connections with the leading European graphic magazine "*Gebrauchgraphik*," published in Berlin in German and English; to this he contributed his articles and graphic works.

At the beginning of the 30-ies Masyutyn became a member of the Association of Independent Ukrainian Artists in Lviv and took part in many exhibitions here and abroad, especially the Ukrainian graphic exhibition in Rome and Naples. Among his engravings of this period are superb plates of such Ukrainian statesmen as Hetmans Khmelnytsky, Mazepa, Skoropadsky and Gen. Otaman Petlyura. He was also a master of sculpture in a truly monumental style and with a great force of expression. We may say that history was for him an inexhaustible source of imagination and dramatic expression (see the portrait of Hetman Mazepa on the cover of the UQ, I, 1955). In a series of over 100 medallions he presented the most important personages of the last ten centuries of Ukrainian history.

His fantastic novels were published by the leading German and Ukrainian publishing houses and had many readers. Asked once what he considered his principal profession — painting, graphic art, sculpture or literature, he answered: "My profession, passion, genre or, to put it better, my life's curse is only one — art. And this can be expressed in various forms."

S. HORDYNSKY

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE OF THE UKRAINIAN LIFE

I. BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

DEATH OF A COLONEL OF THE RED ARMY AT THE HANDS OF UKRAINIAN INSURGENT A COMMON EVENT

The Western prisoners who have just been released from Soviet concentration camps are bringing much information on the great number of Ukrainians in those camps and their courageous spirit of opposition. Information is also coming directly from the USSR. The journalist John Alsop in his report on a journey to Soviet Ukraine tells of an interesting talk with a mechanic of a tractor station in Ukraine; the man was a Russian. In a conversation, he proudly confessed that his father had been a Colonel in the Red Army and had died in Ukraine. To the question whether his father perished during the war, the mechanic answered *very naturally*, that he had been killed by a bullet from a Ukrainian insurgent.

SOVIET TANKS CRUSHED 500 UKRAINIAN WOMEN

Dr. Fedor Varkony, a Hungarian physician, who has recently returned from a Soviet prison, reports over Radio Liberation that in the concentration camp Kingir in Karaganda, there was a revolt of the prisoners, which the detachment of the MVD could not suppress. Tanks of the type T-34 came to their assistance. The path of the attacking tanks was barred by 500 Ukrainian women in the hope that the tankmen would stop before a living wall of women prisoners. They were wrong. The tanks quickly advanced and crushed the 500 Ukrainian women.

THE STRUGGLE FOR UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM STILL GOES ON

Before the XX Congress of the All-Union Communist Party in Moscow, congresses of the local branches of the Communist Party were held in the different republics. The XIX Session of the Ukrainian Communist Party took place in Kiev on January 17-21, 1956. O. Kyrchenko, First Secretary of the Communist Party in Ukraine, made the principal speech. In the field of cultural work he and all the speakers by order of Moscow unanimously emphasized the need of further struggle against "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism," which despite all their efforts is still a serious threat to the Moscow domination over Ukraine. Among the assistants of this "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" was included also the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, which the Soviet government in agreement with the Patriarch of Moscow officially liquidated ten years ago and which still continues to exist underground. There were also at the Congress slight voices of criticism as to the lowering of Ukrainian culture. Korniychuk complained that there were no Ukrainian books in the Soviet bookstores in Prague and Warsaw and that the translations of the works of Ukrainian literature in Polish or Czech were made from Russian translations of the Ukrainian originals.

THE SESSION OF UKRAINIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AMONG THE MINERS OF THE DONBAS

On December 24-26, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences held its meeting in the village of Horlivka in the Donbas. The object of this meeting was "to

bring Soviet science to the proletarian masses." The lectures read were the usual popular propaganda talks on the growth of the Communist Party in Ukraine.

It is interesting to know if the Russian Academy of Sciences (officially the All-Union Academy of Sciences) also is occupied with agitational lectures among the Russian workers in the Urals. Up to now we have not heard of such a meeting of the Russian Academy of Sciences in any forgotten locality of the Ural mines.

THE SUDAN PROPOSES THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC DISPOSES

After the proclamation of Sudan as an independent Republic, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan according to the report of the *Moscow Pravda* for January 25, 1956, turned to the Kievan government with a notification of this action and the following request: "*Informing you of this historic event, I hope that your government will take the necessary measures.*" The government of Sudan obviously had in mind the recognition of Sudan by Ukraine *de jure* and the establishment of diplomatic relations. But Moscow did not permit Ukraine to act abroad as an independent state.

The formal Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, (Palamarchuk) who in fact has no power, took no measures except to thank Sudan for the congratulations to the Ukrainian people and asked that the same greetings be extended to the people of Sudan. Moscow allowed nothing more.

