The decision of the JCPOA’s European participants to launch the dispute resolution mechanism, as stipulated in paragraph 36 of the JCPOA, and their appeal on this matter to the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who coordinates the work of the JCPOA’s Joint Commission is profoundly disappointing and of serious concern.

We see no reason for this step. Quite possibly, the ill-conceived actions of the E3 could lead to a new escalation of the situation around the JCPOA and will make it impossible for the nuclear deal to be returned to the initially coordinated framework, which is what the European Three allegedly wants.

The dispute resolution mechanism was created for entirely different purposes. The reasons that led to complications during the implementation of the JCPOA are well-known and are not linked with Iran. When the mechanism was drafted, no one could predict that the United States would unilaterally withdraw from the JCPOA. Unfortunately, despite serious efforts exerted by the concerned parties since Washington’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018, it has so far proved impossible to restore the former stability to the agreements.

Tehran’s decisions to suspend its voluntary obligations under the JCPOA are of a retaliatory nature and, first of all, constitute a response to rude violations of agreements and UN Security Council Resolution 2231 by the United States. At the same time, the Iranian nuclear programme remains under permanent and unprecedented [in terms of the scale and depth of its verification] IAEA control. Iran fully complies with the JCPOA, fulfils the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and applies the Additional Protocol. The transparency of Iranian nuclear activities is a key aspect of the entire nuclear deal.

We take note of statements by E3 leaders who say they do not accept the policy of maximum pressure with regard to Iran and their commitment to the JCPOA despite US pressure. At the same time, despite a display of their readiness to work on creating reliable and effective ways for circumventing obstacles that have been created by Washington, the E3 is either not prepared or cannot allow this to take place. We also note serious drawbacks regarding E3 countries fulfilling comprehensive safeguards.

The Islamic Republic of Iran would have no reason for renouncing initially agreed upon JCPOA parameters if and when these numerous problems, that are diverse in terms of their origin and essence, are eliminated.

Tehran agreed to accept the JCPOA’s restrictions with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme in the interests of reaching a compromise with due consideration for the balance of interests and mutual obligations. These restrictions were of a temporary nature from the very beginning, and they aimed to create opportunities for the IAEA, so that it would be able to receive answers to its questions with regard to Tehran. In reality, these questions were resolved in less than six months. Nevertheless, Iran was ready to honour all the terms of the nuclear deal in conditions of due reciprocity and a responsible attitude on the part of all other partners.

The JCPOA remains a topical issue despite all the challenges. We advocate its purposeful and comprehensive implementation under the parameters that were coordinated during the conclusion of the agreements in 2015 and formalised in UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

We are insistently urging the E3 not to aggravate the situation and to refrain from actions that could jeopardise the nuclear deal.