KYRYCHENKO BARKS AT PROFESSOR MANNING

During the XX Congress of the All-Union Communist Party on February 16, the Moscow regent of Ukraine, Oleksiy Kyrychenko, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, made a speech. In this he attacked with sharp words Prof. Clarence A. Manning of Columbia University, especially for his book, *Twentieth Century Ukraine*. Kyrychenko called Prof. Manning "an old American spy and a specialist in blackening the Soviet Union."

FOREIGN DELEGATIONS IN UKRAINE

In his address at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in Moscow, the head of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, Pavlo Tychyna, gave some interesting information on the visits of foreign official delegations to Ukraine. While in 1949 only 12 foreign delegations, scientific, cultural and social, visited Ukraine and its capital Kiev, in 1955 Ukraine was visited by 255 delegations. Official relations were established with representatives of foreign parliaments (began in 1954). In Kiev there were 10 Western European and one Indian parliamentary group. These were especially interested in the Constitution of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, that is of the position of Ukraine in the USSR.

IN LVIV THE NUMBER OF POLES HAS FALLEN BELOW 4%

According to the reports of eye-witnesses who at the end of 1955 were in Lviv and reported to the journal *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* in March 1956 communications between communized Poland and the USSR were greatly eased. One of these eye-witnesses says that Lviv now has about 800,000 population (in 1939 it had 340,000). The Polish population which in 1939 in this

Polonized capital of Western Ukraine in a Ukrainian sea, was somewhat less than 50% has now fallen to 30,000, i. e. less than 4%. The Poles live chiefly on the outskirts of Lviv and as they can, they are moving to live steadily in Poland. Thus life is liquidating this Polish island in the overwhelmingly superior Ukrainian sea of the entire country. This island had given the reason for speaking of "Polish Lwow" and on this basing their claim to the whole of Western Ukraine.

IMPORTANT METALLURGICAL PRODUCTS OF UKRAINE ARE FOR INDIA

The machine factories in Odesa are now carrying out large orders for the technical development of the industry of India as freezers, railroad cranes, electric scales. Heavy cranes for India are being made by factories in Staro-Krematorske in the Donbas.

THE WESTERN DONBAS — A NEW COAL BASIN OF UKRAINE

Radyanska Ukraina No 7 for 1956 reports that in the area between Dnipropetrovsk and the Stalino District, i. e. between the Donbas and the Dnieper there has been discovered a new coal area about 125 miles in length and 8-10 miles in breadth, called the Western Donbas.

The plan of exploiting the Western Donbas foresees a production of about 100 mines, each of which is to produce 600,000 to 900,000 tons of coal yearly. The building of some shafts has been started.

ARCHEOLOGICAL WORK IN UKRAINE

Archeological excavations are going on in Volodymyrska Street in Kiev. At a depth of two metres the foundations of the palace of Prince Matyslav Volodymyrovych (the son of Monomakh) have been uncovered. Many examples of the jeweler's art have been found.

THE PECHERSKA LAVRA DOES NOT ALLOW THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS TO SLEEP

In the journal *Sovietska Kultura* and in *Pravda* in the early numbers for 1956 are articles which attack this shrine of Ukrainian Christianity (the beginning of which dates back to the first half of the XI century). Although the Bolsheviks decorated the Lavra with such signs as "Religion is the Opium of the People" and turned part into a Museum of Atheism, by the reports of the Soviet publications in 1955 the Pecherska Lavra was visited by over 200,000 faithful, not to see the Museum of Atheism but to pay honor by lighted candles and prayers to the monks buried in the subterranean vaults.

THE MYSTERIOUS DEATH OF BISHOP MYKHAYLO MELNYK

The Russian Communists liquidated the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Western Ukraine with the aid of three apostate priests. One of these was Rev. Dr. Mykhaylo Melnyk. For these black services the Patriarch of Moscow made Fr. Melnyk Bishop with his seat in Drohobych. For a long time the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, the official organ of the Moscow Patriarch, has not mentioned the name of the Bishop of Drohobych. Through underground channels the rumor has come from Ukraine that Bishop Mykhaylo Melnyk died on a journey October 13, 1955 under very mysterious circumstances. The Soviet government gave him a large funeral.

A UKRAINIAN — OLEH HONCHARENKO SKIING CHAMPION IN THE OLYMPIC GAMES

Oleh Honcharenko, a Ukrainian from Kharkiv, Ukraine, at the last Olympic Games won the championship in skiing for 500, 1,500, 5,000 and 10,000 metres. Present at the contests were the Norwegian Crown Prince Olaf and Princess Astrid.

II. OUTSIDE THE IRON CURTAIN

CANADIAN SENATOR WALL TAKES UP THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION

The first senator of Ukrainian origin in Canada soon after his appointment was named member of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations, where he has the opportunity for his first official orientation in international affairs.

On February 6, Senator Wall made his first speech in the Canadian Senate. In this he stressed the right of the Ukrainian people to have in their own land their own independent Ukrainian state.

A UKRAINIAN DELEGATION TO THE BRAZILIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In December, 1955, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jose Carlos de Maser Saorez, gave an audience to representatives of the Brazilian Ukrainians under Dr. Petro Firman, a Ukrainian member of the Federal Parliament of Brazil. The delegation asked the Minister to take the Ukrainian people who were being exterminated by the Bolsheviks, under his protection in the field of the United Nations.

THE QUESTION OF THE PERSECUTION OF THE UKRAINIAN CHURCHES BEFORE THE AMERICAN CONGRESS

Hon. Hubert Humphrey, Democratic Senator from Minnesota, introduced on January 20 into the American Senate a resolution stressing the history of the destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church ten years ago by the liquidation of the entire episcopate, thousands of priests and tens of thousands of the faithful. The Senator asked the American government to charge the representative of the USA in the UN to raise this question and to ask an official investigation of the religious persecutions in Ukraine.

Three days earlier, on January 17, Congressman Otto Kruger of North Dakota introduced in the House of Representatives into the Congressional Record the full text of a memorial on the religious persecutions in Ukraine. This was prepared by Dr. Antin Zhukovsky of North Dakota. In his memorial the author appended an article of Prof. N. Chubaty, editor of the *Ukrainian Quarterly* on this subject published in this periodical, Vol. XI, No. 1.

CONFERENCE ON THE LIQUIDATION OF THE UKRAINIAN CHURCHES IN SARCELLES, FRANCE

There was held in Sarcelles, France, the seat of the Administration of the Shevchenko Scientific Society on January 22, 1956, a Scientific Conference devoted to a study of the destruction of the Ukrainian Churches by the Soviet government, — the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The Conference received 23 papers from well-known Ukrainian

scholars, — clerical and lay, Catholics and Orthodox. In view of the large number of papers offered on the opening day of the Conference, there were read only seven papers with the resolution to include the others in a second and perhaps a third conference in the near future.

THE DEATH OF THE FIRST UKRAINIAN IMMIGRANT IN CANADA

On January 12, 1956 Vasyl Yelynyak, the first Ukrainian immigrant in Canada, died at the age of 98 in the hospital at Mondery, Alberta. He was very well-known in Canada and was honored by the highest officials of the Dominion on the occasion of the Jubilee of the settlement of Ukrainians in Canada. The Western prairies of Canada had Ukrainians among their earliest settlers.

Vasyl Yelynyak was born in Nebyliv in Western Ukraine. He went to Canada in 1891 and by old Ukrainian tradition as an agricultural nation, he devoted himself to working the then virgin soil of Western Canada in Alberta. He left three sons, four daughters, 51 grandchildren, 62 great grandchildren and one great-great-grandchild.

The memory of the pioneer Vasyl Yelynyak was honored soon after at a session of the Canadian House of Commons by Ivan Dikur, a delegate of Ukrainian origin from Vegreville, Alberta.

AN ECONOMIC JOURNAL IN UKRAINIAN IN THE USA

The *Ukrainian Economist* has been appearing under this title for two years in Ukrainian. It is a journal devoted to the study of the economic conditions in Ukraine, at present under Soviet rule, and also in the future, after the liberation of Ukraine and the formation of an independent Ukrainian state. The publisher and editor is Prof. Mykola Velychivsky. Five numbers have appeared.

"SLAVO-ORIENTALIA" OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG UNDER THE EDITORSHIP OF A UKRAINIAN

Omelyan Prytsak, a Ukrainian scholar orientalist who is now working in the University of Hamburg, Germany, has begun to edit a series under the title *Slavo-Orientalia*. Four books have appeared.

A NEW WORK ON UKRAINIAN LITERATURE

The Russian Institute of Columbia University has recently published in its Series of Studies a work by Prof. George S. N. Luckyj of the University of Toronto, entitled *Ukrainian Literary Politics 1917-1934*. In the same series recently appeared *Ukrainian Nationalism 1939-1945* by John A. Armstrong.

ILLYA KYRIAK DIED

A Ukrainian Canadian writer, Illya Kyriak, died in Canada. In his works he pictured the pioneering life of the Ukrainian immigrants in Canada. The most famous is his two volume work *The Sons of the Earth*, recently translated into English. Tribute to his memory and literary work was paid at a special meeting of the Canadian Branch of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Arts and Sciences.

BOOK REVIEWS

DER METROPOLIT, by Dr. Gregor Prokoptschuk. Muenchen, 1955, pp. 299.

In the Jubilee year of the One Thousandth anniversary of Christianity in Ukraine there has appeared in Munich a volume about one of the most meritorious leaders of Christianity in Ukraine, Andriy Sheptytsky, Metropolitan of Halych and Primate of the Ukrainian Catholics of the Eastern Rite.

The figure of Metropolitan Andriy is fascinating not only because of his strength of spirit but also because of his many-sided interests. He was not only one of the greatest figures of Ukrainian history but also one of the greatest contemporary figures of the Catholic Church.

When the Ukrainian artist, Mykhaylo Novakivsky, chose for a portrait of the Metropolitan the concept of the Old Testament Moses, he defined the Metropolitan's role in the development of the Ukrainian people.

During World War I, Western Ukraine with its capital Lviv was occupied by tsarist Russia, the implacable foe of Ukrainian Catholicism of the Eastern Rite. The Metropolitan, a warm advocate of Church Union, was arrested in the first days of the war and was only liberated by the Great Russian Revolution.

Simultaneously the national revolution of the Ukrainian people for independence commenced. It was joined with the war against red Russia and Poland, which occupied Lviv and Western Ukraine. On the other hand Eastern Ukraine was occupied by the Russian Bolsheviks; the threat that the remainder of Ukraine would fall into the hands of red Moscow constantly hung like the sword of Damocles over Western Ukraine, and Metropolitan Andriy prepared his people for this contingency.

The volume of G. Prokoptschuk is only in part a systematic biography of a great and holy Ukrainian. The larger part consists of a series of essays, which depicts various aspects of the life and work of the Metropolitan as the organizer of church life, the ideologist of Church Union, as a Ukrainian patriot and a national leader and as a protector of art and sciences.

Among the Ukrainians he appeared a man from an alien camp, for the old Ukrainian noble family of the Sheptytsky's had been Polonized in the 19th century and the young Count Roman Sheptytsky on his own initiative returned to his Ukrainian people and brought with him the majority of his family.

In moving among the Ukrainian people he tried, as it were, to atone for the neglect of his direct ancestors and redeemed them wonderfully. It was the purpose of the work of Dr. Prokoptschuk to give a picture of this and his portrait is clear and accurate.

In the first sections which give a historical introduction to church life in Ukraine, there have crept in a few historical mistakes but these do not diminish the value of the entire work as a whole. This book of Prokoptschuk is a valuable addition to the biographical literature of the historical figures of the Ukrainian people.

N. CHUBATY

THE CATHEDRAL OF ST. SOPHIA IN KIEV, by Olexa Povstenko. The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in US, New York, 1955. 242 pages + 136 illustrations + 200 plates. (\$12.50).

There has never been published an adequate monograph with satisfactory illustrations on the 11th century St. Sophia Cathedral in Kiev. In 1882 there appeared a Russian book with outline illustrations of the Cathedral frescoes, but these lithographed drawings were second hand and could not reproduce the magnificent beauty of the ancient works. On the other hand the photographers never had an easy access to them, and only relatively recently the frescoes, cleared of the 19th century overpainting (done by Russian restorers in oils) could be properly photographed. This can also be said about the mosaics, which were covered with a coat of age old dust and "restored" with the aid of large-headed nails that secured them to the walls. But thanks to the Ukrainian scientists who worked intensively despite the Soviet anti-religious and anti-tradition drive, much was salvaged. This task was not easy when even the officials of the Soviet ministries called such ancient art treasures "old rubbish." Today St. Sophia is the only medieval church with mosaics in Ukraine that has withstood Mongol and Soviet Russian ruination.

St. Sophia Cathedral in Kiev can be regarded as the most important single be properly photographed. This can also be said about the mosaics, which mosaics, the last of them, the 11th century Golden-Roofed St. Michael's monastery, was destroyed by the Soviets in 1934. Those of its mosaics that were preserved were shipped to Moscow and there they were exhibited in a museum as specimens of "Russian art." Russia itself at the same period had no mosaics.

As to the architecture, St. Sophia is built in the Byzantine style, but the view that it was merely a reminiscence of the St. Sophia of Constantinople was long ago proved incorrect. The Cathedral has many features that connect it with the early Crimean and Caucasian churches. Its mosaics date from the period when that art in Byzantium had passed its height and had started to decline, but still flourished in other areas — Italy and Ukraine. The Kievan mosaics, with the slightly more recent ones of Daphni in Greece, created a link between the 10th century original Byzantine art and the 12th century mosaic art of Italy, as in St. Mark's in Venice and the cathedrals in Monreale and Palermo in Sicily. The importance of the Kievan mosaics lies in the fact that they introduced more freedom and life in the rigid, Hellenic-influenced original Byzantine style, and this rejuvenated style was able to develop creatively for several centuries more.

Some of the Kievan mosaics are unique in the artistic world; for example, the scene of the Eucharist, with Christ, represented twice and distributing bread and wine to His disciples, is the oldest known mosaic representation of this scene in all Christian art. As to the frescoes, such an authority on Byzantine art as Prof. Oskar Wulff, places them far higher than the contemporary Italian and Cappadocian frescoes. Mr. Povstenko tries to prove that the St. Sophia mosaics and frescoes were made by local artisans, not Greeks. The truth is that we still do not have any scientific proof of this and it seems safer to say that these works were done by both Greek and Ruthenian artists. It is worthy of mention that the frescoes of both towers have not religious but secular subjects and beasts, showing that the connection with the former pagan art was still not entirely broken. They could hardly have been works of Greeks who specialized in rendering the different aspects of the religious rites.

Architect Olexa Povstenko, now in Washington, D. C., was formerly a member of the Council of Scholars of the Sophia Architectural Museum, after this church was closed by the Soviets to religious services. He had the opportunity to make detailed studies of the architecture and paintings, and on leaving Ukraine in 1943, he preserved all his unique artistic material now published in this book. We may add that Mr. Povstenko managed to save the Cathedral from destruction in September 1941 when the retreating Soviets dynamited many Kievan buildings, and blew up among them the 11th century Church of the Assumption in the Lavra Monastery. The reader will find in this book a complete description of the Cathedral's history, its architecture and art treasures. The author mentions also the important research work done by an American, Prof. K. J. Conant, who made one of the best reconstructions of the original appearance of the old structure. This is a beautiful book that will enchant everyone with a feeling of the artistic, and also will be a revelation in the scientific world, as no other work on St. Sophia has ever had such a wealth of superbly reproduced plates. Many works on Byzantine art, have been published recently, and this on St. Sophia will occupy an important place among them.

S. HORDYNSKY.

Georg von Rauch. GESHICHTE DES BOLSCHEWISTISCHEN RUSSLAND. — Wiesbaden. Rheinische Verlag-Anstalt, 1955; pp. 607.

In this ponderous volume Prof. von Rauch has written almost an encyclopedia of the history of Bolshevik Russia. He has tried to follow events and he has on the whole succeeded in giving a coherent picture of the policies that Lenin and Stalin adopted in their efforts to build a powerful Communist state in the old Russian Empire and he has done so with due regard for the general feelings of the Germans. His criticisms of English, French and American policies, while sometimes sharp, are probably largely justified. He has traced the motives in the purges, has noticed Stalin's attitude and the reasons for his discarding of the theories of Marr and for supporting Lysenko. His work is, as the title says, a history of Bolshevik Russia.

He is on far weaker ground when he attempts to deal with the non-Russian peoples of Russia-USSR. Here he follows the exact policy of the Russian chauvinists. Almost in the very beginning (p. 10) he sees Russian culture as bound to the west through St. Vladimir and Yaroslav the Wise.

His attitude toward Ukraine is very different. He calls the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk one of the most unfortunate peace treaties in history. (p. 110). He is ready to concede the rights of the Poles and Finns and Balts to independence, the latter largely because of the old German traditions, but is indignant about Ukraine: "Ukraine was bound with Great Russia by countless cords, which were sunk deep in the historical consciousness. The cultural common elements were stronger than the linguistic differences. The loss of Ukraine was economically unendurable because of the loss of the rich grain belt and the coal and iron. It meant the forcing of Russia away from the Black Sea and its reduction to the area which had corresponded to the extent of the Muscovite realm in the 16th century. With all recognition of the Ukrainian desires for autonomy the Ukrainian question demanded a federative solution of the national problem."

With this in mind he still cannot escape from the Ukrainian question. In his account of the Civil War he slurs over the fighting of the Ukrainians to stress the program of Denikin and he sees the Ukrainian movement more or less

as characterized by Makhno and his opposition to both Reds and Whites. He assumes that it was the appeal of Brusilov and the native hatred of the Poles that enabled the Soviets to win back Kiev in 1920.

Later in his discussion of the cultural achievements of the Russian Soviets during the twenties, he has nothing to say of the developments in Ukraine and only mentions in one paragraph the shattering of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in 1933 among whom "economic need had combined with national autonomistic tendencies which had been able to develop unperceived" (p. 301).

In a word the weakest part of the volume is the author's insistence that the Soviet Union with a sham of federation is still really Russia and must continue to remain so and that Russian patriotism will ultimately triumph. To him a dismemberment of Russia is unthinkable and yet he is honest enough to see that the Ukrainian problem cannot be eliminated. The Ukrainians have not been conquered and this book, if it proves anything, stresses the seriousness of that problem and he seems inclined to hope that the removal of many young Ukrainians to Central Asia, to be sure like the forced deportation of the Volga Germans, etc., will not shatter the powerful stimulus to rapprochement stressed by the Theses of Pereyaslav and the annexation to Ukraine of the Crimea.

From this respect the volume whatever its merits falls within the traditional type of Russian history with its steady emphasis on the need of Moscow. We can only regret that the author has not looked more deeply into the national questions and used them to illustrate his entire concept of the problems of Bolshevism which he does not regard as the necessary product of Russian history and development. Despite his desire Ukraine runs through the volume and shows itself again as in the past the key to the future of the Russian Empire-USSR, with its assertion on living its own independent life.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Emanuel Sarkisyanz. *RUSSLAND UND DER MESSIANISMUS DES ORIENTS*. Sendungsbewusstsein und politischer Chiliasmus des Ostens. Tuebingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1955, pp. XII+419.

This book deserves far more attention than it will probably receive, for it runs exactly counter to most American political and scientific thought on Russia and perhaps the entire Orient. The works of Leroy-Beaulieu and the once popular books of Stephen Graham have long been in a class by themselves, for they sought to create an independent and perhaps differently sentimental view of Russia. Almost without exception other scholars have followed closely the formal line of the superficial Russian Westernizers of the nineteenth century or in a few cases the official tsarist program as the supporter of "conservative" elements in Europe. Before and after the Revolution, American thought on Russian matters has been based on the hypothesis that Russia under Peter the Great became a European state culturally as well as politically, somewhat backward but ultimately destined to find its place in the Western democratic tradition. When events proved this position wrong, the fault was found in details and not in the basis. This is undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the preservation in influential American political circles of the belief that Russia-USSR must be preserved as an entity, no matter what the wishes of its non-Russian population and the theories of the Soviet authorities.

On the intellectual ground and still more the religious, there has been a deliberate attempt to gloss over the events of the seventeenth century and to envelop the work of Avvakum and his opposition to the coming of Kievan scholars to Moscow in a series of vague generalities, in order to strengthen the same general position.

This book challenges the entire theory and even seeks a deeper solution than did the early Evraziytsy after World War I. Without indulging in the details of history, he has analyzed the actual ideas of many of the Slavophiles and the official representatives and has produced a book of quite different purport.

The author passes over almost in complete silence the Kievan period and there are very few allusions to it. And one or two references to Borys and Hlib and to Andrey Bogolubsky. He lays his stress on the Old Believer mentality of Moscow, which he regards as the source of the dominant Russian belief in Moscow and the Third Rome, the destined centre of the World. He emphasizes the significance of the sunken city of Kitezh and the belief that there is a special *Pravda* (Truth, Justice, Divine Order) in Moscow long personified by the Tsar or, if the Tsar failed, by the true Tsar. He shows the maintenance of this idea among the peasants and he points out what has been noticed but ignored, the surprising agreement between such a "Christian thinker" as Leo Tolstoi and the Procurator of the Holy Synod, Pobyedonostsev.

The Russian demand for wholeness of life, a fusion of belief, thought and action is a thread that runs through a surprising number of men of all political and social classes. He considers that this definitely paved the way for the rise of Communism and still more the power of Lenin who was inspired by it even more than by Marxism to found the Russian totalitarian system under a somewhat different guise but for exactly the same purpose.

He supports this by many quotations from the early Bolshevik lyric poets including those like Klyuyev who definitely saw Lenin on the same plane as Avvakum and Esenin who called himself the friend of the prophet Jeremiah. One and all aimed, like the old Slavophiles, not for the liberation and reform of the individual man but for the liberation and reform of men and of all nature, the actual creation of a new world, or should we say a new universe, giving full force to the ideas of the Russian Nihilists and similar groups. He shows this thread in the most varied writers from Khomyakov to Andreyev and even Sholokhov.

Going further, he connects the method of thinking with the proclamations of the Mahdis in Asia and the Sudan and with many other Asiatic Messianistic and chiliastic movements.

In some places the author may push his argumentation too far but he furnishes a long overlooked mass of material from unquestioned sources which has been neglected by most Western and especially American statesmen and scholars. His book is a good antidote to the mass of volumes based on economic laws and the search for the democratic elements in Russia-USSR. As such, it demands careful consideration in any endeavor to study the origin and development of Marxism in Russia, Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism and coexistence and calls for a truer evaluation of the meaning of Western Christian ideals, if the West is to fulfill its mission and aid in promoting a better world for humanity.

UCRAINICA IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS

MODIFICATIONS OF THE REGIME IN THE TAYSHET CAMPS FROM THE SPRING OF 1953 TO NOVEMBER 1954. *Information Bulletin of the International Commission Against Concentration Camp Practices*, No. 5., Dec. 1955.

This bulletin contains an extract from Mr. Herbert Passin's report based on recent declarations by Japanese prisoners returning from the Soviet concentration camps in Siberia. It deals with modifications of the regime in the Tayshet camps since 1953 and the important role in the resistance action of the Ukrainian prisoners. The Tayshet Combinat is in the Krasnoyarsk region, Eastern Siberia.

It is noteworthy that the deposition of the Japanese prisoners agree fully with similar statements made by the German physician Dr. Scholmer, the American prisoner John H. Noble and others. We quote from this report: "But on May 5, 1954, a new development took place. 15 Ukrainians who had taken a leading part in the Norilsk strike arrived in camp 13. Their transfer was part of the policy of dispersal of the strike leadership. For the first time the Tayshet prisoners learned of the strike, and for the first time they met fellow prisoners who were not afraid to stand up to the administration. The camp authorities seemed somewhat afraid of the new arrivals, so for the first few months they did not assign them any heavy work. The Ukrainians thrilled the prisoners with their detailed stories about Norilsk. The moral of their story, which they repeated over and over again, was that the prisoners should assert themselves and demand their rights. "Something new is happening in the Soviet Union," they argued. "Beria's day is over." They would shout back at the guards, "Now we are the ones who respect the laws of the Soviet Union. Don't try to pull anything on us." In very short order they took over control of Camp 13. Until then, the camp had been under the control of one of the criminal prisoners, but the Ukrainians organized the camp against him and one night gave him such a thorough beating that he was taken to the hospital and never showed up in Camp 13 again. At night the Ukrainians used to sit around singing Ukrainian songs. Their example of boldness and self-respect and even more important, that they could get away with it — stirred the Camp 13 prisoners deeply."

In the next few months, many changes began to make their appearance in Tayshet No 13.

Japanese prisoners were allowed to correspond with their families...

The use of food-ration reduction as punishment was abolished...

Family visits were permitted... Prisoners with a good record could petition to live outside of the camp... Prisoners were allowed to grow hair long... The work day was reduced from 10 to 8 hours... Piecework rates were raised 20%...

There was also a change in the system of guarding workplaces... When the temperature fell below 42°C work was stopped... It was announced that upon petition sentences under Article 58 (political crimes, editor) would be reexamined...

At the end of 1954 of the 1000 prisoners in Camp 13 who had been sentenced under Art. 58, 25 were released as "innocent".

I WAS A SLAVE LABORER IN THE SOVIET UNION, condensed from "*Slave IE-241*" by John H. Noble. Reader's Digest, February 1956.

This is a very skillful condensation of a book (in preparation) by John H. Noble, for the Reader's Digest, the popular American monthly. The condensation is a sample of misinformation for the American reader on the real relations in the Vorkuta concentration camps along the lines influential in this country. In spite of all previous statements made by J. H. Noble we read in the condensed edition made by the editorial staff of the Reader's Digest the following: "Gradually I came to know other prisoners. Vorkuta was a veritable League of Nations, as well as a Who's Who of the Communist world... We had Poles, who had served with the Allies during World War II, and hundreds of Baltic peoples whose nations had been gobbled up in 1940. There were slaves from Iraq, Iran, France, Italy, Mongolia, China, Czechoslovakia:-

"Numbers of my fellow-prisoners were clergymen — Catholic priests from Lithuania, Protestant ministers from Latvia and Germany, Russian Orthodox priests.

"The Committee (revolt-committee,—*editor's remark*) was made up mostly of Russian (!) intellectuals."

"In mid-July some 200 people from Karaganda, in the Kazakh Republic in Soviet Central Asia had been brought in the Camp 3." What the nationality of the newcomers was the Reader's Digest condenser did not say; probably they were Iraqi or Iranians.

The reader may compare the statement of the Japanese prisoners, that by Dr. Scholmer as well as by Mr. John H. Noble himself with the fabrication made here; the judgement we leave to the reader. But if an expert on the Soviet affairs analyzes this article he will detect skillful following of the famous *Russia First* Policy among the Americans.

In Vorkuta there were Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians, an open expression of the principle kept by the American Committee for Free Europe, that the territory of the captive nations ends on the Curzon line, the present Soviet-Polish border.

The leading opposition in the Soviet Union — in Russia as stubbornly used by American *Russia Firsterers* — are only the Russians. The heroic struggle of the non-Russian peoples against Muscovite rule has to be hidden from the eyes of the American people. Therefore in Vorkuta there could not be Ukrainian (the most numerous) prisoners and the real leaders of the Vorkuta revolt after their arrival from Karaganda. There could not be Byelorussians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians, Turkestanians. In order to save the Russian undivided Empire those elements disrupting the power of the Soviet Empire, the most worthy allies of the American people, must not be mentioned. Sapiienti sat.

"BEHIND KHRUSHCHEV'S 'COEXISTENCE' OFFER" by Ansel E. Talbert, Military and Aviation Editor of the *New York Herald Tribune*, Feb., 16, 1956.

Mr. Talbert analyzes very competently the hypocritical offer of peaceful co-existence to the western world by the Soviet leader. The author pays attention to the fact that at present when the Soviet leaders are offering peaceful co-existence with the West they ruthlessly are robbing the satellite countries with full force. There is no peace for the enslaved.

The author tries to find the reasons for this offer; the basic reasons are the internal troubles facing the Soviets especially in Ukraine where the nationalist underground still is working, as is proved by the recent issue of the Ukrainian Soviet newspaper "*Red Banner*." The author reminds the readers of the hypocrisy of such appeal for peaceful co-existence. Ukraine, the first victim of Red Russian aggression received a similar offer 38 years ago. The acceptance of the offer by the Ukrainian President M. Hrushevsky was the first step for the following Russian invasion and the final subjugation of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1920. Mr. Talbert is a very competent expert on Soviet affairs and such our country needs at present.

"UNDER RUSSIA'S HEEL," a letter by Jerry Michael to the Editor of *The New York Herald Tribune*, Jan. 3, 1956.

The author of the letter justly emphasizes that the American people possess behind the Iron Curtain reliable allies, the peoples subjugated by Red Russia; this fact is still not exploited by our foreign policy although only they are able to bring Red Moscow to its downfall. It is necessary in the author's opinion to make a careful distinction between the interests of the Russian people, the rulers of the Russian Empire, and interests of the peoples subjugated by Russia.

WILSON UND LENIN, by Dietrich Geyer. — *Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas*. Vol. III, No. 4. Munich 1955.

The last issue of the excellent historical journal on East-European problems edited in Germany by Prof. Hans Koch in Munich contains an interesting article which tries to compare the approach of the two statesmen: the democrat Wilson and the revolutionist Lenin, to the problems of self-determination of peoples as well as to the international organizations of nations — the League of Nations, and respectively the Comintern. By the way, the author, as all European historians dealing with this territory by the term "East-Europe" understand primarily the European part of the former Tsarist Empire. The new conception for the term "East Europe" as the synonymous with the territory of the satellite countries, still by European historical science popularized at present in USA, is not accepted.

Mr. Geyer states that Wilson intended to create a strong basis for world democracy (in American understanding) through self-determination of peoples and led by the League of Nations; Lenin endeavored to create a new social structure of the world, Communism, also through the "self-determination of nations" but led by the Comintern. The coming of Russian Communism to power confused all of Wilson's plans. He tried to adjust the situation and started to study the new national organisms born in Eastern Europe; he intended also against the will of Churchill and Clemenceau to call a conference of representatives of all these new nations in Paris for Jan. 22, 1919, but the plan was frustrated.

Lenin's understanding of the self-determination of peoples was different from that of Wilson; Wilson understood the absolute right of a people to decide for themselves; Lenin understood self-determination as subordinated to the interests of the world communist revolution. The peoples of the fallen Russian Empire understood self-determination in Wilson's sense but deprived of any help from the West, were invaded and subdued by the Red Russian centre of Communist revolution, Red Moscow.

"BENTON CRITICIZES SOVIET TEXTBOOK", by William Benton. *New York Times*, Dec. 4, 1955.

The former U.S. Senator from Connecticut and the Editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica recently visited the Soviet Union. He was especially interested in the publications of the USSR. Mr. Benton mentions the Soviet distortions in the Soviet historical textbooks. He writes: "Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Latvians, Letts, Estonians and nationals of other satellite countries 'welcomed their saviours the Soviet fighters' and 'expressed their desire to become a part of the USSR'."

"SOME GUESSING" by Walter Lippman. *N. Y. Herald Tribune*, March 20, 1956.

Walter Lippman, a senior among American journalists, tries to find the basic reason for the defamation of Stalin by the Collective Soviet Leadership headed by Khrushchev. This action is very dangerous for the Russian communists themselves. In Lippman's opinion this means the coming of the Russian nationalist-minded Army to power in the USSR. The underlining of the main goals of Communism and the practical expansionist policy of the present Kremlin do not contradict this conception because the Russian Tsarist and Communist expansions in the past and in the present go in the same direction: 1. domination of Poland the Danube Valley and the Balkans; 2. access to the Middle East and to the Indian Ocean; 3. the enlarging of Russian domination in the regions bordering Eastern Siberia. In Lippman's opinion the nationalistic Russian Army will, if it comes completely to power, prosecute the same goals even more vigorously than the communists. In our opinion Lippman's remarks are right and very timely for the planners of American foreign policy.

DOUBT ANY SHIFT IN RUSS FOREIGN POLICY, by Walter Trohan. — *Chicago Sunday Tribune*. March 18, 1956.

Mr. Trohan tries to find the reason for the deposition of Stalin from the Soviet pantheon in spite of his merits in enlarging the Soviet power. In the author's opinion the main reason is the desire to placate Ukraine, the most restless republic of the USSR. Unrest in Ukraine existed during the war and now the danger that Ukraine could be torn from the Soviet Union still exists. He believes that Khrushchev as a Ukrainian has to be the medium for the placation of this revolution-torn country.

Agreeing in principle with the author concerning the strength of the independent movement in Ukraine, we doubt that Khrushchev's rise to power can be a suitable means for placating Ukraine. Khrushchev is not a Ukrainian but a Russian from the Kursk Oblast, neighboring Ukraine. Although this region is inhabited partially by Russians, partially by Ukrainians, Khrushchev never showed his adherence to the Ukrainian nationality. He probably even does not speak Ukrainian. His policy in Ukraine during his 12 year reign was strongly anti-Ukrainian and favored the russification of Ukraine. Only a fundamental change in the regime and at least the realization of the constitution of the Ukrainian Republic could be able partially to change the hostile attitude of the Ukrainian population toward the Soviet Union, which is at present fully dominated by the Russian communists.
